NPC Power System Protection Philosophy

POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION PHILOSOPHY AND GUIDELINES
Approved by:
____________________ L. S. CRUZ VP NLRC
____________________ R. T. BACANI OIC, S.O.
____________________ A. T. CORPUZ VP - SLRC
Dated: ______________
NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ITEM 1.0 2.0 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.2.3 3.2.4 3.2.5 3.2.6 3.2.7 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 4.0 SUBJECT Philosophy of Protection Principles of TRANSCO Protective Relaying Appendix Planning and Design Affecting Protection System Component Protection Line Protection Bus Protection Transformer Protection Generator Protection Shunt Reactor Protection Series Capacitor Protection Shunt Capacito Protection Breaker Failure Communication Channels Thermal Capacity of Current Transformers and Relays DC Control Power Factors Affecting Shielding and Grounding of Control Cables System Monitoring Under-frequency Protection Relay Maintenance and Testing Guide References PAGE NO. 4 5 9 9 13 13 24 26 29 34 36 38 40 42 46 47 49 52 54 55 60
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POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION PHILOSOPHY AND GUIDELINES

The National Power Corporation has established the philosophy and guidelines regarding matters affecting the power system within NPCs grids. It recognizes that the selection, setting, and maintenance of protective relays affect the reliability of the interconnected network. Accordingly, everyone connected to the system shall use this set of philosophy and guideline for the relay protection of major interconnections and important intra-company transmission as well as distribution elements. It is recognized that the application of this Guide will vary to some degree between companies to cover local conditions and individual system characteristics. An appendix detailing methods by which these principles and procedures can be realized is included.
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1.0 PHILOSOPHY OF PROTECTION

It is recognized that the application of protective relay equipment is not a precise science; therefore, inflexible rules cannot be formulated. However, the following design and operating criteria specify the basic objectives, which all protective systems must adhere to as completely as equipment and technology permit. 1. Remove the faulted section from the power system to prevent or minimize further effect on the normal operation of the unfaulted parts of the system. 2. Minimize or prevent damage to apparatus thus permitting faster restoration of service. 3. Provide alternate means for removing faulted equipment from the power system in the unlikely event that the primary protection should fail. This is to be done with a minimum of disturbance to the rest of the system. 4. Recognize when a catastrophic failure is imminent or has occurred, and take the necessary steps to minimize the disturbances and facilitate the speedy restoration of the affected area. 5. Respond correctly to the effect of heavy load surges and power swings. The operation of protective systems should be prevented when these conditions will not cause damage or adversely affect normal operation of the system.
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2.0 PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING

To achieve the objectives specified in the Philosophy of Protection, everyone connected to the system shall agree to install and maintain protective systems that have the following attributes: 1. Reliability - dependably detects and clears all types of electrical failures and still provides essential security against incorrect operations. 2. Selectivity - maintain continuity of service through the isolation of only the faulted parts of the system. 3. Speed - provide operation in the fastest time possible, consistent with 1 and 2 above. 4. Simplicity - install the minimum amount of equipment and circuitry to achieve the above. 2.1 PRIMARY PROTECTION Application of protective relays is based on the premise that electrical equipment failures will occur. Thus, no portion of the power system should be left unprotected. The protection provided will in general cover four main categories: 1. Transmission Lines 2. Transformers, Reactors, and Capacitors 3. Station Buses 4. Rotating Machinery 2.1.1 Transmission Lines Transmission lines must be protected against all types of faults: phase-to-phase, phase-to-ground, two phase-to-ground, and three phase. The protection should discriminate between short circuit and load current thus permitting loading of lines to maximum capacity while still ensuring that all faults will be detected. Bulk power transmission lines require high-speed primary relaying that will simultaneously trip all phases at all terminals of the line for all multi-phase internal faults. In some cases, a second primary system may be required. Simultaneous single pole tripping at each terminal may be used for single phase-to-ground faults.
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2.1.2 Transformers, Shunt Reactors and Capacitors, and Series Capacitors Transformers and reactors associated with the bulk power systems must be provided with high-speed protection. Transformer protection must be capable of distinguishing between fault current and magnetizing in-rush current. When in-rush or heavy external fault currents exist, means will be provided to prevent misoperation of differential relays due to instrument transformer errors. Gas analysis, pressure, and temperature relays can be used for tripping or alarming where it is practical and expedient. Shunt capacitors are connected to a bus or tapped to a line through a breaker or disconnect switch. The protection scheme employed must consider preventing the capacitor bank from being stressed beyond its voltage rating under non-fault conditions, and preventing the line breakers from reclosing into a charged capacitor bank during trip and reclose operations when the capacitor is tapped on a transmission line. Series capacitor protection is largely dependent upon the line impedance, fault current, and type of line protection. Line protection using phase comparison relays is not affected by series capacitors. Distance relays can be applied, provided proper account is made of the capacitor shorting gaps or zinc-oxide varistors (ZnO), sometimes referred to as metal oxide varistors (MOV), although additional time may be required. 2.1.3 Station Buses All generating plant and bulk power station buses must be provided with high-speed protection. This protection must discriminate between faults on the bus and those which occur external to the protected zone. Means must be provided to prevent misoperation of the relays due to instrument transformer errors. 2.1.4 Rotating Machinery Generators and synchronous condensers must be provided with high-speed protection. This protection must discriminate between faults within the protected zone and external faults or heavy loads. In addition, protective equipment may be provided that will recognize such things as (but not limited to) excessive heating, unbalanced loading of the machine, and stator ground. Loss of field protection may be provided where the loss of excitation will adversely affect the system or result in machine damage. The above protective equipment can be used to either trip or alarm.
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2.2 BACKUP PROTECTION Since any element of the protective system may fail, faults which are not cleared by primary protection must be detected and cleared by backup devices using various combinations of relays and communication facilities. Backup or alternate relaying may not isolate the faulted equipment in as fast a time, or with as minimum and amount of system disturbance, that is obtained with primary relaying, but it must operate in such a manner as to assure the security of the remaining system. Backup relaying can be either remote or local depending on the particular system and situation involved. 2.3 SETTINGS Relay settings, including backup timing, require a considerable amount of judgment, compromise, and coordination. Specific guidelines and factors are covered in the Appendix. In general, settings must be such that relays will: 1. Operate for minimum fault values, considering all credible system operating conditions 2. Permit required maximum emergency loading 3. Permit recoverable swings to occur without incorrect tripping 4. Operate before system stability is jeopardized 2.4 STATION EQUIPMENT A variety of equipment that is not normally classified as protective equipment must be considered as an integral part of the protective system. Batteries are the prime source of tripping and control power; their correct application and proper maintenance are fundamental to adequate protection. Battery capacity should be reviewed periodically to determine that it is sufficient. The charging equipment should be carefully selected to coordinate with the battery size and load. Monitoring should be provided to detect abnormal battery conditions. Control cable type, size, and layout can affect the proper operation of the protective equipment. The need for and the method of, shielding and grounding of control circuits are also a vital consideration. The number of panels and the individual panel layouts are important to the degree of separation between protection schemes.
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The proper analysis of system disturbances requires adequate automatic fault recording devices. Sufficient equipment should be provided to monitor both the internal and interconnected transmission system. 2.5 SPECIAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS (SPS) Transfer-Tripping Schemes, also known as Special Protection Systems (SPS) or Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) in other countries, are relay configurations designed to perform functions other than the isolation of electrical faults. SPS are usually installed to maximize transfer capability, however, they are also sometimes used to maintain system stability, control power flows on critical facilities immediately following a disturbance on a system, or to separate a system at pre-planned locations to prevent cascading. The use of SPS may expose the system to risks exceeding NPCs reliability criteria since the integrity of the system depends on their correct operation. In those situations where misoperation of the SPS could lead to a cascading outage of the bulk power system, SPS should not be used as a substitute for the planning, construction and operation of adequate facilities 2.6 NON-UTILITY GENERATING FACILITIES EMBEDDED WITHIN DISTRIBUTORS CONNECTED TO THE GRID Non-Utility generators and their connecting host utilities simultaneously perceive the same operating conditions and must be design-coordinated to maintain the reliability of the bulk power system. Each distributor connecting to the system shall provide its own guideline document for interconnection of customer-owned generators or independent power producers' generators to cover local conditions and individual system characteristics. The US NERC publication, "Reliability Considerations for Integrating Non-Utility Generating Facilities with the Bulk Electric Systems" and this Guide shall be used for reference when such guidelines are prepared.
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3.0 APPENDIX
3.1 PLANNING AND DESIGN AFFECTING PROTECTION 3.1.1 Bus Arrangements Today's station designs run the gamut from the very simple single bus with no bypass arrangements, to rather sophisticated ring, double breaker, breaker-and-ahalf, breaker-and-a-third, etc., arrangements. Typical arrangements are shown in Figures 3.1 through 3.6. Each of these has its own merit and associated problems that must be evaluated in light of the particular requirements of the station as part of the associated electrical system. Each bus arrangement must be the simplest possible consistent with maintenance, operating, and system reliability requirements. When making a selection, the location of voltage and current transformers, the absence or presence of circuit breakers and their resultant effect upon the protective relaying and control circuitry must be considered as a part of the overall station design. The probability of certain types or locations of faults and consideration of second and third contingencies must be carefully weighed against the complexities introduced into the relay and control circuitry. Care must be taken to insure that overall security is not inadvertently sacrificed by the use of a complex protective scheme. The single bus, single breaker per line arrangement with no bypass facilities as shown in Figure 3.1 can be protected by a simple, uncomplicated and secure relay scheme. Line faults are cleared by tripping a single breaker with relays that are supplied current from current transformers located within the line breaker and voltage supplied from bus or line voltage sources. With this arrangement, breaker failure protection clears a faulty breaker by local tripping of all remaining feeds to the bus. There is, therefore, no requirement for any type of transfer-trip facility. This type of bus arrangement may not be acceptable because of other requirements such as maintenance, system operation, etc., depending on the design and adequacy of the electrical system surrounding the bus.
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Sin gle Bu s - Sin gle Br ea ker F igu r e 3.1
Sin gle Bu s - Sin gle Br ea ker wit h By-P a ss F a cilit ies F igu r e 3.2

Alt er n a t e Bu s wit h Spa r e Bkr . F igu r e 3.3

Dou ble Bu s - Dou ble Br ea ker F igu r e 3.4

Rin g Bu s F igu r e 3.5

Br ea ker -An d-A-H a lf F igu r e 3.6
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When lines cannot be opened for the maintenance of breakers, or an entire bus removed from service for maintenance, or interrupted by breaker failure protection, other configurations must be used. These take the form of alternate buses, alternate breakers, bus sectionalizing, bypass switching, etc., all of which tend to complicate the protective relaying system. The more operating and maintenance flexibility that is built into a bus arrangement, the more complicated the relaying and control circuitry may become. Ultimately, a point will be reached where the relay and control scheme complexity jeopardizes the security and dependability desired for in the station design. This is particularly true when the protective schemes bear the burden of too few circuit breakers. 3.1.2 Line Arrangements Like station buses, the least complicated line configuration lends itself to the least complex relay protective system. Double circuit lines or lines in close proximity on the same right-of-way are more difficult to relay than are isolated single circuit lines. Two terminal lines are less troublesome than three terminal lines. Where three terminal lines must be utilized, the relay problem may be appreciably lessened if all three legs are of similar electrical length. With multi-terminal line arrangements, the amount of in-feed from any leg at the junction can materially affect the reach of distance relays at the other line terminals; in some cases the loadability of these lines may be limited by the required relay settings. Additional relaying equipment may be necessary to properly protect three terminal lines, especially if one terminal is a weak source. In-feed is also important on transmission lines with long tap lines or with large generating sources connected between terminals. Very long lines may require special relaying (e.g. blinders, lens characteristics) in order that their load carrying ability is not restricted by the relay settings. Conversely, very short lines present problems in applying relays which will provide fast protection but not overreach or fail to trip due to fault-arc resistance. Six-wired lines present difficult relaying problems unless cross-tied at many points along the line. For example, if one conductor of a phase pair breaks loose near one terminal and falls to the ground, the relays at that terminal are required to reach the line length to the first cross tie point and back again to see the fault. Phase spacing and conductor size are important since they affect short circuit current magnitude and distribution. However, these parameters are normally determined by other than protective relay considerations.
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3.1.3 Unit Arrangements Modern large generating units are designed into one of two configurations, tandem or cross compound. The tandem unit is easier to protect with relays than the cross compound unit due mainly to the various configurations possible with the cross compound unit. Since the cross compound unit configuration involves two physically separate generating units, the electrical connections to the transmission system will generally follow one of the three following patterns:
^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^

