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Conflicting priorities
GoSS security challenges
and recent responses
F
our years after the signing of the left unresolved, and there has been The international community needs
Comprehensive Peace Agree- associated violence in a number to refocus on the fragile North–South
ment (CPA), Southern Sudan of areas in Southern Sudan and ceasefire and a southern govern-
is facing a profound set of problems. border regions. ment that is struggling to cope with
The Government of Southern Sudan The GoSS’s security planning con- mounting internal and external
(GoSS) has yet to establish security tinues to be largely based on the pressures. In particular, the UN
throughout the South and to address perception that the North is actively Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) could
internal challenges to its authority, working to undermine the CPA and more effectively operationalize its
including various militia groups and that a future war is likely. core mandate to monitor the cease-
inter-communal conflicts. Within the The 2008 GoSS civilian disarmament fire and security arrangements of
context of faltering implementation of campaign had limited impact, in
the CPA and could establish a more
the CPA and its perceived obstruction terms of both removing weapons
dynamic presence on the ground,
by the North, a potentially destabiliz- from circulation and stemming vio-
as it has begun to do in Jonglei.
ing financial crisis, and elections slated lence. The campaign was conducted
Donors and others involved in secu-
for February 2010, the GoSS is strug- selectively, took place alongside re-
rity policy and programming have
gling on multiple fronts. Looming over armament, and failed to address
an opportunity to engage decision-
these issues is the prospect of the ref- internal conflicts and gaps in civil
securityprovision, which continue makers both to plan for possible
erendum on self-determination, which
to motivate weapons possession. scenarios following the referendum
the GoSS is resolved should take place
Disarmament in the current con- in 2011 and to develop strategies to
by 2011, as stipulated by the CPA.
text is unlikely to contribute to the address and mitigate internal threats
The GoSS continues to be driven by
broader goals of peace and security. to stability for the remainder of
the belief that a confrontation with the
North is likely. This stance has shaped The 2008 disarmament campaign the interim period. This calls for a
its current security strategy, which and subsequent violence in Jonglei sequenced approach that takes secu-
focuses on defending the border with and Upper Nile in 2009 are indica- rity—rather than disarmament—as
the North and other strategic posi- tive of divisions within the GoSS, the necessary starting point.
tions, as well as containing potential between those empowered by the
spoilers, including possible allies of CPA and other southern groups, as
Khartoum. The consequence is a lim- well as ongoing inter-communal External threats
ited ability to address insecurity and conflicts. The issue of how to handle
Despite the continued effort to adhere
conflicts emerging within the South. militias—whether independent or
to the terms of the peace agreement,2
This Issue Brief explores some of the aligned with security forces in the
the GoSS’s security decision-making
internal and external challenges cur- North—is connected to these divi-
continues to be driven by what it per-
rently facing the GoSS, and its responses, sions. A renewed focus on South–
ceives to be the unresolved conflict
particularly the most recent civilian South dialogue and reconciliation
is essential if the South is to remain with the North. Security continues to
disarmament campaign, which took be understood in terms of the need to
place in the second half of 2008.1 unified.
In order to engage meaningfully prepare for a possible future war, which
Key findings are the following:
with the GoSS on security issues, includes the need to address perceived
The GoSS faces a combination of the UN and donors need to appre- proxy forces and other destabilizing
internal divisions and external ciate the GoSS’s security dilemmas groups and individuals operating in
pressures from an increasingly and priorities, and allow these to the South.3
hostile National Congress Party inform their approach to support- The perspective of the Sudan
(NCP) in the North; numerous ing the development of security People’s Liberation Movement/Army
violations of the CPA have been policies and institutions. (SPLM and SPLA) that Southern Sudan
www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 1
must be able to protect its sovereignty
Box 1 Confrontation within the Malakal-based JIU
in the event that the northern govern-
ment reneges on the peace agreement The SAF component of the Malakal-based JIU consists primarily of soldiers previously under the command
has been clear since the outset of the of Gabriel Tang-Ginya, a (former) militia leader in Southern Sudan and an SAF Major-General.11 This JIU was
CPA negotiations. The maintenance at the centre of a violent confrontation on 24–25 February 2009 in Malakal, capital of Upper Nile State, as
of the SPLA as the official army of well as of earlier confrontations.
