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Yamagata,N. HomericMorality. MnemosyneSuppl.131.Leiden:Brill1993.
Epicurus on EiJpoavv1]
and 'EvipyEta (DL 10.136)
DavidWolfsdorf
I Introduction
MiroslavMarcovich's TeubnereditionofDiogenesLaertius' Lives and
OpinionsofEminentPhilosophersprintsthefollowingdoctrinefromEpi-
curus'OnChoices:!
(e) ~ l1EV yapo:tUPUSlU Kat C1JtOVlU KU"tUO"t'lll1UnKUl dOLV ~ 6 V U l
~ 6 xupaKat ~ EU<PPOOUVTj KU"ta KlVTjOLV VEpycl<;X BA.JW'V"tUL.
2
In theLoeb edition,whoseGreekis thesamc,R. D. Hicksrenders(e)
as:
Peace
\
of mind and freedom from painare pleasures which imply a
stateofrest; joy and delightare seen to consistinmotionandactiv-
ity.3
IdonotentirelyagreewithHicks'renditionof(e), nordoIregard(e)
itselfastextuallysound,butbothareadequatepointsofdeparturefor
thepresentdiscussion.
I amgratefulto an anonymous referee for anoutstandingsetof commentsona
previousdraft;thesecompelledmetorethinkmanyaspectsofmyargument.
1 OnthetitleofEpicurus'work,seen.5.
2 DiogenisLaertiiVitae Philosophorum, B. G. Tuebner,1999,vol. 1,800(= 10.136)
3 Diogenes Laertius Lives and Opinions ofEminent Philosophers, Harvard University
Press,1925,Vol2,661 .
APEIRONajournalforancientphilosophyandscience
222 DavidWolfsdorf
Diogenescites (e) inthe,contextofhisdiscussionofthedistinction
betweenEpicurus'andtheCyrenaics'conceptionsofpleasure:
Epicurus differs from the Cyrenaics with respect to pleasure. They
donotrecognize katastematic <pleasure>, butonlypleasureinmo-
tion(EV Herecognizesboth, <andineachcase>4ofthesoul
andthebody,ashesaysinhisworksOn ChoiceandAvoidance,sOn the
End, inthefirst bookofOn Lives, andintheLetter to the Philosophers
in Mytilene. Likewise, DiogenesintheseventeenthbookofSelections
andMetrodorusinhisworkTimocrates saythefollowing: 'pleasureis
conceived (VOOUIlEVT]t; bothaskinetic (KaTa dVT]OLV) andas
katastematic
(e)immediatelyfollowsthispassage.Thus,thefunctionof(e) istopro-
vide evidence thatEpicurus distinguished betweenkatastematic and
kineticpleasures.
Thefirstclauseof(e)isclearenough:<'xtapa1;(aandaJtov(aarekatas-
tematicpleasuresofsoulandbodyrespectively.Thesecondclausecon-
tainsanumberofdifficulties. First,ontheassumptionthatthesecond
clauseparallelsthefirstindistinguishingapsychologicalandasomatic
species ofthe distincthedonic genus, xapa would seem to be kinet-
ic pleasureofthesoul, whereas EU<ppOOUVTj wouldseemto bekinetic
pleasureofthebody. However,ithasbeenthoughtoddthatEpicurus
wouldusethe word'EU<PPOOUVTj' to refertobodilypleasuresince the
<ppo-rootofthewordsuggestsapsychologicalcondition.
Second,itisunclearhowtounderstand'EVEpyEL<,X'. Thephrase'Kata
I((VTjOLV' seemsfunctionally equivalentto inthefirst
clauseandthustocontainadequateinformationbyitselftodistinguish
thisgenusofpleasures.Consequently,theconjunctionof'EVEpyE(<,X' and
'Kma I((VTjOLV' seemsredundant. Forexample,DavidBradshawcom-
4 HermannUsener,Epicurea, trans.I. Ramelli,Bompiani,2002,91. Usenerfirstsug-
gestedalacunahere.Marcovichdoesnotfollowhim.ThewordsIhaveaddedin
bracketsaremerelyintendedtofacilitateintelligibility.Cpo PhilipMerlan,Studies
in EpicurusandAristotle,O.Harrassowitz,1960,4-5.
