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Philosophy and Nature of

Science
Part 1. Philosophy
Part 2. Philosophers
Basic Questions
How do we know?
What is knowing?
Can we know with certainty?
Can we believe something with certainty?
Are there facts?
Is there truth?
Can an hypothesis be verified or falsified?
What Constitutes Evidence?
Is there a relationship between evidence and
hypothesis?

What evidence does one select to establish


an hypothesis?
How Does One Do
SCIENCE?
Science does not adhere to the Baconian
procedure of observation before hypothesis,
hypothesis before testing.
It is more artistically driven. The scientist
responds to an observed event by curiosity.
The scientist follows up curiosity with
persistence having no sure and fixed method
to unravel the conundrum. Finally the
researcher employs memory to relate one
event to another and to avoid redundancy.
Where art Comes In
Abstraction and Synthesis
Scientists cut up nature into parts.
They study the parts as if they were
actual parts of the physical world. Once
confident they the scientists
understand the part, then combine the
parts to “synthesize’ or to reconstitute
nature.
Experienced and not
Experienced
Things experienced implies facts and knowing.

The world of knowledge divides into the experienced


and the non-experienced

What does it mean to have non-experienced


knowledge?

If we don’t experience, can we know anything?


Kant distinguished between pure and empirical
knowledge; i.e., a priori &.a posteriori knowledge
Philosophy of Science
Concerns
Observation,
Hypothesis,
induction,
Falsification,
Theory
Explanation
Science divides into Methods
and Applications

• Method - Procedures for acquiring


knowledge
• Application - Use and purpose of
discoveries
Questions asked in the
philosophy of science
• Is science based on faith?
• What is the scientific method?
• How are new discoveries treated?
• Is everything reducible to physics and
mathematics?
• Is everything reducible to a few rules?
Science and Faith
Science is based on faith.

Some Articles of Faith :


The universe is constent over space and time.
The universe is understandable.
We can understand the universe.
What’s valid here is valid there.
The universe is material and not spiritual
The language of the universe is mathematics.
Experiment validates theory
What Characterizes science?
• A method for retaining reliable knowledge about the
universe is test and retest
• Science is a testing community
• Science seeks consistency not truth
• Science tells the best minimal story about the
universe. Pieces fit into a puzzle
• Science does not ask why, but asks how, what,
where, and when.
• Science seeks measurement
Ideal Scientific Method
• Observation
• Repetition
• Induction(1)
Hypothesis
• Deduction or generalization
Consequence or prediction
• Testing
• Induction(2)
• Induction (1) not successful
Critique of the Ideal scientific
Method
• What’s observed and studied depends on the
currently accepted explanation
• Explanation selects the observation
Explanation Influenced by:
Brain hardware
Gestalt formation
Optical illusions
Brain Software
Education
Induction

induction
Observation -----------------> Hypothesis
Induction
• Induction goes from effect to cause.
• Effect can possibly have many causes.
• A cause may have a single effect.
• Hypothesis is a kind of cause

cause effect
Critique of Induction
• There is no logical way of going from
observation to hypothesis

• Hypothesis is a simple guess

• Frequently hypothesis precedes


observation
Maybe Hypotheses should be considered
only as Statements of Probability
• The universe is a series of stochastic events with
ill-defined boundaries
• An hypothesis is neither true nor false. It is a
statement of probability for success or failure.
• Replace “All swans are white”
with
“What is the probability of finding a green or black
or blue swan?”
Genealogy of Certainty
• Hypothesis --> Theory --> Fact

INCREASING CERTAINTY
Gloss
• A Law is a late 18th and early19th century way of
saying theory: LAW = THEORY
• Theory gives a mathematical relationship between
observable dependent and observable independent
variables.
The distinction between independent and dependent
variable is arbitrary.
• Hypothesis gives a mathematical relationship
between non-observable and observable variables
Are These:
Explanations, Hypotheses,Theories, or
Facts?
• 2nd Law of Thermodynamics
• Newton’s Law of Universal Gravitation
• Gas Law
• Ohm’s Law
• Electromagnetic Theory
• Kinetic Gas Theory
• Atomic Theory
• Theory of Relativity
• String Theory
Hypothesis, Theory, Fact
• Hypothesis are Guesses not logically
derivable from deduction or Induction

• Theories are statement of Probability

• Facts do not exist- nothing is 100%


certain
Verification & Falsification
• What is meant by explanation?

• What is a fact?

• When is a Fact verified?

• How many observations needed?


Form Hypothesis
I put a balloon in my refrigerator and funny things
happened. I really need an explanation.

First the balloon shriveled up.


Next, the balloon changed color from red
to blue.
Finally the balloon said, “Get me out of here,
I’m cold!”
Deduction and Induction

induction
Observation ------------> Hypothesis

deduction
Hypothesis ------------> Observation
Deduction

If there is no cogent way of going from


observation to hypothesis, then there is
no cogent way of deducing from
hypothesis to observation
Critique of Deduction

• Modern Science does not seek causes


but seeks relationship among variables
• Independent variables are not causes
and dependent variables are not effects
• If one knows Y =g(x), can one predict
(deduce) the future?
Verification and Falsification
• Replace Verification with Falsification
• Verification and falsification are asymmetrical
• Multiple verification does not establish a theory more
than a single verification
• A single falsification overturns a theory
It takes only one green swan overturns the theory
that all swans are white. Observing one million white
swans does no more to prove all swans are white
than witnessing ten white swans.
Falsification

• It is nearly impossible to falsify an hypothesis.


• Since a test depends on many factors it is difficult to
determine whether the hypothesis failed or one of the
other factors failed.
• Some failures of dependent factors:
precision and accuracy of instrumentation, correct
interpretation of data, flawless recording of data,
improper experimental conditions
What is an Explanation?
• Hypothesis is not always an explanation
• Explanations reference non-observables
• Science explains objective reality in terms of
a non-objective, non-observable reality
• Among non-observable objects are electrons,
quarks, photons, gluons, gravitons, positrons,
black holes, dark matter, dark energy
Explanation
• Explanation is to ask a quantifiable question

• Explanation is not to ask a “why” question

• Explanation is a sequence of events.

