In Re Argosino

B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997 RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH RESOLUTION PADILLA, J.: Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months :and one (1) day to four (4) years. On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation. On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation. On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from probation. On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case. On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath. In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that: a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery. b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident. After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition: In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service. The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death. d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court. The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable. The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for. In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated: . . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character. 1 In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death. Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this case, to find room for forgiveness. However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned. The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society. PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.

SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 Resolution, p. 8.

Tapucar vs Tapucar
[A.C. No. 4148. July 30, 1998] REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, vs. ATTY. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea under scandalous circumstances.[1] Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six months suspension without pay,[2] while in Administrative Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were consolidated,[3] this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from service of respondent.[4] Now he faces disbarment. The records reveal the following facts: From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, it appears that complainant and respondent were married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Church in Quezon City. They established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, were eight of their eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent relocated his family to Dadiangas, Cotabato (Now General Santos City), where his last three children were born and where he practiced his profession until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on January 30, 1976. In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea, in Nasipit, Agusan Del Norte. On December 28, 1977 Elena gave birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Pea. In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative complaint against respondent for immorality. After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six months without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent.[5] Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to another charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such as conduct unbecoming an officer of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated and after investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and separation from the service.[6] But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He continued living with Elena, which resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child named Laella Pea Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his children by her. Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing along Elena and their two children. And on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage with Elena in a ceremony solemnized by Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This was done while the respondents marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on record shows the dissolution thereof. Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon her retirement from the government service in 1990. However, her children, who remained in Antipolo, kept her posted of the misery they allegedly suffered because of their fathers acts, including deception and intrigues against them. Thus, despite having previously withdrawn a similar case which she filed in 1976, complainant was forced to file the present petition for disbarment under the compulsion of the material impulse to shield and protect her children from the despotic and cruel acts of their own father. Complainant secured the assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this case. Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. After conducting a thorough investigation, the Commission through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended that respondent be disbarred, and his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the ground that, notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court, respondent continued the illicit liaison with Elena.[7] In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the charges against him, respondent displayed arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the Court, as when he said: I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months without pay in 1980 for having a mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena (Helen) Pea, now my wife. Being ordered separated in later administrative case constitute double jeopardy. If now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena Pea will constitute triple jeopardy. If thats the law so be it.[8] Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, passed on May 17, 1997, a Resolution adopting the Commissioners recommendation, as follows: RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97 Adm. Case No. 4148 Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the abovetitled case, herein made part of the Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation therein to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and adopted by the Board of Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support the foregoing Resolution, herein considered as the recommendation to this Court by said Board pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b), of the

Rules of Court.* We are in agreement that respondents actuations merit the penalty of disbarment. Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain ones good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity.[9] There is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law.[10] The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.* As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standards of legal proficiency, as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all times subject to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private fails this scrutiny would have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly. Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a member of the judiciary, a fact that aggravates this professional infractions. For having occupied that place of honor in the Bench, he knew a judges actuations ought to be free from any appearance of impropriety.[11] For a judge is the visible representation of the law, more importantly, of justice. Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of strength that fortifies their will to obey the law.[12] Indeed, a judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all of his actuations, lest it be a demoralizing example to others.[13] Surely, respondent could not have forgotten the Code of Judicial Conduct entirely as to lose its moral imperatives.[14] Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical conduct,[15] an attorney-at-law is also invested with public trust. Judges and lawyers serve in the administration of justice. Admittedly, as officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith and confidence of the public that justice is administered with dignity and civility. A high degree or moral integrity is expected of a lawyer in the community where he resides. He must maintain due regard for public decency in an orderly society. A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.[16] Exacted from him, as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously described as moral character. To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the administration of justice. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.[17] The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and

character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court of and member of the bar.[18] For disbarment proceedings are intended to afford the parties thereto full opportunity to vindicate their cause before disciplinary action is taken, to assure the general public that those who are tasked with the duty of administering justice are competent, honorable, trustworthy men and women in whom the Courts and the clients may repose full confidence. In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[19] a complaint for disbarment was filed against a member of the bar by his wife. She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife and their son; and that he had adulterous relations with a married but separated woman. Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence presented by his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. In another case,[20] a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. The Court held that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of a bar. In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon by this Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than lawfully-wedded wife. The report of the Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the complaint found respondent far from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance; in the face of charges against him. The IBP Board of Governors, tasked to determine whether he still merited the privileges extended to a member of the legal profession, resolved the matter against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral conduct abounds against him and could not be explained away. Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their children, show his disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyers oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondents character, his moral indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action. IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur. Bellosillo, no part due to personal relationships. Purisima, J., no part.

Sebastian vs Calis
[A.C. No. 5118. September 9, 1999] MARILOU SEBASTIAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS, respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: For unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct as well as violation of his oath as lawyer, respondent Atty. Dorotheo Calis faces disbarment. The facts of this administrative case, as found by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),[1] in its Report, are as follows: Complainant (Marilou Sebastian) alleged that sometime in November, 1992, she was referred to the respondent who promised to process all necessary documents required for complainants trip to the USA for a fee of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00). On December 1, 1992 the complainant made a partial payment of the required fee in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), which was received by Ester Calis, wife of the respondent for which a receipt was issued. From the period of January 1993 to May 1994 complainant had several conferences with the respondent regarding the processing of her travel documents. To facilitate the processing, respondent demanded an additional amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) and prevailed upon complainant to resign from her job as stenographer with the Commission on Human Rights. On June 20, 1994, to expedite the processing of her travel documents complainant issued Planters Development Bank Check No. 12026524 in the amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) in favor of Atty. D. Calis who issued a receipt. After receipt of said amount, respondent furnished the complainant copies of Supplemental to U.S. Nonimmigrant Visa Application (Of. 156) and a list of questions which would be asked during interviews. When complainant inquired about her passport, Atty. Calis informed the former that she will be assuming the name Lizette P. Ferrer married to Roberto Ferrer, employed as sales manager of Matiao Marketing, Inc. the complainant was furnished documents to support her assumed identity. Realizing that she will be travelling with spurious documents, the complainant demanded the return of her money, however she was assured by respondent that there was nothing to worry about for he has been engaged in the business for quite sometime; with the promise that her money will be refunded if something goes wrong. Weeks before her departure respondent demanded for the payment of the required fee which was paid by complainant, but the corresponding receipt was not given to her. When complainant demanded for her passport, respondent assured the complainant that it will be given to her on her departure which was scheduled on September 6, 1994. On said date complainant was given her passport and visa issued in the name of Lizette P. Ferrer. Complainant left together with Jennyfer Belo and a certain Maribel who were also recruits of the respondent. Upon arrival at the Singapore International Airport, complainant together with Jennyfer Belo and Maribel were apprehended by the Singapore Airport Officials for carrying spurious travel documents; Complainant contacted the respondent through overseas telephone call and informed him of by her predicament. From September 6 to 9, 1994, complainant was detained at Changi Prisons in Singapore. On September 9, 1994 the complainant was deported back to the Philippines and respondent fetched her from the airport and brought her to his residence at 872-A Tres Marias Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Respondent took complainants passport with a promise that he will secure new travel documents for complainant. Since complainant opted not to pursue with her travel, she demanded for the return of her money in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00). On June 4, 1996, June 18 and July 5, 1996 respondent made partial refunds of P15,000.00; P6,000.00; and P5,000.00. On December 19, 1996 the complainant through counsel, sent a demand letter to respondent for the refund of a remaining balance of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P114,000.00) which was ignored by the respondent. Sometime in March 1997 the complainant went to see the respondent, however his wife informed her that the respondent was in Cebu attending to business matters. In May 1997 the complainant again tried to see the respondent however she found out that the respondent had transferred to an unknown residence apparently with intentions to evade responsibility. Attached to the complaint are the photocopies of receipts for the amount paid by complainant, applications for U.S.A. Visa, questions and answers asked during interviews; receipts acknowledging partial refunds of fees paid by the complainant together with demand letter for the remaining balance of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P114,000.00); which was received by the respondent.[2] Despite several notices sent to the respondent requiring an answer to or comment on the complaint, there was no response. Respondent likewise failed to attend the scheduled hearings of the case. No appearance whatsoever was made by the respondent.[3] As a result of the inexplicable failure, if not obdurate refusal of the respondent to comply with the orders of the Commission, the investigation against him proceeded ex parte. On September 24, 1998, the Commission on Bar Discipline issued its Report on the case, finding that: It appears that the services of the respondent was engaged for the purpose of securing a visa for a U.S.A. travel of complainant. There was no mention of job placement or employment abroad, hence it is not correct to say that the respondent engaged in illegal recruitment. The alleged proposal of the respondent to secure the U.S.A. visa for the complainant under an assumed name was accepted by the complainant which negates deceit on the part of the respondent. Noted likewise is the partial refunds made by the respondent of the fees paid by the complainant. However, the transfer of residence without a forwarding address indicates his attempt to escape responsibility. In the light of the foregoing, we find that the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for violating Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS be SUSPENDED as a member of the bar until he fully refunds the fees paid to him by complainant and comply with the order of the Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 6 of the Rules of Court.[4] Pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this administrative case was elevated to the IBP Board of Governors for review. The Board in a Resolution[5] dated December 4, 1998 resolved to adopt and approve with amendment the recommendation of the Commission. The Resolution of the Board states: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decisions as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment that Respondent Atty. Dorotheo Calis beDISBARRED for having been found guilty of Gross Misconduct for engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