Southern Sudan is enshrined in the In a highly contentious move, Tang-Ginya arrived in Malakal, where he has family and owns property, on
agreement 4 and was seen by south- 23 February, having ostensibly been given permission to take leave for a week. He moved into the SAF JIU
erners as an essential guarantor of the barracks in the town upon his arrival and the following morning went for a walk accompanied by SAF body-
autonomous region’s security and guards. An exchange of fire broke out early that morning killing one civilian and injuring two SPLA soldiers.
integrity. Yet the SPLA continues to UN officials asked Tang-Ginya to leave the town, which he declined to do, and the Upper Nile State
Security Committee threatened to arrest him. A drunken spree of indiscriminate fighting involving tanks,
see the SAF as the biggest threat to its
artillery, and small arms then broke out between the SPLA and SAF components of the JIU, killing at least
security, as it did during the civil war.5
62 people (including about 30 civilians) and injuring 94 others.12 The SAF JIU contingent was composed
It is extremely mistrustful of SAF forces
largely of Tang-Ginya’s (former) militia members and was better equipped than its SPLA counterpart. Serious
on or near its territory, both those ille-
looting followed and an additional SAF soldier was shot dead the following day. GoSS Vice President Riek
gally ‘guarding’ strategic assets such Machar travelled to Malakal and, together with Minister Ahmed Harun of the Government of National Unity,
as the oil fields and SAF members of mediated an agreement between the two sides. The terms included the disengagement of forces, a stipula-
the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs).6 tion that both JIU teams would rotate out of Malakal completely, and the relocation of future JIUs to a
The problematic make-up of the location 10 km out of town.13 These terms have yet to be met.
JIUs has reinforced the SPLA’s con- There is a widespread belief in Southern Sudan that the violence was orchestrated. ‘We believe that
cerns. Rather than building a model Tang-Ginya is being used by SAF as a catalyst to start another civil war in Southern Sudan,’ said a state-
for a future unified army, the SAF ment from the GoSS Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.14 ‘SAF is not willing to hand over Tang-Ginya
strategy of deploying former SAF- to face justice as repeatedly demanded by GoSS,’ it said. This and other violent clashes are violations of
aligned southern militias to the JIUs the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
has created insecurity and is seen by The SAF contingents of the JIUs, in particular in Malakal and Paloich, include former militia members15
many in the GoSS as a deliberate prov- who are believed to remain loyal to their former commanders. As such, the SAF commander does not have
ocation. Tensions between the SAF effective control over these forces. Matters are further complicated by reported tensions within the SAF
and SPLA components of the JIUs component of the Malakal-based JIU. More specifically, Tang-Ginya’s supporters are in conflict with those
have led to several instances of heavy loyal to other southern, SAF-aligned militia leaders such as Gordon Kong and Thomas Maboir, as well as with
some Murle groups. As such, the JIUs cannot fulfil their mandate of providing a unified military capability
fighting, most recently in Malakal in
during the interim period and have instead become a source of insecurity.16
February 2009 (see Box 1).
The Southern Sudan Security
Strategy (2009) identifies the failure
to demarcate the North–South border Popular Defence Forces (the Islamist The failure by the NCP to respect
as the most pressing challenge to the militia that supported the National the Abyei boundary as per the
CPA, and confrontations along the Islamic Front’s rise to power and was findings of the Abyei Boundaries
contested border as a primary threat to used to conduct the civil war in the Commission21 and to implement
the South (see Box 2). These concerns South),17 also deploying them to South- the Abyei Protocol. Violent clashes
are heightened by recent SAF and ern Kordofan. between the SAF and the SPLA
SPLA troop build-ups along strategic Since the CPA was signed, the broke out in and around Abyei in
border areas as well as significant North–South border and the so-called May 2008, which led to the signing
arming by both sides.7 The SPLA Three Areas of Abyei, Southern Kordo- of the Abyei Road Map,22 as part
also moved 18 tanks from Ethiopia fan, and Blue Nile have been a major of which both parties agreed to
to positions in Blue Nile during July focus of dispute; there is no shortage have the dispute resolved by the
2008.8 Several shipments of tanks, of related examples of violations of Abyei Arbitration Tribunal in The
heavy weaponry, and small arms the agreement. These include: Hague. The court is expected to
from Ukraine landed in Mombassa in
Resistance by the NCP to the demar- reach a final decision on the bound-
neighbouring Kenya and reportedly
cation of the boundary between the ary in mid-2009, but whether the
moved towards the Sudanese border
North and South as per the agreed findings will be respected remains
during late 2007 and 2008.9
Most recently, several brigades of formula.18 doubtful. Among other current
SAF forces were reportedly moved The failure to redeploy forces, as problems, Abyei has no budget to
into Southern Kordofan under the per the agreed formula, and the implement the road map.23
pretext of preparing to defend the ongoing recruitment of proxies.19 Violent sporadic clashes between
area from rebel Justice and Equality The failure of both parties to meet the SPLA and SAF, most recently
Movement attacks from Darfur, though troop strength commitments for in Kharasana (March 2008), Abyei
this claim has been disputed.10 The JIUs, and the refusal of the SAF to (May 2008), and Malakal (Febru-
NCP has further remobilized the accept mandated training efforts.20 ary 2009).