• Is an explanation at all posible?


Explanation
Pathway vs. Endpoints
Limits of Explanation
• The ultimate building blocks of the universe do not
interact with our instruments at all or else interact too
strongly so that physical nature alters.
• It is possible we are at the end of traditional
empiricism where observations suggest for or else
test for hypothesis.
• String theory perhaps is an harbinger of
post-scientism wherein hypothesis and observation
formally separate.
Theory Have Limits of
Application
• Ptolemaic Astronomy replaced by
• Copernican Astronomy replaced by
• Newtonian Astronomy replaced by
• Einsteinium Astronomy replaced by
• Quantum Gravity Theory
Overall Criteria for Theories
• Consistent
• Parsimonious
• Correlative
• Empirically Testable (verifiable& falsifiable)
• Useful
• Progressive
• Retrogressive
Transition to Immanuel Kant

Rationalism and Empiricism


Historical Overview
Rationalism

Descartes Spinoza Leibniz Wolff

Locke Berkeley Hume Kant


Empiricism
Empiricism
• Basic tenets of Empiricism
– All knowledge comes from experience
– The mind is a blank slate (tabula rasa)
– The mind is passive, merely a receptor of sense impressions
• Hume’s radicalizes these, ending in Skepticism
– Unbridgeable gap between sense impressions and objects in the
world
– All we know are ‘sensations’ playing in our minds
– The necessary ‘connectedness’ of experience is problematic
Causality is merely superstition, born of habit
Rationalism
• Basic tenets of Rationalism
– Reason has access to reality as it really is
– Reason can go beyond what is given to us in experience
– Reason can then grasp things, not as they appear, but as they
really are
• The Leibniz-Wolffian School
– Reason (without experience) can know about God, immortality of
the soul, and human freedom
• Reason has direct access to “meta-physical” knowledge
• metaphysics: a theory of the essence of things, of the fundamental
principles that organize the universe
Part 2
• John Locke
• David Hume
• Immanuel Kant
• Thomas Bayes
• Karl Popper
• Thomas Kuhn
• Imre Lakatos
• Paul Feyerabend
John Locke (1632-1704)

Introduction
John Locke
Biography
• B. 1632, son of a small property-owner and lawyer
• Oxford, 1652-67
• Studied church-state issues, chemistry and medicine, new
mechanical philosophy
• Involvement in politics through Lord Ashley, whom he treated for
a liver abscess
• Plotted to assassinate King Charles II and his Catholic brother,
later James II
• Exile in Holland, 1683-89
• 1689: 3 major works published
Major works and themes:
A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689)
- Argues for religious toleration;
- Except for atheists, “who deny the Being of a God”
and thus cannot be trusted to keep their promises
(e.g. in contracts).
Context:
- Religious wars and persecution in England and on the
Continent.
Works, cont.
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689)
• Argues against innate ideas
• For the acquisition of knowledge through the senses:
“Intuitionism”
• Anti-Cartesian (Descartes)
• Re-opens debate about essentialism vs
conventionalism with his views on identity,
comparison, classification and natural kinds.
Definitions
essentialism
conventionalism
identity
comparison,
classification
natural kinds.
Essentialism
Plato was an essentialist since he believed in
ideal forms of which every object is just a
poor copy. Ideas are eternal. Ideas are
superior to material objects. When we see
objects in the material world, we understand
them through their relationships between
them.
Conventionalism
• Belief that judgments of a specific sort are
grounded only on (explicit or implicit)
agreements in human society, rather than by
reference to external reality. Although this
view is commonly held with respect to the
rules of grammar and the principles of
etiquette, its application to the propositions of
law, ethics, science, mathematics, and logic
is more controversial.
identity
• The logical relation of numerical sameness, in which
each thing stands only to itself. Although everything
is what it is and not anything else, philosophers try to
formulate more precisely the criteria by means of
which we may be sure that one and the same thing is
cognized under two different descriptions or at two
distinct times. Leibniz held that numerical identity is
equivalent to indiscernibility or sameness of all the
features each thing has. But Locke maintained that
judgments of identity are invariably made by
reference to types or sorts of things. The identity
of individual persons is an especially
troublesome case.
Works, cont.
Two Treatises on Government (written 1679/80;
published 1689/90)
• First: Argues against traditional basis for
political authority expressed in Filmer’s
Patriarcha, divine right of kings;
• Second: protection of private property, life
and liberty = basis for civil government.
Locke’s Basic Epistemology

• Human being = tabula rasa (blank slate)


• receives sense-impressions
• some of these transformed by Mind into Ideas
• Ideas represented in language by words
• However, no Ideas are innate
• Mind operates (through gradual learning process) w/out
reference to any received authority (of Church, State or others)
Complex Ideas
• Sense-data of primary qualities (PQs)
and secondary qualities (SQs), produce
ideas in the mind:
• Ideas are mental results of sense-data
• -Sense-perceptions
• -Bodily sensations
• -Mental images
• -Thoughts and concepts
Primary(PQ) and
Secondary Qualities(SQ)
Distinction between perceived aspects of things. The
primary qualities are intrinsic features of the thing itself
(its size, shape, internal structure, mass, and
momentum, for example), while the secondary qualities
are merely its powers to produce sensations in us (its
color, odor, sound, and taste, for example). This
distinction was carefully drawn by Galileo, Descartes,
Boyle, and Locke, whose statement of the distinction
set the tone for future scientific inquiry. But Foucher,
Bayle, and Berkeley argued that the distinction is
groundless, so that all sensible qualities exist only in
the mind of the perceiver.
Attacks Innatism (Descartes)
Locke’s objections to innate ideas (“II’s”)
• Lack of universal assent: II’s not known to idiots,
children, illiterates
• Dependence on authority:
• “…a Man is not permitted without Censure to follow
his own Thoughts in the search of Truth, when they
lead him…out of the common Road”.
• Epistemological and political commitment to the
individual (who is the foundation of Locke’s political
liberalism).
Revised, 11/21/03