We are now called upon to evaluate, for final action, the IBP recommendation contained in its Resolution dated December 4, 1998, with its supporting report. After examination and careful consideration of the records in this case, we find the resolution passed by the Board of Governors of the IBP in order. We agree with the finding of the Commission that the charge of illegal recruitment was not established because complainant failed to substantiate her allegation on the matter. In fact she did not mention any particular job or employment promised to her by the respondent. The only service of the respondent mentioned by the complainant was that of securing a visa for the United States. We likewise concur with the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution, that herein respondent is guilty of gross misconduct by engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct contrary to Canon 1, Rule 101 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent deceived the complainant by assuring her that he could give her visa and travel documents; that despite spurious documents nothing untoward would happen; that he guarantees her arrival in the USA and even promised to refund her the fees and expenses already paid, in case something went wrong. All for material gain. Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyers relationship with others should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyers oath. The lawyers oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable.[6] The nature of the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral character.[7] This requisite is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.[8] We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.[9] It is dismaying to note how respondent so cavalierly jeopardized the life and liberty of complainant when he made her travel with spurious documents. How often have victims of unscrupulous travel agents and illegal recruiters been imprisoned in foreign lands because they were provided fake travel documents? Respondent totally disregarded the personal safety of the complainant when he sent her abroad on false assurances. Not only are respondents acts illegal, they are also detestable from the moral point of view. His

utter lack of moral qualms and scruples is a real threat to the Bar and the administration of justice. The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.[10] We must stress that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during good behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be heard.[11] Here, it is worth noting that the adamant refusal of respondent to comply with the orders of the IBP and his total disregard of the summons issued by the IBP are contemptuous acts reflective of unprofessional conduct. Thus, we find no hesitation in removing respondent Dorotheo Calis from the Roll of Attorneys for his unethical, unscrupulous and unconscionable conduct toward complainant. Lastly, the grant in favor of the complainant for the recovery of the P114,000.00 she paid the respondent is in order.[12] Respondent not only unjustifiably refused to return the complainants money upon demand, but he stubbornly persisted in holding on to it, unmindful of the hardship and humiliation suffered by the complainant. WHEREFORE, respondent Dorotheo Calis is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be FURNISHED to the IBP and the Bar Confidant to be spread on the personal records of respondent. Respondent is likewise ordered to pay to the complainant immediately the amount of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand (P114,000.00) Pesos representing the amount he collected from her. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. Davide, Jr., C.J., and Panganiban, J., on official leave.

In Re Arthur Cuevas
B.M. No. 810 January 27, 1998 IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH BY ARTHUR M. CUEVAS, JR. RESOLUTION FRANCISCO, J.: Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar Examinations 1. His oath-taking was held in abeyance in view of the Court's resolution dated August 27, 1996 which permitted him to take the Bar Examinations "subject to the condition that should (he) pass the same, (he) shall not be allowed to take the lawyer's oath pending approval of the Court . . ." due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The conviction stemmed from petitioner's participation in the initiation rites of the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW, sometime in September 1991, where Raul I. Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of the personal violence inflicted upon him. Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted probation. On May 10, 1995, he was discharged from probation and his case considered closed and terminated. In this petition, received by the Court on May 5, 1997, petitioner prays that "he be allowed to take his lawyer's oath at the Court's most convenient time" 2 attaching thereto the Order dated May 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Antique discharging him from his probation, and certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding character issued by: (a) the Mayor of the Municipality of Hamtic, Antique; (b) the Officer-in-Charge of Hamtic Police Station; (c) the Sangguniang Kabataan of Pob. III, Hamtic, through its chairman and officers; (d) a member of the IBP Iloilo Chapter; (e) the Parish Priest and Vicar General of St. Joseph Cathedral, San Jose, Antique; and (f) the President of the Parish Pastoral Council, Parish of Sta. Monica, Hamtic, Antique. On July 15, 1997, the Court, before acting on petitioner's application, resolved to require Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan, father of the deceased hazing victim Raul I. Camaligan, to comment thereon. In compliance with the Court's directive, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan filed his comment which states as follows: 1 He fully appreciates the benign concern given by this Hon. Court in allowing him to comment to the pending petition of Arthur M. Cuevas to take the lawyer's oath, and hereby expresses his genuine gratitude to such gesture. 2 He conforms completely to the observation of the Hon. Court in its resolution dated March 19, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 712 that the infliction of severe physical injuries which approximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan was deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) thus, indicating serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. This is consistent with his stand at the outset of the proceedings of the criminal case against the petitioner and his co-defendants that they are liable not only for the crime of homicide but murder, since they took advantage of the neophytes' helpless and defenseless condition when they were "beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog", suggesting the presence of abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery (People vs. Gagoco, 58 Phil. 524). 3 He, however, has consented to the accusedstudents' plea of guilty to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting to the homicide, including the petitioner, out of pity to their mothers and a pregnant wife of the accused who went together at his house in 4 As a Christian, he has forgiven the petitioner and his co-defendants in the criminal case for the death of his son. But as a loving father, who lost a son in whom he has high hope to become a good lawyer to succeed him, he still feels the pain of his untimely demise, and the stigma of the gruesome manner of taking his life. This he cannot forget. 5 He is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner, since then has become morally fit for admission to the noble profession of the law. He politely submits this matter to the sound and judicious discretion of the Hon. Court. 3 At the outset, the Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan and commiserates with the untimely death of his son. Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan admits that "[h]e is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner since then has become morally fit . . ." and submits petitioner's plea to be admitted to the noble profession of law to the sound and judicious discretion of the Court. The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing or allowing petitioner's admission to the noble profession of law. His deliberate participation in the senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte which resulted to the latter's untimely demise indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar. And as the practice of law is a privilege extended only to the few who possess the high standards of intellectual and moral qualifications the Court is duty bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to exclude those who have been admitted but have become a disgrace to the profession. The Court, nonetheless, is willing to give petitioner a chance in the same manner that it recently allowed Al Caparros Argosino, petitioner's co-accused below, to take the lawyer's oath. 4 Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.'s discharge from probation without any infraction of the attendant conditions therefor and the various certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented character prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the unfortunate death of Raul I. Camaligan. The Court is prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of the youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. 5 Let it be stressed to herein petitioner that the lawyer's oath is not a mere formality recited for a few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the presence of select witnesses. Petitioner is exhorted to conduct himself beyond reproach at all times and to live strictly according to his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. And, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Padilla's comment in the sister case of Re:Petition of Al Agrosino To Take Lawyer's Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997, "[t]he Court sincerely hopes that" Mr. Cuevas, Jr., "will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society" 6. ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M.. Cuevas, Jr., to take the lawyer's oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be set by the Court, subject to the payment of appropriate fees. Let this resolution be attached to petitioner's personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO ORDERED. Lucena City, literally kneeling, crying and begging for forgiveness for their sons, on a Christmas day in 1991 and on Maundy Thursday in 1992, during which they reported that the father of one of the accused died of heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the case.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban and Martinez, JJ., concur.

