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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

Citation: Hastings Community Association v. The Vancouver Board of Parks and Recreation, 2014 BCSC 80 Date: 20140117 Docket: S136262 Registry: Vancouver Between: Hastings Community Association, Kensington Community Centre Association, The Kerrisdale Community Centre Society, Killarney Community Centre Society, Riley Park Hillcrest Community Centre Association, and Sunset Community Association Plaintiffs And The Vancouver Board of Parks and Recreation Defendant

Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice Bowden

Reasons for Judgment re Application for Injunction In Chambers


Counsel for the Plaintiffs/Applicants: Counsel for the Defendant: Place and Date of Chambers Injunction: Place and Date of Judgment: D.P. Davison R.W. Cooper B. Parkin J.S. Twa Vancouver, B.C. December 9-13, 2013 Vancouver, B.C. January 17, 2014

Hastings Community Association v. The Vancouver Board of Parks and Recreation I. [1] INTRODUCTION Each of the six plaintiffs are currently involved in the operation of a

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community centre in the City of Vancouver. Each is also a party to an agreement with the defendant regarding the operation of the community centre with which they are involved. On August 29, 2013, the defendant issued a notice (Notice of Termination), to each of the plaintiffs terminating those agreements (Joint Operating Agreements), effective December 31, 2013. [2] The defendant is a branch of the City of Vancouver and has a board of

elected commissioners established under the Vancouver Charter, R.S.B.C. 1953, c. 55. It is responsible for the governance of all public parks in the City of Vancouver which include the community centres. [3] On August 20, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a notice of civil claim, (Main Action),

against the defendant seeking various forms of relief on the basis that the defendant was in breach of the Joint Operating Agreements; that the defendant was in breach of a joint venture or partnership carried on by the parties; that a contractual licence exists between the parties independently from the Joint Operating Agreements permitting the plaintiffs to use and occupy the community centres and such licence is only terminable upon mutual consent or upon reasonable notice by a party acting in good faith. [4] In these proceedings, the plaintiffs seek an interlocutory injunction restraining

the defendant from acting on the Notice of Termination; from treating the Joint Operating Agreements as terminated; a declaration that the Joint Operating Agreements remain in effect until the trial of the Main Action and ancillary relief. II. [5] BACKGROUND The plaintiffs are non-profit associations under the Society Act, R.S.B.C.

1996, c. 433. They were established between 1934 and 1987. Each of them operates a community centre together with the defendant including Hastings Community Centre, Kensington Community Centre, Kerrisdale Community Centre,

Hastings Community Association v. The Vancouver Board of Parks and Recreation

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Killarney Community Centre, Riley Park Hillcrest Community Centre and Sunset Community Centre. There are currently 20 such community associations in Vancouver. [6] The associations are managed by a volunteer board of directors. Members of

the board are elected annually by members of the particular association. [7] The main purpose of the associations is to provide programs and services to

residents of the communities in which they are located. The services and programs include recreational, athletic, cultural, educational and social activities for members. In order to utilize the programs and services, an individual may be required to become a member of the association that provides them. A fee is charged for membership. In addition, an individual may be required to pay an additional fee to participate in a particular program. [8] The land on which the community centres are situated is owned by the Park

Board. The financial arrangements for the construction of each of the centres is unclear; however, it appears that they were constructed with some combination of funds from the Park Board, funds raised by the associations for that purpose and government grants. [9] The funding for major capital projects at the community centres comes from

the Park Board, the Provincial and Federal governments and the associations. For some of the plaintiffs, the majority of funds for capital expenditures have come from the Park Board and other levels of government. However, for some of the plaintiffs, like the Kensington Community Centre and the Kerrisdale Community Centre, the associations have made contributions towards capital expenditures which are similar in amount to those made by the Park Board and other levels of government. [10] The plaintiffs and the defendant have jointly operated community centres

successfully for decades. Generally it appears that the associations have determined how to spend the money that they receive from various sources including their members and the defendant.