5 Aswehaveseen,at10.136Diogenesalsomentionsa workbyEpicuruswiththe
titleOn Choices. In thecatalogueofEpicurus'writingsat10.27,Diogenesalsolists
aworkentitledOn Choices and Avoidances.Allthreetitlesarecommonlytakento
refertoasinglework.
6 10.136
Epicuruson EVcPpoavv'f/ and 'EvepYfw(OL10.136) 223
ments: 'Thisstatementisslightlypuzzling,forEVEpyE(<,X doesnotseem
toaddanythingnotalreadysaidbyKma dVTjOLV,.7 Ontheotherhand,
if'EvEpyELa' doeshavea differentmeaningfrom 'dVTjOLS;', itisunclear
whatthatmeaningis. Certainly, Hicks' insertionofa conjunction, 'in
motionandactivity',isunfaithfultotheGreekandtestifiestotheawk-
wardnessofthetext.
8
LongandSedleylamentthat'EVEPYE(<,X' 'hasneverbeensatisfactorily
explained.'9SincetheoriginalGreektextswouldhavebeenwrittenin
capitalsandwithoutaccents,theynotethat'EVEpyEL<,X' wouldhavebeen
composedas'ENEPfEIAI'andthatthisisambiguousbetweentheda-
tivesingularandthenominativeplural.Consequently,theyrenderthe
nounas 'EvEpyELaL' andtake thephrase 'Kata dVTjOLV' tomodifythis
noun;viz.: 'joyanddelightareregardedas kineticactivities.
do
Iagree
thatthis bettersensethan(e). Moreover,LongandSedley'sren-
ditionbetteraccords with the citationfrom Metrodorus immediately
precedingit: OE tfjs; tE Kma dVTjOLV Kat tf]s; Kma-
Consequently,Isuggestthat(e) shouldbeemendedto:
(E) yapatapa1;(a Kat aJtov(a doLY
OE Xapa Kat EU<PPOOUVTj Kata dVTjOLV EVEPYELaL [3A.EJtOVtaL.
Irender(E) as:
For tranquility and freedom from pain are katastematic pleasures,
whereasjoyanddelightareviewedaskineticactivities.
Hereafter,Iwillfocuson(E).
Grantedthis, thefirst problemremains: itis unclearwhyEpicurus
shouldusetheword'EU<PPOOUVTj' torefertoabodilypleasure.Further-
more,partofthesecondproblemremains:thephrase'kineticactivity'
seemsredundant.Indeed,inthequotationfromMetrodorus'Timocrates,
thecontrastbetween'Kma dVTjoLY' aloneand'tf]s; is
7 AristotleEastandWest, CambridgeUniversityPress,2004,47n7
8 Cpo Merlan(1960) 6,whodrawsattentiontothesametwoproblemsin(E).
9 Oneproposalistoemendthetextto 'Evapye[<;1', Cpo Merlan,1960,6.Idiscussthis
possibilityinsectionVI.
10 A A LongandD.Sedley,TheHellenisticPhilosophers,CambridgeUniversityPress,
1987,Vol2,125
224 DavidWolfsdorf
sufficient.Thispaperattemptstoprovidea satisfactoryinterpretation
of(E)byaddressingthesetwoproblemsofthesecondclause.
Thediscussionisorganizedintothefollowingsections:
I Introduction
II PleasuresoftheSoul
III ProdicusandHisSuccessorsonEU<j)poOUVTj
IV 'Eu<j)poOUVTj' totheTimeofEpicurus
V EpicureanEu<j)poOUVTj
VI "EvupyLq'?