Nunez vs Astorga
A.C. No. 6131 - February 28, 2005 EDUARDO L. NUEZ, EUGENIO O. NUEZ, ELISA NUEZ-ALVARICO and IMELDA L. NUEZ, complainants, vs.Atty. ARTURO B. ASTORGA, Respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Disbarment and suspension of an attorney are the most severe forms of disciplinary action; thus, they should be imposed with great caution. They should be meted out only for duly proven serious administrative charges. 1 The Case and the Facts This administrative case stems from a Complaint-Affidavit 2 filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Eduardo L. Nuez, Eugenio O. Nuez, Eliza Nuez-Alvarico and Imelda L. Nuez. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga was charged therein with conduct unbecoming a member of the bar. The material averments of the Complaint are summarized by the IBP-CBD as follows: "Complainants allege that sometime on June 5, 1968, the late Maria Ortega Vda. De Nu[]ez executed a Sale with Right to Repurchase in favor of Eugenio O. Nu[]ez Lot No. 106 covered by OCT No. 2651 (now TCT No. 8955) containing an area of 384 sq. ms. for a consideration of P400.00. In the said contract, the stipulated time of repurchase was ten (10) years from the date of execution thereof or until June 5, 1978. That said period of vendors right to repurchase expired without any agreement of extending said period of repurchase. To date, even the heirs of the late Maria Ortega Vda. de Nu[]ez have not exercised[d] their right of repurchase. A year after the execution of the said pacto de ret[r]o sale, the late Maria Ortega Vda. de Nu[]ez and her son Ricardo Nu[]ez, as the surviving heirs of the late Eleuterio Nu[]ez, extrajudicially partitioned his estate, among others, the subject [L]ot No. 106 was adjudicated to Ricardo Nu[]ez which eventually was the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 8955 in the name of Ricardo Nu[]ez. Eugenio O. Nu[]ez [has] occupied and possessed said Lot No. 106 for more than 40 years up to the present and it is also where his children, Eduardo, Elisa and Imelda, all surnamed Nu[]ez, grew and [are] presently residing. "By virtue of a power of attorney executed sometime in 1982 by the late spouses Ricardo Nu[]ez and Paterna Nu[]ez appointing respondent as administrator, as well as on the alleged judicial confirmation of respondents wife, as acknowledged natural child of Ricardo Nu[]ez, respondent, on the pretext of administering the properties of the late spouses, had been disturbing the peaceful occupation and possession of complainants of Lot No. 106 claiming that complainants have no right over the same. With our desire to peaceably settle the controversy, complainants agreed to buy Lot No. 106, and respondent, who, without being appointed by the court as administrator of the intestate estate of the late spouses Ricardo Nu[]ez and Paterna Nu[]ez, sold and conveyed to Imelda Nu[]ez and Elisa Nu[]ez-Alvarico the portions of Lot No. 106 they were occupying. After which Elisa Nu[]ez-Alvarico filed a criminal complaint for Estafa against respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte docketed as Criminal Case No. R-4013-A. "Sometime on 29 March 2001 at around 7:30 in the evening, respondent went to the house of Eduardo L. Nu[]ez at corner J.P. Laurel and M.L. Quezon Sts., Baybay, Leyte and threatened to kill Eduardo Nu[]ez by uttering the words ipaposil ta ka which means Ill have you shot. A complaint for Grave Threats docketed as Case No. R-4012-A was filed by Eduardo L. Nu[]ez before Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte." 3 In a hearing held on June 5, 2002, complainants appeared with their counsel, while respondent was represented by Atty. Arnold Logares. As respondent had not yet filed his answer to the Complaint despite a previous Order dated December 7, 2001, he was granted a period of fifteen (15) days within which to do so. The hearing was thus reset to June 26, 2002. 4 On June 26, 2002, only respondents counsel, Atty. Arnold Logares, was present. Respondent filed a Motion seeking a cancellation of the scheduled hearing and another extension of fifteen (15) days within which to file his answer. He was thus granted a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days within which to do so. 5 On July 18, 2002, Atty. Astorga finally submitted his Answer. 6 He denied that he had utilized his profession to circumvent the law and averred that there were already several pending cases involving the same issues raised by complainants in the present administrative action: "2. That the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase executed by the late Maria Ortega Vda. De Nuez on June 5, 1968 is more civil in nature and can be best threshed out in the amended complaint of Civil Case No. B-2001-10-27, entitled []The Intestate Estate of the late Spouses Ricardo O. Nuez, et al versus Spouses Bonito D. Alvarico, et al[] for Rescission of Contract[.] [T]he original complaint was filed in October 2001 at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte; an amended complaint of which is filed where one of the issues is the declaration of invalidity of the foregoing questioned deed of sale with right to repurchase because if this document is really valid and existing then why did complainant Eugenio Nuez [affix] his signature as one of the instrumental witnesses in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition among Maria Ortega Vda. De Nuez and Ricardo O. Nuez on May 19, 1969 otherwise he would have protested at the time of the execution thereof because he is the temporary owner of Lot No. 106, one of the properties subject of partition. Why did he allow the late Ricardo O. Nuez to take control and full possession and ownership of Lot 106 to his exclusion after the partition in 1969? xxxxxxxxx "[3] b) It is not only the authority of the Spouses Ricardo O. Nuez and Paterna Baltazar that herein respondent is relying as administrator of the said intestate estate but the same had been duly confirmed by the judicially declared daughter of Ricardo O. Nuez, namely, respondents wife Dr. Linda Teresa Tan-Nuez who confirmed undersign[ed]s authority as administrator of the aforenamed estate; "[3] c) With the discovery of the aforenamed deed of sale with the right to repurchase only recently, the complainants were emboldened to actively [question] [the] estate as they now [refuse] to recognize the ownership and long time possession of the real properties forming part of the aforenamed [estate] to belong to the offspring of the late Ricardo O. Nuez; "[3] d) Undersigned respondent did not utilize his profession to circumvent the law. Complainants Elisa L. Nuez and Imelda L. Nuez are actually renting the cornermost portion of the consolidated Lot Nos. 106 and 107 of the Baybay Cadastre with an area only of 201 square meters, more or less, and when respondent was trying to eject them, complainants negotiated with the respondent to buy their area of Lot No. 106 they rented and in fact actually advanced part of the agreed consideration until their father Eugenio Nuez discovered an existing document of sale with right to repurchase when they, ill-advised by their counsel [started] filing [a] series of criminal, civil and administrative cases against respondent and his wife at the instigation of their lawyers, the late Atty. Jose C. Modina and their current counsel, Atty. Norjue I. Juego as a way of pressuring respondent and wife to give up [the] portion they are occupying [of] Lot No. 106[,] including [the] portion which complainant Eduardo Nuez is now renting of Lot No. 89; "4. That respondent in response to paragraph 7 of the complaint hereby admit the pendency of Criminal Case No. R-4013-A which was personally filed by Elisa L. Nuez without the intervention from any government prosecutor but said case is no longer pending in the Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte when then same was recommended for dismissal x x x. Later it was ordered dismissed by the Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero and approved by Provincial Prosecutor Teresita S. Lopez on February 22, 2001 x x x but complainants elevated the case for review to the Department of Justice x x x. Because of the pendency of this criminal case with the Department of Justice[,] a prejudicial question now exist[s]