Hastings Community Association v. The Vancouver Board of Parks and Recreation [11]

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While the plaintiffs say that their relationship with the defendant is based on a

long-standing practice of consent and mutual agreement, the defendant points to the Joint Operating Agreements between them as the principal documents governing the operation of the community centres. These agreements were entered into at various times by the different plaintiffs and the defendant after the parties had operated together for a number of years without a formal agreement. [12] In June 2013, the defendant introduced what is described as a OneCard

system. A OneCard is now available to the public and allows a holder to access programs at any of the participating community centres. A holder can purchase a 10visit pass which is loaded onto their card. The holder may then access facilities at several community centres without having to buy a membership or pay a fee. When a OneCard is used at a particular community centre, that centre can bill the Park Board for such use and is then reimbursed. [13] The plaintiffs became concerned that the OneCard system would have the

effect of eliminating their memberships, which they say are essential to the pursuit of their mandate. [14] The defendant has carried on negotiations with 12 other community centre

associations, seeking to revise their operating agreements and to implement its public policy goals including the provision of universal access to community centres through the OneCard system. Those other associations reached an agreement with the defendant. The plaintiffs have not participated in those negotiations. [15] The plaintiffs applied for an interim injunction restraining the defendant from

promoting the OneCard in their centres. On October 13, 2013, their application was dismissed, essentially because the defendant informed the court that it was not going to implement the OneCard system at the plaintiffs centres during the currency of the Joint Operating Agreements.

Hastings Community Association v. The Vancouver Board of Parks and Recreation [16]

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Shortly after the Main Action was commenced by the plaintiffs, the defendant

gave notice terminating the Joint Operating Agreements with each of the plaintiffs, effective December 31, 2013. [17] The following are the salient parts of the provisions of the Joint Operating

Agreement between Riley Park Community Association and the defendant, which are typical of the provisions found in the other joint operating agreements:
Whereas the Community Recreation facilities, swimming pools, ice rinks, parks and amenities, (hereinafter referred to as Facilities), controlled or owned by the Board within the Riley Park Community have been set aside, erected and made available for the recreation, comfort and enjoyment of the public; And Whereas it is intended that those mutually agreed facilities described in (hereinafter referred to as the jointly-operated facilities), are to be operated jointly and in close cooperation by the Association and the Board; And Whereas the Association and the Board wish to set out in writing their respective positions with regard to the joint operation of the said facilities; 1. The Board shall have the control, care, and maintenance of all facilities, spending thereon such sums as may be allowed each year by the City Council of Vancouver. The parties shall agree upon an operating budget based on such sums of money as the City Council shall make available to be expended on the operation of the jointly operated facilities including subsidized program, daily maintenance, light, heat and other utility services as may be required. The Board, subject to budget constraints, shall maintain all facilities in a state of good repair to the satisfaction of both parties. The Association shall notify the Board in writing of any dissatisfaction with the maintenance of the jointly-operated facilities. The Board will be required to respond to the Association within Fifteen days advising that the necessary repairs have been made or explain the reason for the nonrepair or delay. Designated facilities shall have, subject to budget constraints, full-time coverage with operating staff provided by and accountable to the Board. The operating hours of the jointly-operated facilities shall be mutually agreed upon the Board and the Association.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Hastings Community Association v. The Vancouver Board of Parks and Recreation


6. The operating staff shall comply with all reasonable directives of the Association and their duties and working hours shall be mutually agreed upon by the Board and the Association, keeping in mind that such agreed duties and working hours cannot be inconsistent with the agreements entered into, from time to time, between the City of Vancouver (including the Board) and the Canadian Union of Public Employees and the Vancouver Municipal and Regional Employees Union on behalf of their members. The Association shall be notified of all such agreements. The Board shall allow three designated representatives of the Association to participate in the interview of prospective Recreation Division programming and clerical support staff for the facility. The Association will be notified of changes in the custodial staff where possible. The Board shall consider all reasonable comments of the Association fulfilling their responsibility of hiring staff. The Association and Board shall collectively prepare a job description that accurately reflects the function to be performed by each staff member within the various jointly-operated facilities. The job description will be renewed at the request of either party. In the event that the Association shall desire a change in the operating staff in the designated facilities, the Association must show cause in writing to the Area Manager concerned, with a copy to the Board and the Director of Recreation. Should the Board desire to make any temporary or permanent change whatsoever in any staff assigned to all, or any, of the jointly-operated facilities, the Board shall advise the President of the Association where possible, of such intended changes. New staff shall receive, where possible, a minimum of Fourteen days in-service training within the jointly-operated facility prior to any change. Vacation time for Recreation Division programming and clerical support staff in the designated facilities shall be arranged by the Area Recreation Manager, in consultation with the Association, and suitable arrangements for coverage will be insured by the Area Recreation Manager. Where possible fifteen days notice of vacations will be given in writing to the Association. The Association will be advised of vacation time for custodial staff where possible. The Community Recreation Coordinator and the Association representatives shall consult together and