David Hume
(1711-1776)

An Inquiry Concerning Human


Understanding
Anthem1

Anthem2
1. Sensation & the Origin of
Ideas
The contents of the mind: (1) ideas & (2)
impressions (sensations & feelings) -- Ideas
(concepts, beliefs, memories, mental images, etc.)
are faint & unclear; impressions are strong & vivid.
Ideas are derived from impressions: All ideas are
copies of impressions.
The meaning of ideas depends on impressions
The empirical criterion of
meaning
"From what
impression is that
alleged idea
derived?"
No impression, no meaning?
No impression, no foundation in reality?
The Nature & Limits of
Human Knowledge
Two kinds of ideas
(or judgments)
"All the objects of human reason or inquiry may naturally be divided
into two kinds: relations of ideas and matters of fact".

"Hume's Fork"
Judgments concerning relations of ideas

Ideas ("Hume's Fork")

Judgments concerning matters of fact


Judgments concerning relations of
ideas
Intuitively or demonstrably certain
Discoverable by thought alone [a priori]
Cannot be denied without contradiction

*Hume's examples: Pythagorean Theorem


or
3 x 5 = 30 ÷ 2
The Pythagorean Theorem
On a right triangle, the square of
the hypotenuse is equal to the
sum of the squares of the other
two sides

5'
4'
(hypotenuse)
2 2 2
3 +4 =5
3'
(9 + 16 = 25)
Judgments concerning matters of
fact
"Every judgment concerning matters of fact
can be denied without contradiction" (e.g.,
"the sun will not rise tomorrow").
Neither intuitively nor demonstrably certain
Not discoverable by thought alone [a priori],
but rather on the basis of sense experience
[a posteriori]
More specifically,
All judgments concerning
matters of fact are based on . .
..
the more fundamental belief that
there is "a tie or connection"
between cause & effect.
And why do we believe that
there is a "tie or connection"
between cause & effect?

Answer: The belief arises entirely from


experience [a posteriori, not a priori],
namely, the experience of finding that
two events (cause & effect) are
"constantly conjoined" with each other.
It is not logically necessary
that a particular effect follows
a particular cause;

it is just a fact of experience.

This view leads to Hume's discussion of . . . .


3. The Nature & Limits of
Inductive Reasoning

(the problem of induction)


Hume on Induction
Induction is the process of drawing inferences
from past experiences of cause & effect
sequences to present or future events.
Hume's point is that an "effect" cannot be validly
deduced from its "cause;"
the inference from "cause" to "effect" is based
on past experiences of "constant conjunction,"
and these past experiences . . . .
accustom or habituate us

to believe that one event is the


cause of another, which we
believe to be the effect of the prior
event.

This is what leads us to believe that . . . .


the future will resemble the
past.

It is all a matter of CUSTOM or HABIT.

This is the foundation of . . . .


The Idea that there is a
Necessary Connection between
Cause & Effect
If this is a meaningful (& true?) idea, then (according to
Hume) it must be derived from sense impressions.

What, then, is the sense impression from


which this idea is derived?
There is no sense impression
of causal power or necessary
connection of cause & effect,
but we do experience . . . .
(1) the spatial contiguity,
(2) the temporal succession, and
(3) the constant conjunction

of "cause" & "effect."


It is from this experience,
 especially the experience of constant conjunction,
 that the idea of a necessary connection between
"cause" & "effect" arises (or is inferred);
 but the "inference" is simply a matter of "custom or
habit."
 This seems to mean that the "inference" here is psycho-
logical rather than logical. Actually, there is no experience of
the necessary connection between cause and effect. Thus,
all factual judgments (which are based on the assumption
that there is a necessary connection between cause and
effect) are subject to doubt.
 No necessity, no certainty.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Immanuel Kant
• 1724-1804
• Lutheran (Pietist) background
• “Second Copernican Revolution”
in philosophy
• Spent all his life in Königsberg, a
small German town on the Baltic
Sea in East Prussia. (After World
War II, Germany's border was
pushed west, so Königsberg is now
called Kaliningrad and is part of
Russia.)
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Immanuel Kant
• At the age of fifty-five, Kant had published much
work on the natural sciences, taught at Königsberg
University for over twenty years, and achieved a
good reputation in German literary circles.

• During the last twenty-five years of his life,


however, Kant's philosophical work placed him
firmly in the company of such towering giants as
Plato and Aristotle.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Immanuel Kant
• Kant's three major works are often considered to
be the starting points for different branches of
modern philosophy:

the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) for the


philosophy of mind;
the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) for
moral philosophy;
and the Critique of Judgment (1790) for
aesthetics.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Immanuel Kant
• The Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals was
published in 1785, just before the Critique of
Practical Reason.

• It is essentially a short introduction to the


argument presented in the second Critique.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant’s Intellectual Climate
• Kant lived and wrote during the Enlightenment.
This period produced the ideas about human rights
and democracy that inspired the French and
American revolutions. (Some other major figures of
the Enlightenment were Locke, Hume, Rousseau and
Leibniz.)
• The characteristic quality of the Enlightenment was
an immense confidence in reason, i.e. humanity's
ability to solve problems through logical analysis.
The central metaphor of the Enlightenment was a
notion of the light of reason dispelling the darkness
of mythology and misunderstanding.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant’s Intellectual Climate
• Enlightenment thinkers like Kant felt that history
had placed them in the unique position of being
able to provide clear reasons and arguments for
their beliefs.
• The ideas of earlier generations, they thought, had
been determined by myths and traditions; their own
ideas were based on reason.
(According to this way of thinking,
the French monarchy's claims to
power were based on tradition; reason
prescribed a republican government
like that created by the revolution.)
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant
• Kant's philosophical goal was to use logical
analysis to understand reason itself. Before we go
about analyzing our world, Kant argued, we must
understand the mental tools we will be using.
• In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant set about
developing a comprehensive picture of how our
mind – our reason – receives and processes
information.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant
• Kant later said that the great
Scottish philosopher David Hume
(1711-1776) had inspired him to
undertake this project. Hume, Kant
said, awoke him from an
intellectual "slumber."
• The idea that so inspired Kant
was Hume's analysis of cause-and-
effect relationships.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Hume
According to Hume, when we talk about events in
the world we say that one thing ‘causes’ another.

