"

SeeFet

• MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Interview of Miami Intelligence Operations Specialist (1081..

Date: October 2, 2003 /

-..

Special Access Issues: None

Prepared by: Caroline Barnes

Team number: 6

Location: FBI, Miami Field Office

Participants Non-Commission: Assistant General Counsel Sean O'Neill

Participants - Commission: Lance Cole, Caroline Barn e.!

Background

•
I L,vasborn and raised in Guatemala as his :6arents were missionaries. HI.·s_
.. ...
family lived fOr
a time in EI Salvador, moved Roanoke, Virginia for o~ (whe~ I
was in first grade), and then moved back to Guatemala. In 1976 whe1-...JNas.l5 years
old his family moved to South Florida. He attended/ college there, £l1ajoring in cultural
anthropology, world religions and Spanish. While In college he became an Emergency
Medical TeChnici~~Tt ~e and his wife (who he had met while in college) moved to
Pennsylvania whet. as hoping to attend medical school.but they found the area
too expensive. In 19.86 pplied for a clerk.position with-the FBI.,/He was told he
was overqualified fot. such. position, so he took the Language Specialist and Special
Agent 'examinations and failed by a very narrow margin.:/ :/

Ul?~ateIYCJ~.ok~~O~i~o8 with FBI He;~q~ers..~ a g~~3Ievel clerk ~n the

Criminal Irivestigative Division (CID)/Counterterronsm and MIddle East Section, where
he worked Domestic.Terrorism matters. He . remainedin that position for eight months
and then transferred to..the'Strategic Information and' Operations Center (SIOC)/night
duty office. He worked. thefour to midnight shift .Saturday and Sunday in the SIOC, and
worked the eight to four"'~hi~ during the w~ek in:tIO'''~ Administrative Unit handling
personnel ~d.budget issues. \.,~E~.efY F~d,~~~e Director'. s weekl~ briefing
report containing all of CID.~s·~~~ wnte.+J~w~ob to gather the wnte-ups
from the cm Section Chiefs ..~d\p'rodu~~ a:co,rre.sponding table of contents. His SlOe
duty involved re~omih~ ....
~~leslt*~p~,compl~int calls ~d showing executives
around the SIOCLJ-~els hl~\.~~e:·1h...$rOC gave him a good Idea of how the Bureau
>~:.,,:/

•
runs. -. ..~:\\!.(::..
\ ..:::
'-"" ":)~ i::,(':"
...~~~'/11 Law Enforcement Pri vacy

. Seeret- ..
9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

\: .•:;::.::.'. \' ••••:........ ., SeeFe&

i\\::~:·············'.~e~~:~~~~~a~:~l~r~~!~s~if:~~::~lerto rucan terroristgroupswere

'\\ \~ .\'" considered the.most vl"cHelit as assigned to that target in, part for that reason and in
\\ \. \.. part because he had Spanishlanguage skills. He followed cases involving Puerto Rican
\ \, \" fugitiv~~d been, provided 'safe. haven in Cuba and cases involving anti-Castro
\\ \'. ....,,,
elements:'L.J'roduccid.{~ports listingsignificant dates or events that might prompt
\\ 'terrorist activity on the part o[~ Puerto Ricangroup and sent those to FBI field offices.
\\ H~ also produced more in-depththreat analysis onthe topic and disseminated relevant
\\ US..Intelligence Community reporting.to FBI field offlces ....He indicated that he was
,. responsible for looking for patterns andtrends in the reporting-in effect having the "big
pictutf onPuertoruc~.terrorism.Laterli.e?\l~an~orkingo~e~Dr.\\"~uESin,IU~ing
the Japanese Red Army, r;~A apd the PrpvISlona-l)nsh Repubhcan Anti" ndicated
that he worked closely wit~fa Bureau of~,~sons employee detailed to the
FBI. \\., .

\At that pointin time there were only 25 people working D'Lrnatters for the FBI. After
the Oklahoma" City bombing the section grew to 110 individuals an'~as assigned
the responsibility of locating additional space for five new DT units: 1) DT Operations,
2) WMD Operations, 3) WMD Countermeasures, 4) DT Analysis, and 5) Special Events
M~agement. ....
,\,

•
By \~'ovember 199~'J telt he had "peaked" as a non-supervisory GS-14 analyst and
was \,bumed out" on the topic of DT, an area he had worked for 12 years. Also, he felt
he needed experience working in other areas of the Bureau in order to become a OS-15.
Therefore, he transferred to the National Security Division's
Administrative/Budget/Support Services Unit where spent three years. He drafted the
"space "plan" for the new National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO). The NDPO
created '~nthe wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, primarily to ensure that the US
Government was prepared to respond to a WMD incident. The FBI was the lead agency
. in the NQPO, the chairmanship was to be shared, and the organization was staffed by FBI
employees and detailees from local police and fire departments (Note: Congress shut this
: : office down in 2000 and it is now part of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
\ \. (FEMA». \

\I then spent a year in the National Security Division's Training Unit working the
\ ANSIR program, a program involved primarily in outreach to the private sector, and
\ producing an Internet awareness bulletin (no further information).
. ,

'r---lransferr~4 to Miami in July 2002 because he wanted to do more operational work

-arurtelt he couldn't do that at Headquarters. Also, he regarded coming to Miami as
returning home. '-t'letook a significant pay cut in taking the Miami job. He started on the
DT Squad, thenN~-5.