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7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

Hastings Community Association v. The Vancouver Board of Parks and Recreation


prepare the program of activities to be conducted in the jointly-operated facilities. 13. Copies of all financial statements prepared by the Association which are related to the jointly-operated facilities shall be submitted to the Board or to its designated representatives. The Association shall, within the first quarter of the fiscal year of the Association, submit to the Board an audited statement for the previous fiscal year. The Board, through its designated representatives, shall submit to the Association a monthly report of revenues and expenses relating to the jointly-operated facilities. The Association and the Board may require at any time an accounting of expenditures by the other upon giving the other fifteen days notice in writing, provided that such request shall not be unreasonable. The Board shall receive notice of all meetings of the Association and its Directors. The Boards representatives shall be entitled to address all such meetings. The Association shall abide by and comply with the bylaws, resolutions and directives of the Board and the City of Vancouver which may be in force from time to time governing the conduct and use of the facilities. Neither the Association nor the Board shall make any addition or alterations to the facilities, nor enter into any agreement for the use of the facilities, without first consulting each other. This section shall not derogate from the right of the Association to rent out the facilities. Subject to the provisions in Appendix D all Association membership fees and other revenues generated by the use of the designated facilities shall be received by the Association and expended on program costs, equipment, supplies, community recreation services and other objects as are consistent with the Constitution of the Association. Funds generated by the operation of facilities listed in Appendix E for which the Board assumes financial responsibility, shall be received by the Board. The Association may allow the consumption of alcoholic beverages in the Centre by obtaining the consent of the Board. The written consent of the Area Manager may be accepted by the Association as the consent of the Board. It is the responsibility of the

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14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

Hastings Community Association v. The Vancouver Board of Parks and Recreation


Association to ensure the necessary liquor permit is obtained. 21. Any equipment purchased from the funds of the Association for use in the jointly-operated facilities, shall belong to the Association and shall not be loaned or used elsewhere or disposed of without permission of the Association. Such equipment shall, for the purpose of the insurance by the Board, be grouped with other equipment in the facility and included in the inventory of the facility. The Association should obtain and make available to the public, information about community athletic, social and cultural groups and should encourage the membership and participation of such groups in the Association and its Board. Any disputes arising out of this Agreement or the interpretation thereof shall be determined by the President of the Association and the Director of Recreation, and if no resolution can be arrived at the dispute shall be referred to the Superintendent of Parks and Recreation. Where required, final decision will rest with the Board. Where there is mutual concurrence, certain provisions peculiar to specific areas will be included in the Agreement. These special considerations, where applicable, are defined as Appendix D. This Master Agreement is subject to such further arrangements for the better carrying out of the purposes herein as shall from time to time be mutually agreed upon and shall be taken to be renewed every two years unless notice of termination has been given by either party in accordance with clause 26. This Agreement may be terminated by either party giving Three months notice in writing addressed to the Chairman of the Board of the President of the Association, as the case may be.

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22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

(Signatures)

III. [18]

ANALYSIS A great deal of material was filed by the parties, including affidavits which

contain hearsay, opinions and conclusions of law by the affiants, as well as attachments that are not admissible as evidence in these proceedings. There is also conflicting evidence contained in the material filed. I have attempted to glean the

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background facts from the affidavits and attached material that I consider to be admissible. In relation to conflicting evidence, at this stage of the litigation it is not the Courts function to resolve conflicts of evidence as to facts on which the claims of either party may depend at the trial. For the purposes of these proceedings I have attempted to rely upon evidence that does not appear to be controversial. [19] The requirements for the granting of an interlocutory injunction are: 1) There is a serious question to be tried. 2) The plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted. 3) The balance of convenience favours the granting of the injunction. (British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Wale, [1987] 2 W.W.R. 331, affd [1991] 1 S.C.R. 62; RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311) [20] In Wale, the Court of Appeal said, at paras. 46-48:
46. The traditional test for the granting of an interim injunction is British Columbia is two-pronged. First, the applicant must satisfy the court that there is a fair question to be tried as to the existence of the right which he alleges and a breach thereof, actual or reasonably apprehended. Second, he must establish that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction. 47. The decision in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., [1975] A.C. 396, may be read as suggesting a three-stage test for the granting of interlocutory injunctions rather that the two-stage test to which I have referred, the requirements being (1) a fair question to be tried, (2) irreparable harm, and (3) balance of convenience favouring the injunction. While I prefer to view the requirement of irreparable harm as integral to the assessment of the balance of convenience between the parties, the practical effect of the two approaches is the same. 48. The first step in determining where the balance of convenience lies is to examine the adequacy of damages as a remedy for the respective parties. In most cases, an interlocutory injunction should not be granted unless there is doubt whether damages would be an adequate remedy in the event the applicant succeeds at trial. In other words, it must be shown that the applicant may suffer irreparable harm in the sense that the remedy by damages is not such a compensation as will in effect, though not in specie, place the parties in the position in which they formerly stood: Kerr on Injunctions, 6th ed. (1927), at pp. 17-18, applied in MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Mullin, 61 B.C.L.R. 145, per Seaton J.A. The requirement that there be doubt as to whether