VII TheStatusQuaestionisonEpicurusonKatastematicandKinetic
Pleasures
VIII Nikolsky'sArguments
IX GoslingandTaylor'sArguments
X Diano's, Merlan's, Rist's, Long and Sedley's, and Warren's
Arguments
XI "EVEpyELU' inAristotleandin(E)
InsectionsIII-V,IarguethatEpicurususestheword'u<j)POOUVTj' in(E)
to refertokineticbodilypleasures.InsectionsVII-XtIarguethatEpi-
curususesthephrase'Kata dVTjOLV EVEpYELm'in(E)tomean'kineticac-
tualizations'.KineticactualizationscorrespondtowhatAristotle,inOn
theSoul,callssecondaryactualities.Kineticactualizationsthuscontrast
withprimaryactualities or static actualizations, namely katastematic
pleasures.
II PleasuresoftheSoul
It isnecessarytobeginwithawordaboutpsychologicalpleasures,by
whichImeanpleasuresofthesoul. ThroughmostoftheGreekphilo-
sophical tradition, perception and feeling are conceived as functions
of thesoul. Indeed,for Epicumsperceptionandfeeling arefunctions
of the soul. Consequently, so-called somatic pleasures such as those
of eating anddrinking, whichare orinvolveperceptions or feelings,
arepsychological.Inthisrespect,thedistinctionbetweensomaticand
psychological pleasures collapses. Still, one may preserve a distinc-
tion betweenbodily and psychological pleasures on the ground that
thebodyplaysa relativelysalientcausalroleintheproductionofso-
Epicuruson Ev<jJpoavvT/ and 'EvepYELa (DL 10.136) 225
calledbodilypleasures,whereasthesoulplaysthecorrespondinglysa-
lientcausalroleintheproductionofso-calledpsychologicalpleasures.
Whether this distinction is tenable, however, depends uponhowthe
notionsofthebodyandsoulplayingdistinct,salientcausalrolesinthe
productionofrespectivepleasuresareunderstood.Consequently,itis
necessarytosaymoreaboutEpicurus'conceptionofthesoul.
TheEpicureans,likemostancientphilosophersandschools, distin-
guishpartsofthesoul.Specifically,theEpicureansdistinguishtwoparts
oftheadulthumansoul:onerational,theotherirrational.
l1
Therational
part,whoselocationis restrictedto thechest,12 is thesite ofbeliefand
reasonandis thesource ofagency. Insofarasemotioninvolvesbelief,
therationalpartofthesoulisalsothesiteofemotion.Thus,thescholiast
to DL 10.66 claims: 'therational partresides in the chest, as is mani-
festfromourfearsandjoy.'Inlcontrast,theirrationalpart,whichisdis-
persedthroughthe entirebody, receives sense-impressions,butis not
responsiblefortheirinterpretationorfordeliberatereactionstothem.
13
TheEpicureansregardbothpartsofthesoulassitesofpleasureand
pain.Consequently,so-calledbodilypleasures,whichareexperienced
bymeans oftheirrationalpartofthe soul, mayalsobeconceivedas
perceptual pleasures. Likewise, so-called psychological pleasures,
whichare experiencedbymeansoftherationalpartofthesoul,may
alsobeconceivedasmentalpleasures.Butthisdistinctionandthedis-
tinctionbetweenrationalandirrationalpartsofthesouliscomplicated
bythefurtherfactthataccordingtothe therearesix,rather
thanfivetypesofperception(u'(OElTjOLC;). Inadditiontothefivefamiliar
sensorymodes,theEpicureansrecognize mentalordianoetic percep-
tion (6LuvoLu). Mental perception, like visual perception, has images
directly derived from theexternalworldas its objects.