Figure 3.7
^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^
Figure 3.8
^^^^^ ^^^^^
^^^^^ ^^^^^
Figure 3.9
A tandem arrangement normally will take the following form:
< < < < < < <
< < < < < < <
Figure 3.10
The cross compound unit arrangement involves a greater number of relays, and may necessitate more complex electrical circuitry and tripping considerations than the tandem unit arrangement. 3.1.4 System Constants Protective relay systems are designed to recognize abnormal conditions existing in an electrical network, and cause operation of circuit breakers and other switching devices to correct and/or isolate the abnormal portion. Their operation involves the measurement of the various circuit quantities which determine whether a system is in a normal or an abnormal state. These quantities are basically voltage, current and frequency, and the instantaneous relationship between them. Not only are
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magnitude and direction of concern, but also rate-of-change of these various quantities. In general, the more radical the deviation of these quantities from the normal, the easier it is to detect an undesirable or untenable situation. On the other hand, a certain amount of time is necessary to effect corrective action. During that time interval, it is desirable that other quantities stay as nearly normal as possible. For example, a line-to-ground fault should cause sufficient deviation of current and voltage from normal to permit rapid detection, but ideally, system frequency and generating unit stability should not be affected significantly. In view of the above, the relay engineer is concerned about any system parameter which has an effect on the quantities used by the protective relays for monitoring system condition. Transformer impedances, type of connection (delta-delta, deltawye, wye-wye), multi winding, autotransformers (with and without tertiary windings), grounded or ungrounded, and, if grounded, whether solidly or through an impedance are all factors affecting fault current magnitude. Transient and dynamic stability are also important considerations. Conductor size and phase spacing of transmission lines are generally determined by considerations other than relaying; however, the resulting resistance and reactance are of concern to the relay engineer. Mutual coupling between lines is another consideration which cannot be ignored. Faults on one line are reflected in the adjacent line and, if not recognized as such, may cause incorrect tripping of the unfaulted line. 3.1.5 Summary In all of the above areas, Bus Arrangements, Line Arrangements, Unit Arrangements, and System Constants, protective relaying considerations alone will not determine the final design of equipment and facilities utilized in the electrical system. When systems are designed, however, the relaying requirements must be weighed with all other considerations in arriving at an overall design which will provide the required security and reliability demanded. 3.2 SYSTEM COMPONENT PROTECTION 3.2.1 Line Protection 3.2.1.1 Primary Protection of major inter-company interconnections and important intra-company transmission lines should consist of two separate relay systems, one of which shall be of the pilot type that utilizes a reliable and secure communication channel to link
NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM PAGE 13
the terminals of the line together. The pilot system must provide high speed, simultaneous clearing at all line terminals during internal fault conditions (three phase, phase-to-phase, two phase-to-ground, and single phase-to-ground). In general, pilot relaying systems can be divided into three groups: fault location using directional comparison, fault location using phase comparison, and fault location using pilot-wire line relaying. The communication links between the transmission line terminals may be a metallic circuit, an audio tone channel, power line carrier, a multiplexed channel in a high-speed data communication system utilizing microwave or optical fibers, or a dedicated optical fiber or microwave channel. Reliability and security dictate the choice of the communication medium. 3.2.1.2 Redundancy and Backup The second system may not be as fast as the pilot system in its operation for all fault types and locations, but it should operate as fast as is required. Due consideration must be given to system stability, and coordinating with backup relays on adjacent line sections and/or other zones of protection. For maximum reliability, independent current and potential sources for each relay system should be provided. Isolation of the DC potential supply for the protective equipment from that of the control elements is desirable and may be accomplished in a variety of ways. Each circuit breaker closing circuit should be independently fused or breakered. Trip circuits may be connected directly to the source of DC potential. If the trip circuits are fused or breakered, each trip circuit should be isolated from all other circuits. Virtually complete redundancy can be obtained by using dual batteries and trip coils. 3.2.1.3 Settings The following guides are based on typical line configurations. Special system configurations, stability requirements, maintenance requirements and other factors may require alternate schemes, zone reach, and time settings not covered in this guide. The factors involved in determining a line relay setting for either primary or backup protection include the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. Fault current and voltage magnitude, and phase angle at the relay. Line and equipment impedance. Power swings. Normal and abnormal system configurations.
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5. 6. 7.
Equipment rating. Type and function of the relays. Minimum relay operating quantities.
3.2.1.3.1 Phase Distance Relay SettingsTwo Terminal Lines 3.2.1.3.1.1 Zone ReachesPhase Distance Relay Zone 1 The first zone element trips instantaneously and is independent of the pilot channel. Depending on the relay type and line angle, distance relays that have limited transient overreach should be set for approximately 65% to 90% of the electrical line length to the farthest terminal. Zone 2 The second zone element, when used to stop carrier and/or trip as backup should be set for a minimum reach of 130% of the protected line. An attempt should be made to achieve a reach of 90% of the sum of the protected line plus 70% of the shortest adjacent line with consideration given to minimum infeed for any reasonable system contingency.
ZONE 2 SETTING Zone 2 Reach i. Z2min Reach
Z 2 min =
ii.
13 2 X1+ X 0 + X 0M . 3 1 + KN 2
Z2max Reach Adjacent line section is a single circuit line.
1. Case 1.
21
(a)
(b)
(c)
Z2 max = 90%[Zab + 70%(Zbc)]
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2. Case 2.
21
Adjacent line section is a double circuit line terminating on the same bus.
(a)
(b)
(c)
Z2 max = 90%[Zab + 45% Zbc(shorter line)] 3. Case 3. Adjacent line section consists of three circuits terminating on the same bus.
21
(a)
(b)
(c)
Z2 max = 90%[Zab + 33%Zbc(shorter line)] 4. Case 4. 4a .

(a)
21
Adjacent line sections consist of two circuits not terminating on the same bus.
(b) (c) (d)
Z2 max = 90%[Zab + 70%Zbc(shorter line)] 4b.

(a)
21
(b)
(c)
(d)
Z2 max = 90%[Zab + 45% Zbc(shorter line)] or Z2 max = 90%[Zab + 70%(Zbd)] whichever has the lower impedance. 5. Case 5. bus. Adjacent line sections consist of three circuits not terminating on the same
(b) (a) (d)
21
(c)
(e)
Z2 max = 90%[Zab + 70% Zbc(shortest line)]
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6. Case 6.
Four or more adjacent line sections where infeeds and outfeeds can occur.
(a)
21
1 2 3
(b)
6 7 8
(c)
4 5
6a. Apply a three phase bus fault at the remote bus and determine the number of infeeds. 6b. If there are 5-6 infeeds eliminate three infeeds. If there are 7-10 infeeds eliminate four infeeds. If there are more than 10 infeeds eliminate five infeeds. Note: Depending on the number of infeeds, always eliminate one line of multiple circuit lines with the largest infeeds before eliminating the other large infeeds from single circuit lines. 6c. Check the setting sheets for Zone 1 reach settings of all adjacent lines. If no Zone 1 setting is less than 75%, apply a three phase sliding fault at 75% at each of the remaining lines. Otherwise, apply a three phase sliding fault at 60% at each of the remaining lines. 6d. Z2 max = 90%(Zappshortest) or 90%(Vr/Ir)
6e. If no fault studies are available, Z2 max = 90%[Zab + 75%(Zbc)] Note: This should be used only if an immediate setting is required. However, the setting should be reviewed as soon as possible using more exact methods. 7. Case 7. Adjacent section is a transformer.
(a)
21
(b)
(c)
Z2 max = 85%[Zab + Zbc] 8. Case 8. Adjacent section is N - number of transformer.

(b) (a)
21 N 1
(c)
Z2 max = 85%[Zab + Zbc(parallel equiv.) ]
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9. Case 9.
Adjacent section is a line and N - number of transformers.