But nothing in our perceptions tells us that anything


causes anything else. All we know from our
perceptions is that certain events regularly occur
immediately after certain other events.

‘Causation’ is just a concept that we employ to


make sense of why certain events regularly follow
certain other events.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant
• Kant took Hume's idea and went one step further.
Causation, Kant argues, is not just an idea that we
employ to make sense of our perceptions. It is a
concept that we cannot help but employ. We don't
sit around watching events and then develop an idea
of causation on the basis of what we see. We
automatically bring the concept to bear on the
situation.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant
• Kant argued that causation and a number of other
basic ideas (e.g., time and space) are hardwired, as
it were, into our minds. Anytime we try to
understand what we see, we cannot help but think
in terms of causes and effects.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant
Kant's argument has huge implications. If our
picture of the world is structured by concepts that
are hardwired into our minds, then we can't know
anything about how the world ‘really’ is.

The world we know about is developed by


combining sensory data (‘appearances’ or
‘phenomena,’ as Kant called them) with
fundamental concepts of reason (‘causation,’ etc.).

We don't know anything about the ‘things-in-


themselves’ from which sensory data emanates.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant
• This recognition that our understanding of the
world may have as much to do with our minds as
with the world has been called a “Copernican
Revolution” in philosophy – a change in
perspective as significant to philosophy as
Copernicus’s recognition that the earth is not the
center of the universe.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant
• Kant's insights posed a severe challenge to many
earlier ideas.
Ex.: Before Kant many philosophers offered
‘proofs’ of the existence of God.
One argument made was that there must be a
"first cause" for the universe. Kant pointed out that
the question of whether there "must" be a first
cause for the universe is irrelevant, because it is
really a question about how we understand the
world, not a question about the world itself.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant
• Kant’s analysis similarly shifted the debate over
free will and determinism. (Kant presents a version
of this argument in Chapter 3 of the Groundwork.)
When we use reason to understand why we
have made the choices we have, we can come up
with a causal explanation. But this picture is not
necessarily accurate. We don't know anything
about how things "really" are; we are free to think
that we can make free choices, because for all we
know this might "really" be the case.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant
• In the Critique of Practical Reason and the
Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant
applies this same technique –using reason to
analyze itself – to determine what moral choices
we should make.
• Just as we cannot rely on our picture of the world
for knowledge about how the world "really" is, so
also we cannot rely on expectations about events in
the world in developing moral principles. Kant
tries to develop a moral philosophy that depends
only on the fundamental concepts of reason.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant’s Intellectual Climate: Criticisms
Some later thinkers have criticized Enlightenment
philosophers like Kant for placing too much
confidence in reason. Some have argued that
rational analysis is not the best way to deal with
moral questions.
Further, some have argued that Enlightenment
thinkers were pompous to think that they could
discover the timeless truths of reason; in fact, their
ideas were determined by their culture just as all
other people’s are.
Karl Popper

• Popper replaces induction with falsification


• Science is not distinguished from non-science
on basis of methodology. No unique
methodology specific to science
• Science consists mostly of problem solving.
Karl Popper

• All observations are selective and theory laden


• A demarcation between science and pseudo-
science is established by falsification. A theory is
scientific only if it is refutable by a conceivable
event
• Every genuine test of a scientific theory is based
on an asymmetry between verification and
falsification
Sir Karl Popper (1902-1994)
• Falsification is the idea that science advances by
unjustified, exaggerated guesses followed by unstinting
criticism.

• Any "positive support" for theories is both unobtainable


and superfluous; all we can and need do is create theories
and eliminate error

• Scientists never actually use induction. It is impossible to


verify propositions by reference to experience
Falsificationism (1)
Scientific Method

• Is there a scientific method?


• What justifies scientific claims to knowledge?
• Can we distinguish scientific method from non-
scientific ways of thinking? (demarcation)
• Does science progress?
Falsificationism (1)
Falsificationism ‘No criterion of truth’:
Two Arguments:
2. No Theory/observation distinction:
• ‘Here is a glass of water’ is theory laden
• In accepting the statement we must accept
a significant amount of theory
• We have only as much justification for
accepting the observation statement as we
do for the theory
Falsificationism (1)
Falsificationism ‘No criterion of truth’:
Two Arguments:
2. No Theory/observation distinction:
Upshot: we cannot use observation to establish
the truth of a theory

How can we establish the truth of scientific


theories?
We can’t!
Falsificationism (1)
Confirmation and Pseudoscience
Good scientific practice:
E.g. Einstein’s general relativity
Conjecture: mass of the sun bends the path of light
Apparent location

Actual location

moon
Falsificationism (1)
Confirmation and Pseudoscience
Good scientific practice:
E.g. Einstein’s general relativity
Conjecture: mass of the sun bends the path of light
• If the apparent location of the observed star doesn’t
shift, the theory is wrong.
• It will have been refuted.
• The mark of a scientific theory is whether it can be
falsified by observation
Falsificationism (1)
Conjecture and Refutation:
“Falsificationists… prefer an attempt to solve
an interesting problem by a bold conjecture,
even (and especially) if it soon turns out to
be false, to any recital of a sequence of
irrelevant truisms” (CR: 231)
This gives us:
(i) a glimpse of scientific method
(ii) a demarcation criterion for science
Falsificationism (1)
Scientific method:
Scientific theories have deductive consequences
T: Sodium burns with a yellow flame
Obs: This is a piece of sodium
Pred: This burns with a yellow flame

