Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board GR Nos. 95203-05, December 18, 1990 Sarmiento, J.

FACTS:The petitioners pray for injunctive relief to stop the ERB from implementing its Order mandating a provisional increase in the prices of petroleum and petroleum products. The Order, which was in pursuance to EO 172, was a response to the separate applications of Caltex, Pilipinas Shell and Petron Corporation for the Board to increase the wholesale posted prices of petroleum products. Petitioners submit that the Order was issued with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction and without proper notice and hearing. ISSUE: W/N the ERB committed grave abuse of discretion HELD: NO. While under EO 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex parte, a provisional increase, as it did, subject to its final disposition of whether or not: 1) to make it permanent;2) to reduce or increase it further; or 3) to deny the application. The Board has jurisdiction to decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing. Pending that, however, it may order, under Section 8 of EO 172, an authority to increase provisionally, without need of a hearing, subject to the final outcome of the proceeding.

G.R. No. 78385 August 31, 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC. vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS Gancayco, J. Petitioner: Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit corporate entity duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines Respondent: Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports is a ranking cabinet member who heads the Department of Education, Culture and Sports of the Office of the President of the Philippines.

FACTS: On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by DECS submitted a report entitled "Report and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and Other School Fees." The report favorably recommended to the DECS the following courses of action with respect to the Government's policy on increases in school fees for the SY 1987 to 1988. DECS took note of the report and issued an Order authorizing the 15% to 20% increase in school fees as recommended by the Task Force. Petitioner sought for reconsideration on the ground that increases were too high. Thereafter, the Order was modified reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%. Petitioner still opposed the increases. Petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest, went to this Court and filed the instant Petition for prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered declaring the questioned Department Order unconstitutional. The thrust of the Petition is that the said Department Order was issued without any legal basis. The petitioner also maintains that the questioned Department Order was issued in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution in asmuch as the petitioner was not given due notice and hearing before the said Department Order was issued. In support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that while the DECS is authorized by law to regulate school fees in educational institutions, the power to regulate does not always include the power to increase school fees. Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that students and parents are interested parties that should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before school fees are increased. In sum, the petitioner stresses that the questioned Order constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural due process of law. ISSUE: Whether or not DECS has the power to prescribe school fees HELD: Yes. In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the law.

The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character. Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative function? We believe so. The assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private schools in the country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance.

Taada vs Tuvera
146 scra 446

Publication Presidential Proclamations etc What unless otherwise provided means in Article 2 of the Civil Code FACTS:With the Supreme Courts decision that ordered Tuvera et al to publish in the Official Gazette the unpublished presidentialissuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect, Tuvera et al move for reconsideration and clarification. ISSUE: Whether or not publication should be made in the Official Gazette or elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. HELD: The Supreme Court cannot rule upon the wisdom of a law or repeal or modify it if it finds the same as impractical. That is not its function for such is the function of the legislature. The task of the Supreme Court is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with prescribed procedure. Hence, the Court declared that all laws shall immediately upon their approval or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. The clause unless otherwise provided pertains to the date of publication and not the requirement of publication.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 119761 August 29, 1996
FACTS:Fortune Tobacco Corporation ("Fortune Tobacco") is engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes. The Philippine Patent Office issued to the corporation separate certificates of trademarkregistration over "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes. The initial position of the CIR was toclassify 'Champion,' 'Hope,' and 'More' as foreign brands since they were listed in the World TobaccoDirectory as belonging to foreign companies. However, Fortune Tobacco changed the names of 'Hope'to 'Hope Luxury ' and 'More' to 'Premium More,' thereby removing the said brands from the foreignbrand category.RA No. 7654, was enacted and became effective on 03 July 1993. It amended Section 142(c)(1) of theNIRC. About a month after the enactment and two (2) days before the effectively of RA 7654, RevenueMemorandum Circular No. 37-93 ("RMC 37-93") Reclassification of Cigarettes Subject to Excise Tax, wasissued by the BIR. Fortune Tobacco requested for a review, reconsideration and recall of RMC 37-93. Therequest was denied on 29 July 1993. The following day, or on 30 July 1993, the CIR assessed FortuneTobacco for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9, 598, 334. 00.On 03 August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA. The CTA upheld theposition of Fortune Tobacco and adjudged RMC No. 37-93 as defective. ISSUE:Whether or not there is a violation of the due process of law .RULING:A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering the circumstances under which it has been issued,convinces us that the circular cannot be viewed simply as a corrective measure or merely as construingSection 142(c)(1) of the NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and most importantly, been made in order toplace "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion" within the classification of locally manufacturedcigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby have them

covered by RA 7654.In so doing, the BIR not simply interpreted the law; verily, it legislated under its quasilegislativeauthority. The due observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should nothave been then ignored. The Court is convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen shortof a valid and effective administrative issuance.

Balbuna,et. al. vs. Hon. Secretary of Education, et. al. GR No. L-14280, November 29, 1960 Reyes, J.B.L., J.