•
In November 2002J'I"""- ....~ecame a Reports Officer for Squad T -4, the Intelligence
Squad. He directly supports three operational squads (T-2, T-5, and T-8), and produces
both a weekly report and a daily report regarding ongoing CT activities in the Office,

Seef'et ~ 2
9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy
\\.":.\:.'>",., .....
~'ecre~
~.<\ '<:::..
: ......-t:

\.\\\ "'<\ addi~g·an,alysis where he can. He would also like to create a Miami version of the SIOC
\'.' . <: ,,", Sentinel (SlOG.'s daily report). He has the time to do strategic analysis only when it is
'\>'J:llandated by FBIH.eadquarters because the tactical analysis that must be done takes up
'--Q1Qstof his time. He'als9 does basic research on incoming calls (suspicious activity calls,
..,ifhe can resolve-them without having to pass them on to an SA for resolution.
etc.}to.s.,.e.,e,

... . -. """'" Analysis

In thewcikt?"6{ the Oklahoma City bombing';'the,fBI created an International Terrorism

., ... Analysis Uni~ (rr AU) and a Domestic Terrorism Analysis Unit (DT AU). Fifty percent of
\. \~ the DT AU employees were hired from inside the FBI arid-fifty percent from outside;
""'"1 believes thB:~this was the first time the Bureau ever advertised outside the agency
\~ for analytical personnel, and several of the hires had advanced degrees ~g MAs

\ the DT analysts we.re.

"pe doing or any trammg.
'10~~'
\. and IDs. Of the origmalD'I' hires, only about half are still with the FBILJtated that
t~e issue without any th~ught as to what they need~d to
"', elieves that the Bureau still has some good analysts In
. ttle IT and DT analytical units, but not enough. As a result the Bureau has to rely on the
leAP (Intelligence Community Analysis Program) to get analysts on detail from other
U~ Intelligence Community agencies:

Of~C2 alysts in the Miami Offic~"(th!ee work criminal matters, four FCl and the rest
CT), s the only one with a CT background, Prior to 9/11, Miami really wasn't
focuse on CT ~ it wasn't a top priority. Dianna Brett the Supervisory Analyst in the
• Office, does not have an . I '. . 'COh-'!lt"T~
and organizational skills

ow

\. \. r--leels there is a real need for strategic analysis in the field. Headquarters cannot do it
\ \. -arr.-tte believes that the Intelligence Center, T-4, should do more strategic analysis while
\ \. analysts on the other squads could focus on more tactical work.

\ '1 lstated that Miami needs 100 analysts (i.e., a ratio of one analyst to every two SAs),
\::~
..:: and he's heard that the Office is headed in that direction. There is supposed to be at least
. a 25 % increase in analysts over the next 3-5 years.

Office of Intelligence

'Obelieves that the Office of Intelligence is trying to make the analyst position more
analogous to the SA position by creating specialties within it. Everyone will be called an
Intelligence Analyst (lA), but some will be tactical (Operations Specialists), some will be
strategic and some will be Reports Officers. He believes it will be left up to the Squad
Supervisor to decide what type of analyst he/she needs on the squad. He thinks the skills
required for each specialty are much the same, so analysts should be able to move
• between all three seamlessly if they desire. He likes the fact that analysts won't have to

3
9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy
~~.".<~'~"., . Seel et"
~:~:\.,\\,.-
a \,
~ "\,\
"""compete in order to move to a new position. When pressed he acknowledged
position might require different writing skills than another.
one

~\\\.""" -...He understands that the Office of Intelligence has decided that they will not require a
~.\\ .......
\'" college degree for the analyst position so that they can "grandfather in" current analysts
~\\ \,....
" Wh9 do not have degrees. He believes that the degree is preferred, but that work
\\\, \\ exp~,ence willbe considered as well.

\\ \ \ \ \" He believes that HQ and Field analysts can now go to the GS-14 level and that there wiJI

~\~\ \\\ be a GS- i~non-supeMso~ "expert ::::::~::n as well.

\~ \ \.. \\ \rt,elieves ~·~t.,the UK has a d~~er~nt culture, different form of government and a
\:: \ \. \ 'siruiTfer area to COVet; than the US does.which are important differences. He feels that
\\ \ \ \ major organizationalchange is so cumbersome and takes so long that even if there are
;,', \ \ \1 good ~asons for such cnange the actual implementation of it might make things worse.
\\ \ \ serted that intelligence and CT work need-to be done by the same organization
::\ \ \ because there is so much overlap. The US doesn't need a new agency. Rather, existing
\ \. agencies need to work bettertogether and need more resources.

\ \ Info~~tion Technology Resou~~es

• -' \, t::::}hinks that Intelink is too slow.] J>eIieves that he an~sAl .. .. khiS
\' \, supervisor) are the only ones with acces:rainint:

\\ t=}tated that if the College of Analytical Studies had existed earlier it would have
\\ helped the Bureau to retain analytical personnel. He attended a running of the course in
\\ order to see what the FBI is "preaching" in this area. He has heard the Office of
\.\ Intelligence is thinking of running this class in tandem with the new Agent class, in effect
\.\ providing cross-training, and he thinks this is a good idea. They also may allow other
\:.:::.::\::,:.
state and local law enforcement analysts and foreign analysts to attend.

Reactive vs. Preventive

\I ~tated that the Bureau is very good at being reactive, at investigating something
\ "after the fact." It only started being more proactive after the Oklahoma City bombing.

r---lelieves that the Bureau recognizes not all specialties need to be staffed by Special
~. For example, the FBI is now paying top scientists salaries more commensurate
with their worth (it obtained an exemption to the monetary ceiling for these positions) so

•
it can retain these individuals. Also, the Office of General Counsel is hiring more non-
SA attorneys and Assistant Division Counsels in the field offices are often non-SA
attorneys.

, 8een~t--. 4
9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

SeeFet-

• ····Dompared
Recommendations

terrorism to a camel, and said the camel is in the tent (the tent being the
United States). Intelligence and law enforcement personnel need to work together to
expel it, not simply monitor it.

• o:8coret 5