Suppose: (a) it burns with yellow flame (T may be


true or false)
(b) it burns with a blue flame (T is false)
Falsificationism (1)
Scientific method:
Scientific theories have deductive consequences
• They can be falsified but not confirmed.
• The objective of scientific theorizing is to put
forward (bold) hypotheses and then test them in
order to falsify them
• Theories are falsified by basic statements
(what is a basic statement?)
Falsificationism (1)
Demarcation:
• Scientific theories are those that can be falsified
by basic statements.
• Good scientific theories do not make themselves
immune from falsification by use of ad hoc
hypotheses
Falsificationism (1)
Progress of Science:
• Science progresses by eliminating theories that
have been falsified?
• But does it progress?
• A scientific theory cannot be shown to be true.
But some scientific theories do have varying
degrees of success. They resist falsification.
Falsificationism (1)
Guidance for Scientists:
Is there a rational criterion for choosing between
competing theories?
Verisimilitude:
We can compare competing theories according to
their relative verisimilitude (truth likeness)
T1 has more verisimilitude than T2 or is equal to T2 iff:
All the true consequences of T2 are contained
in T1 and all the false consequences of T1 are
contained in T2
Falsificationism (1)

“We must not look upon science as a body of


‘knowledge’, but rather as a system of
hypotheses which in principle cannot be justified,
but with which we work as long as they stand up to
tests, and of which we are never justified in
saying that we know that they are ‘true’, or ‘more or
less certain’ or even ‘probable’
Kuhn (1)
Thomas Kuhn
(1922-1996)
The Copernican
Revolution (1957)
The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (1962)
• History of science not compatible with rationalist
view
• Progress of science not cumulative, driven by the
application of a method
Kuhn (1)
Thomas Kuhn
(1922-1996)
The Copernican
Revolution (1957)
The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (1962)

• No obvious science/non-science demarcation


• No context of discovery/context of justification
distinction
Kuhn (1)
Kuhn’s History of Science
Two projects:
• Descriptive — what is the structure of
scientific history?
Normal science Scientific revolution
• Explanatory — why does the history of
science have this structure?
Paradigms
Kuhn (1)
1. Kuhn’s History of Science
Descriptive Project:
Immature Science
Revolution

Normal Science

Crisis

Anomalies
Paradigm Diagram
old paradigm unexplained observations competing new
paradigms
in c o
mm
ens
u rat
e

puzzle solving one dominant paradigm


Mopping up operation

unsolved puzzles ignored unexplained observations


unexplained observations and
alternative interpretation ignored
until enough accumulates to overturn
current paradigm
Kuhn (1)
1. Kuhn’s History of Science
Immature Science:
No prevailing school of thought
Various disparate theories
Competition
Kuhn (1)
1. Kuhn’s History of Science
Normal Science:
• Stability
• Determination of significant facts
• Matching facts with theories
• Articulation of theories (refinement and extension)
“puzzle -solving” neither tests nor confirms its theories
Kuhn (1)
1. Kuhn’s History of Science
Normal Science:
• Driven by a paradigm (more later):
• Commonly held set of beliefs, procedures,
techniques
• Agreement upon questions of import
• Agreement on what counts as a solution
• Agreement upon standards of evaluation
Kuhn (1)
1. Kuhn’s History of Science
Anomalies:
Not all expectations are borne out
• Some anomalies lead to further discoveries
(e.g. orbit of Uranus)
• Some simply ignored
• Troublesome anomalies
Challenge key theoretical concepts
Resist solutions
Inhibit application of theory
Kuhn (1)
1. Kuhn’s History of Science
Crisis:
• Weight of accumulated anomalies
• No agreement on how anomalies are to be
dealt with
• Doubts arise
Kuhn (1)
1. Kuhn’s History of Science
Revolution:
A new paradigm emerges
Old Theory: well established, many followers,
politically powerful, well understood, many anomalies
New Theory: few followers, untested, new
concepts/techniques, accounts for anomalies, asks
new questions
Kuhn (1)
1. Kuhn’s History of Science
Revolution:
A new paradigm emerges
Are old and new theories compared by some
rational procedure?
“A new scientific theory does not triumph by
convincing its opponents and making them see
the light, but rather because its opponents
eventually die, and a new generation grows up
that is familiar with it” (Planck)
Kuhn (1)
Scientific Revolutions
The Ptolemaic model

The earth is at the


centre of the
planetary system QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
Problem:
How to explain the
retrograde motion
of planets
Kuhn (1)
Scientific Revolutions
The Ptolemaic model

The earth is at the Deferent


centre of the
planetary system Earth
Planet
Problem:
How to explain the Epicycle
retrograde motion
of planets
Kuhn (1)
Scientific Revolutions
The Ptolemaic model

QuickTime™
QuickTime™ and
and aa
TIFF
TIFF (LZW)
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are
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needed to see this picture.
picture.

http://csep10.phys.utk.edu/astr161/lect/retrograde/aristotle.html

The earth is at the centre of the planetary system


Kuhn (1)
Scientific Revolutions
The Ptolemaic Model:
Problems:
• Complexity: epicycle upon epicycle
• The accumulation of anomalies
• No clear way forward
Kuhn (1)
Scientific Revolutions
The Copernican model
The sun is at the
centre of the
planetary system QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.