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damages will be an adequate remedy is basically a matter of common sense. If damages will be an adequate remedy, and if it appears that the alleged offender can pay them, the court is generally not justified in giving one party his remedy to the detriment of the other before the issues have been tried.

IV. [21]

SERIOUS QUESTION TO BE TRIED The plaintiffs say that the long relationship between the parties has

established them to be joint venturers or partners in the operation of the community centres. [22] They also say that as a result of their relationship and the significant

contribution by the plaintiffs to the construction, maintenance and operation of the centres, as well as the contribution of time and expertise by their members, they have a contractual licence to use and occupy the centres for the purpose of delivering programs and services to their members. [23] The plaintiffs submit that the licence exists independently of the rights and

obligations under the Joint Operating Agreements, and those agreements do not address the right of use and occupancy of the community centres. [24] If the Court finds that such a licence exists, then it must also be determined

whether it can be terminated by reasonable notice. [25] The defendant says that the granting of the injunction sought would

significantly restrict its rights to implement policy objectives for the community centres. As a result, the defendant argues that in order to obtain an interlocutory injunction, the plaintiffs must meet a higher standard and show that they have a strong prima facie case. [26] The defendant relies on RJR-MacDonald to establish that a higher standard

for an injunction must be satisfied by the plaintiffs in this case. RJR-MacDonald is authority for the proposition that where the result of an interlocutory application will in effect amount to a final determination of the action or where it will impose such hardship on one party as to remove any potential benefit from proceeding to trial, then the court hearing the application may engage in a more extensive review of the

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merits of the action. RJR-MacDonald is referred to in Future Shop Ltd. v. NorthwestAtlantic (BC) Broker Inc. et al, 2000 BCSC 1797. In Future Shop Ltd., Parrett J. cites Aetna Financial Services v. Feigelman, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 2, for the proposition that if the applicant for an injunction seeks to significantly restrict the rights of the defendant without a trial, then a strong prima facie case must be established by the applicant. Aetna involved a Mareva injunction. In my view, the circumstances of this case do not require the applicants to establish more than a serious question to be tried. [27] The granting of an injunction in this case will not finally determine the action

by the plaintiffs against the defendant. An injunction may have the effect of deferring the implementation of policy objectives by the defendant; however, a final determination of the issues will not be made until the trial. In this case, the granting of an interlocutory injunction will maintain the status quo in the relationship between the parties until the issues are decided at a trial. [28] Regardless of the test, the defendant argues that the plaintiffs have not

established either a serious question to be tried nor have they met the higher standard of a strong prima facie case. In particular the defendant says that the termination clause in the Joint Operating Agreements is clear and there is no evidence of a collateral agreement by the parties not to terminate the Joint Operating Agreements. The defendant also says that there is no evidence of an implied term in the Joint Operating Agreements that they will only be terminated for cause. [29] In my view, because of the long relationship between the plaintiffs and the

defendant during which the defendant has allowed the plaintiffs to occupy and assist in the operation of the community centres together with the financial and other forms of contribution including volunteer time and expertise by the plaintiffs to the centres, the question of the existence of a licence is a serious question to be tried. This is so even if the Joint Operating Agreements are considered to have been validly

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terminated by the defendant, because the trial judge will have to consider whether or not, if a licence exists, it survives the termination of the Joint Operating Agreements. [30] In Pilcher v. Shoemaker, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2038, and in Stiles v. Tod

Mountain Development Ltd., [1992] B.C.J. No. 440, the principle stated by Lord Denning at page 448 in Inwards v. Baker, [1965] 1 All E.R. 446, was applied by this Court:
if the owner of land requests another, or indeed allows another, to expend money on the land under an expectation created or encouraged by the landlord that [the other party] will be able to remain there, that raises an equity in the licensee such as to entitle him to stay. He has a licence coupled with an equity.