The action was brought to enjoin the enforcement of Department Order No. 8, s. 1955, issued by the Secretary of Education, promulgating rules and regulations for the conduct of compulsory flag ceremony in all schools, as provided in Republic Act No. 1265. Petitioners, who are members of the Jehovas Witnesses, contend that the said Department Order denied them freedom of worship and of speech, among others. They also contend that the Order is not valid for it was not published in the Official Gazette as required by law. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Department Order is invalid 2. W/N RA 1265 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power HELD: 1. NO. The contention that assailed Department Order has no binding effect, not having been published in the Official Gazette is without merit. The assailed order being addressed only to the Directors of Public and Private Schools and educational institutions under their supervision, cannot be said to be of general application, requiring previous publication in the Official Gazette before it could have binding force and effect. No. The requirements of the law constitute an adequate standard

RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 149154, June 10, 2003 Facts: The Board of Directors (BOD) of the Catbalogan Water District granted to themselves RATA, rice allowance, productivity incentive, anniversary, and year-end bonus and cash gifts, as authorized by Resolution No. 313 of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). The COA disallowed and ordered the refund of these allowances as they are not allowed by P.D. No. 198, the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973. Issue: Whether COA is vested with authority to disallow release of allowance not authorized by law even if authorized by the LWUA. Held: Art. IX, Sec. 2 D of the Constitution mandates the COA to audit all the government agencies, including governmentowned and controlled corporations (GOCC) with original charters. The COA is vested with authority to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of government funds. A Water District is a GOCC with a special charter since it is created pursuant to special law, PD 198. The COA can disallow allowances not authorized by law, even if authorized by the LWUA. Considering that the disallowed allowances were received in good faith, without knowledge that payment had no legal basis, the allowances need not to be refunded.

Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS: This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam. The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation. Senate refused the request. On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated that all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress. Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court marshal for such attendance. Hence, these petitions. ISSUES: IS E.O. 464 VALID? HELD:- The congress has the power of inquiry that is expressly recognized by ART 6.21 of the Constitution, where congress may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation - Since congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be inconsistent to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on the executive operations, although there are exemptions to the power of inquiry which exemptions fall under the rubric of executive privilege (the power of the government to withhold info from the public, the courts, the congress) it is only recognized in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character, and it is inclined heavily against secrecy and in favor of disclosure. - The power of congress to compel the appearance of exec officials under sec 21 and the lack of it under sec 22 find their basis in the principle of Separation of Powers. While the exec branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of congress to legislate by refusing to comply w/ its demands for info. - Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch, whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefore and why it must be respected. PETITIONS ARE PARTLY GRANTED, Sec(s) 2(b) &3 of E.O. 464 ARE DECLARED VOID. Sec(s) 1&2(a) ARE HOWEVER, VALID.

PEOPLE VS. QUE PO LAY, digested 94 SCRA 641, March 29, 1954 FACTS: Appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Central Bank Circular No. 20. Appellant appeals on the claim that the said circular had no force or effect because the same was not published in the official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to said appellant. The Solicitor General counters that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect. ISSUE: Whether or not circulars and regulations should be published in order to have force and effect. HELD: Yes, circulars and regulations especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. Before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.

PEOPLE vs VERIDIANO
Facts: On 2nd week of May in 1979, private respondent Benito Go Bio Jr. issued a check amounting to P200,000 to one Filipinas Tan. Said check was subsequently dishonored and despite repreated demands, the respondent failed to make the necessary payment hence the filing of charges against him for violation of BP 22 or the Bouncing Check law. Go Bio filed a Motion to Quash alleging that the information did not charge an offense on ground that BP 22 has not yet taken effect when the offense was committed on May 1979. Said law took into effect on June 29, 1979. The prosecution opposed the motion and contended that the date of the dishonor of the check -- September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the offense, hence BP 22 is applicable. The respondent judge granted Go Bio's motion and dismissed the criminal action. Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that BP 22 was published in the Official Gazette on April 4, 1979, and hence became effective 15 days thereafter or on April 24, 1979. PR contends however that said publication was only released on June 14, 1979 but since the questioned check was issued about the second week of May 1979, then he could not have violated BP 22 because it was not yet released for circulation at the time. Issue: W/N BP 22 was already in effect when the offense was committed HELD: NO. It is proved that the penal statute in question was made public or circulated only on June 14, 1979 and not on its printed date of April 9, 1979. Publication of the law is necessary so that the public can be apprised of the contents and or penalties of a penal statute before it can be bound by it. If a statute had not been published before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such law to be violated. Hence, the accused could not have committed the alleged crime. When the alleged offense was committed there was still no law penalizing it. The term "publication" in BP 22 must be given the ordinary accepted meaning -- or to make known to the people in general. Moreover, if BP 22 intended to make the printed date of issue of the Gazette as the point of reference in the determination of its the effectivity, it could have provided a special effectivity provision.

Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. vs. Department of Finance Secretary [G.R. No. 108524. November 10, 1994] Facts: Petitioner Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. is a domestic corporation whose members, individually or collectively, are engaged in the buying and selling of copra in Misamis Oriental. The petitioner alleges that prior to the issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular 47-91 on June 11, 1991, which implemented VAT Ruling 190-90, copra was classified as agricultural food product under $ 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code and, therefore, exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution. Under Sec. 103(b) of the NIRC, the sale of agricultural food products in their original state is exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution. The reclassification had the effect of denying to the petitioner the exemption it previously enjoyed when copra was classified as an agricultural food product under 103(b) of the NIRC. Petitioner challenges RMC No. 47-91 on various grounds.

