Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 5

PEOPLE V QUIDATO FACTS: Accused-appellants case was tried jointly with the murder case filed against his

co-accused, Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita who, however, withdrew their not guilty plea during the trial and were accordingly sentenced. Thus, only accused-appellants case was tried on the merits. The prosecution, in offering its version of the facts, presented as its witnesses accused-appellants brother Leo Quidato, appellants wife Gina Quidato, as well as Patrolman Lucrecio Mara. Likewise, the prosecution offered in evidence affidavits containing the extra-judicial confessions of Eddie Malita and Reynaldo Malita. The two brothers were, however, not presented by the prosecution on the witness stand. Instead, it presented Atty. Jonathan Jocom to prove that the two were assisted by counsel when they made their confessions. Similarly, the prosecution presented MTC Judge George Omelio who attested to the due and voluntary execution of the sworn statements by the Malita brothers ISSUE: wON the testimony of Gine Quidato be given credit With regard to Gina Quidatos testimony, the same must also be disregarded, accused-appellant having timely objected thereto under the marital disqualification rule. As correctly observed by the court a quo, the disqualification is between husband and wife, the law not precluding the wife from testifying when it involves other parties or accused.[14] Hence, Gina Quidato could testify in the murder case against Reynaldo and Eddie, which was jointly tried with accused-appellants case. This testimony cannot, however, be used against accused-appellant directly or through the guise of taking judicial notice of the proceedings in the murder case without violating the marital disqualification rule. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly is a rule familiar even to law students. U.S. vs Antipolo 37 Phil 726 Facts:The appellant, Dalmacio Antipolo was prosecuted in the CFI of Batangas for the murder od one Fortunato Dinal. The trial court prosecuted him of homicide and from that he has appealed. One of the errors assigned is based upon the refusal of the trial judge to permit Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of the man the appellant is accused of having murdered to testify on behalf of the defense concerning certain alleged dying declaration. The fiscal objected to the admissibility of the testimony of the witness. He asserted that the witness, being the widow of the deceased, is not competent to testify under the rules of procedurein either civil or criminal case, unless it be with the consent of her husband and because he is dead, he cannot give permission. Issue: Whether or not the widow of the deceased is a competent witness due to the husband-and-wife privilege Ruling:Yes, the widow of the accused is a competent witness in a prosecution for homicide to testify on behalf of the defense or prosecution regarding dying declarations to her by the deceased concerning the cause of death. The purpose of the rule is to protect the accused against statements made in confidence engendered by the marital statuz. A dying declaration of the husband to the wife is in no sense confidential as it is intended to be communicated to others after death.

PFLEIDER v PALANCA A.C. No. 927 Petitioner: IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF ATTORNEY POTENCIANO A. PALANCA. WILLIAM C. PFLEIDER Respondent: POTENCIANO A. PALANCA September 28, 1970 FACTS: Palanca is the lawyer of Pfleider. Pfleider leased to Palanca an agricultural land, Hacienda Asia, in Negros Occidental for a period of 10 years. It is stipulated in the lease agreement that a specified portion of the lease rentals would be paid to Pfleider and the remainder would be delivered by Palanca to the listed creditors of Pfleider. Pfleider filed a suit for the rescission of the lease agreement on the ground of alleged default in the payment of rentals of Palanca. Pfleider also filed for disbarment of Palanca. The indictment consists of 4 counts: 1. Palanca did not follow the instructions of Pfleider to settle his estafa case against Matiao in 1965 and the latter also failed to deposit the sum of P5,000 with the court; 2. Palanca has fraudulently charged the P5,000 as part of the lease rental of the Hacienda Asia; 3. Palanca also falsely represented having paid one Guintos the sum of P866 for the account of Pfleider when in truth and in fact, Guintos only received P86; and 4. The list of creditors which Pfleider has confidentially supplied Palanca was disclosed by Palanca in violation of their attorney-client relationship. ISSUE: Whether or not Palanca committed a breach of fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client HELD: NO. There is no substantial blame against Palanca inasmuch as the latters services were implicitly terminated by Pfleider when he sued his lawyer. While the object of the suit is the rescission of the lease contract, the conflict of interest became incompatible with the mutual confidence and trust essential to every lawyer-client relationship. Also, Pfleider delivered the list of creditors to Palanca not because of the professional relation then existing between them, but on account of the lease agreement. A violation thereof would partake more of a private and civil wrong than of a breach of fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client.

People v Francisco 78 Phil 694 (1947) FACTS: Defendant Juan Francisco had been previously arrested on charges of robbery, and was being held as detenti0n prisoner in the Municipal Jail of Mansalay, Mindoro. After requesting permission from the Chief of Police to see his wife and son, he was granted to go with Sergeant Pacifico Pimentel who was detailed to guard him. Upon reaching the house, the Sergeant allowed the prisoner to see his wife and son aged 1 and a half years old, while the Sergeant remained at the foot of the stairs of the said house.