(b) (a)
21 N 1
(c)
(d)
Z2 max = 85%[Zab + Zbc(parallel equiv.)] Z2 max = 90%[Zab + 70%Zbd ]
or whichever is smaller.
ADDITIONAL NOTES TO REMEMBER: 1. For radial generation set Z2 to minimum reach only. Zone 3 The third zone, when used for remote backup, should be set as follows: 1. For remote backup trip or when used for dual duty such as carrier trip and remote backup, the third zone reach should be set for a minimum of 120% of the sum of the protected line plus the longest adjacent circuit. 2. Unless there is inadequate fault sensitivity, the setting should not limit the maximum load which the line is expected to carry.
ZONE 3 SETTING
Zone 3 Reach Z3min = 120% (protected line section + largest adjacent line section) Z3max = 120% (largest apparent impedance seen by the relay for a second bus line end fault) IMPORTANT NOTE TO CONSIDER: If Zone 3 reach has been clipped due to hardware limitation, reduce the CTR so it would result to a longer Zone 3 reach. However, the primary of the CTR must not be less than 80% of line ampacity. CHECKING OF ZONE 3 REACH: 1. Apply a three phase line end fault at third busses from the relay being set. In no instance shall the impedances seen by the relay be lower than the Zone 3 reach. If this situation cannot be achieved, increase Zone 3 timer to 1500 msec.
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3.2.1.3.1.2 Coordinating and Operating TimesPhase Distance Relays Two Terminal Lines Zone 2 operating times should be 0.40 seconds (24 cycles) to limit fault damage and minimize system instability. This setting assumes a 10-cycle margin above a fault clearing time of, at most, 5 to 8 cycles on lines within reach of Zone 2. These times may have to be increased if a local breaker failure backup timer is used (Refer to Breaker Failure Section 3.4). Zone 3 should be from 1.2 seconds (72 cycles) or a 10-cycle margin above the clearing time of the line within its reach. Where system conditions and equipment permit, faster operating times may be employed. If the second or third zones overlap their counterparts on adjacent lines under normal system conditions, then longer time settings are required for coordination provided that it does not violate the stability limit of the generators within the area. 3.2.1.3.1.3 Ground Overcurrent Relay SettingsTwo Terminal Lines At high multiples of pickup, backup time overcurrent ground relays should in general have a coordinating time in the range of 0.15 seconds with other ground relays. The time overcurrent unit pickup should be as low as practical, considering such problems as mutual induction, arc resistance, ground resistance, and pickup with remote ground over-current relays, and no higher than 67% of the minimum ground fault current. The instantaneous unit pickup should be at least 1.3 times the maximum through fault current for which the relay must not operate. This can be less if the relay is not sensitive to transient overreach. The ratio of carrier trip to carrier start ground overcurrent relay pickup settings should be in the order of 1.5/1 to 2/1. 3.2.1.3.2 Phase Distance Relay SettingsThree Terminal Lines 3.2.1.3.2.1 Zone ReachesPhase Distance Relay Zone 1 The first zone instantaneous element trips independently of the carrier. Depending on the relay type and line angle, distance relays that have limited transient overreach should be set for approximately 80% to 90% of the electrical line length, without in-feed, to the nearest terminal. Zone 2
The second zone element when used for carrier trip, remote backup trip, or combinations of these two functions should be set as follows: 1. For carrier stop and carrier trip, a minimum of 120% of the maximum, apparent impedance to the farthest terminal. 2. For remote backup, a minimum of 110% of the maximum apparent impedance to the far end of the longest adjacent line at either remote terminal, but never less than 120% of the protected circuit. 3. Zone 2 should not overreach first zones on adjacent lines at either remote terminal with the third terminal open (two terminal operations). If it does, then additional coordination time will be necessary or the reach can be reduced and a third zone added. Zone 3 A forward-looking third zone, when used for carrier trip, remote backup, or a combination of these two functions should be set as follows: 1. For carrier trip, reach a minimum of 120% of the maximum apparent impedance to the farthest terminal. 2. For remote backup, reach a minimum of 110% of the maximum apparent impedance to the far end of the longest adjacent line at both remote terminals, but never less than 120% of the protected circuit. 3. Under no circumstances should the zone setting limit the maximum load which the line is expected to carry, giving due consideration to fault sensitivity. If the third zone element is reversed and used to start carrier or trip in reversed third zone backup, its setting should: 1. Exceed the reach of the farthest reaching carrier setting by 25% at the remote end (carrier stop unit at opposite end less the impedance of the protected line without in-feed). 2. Reach 110% of the maximum apparent impedance of the longest adjacent line. 3. Not limit the maximum load which the line is expected to carry, giving due consideration to fault sensitivity. 3.2.1.3.2.2 Coordinating TimesPhase Distance RelaysThree Terminal Lines
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Time coordination is the same as for two terminal lines except that the overlapping of adjacent second and third zones is far more apt to occur, resulting in longer timer settings for coordination. 3.2.1.3.2.3 Ground Overcurrent Relay SettingsThree Terminal Lines Time coordination for three terminal lines is the same as for two terminal lines with the following exceptions: 1. The instantaneous unit pickup should be at least 1.3 times the maximum fault current resulting from a ground fault at either remote terminal with the other remote terminal open This setting can be less than 1.3 if design of relay is not susceptible to in-rush transient overreach. 2. The ratio of carrier trip to carrier start ground overcurrent relay pickup settings should be at least 2.5/1. 3.2.1.3.3 Ground Distance Relays The settings for ground distance relays, in general, require a reach setting for zones 1, 2, and 3 , a timer setting for zones 2 and 3, a reach setting for the zero sequence overcurrent ground fault detector, and a reach setting for zero sequence compensation. The following guides are based on a solidly grounded system composed entirely of overhead transmission lines for which the positive and zero sequence impedance of the lines have approximately the same angle. 3.2.1.3.3.1 Zone Reaches -- Ground Distance Relay Zone 1 The first zone unit provides for instantaneous tripping and should be set to reach approximately 70% to 85% of the line length to the opposite terminal, depending on the accuracy of the calculated zero sequences impedance of the line, the calculated zero sequence mutual effect of parallel lines, and how well these effects can be compensated (See Zone 2). On three terminal lines, the reach should be 70% to 85% to the nearest remote terminal without infeed. Zone 2 and Zone 3 For time delay tripping, the second and third zone should be set using the same criteria as the second and third zone phase distance relays. However, ground distance relays must be set taking the following into account:
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1. Minimum in-feed at the far bus for a reasonable system contingency 2. Improper compensation for mutual coupling due to an open circuit breaker on a parallel line 3. Uncompensated mutual coupling due to partial parallel circuits. This criteria is to be use for both two and three terminal lines. 3.2.1.3.3.2 Coordinating TimesGround Distance Relay Zone 2 and Zone 3 The second and third zone coordinating times should be set using the same criteria as the second and third zone phase distance relays. 3.2.1.3.3.3 Zero Sequence Overcurrent Ground Used With Ground Distance Relays Set the pickup low enough to detect all single phase-to-ground faults within the reach of Zone 3. (Refer to faul t study) 3.2.1.3.4 Phase Comparison Carrier Relays The phase comparison carrier relaying system uses only line current to detect and locate both phase and ground faults. Settings are required at each terminal for a low set fault detector, which starts carrier to block tripping, and a high set fault detector, which operates to trip if the fault is within the protected zone. The following guides are based on typical line configurations, using phase comparison carrier relays and ground distance relays with overcurrent fault detectors. Certain applications may require distance relay fault detectors. For normal applications on two terminal lines, the fault detector settings are determined by the maximum load current and the minimum fault current. 3.2.1.3.4.1 Low Set Fault DetectorPhase Comparison Relays The positive sequence setting of the low set fault detector should be 1.33 times the maximum load current. This setting assumes that the unit will reset at 75% of pickup, enabling it to reset after an external fault has cleared and load current continues to flow. 3.2.1.3.4.2 High Set Fault DetectorPhase Comparison Relays
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The positive sequence pickup of the high set fault detector for two terminal lines should be 1.25 times the pickup of the low set fault detector and 2.5 times for three terminal lines. The minimum fault current should be at least 1.2 times the high set fault detector setting to insure tripping for internal faults. Fault detectors of similar function must be set for the same pickup at all terminals in order to insure correct blocking for external faults. For static phase comparison relay setting, refer to the manufacturers application information. 3.2.1.4 ReclosingTransmission Lines 3.2.1.4.1 High Speed With modern high speed relay systems and circuit breakers, there is a good chance that line faults will remain transient in nature. Fast clearing tends to minimize the effect of the fault on the systems involved and limits the damage of equipment. High speed reclosing in conjunction with the high speed relays and circuit breakers helps maintain the integrity of the interconnected systems and should be used whenever equipment considerations do not prevent its use. In most cases, successful high speed reclosing increases the amount of power that can be transmitted without endangering system stability. In addition, the rapid restoration of any element of a system greatly reduces the possibility of simultaneous outages. Both normal and emergency power transfer requirements increase the need to minimize interruption of system interconnections. Factors to be evaluated when considering a high speed reclosing scheme include: 1. 2. 3. 4. The effect on stability. The characteristics of tapped loads. Switching Surges. Proximity to generators (potential for high turbine shaft torques).
The operating time of the high speed reclosing schemes will depend upon the inherent characteristics of the particular scheme used. There are nominal minimum values according to the voltage class of the circuit. Depending on the nature of the fault, the reclosing time must be increased to allow dispersion of the arc products and thus avoid a recurrence of the fault. These minimum times are in the order of 24 cycles for single phase tripping and 30 cycles for three phase tripping.
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3.2.1.4.2 Delayed The consideration of a delayed automatic reclosing feature is independent of the need or desirability to reclose at high speed. It depends primarily upon the effect of the loss of the interconnection upon the overall transmission system, and whether or not there are station operators or supervisory control available to restore the circuit. Even in the latter case, there is merit in not burdening operators with this function in that they also may be involved with other system problems when the interconnection is needed most. Delayed reclosing may incorporate an unsupervised timer, a hot-bus/dead-line or hot-line/dead-bus potential sensing scheme, a synchronism check relay, or a combination of these. Consideration should be given to delayed automatic reclosing in the event that high speed reclosing is not used or at times is not successful, even though operators or supervisory control are available. The indiscriminate application and setting of synchronism check relays is not recommended. The permissible closing angle of the relay must be reviewed each time the power system configuration is changed. Too narrow a setting may prevent timely restoration of the system after a major disturbance. On the other hand, too wide a setting may create a power swing which may trip other lines within the system. Consideration should be given to omitting synchronism check relays on tightly integrated networks. If supervisory control is available, synchronism indication should be used in lieu of supervising the remote closing function with the synchronism check relay. 3.2.1.5 Thermal Thermal protection of transmission lines and associated equipment must be treated as a distinct subject. It is important that the loadability point of protective relays (such as distance relays or directional overcurrent relays) should not be construed as providing thermal overload protection. Therefore, dependence must be placed on the system design and operating practices. 3.2.2 Bus Protection 3.2.2.1 Primary Buses that are part of inter-company interconnections and major intra-company connections should preferably be protected by a high impedance voltage differential, a restrained moderately high impedance voltage differential, or the linear coupler system. These types are preferred because they differentiate between internal and external faults with fidelity. Unlike other forms of differential protection, these types are not subject to misoperation due to current transformer saturation.
In some station designs, the bus may be included as part of a line or transformer connection. Therefore, separate bus protection may not be required.
3.2.2.2 Redundancy and Backup Bus backup protection should be provided. For example, second zones of remote distance relays would operate to clear all lines from a faulted bus. Other equipment connected to the bus, such as generators and transformers, should also be provided with backup protection scheme. When remote backup relaying is too slow, it may be necessary to use a duplicate primary bus protection scheme with both schemes set to operate without time delay. For multiple bus arrangements, a local breaker failure relay scheme should be used in conjunction with the remote backup. Maximum reliability is obtained in the relaying and control when Section 3.2.1.2 Redundancy and Backup is followed. 3.2.2.3 Settings The setting of the bus protective relays for the different schemes used is based on the maximum and minimum fault current, current transformer or linear coupler characteristics, and current transformer ratio used. There is no intentional time delay inserted in the operation of primary bus protective relays. The restrained moderately high impedance voltage differential relay requires consideration of maximum bus load currents. 3.2.2.4 Reclosing System reliability may be improved if transmission switching station buses are automatically re-energized after a fault. Only one circuit is used to test the bus and it must provide adequate current to cause differential relay operation if the fault is still on the bus at the time of reclosing. A second trip should lock open all the breakers on the bus. In the majority of the cases, however, the bus will remain energized and it will then be possible to close the other circuits to the bus. The possibility of reclosing into a fault with adverse effects on system stability should be examined. 3.2.2.5 Thermal Bus differential relaying does not provide thermal protection for buses, since this protection must be provided by design and operating practices.
