How convincing is the argument that the major European powers went to war in 1914 not because they

had specific war aims, but because they feared diplomatic isolation? The great war of 1914-1918 was the worst war the world had ever seenbetween 1914 and 1918 more than 15 million men and women lost their lives as a direct result of the conflict, making it one of the deadliest wars in human history. The war also caused a number of significant changes in political, social and economic life in Europe, such as the decline of the empires; nationalism and one could also argue it lead to ww2. Therefore, it is only natural that the causes of the first Great War have been debated by politicians and historians ever since. One argument is that the major European powers in 1914 didnt go to war due to the possession of specific war aims, but for fear of a situation whereby they were isolated diplomatically. This argument is only convincing to an extent, as different countries went to war for different reasons and therefore making the broad statement that the major European powers went to war because they feared diplomatic isolation is heavy handed and correct only for some of the major European powers. To demonstrate this, it makes sense to divide the major European countries into 3 groups based on their reasons for joining the war: countries that had specific war aims, countries that only went to war for fear of diplomatic isolation and countries that went to war for a mixture of these two reasons. The argument that the major European powers went to war in 1914 not because they had specific war aims, but because they feared diplomatic isolation is especially pertinent to Russia and France as both of these countries were effectively fighting for their survival as major powers. France had only just come out of a situation where they were diplomatically isolated, as Bismarck had ensured through the reinsurance treaty with Russia that an alliance with France wasnt viable, and an alliance with Britain-the only other major power not allied to Germany-was almost impossible due to the ever-present rivalry between the two nations. This was obviously not a situation she wanted to find herself in again, as Germany were becoming more and more of a threat and on their own, France knew she stood no chance (just 40 years previously Germany had defeated France in ten weeks). Despite their military might, Russia was in a similar boat, as they feared Germanys industrial power and the growth of the German army after Germany refused to renew the reinsurance treaty. Russia were also worried about the actions of Austria Hungary in the Balkans, as Russia thought that it needed its influence in the Balkans in order to maintain its power and status as a European power and thus avoid diplomatic isolation (Russias value as a potential ally was already hindered by the humiliating loss at the hands of the Japanese), illustrated by the fact that Russian involvement with the Balkans has run very deep and developed into a central theme of Russian foreign relations. These mutual insecurities over Germany and fear of isolation on behalf of France and Russia led to the signing of the Franco-Russian alliance, the Russian-Serbian alliance and the formation of the triple entente. It was these alliances that eventually dragged France and Russia into the war (Russia to protect Serbia and France to protect Russia).

One could argue that France had the specific war aim of regaining AlsaceLorraine, which was still regarded as French by most of the population. However, French war generals were not so blood thirsty that they were will to fight a war over it, but because fighting a war in order to gain stolen territories was much more likely to satiate the proud French populace than fighting a war in order to survive was, the re-capturing of Alsace Lorraine was publicized as the reason for Frances entry into the war. Russia also formulated more appealing war aims than mere survival, focusing on the old attractions of the Dardanelles and Constantinople, interestingly though, this was done a year after the war had actually begun in April 1915. To conclude, France and Russia entered the conflict primarily through fear of the consequences of neutrality, and late 1914 presented the bizarre sight of both countries clumsily formulating war aims after the conflict had begun, supporting the point raised by the title. Britain, on the other hand, was rather unique as it joined the war for a mixture of the two reasons, and therefore the argument that the major European powers went to war in 1914 not because they had specific war aims, but because they feared diplomatic isolation is less convincing. Britain put forward democratic war aims, offering the idea of some sort of self-determination for the nationalities within the Austrian-Hungarian and Turkish empires. Propaganda demanded the elimination of Junker militarism and of the power of the house of Hohenzollern as essentials for stable peace, and for a Europe safe for democracy. However, it was not quite consistent with these aims that the provisions that Britain was most insistent were the elimination of the German navy and colonial empire. Both were less of a threat to democracy than to British trading interests. Therefore it could be argued that the war aims put forward by Lloyd George were simply a front for Britains real, less noble war aims to ensure that the balance of power in Europe was maintained by slowing the progression of the ambitious, rapidly industrializing Germany through the weakening of their navy and the elimination of their aspirations for a place in the sun. Nevertheless, what cannot be disputed is that Britain went into WW1 with specific war aims which reduces the conclusiveness of the argument that the major European powers went to war in 1914 not because they had specific war aims, but because they feared diplomatic isolation. Be that as it may, one could also argue that a fear of diplomatic isolation contributed heavily in Britains involvement in the war. The vastness of Britains empire at the time (it covered over 11,400,000 square miles of territory) meant that diplomatic isolation in wartime would be a disaster. British resources were overstretched and its most potent weapon was spread across its empire, patrolling trade routes and helping the empire to run as smoothly as possible. Lord Salisbury recognized that Britain entering the war on its own could only end badly, and so out of fear of diplomatic isolation, diplomatic moves were made to augment Britains defensive posture within Europe. The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 allowed the return of British warships from the Far East to home waters while the growing entente with France allowed a parallel movement from the Mediterranean. The entente with Russia had the two fold effect of relieving defense concerns over India and the Middle East. By 1910 it was clear that British fear of isolation had forced them into closer relations with