whereby this administrative case should be suspended until the resolution of that petition for review by the Department of Justice; "5. That respondent specifically denies the material allegations of paragraph 8, 9 and 10 of the complaint, the truth of the matter is that Amado Caballes at the instigation of the complain[an]ts and their counsel filed Criminal Case No. R4011-A with the Municipal Trial Court, Baybay, Leyte which is pending pre-trial. Like Criminal Case No. R-4013-A, the same was filed at the instance of Amado Caballes, x x x. But before the filing of this present action initiated by Mr. Caballess counsel and complainants Eduardo Nuez and Eugenio Nuez required Mr. Caballes to execute a document of resale on August 14, 2001 despite knowing that the same has already been long redeemed by respondent x x x. Despite legal redemption, and despite Amado Caballes having executed x x x a Deed of Resale which was witnessed by complainant Eugenio Nuez x x x, the complainants convinced Amado Caballes to file Crim. Case No. R-4011-A[.] x x x. That by virtue of the pendency of Criminal Case No. R-4011-A, there exist[s] a prejudicial question and that further hearing of the present administrative action should be suspended until the outcome of this criminal case; "6. That respondent is duly authorized to negotiate for the disposal of any part of the Intestate Estate of the late Spouses Ricardo O. Nuez and Paterna Baltazar x x x. "7. That regarding paragraph 12 and 13 of the complaint[,] this is a matter of existence and pend[ing] with [the IBP-CBD] and need not be a part of this complaint because this will be threshed out in another hearing[.] [T]he truth of the matter is that respondent had been already acquitted in Crim. Case No. CBU29395 x x x. "8. That similar to other cases filed at the instance of the Nuezes, there is also filed Crim. Case No. R-4012-A for Grave Threats by complainant Eduardo Nuez and now pending in the Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte despite the lack of witnesses x x x. Again, the pendency of this case will constitute a prejudicial question which necessarily will suspend further hearing of the present administrative action until the final outcome of the aforesaid Crim. Case No. R4011-A;" x x x x x x x x x. 7 On August 8, 2002, complainants submitted their Reply. 8 Thereafter, IBP-CPD Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala scheduled the case for hearing on December 11, 2002. On this date, respondent requested and was a granted a period of fifteen (15) days to file his rejoinder. The parties agreed to file simultaneous memoranda on January 15, 2003, after which the case was to be considered submitted for resolution. 9 Report and Recommendation of the IBP In her Report, 10 Commissioner Villanueva-Maala found respondent guilty of serious misconduct. Thus, the investigating commissioner recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year. In Resolution No. XV-2003-346 dated June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner VillanuevaMaala. The Resolution, together with the records of the case, was transmitted to this Court for final action, pursuant to Section 12(b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Respondent also filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to set aside Resolution No. XV-2003-346 of the IBP Board of Governors. The Courts Ruling We disagree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP, but find respondents offensive language against complainants and their counsel unbecoming an attorney. Administrative Liability of Respondent

The legal profession exacts a high standard from its members. Lawyers shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on their fitness to practice law. Neither shall they, whether in public or in private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. 11 In gr_ Gonzaga v. Villanueva , 12 this Court, citing Tucay v. Tucay,13 held thus: "A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber, which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein." 14 However, the penalties of disbarment and suspension are severe forms of disciplinary action and must be imposed with great caution. 15 The allegations in the Complaint were not substantiated by clear evidence; they were bereft of convincing proof of respondents deceit and gross misconduct. The admission of respondent that there are various cases filed or pending against him does not ipso facto constitute serious misconduct. His contention that the pending cases against him pose a prejudicial question that will bar the instant administrative case is untenable. Likewise bereft of merit, however, is the finding of the IBP investigating commissioner that the mere existence of the same pending cases constitute serious misconduct on the part of respondent. Under Section 27 of Rule 138, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. Suspension or disbarment may follow as a matter of course, upon a finding that the crime a lawyer has been convicted of involves moral turpitude. By such conviction, such lawyer has become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and is no longer possessed of good moral character. 16 In the present case, however, while respondent has been charged with several criminal cases involving moral turpitude, he has yet to be convicted of any of them. Without clear and convincing evidence that he committed acts that allegedly constituted serious misconduct, the mere existence of pending criminal charges cannot be a ground for disbarment or suspension of respondent. To hold otherwise would open the door to harassment of attorneys through the mere filing of numerous criminal cases against them. Respondent contends that his right to due process was violated when the IBP investigating commissioner failed to conduct a formal investigation. 17 As borne by the records, Investigating Commissioner Villanueva-Maala conducted hearings on the case on June 5 and June 26, 2002, during which counsel for respondent, Atty. Logares, appeared. Respondent was allowed to file his Answer, as well as his Rejoinder. And, more important, he himself appeared at the December 11, 2002 hearing when the parties agreed to file simultaneous memoranda, after which the case was deemed submitted for resolution. Records show that respondent filed his Memorandum on January 29, 2003. Hence, he cannot claim that he was not given ample opportunity to rebut the charges filed against him. While we are not convinced that complainants have clearly and convincingly proven the charges of serious misconduct, we do, however, note the use of offensive language in respondents pleadings. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates: CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

In his Memorandum 18 dated January 15, 2003, the opposing counsel, Atty. Norjue I. Juego, points out the manner and tenor of the language in the Answer 19 and the Rejoinder of respondent. 20 The latter suggested that complainants and their counsel had caused the filing of several baseless suits, including the present charge, merely to harass and place him in a bad light. 21 He hurled insulting language in describing the opposing counsel 22 and cast doubts on the latters integrity by implying that the lawyer had instigated the filing of the so-called baseless suits, violated the rules on non-forum shopping and committed malpractice. 23 Indeed, these statements, particularly the words "who he is despite x x x his shortness not only in size but in arrogance," constitute conduct unbecoming a member of the legal profession and cannot be countenanced by this Court. A lawyers language may be forceful, but should always be dignified; emphatic, but respectful as befitting an advocate. Arguments, whether written or oral, should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should use such language as may be properly addressed by one gentleperson to another. 24 WHEREFORE, Atty. Arturo B. Astorga is ACQUITTED of the charge of serious misconduct, but is held liable for conduct unbecoming an attorney and is FINED two thousand pesos.