3.2.3 Transformer Protection 3.2.3.1 Primary Primary protection for power transformer banks associated with the bulk power system will be high speed differential relaying, preferably the harmonic restraint type. 3.2.3.2 Redundancy and Backup Transformer backup relays may be a duplicate differential, directional comparison, impedance, directional and non-directional overcurrent, oil or gas pressure, and gas detector types. In selecting a backup scheme, the transformer size, connections, impedance, and system characteristics at the transformer location must be considered. Other factors such as in-rush current, emergency load carrying requirements, and coordination with other protective devices must be taken into account when applying backup relays other than the differential scheme. 3.2.3.2.1 Overcurrent This type of protection is not recommended as the sole backup protection for transformer faults on the bulk power system. 3.2.3.2.2 Fault Pressure This type of protection operates on the rate of change of transformer oil or gas pressure. Both the gas and oil type are designed to operate on incipient and low level type faults. Each has the capability of detecting a fault below the sensitivity level of the ordinary differential relay. However, experience has indicated that the relay is not completely secure against misoperation. It is an excellent means of supplementing differential transformer relaying if a slightly reduced level of security is acceptable. When it is desired to retain tripping for low level faults without sacrificing security, an overcurrent blocking scheme can be used. The scheme blocks fault pressure relay tripping for high currents, which might result from faults external to the transformer.
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3.2.3.2.3 Gas Detector and Analysis Incipient faults produce combustible gas by-products by decomposition of the transformer oil and insulating material. These faults can be detected by measuring the amount of accumulated gas or by an analysis that indicates the presence of combustibles in the gas. Gas detector relays measure the amount of accumulated combustibles in the gas and, upon reaching a predetermined level, operate to give an alarm. Periodic batch sampling and analysis of the transformer gas for combustibles is also a recommended procedure. Where applicable, these devices and tests are desirable supplements to transformer protection. 3.2.3.2.4 Over-excitation Protection against transformer over-excitation can be provided by a volts per hertz relay. A volts per hertz relay responds to the ratio of voltage to frequency. When this ratio exceeds a set value, the relay will operate an alarm, and if the condition persists after a predetermined time delay, the relay should initiate tripping of the transformer. 3.2.3.3 Transfer Trip The protective system of a transformer that is connected to a transmission line, without a line side breaker or circuit switcher, should include a transfer trip facility to effect tripping of the remote line breaker(s) upon operation of the local relays. It is recommended that the transfer trip utilize a reliable communication channel. Backup can be by some other method, preferably a second transfer trip channel. When a transformer is connected without a primary interrupting device directly to a station bus or transmission line, a motor operated disconnect switch can be provided to automatically isolate the transformer following a relay operation so as to allow restoration of the line or bus. 3.2.3.4 Settings Considerations in setting transformer primary differential relays should include the rating of the power transformer, maximum expected fault current, current transformer ratio and characteristics, length of secondary current leads, power transformer ratio, and power transformer tap changer operating range and excitation. The rating of the transformer and the expected maximum fault current must be considered in selection of the current transformer ratio for the differential relays, so that the current ratings of the relays are not exceeded. Transformer differential relay ratio matching taps should be selected so that they match as nearly as possible the overall transformer ratio. On load ratio control
transformers, where a number of ratios are possible, selection should be made at the mid-tap position. Mismatch resulting from the load ratio control taps, current transformer characteristics, and length of secondary leads should be considered when selecting the percentage slope tap. No intentional time delay should be introduced in the operation of differential relays. Transformer overcurrent relay settings should allow maximum emergency loading of a transformer and coordinate with other primary and backup relaying in the system. Gas accumulation relay settings vary with transformer size; the accumulation of approximately 250 cc of gas in a large bank should operate an alarm. An analysis of 0.5% to 1.0% by volume of combustible gas warrants investigation. Permissible levels of excitation of power transformers are specified in IEEE C57.12.00-1993 and should be used as a guide when setting a volts per hertz relay. The time delay between alarm and trip should be of sufficient duration to allow reduction of excitation if such means are available before tripping. 3.2.3.4.1 Differential Relay (87T) Based on the recommendation of the manufacturer. Mismatch should not exceed 5%. Differential relays with harmonic restraint should be provided for transformers where the inrush current is relatively large. 3.2.3.4.2 Phase Overcurrent Relay a. Instantaneous Overcurrent Unit (50) Pickup = 120% of the maximum symmetrical through-fault current or eight (8) times the transformer full-load current, whichever is higher. b. Time Overcurrent Unit (51) Pickup = 150 - 200% of the transformer full-load current Time = 0.5 sec for the maximum symmetrical through-fault current. Settings should be coordinated with the line relays. 3.2.3.4.3 Ground Overcurrent Relay a. Instantaneous Overcurrent Unit (50N)
Pickup = 170% of the maximum near bus line-to-ground fault current through the relay
b. Time Overcurrent Unit (51N) Pickup = 30% of the transformer full-load current Time = 0.75 sec for the maximum near bus line-to-ground fault current. Settings should be coordinated with line relays. 3.2.3.4.4 Ground Relay (64T) Pickup = 67% of minimum far bus line-to-ground fault current, but not less than 20% of the transformer full-load current. Time = 0.75 sec for the maximum near bus line-to-ground fault current. 3.2.3.5 Thermal Protection of transformers against overload or loss of coolant may be provided by a thermal relay that indirectly responds to transformer conductor temperature. It consists of a thermal element immersed in the transformer oil and indirectly heated by load current. The relay can be set to alarm if the temperature approaches a dangerous level, and may be set to trip if an unsafe temperature is reached. Selection of the maximum hot spot temperature allowed depends on the tolerable transformer loss of life. The temperature at which the relay is set to trip should be such that the loss of life is not excessive. The manufacturer's suggested setting should be followed whenever practical. 3.2.4 Generator Protection High-speed clearing of generator faults is imperative for the maintenance of system reliability. Conversely, simplicity of the relay scheme is desired to preclude improper tripping that might compromise system reliability. Generator protection must be applied within these parameters. Most large generators are installed as a unit with no breaker between the transformers and the generator. This section of Guide No. 3 is confined to the protection of this configuration for electrical faults that require unit shutdown. On modern large units, it is desirable to provide dual protection for all types of internal faults.
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3.2.4.1 Machine Protection 3.2.4.1.1 Differential Stator inter-phase fault protection should be high-speed percentage-differential relaying. If there are parallel windings for each phase with separate terminals, an additional relay which compares the balance of current between the windings (split-phase differential) may be used. These relays must shut down the unit. 3.2.4.1.2 Ground Protection Unit tripping by a relay energized from the secondary of the generator neutral distribution type grounding transformer is recommended. Protection can also be provided by overcurrent relays in the generator neutral. However, these schemes are unable to detect ground faults near or at the generator neutral. An additional relay is recommended which will detect faults in that that portion of the stator winding nearest the neutral while also monitoring the integrity of the generator's neutral grounding system. 3.2.4.1.3 Negative Sequence Unbalanced three phase stator currents induce currents in the rotor surface that can cause thermal damage. Unit tripping or alarm by negative sequence overcurrent is recommended protection for this condition. 3.2.4.1.4 Loss of Field Complete loss of excitation on an operating generator can result in dangerous overheating of its rotor within a very short time due to the extremely high induced rotor body currents. Unit tripping by a single or two zoned impedance relay having a mho characteristic with trip delay is recommended protection for this condition. 3.2.4.1.5 Inadvertent Energizing Protection Inadvertent energizing of generators may occur due to operator error, control malfunction or breaker flashover. When a generator is energized with three
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phase system voltage at standstill, it behaves as an induction motor and during the period of acceleration, high currents will be induced in the rotor. Open breaker pole flashover (typically one or two poles) is the most frequent cause of single phase inadvertent energization. Pole flashover is most likely to occur when the generator and system voltage are 180 degrees out of phase (2 p.u. voltage across the open breaker contact). For this condition, the initiation of breaker failure of the flashed-over breaker is essential for isolating the generator. Although some generator protective relays (e.g., loss of field, reverse power or system backup relaying) may detect inadvertent energizing, their performance during such an occurrence is marginal or too slow to prevent significant damage. Operating practices may also be such that these relays are out of service when the generator is off-line. Dedicated supplemental protection to detect and quickly de-energize the generator should be provided. Typically these protection schemes have taken the form of frequency, voltage or auxiliary breaker contact supervised instantaneous overcurrent relays. Directional or impedance relays which are polarized to respond to current flow into the machine are also used. Some of these schemes are continuously in-service while others are enabled only when the unit is off-line. 3.2.4.1.6 Out-of-Step Protection When a generator loses synchronism, the resulting high peak currents and offfrequency operation may cause winding stresses, pulsating torques, and mechanical resonances that are potentially damaging to the turbine generator. In general, the protection normally supplied to the generator zone, such as differential relaying, time delay system backup, etc., will not protect a generator during a loss of synchronism. The loss of excitation relay may provide some degree of protection, but cannot be relied on to detect generator loss of synchronism under all system conditions. Therefore, when during a loss of synchronism the electrical center is located between the high voltage terminals of the generator step-up transformer down into the generator, separate out-of-step relaying will be necessary to provide full machine protection. 3.2.4.1.7 Reverse Power Protection A reverse power (or anti-motoring) relay is usually provided which looks at power flow into the generator. This protection is provided to prevent turbine overheating and/or turbine over-speeding, and is not for the benefit of the generator. 3.2.4.1.8 Under-frequency protection of Turbine Blades
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Opinions vary as to the need for under-frequency protection to minimize turbine blade damage during major system disturbances. Any under-frequency tripping applied for turbine blade protection must coordinate with the automatic underfrequency load shedding program. Turbine blade protection is designed to closely follow the turbine manufacturers damage curves for under-frequency operation, and involves multi-under-frequency set points with accumulating counters and time delays 3.2.4.2 Unit Transformer An overall differential protective zone from the generator neutral to the high side of the unit transformer, and a separate unit transformer differential is recommended. The harmonic restraint type relay should be used for both applications. These relays must initiate unit shutdown. Over-excitation protection is recommended for the unit transformer and generator. Refer to Section 3.2.3.2.4 3.2.4.3 Station Auxiliary Transformers In most cases, the CT ratios required do not permit inclusion of the auxiliary transformer in the overall differential scheme. Transformer protection recommendations are given in Section 3.2.3. 3.2.4.4 Redundancy and Backup Backup generator differential relay protection is provided by the overall differential, generator ground, and negative sequence relays. Where used, a split phase differential provides backup and a degree of turn-to-turn fault protection. Backup generator limited-ground protection is normally not provided. However, a current activated relay supplied from a CT in the distribution transformer secondary or in the primary neutral may be applied for backup. An alternative is an overvoltage relay connected to receive 3 phase voltage from potential transformers at the generator terminals. Backup protection for unit transformer faults can be provided by a fault pressure relay, or another harmonic restraint differential relay. The generator ground relay will also respond to low-side winding ground faults in the unit transformer. As most high-side unit transformer windings are solidly grounded, ground backup relays, supplied from a neutral CT, are commonly applied to backup high-side winding and bus faults. The negative sequence relay provides backup for unbalanced faults in the unit transformer.
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External faults of the unbalanced type are backed up by the negative sequence relay for phase-to-phase faults, and by the unit transformer neutral ground relay. High-side bus local breaker failure protection is also wired to trip the unit main breaker. Distance type relays with a timer or voltage-restrained inverse overcurrent relays are sometimes used for external backup. Operation of these relays generally trips the generator breakers. Other special protection may be required. For example, some types of relays will not function reliably below 60 Hz during pre-warming intervals and supplemental low frequency protection (rotor pre-warming protection) may be required. Another special protection example is torsional monitoring/protection relays that may be required where system conditions such as series compensated lines or particular types of industrial loads (cyclo converters) are located electrically near a generating unit. 3.2.4.5 Settings Limited-ground over-voltage relay settings will vary with the voltage ratio of the distribution transformer and the secondary voltage selected. For example, relays with a 5.4 to 20 volt range and a 67 volt continuous rating can be used with a 240 volt secondary, and set to trip for faults to within 5% to 15% of the generator neutral. These relays are tuned for 60 Hz and desensitized to 180 Hz. When protection is provided by an overcurrent relay connected in the distribution transformer secondary, the relay can be set to trip for faults within 3% to 5% of the generator neutral. The minimum setting is determined by the amount of third harmonic current which exists, and time coordinated with the generator potential transformer fuses. A relay connected in the primary of the distribution transformer neutral may be set less sensitively than one connected in the secondary, since its purpose would be to provide backup for accidental grounding ahead of the distribution transformer grounding. Similar attention must be paid, however, to third harmonic currents and coordination with potential transformer fuses. Negative sequence relay settings are based on the I 2 T rating of the generator. Electromechanical relays are set about 0.7 per unit or greater, solid-state relays may be set lower. Where used, alarm relays are set about 0.10 to 0.25 per unit. Machines with low I 2 T ratings may require the use of solid state negative sequence relays for protection. Distance type relays are set to reach beyond the bus and coordinate with bus and line relays. Allow sufficient margin to prevent relay misoperation due to degraded system voltage conditions and corresponding high Var demands.
2 2
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3.2.4.5.1 Differential Relay (87G) Refer to relay manual Time = Instantaneous 3.2.4.5.2 Ground Relays a. 64G Select tap such that the relay picks up for faults between 5 to 15% of the generator winding from neutral.
0.05Vn 015 . Vn Vtap N1 N1