www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 3
(see Box 3). The inability to pay public
Box 3 Southern Sudan’s financial crisis
sector salaries, including payment of
soldiers, is generating protests and The GoSS budget for 2009 is SDG 3.6 billion (or approximately USD 1.52 billion).41 This was calculated on the
violence.40 The failure to pay soldiers’ basis of an expected oil price of USD 50 per barrel, which then dropped to less than USD 40. It is consider-
salaries, combined with the lack of ably less than the 2008 budget, which amounted to SDG 3.4 billion (USD 1.44 billion), with an additional SDG
alternative livelihoods, increases the 3.08 billion (USD 1.3 billon) passed by the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly in October 2008,42 apparently
risk of defection by former militia away for military spending.
from the SPLA, lowers soldier morale, Oil revenues to the GoSS dropped by almost 70 per cent between August and December 2008: from
USD 370.65 million in August to USD 118.87 in December.43 Donors now estimate that revenues for 2009 will
and increases the likelihood of soldiers’
be 40 percent less than indicated in the 2009 budget.44 Non-oil revenues in Southern Sudan are gathered
involvement in crime. Furthermore,
mainly from customs, personal income tax, and a variety of other sources (VAT, corporate tax, airport,
the budget crisis is preventing the
immigration, and traffic dues) but remain extremely small: between January and September 2008, only
government from providing essential
SDG 26.8 million (USD 11.33 million) was reportedly collected in the South, of which half was remitted to the
services that would build public con- Government of National Unity (GoNU) under the terms of the CPA.45
fidence in both it and the CPA. A number of key issues have contributed to the crisis, including: an inflated and largely unskilled
workforce; 46 over-spending on the security forces; 47 over-spending on ghost-worker salaries; an almost
total dependency on oil reserves; a lack of transparency in the oil sector; 48 a unilateral decision by the
Disarmament as a response GoNU to deduct SDG 15 million (USD 6.34 million) per month from GoSS oil revenues to finance upcoming
to insecurity elections; 49 widespread corruption and inefficiency; the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA) passing
unrealistic budgets; 50 as well as the spending of reserves that could otherwise act as a cushion in lean
Beginning with its inclusion in the times. In addition, the Juba-based GoSS Ministry of Finance and economic planning has been unable to
CPA, disarmament has been under- identify over-spending by government entities as it has occurred unfettered,51 resulting in enormous
stood as an important component of shortfalls: ‘I suspect that once the budget is passed, many ministries pay no further attention to their
the peace- and security-building pro- planned activities and spend a lot of money either on administration, or on activities they did not plan for,’
cess. Given the current state of other noted Kuol Athian Mawein, GoSS minister of finance and economic planning, in his 2009 budget speech.52
peace-building and security sector As decentralization occurs, this will be an increasing problem at the state level.
transformation processes, however, it In March 2009, Elijah Malok Aleng, governor of the Bank of Southern Sudan, noted that the bank’s coffers
is unlikely to contribute to these goals. were almost empty.53 One major bank, the Nile Commerce Bank, has run out of cash to meet obligations,
The 2008 GoSS disarmament cam- reportedly due to improper borrowing by GoSS officials.54 The GoSS has set up a task force to address the
cash-flow problem and is now scrambling to rein in spending55 and attract funding from outside sources.56
paign, as well as previous campaigns
The resulting uncertainty is leading to profound instability and renders the government unable to deliver
in 2005–06, have had limited positive
meaningful peace dividends to southern Sudanese.
impacts on the critical security condi-
tions facing the GoSS, and in some
cases they have had a negative effect.