[31]

In Stiles, Huddart J. stated the principle as follows:


Thus, where a party expends money on the land of another under an expectation created or encouraged by the owner, or even where the landowner merely stands silent, the authorities establish that proprietary estoppel may found a cause of action, a revocable licence may be rendered irrevocable, or the partys interest may be found in a licence coupled with an equity, the circumstances may establish a contract between the parties or equity may require that the fee simple be transferred.

[32]

The defendant argues that the plaintiffs did not assert the existence of a

licence in their application for an interlocutory injunction and the only question is the right of the defendant to terminate the Joint Operating Agreements. In my view, the Court must look at the notice of civil claim in the Main Action, and not the application for the interlocutory injunction, to determine if there is a serious question to be tried. In the notice of civil claim in the Main Action, the plaintiffs assert the existence of a contractual licence as one of the grounds for seeking declaratory and other relief and, in my view, that is a serious question to be tried. [33] The defendant also argues that by virtue of the provisions of the Vancouver

Charter, it was ultra vires the defendant to enter into a licence with the plaintiffs. While this might be persuasive in relation to an express written licence, it remains to be determined at trial whether an implied licence may have arisen between the parties because of their long and mutually reliant relationship.

Hastings Community Association v. The Vancouver Board of Parks and Recreation [34]

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In this application it is not necessary to engage in an extensive review of the

merits of the plaintiffs case. It will remain for the trial judge t o determine the merits after a thorough consideration of the evidence at the trial. Whether the principle stated by Lord Denning applies in the circumstances of this case, where the parties have entered into the Joint Operating Agreements in relation to the operation of the community centres and in light of the provisions of the Vancouver Charter, will be determined by the trial judge. [35] In view of this conclusion, it is not necessary for me to determine whether the

other issues raised in the notice of civil claim, including the existence of a collateral contract, an implied term in the Joint Operating Agreement, or whether the defendant acted in good faith in terminating the Joint Operating Agreements give rise to a serious question to be tried. V. [36] BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE As the first step in considering the balance of convenience it is necessary to

examine whether damages would be an adequate remedy for the plaintiffs. Put another way, will the plaintiffs suffer irreparable harm in the sense that the remedy by damages is not such a compensation as will in effect, though not in specie, place the parties in the position in which they formerly stood. (Wale, supra) [37] The plaintiffs submit that they will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is not

granted and the defendant is allowed to terminate the Joint Operating Agreements and take control of the assets of the community centres. If an injunction is not granted, the plaintiffs argue that they will lose their ability to survive as an organization that provides programs and services to their communities and that loss will not be compensable in damages. [38] The plaintiffs refer to Edward Jones v. Voldeng, 2012 BCCA 295, where at

para. 25 the Court of Appeal refers to the definition of irreparable harm in Onkea Interactive Ltd. v. Smith, 2006 BCCA 521 at para. 18:
Irreparable harm is of two types. First, there is harm that cannot be quantified in monetary terms, such as permanent market loss or irrevocable damage to

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business reputation. Second, there is harm that cannot be compensated: for example, because an award of damages will not be collectible: see RJRMacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney-General), supra, at 341.

[39]

In the case at bar, the plaintiffs argue that they cannot be compensated in

damages for the loss of the right to jointly operate the community centres with the defendant and the associated goodwill that has been built up over the years. Referring to Baxter Motors Ltd. v. American Motors (Canada) Ltd., [1973] B.C.J. No. 625, they submit that the loss of goodwill is something that cannot be compensated for in damages. They say that by terminating the Joint Operating Agreements, the defendant will eliminate the reason for the plaintiffs existence. [40] The defendant submits that if an injunction is ordered, then the elected

commissioners of the defendant will be unable to implement their public policy goals. It says that if the implementation is delayed by judicial proceedings it will suffer irreparable harm and cannot be compensated in damages. For this position it relies on Jay & Mereti Holdings Ltd. v. British Columbia Lottery Corporation, 2008 BCSC 196. [41] Jay & Mereti Holdings Ltd. was unsuccessful in obtaining an injunction