where: Vn - phase voltage of the generator N1 - turns ratio of the grounding transformer Time = set to coordinate with fuses on the low voltage side of the potential transformers connected to the generator bus (about 5 sec for a fault at the generator terminals). 3.2.4.6 Thermal The generator stator and field, and the auxiliary and main transformers should be provided with temperature alarming devices. Additionally, the operator monitors other equipment capability limits and is responsible for operating within these limits. 3.2.4.7 Unit Transformer Lead Protection The lead from the step-up transformer to the substation breakers is usually included in the differential protection for the transformer. If the distance between the transformer and switchyard becomes excessive (1,000 to 1,500 ft), short line protection techniques should be considered for protection of the lead. 3.2.5 Shunt Reactor Protection Shunt reactors are used to control over-voltages and compensate for line-charging requirements on an EHV system. The protection is dependent on the type of reactor and its location in the electrical system. 3.2.5.1 EHV Connected Reactors
( )
There are various configurations for connecting EHV shunt reactors to the transmission system. This could range from having a dedicated exit with breakers, to having no disconnect device, requiring switching with the line. In instances where EHV breakers are not provided for switching, the reactor has to be considered part of the line and its protection compatible with the EHV line relays. Primary protection would consist of differential relays of the generator differential or bus differential type, set at maximum sensitivity. There will always be an area close to the neutral of the reactor which cannot be protected by relays. Since all EHV reactors are oil immersed, pressure relay should be used. Backup protection can be provided by overcurrent and or over-voltage relays if they can be realistically set. This setting must be such that the relays do not operate on the high frequency oscillation that might accompany line and reactor de-energization. If the reactor is switched with a single pole device, then a neutral over-voltage device should trip for an open pole condition. In general, a distance relay, either phase or ground, can be used as backup in place of the overcurrent relay with the following precautions. The impedance relay should be designed so that its ohmic reach is appreciably shortened at frequencies lower than 60 Hz. This is required to prevent operation on low frequency oscillations that occur when the line and reactor are de-energized together. A ground distance relay used for reactor backup does not need and should not use zero sequence compensation. If such compensation is used, a close-in ground fault will tend to make the relay operate incorrectly. The distance relay should not be set so sensitive that it operates for maximum over-voltage saturated reactance or in-rush saturated reactance. If the reactor is tied solidly to the line, transfer tripping must be applied to trip the remote breaker for reactor faults. 3.2.5.2 Low Voltage Reactors In general, instantaneous and time delay overcurrent relays are sufficient for protection of reactors connected either to an auto-transformer tertiary or a lowvoltage bus. The size of the reactor does not require the extra cost of sophistication of the EHV reactor protection. If connected to the tertiary of an autotransformer, a ground detection scheme should be used. For oil-immersed low-voltage reactors a pressure relay may be used to cover the unprotected zone near the reactor neutral. Dry type reactors present special problems in their installations. These reactors operate at high flux densities at all times. The high strength magnetic field will cause circulating current and hysteresis losses in any magnetic material within the field, including the reinforcing steel in concrete. Special precautions are required in
locating these reactors both with respect to other single-phase units of the installation and to the associated foundation and structural members of the substation. 3.2.6 Series Capacitor Protection There are three aspects to the relay requirements of transmission lines when series capacitors are involved: 1. The protection of the series capacitor itself 2. The effect of the series capacitor on the protection of the associated transmission line 3. The effect series capacitor operation (sub-synchronous resonance) could have on nearby generating units. 3.2.6.1 Protection of Series Capacitors Since the capacitor bank is in series with the line, the equipment must withstand both normal and abnormal electrical and mechanical conditions to which it may be exposed. If fault currents exceed the capacitor's capability, the installation must quickly by-pass itself and permit the system to operate without series capacitor compensation. The design must be based on the thermal and dielectric strength limits. Units are paralleled to provide the necessary steady state current-carrying capacity. Sufficient parallel units are in series to provide the desired capacitive reactance. The number of units in parallel is usually large and each unit is protected by its own fuse. Modern series capacitors are designed with a non-linear zinc-oxide (ZnO) resistor called a varistor (sometimes referred to as metal oxide varistors or MOV), a spark gap and a bypass breaker, all in parallel with the series capacitor. The ZnO varistor limits the voltage across the series capacitor during faults. Normally, the energy during the fault is absorbed by the varistor without necessitating the firing of the spark gap. The spark gap is automatically triggered and provides additional protection on excessive energy absorption by the ZnO varistor or very high fault currents. A bypass breaker allows the spark gap to extinguish along with providing a reliable method to bypass the capacitors on series capacitor can failures. Optical current transducers measure capacitor bank current at various locations on the series capacitor outdoor platform. These transducer signals are transmitted by optical fiber to control/protection cabinets that provide the following protection: A. Capacitor unbalance B. Capacitor overload with automatic reinsertion C. Spark gap ignition
D. Platform flashover E. ZnO failure or overload with automatic reinsertion The bypass breaker is operated as a 3 phase device to minimize the time the series capacitor is operating in an unbalanced condition. Current limiting reactors that limit the current during a bypass operation are required in order to hold the mechanical stresses to within design strength limits and to prevent the fuses from melting. Because the actual settings of the various protective devices are related to both the rating of the capacitor bank and the parameters of the system, there are no hard and fast application rules. The most basic of all the required information is the continuous current rating and the reactance per phase. The product of these two (IXc) is the major factor in determining how many sets of protective equipment will be required. The individual fuses should be sized to permit 10% over-voltage on each unit. The ZnO varistors should permit approximately 2 times rated voltage across the series capacitors. The automatic spark gap initiation setting is based on energy absorption (temperature model based on current) and high fault currents (ignition at first crest prior to significant ZnO conduction). 3.2.6.2 Effect on Transmission Line Protection Another significant aspect of a series capacitor installation is the effect it has on the protection of the line with which it is associated. If phase-comparison relays are used, the series capacitor has no effect. Similarly, series compensation below 40% with the compensation located in the middle of the line section presents no problem and allows the application of conventional impedance relays. The latter can best be explained by the fact that a relay set to reach 50% of the line impedance with a 50% series capacitor bypassed will reach 100% of the line with the capacitor in service. To allow for inaccuracies, this limits the series compensation to 40% with relays set to 55% of the line impedance to assure that the relay will see at least half the line section without the compensation and not overreach the next bus with compensation. If the series capacitor is located next to a bus and line breaker, for a fault just beyond the series capacitor, even with a low value of compensation such as 40%, the line will look like a capacitive reactance to the relay and the directional element will misoperate. However, if the tripping relays are delayed until the series capacitor is bypassed by its protective equipment, normal relay operation can occur. This requires that a voltage calculation be made to insure that the ZnO varistor conductor gaps fire for fault conditions along the line. Additionally, some directional distance relays are specially designed to operate on lines with series capacitors and do not require any delay while waiting for gaps to fire.
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A special problem on ground relay application exists since capacitor bypass gaps are single-phase devices and for some faults, only one or two gaps may fire resulting in a circulating zero sequence current. This may require higher pickup settings or additional time delay for the ground relay.
3.2.7 Shunt Capacitors Shunt capacitor banks are connected in either a grounded or ungrounded wye configuration connected to a bus or tapped on a line. A circuit breaker or circuit switcher may be used to disconnect the capacitor bank during fault conditions or normal switching. When a shunt capacitor is tapped on a line, consideration must be given to preventing the line breakers from reclosing into a charged capacitor bank whenever the line breakers trip and reclose for faults on the line. An instantaneous undervoltage relay can be used to detect the de-energized line and trip the shunt capacitor bank circuit switcher or breaker. An over-voltage relay should be used to insure that the capacitor bank is not stressed beyond its voltage rating under non-fault conditions. This is normally accomplished with a time delay over-voltage relay set for 110% of the nominal line voltage. There may be cases where the relay may be set less than 110% if there is other equipment in close proximity that cannot withstand 10% over-voltage. 3.2.7.1 Ungrounded Wye Connection For ungrounded-wye connected shunt capacitor banks, a neutral shift detector relay provides the basic protection against catastrophic can failures. A potential device connected between the capacitor wye neutral point and ground provides the step-down potential to the relay to detect a shift in the electrical neutral. Under normal conditions, i.e. when all cans are in service, the neutral shift relay ideally should sense zero volts. In reality, however, a small residual or error voltage exists due to the variation of the individual cans, unbalanced system loading, untransposed lines or zero sequence voltages due to harmonic currents. When a fuse on one capacitor can in one phase operates, the neutral point shifts further and the remaining cans in service are stressed with a higher voltage. The ability of any scheme to detect single can failures is contingent on the residual voltage and is a function of the physical properties of the bank such as the number of series groups per phase and the number of cans in parallel within a series group. It is advisable that action be taken for that condition.
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The capacitor bank should be designed to allow for one can fuse to blow without exceeding 110% over-voltage on the surviving cans. The neutral shift detector relay should be set to alarm for one blown fuse and trip the capacitor bank off if more than one fuse blows or when the voltage impressed on the surviving members exceeds 110% of their rated voltage. The potential device also measures the system zero sequence voltage Vo during a line to ground fault. There are relays available that can receive a compensating system zero sequence voltage for voltage shift differentiation between internal and external capacitor shifts. In those cases, no intentional time delay is needed. Otherwise, an external a time delay must be chosen to coordinate with the longest expected clearing time for system phase-to-ground faults. A 1-2 second delay should be appropriate on the transmission system. 3.2.7.2 Grounded Wye Connection For grounded capacitor banks, there are two basic types of unbalance protective schemes - those that detect unbalances from the resultant capacitor bank neutral current flow and those that detect unbalances by utilizing tap point voltages within the bank. The sensitivity of each type should be adequate to detect when the voltage across any capacitor can exceeds 110% of rated voltage. 3.2.7.2.1 Tap Point Voltage Schemes In these schemes, voltage is measured at some intermediate tap point between parallel groups of capacitors on each phase within the bank. Potential transformers (PTs) or coupling capacitors voltage transformers (CCVTs), connected between the tap point and ground, usually provide the tap voltage measurement. The tap voltages are either summed in an open delta connection, Summation Scheme, or compared with the bus voltages in a Voltage Differential Scheme. With the Summation Scheme, an unbalance in the bank will cause a similar unbalance in the tap point voltages and produce a resultant voltage across the open delta. A time delay voltage relay connected across the open delta can therefore respond to the unbalance. Time delay is required to allow coordination with system ground fault protection. With the Voltage Differential Scheme, each tap voltage is compared with its respective bus phase voltage. Six voltage inputs are required to protect a 3phase bank with a Voltage Differential Scheme. This scheme has an advantage in that it is not responsive to system ground faults. However, differences in the transient responses of the voltage measuring devices must be taken into account.