Issues: (1) Whether the BIR is the proper the competent government agency to determine the proper classification of food products. (2) Whether RMC No. 47-91 is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Held: The court, as to the first issue, ruled in the affirmative. The BIR, as the government agency charged with the implementation and interpretation of the tax laws, is entitled to great respect. In interpreting Section 103 of the NIRC, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue correctly gave it a strict construction consistent with the rule that tax exemptions must be strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the state. The ruling was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the exercise of his power under 245 of the NIRC to "make rulings or opinions in connection with the implementation of the provisions of internal revenue laws, including rulings on the classification of articles for sales tax and similar purposes. With regard to the second issue, the court ruled in the negative. Petitioner likewise claims that RMC No. 47-91 is violative of the equal protection clause because while coconut farmers and copra producers are exempt, traders and dealers are not, although both sell copra in its original state. Petitioners add that oil millers do not enjoy tax credit out of the VAT payment of traders and dealers. The argument has no merit. There is a material or substantial difference between coconut farmers and copra producers, on the one hand, and copra traders and dealers, on the other. The former produce and sell copra, the latter merely sell copra. The Constitution does not forbid the differential treatment of persons so long as there is a reasonable basis for classifying them differently. It is not true that oil millers are exempt from VAT. Pursuant to 102 of the NIRC, they are subject to 10% VAT on the sale of services.
Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. vs. Board of Transportation GR No. L-59234, September 30, 1982 Melencio-Herrera, J.

FACTS:Petitioner is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators. They filed the petition seeking to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 of the Bureau of Land Transportation. The assailed memorandum order provides for the phasing out and discontinuance in the operation of dilapidated taxis or taxis of Model 1971 and earlier. Pursuant to the said memorandum, the Bureau of Land Transportation issued Implementing Circular No. 52 instructing Regional Directors, the MV Registrars and other personnel of the BLT, all within the National Capital Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. ISSUES: W/N the assailed memorandum orders were invalid exercise of police power

HELD: NO. Section 2 of Presidential Decree 101 grants the Board of Transportation the power to fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. As enunciated in the BOT circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health,safety and general welfare of the people.

US vs. PANLILIO Facts:Respondent was convicted of violating the law relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous communicable diseases thereby sentencing him to pay a fine of 40pesos.The accused allegedly permitted his carabaos to be taken from the corral where they were quarantined because of rinderpest. It appears from the evidence that the accused was notified that his carabaos had rinderpest and the subsequent declaration of quarantine, and that the respondent fully understood that he was not to remove the animals from the corral in which they were placed. Accused avers that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense Issue:(1) W/N facts alleged in the information constitute an offense punishable under Act No 1760? Held:No Although the original information of the accused charged him with violating section 6 of Act No. 1760, the information was subsequently amended, however the amended information did not specify which section of Act No 1760 was violated.The only sections of Act No. 1760, which prohibit acts and pronounce them unlawful are 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them. However, defendant did violate art 581, paragraph 2 of the Penal Code which punishes any person who violates any regulations or ordinances with regard to any epidemic disease among animalsIt alleged in the information and was proved on the trial that the Bureau of agriculture had ordered a quarantine of the carabaos at the time and place mentioned; that the quarantine had been executed and completed and the animals actually segregated and confined; that the accused, in violation of such quarantine and of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, duly promulgated, broke the quarantine, removed the animals and used them in the ordinary work of his plantation.The fact that the information in its preamble charged a violation of act No. 1760 does not prevent us from finding the accused guilty of a violation of an article of the Penal Code. SC would not permit an accused to be convicted under one Act when he is charged with the violation of another, if the change from one statute to another involved a change of the theory of the trial or required of the defendant a different defense or surprised him in any other way. The allegations required under Act No. 1760 include those required under article.

Pesigan vs. Angeles G.R. No. L-64279 April 30, 1984 AQUINO, J.

Facts: Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia, Batangas, as the destination. They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Sur, issued under the Revised Administrative Code and Presidential Decree No. 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974; (2) a permit to transport large cattle issued under the authority of the provincial commander; and (3) three certificates of inspection, one from the Constabulary command attesting that the carabaos were not included in the list of lost, stolen and questionable animals; one from the LIvestock inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and one from the mayor of Sipocot.

In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the carabaos, while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's police station commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was basis on the aforementioned Executive Order No. 626-A which provides "that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed ... to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos" Issue: Whether or not Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A dated October 25, 1980, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another is enforceable before publication in the Official Gazette of June 14, 1982 Held: The court held that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code. The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Norte and the head of the Public Affairs Office of the Ministry of Agriculture were unaware of Executive Order No. 626-A. The Pesigans could not have been expected to be cognizant of such an executive order. It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary confiscation was not in order. The recipients of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and Zenarosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.