because the court held that a remedy in damages was available to it in relation to the loss of its right to sell lottery tickets. In obiter the court said that the British Columbia Lottery Corporation could not be compensated in damages if the termination of its agreement with Jay & Mereti Holdings Ltd. were delayed. In addition, because British Columbia Lottery Corporation considered Jay & Mereti Holdings Ltd. to have been dishonest in its dealings with Loto ticket purchasers, the court said that the need to preserve the integrity of the lottery scheme outweighed the need to protect the retailer from the consequences of the termination of its agreement. In my view, elements of dishonesty on the part of the retailer led the court to determine that the balance of convenience favoured the British Columbia Lottery Corporation, rather than simply the frustration of the Corporations policy objectives.

Hastings Community Association v. The Vancouver Board of Parks and Recreation [42]

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The defendant also argues that when a public authority is prevented from

exercising its statutory powers, it can be said that the public interest, of which that authority is the guardian, suffers irreparable harm. For this proposition it relies on Canada (AG) v. Fishing Vessel Owners Association of British Columbia, [1985] 1 F.C. 791; and Esquimalt Anglers Assn. v. Canada, [1988] F.C.J. No. 702. [43] In those cases the applicants for an injunction were seeking to restrain the

Government of Canada from implementing and enforcing regulations enacted by the Governor-General by Order-in-Council for the purpose of regulating fishing under the Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14. In Esquimalt Anglers Assn., Cullen J. of the Federal Court Trial Division, considered that when an interlocutory injunction is sought in a constitutional case, then a factor to be considered in determining the balance of convenience is the public interest. Cullen J. refers to a statement by Beetz J. in Manitoba (A.G.) v. Metropolitan Stores Ltd., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110 at page 128:
A review of the case law indicates that, when the constitutional validity of a legislative provision is challenged, the courts consider that they ought not to be restricted to the application of traditional criteria which govern the granting or refusal of interlocutory injunctive relief in ordinary private or civil law cases. Unless the public interest is also taken into consideration in evaluating the balance of convenience, they very often express their disinclination to grant injunctive relief before constitutional invalidity has been finally decided on the merits.

[44]

This is not a constitutional case. In my view, the plaintiffs in this case are not

seeking to restrain a government authority from implementing a regulation or bylaw. Rather, they are seeking to restrain the defendant from terminating private agreements with them until their rights under those agreements or any rights arising out of their long relationship with the defendant are determined at trial. The defendant is not relying on statutory powers to terminate the Joint Operating Agreements. It is relying on its contractual rights. [45] I do not consider this to be a case where I should depart from the application

of the traditional criteria governing the granting or refusal of interlocutory injunctive relief.

Hastings Community Association v. The Vancouver Board of Parks and Recreation [46]

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I accept the plaintiffs position that the termination of the Joint Operating

Agreements will in effect end the reason for their existence. I do not accept the defendants argument that the plaintiffs could establish another centre in their community. While the plaintiffs may be found to be entitled to some of the personal property in the centres, there is no suggestion that they could acquire the land necessary for the operation of a similar facility. In the Main Action, the plaintiffs do not allege that they have an interest in the land of the defendant other than as a licencee in occupation. If at trial they are found not be entitled to continue in occupation of these community centres, then that would appear to end the reason for their existence. [47] I also agree with the plaintiffs that damages would not compensate them for

their inability to operate a community centre. They are non-profit associations formed for the purpose of operating community centres together with the defendant. If their relationship with the defendant is terminated, the foundation for their existence will come to an end. If an injunction is not granted, it is my view that the plaintiffs will cease to exist, at least for the purposes for which they were created and perhaps altogether, before a trial is held to consider the issues. [48] The effect of granting an interlocutory injunction in the circumstances of this

case is to maintain the status quo between the parties until a trial. The relationship of the parties that has resulted in the successful operation of the effected community centres over the decades would be expected to continue until the trial of the Main Action. I do not consider that the result will be irreparable harm to the defendant. [49] In the end result I have concluded that the balance of convenience favours

the granting of an interlocutory injunction.

Hastings Community Association v. The Vancouver Board of Parks and Recreation [50]

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The defendant is restrained from acting on the Notice of Termination dated

August 29, 2013, and the Joint Operating Agreements are declared to remain in effect until the trial of the Main Action or until further order of this Court. [51] Costs shall be in the cause. Bowden J.

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