The problem is twofold. First, some lation of Southern Sudan, which was the collection of all civilian weapons
communities have perceived disarma- the most recent disarmament effort within a six-month period ending on
ment as being targeted along ethnic since those carried out in 2005–06.57 30 November. The order called for the
lines, which has exacerbated inter- The 2008 campaign was directed by an operation to be conducted jointly by
communal divisions. Second, the operational order issued by President the state authorities and the SPLA.59
GoSS has been unable to provide Salva Kiir on 22 May. The stated objec- In the event, the directive was
adequate protection to communities, tive was ‘to peacefully have all civilians selectively implemented. In five out
which consequently perceive the in the ten states surrender any kind of of the ten southern states there is no
maintenance of weapons as being cru- firearm in their possession to the State evidence that disarmament took place
cial to their defence. These issues play authorities and the SPLA forces who as a result of the directive; some gov-
out differently depending upon the conduct this operation’; the order ex- ernors ignored the order and elsewhere
local security and conflict dynamics. plicitly condoned the threat of SPLA it did not lead to any practical activi-
Campaigns in 2005–06 and more force in the event of non-compliance.58 ties. In Upper Nile, Western Bahr el
recently in 2008 illustrate some of The interpretation and implementa- Ghazal, and Western Equatoria, for
these problems. tion of the order was left largely to the example, no disarmament activity
In mid-2008 the GoSS initiated a discretion of the state governors. The was reported. In Northern Bahr el
campaign to disarm the civilian popu- governors were directed to organize Ghazal, a one-day operation was
conducted, netting fewer than 300
weapons. Although the governor of
Warrap suggested that 15,000 weapons
The budget crisis renders the GoSS unable to had been collected there, this remains
unverified.
deliver meaningful peace dividends. However, there has also been a
countervailing evolution towards arms
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
January February March April May June July August September October November December
control in some locations, with the seen as posing a local threat and by was raped, two people were killed,
result that certain groups are authorized authorizing the use of arms by others. seven others wounded, and that prop-
to hold weapons, partly in response In some cases, there were incidents erty was ransacked. In the process, the
to community concerns about self- of abuse or violence, which may have deputy speaker of the state legislative
defence. In Western Equatoria, the involved misconduct by soldiers acting assembly was beaten up.61 The gover-
state has encouraged the formation of under the auspices of the disarmament nor reacted by suspending all disarm
‘community defence forces’ by civilians campaign. In Lakes State, the first phase ament operations and withdrawing
to fend off the LRA. In Lakes the ini- of the operation—conducted in July all SPLA soldiers from the state. In the
tial attempt to use the order to disarm and August 2008—was organized by immediate wake of the SPLA’s depar-
the Gelweng (cattle guards previously county-level disarmament commit- ture, inter-clan tensions flared and the
armed by the SPLA) had the net effect tees, which reported to the governor. Yirol County commissioner and six
of collecting, registering, and author- This initial voluntary collection was others were injured in an attack, pos-
izing the use of firearms by a group of deemed insufficient, and the SPLA sibly by deserting soldiers.62
Gelweng leaders who have become was brought in to conduct a second In Unity State, Governor Taban
more formally linked to the state’s round in September. Before it could Deng delegated responsibility for
security forces.60 This suggests that get fully under way, however, three executing the president’s operational
disarmament can usefully be seen as battalions of SPLA involved in a cordon- order to the SPLA, with little or no
an effort to bring particular groups and-search operation in Rumbek consultation with community leaders.