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3.2.7.2.2 Neutral Current Scheme Loss of individual cans in a grounded bank will cause neutral current flow. A capacitor bank neutral current transformer in combination with a time delayed voltage relay across a secondary loading resistor can therefore provide the unbalance protection. This scheme also requires sufficient time delay to avoid misoperation for system ground faults. It is advantageous that the voltage relay used in any of the unbalance schemes described above have the capability to compensate for or null out any error or residual voltage due to capacitor tolerances and PT or CCVT errors. Uncompensated residual voltage will hinder the ability of these schemes to provide sensitive unbalance protection. 3.3 BREAKER FAILURE 3.3.1 General Considerations Failure of a circuit breaker to interrupt the current through it upon receiving a signal from the protective control system is considered a breaker failure. This failure requires isolation of the defective circuit breaker and fault with the least disturbance to the concerned system(s). System configuration dictates the type of breaker failure protective system to be employed. In general, two types of breaker failure protective systems can be considered: local breaker failure (preferred) and remote backup. A local breaker failure protective system senses breaker failure at the defective breaker location. Remote backup relies upon relays at remote locations to sense the fault and successfully effect isolation. Isolation of the defective breaker and fault is accomplished by operation of equipment which will result in minimal system disturbance. This equipment may be at the failed breaker location and/or at remote terminals. Ideally, the failure of a circuit breaker to open when so signaled, should be detected by a system independent of the breaker trip control and operating mechanism. Electrical isolation of the protective system can be realized by separately fusing the breaker trip control and the local breaker failure detection circuit. This requires separate electrically isolated contacts of the normal protective relays to initiate the local breaker failure detection system. Presence of current through the breaker is then monitored to determine if the breaker trip operation is successful. Where the above arrangement is not feasible, reliance on the breaker trip control or breaker auxiliary contacts may be necessary, thus sacrificing the complete isolation desired. Multi-bus stations require additional considerations in applying a local breaker failure system. In any application, care must be exercised not to design a scheme so involved that reliability, ease of maintenance, and testing are sacrificed. Therefore, application of a breaker failure scheme should be included early in the planning of
system configuration and breaker arrangement to yield an overall coordinated protective system. 3.3.2 Breaker Failure Coordination A well designed protective system requires breaker failure to be coordinated with other system protective arrangements. Knowledge of system behavior under normal and abnormal operating conditions is necessary to maintain critical switching times, assure defective equipment isolation, and enhance system operation. With this information and taking into consideration the operating times of the protective relays, auxiliary timing relays, auxiliary tripping relays, circuit breakers, fault detectors, and a safety factor, breaker failure timing can be optimized to yield the desired coordination. Consideration must be given to the following for both primary relays and backup protection: 1. Protective Relay - The operating time of the protective relays is a direct reflection of the protective philosophy of each user, and the effect of proper maintenance and calibration. In this discussion we will assume only primary or first-zone relays; i.e., no intentional time delay, correctly calibrated, maintained and set with sufficient margin to insure positive, fast operation. Modern-day static or electromechanical impedance relays should operate between 0.5-1.5 cycles under these conditions. 2. Auxiliary Relays - It is common practice today to separate the tripping circuits of the primary and backup relays, tripping directly, through tripping diodes, or through an auxiliary relay. If standard auxiliary relays are used, their operating times may be 1-2 cycles. This time can be decreased somewhat by using "lightrated" relays (for example, 24 or 48 V coils on 125 V d.c. circuits). A greater increase in speed can be achieved by using special electromechanical highspeed tripping relays or static tripping relays. These relays will operate in no more than 0.25 cycle. 3. Breaker Clearing Time - This is one of the most variable of all of the factors involved. The clearing time of circuit breakers is dependent upon the operating medium; i.e., air, oil, or gas, the duty cycle, and, in oil circuit breakers, the amount of fault current relative to its rating. ANSI standard C37.04-1979 specifies that for an oil circuit breaker, the interrupting time may increase 50% for 5 and 8 cycle breakers and 1 cycle for 3 cycle breakers when interrupting fault current less than 25% of its asymmetrical interrupting capability at rated maximum voltage. Also, if a circuit breaker is called upon to re-trip after closing, an additional cycle must be added for circuit breakers rated 5 to 8 cycles and 1/2 cycle must be added for 3 cycle breakers. Additional time may be required for the effect of breaker resistors on fault detector reset. These resistors limit primary currents for 1 1/2 cycles.
4. Relay Reset - The importance of the relay reset is often overlooked or misunderstood. The control circuit details will determine the particular relay that will stop all timing; but, the circuit must be examined for a variety of conditions. Usually the entire breaker failure sequence is controlled by a fault detector overcurrent relay. This type of relay resets in 1 to 2 cycles if it is electromechanical, and 1/4 to 3/4 cycle if it is static. Overcurrent type fault detector cannot be used where faults of low magnitude are likely, such as in transformers and some buses. In such cases, the protective relay itself must reset and stop the timing sequence. These relays can take as long as 6 cycles to reset and this time must be considered. Where fault detectors cannot be properly set (e.g. generator protection), a timer initiated by the trip signal is controlled by a breaker auxiliary switch. These circuits usually use separate timers. The auxiliary switch operation does not coincide with that of the main contacts and the timing difference between these two must be considered. 5. Timer Setting - The minimum setting on the breaker failure timer is determined by all of the foregoing factors plus a factor of safety. If the timer is started by the closing of the protective relay contacts, then the minimum time will be the sum of the maximum times in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, plus an adequate safety margin. This additional time is necessary to cover reset of the timer itself and any unusual operating conditions, such as low battery charge, which might extend the operating times of all of the auxiliary relays beyond the assumed maximums. The maximum setting of the breaker failure timer is determined by the longest allowable time a fault may remain on the system. This would be the lesser of the time between critical switching for system stability, or the time necessary to coordinate with the adjacent terminals. Therefore, the maximum setting of the timer is the critical time, less the breaker tripping relay and breaker clearing times. 3.4 COMMUNICATION CHANNELS Relay communication channels are used to provide high speed simultaneous tripping of all terminals of a protected line. There are four major types of communication channels in use today for protective relaying purposes: 1. 2. 3. 4. Power Line Carrier Microwave Wire Line and Telecommunication Channels Fiber Optic Channels
Any of the above communication channels can be used for types of protection such as Directional Comparison, Phase Comparison, and Transfer Trip.
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3.4.1 Channels 3.4.1.1 Power Line Carrier Channel Power Line carrier channels operate in a 30 to 500 kHz range. The basic carrier can be on-off keyed or frequency or phase shifted. The selection of carrier frequencies must be coordinated between the location and companies involved. The cost of power line carrier equipment is relatively fixed on a per terminal basis and, therefore, is independent of line length. A single side band carrier system may be justified if there are many functions in addition to relaying to be performed. Atmospheric conditions such as rain on the power line can have an effect on the carrier signals. Since there is no assurance of signal reception with a faulted line, the power line carrier channel is best suited for a "blocking" scheme. A "tripping" scheme is suitable if the signal is not required to pass through a fault. Directional comparison and phase comparison are typically "blocking" schemes. Transfer trip by carrier as used in transformer and breaker failure schemes or for the protection of an alternate line are typical "tripping" schemes. 3.4.1.2 Microwave Channel The microwave channel consists of radio signals propagated through the atmosphere between line of sight antennas. Frequency shift audio tones are commonly used to modulate sub-carriers; however, frequency shift sub-carriers are also employed directly on the base band. Geographic location is usually a factor in the application of microwave, whereas it does not affect the other types of communication channels. A microwave channel is generally used for a large number of different functions. The NTC, authorizes the radio frequencies to be used. The high cost of a microwave installation will usually not be justified, unless a number of functions can be applied. Microwave facilities may be leased from local telecommunication companies; however, these may be less desirable than utility company-owned channels. Microwave is subject to fade due to atmospheric conditions. However, fading is usually independent of weather conditions that cause line faults. Either "tripping" or "blocking" schemes can be used on a microwave channel. 3.4.1.3 Wire Line and Telecommunication Channels
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A wire line channel is basically a metallic pair of wires between terminating points. A telecommunication channel may be a wire line or a voice communication channel between line terminals. Direct current or 60 Hz alternating current relay schemes employ a wire line channel while audio tone frequency signals may be used on wire line or voice communication channels. A wire line with audio tone can be used where resistance and/or shunt capacity would otherwise be a limitation to a metallic pair. Protection against rise of station ground potential and longitudinal induction during power line faults must be provided. Channel cost is proportional to length. The usual breakpoint for AC pilot-wire is 10 to 20 miles; resistance and shunt capacity may be more of a factor than cost. Telecommunication companies can handle audio frequencies to almost any distance. A wire line channel is generally not affected by atmospheric conditions. A leased channel is inherently less reliable than a privately owned channel, and additional measures may be required to improve dependability and security. The circuit may be opened, shorted, or subjected to test signals by telecommunication company workers. Utility company owned channels are more reliable than leased channels but are also subject to interruptions should cable damage occur. A wire line channel is adaptable to a current differential pilot-wire scheme. Since this type of channel is isolated from the power line either a "tripping" or a "blocking" scheme can be used. Test requirements will depend on the type of scheme used. 3.4.1.4 Fiber Optic Channels An optical channel utilizes a fiber optic cable as a waveguide for the transmission of light signals between terminal points. Dedicated fibers are preferred for protective relaying schemes. Use of multiplexed channels degrades the reliability of the protection schemes. The optical channel length is limited by the minimum receivable optical power and by signal bandwidth. Received light power is determined by transmitter power, transmitter to fiber cable coupling, and fiber cable attenuation. For long distances it may be necessary to utilize single mode fibers and/or regenerative repeaters. The optical channel is immune to ground potential rise and longitudinal induction during power line faults. This makes the channel more dependable during faults than a wire line or power line carrier. An optic channel is adaptable to "blocking" schemes, "tripping" schemes, and line current differential schemes. The optical channel system can be designed to continuously monitor itself. To employ the advantage of ground potential rise immunity, but still use existing communication mediums, an optical channel can be installed from a station to a communications terminal remote from the station grounding grid.