SO ORDERED. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur. Carpio-Morales, J., on leave. Nunez v. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga,38 the Court held that the mere existence of pending criminal charges against the respondent-lawyer cannot be a ground for disbarment or suspension of the latter. To hold otherwise would open the door to harassment of attorneys through the mere filing of numerous criminal cases against them.

In re CARLOS S. BASA
December 7, 1920 Pedro Guevara for respondent. Attorney-General Feria for the Government. MALCOLM, J.: The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the disbarment of Attorney Carlos S. Basa. Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California and the Philippine Islands. Recently he was charged in the Court of Fist Instance of the city of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent, was found guilt in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. del Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed down by the second division of the Supreme Court.[[1]] The Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that "A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office of lawyer by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude . . ." The sole question presented, therefore, is whether the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by article 446 of the Penal Code, involves moral turpitude. "Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.) Although no decision can be found which has decided the exact question, it cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this character involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct. ( In re Hopkins [1909], 54 Wash., 569; Pollard vs. Lyon [1875], 91 U.S., 225; 5 Ops. Atty.-Gen. P. I., 46, 185; decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 30, 1876 and June 15, 1895.) When we come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken by the court, we do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in order that so promising a career may not be utterly ruined. It is the order of the court that beginning with the day when Carlos S. Basa shall be discharged from prison, he be suspended from his office of lawyer for one year. So ordered. Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Street, Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur. Footnotes

Burguete vs Mayor
G.R. No. L-6538, May 10, 1954 PABLO BURGUETE, petitioner, vs. JOVENCIO Q. MAYOR, as Provincial Governor of Romblon, and ESTEBAN B. MONTESA, as Acting Municipal Mayor of Badajoz, Romblon, respondents. Aguedo F. Agbayani, Cirilo C. Montejo and Felix B. Morada for petitioner. Francisco H. Marcial, Provincial Fiscal of Romblon, for respondents. JUGO, J.: The petitioner, Pablo Burguete, is the municipal mayor of Badajoz, Province of Romblon, and was elected for that position in November, 1951; the respondent, Jovencio Q. Mayor, is the provincial governor of Romblon; and Esteban B. Montesa, the acting municipal mayor of Badajoz, Province of Romblon. On August 21, 1952, a criminal complaint for serious slander was filed against Burguete in the justice of the peace court of Badajoz. On October 7, 1952, the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Romblon. On November 13, 1952, Jovencio Q. Mayor suspended the petitioner as mayor on the ground that a criminal case against him was pending, and that it was the "standing policy of the Administration to the place under suspension any elective official against whom a criminal action involving moral turpitude is pending adjudication before the competent court." The Governor directed Esteban B. Montesa, the vice-mayor, to act as mayor. Burguete now files in this Court a petition for mandamus and quo warranto against Mayor and Montesa. The case for serious slander against Burguete is still, pending in the Court of First Instance. Burguete has filed a motion to quash, but it was denied. The case could not be tried on the merits on account of the non-appearance of the witnesses for the prosecution. No administrative investigation by the provincial board has been conducted under section 2188 of the Administrative Code. The questions raised in this case are not new, as they have already been decided in the case of Lacson vs. Roque,* (49 Off. Gaz., 93). There it was held that the mere filing of an information for libel against a municipal officer is not a sufficient ground for dispensing him. The same may be said with regard to serious slander, which is another form of libel. Libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. Furthermore, it would be an easy expedient to file a criminal complaint or information against a municipal mayor for the purpose of suspending him, and the suspension would last almost indefinitely, according to the time that would elapse before the criminal case is finally terminated by conviction or acquittal. It is unnecessary to elaborate here on the reasons given for the principle, as they are set forth extensively in said decision. Our conclusion is that the suspension of the petitioner is illegal and unjustified. In view of the foregoing, the respondent Jovencio Q. Mayor is ordered to reinstate Pablo Burguete in his office as municipal mayor of Badajoz, Romblon, and to oust the respondent Esteban B. Montesa, as such officer, with costs against the respondents. It is so ordered. Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
*92

Phil., 456.

Villanos vs Subido
G.R. No. L-23169 May 31, 1972 CONCHITA G. VILLANOS, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE HONORABLE ABELARDO SUBIDO, Commissioner of Civil Service, respondentappellant. Raymundo R. Armovit for petitioner-appellee. The Solicitor General for respondent-appellant. 25, 1958, no hearing actually took place on said date. Two years thereafter, on March 1, 1960, petitioner-appellee wrote a letter to the investigator asking for a special investigator from either the Bureau of Public Schools or Bureau of Civil Service. Petitioner's request was, however, denied by the Bureau of Public Schools "in view of dearth of personnel" in the Office. Continuation of the investigation was directed. Pursuant thereto, hearing was again scheduled for August 8, 1960, but investigation could not also proceed on said date because of another plea for postponement by petitioner-appellee who claimed that she made a second request for another investigator, this time from the Civil Service Commission, who will try jointly the charge against her together with another two administrative charges which she herself has filed against Supt. Dizon and one Mr. Padernal and against Mrs. Sebastian and Miss Faypon. For quite sometime, no action whatsoever was taken on the second request of petitionerappellee. Hence, on March 16, 1962, the investigator made an indorsement forwarding to the Division Superintendent of Public Schools the explanation of petitioner-appellee on the charges preferred against her and the papers covering the investigation so far conducted. The indorsement stated that continuation of the investigation could not proceed because of another request of the petitioner-appellee for another investigator from the Civil Service Commission, which so far has not been acted upon. The Division Superintendent, in turn, indorsed the same papers to the Director of Public Schools with a statement to the effect that petitioner-appellee refused to submit to investigation. He also forwarded to the Director a copy of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (C.A. G.R. No. 00189-R) which affirmed the libel conviction of petitioner-appellee. Subsequently, following the indorsement of the Superintendent of Schools, the Assistant Director of Public Schools coursed another indorsement to the Secretary of Education wherein he likewise stated that petitionerappellee "refused to submit to a formal investigation." The Assistant Director further stated that considering the refusal of petitioner-appellee and her conviction of the crime of libel, he recommends that petitioner-appellee be transferred to another station, reprimanded and warned that the commission by her of the same or similar offense will be severely dealt with. This recommendation met the approval or concurrence of the Secretary of Education who in an indorsement, dated May 21, 1962, manifested said concurrence to the Commissioner of Civil Service, respondent-appellant herein. Disregarding the recommendation of the Department of Education, respondent-appellant, on February 7, 1963, rendered a decision finding petitioner-appellee guilty of the administrative charge and dismissing her from the service. 1 On March 7, 1963, petitioner-appellee filed a verified petition for certiorari and/or prohibition, with writ of preliminary injunction, before the lower court, for the nullification of the decision of the respondent-appellant. Petitioner-appellee claimed that she was denied due process of law in that the charge against her was decided without affording her an oppurtunity to defend herself, the decision being merely based on the criminal conviction for libel. She obtained, on March 11, 1963, a writ of preliminary injunction from the lower court enjoining the respondent-appellant and/or any of his agents or representatives from enforcing his decision. After due trail, the lower court promulgated the appealed decision on March 2, 1964 in favor of petitioner-appellee. Hence, this appeal. Pending resolution of this appeal, on January 29, 1969, the Secretary of Education issued an indorsement stating, in effect, that his Office will interpose no objection to the payment of whatever retirement benefits are due to petitioner-appellee, who has already reached the compulsory age of retirement last December 31, 1968. On February 6, 1969, We noted the contents of said indorsemets. Respondent-appellant presents the following three major issues: (1) The lower court had no jurisdiction over the case, considering the fact that petitioner-appellee failed to appeal the decision of respondent-appellant to the Civil Service Board of Appeals; (2) Petitionerappellee was not given due process in the administrative case before it was decided; and (3) Respondent-appellant did not commit grave abuse of discretion in rendering the decision imposing upon petitioner-appellee the penalty of dismissal with the further injunction that the decision be immediately executed. We find for the petitioner-appellee on all counts and We, accordingly, affirm the decision of the trial court. There can be no question that petitioner-appellee has not been given a full hearing. The investigation was not even half-through when the Superintendent of Schools of Ilocos Sur made his indorsement which culminated in the challenged decision of the respondentappellant. The contention of respondent-appellant that petitioner-appellee was unduly