14
Moreover, as
ElizabethAsmis emphasizes, 6LuvoLu 'does notimplythe use ofrea-
11 apudDLX66; DiogOenFrag37,I5-7; LucrIII136-44;VH
2
VII 17col. 22 (= Us
313);Aetius4.4.6(= [Plut14.4.3)
12 LapudDLX66;AthIV4,6p.390d;LucrIII140
13 Thisaccountis complicatedbythefact thatthesenseorgansplayanactiverole, .
through in theformation of<!JuvluaLm. Cpo ElizabethAsmis, Epicurus'
ScientificMethod,CornellUniversityPress,1984,118-40.
14 Cpo ibid., 106: 'Whatis strikingly peculiar about the Epicurean positionis that
allthoughtconsistsofimagesproducedbyparticlesenteringfromoutsidea per-
son.'
226 DavidWolfsdorf
.'
son. The images that occur in )LaVoLa) maybe rationallyorganized
by (reasoning) ... but(<'lLaVoLa) includesalso suchirrational
processesasdreaming,daydreaming,andhallucinating.'ls
Consequently,whileIwillsometimesfollowtheGreeksandusethe
phrases 'pleasures of the body', 'bodilypleasures', or 'somatic plea-
sures' and 'pleasures of the soul' or 'psychological pleasures', inthe
case oftheEpicureansthesephrasesshouldbeunderstoodto,refer to
perceptualandrationalpleasurespleasuresrespectively,phrasesIwill
also use. Moreover, perceptualpleasures shouldbeunderstoodto in-
cludepleasuresderivedfrom<'lLUVOLU inthosecasessuchasdreaming,
daydreaming,andhallucinatingwhereA.oywIt6C; isnotinvolvedinthe
perceptualprocess.
16
Finally, observethatsince pleasuresofthebodyareperceptualand
thuspsychological,albeitoftheirrationalpartofthesoul,theconcern
that'EU<!>poovvrj' shouldnotrefertosomaticpleasurebecausethe<j:Jpo-
rootindicatesthatthenounmustrefertopsychologicalpleasureshould
berecastandinfactputmorestronglyasfollows.The<j:Jpo-rootsuggests
thatthenounmustrefernotmerelytopsychologicalpleasure,butspecif-
icallytorationalpleasure.Thus,ifthesecondclauseof(E)isfunctionally
equivalenttothefirstclauseindistinguishingbodilyandpsychological,
thatis,rational,speciesofahedonicgenus,itisoddthatEpicuruswould
use'EU<j:JPOOVVlj' torefertobodilyorperceptualpleasure.
Giventhisdifficultywiththe useof'EU<j:Jpoovvrj' in(E), Inowturn
toconsidertheuseand'conceptualizationof'EU<j:JPOOVVlj' inpre-Epicu-
reanphilosophicalcontexts.
III ProdicusandHisSuccessorsonEv<j>poOVVlj
In Plato's Protagoras the character Prodicus delivers a speech whose
purposeis toencourageSocrates andProtagorasto resumetheirsus-
15 Ibid.
16 Ananonymousrefereehassuggestedthatmydistinctionbetweenmentalandper-
ceptualpleasuresmaybejeopardizedbya casesuchas daydreamingoverpast
goodtimes.Itakeitthatthissituationmayberedescribedas musingovermemo-
ries. Theslim evidence for Epicurus' conceptionof memorysuggests,however,
thatmemories,likedaydreams,hallucinations,andsoonarisethroughdianoetic
perceptionofextra-mentald6wAa.Nodoubt,thisisanextraordinaryview,butsee
LucrIV722-815andDiogOenfro 9. (IamgratefultoLizAsmisandJamesWarren
fordiscussingthispointwithme.)