Electrical test equipment for the optical channel will vary depending on the type of terminal equipment and communication system utilized. Optical test equipment required includes an optical power meter and an optical attenuator. When it is necessary to splice fiber cable or locate fiber break points, an optical time domain reflectometer (OTDR) is required.
3.4.2 Channel Reliability The intrinsic reliability of a given medium of communication cannot be improved by the protective relay scheme applied. However, either the security or the dependability of a protective scheme using communication channels can be changed, depending on the type of channel. Any improvement in one factor is often accompanied by a degrading of the other. 3.4.2.1 Dual Channels The use of dual channels, each using an independent route or different media, can improve relaying security or dependability. To improve security, the operation of both channels is required before tripping will occur. However, for the loss of one channel, there should be an automatic switch to single channel mode operation. Independent tripping by each channel improves dependability. 3.4.2.2 Channel Outages When the relay scheme employing these channels provides the only high speed protection for 100% of a protected line, channel outages must be held to a minimum. Suitable cutout switches should be provided to clear a channel in the event of its failure, and for maintenance or testing. 3.4.2.3 Channel Monitoring All channels should be monitored and/or routine tests should be used to detect failures as soon as possible. Frequency shift carrier is made self-monitoring via the "guard" signal and only the "trip" portion requires routine testing. As on-off carrier is not continuously monitored, routine tests (either manual or automated) must be made to determine if the carrier is functioning. These tests usually do not require disabling of trip circuits. Testing of microwave channels is similar to the testing and monitoring of power line carrier channels.
3.4.2.4 Ownership of Channels As mentioned earlier, either microwave, optical, or wire line channels may be leased from local telecommunication companies. However, to realize maximum reliability of the associated protective schemes, complete control of the channels via power company ownership is desirable. It should be noted that a privately owned optical channel, being completely under the power company's control, is more reliable than a leased channel. 3.5 THERMAL CAPACITY OF CTs AND RELAYS 3.5.1 CTs IEEE Standard C57.13-1993 defines the continuous and short-time ratings of current transformers as follows: 1. The continuous thermal current rating factors shall be based on 30 C ambient temperature and shall be 1.0, 1.33, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0, or 4.0. 2. The mechanical short-time current rating shall be the rms value of the AC component of a completely displaced (asymmetrical) primary current wave, which the transformer is capable of withstanding with the secondary short circuited. 3. The short-time thermal current rating of a current transformer is the rms symmetrical primary current that can be carried for one second, with the secondary short circuited, without exceeding in any winding the limiting temperature. Application of these ratings is outlined in the NEMA Standards for Power Circuit Breakers Publication No. SG4-1975. These requirements apply only to bushing type, wound type, or eye type current transformers used on or with outdoor circuit breakers. The application requirements are: 1. The current transformers shall have a minimum continuous thermal currentcarrying rating factor to 1.0. 2. The mechanical short-time current capability of any tap of a current transformer shall be the lesser symmetrical current value of either: (a) 120 times the rated primary current of the tap under consideration or (b) the closing and latching capability of the circuit breaker. 3. The thermal short-time current capability of any tap of a current transformer shall be the lesser symmetrical current value of: (a) 60 times the rated primary current of the tap under consideration for 1 second, (b) 42.5 times the rated primary
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current of the tap for 2 seconds, or (c) the 3 second short-time current carrying capability of the circuit breaker.
3.5.2 Relays The thermal capability of relays varies as to the type relay involved. Each element of the relay must be investigated and the element with the lowest capability should be used for the rating of the relay on a primary ampere or kVA basis. The continuous rating may be less than five amperes. The continuous current capability is quite often given in the relay instruction book. If not given, the manufacturer should be contacted for the required information. Short-time (1 second) ratings of relays should be considered especially in the case of low range ground overcurrent relays to be sure the short-time rating is not exceeded. 3.6 DC CONTROL POWER Maximum reliability of system protection requires close attention to DC control power. This includes conductor sizes, coordination of protective devices, voltage drops, loading, maintenance procedures, battery capacity, and charger requirements. 3.6.1 Battery Capacity The ampere-hour rating should be determined considering the following: 1. The battery capacity must be adequate to maintain normal continuous loads plus intermittent loads. It must be able to provide capacity for circuit breaker or related switch operations without the battery charger for a period of time determined by local conditions and availability of alternate supplies. 2. Reduction in capacity when the temperature goes below 25 C. 3. Reserve capacity for growth. 4. Refer to IEEE standards 485-1983 and 535-1986 for further information and definition.
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3.6.2 Battery Type and Voltage The type of battery to be used will depend on the experience and maintenance procedures of a particular company. Static equipment with dropping resistors tends to favor the use of 125 volt or 48 volt batteries over a 250 volt battery. Separate batteries might be considered to provide isolation of telemetering or supervisory functions, static relays, or circuit breaker control. 3.6.3 Battery Charger The battery charger must be able to charge a discharged battery in a reasonable time while an abnormal amount of switching is taking place. Charger protection should not operate during momentary heavy loads or branch circuit faults. The inputs and outputs of the battery charger must be conditioned so as not to present a hazard to either AC supply or the protective relaying (especially static) supplied by the charger. Damaging spikes may be prevalent if proper filter and/or surge protection is not provided in the battery charger. Unless the battery charger is designed to operate connected to the DC bus with the control battery disconnected, such operation should be avoided because of the possibility of high voltage. 3.6.4 Monitoring The station monitoring scheme should include a specific device to immediately detect and alarm for low battery voltage, and/or the loss of the battery charger output. When available, a separate power source should be used for the alarm circuit. 3.6.5 Loading Large loads require a high capacity battery which results in an inherent high fault current capability. To avoid this situation, steady loads should be reduced as much as possible. This may require the replacement of tube type equipment and the use of static supervisory control units, low drain lamps, and normally de-energized auxiliary relays. 3.6.6 Conductors DC conductors must be large enough for normal loads. Small cable or conductor may cause excessive voltage drop. Trip circuit voltage drop should not exceed 35 volts on a 125 volt system. Closing circuit voltage drop should not exceed 15 volts.
The conductors should never be used as fuse since extensive cable damage can result.
3.6.7 DC Protective Device Coordination The extensive use of primary and backup schemes requires special attention to control circuit protective device coordination. Fuse and circuit breaker curves must be checked carefully. Heavy short circuit currents of high capacity batteries can make coordination difficult. 3.6.8 General Considerations Transient voltage (battery) clamps using capacitors connected to ground can cause relays to operate when grounds appear on their coils. Blocking diodes should be applied with care to avoid "sneak" circuits. The consequence of these diodes opening or shorting should be considered. When applying new static devices, minimum operating values should be checked and the effects of high charger voltage on the components should be examined. Proper disconnecting points should be provided so that maintenance may be readily performed. Primary and backup schemes should be separated by proper fusing, separate batteries, or both. Dual trip coils should be considered to insure complete independence. Provisions should be made to facilitate location of control grounds by disconnecting equipment. Refer to IEEE standard 450 for maintenance and testing and 484 for installation. 3.6.9 Grounds Some form of ground detection should be provided. This may consist of two lamps with midpoint grounded or a selective voltmeter capable of reading positive or negative to ground. 3.7 FACTORS AFFECTING SHIELDING AND GROUNDING OF CONTROL CABLES The problems and solutions presented in this section of Guide No. 3 are a small part of a large and complex subject. They are included to indicate the nature of the problem and suggest a limited number of remedies. Primarily, this section is intended to create an awareness that induced voltages may be encountered, particularly in
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EHV Stations, and may create difficulties. Specific problems and solutions will depend on the location, equipment, and arrangement involved. Protection of relaying and control equipment against surges requires an review of the methods or grounding, shielding, and routing of control cables. The use of nonmetallic ducts and cable sheaths has resulted in the loss of the shielding effect provided by metallic ducts or lead covered controls cables. For this discussion, the term "control cables and/or circuits" relates to AC current circuits, AC potential circuits, and DC circuits used with relaying and supervisory control equipment. 3.7.1 Source of Surges The sources of surges appearing in control circuits fall into two general categories: those surges that originate within the control circuits, and those that are electromagnetically and/or electro-statically induced into the control circuit by an external source. Certain types of equipment used in control schemes can be a source of surge voltages. Interruption tests of DC auxiliary relays and DC telephone type relay coils have shown that the rapid decay of current in the coil circuit produces a high surge voltage (2.0 to 3.0 kV peak). These surge voltages have been observed to flashover open relay contacts and to destroy static components. They are usually of an oscillatory nature and have a rather high frequency. The operation of breakers and disconnect switches on the high voltage system produces surges that are generated external to the control circuits. These surges are electro-magnetically or electro-statically coupled into the control circuit and are a function of many variables: system voltage, types and methods of shielding of control cables, and relative location of control cables to surge source. Values of several kVs have been recorded in unshielded control cables. Surges have become more noticeable as system voltages have increased. Theoretical calculations show induced voltages will increase as the cube of the system operating voltage. 3.7.2 Surge Withstand Capability The manufacturers of equipment used in relaying and control circuits are endeavoring to design and supply equipment with a certain level of Surge Withstand Capability (SWC). This SWC level for which the equipment is to be designed, is defined in ANSI / IEEE C37.90A-1974. The SWC is not intended to protect equipment from failure or incorrect operation for all possible surges. Necessary precautions must be taken in control circuit design to minimize the value of the surges to which the relays are exposed. 3.7.3 Control of Surges
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3.7.3.1 Internal Surges Control circuit surges originating from the interruption of DC coil circuits can be controlled by proper circuit design. Among things to avoid are capacitors connected across contacts for arc suppression. Blocking diodes used in control circuits should have a high peak inverse voltage (PIV) and have self protecting characteristic. Experience indicates the values shown in Table 3.1 are applicable. Blocking Diodes for Control Circuits Table 3.1
Number Avalanche Diode In Series 1 2* 3
DC Control Voltage 48V 125V 250V
Avalanche Diode PIV 800 800 800
Avalanche Voltage Per Diode 1200 1200 1200
* Some companies have not found two diodes of this type to be necessary. To reduce voltage surges generated by relay coils, a resistor and diode shunting of the coil current shown in the figure below is recommended.
(+)
COIL COIL