BARREDO, J.:p Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVI, in its Civil Case No. 53309, declaring null and void the decision of the respondent-appellant Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo Subido, dated February 7, 1963, in Administrative Case No. R-23917, dismissing from the government service the petitioner-appellee Conchita G. Villanos. The last two paragraphs of the lower court's decision read as follows: Premises considered, the Court holds that the action of the Commissioner of Civil Service in decision (deciding) the administrative case against the herein petitioner without affording her a fair trial and an opportunity to present her defense and imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal, constitutes a grave abuse of his discretion. WHEREFORE, the Court declares the decision of the respondent in Administrative Case No. R-23917 null and void. The writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case is made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs. As found by the trial court, the facts of this case which are conclusive upon this Court in this appeal are as follows: Petitioner-appellee is a public school teacher of the Vigan Central School, in Vigan, Ilocos Sur. She holds the degrees of Elementary Teacher's Certificate, Bachelor of Science in Elementary Education and Bachelor of Science in Education. She is a civil service eligible, having passed the junior as well as the senior teachers' civil service examinations in 1937 and 1956, respectively. As of the year 1963, she had to her credit thirty-eight (38) years of teaching experience. In the district of Vigan, she was ranked fifth among 138 classroom teachers, with efficiency ratings of mostly 95 %. On April 1, 1957, petitioner-appellee wrote a letter jointly addressed to Mrs. Esperanza F. Sebastian and Miss Anacleta Faypon, her co-teachers in the same school, containing libelous remarks against the two. Upon receipt thereof, Mrs. Sebastian and Miss Faypon lost no time in instituting a criminal action against petitioner-appellee in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur charging the latter with the crime of libel. On March 30, 1959, petitioner-appellee was convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay costs. This libel conviction was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision which it rendered on December 21, 1960. Review of the latter decision was denied for lack of merit by this Court in a resolution dated March 6, 1961. A few days after the commencement of the criminal action, or on April 11, 1957, Mrs. Sebastian and Miss Faypon lodged before the Division Superintendent of Schools an administrative charge against petitioner-appellee for (1) gross discourtesy to them as her co-teachers, and for (2) notoriously disgraceful and/or immoral language and/or conduct. They supported their charge with the same libelous letter, basis of the criminal action. The administrative charge was first heard on September 23, 1957 before Mr. Severo Lucero, District Supervisor and Investigator, at which hearing Mrs. Sebastian commenced her direct testimony. Second hearing thereof took place on February 12, 1958 before the same investigator, wherein Mrs. Sebastian's testimony was concluded. Although at the conclusion of the second hearing, the investigator scheduled a third hearing on February

delaying the proceedings and that she refused to submit to investigation has no basis in fact and in law. As rightly held by His Honor: That petitioner did not have the opportunity to defend herself during the administrative investigation can not be seriously questioned. As a matter of fact only one witness was able to testify and her cross examination has not yet been concluded when the hearing was postponed. Even the Solicitor General apparently agrees to this finding when he argues in his memorandum that 'when disciplinary action is based upon conviction of a criminal offense, the formal administrative hearing may be dispensed with.' The argument of the Solicitor General is too broad and can not be true in all cases. In this particular case, three separate administrative charges are inter-linked with each other. One is the administrative charge against the former Superintendent of Schools of Ilocos Sur and his Chief Clerk for alleged bribe or at least corruption in office. From the evidence in the records in the present case, it was insinuated that the Chief Clerk received material favors from the father of Mrs. Sebastian resulting in salary promotions in her favor. Another administrative case is that one filed by petitioner against Mrs. Sebastian and Miss Anacleta Faypon for uttering similar words for which the petitioner is now being dismissed. The third is, of course, the case against the petitioner for writing the libelous letter. In view of the close relation between three administrative cases, the best procedure would have been to investigate them jointly. The investigator must necessarily be not one who occupies the rank of District Supervisor because it is lower than the rank of one of the respondents. He should also not be under the office of the Division Superintendent of Ilocos Sur, in order to avoid any suspicion of partiality. In asking for an investigator from the Bureau of Public Schools or from the Office of the Commissioner of Civil Service, the herein petitioner cannot be charged with deliberately delaying the proceedings. Just what happened with the other two cases, the Court has no idea as there is no evidence in the present case about them. What was proven in the present case is that both respondent Commissioner of Civil Service and the Director of Public Schools (Exh. N) were misled by the erroneous conclusions of the Superintendent of Schools of Ilocos Sur (Exh. M-1) to the effect that the 'respondent (herein petitioner) refused to submit to investigation by' his office. Such a conclusion is unwarranted for as shown by the evidence, the investigation was delayed first because the investigator was out of Ilocos Sur for over two years and later because apparently the respondent did not act on petitioner's request for an investigator coming from the Civil Service Commission and the old investigator, instead of proceeding with the investigation, merely submitted the records to the Director of Public Schools through the Superintendent of Schools, who as stated above misunderstood the indorsement of the investigator (Exh. M). This misunderstanding of the attitude taken by the herein petitioner is very important not only in the action taken by the Director of Public Schools (Exh. N) who submitted the case to the herein respondent thru the Secretary of Education for decision but also in finding herein petitioner guilty and recommending that she be transferred to another station, reprimanded and warned that the commission by her of the same or similar offense will be severely dealt with. Indeed, it may be noted that what occurred was precisely what petitioner feared would happen if the investigation were to be conducted by someone from the Office of the Superintendent, considering that she had charged the former Superintendent with bribery or corruption in office. As can be seen, it was the Superintendent who made the initial erroneous indorsement that petitioner-appellee "refused to submit to an investigation" and even attached to the records which were sent with said indorsement certified copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals convicting her, thus providing, as it turned out later, the respondent appellant with what he considered a sufficient legal basis for her dismissal. These circumstances give added weight to the charge of petitioner-appellee that the action