under the control of the state, both by became unruly. Accounts differ, but In practice, the disarmament process
removing weapons from some groups some reports suggest that one woman was conducted as a discrete series of
www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 5
military operations. The SPLA divided
Box 4 Inter-ethnic fighting in Jonglei State
the state into three zones and assigned
a brigade from the 4th Division to each. In and around Jonglei State, resource competition and cattle raiding between ethnic groups—among them
The exercises were largely peaceful, the Lou, Jikany, and Gawaar Nuer, Murle, Bor Dinka, and Anuak—is common.66 But since March 2009, the
except for a small clash in Leer, where nature of inter-communal violence has shifted from the targeting of armed youth typically involved in
two civilians were wounded.63 It is raiding, to attacks on communities, including the elderly, women, and children.
unclear how many weapons were Tensions between armed Lou Nuer and Murle rose considerably following a series of raids in January
and February. In one of these attacks, on 30 January, 29 people were reportedly killed, 15 injured, and 3,000
collected in total, but the campaign
cattle stolen from the Lou Nuer.67 A large group of Nuer youth, described as being part of an ‘unknown
contributed to resentment among
armed civilian group’, retaliated in a series of attacks between 5 and 13 March,68 starting with cattle camps
targeted communities rather than
in Gumuruk payam, Pibor County, and moving to the town of Lekwangole, which they held for two days. Up
securing control of an economically
to 1,000 people were reportedly killed in the fighting and the aftermath, many of them women, children, and
and strategically important area.64 elderly as most of the men were with their cattle in the toic (grasslands).69 The Nuer also abducted Murle
In Jonglei State, the 2008 campaign children, apparently in retaliation for their own children being abducted in previous attacks. Schools, clinics,
followed previous initiatives. In 2005– NGO compounds, and churches were looted in the town, some of them destroyed in the process.
06 the SPLA had conducted an opera- Murle survivors described the Nuer as being heavily armed with AK-47s, PKMs, rocket-propelled grenade
tion in northern Jonglei State that launchers, and hand grenades. There were reports that weapons were redistributed to Lou Nuer (the white
targeted the Lou Nuer in the area, army, which was the target of the 2005–06 disarmament) from SPLA stores in the period before the attacks.70
perceived to be linked with ‘white Southern Sudan Police Service and SPLA uniforms were found on some of the dead bodies.71 This suggests
army’ and South Sudan Defence Forces that ethnic Lou Nuer within the SPLA were deserting to join their kin in the violence, pointing to problems
of disaffection and command and control within the army. Furthermore, the SPLA—which had battalions in
elements.65 The campaign was led by
both Gumuruk and Pibor Counties and a smaller contingent about 1 km from Lekwangole town—did nothing
SPLA commanders who had a history
to stop the attacks.72 Neither did the state authorities.73 There were similar accusations that the Murle,
in the area, which partly explains why
frequently allies of the SAF during the war, with a history of difficult relations with the SPLA, were receiving
some of the target community rebelled ammunition from the SAF.74
and more than 1,600 lives were lost in The Nuer attack on Lekwangole town was unusual in its targeting of communities rather than individu-
the ensuing battle. The fighting led to als or small groups. It is unclear who led the attacking force, and what motivated it apart from revenge for
the highest number of SPLA casualties previous Murle raids. The governor of Jonglei State reportedly met with the GoSS president to request
in military action in Southern Sudan support from the SPLA to stop further retaliatory attacks;75 however, this kind of intervention probably
since the end of the second civil war. would have fuelled accusations of GoSS bias against the Murle. The perception among the Murle is that
Following this incident, there was a state authorities were behind the attack.76
series of efforts to undertake disarma- The violence continues. On 18–19 April, the Murle conducted a major attack on Lou Nuer communities
ment in a way that would not generate in Akobo County, leaving at least 170 confirmed dead; the total death count could be as high as 300.77 Murle
rearmament combined with the possible resurgence of the Lou Nuer white army greatly increases the
similar resistance. These built on local
potential for future violent confrontations.78
peace conferences and involved chiefs
and former militia leaders, particularly
in Murle and Lou Nuer areas of Pibor protection. Overall, some 2,000 weap- The international community’s
and Akobo counties. ons were reportedly collected during approach to this and previous disarma-
The 2008 campaign took place in the 2008 campaign, mostly from Akobo, ment campaigns has been inconsistent.