Problem:
How to explain the
retrograde motion
of planets
Kuhn (1)
Scientific Revolutions
The Copernican model

QuickTime™
QuickTime™ and
and aa
TIFF (LZW) decompressor
TIFF (LZW) decompressor
are
are needed
needed toto see
see this
this picture.
picture.

http://csep10.phys.utk.edu/astr161/lect/retrograde/copernican.html

The sun is at the centre of the solar system


Kuhn (1)
Scientific revolutions
The Copernican Model:
Problems:
(i) The rotation of the earth

A A B
B
Kuhn (1)
Scientific Revolutions
The Copernican Revolution was not the
consequence of an old theory with less ‘empirical
content’ being replaced by a new theory with more
• No appeal to reason alone
• ‘propaganda’
To discover how scientific revolutions are effected,
we shall therefore have to examine … the
techniques of persuasive argumentation within the
quite special groups that constitute the community
of scientists (SSR: 94)
Kuhn (1)
2. Explanatory Project
Two Questions:
(i) If this is the course of the history of
science, why?
(ii) Why aren’t competing theories/traditions
measured against each other by some
rational procedure?
Kuhn (1)
2. Explanatory Project
Paradigms
Two concepts:
Sociological —a consensus, a body of beliefs
shared among scientists working
within a tradition: Disciplinary Matrix
Individual — an example, prototype, teaching
procedure: Exemplar
Kuhn (1)
2. Explanatory Project
Paradigms
Disciplinary Matrix:
(i) Symbolic generalisations
(ii) Metaphysical commitments
(iii) Scientific values
(iv) Heuristic models
(v) Exemplars
Kuhn (1)
2. Explanatory Project
Paradigms
Exemplars:
Not explicit rules
Illustrations of theories, text book examples, critical
experiments.
Those things that are used to induct a new scientist
into the practice of the disciplinary matrix.
Kuhn (1)
2. Explanatory Project
Paradigms
Exemplars:
The roles of an exemplar:
• Semantic
• Identify puzzles
• Suggest procedures
• Demarcate adequate solutions
• Determine relevant questions
Kuhn (1)
2. Explanatory Project
Why is normal science stable?
It is conducted wholly within the terms of a
disciplinary matrix:
questions
procedures
problems
priorities
standards of evaluation
All are generated by the disciplinary matrix
Kuhn (1)
2. Explanatory Project
Why is theory change revolutionary?
Theory change is brought about by a ‘gestalt
switch’ a complete change of world view

There is no neutral point from which one can


assess theories from two paradigms simultaneously
Kuhn (1)
Kuhn sources on the web
General:
http://webpages.shepherd.edu/maustin/kuhn/kuhn.htm
http://philosophy.wisc.edu/forster/220/kuhn.htm
Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996)
• All research presupposes a world-view,a collection of
fundamental objects, natural laws, definitions, and above all a
definition of what research is.
• Kuhn called a world-view, paradigms

• Mature science have established paradigms


• Example of mature sciences are chemistry, physics, geology;
whereas, economics and psychology are
immature sciences.
Paradigm
• Thomas Kuhn popularized the term in his book The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions (1996) by using it to describe how
science works. According to Kuhn, scientific explanations of
the world are controlled by a paradigm, some model of how
the world is expected to work and into which actual
observations are fitted, even if the fit is not very exact. As
inexact fits accumulate, it becomes more apparent that the
dominant paradigm is inadequate as a model of reality. When
enough contradictions exist, a paradigm revolution occurs and
a new paradigm is adopted.

• The word paradigm comes from the Greek paradeiknunai and


means "to compare." In science and philosophy it has the
same basic meaning as in common usage: a model or
instance used as a basis or example for further work.
Need for Paradigms
• Research requires paradigms
• Paradigms are models of the way the world works
• Without paradigms research is a random collection of
observations lacking unification of structure into a
whole.
• Without paradigms, it is not possible to decide which
are and which are not important observations
Dominant Paradigms

As a field matures, one paradigm


becomes the dominant one. Once
paradigms is established research
progresses quickly
Paradigm guides direction of
Research
It becomes clear with aid of paradigm
which research areas are fruitful. These
areas are ones not totally explained

Paradigms give concepts and laws to


build on.
Paradigm Shift
Paradigm shift occurs when old
paradigm shown inadequate

What is defined as research is reevaluated


Concepts turn upside down. Earlier research is
reinterpreted
Real research
• Real Research occurs during a
paradigm shift
• Once a paradigm dominates, research
becomes puzzle solving
• Puzzle solving is not research due to
answers known beforehand
Example of Puzzle Solving
After Newton explained solar system,
later scientists using Newton’s theory
predicted
The presence of the then unknown
planets
Neptune, Uranus, and Pluto
What New Paradigms Do
• Discovery of new paradigm results in
new questions being asked and old
questions abandoned
• Newton saw gravitation as a property of
matter. Earlier theories tried to find a
mechanical explanation as whirlpools in
space or angels.
Paradigms are
Incommensurable
• Paradigms have different world view. It
is difficult to compare them

• Consequently, science defines truth


relative to a paradigm and not
absolutely. Truth is a story
Science
• Science is a conformist society which present
only the currently accepted theory
Consequently science defines reality relative
to the accepted paradigm
• Students are educated into the accepted
paradigm and to ignore alternative paradigms
• The society of science determines what
scientists observe
Imre Lakatos (1922 - 1974)
`

• All scientific theories are equally un-provable

• Falsification doesn’t work due to rescue hypotheses

• the "basic unit" of scientific development is not the


scientific theory, such that science progresses when one
theory proves to be more successful than another.
Imre Lakatos

the "basic unit" is actually the research program.


Science progresses when one research program
becomes more productive and more useful than other
and, hence, receives a greater share of social resources
through funding and younger scientists looking to join.
A research program is characterized by a particular set
of "hard core" fundamental ideas and is deemed
successful so long as it contents continue to increase.
Imre Lakatos

• In reality scientists do not abandon theories. They invent rescue


hypotheses or ignore anomalies or refutations

• Popperian crucial experiments and Kuhnian revolutions turn out


to be myths. What happens is progressive research replaces
degenerating ones.