of respondent-appellant is short of being fair and legal. Undoubtedly, she had a right to request for a different investigator and to await the outcome of such request. That the authorities concerned allowed years to pass without even acting thereon cannot be counted against her. At the stage in which the investigation was at the time when the Superintendent indorsed the records to higher authorities, only one witness of the complainants had testified, so, even the complainants' side had not rested; more importantly, the respondent therein, herein petitioner-appellee had not yet presented any evidence. We hold, therefore, that the action of the education authorities and the respondent-appellant of considering the case submitted for decision is unwarranted. It is obvious that said action constitutes denial to petitioner-appellee of her right to due process, hence the decision of respondent-appellant is null and void. The plea that the decision of the Court of Appeals which found petitioner-appellee guilty of libel against the complainants in the administrative case, which arose from the same allegedly slanderous remarks, is enough basis for respondent-appellant's decision is equally without merit. To begin with, the said decision was never presented, even informally, as evidence during the investigation. It was just attached to the records by the Superintendent when he indorsed them to the Bureau of Public Schools without even advising petitioner-appellee about it. Thus, she had no chance to present evidence which could have blunted the effects of said decision. And she had a right to present such evidence. A condemnatory decision in a criminal case, even if final, by itself alone, cannot serve as basis for a decision in an administrative case involving the same facts, for the simple reason that matters that are material in the administrative case are not necessarily relevant in the criminal case. So, notwithstanding that findings in criminal cases must be beyond reasonable doubt, they cannot be conclusive for administrative purposes. There are defenses, excuses and attenuating circumstances of value in administrative proceedings which are not admissible in the trial of the criminal cases. At any rate, it is settled in this jurisdiction that even where criminal conviction is specified by law as a ground for suspension or removal of an official or employee, such conviction does not ex proprio vigore justify automatic suspension without investigation and hearing as to such conviction. Not even final conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, as distinguished from conviction pending appeal, dispenses with the requisite notice and hearing. Final conviction is mentioned in section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code as ground for proceeding administratively against the convicted officer but does not operate as automatic removal doing away with the formalities of an administrative hearing. (Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil. 456, 471.) Neither can We place our stamp of approval on respondent-appellant's posture that petitioner-appellee has not exhausted administrative remedies. It is charged and We have found it is true that petitioner-appellee was denied due process. Such being the case, the rule of exhaustion invoked is not applicable here. Appellants further maintain that the appellee in this case, had not exhausted administrative remedies, for appeal from the order of the Commissioner of Civil Service to the President was yet available, and it was error on the part of the Court of First Instance of Manila to entertain the premature action instituted against them. We find no merit in this argument. It has been repeatedly held that the principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the question in dispute is purely a legal one (Tapales vs. The President & Board of Regents of the U.P., L-17523, March 30, 1963), where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction (Mangubat vs. Osmea, L-12837, April 30, 1959), where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter (Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc. vs. Secretary of Public Works, G.R. No. L-15982, May 31, 1963), or where there are circumtances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention (Alzate vs. Aldaba, L-14407, February 29, 1960; Demaisip vs. Court of Appeals, L-13000, September 29, 1959). Similarly, when, as this case, in terminating the services of the appellee, the Commissioner of Civil Service acted summarily without any semblance of compliance, or even an attempt to comply with the elementary rules of due process, when the order is immediately executed and petitioner was immediately removed from office, then appeal was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in ordinary course of law (Fernandez, et al. vs. Cuneta, et al., G. R. No. L-14392, May 30, 1960), and the employee adversely affected may forthwith seek the protection of the courts. (Mitra vs. Subido, G.R. No. L-21691, Sept. 15, 1967.)

After this case was submitted for decision, or, under date of February 1, 1969, counsel for appellee brought the attention of the Court a 3rd indorsement of then Secretary of Education, Hon. Onofre D. Corpuz, of January 23, 1969 reading: Respectfully transmitted to the Honorable Commission of Civil Service, Manila. This has reference to a decision of that Office dated February 7, 1963 wherein for highly improper conduct (libel), Mrs. Conchita G. Villanos, a public school teacher was dismissed from the service. It appears that Mrs. Villanos was able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the immediate execution of the decision of that Office. On March 2, 1964, however, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVI through Judge Carmelino Alvendia rendered a decision declaring the aforesaid decision of that Office in Administrative Case 23917 null and void, thereby making the writ of preliminary junction permanent. It appears further that the decision of the Court of First Instance is on appeal to the Supreme Court. Records show that last December 31, 1968, Mrs. Conchita G. Villanos reached the compulsory retirement age of 65. Devoid of any means of livelihood, she is now requesting for whatever retirement benefits she is entitled to after long years of service in the government. It may be mentioned in this connection that in a 1st Indorsement dated May 18, 1961 that Office ruled that the compulsory retirement of one who has reached the age of 65 terminates the administrative proceedings against him. The Secretary of Justice, however, in Opinion No. 5, s. 1962 stated the the "retirement of an officer or employee does not, ... nullify or render moot the investigation of the administrative charges filed against him for delinquency or misconduct in Office, although it may render academic the imposition of certain penalties like removal, demotion or reduction in rank. The consequential penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits and leave privileges incidental to dismissal from the service for cause may still be given effect." However, the Honorable Commissioner of civil Service in a 1st Indorsement dated January 17, 1962 rendered an opinion that "only in case of investigation or prosecution of those offenses, as defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law and those in the Revised Penal Code on Bribery, may a public officer be prohibited from resigning or retiring." In view thereof, the within request of Mrs. Conchita G. Villanos is being transmitted to that Office for whatever action that Office deems proper to take on the matter. Further, information is being requested as to what Office "will give effect" to the forfeiture of retirement benefits incidental to dismissal from the service. It may be mentioned in this connection that considering the forty three years of service of Mrs. Villanos in the government and in consonance with decisional consensus (e.g., Lacson v. Roque, et al., 49 O.G. No. 1, p. 93 and 67 C.J.S. secs. 58, 61, 62 & 67) here and abroad that the construction of rules relating to administrative disciplinary action must be strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor of respondent employee, this Office will interpose no objection to the payment of whatever retirement benefits are due to Mrs. Conchita G. Villanos. We required further information from the parties, by Our resolution of December 5, 1969, as to whether or not appellee's purported retirement has actually materialized. In a manifestation dated January 19, 1970, all that appellee's counsel could say was that he transmitted copy of the resolution to his client by registered mail but he had not received any reply from her. 2 Under the circumstances, and in view of the above result We have arrived at, the Court has deemed it best to render this judgment, but this decision is not to be understood as upholding any of the views expressed by the different officials referred to in the above-quoted indorsement regarding the question of whether or not an official or employee in the civil service may allowed to resign before the termination of an administrative investigation being conducted against him, which question, We do not have to decide for the purposes this case.