some of the same areas targeted in Pibor, and Duk Counties.79 On the one hand, the UN and donors
2005–06, including Akobo and Pibor The response of the GoSS Council have expressed concern that SPLA-
Counties. Participation in the cam- of Ministers to resistance to disarma- led disarmament will trigger resistance
paign was minimal largely due to ment was to direct states to arrange and exacerbate internal divisions, as
community concerns about ongoing community awareness raising events was the case in 2005–06. On the other
insecurity. In the context of recurrent to highlight the dangers of firearm hand, the UN has at various points
conflict in Jonglei (see Box 4), fear of use and the resulting need to disarm. offered assistance subject to there
attacks from neighbouring communi- A series of meetings, hosted by the being a plan in place; it has also
ties led people to refuse to comply. president or vice president and sought guarantees that operations
Furthermore, in the absence of efforts attended by high-level GoSS officials, would be conducted voluntarily or
to address underlying peace and state governors, CSSAC Bureau repre- as a strategy to minimize harm, as
security issues, youths have re-armed sentatives, and community leaders was the case in Akobo in 2006.80 More
themselves for self-defence and the from five states, took place at the end recently, for example, UNMIS supplied
protection of cattle. For instance, of 2008 and in early 2009. Part of the secure containers for collected weapons
according to local officials, ongoing aim of these meetings was to assure on the condition that only weapons
cattle raiding by Murle, particularly communities that the SPLA would collected ‘voluntarily’ would be stored
in the area of Kolnyang, made civilians provide security and develop recom- in them.81
wary of cooperating in the disarma- mendations for other measures to Whether in terms of stemming
ment campaign and prompted some enhance security between communi- internal threats, reducing weapons in
youths to purchase firearms for their ties in conflict. circulation, or addressing insecurity,
the 2008 campaign had very little the North has limited its ability to mission – through more direct inter-
impact on the internal security dynam- address divisions and community action with local actors. Playing this
ics within Southern Sudan. There were security concerns within the South, role calls for more dynamic patrolling
instances of abuse committed under which are equally destabilizing. This by military and civilian observers,
the auspices of civilian disarmament, dynamic has not been recognized by greater interaction and cooperation at
but the effort did not lead to violence many outside observers. A better an operational level between the UN
on the scale of the 2005–06 campaign. appreciation of the realities on the military, police, and their counterparts
Indeed, its implementation was ground is crucial to assisting the at all levels, and improved information
relatively peaceful, though largely southern government to reduce the sharing, analysis, and reporting. To
due to its cautious and patchy imple- risk of further political, ethnic, and counteract the current perception that
mentation, not as a result of a funda- social crisis. A number of important there is little recourse to address CPA
mental change of strategy on the part steps should be considered. violations and the tendency of peace-
of the GoSS. All indications are that First, UNMIS can make a significant keepers to respond only after outbreaks
the government plans to continue contribution to building confidence in of violence have occurred, UNMIS
civilian disarmament in 2009, by force the peace by more effectively monitor- could work more with local actors to
if necessary. 82 ing the ceasefire and security arrange- address concerns before they escalate.
ments of the CPA—arguably the most Part of UNMIS’s mandate falls under
fundamental task of the peacekeeping Chapter VII of the UN Charter83 but it
Closing reflections
As the CPA enters a critical period,
Southern Sudan is under pressure from
ceasefire violations as well as internal All indications are that the GoSS plans to continue
instability and security challenges.
The GoSS’s focus on preparations for civilian disarmament in 2009.
