REPUBLIC VS.

CASTELVI
[58 SCRA 336; G.R. No. L-20620; 15 Aug 1974]

Facts:
In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a
lease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to
terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectment
proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the
expropriation proceedings for the land in question.
Issue:
Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that
just compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as
of that year.
The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) the
entry must be for more than a momentary period, 3) it must be under warrant or color of
authorities, 4) the property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public use
must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
property. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled
that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing
of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of
the date of the filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the
Republic was placed in possession of the Castelvi property, by authority of court, on
August 10, 1959. The taking of the Castelvi property for the purposes of determining
the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when
the complaint for eminent domain was filed. There is no basis to the contention of the
Republic that a lease on a year-to-year basis can give rise to permanent right to occupy
since by express provision a lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of
Castelvi land in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand
(Art. 1669, New Civil Code). The Supreme Court, however, did not apply Art. 1250 of the
New Civil Code for the adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or
deflation because in eminent domain cases the obligation to pay arises from law
independent of contract.

Landbank vs CA 249 SCRA 196

Facts:
In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated principles
be applied in its resolution. Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of the following the adverse ruling
by the Court of Appeals. Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were
acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR
and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their
land, they sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative
proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the
Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked",
"reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them
to withdraw the same. DAR and Land Bank filed for petitions but it was dismissed and
they filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
Issues:
Whether or not the opening of "trust accounts" is within the coverage of term "deposit.
Ruling:
The provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow
an expanded construction that would include the opening of "trust accounts" within the
coverage of term "deposit. Accordingly, we must adhere to the well -settled rule that
when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for
interpretation or construction, but only for application. The validity of constituting trust
accounts for the benefit of the rejecting landowners and withholding immediate payment
to them is further premised on the latter's refusal to accept the offered compensation
there by making it necessary that the amount remains in the custody of the LBP for
safekeeping and in trust for eventual payment to the landowners. As an exercise of
police power, the expropriation of private property under the CARP puts the landowner,
and not the government, in a situation where the odds are already stacked against his
favor. He has no recourse but to allow it. His only consolation is that he can negotiate for
the amount of compensation to be paid for the expropriated property. Unduly burdening
the property owners from the resulting flaws in the implementation of the CARP, which
was supposed to have been a carefully crafted legislation, is plainly unfair and
unacceptable.