< < < < < <

(-)
Care should be taken in selection of DC sources for static relaying, supervisory, and communication equipment. The DC leads for this equipment should not be routed in the vicinity of leads associated with high surge producing auxiliary relays. Where possible, the DC leads for each panel should be in a separate cable routed directly to the battery. If possible, these leads should be shielded with the shield grounded at both ends. Large loops in the control circuit should be avoided, by keeping positive and negative leads in the same cable.
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3.7.3.2 External Surges
Externally induced control circuits surges can be reduced by the use of separate parallel grounded conductors, shielding, or a combination of both. The use of separate grounded conductors located parallel to the control cables is somewhat effective in reducing the common-mode voltages. The most effective means is to use a shielded control cable and separate grounded conductors located in close proximity to the shielded control cable. The grounded conductor protects the cable shield from being damaged from high fault current flow. Particular attention must be given to grounding the cable shield. In switchyards, the shield should terminate on the same device terminal block as its conductor. The shield should be connected to a separate ground conductor which is routed as close as possible to the shielded cable. In the control house, the shield should be continuous with its cable conductors to the panel terminal strip. At this point, the shield should connect to a grounded conductor. Spare conductors should be grounded at both ends where feasible. These practices in grounding of the shield will reduce common mode voltages which result from high frequency switching surges or low frequency differences in potentials between the field device and the control house. If transverse mode voltages are significant, they can be reduced by the use of capacitors connected between each conductor of the cable and ground at the relay panel. A capacitor having a value of approximately 0.5 mfd. should be sufficient. This method of surge suppression is one used by several major manufacturers of static relay panels to protect their relays.
3.8 SYSTEM MONITORING
The use of automatic monitoring devices, with sufficient capability to permit adequate analysis of electrical disturbances within a system, is highly recommended, particularly when faults on one utility system affect neighboring systems. Fault recorders are installed primarily to assist in analyzing the type, magnitude, duration, and location of electrical faults after they have occurred. Event recorders are used to assist in this analysis by recording the time of switching operations. Although not their primary function, both devices can often be used to assist operators in determining the proper course of action during an emergency. Internal oscillography of digital type relay systems can also provide valuable data in analyzing a disturbance. A complete analysis of a system disturbance is essential for the following reasons: 1. For maximum system reliability, the evaluation of the performance of a protective system during a disturbance is necessary to assure proper functioning of the equipment, and to indicate the need for any improvements that might be required.
2. Evaluation of the severity of duty imposed on equipment and lines will, to some degree, determine the extent to which maintenance is required. 3. Management, regulatory bodies, and customers must be advised of the cause and effect of major occurrences. 4. The statistics generated by such an analysis are valuable for planning future facilities. 5. System performance statistics, particularly voltage dip and duration figures, greatly assist company personnel in their public relations programs. The type of monitoring equipment and the number of items to be recorded will be determined, to a large measure, by the extent to which any or all of the above reasons are to be satisfied. The following discussion covers some general reasons for use of any particular element. A comprehensive review of the application and evaluation of automatic fault recording devices is given in IEEE in Transaction Paper 31TP65-185 and 70TP524-PWR: 1. The duration and magnitude of faults involving ground can be obtained from records of transformer neutral current, three-phase potential, or sufficient residual current from each line to assure seeing all faults. 2. The duration and magnitude of faults not involving ground, as well as identification of the phase(s) involved can be obtained from three-phase potential connected either phase-to-phase or phase-to-ground. 3. The sequence of breaker operation and high speed reclosing time can be obtained from records of phase current or line side potential. These and similar on-off operations can also be obtained by superimposing a DC offset that indicates breaker position on an existing AC current or potential trace. 4. The proper operations of components of the overall protective system can be obtained from internal oscillography of digital relays, either by directly recording the relay pilot channel performance, or by monitoring specific relay contacts or other output. 5. Additional monitoring elements such as rate-of-change of current starting relay or watt transducers can record power swings and out-of-step conditions. The coordination of all fault recorders in an area will greatly reduce the number of elements required by assuring the necessary coverage is obtained without unnecessary redundancy. The same coordination technique should be used within a station when assigning the various traces to the different phases and line or bus side potential sources. Remote retrieval of fault data from fault recorders and digital relays via telecommunications channels can expedite fault event analysis.
3.9 UNDER-FREQUENCY PROTECTION
With the large generating units and generating stations in operation throughout the interconnected system, there is a possibility of the loss of large amounts of capacity within a geographic area. As long as t*he entire interconnected system remains intact, serious frequency excursions are not likely to occur. However, it is recognized that regardless of how well a system is planned and operated, certain combinations of operating conditions, faults, or events may cause separations resulting in the isolation of an area with a generating deficiency within that area. If this should occur, the only practical means of correcting the imbalance of generation to load is by automatic shedding of load by under-frequency relays. The under-frequency load shedding steps stipulated by NPC are: GROUP 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 FREQ. SETTING 59.2 Hz 59.1 Hz 59.0 Hz 58.9 Hz 58.8 Hz 58.7 Hz 58.6 Hz 58.5 Hz 58.4 Hz 58.3 Hz 58.2 Hz 58.1 Hz 58.0 Hz 59.2 Hz 59.2 Hz LOAD 100 MW 100 MW 100 MW 100 MW 120 MW 70 MW 70 MW 120 MW 50 MW 100 MW 110 MW 120 MW 100 MW 55 MW 30 MW TIME DELAY insts. insts. insts. insts. insts. insts. insts. insts. insts. insts. insts. insts. insts. 9.0 sec 15.50 sec
The following should be considered when modifying existing or applying new protective equipment to meet the basic security & reliability requirements. 1. The use of minimum intentional time delay to improve the coordination of load shed steps. 2. The use of the more precise and predictable solid state under-frequency relays to achieve the more stringent coordination requirements of high rate of frequency decay and/or multiple load shedding steps.
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3. The automation of additional amounts of load shed in excess of that stipulated here, if required by an individual distributor, company or group. 4. The use of under-frequency relaying for isolation of generating units, where applicable, for turbine-generator protection in accordance with the manufacturers' published information on steam turbine operating limitations, and coordination with the automatic load shedding programs.
3.9.1 Reliability
Precautions should be taken in the selection of the voltage source to underfrequency relays. This should be a secure voltage source which at all times accurately represents system frequency.
3.9.2 Calibration and Tests
Considering that there is a margin of only 0.1 Hz between load shedding steps in the NPCs schedule, it is essential that an accurate frequency generating source and frequency measuring equipment be used to calibrate the under-frequency relays. Test equipment with an accuracy of 0.05 Hz is an absolute minimum requirement. Test equipment with an accuracy of 0.01 Hz is available and should be used if possible. The higher accuracy test equipment makes possible more accurate relay calibration and thus, provides greater selectivity of load shedding. Under-frequency relays should be calibrated in the environment in which they are to operate. Following their initial installation, calibration checks should be made to determine drift from the initial settings. Historical data available after years of experience will provide a basis for establishing maintenance and testing periods.
3.10 RELAY MAINTENANCE AND TESTING GUIDE
Everyone connected to the system/grid of NPC should agree that correct relay performance is essential to the reliable operation of the bulk power system. It is further agreed that a program for relay maintenance is basic in ensuring correct relay performance. Facilities should be provided so that a protective system or any of its components can be removed for maintenance without significantly affecting the reliability of the power system. Prior to accepting a new relay, new software version, or new component design for application on the system, sufficient tests and inspections shall be performed to ensure that the relay or component will meet the specifications. Concurrently, procedures should be established for subsequent maintenance tests that are required to ensure correct performance.
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Having approved the design of a relay, software version, or component as acceptable for application, the testing program should provide for conducting sufficient tests on subsequent relays or components as received from the vendor to ensure that the characteristics are not altered by component or design changes. To ensure that the relay will perform correctly after it is initially installed in its "in service" location, the program should provide for the complete verification of performance. Data obtained from previous tests may be used to reduce the amount of testing required at this time. Recognizing that the performance of any relay may change with time, the relay maintenance program will provide for restoring the performance of the relay to the accepted level if necessary. Sufficient records must be retained to determine if there is a deterioration of performance and to verify that the time interval for testing of each component is adequate. Protection system settings and coordination should be reviewed whenever system changes are anticipated or as warranted by system performance.
3.10.1 Field Tests
The testing portion of the relay maintenance program will be accomplished by timely use of functional, calibration, and verification tests and inspection.
3.10.1.1 Functional Test
The purpose of a functional test is to provide, by a simple means, a test of the integrity of the logic of the relay and/or protective system. This may consist of, but not be limited to, such action as the application of sufficient electrical, thermal, or mechanical force to cause the operation of a controller, relay or auxiliary relay to assure breaker tripping and closing. Such testing will be extended to include operation of associated breaker failure and/or automatic reclosing schemes. A correct operation during a system fault would constitute a functional test of the equipment which operated.
3.10.1.2 Calibration Test
This test consists of those procedures which are necessary to insure the operation of the relay at the value of current, voltage, power, impedance, reactance, or other specified quantities relating to the particular application. This test is to be made on as many components of a protective system as are necessary to insure its dependable operation at specified values.
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3.10.1.3 Verification Tests
This test is to provide a reliable indication of the ability of the protective system to perform in accordance with its design criteria. The test will require the application of known quantities such as current, voltage, power, and other specified quantities to the protective system. This test is more extensive than a calibration test. It may be made at times other than initial installation, such as after questionable operation or following a component change or replacement.
3.10.1.4 Inspection
Inspection is the physical examination of the protective system and its environment for conditions that may be detrimental to its proper operation.
3.10.2 Test Intervals
Test intervals are based on the premise that certain components of the protective system require maintenance more often than other components. Similar components require different maintenance periods because of their diverse application. The simpler the degree of maintenance, the more often it can be performed, but the less conclusive it is that the system is operating properly. Simpler maintenance causes the least disturbance to the protective system thereby reducing the possibility of the equipment not being properly returned to service. Self diagnostic capabilities of digital relays may also influence relay maintenance intervals. Historical performance data (after years of service) can provide a basis for establishing appropriate test intervals. In the absence of historical data, test intervals suggested in the Relay Maintenance and Testing Interval table should be used. See the Relay Maintenance and Test Interval table for the following: Line Protection Transformer Protection Bus Protection Shunt Reactor Protection Shunt Capacitor Protection Series Capacitor Protection Communications Channels D.C. Control Power
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Generator and Synchronous Condenser Protection -- Complete maintenance should be performed at the time the unit is out of service. The maximum period not to exceed that in the table of Relay Maintenance and Test Interval. System Monitoring -- Maintained at an interval to provide proper operation. Under-frequency Relays -- Maintenance periods should be determined by: (a) Type Load, (b) Magnitude Load, and (c) Type of Relays.
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Relay Maintenance and Test Interval

Equipment Type Relays a. Protective Relays b. c. d. e. f. Aux. relays & Devices Breaker Failure System Reclosing Synchronizing Comm. Channels 1. Non-Continuous 2. Continuous (1) Circuit Breaker CT PT or CCPD Control Power Inspection Suggested Time Between Tests Functional Calibration Verification
Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly
24 mo. 24 mo. 24 mo. 24 mo. 24 mo. Monthly 12 mo. None None
36 mo. 36 mo. 36 mo. 36 mo. 36 mo. 36 mo. 36 mo. 60 mo. 60 mo.
Initially and as defined in note 2 " " " "
g. h. i. j.
Initially Initially
(1) Continuous refers to channels equipped with continuous supervision. (2) This test is generally made following a suspected relay malfunction to obtain more detailed information on the performance of the equipment than can be obtained from inspection and functional tests.
PAGE 59
4.0 References a. National Electric Reliability Council (NERC) Operating Manual b. East Central Area Reliability Coordination Agreement (ECAR) Operating Manual Principles and Procedures for Protective Relaying c. Northeast Power Coordinating Council (NPCC) Operating Manual i. Bulk Power System Protection Criteria ii. Guide for the Application for Autoreclosing to the Bulk Power System iii. Automatic Load Shedding Employing Underfrequency Threshold Relays iv. Application of Underfrequency Protection v. Special Protection System Guideline d. The Mid-Atlantic Area Council (MACC) Operating Manual MACC Protective Relaying Philosophy and Design Standars e. Mid-Continent Area Power Pool Engineering Committee Engineering Handbook Special Protection Systems f. Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) Engineering. Subcommittee Procedures i. Application of Underfrequency Relaying ii. System Protective Relaying iii. System Protective Relaying Recommendations
g. Mid-America Interconnected Network, Inc. (MAIN) Operating Manual MAIN Protection Principles and Guides
h. Southwest Power Pool (SPP) Operating Manual Protective Relaying i. National Power Corporation (NPC) Relay Setting Guidelines j. SwedPower Procedure for Setting of Relay Protection
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NPC Power System Protection Philosophy

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NPC Power System Protection Philosophy

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POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION PHILOSOPHY AND GUIDELINES

____________________ L. S. CRUZ VP NLRC

____________________ R. T. BACANI OIC, S.O.

____________________ A. T. CORPUZ VP - SLRC

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION PHILOSOPHY AND GUIDELINES

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

1.0 PHILOSOPHY OF PROTECTION

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

2.0 PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

Sin gle Bu s - Sin gle Br ea ker F igu r e 3.1

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^

A tandem arrangement normally will take the following form:

< < < < < < <

< < < < < < <

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

Z2max Reach Adjacent line section is a single circuit line.

Z2 max = 90%[Zab + 70%(Zbc)]

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

Z2 max = 90%[Zab + 33%Zbc(shorter line)] 4. Case 4. 4a .

Z2 max = 90%[Zab + 70%Zbc(shorter line)] 4b.

Z2 max = 90%[Zab + 70% Zbc(shortest line)]

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

Z2 max = 85%[Zab + Zbc] 8. Case 8. Adjacent section is N - number of transformer.

Z2 max = 85%[Zab + Zbc(parallel equiv.) ]

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

Adjacent section is a line and N - number of transformers.

Z2 max = 85%[Zab + Zbc(parallel equiv.)] Z2 max = 90%[Zab + 70%Zbd ]

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

0.05Vn 015 . Vn Vtap N1 N1

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM

DC Control Voltage 48V 125V 250V

Avalanche Diode PIV 800 800 800

Avalanche Voltage Per Diode 1200 1200 1200

< < < < < <

NPC Protection Philosophy and Guidelines REVISED: 4/14/1998 11:49 AM