a possible military confrontation with
www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 7
has yet to effectively operationalize enable the GoSS to plan for the refer- ernment and others have a capacity to
this on the ground. This will require a endum and beyond, to create the influence policy due to their history
substantial shift in the focus of current conditions for peaceful secession— of bilateral relations, as well as finan-
assets and human resources.84 A first should this be the outcome of the cial support for programming. A dual
step would be to patrol key areas more referendum—and to overcome the approach is needed that both engages
proactively, as is currently beginning South’s internal divisions after 2011. decision-makers at a political level
to take place through a deployment in In the interim, a short- to medium- and supports sectoral and community-
Jonglei. It is from this starting point term strategy is also needed to realisti- based initiatives that contribute to
that a discussion about more effective cally assess and manage internal threats stability. In the longer term, it is criti-
response mechanisms and protection to security, mitigate the potentially cal to develop the infrastructure for
could be developed. destabilizing impact of the financial state security, particularly the police,
Second, donors and others inter- crisis and upcoming elections, and law, and justice institutions, and their
ested in engaging with the GoSS on moderate the ongoing internal conflicts links to customary security and legal
security sector reform issues can assist and criminality that impact on the daily systems. At the same time, it is impor-
the government in planning to address lives of ordinary people. tant to enhance the capacity of the
internal security challenges. This re- Bilateral donor arrangements may Southern Sudan Peace Commission
quires greater recognition of current have an important role to play. The (SSPC) and relevant SSLA and State
security dilemmas, and a focus on US and UK governments have had Legislative Assembly Committees and
strengthening security policy and significant influence through their their members to work with commu-
decision-making structures as well as support of the ongoing SPLA trans- nities and state authorities to mediate
the government’s capacity for plan- formation process, which provides disputes in their constituencies.
ning. A more realistic analysis and important entry points for dialogue As these steps suggest, re-empha-
acknowledgement of possible future and leverage with key GoSS security sizing peace-building and both state
scenarios and threats would help policy-makers.85 The Norwegian gov- and human security is essential. The
Tribal peace and reconciliation conference, Jonglei, May 2009 © Timothy McKulka
www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 9
35 Dak (2009a). The strategy states: ‘The 56 For example, the US Congress has report- 72 Generally, the SPLA does not intervene in
Government of Southern Sudan exists edly pledged USD 275 million to meet tribal conflict for fear of being forced to take
for the ultimate purpose of ensuring the the budget deficit. Three banks were also sides and also because these conflicts are
security and sovereignty of the people of reportedly in ‘cut-throat’ competition to so numerous that it would be unfeasible.
Southern Sudan . . . Though we have guarantee USD 140 million to the GoSS, 73 Governor Kuol Manyang, who has been
limited resources, we will seek to minimize with oil reserves being used as a guaran- extremely vocal about the need to end
risk while focusing our efforts on those tee. See Anyanzwa (2009). Murle attacks and insecurity in Jonglei,
activities that are most vital to securing 57 This section is largely based on O’Brien was in Juba at the time of the fighting.
our interests.’ (2009). 74 The SPLA reported that ammunition was
36 The Security Strategy built on discussions 58 Kiir Mayardit (2008). The order states: ‘In intercepted en route to Murle areas from
initially held during the Defence White the event that any individual or group of the North in March 2009.
Paper process, which was supported by individuals refuse(s), and exhibit resistance 75 The vast size of Jonglei State (more than
the US and UK governments. that can be construed to endanger the 120,000 km2) would make it very difficult
37 The Bureau was given a mandate and live of the forces and/or the State officials for the force to provide a buffer zone
was placed within the Ministry of Inter- conducting this exercise, appropriate between the warring groups.
nal Affairs by a decision of the Council of force must be used to cause the collection 76 There is no proof that state authorities
Ministers on 31 October 2008. of all arms from the resisting individual were behind the attack. Either way, the
38 According to statistics released by the or group of individuals.’ Murle believe that they are being victim-
UN in January 2009, 187,000 people had 59 See Kiir Mayardit (2008). ized and that the attack was part of an
been displaced by ‘tribal and armed con- 60 See O’Brien (2009). orchestrated effort backed by the state to
flict’ since January 2008. See UN OCHA 61 O’Brien (2009, p. 32). exterminate the Murle and to unite Dinka
(2009a). 62 Sudan Tribune (2008). and Nuer against them.
39 See Pax Christi (2009) and UNSC (2009) 63 Interview with disarmament, demobili- 77 Reuters (2009a).
on the LRA’s recent attacks and impact zation, and reintegration (DDR) official 78 Interview with humanitarian worker,
on security in Southern Sudan. in Bentiu, October 2008. Nairobi, March 2009. Reports of inter-
40 Disabled war veterans staged recent pro- 64 O’Brien (2009, pp. 42–48). ethnic violence, with large numbers of
tests in Eastern and Central Equatoria 65 The white army, a loosely constituted deaths, continue, including recent Lou
states, in response to non-payment of fighting force active during the civil war, Nuer–Jikany Nuer incidents that left up to
salaries for seven months. See Aleu (2008). was disarmed by the SPLA in the bloody 50 people dead and more than 50 injured
41 UNMIS (2009a, para. 76). All conversions campaign of 2006. See Young (2007a) for (Reuters, 2009b).
based on SDG 2.37 to USD 1. background on the white army; and Small 79 O’Brien (2009, p. 21).