• Progressive scientific programs predict and produce dramatic,


unexpected observations and results
Falsificationism
Popper
Science progresses toward its goal of increasing
verisimilitude by advancing bold conjectures and
then attempting to refute these by observations
• Theories cannot be verified by observation
—anti-inductivism
—no theory/observation distinction
• Theories are falsified by basic statements
• We choose between theories on grounds
of corroboration (mark of verisimilitude)
Scientific Research Programmes
Imre Lakatos (1922-1974)
Objective is to maintain Popperian insights:
• Goal of Science: Increasing verisimilitude
• Method of Science: Rational account of the
assessment of theories
• Forge a link between the goal of science and
its methods
Scientific Research Programmes
Revision versus Ad hoc Hypotheses
Duhem-Quine Thesis:
‘Theories face the tribunal of experience as
corporate entities’ (Quine)
What gets tested against experience:
• Theory
• Auxiliary assumptions
• Initial conditions
• ‘Basic statements’
Scientific Research Programmes
Revision versus Ad hoc Hypotheses
Duhem-Quine Thesis:
A theory as a web of belief
• Touches experience at the periphery
• More central parts more removed from direct
evaluation by experience (e.g. principles of
logic)
One can make a change anywhere in the web
Any theory can be made consonant with any set of
observations (Underdetermination)
Scientific Research Programmes
Revision versus Ad hoc Hypotheses
Two questions
In the light of anomalies:
(i) What should one change?
Principle of least change
(ii) When should one abandon a theory(in favour
of another)?
Scientific Research Programmes
Scientific Research Programmes (SRP)
A theory is:
• Rules of logic and mathematics
• Metaphysical commitments
• Statements of laws
• Assumptions about initial conditions
A SRP is a lineage of theories. SRP evolve over
time
Rules according to which SRP’s evolve over time.
Scientific Research Programmes
Scientific Research Programmes (SRP)
Parts of a SRP:

Hard Core:
Theoretical assertions
Metaphysical commitments

HC
Auxiliary Belt:
Initial conditions
AB
Assumptions
Ad hoc hypotheses
Scientific Research Programmes
Scientific Research Programmes (SRP)
Parts of a SRP:
e.g. Celestial Mechanics Hard Core:
Laws of Motion
Universal Gravitation
Space and time
HC
Auxiliary Belt:
AB Number of planets
Masses of planets
Scientific Research Programmes
Rules Governing Changes to SRP
Negative Heuristic:
• ‘Don’t touch the hard core’
• Hard core is held true ‘by convention’; it is not
up for falsification
Positive Heuristic:
• Set of rules concerning how to deal with
anomalies, what to change
Scientific Research Programmes
Assessing/Comparing SRP
Three Criteria for a Good SRP:
(i) Later theories have excess empirical
content: predicts novel outcomes
(ii) Later theories explain the success of earlier
theories
(iii) Later theories have more corroboration
When a SRP meets these conditions it is said to be
progressing
Scientific Research Programmes
Assessing/Comparing SRP
Three Criteria for a Good SRP:
(i) Later theories have excess empirical content:
predicts novel outcomes
(ii) Later theories explain the success of earlier
theories
(iii) Later theories have more corroboration
When a SRP fails to meet these conditions it is said to be
degenerating
Progressive SRP’s replace degenerating ones
Scientific Research Programmes
Content of the Positive Heuristic
Two Readings:
(i) Strong reading: heuristic contains explicit
rules for dealing with each anomaly in a
given SRP.
(ii) Weak reading: heuristic contains general
injunctions (e.g. ‘seek unified theories’,
‘quantitative theories are better than
qualitative ones’)
Scientific Research Programmes
Content of the Positive Heuristic
Should yield a method for revising theories, guiding
research and assessing SRP’s.
“…defines problems, outlines the construction
of a belt of auxiliary hypotheses, foresees
anomalies and turns them victoriously into
examples, all according to a preconceived
plan.”
“… a partially articulated set of suggestions, or
hints, on how to change, develop…the
‘refutable’ protective belt’ (Lakatos TMSRP)
Scientific Research Programmes
Problems with SRP
1. Positive Heuristic:
(i) Strong Reading: what could count as a set
of general rules for dealing with all
conceivable anomalies?
(ii) Weak reading: No big deal. Positive
heuristic held in common between all
SRP’s. Insufficient to offer a criterion of
choice between competing SRP’s
Scientific Research Programmes
Problems with SRP
2. Assessing Theories:
(i) Hard Cores held true as convention
The success of a SRP, then, may simply be
down to the success of the positive heuristic.
Incompatible with Lakatos’ realism. Why don’t
we view theories as simply instrumental
devices?
Scientific Research Programmes
Problems with SRP
2. Assessing Theories:
(ii) Hard Cores actually do get tested