Before closing, We may add the observation that the alleged fault of petitioner-appellee had no direct relation to her work. Besides, the alleged libel charged was contained in communications which were not public and could not, therefore, have been in any manner dangerous to the impressionable minds of the young students of the school where she was teaching, contrary to the contention of respondent-appellant. On the other hand, her impressive credentials and record of service, its length and highly rated efficiency are worthy of utmost consideration. It was improper for the respondent-appellant to completely ignore them in making his decision. It is to be presumed that petitioner-appellee knew better than to refuse to submit to an investigation duly ordered by competent authorities and that she would not deliberately throw away her valuable investments in her career in the public service by virtue actually foregoing her right to present her case fully. It is in this perspective that her position should have been viewed and construed. These observations, however, are not intended to hint in any way the Court's opinion as to petitioner-appellee's guilt or innocence which must be determined by the corresponding authorities after proper and full hearing, albeit, if the education authorities feel that it is best for all concerned to earlier put an end to the case against petitioner-appellee, the Court sees no insurmountable objection to their adopting the course of action suggested in the above communication of Secretary Corpuz which would naturally mean that, upon the resumption of the proceedings as a consequence of this decision, the administrative case against petitioner-appellee shall be immediately dismissed, without regard to the merits of the charge therein made and she will be granted all the benefits of retirement, if only to compensate the denial to her of due process that We have found above, which would be in the same fashion in essence to the dismissal of a criminal case without regard to the possible guilt or innocence of the accused when it appears that said accused is being denied speedy trial, which, to be sure, could be said not to be any more objectionable than the lengthy wait that petitioner-appellee was made to suffer in this case. WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is affirmed. No costs. Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ., concur. Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring: I concur in the main opinion of Justice Barredo but would go further than the concurring opinion of Justice Teehankee as to the disposition of this appeal. The pendency of an administrative case that had its origins in an offensive letter that was written on April 1, 1957 could, to my mind, no longer preclude the full enjoyment of retirement rights to which petitioner-appellee was entitled as of December 31, 1968, thus putting an end to an intolerable situation not traceable to petitioner-appellee. What has been so strongly put forth in both opinions as to the lengthy and honorable service of petitioner-appellee, except for that lapse for which she had presumably been dealt with according to our penal laws with the offended parties having been given satisfaction, suffices for me to reach the above result. Considering her age, and possibly her state of health, she should not be made to undergo another administrative investigation. The matter should be declared terminated. Castro, J., concurs.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: I concur with Mr. Justice Barredo's main opinion sustaining the trial Court's decision which declares null and void respondent commissioner's decision of dismissal, notwithstanding that ordinarily petitioner-appellee should have appealed the decision to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, as provided by law. However, the antecedents and merits of the subject administrative case of gross discourtesy and notoriously disgraceful language against petitioner have been substantially discussed before the Court. As far back as 1962, even without hearing petitioner's side, the maximum penalty that the Education department authorities recommended was transfer of station with reprimand and warning. 1 On January 23, 1969, then Education Secretary O. D.

Corpuz issued an indorsement to respondent commissioner noting that petitioner "reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 (on December 31, 1968). Devoid of any means of livelihood, she is now requesting for whatever retirement benefits she is entitled to after (43) years of service in the government" and that "this office will interpose no objection to the payment of whatever retirement benefits are due to (her)." By virtue of such indorsement and considering further that the main opinion notes that "the alleged fault of petitioner-appellee had no direct relation to her work," 2 and that the alleged libel charged was not contained in public communications, in contrast to her impressive credentials and length and record of service as a public school teacher with efficiency ratings of mostly 95%, I submit that in the interest of justice and equity and to avoid further undue delay and deprivation of petitioner of her right to her justly earned retirement benefits owing her for over three years now, the Court should direct that respondent commissioner accept the original recommendation of reprimanding petitioner (since transfer of station is now moot) and forthwith authorize the payment of all retirement benefit due to petitioner-appellee. This would render unnecessary the remand of the case for the holding yet of a "proper and full hearing" for the determination of petitioner-appellee's "guilt or innocence" on the administrative charge notwithstanding then Secretary Corpuz' endorsement and the Court's own views as above referred to, and which by the very time and delay entailed, would result in grave prejudice to petitioner who in her twilight years is in great need of the retirement benefits duly earned by her after forty-three years of faithful and efficient service. Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., concur.

credentials and length and record of service as a public school teacher with efficiency ratings of mostly 95%, I submit that in the interest of justice and equity and to avoid further undue delay and deprivation of petitioner of her right to her justly earned retirement benefits owing her for over three years now, the Court should direct that respondent commissioner accept the original recommendation of reprimanding petitioner (since transfer of station is now moot) and forthwith authorize the payment of all retirement benefit due to petitioner-appellee. This would render unnecessary the remand of the case for the holding yet of a "proper and full hearing" for the determination of petitioner-appellee's "guilt or innocence" on the administrative charge notwithstanding then Secretary Corpuz' endorsement and the Court's own views as above referred to, and which by the very time and delay entailed, would result in grave prejudice to petitioner who in her twilight years is in great need of the retirement benefits duly earned by her after forty-three years of faithful and efficient service. Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., concur.

Footnotes BARREDO, J.: 1 The pertinent portions of said decision read: "This is an administrative case against Mrs. Conchita G. Villanos, a Classroom Teacher in the Vigan Central School, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, for highly improper conduct. "In a decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 00189-R promulgated on December 31, 1960, confirmatory of that of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, respondent Conchita G. Villanos was convicted of the crime of libel and sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. The offended parties were Esperanza F. Sebastian and Anacleta Faypon, co-teachers of the respondent in the Vigan Elementary School. The libel against the offended parties was contained in a letter presented in the criminal prosecution of the respondent as Exhibit 'A' and reproduced in its entirety in the criminal complaint. Both courts that condemned the respondent found the letter libelous per se. A cursory reading of the same erases any doubt as to its character. The Court of Appeals made the additional remark that the respondent went 'beyond limits by insulting and slandering not only the complainants but also their mothers.' In the case of People vs. Alcabao, 44 O.G. 5006, the Court of Appeals ruled that the remark coming from a minor 'putang ina mo' is a clear indication of the minor's perverted character. This Office is of the belief that the word contained in Exh.'A', coming as they are from a public school teacher, underwrites its author as unfit for the role of moulder of the Filipino youth's character. In view of the foregoing, respondent Conchita G. Villanos is found guilty as charged for which she is hereby dismissed from the service effective on her last day of service with pay. In the public interest, it is hereby ordered that this decision be executed immediately." 2 Counsel's attention is called to the fact that resolutions of the Court are to be attended to with less indifference than what his manifestation evidences, since it does not appear that counsel has exerted maximum effort to comply with the Court's resolution. A similar nonchalant attitude in the future will be properly dealt with. TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: 1 At page 4, main op.

Separate Opinions FERNANDO, J., concurring: I concur in the main opinion of Justice Barredo but would go further than the concurring opinion of Justice Teehankee as to the disposition of this appeal. The pendency of an administrative case that had its origins in an offensive letter that was written on April 1, 1957 could, to my mind, no longer preclude the full enjoyment of retirement rights to which petitioner-appellee was entitled as of December 31, 1968, thus putting an end to an intolerable situation not traceable to petitioner-appellee. What has been so strongly put forth in both opinions as to the lengthy and honorable service of petitioner-appellee, except for that lapse for which she had presumably been dealt with according to our penal laws with the offended parties having been given satisfaction, suffices for me to reach the above result. Considering her age, and possibly her state of health, she should not be made to undergo another administrative investigation. The matter should be declared terminated. Castro, J., concurs. TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: I concur with Mr. Justice Barredo's main opinion sustaining the trial Court's decision which declares null and void respondent commissioner's decision of dismissal, notwithstanding that ordinarily petitioner-appellee should have appealed the decision to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, as provided by law. However, the antecedents and merits of the subject administrative case of gross discourtesy and notoriously disgraceful language against petitioner have been substantially discussed before the Court. As far back as 1962, even without hearing petitioner's side, the maximum penalty that the Education department authorities recommended was transfer of station with reprimand and warning. 1 On January 23, 1969, then Education Secretary O. D. Corpuz issued an indorsement to respondent commissioner noting that petitioner "reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 (on December 31, 1968). Devoid of any means of livelihood, she is now requesting for whatever retirement benefits she is entitled to after (43) years of service in the government" and that "this office will interpose no objection to the payment of whatever retirement benefits are due to (her)." By virtue of such indorsement and considering further that the main opinion notes that "the alleged fault of petitioner-appellee had no direct relation to her work," 2 and that the alleged libel charged was not contained in public communications, in contrast to her impressive

2 At pages 2, 13, main op.