42 The supplementary budget was approved Arms Survey (2007) for background on 80 See Small Arms Survey (2007, pp. 4–6) for
in October 2008. See UNMIS (2008b, the Jonglei disarmament campaign; and background on the Akobo disarmament.
para. 67). Young (2006) for a discussion of the South 81 Interview with DDR official, Juba, March
43 See UNMIS (2009a; 2009b). Sudan Defence Forces. 2009. In fact, ‘voluntary’ collections are
44 JDT (2009). 66 Other causes of conflict include child impossible to verify and arguably do not
45 UNMIS (2009a, para. 110). The GoSS abductions and the inability to trace exist in a context where the use of force is
intends to double its non-oil revenues abductees, disagreements over county explicitly threatened.
in 2009. and payam (county subdivision) borders 82 In January 2009, the GoSS Council of
46 For 2008, total government spending on (e.g. Duk and Uror Counties), and ineq- Ministers resolved that disarmament
GoSS employees was projected at 55 per uitable disarmament campaigns. Inter- should continue and that the Ministry of
cent. This covers 112,000 personnel ex- view with Lony Ruot, Standard Action the Interior should commit additional
cluding the SPLA, 60 per cent of which Liaison Focus (SALF), a Sudanese NGO police to the initiative. See GoSS (2009a).
are other ‘organized forces’ such as the working in Jonglei, March 2009. 83 The UNMIS mandate is available at
police, prison, and wildlife services. See 67 UN OCHA (2009b, p. 2). <http://www.unmis.org/english/
GoSS (2007, para. 9). 68 SALF (2009, p. 1). mandate.htm>. UN Security Council
47 No less than 51 per cent of the 2009 bud- 69 The commissioner of Pibor County re- Resolution 1590 seeks to balance UNMIS’s
get is expected to be spent on salaries, ported that 453 Murle had died, while role in protecting civilians from physical
including pensions. This figure rises to other sources said that 160 people remained violence with the recognition that the
61 per cent if state budgets are included. ‘missing’, presumed dead. In addition, government is ultimately responsible for
See GoSS (2008, para. 19). 300 Nuer were reported dead. See SALF the safety of its population (see UNSC
48 Figures and funds are released unilater- (2009, p. 2). The number of injured is 2005, para. 16(i)). UNMIS is not author-
ally by the Khartoum-based Ministry of unknown. NGO and UN staff had been ized to engage the SAF or SPLA using
Finance and National Economy with no relocated from the area following a warn- armed violence.
input from the GoSS. ing of the imminent attacks; consequently, 84 Some progress is being made. In response
49 See Dak (2009b). no international witnesses were on the to violence in Jonglei, in May 2009 UNMIS
50 For example, in the 2007 budget debate, ground to monitor events. began establishing Temporary Operating
the assembly voted to increase the budget 70 Eyewitness report from humanitarian Bases in Akobo and Pibor and putting
by USD 159 million without any ability to worker, Juba, March 2009. Confirmed by air asset and vehicles at the disposal of
raise the funds. See GoSS (2007, para. 17). statement by state authorities that weap- its teams.
51 See GoSS (2007, para. 32). ons had to be returned to Lou Nuer so 85 The US has supported the SPLA transfor-
52 See GoSS (2008, para. 23). that they could defend themselves from mation process as well as police develop-
53 Dak (2009b). Murle raiders who had not been disarmed. ment and other rule of law and justice
54 Vuni (2009). 71 Interview with humanitarian worker, sector activities. The other major ongoing
55 See Dak (2009b). Nairobi, March 2009. security sector reform initiative in South
www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 11
Number 8 September 2007 Number 3 May 2007 Number 11 December 2007
Responses to pastoral wars: a review of violence The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Mar- Violence and Victimization after Civilian Disarma-
reduction efforts in Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya ginalization, by John Young ment: The Case of Jonglei, by Richard Garfield