japan, France and Russia. The alliances that were the product of these relations pulled Britain into a war that they were looking for an excuse to get involved in anyway. In conclusion, Britain went to war both because they feared diplomatic isolation and because they had specific war aims, contradicting the argument that European powers went to war in 1914 solely for fear of diplomatic isolation. The argument that the major European powers went to war in 1914 not because they had specific war aims, but because they feared diplomatic isolation simply doesnt apply to Austria-Hungary and Germany. Austria-Hungary wanted control of Serbia and thus the end of the challenge of south Slav nationalism, as well as control of the Ottoman Empire and to defend the border between Italy and Austria Hungary. Due to the blank cheque provided by the Kaiser to AustriaHungary, there was no fear of diplomatic isolation thus it is blindingly clear that Austria Hungary entered the war with specific war aims, not for fear of diplomatic isolation. German propaganda, per contra, initially portrayed the war as an attempt to escape strangulation and Einkreisung politik of jealous and hostile neighbors, and righteously proclaimed that Germany was not driven by the lust for conquest, but instead driven by a fear of isolation. However Germany eventually made their intentions clear through the announcement of the September Programme of war aims. Although couched in defensive terminology, Germanys war aims were expansionistic. Territorial annexations, economic domination and military control would provide, Bethmann Hollweg promised, security for the German Reich in west and east for all imaginable time. As such, Germanys war aims were an expression of the social-Darwinist philosophy of imperialistic competition, which had underpinned pre-war arms races and colonial rivalries. Weltpolitik may have failed in peacetime, but war presented an opportunity to achieve Germanys global ambitions. In Europe, Germany wished to impose her hegemony, through a combination of territorial expansion and economic control. In the east Russian territory in Poland and the Baltic would be annexed. In the west Luxembourg and important economic regions of France and Belgium the Longwy-Briey iron-ore field and the Belgian Channel ports, Antwerp, Zeebrugge and Ostend would be incorporated within the German empire to boost Germanys economic capacity and secure her against future British and French hostility. France, Belgium and the Netherlands would be incorporated in a German-dominated economic union Mitteleuropa that would stretch from the Atlantic coast in the west to Poland in the east, and from Scandinavia in the north to Turkey in the south. Africa would become a German-dominated continent. French, Belgian and Portuguese colonies in central and southern Africa would be incorporated into a central Africa economic region Mittelafrika that would supply German industry with raw materials. Control of the Atlantic and Red Sea coasts would secure German command of key international routes, a check on British power. With Germanys economic interests assured, Britains economic and commercial hegemony could be effectively challenged. The aforementioned objectives could only come about through a war, and so a war is what Germany pursued. Austria-Hungary and Germany both had clear-cut war aims, and did not fear diplomatic isolation. Austria Hungarys lack of fear can be attributed to Germanys unconditional support, and Germanys lack of fear was evident

through their failure to renew the reinsurance treaty, as well as the ambiguous nature of their discussions with Britain. In conclusion, the argument that the major European powers went to war in 1914 not because they had specific war aims, but because they feared diplomatic isolation is not convincing at all, as it only applies to 2 of the 5 major powers in Europe (France and Russia). Britains entry to the war can be accredited to both their possession of specific war aims and their fear of diplomatic isolation, and one could go as far as saying that Germany and Austria-Hungary went to war in 1914, not because they feared diplomatic isolation, but because they had specific war aims.