Apparent location

Actual location

moon
Scientific Research Programmes
Problems with SRP
2. Assessing Theories:
(ii)i Hard Cores actually do get tested
• Metaphysics of space/time
• Laws of gravitation
• Behaviour of light in gravitational field
Scientific Research Programmes
Problems with SRP
3. Comparing SRP’s:
(i) Assessing relative empirical content (Popper)
(ii) SRP’s wax and wane
(iii) Why is the success of SRP a sign of
verisimilitude?
(iv) What is the reason for thinking that the
method of science is a means to its goal
Questions for tests or Class
Discussion*
•What kind of activity is science?
•Is Basketball a science?
•Is boxing a science?
•Differentiate between natural
philosophy and natural history.
•Where was science first practiced
and by whom?
•See sections 2.1,2.3,3.1,3.24,5,6,&7
Theory7Reality”.Godfrey-Smith, Chicago Press,2003
Paul Feyerabend
• In his books Against
Method and Science
in a Free Society
Feyerabend
defended the idea
that there are no
methodological rules
which are always
used by scientists.
Feyerabend's position
• is generally seen as radical
in the philosophy of science,
because it implies that
philosophy can neither
succeed in providing a
general description of
science, nor in devising a
method for differentiating
products of science from
non-scientific entities like
myths. It also implies that
philosophical guidelines
should be ignored by
scientists, if they are to aim
for progress.
Feyerabend & Falsification
• Feyerabend was also critical of
falsificationism. He argued that no
interesting theory is ever consistent with
all the relevant facts
Feyerabend & Consistency
• One of the criteria for evaluating scientific theories that
Feyerabend attacks is the consistency criterion. He points out
that to insist that new theories be consistent with old theories
gives an unreasonable advantage to the older theory. He makes
the logical point that being compatible with a defunct older
theory does not increase the validity or truth of a new theory
over an alternative covering the same content. That is, if one
had to choose between two theories of equal explanatory
power, to choose the one that is compatible with an older,
falsified theory is to make an aesthetic, rather than a rational
choice. The familiarity of such a theory might also make it more
appealing to scientists, since they will not have to disregard as
many cherished prejudices. Hence, that theory can be said to
have "an unfair advantage".
Questions for tests or Class
Discussion
• Define epistemology.
• Define metaphysics
• Explain the correspondence between
the visible and non-visible worlds.
• Is there a scientific method? If so list the
• Components of the method.
• What is empiricism?
Questions for tests or Class
Discussion
• Discuss the social structure of science.
• What was Locke’s theory of the mind?
• How does Hume’s theory of mind differ
from that of Locke?
• Explain “external world skepticism.
• Explain “inductive skepticism.
Questions for tests or Class
Discussion
• What is rationalism?
• What is the analytic/synthetic distinction
made with in Logical Empiricism?
• Write a essay about the following:
• “If a sentence has no possible method
of verification, it has no meaning”.
Questions for tests or Class
Discussion
• Give an example where a non-
observable explicates an observable.
• What does it mean to say a theory can
never be proved?
• Discuss “holism” in relation to testing an
hypothesis.
Questions for tests or Class
Discussion
•What philosopher espoused the
idea of epistemological anarchy?
•What is meant by theory laden
observations?
•Are religion and science
incommensurate majesteria?
Questions for tests or Class
Discussion
•Distinguish between science and
pseudoscience.
•What is the problem of
demarcation and how does
Popper address it?
•What according to Popper
defines a scientific hypothesis?
Questions for tests or Class
Discussion
•Discuss Popper’s contention that
it’s never possible to confirm an
hypothesis.
•Why is inductive skepticism no
threat to the rationality of science?
•What are the two steps Popper
claims in which scientific change
occurs?
Questions for tests or Class
Discussion
• What is a paradigm?
• How does a revolution occur in
science?
• What is normal science?
• Is normal science open to new ideas?
Elucidate.
• What is according to Lakatos a
research program?
Basic Questions
Are these questions logically
equivalent?
Do you believe in God?
Do you believe in Science?
Do you believe God?
Do you believe Science
Definitions
know:to perceive directly, to recognize, to be the same
certain: fixed, settled, reliable, true
truth: fidelity, constancy, fact
fact: a thing done, actual, objective reality
evidence(to see from Latin):furnishing proof
proof:cogency of evidence that compels acceptance
validity:justified, correctly derived from premises
Three Theories of Truth
Coherence-theory true if it “coheres” or is
consistent with other statements.

Pragmatic-It’s true if it works.

Semantic- language deceives us by


setting up relationships
Science and religion

Is science different from religion in that both are not


faith based? Does science’s request for evidence no
matter how tenuous the evidence “coheres” to the
hypothesis making science different from religion?
Falsificationism
Problems for Falsificationism (recap)
Falsification:
Some legitimate features of scientific enterprise
are not falsifiable:
• Probabilistic Statements
• Existential Statements
• Metaphysical Commitments
Falsificationism (finale)
Problems for Falsificationism
Verisimilitude:
We judge a theory’s verisimilitude by its degree of
corroboration.
How could corroboration be a criterion of
verisimilitude?
The past performance of a theory can be taken as
evidence of its verisimilitude only if one is willing to
make inductive inference on the past successes of
a theory
Falsificationism (finale)
Problems for Falsificationism (recap)
Verisimilitude:
We judge a theory’s verisimilitude by its degree of
corroboration.
Why should a theory be chosen on the grounds of
true consequences alone.
e.g. Ptolemaic versus Copernican systems
Ptolemaic system had larger number of true
consequences. Copernican system simpler
Falsificationism (finale)
Problems for Falsificationism (recap)
2. Verisimilitude:
We judge a theory’s verisimilitude by its degree of
corroboration.
Why should a theory be chosen on the grounds of
true consequences alone.
Other virtues:
simplicity
productivity
unification
Falsificationism (finale)
Problems for Falsificationism
3. Basic Statements:
Theories are falsified by basic statements.
What warrants our acceptance of basic statements?
(i) Observation?: No. Basic statements are
theory laden. Accepting them requires
accepting theory
(ii) Decision/convention: not grounded in a
rational procedure
Falsificationism (finale)
‘Whiff of Inductivism’
“… there may be a whiff of inductivism here. It
enters with the vague realist assumption that
reality, though unknown, is in some respects
similar to what science tells us or, in other
words, with the assumption that science can
progress towards greater verisimilitude” (1974)
Falsificationism (finale)
‘Whiff of Inductivism’

Two inductive claims:


1: ‘vague realist assumption’: theories increase in
their verisimilitude
2. Theories that have performed well in the past
have a greater degree of verisimilitude
Falsificationism (finale)
‘Whiff of Inductivism’
A Dilemma for Popper:
(i) Give up on induction
—No rational criterion for choosing between
competing theories
—No rational grounds for continuing to use
successful theories
(ii) Give up the distinctive features of falsificationism
Falsificationism (finale)
Problems for Falsificationism
3. Basic Statements:
Theories are falsified by basic statements.
What warrants our acceptance of basic statements?
(i) Observation?: No. Basic statements are
theory laden. Accepting them requires
accepting theory
(ii) Decision/convention: not grounded in a
rational procedure
Falsificationism (finale)
‘Whiff of Inductivism’
“… there may be a whiff of inductivism here. It
enters with the vague realist assumption that
reality, though unknown, is in some respects
similar to what science tells us or, in other
words, with the assumption that science can
progress towards greater verisimilitude” (1974)
Falsificationism (finale)
‘Whiff of Inductivism’

Two inductive claims:


1: ‘vague realist assumption’: theories increase in
their verisimilitude
2. Theories that have performed well in the past
have a greater degree of verisimilitude

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