After a few moments, Sergeant Pimentel heard a scream, after running upstairs he found the child dead. The prosecution, in recommending the imposition of the capital penalty upon the accused, relies mainly on: (1) the affidavit, Exhibit C, which is a virtual confession of the accused; (2) exhibit D, which is the record made by the justice of the peace of Mansalay of the arraignment of the defendant upon which the latter entered a plea of guilty; and (3) the rebuttal testimony of Emilia Taladtad, wife of the appellant Juan Francisco. ISSUE: WON the rebuttal testimony of the appellants wife is admissible considering the provision prohibiting the wife and husband from testifying for or against each other. HELD: The reasons given by law text-writers and courts why neither a husband nor wife shall in any case be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other have been stated thus: First, identity of interests; second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and fourth, because, where a want of domestic tranquility exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. However, as all other general rules, this one has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. The SC thus held that as a rebuttal witness, the wife was allowed to testify against the husband who was charged with having killed his son, and who testified that it was the wife who killed their son. When the husband testified that it was his wife who caused the death of their son, he could not, justly expect the State to keep silent and refrain from rebutting such new matter in his testimony, through the only witness available, namely, the wife; nor could he legitimately seal his wife's lips and thus gravely expose her to the danger of criminal proceedings against her being started by the authorities upon the strength and basis of said testimony of her husband, or to bear the moral and social stigma of being thought, believed, or even just suspected, to be the killer of her own offspring. The court holds that it is not necessary to justify such rebuttal evidence. At any rate, the trial court not only had the power to allow the State to utilize the wife as rebuttal witness, but also the discretion to permit "new additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question." But even restricting the wife's testimony to merely contradicting her husband's version that she was the one who killed their child, there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was the killer. With the testimony of both spouses upon the point, instead of that of the accused alone, let justice take its course.

TRAMMEL v. UNITED STATES Facts. Petitioner Otis Trammel was indicted for importing heroin into the United States from Thailand and the Philippine Islands and for conspiracy to import heroin. The indictment also named six unindicted co-conspirators, including petitioners wife. Petitioners wife agreed to cooperate with the Government, and prior to trial the petitioner advised the court that the Government intended to call his wife as an adverse witness and he asserted his claim to privilege to prevent her from testifying against him. At hearing on this motion, the Government called Mrs. Trammel and granted her use immunity. She testified that she was married to Trammel and that her cooperation was based on assurances that she would be given lenient treatment. The District Court ruled that Mrs. Trammel could testify to any act she observed during the marriage and to any communication made in the presence of a third person. Confidential communications between petitioner and his wife were held privileged and inadmissible. At trial, Mrs. Trammels testimony constituted virtually its entire case against petitioner. He was found guilty, and on appeal petitioners only claim of error was that the admission of the adverse testimony of his wife, over his objection, contravened prior precedent and therefore constituted reversible error. The Court of Appeals rejected this contention. Issue. May an accused invoke the privilege against adverse spousal testimony so as to exclude the voluntary testimony of his wife?

Held. The existing rule should be modified so that the witness-spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying. The privilege claimed by petitioner has ancient roots. It sprang from two canons of medieval jurisprudence: the rule that an accused was not permitted to testify in his own behalf because of his interest in the proceeding; second, the concept that husband wife were one, and that since the woman had no recognized separate legal existence, the husband was that one. The rule evolved into one of privilege, rather than one of absolute disqualification. The modern justification for the privilege is its perceived role in fostering the harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship. The rule has been criticized, and it has been suggested that it should be modified to protect only private marital communications, modeled on the privilege between priest and penitent, attorney and client, and physician and patient. The American Law Institute in response advocated a privilege for marital confidences, but rejected a rule vesting in the defendant the right to exclude all adverse testimony of his spouse. Several state court enacted similar provisions. The long history of the rule suggests it should not be casually cast aside. This Court must decide whether the privilege against adverse spousal testimony promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence in the administration of criminal justice. The complete privilege provided by prior precedent is unnecessary to protect information privately disclosed between husband and wife in the confidence of the marital relationship. Those are privileged under the independent rule protecting confidential marital communications. The privilege addressed is intended to exclude evidence of criminal acts and of communications made in the presence of third persons.

The privileges between priest and penitent, attorney and client, and physician and patient limit protection to private communications. The ancient foundations for so sweeping a privilege have long since disappeared. The contemporary justification for allowing such a privilege is also unpersuasive. If one spouse is willing to testify, their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair, with little in the way of marital harmony to preserve. It seems far more likely to frustrate justice than to foster family peace.

Похожие интересы