Epicuruson EiJcjJpoavvT/ and 'Evepyla(DL 10.136) 227
pended discussion regarding the partition of excellence. Within the
speech,Prodicusintroducesanumberofsemanticdistinctions.Oneof
theseisbetweenpleasure anddelight(EU<j:JpOOVVlj):
...weintheaudiencewouldbewhollydelighted(E1'J<ppaLVWem), not
pleased('1160 LItWSm), for being delighted(E1'J<ppaLvwSm) is acondition
oflearningsomething andpartakingof understanding (<ppOVl)OEWs)
withthe intellect(6LavoLq.) itself,whereasbeingpleased is
aconditionofoneeatingsomethingorexperiencingsomeotherplea-
sure withthebody itself.
17
The passage is noteworthy in being the earliest surviving linguistic
distinctionbetweenpleasuresofthebodyandpleasuresofthesoul.
18
Prodicus' statement also indicates an explanation for his distinction:
the use of the word '<j:Jp6VljOLC;' suggests that thebasis for Prodicus'
distinctionisetymological.
19
The word 'EU<j>poovvrl' actuallyonlyoccurs intwo otherpassages
inthePlatoniccorpus.In Timaeus Timaeusdiscussestheexperienceof
harmonious and inharmonious sounds: ' ... so they produce a single
experience, a mixture of high and low. Hence the pleasure
they bring to the ignorant (a<j:JpooLv) and the delight (EU<!>POOVVljv)
theyprovide- bytheirexpressionofdivineharmonyinmortalmove-
ment- tothoseofunderstanding Hereagain,theuseof
'EU<!>poouvrj',incontrastto isrelatedtotheword'<j>p6VljOLC;'.
Considerthe Timaeus passageinrelationto etymologyof
'EU<!>POOuvlj' in Cratylus: 'Eu<j>poovVlj needs no explanation, for it is
clear to everyonethatsince itisconveyance (<j:Jpw8m) ofthesoulin
concordwiththeworld,itsnamederivesfrom EU<!>EpOOVVlj (wellcon-
veying).'21Consequently,itseemsthatinTimaeus Platoiseitherfollow-
17 Prt337c1-4.Theuseof hereisofcoursenotEpicurean.
18 The earliest surviving philosophical distinction occurs amongthe fragments of
Democritus.Democritusspeaksofbodilypleasures(B127, 178,189,214,235)and
psychologicalpleasures(B146,194,207,210,232).
19 Cpo JamesWarren'sdiscussionofDemocritusonthe distinctionbetween
and inEpicurus and Democritean Ethics: AnArchaeologyofAtaraxia,Cam-
bridgeUniversityPress,2002,48-52.
20 Ti80b4-8
21 era419d4-9
228 DavidWolfsdorf
ingthedistinctionthathehimselfhasProdicusintroduceinProtagoras
orratherthatheis following a Prodiceandistinctionthathadgained
somecurrencyamongphilosophers.
In fact, there is evidence that the distinctionbetween 'EU<ppoouvrl'
and in Protagoras does notfaithfully follow Prodicus. Rather
thedistinctioninProtagoras isa PlatonicappropriationfromProdicus,
deployedforthepurposeofparody.In Topics Aristotlesuggestsa
cismofaninterlocutorwhomistakenlytreatsco-referringexpressions
asthoughonecouldbepredicatedoftheother:
Inaddition,lookandseeifhehasstatedathingtobeanaccidentof
itself,takingittobedifferentbecauseit hasadifferentname,asPro-
dicususedto dividepleasuresintojoy (xapav), good-cheer(t{p'ljnv),
anddelight(l':u<PPOO1JvT]v); for allthesearenamesfor thesamething,
pleasure Andifanyonesaysthatbeingjoyful(toxa(pnv)is
anaccidentofbeingdelighted(to1J<ppu(vw8m),hewouldbedeclar-
ingittobeanaccidentofitself.
22
CompareAlexander'scommentsonthepassage:
For and xapa and EU<PPOO1JVT] and tfp'ljnc; are the same thing
withrespecttotheirunderlyingnatureandsignificance.ButProdicus
tried to distinguish particularsignificances for eachof these words,
justastheStoicsdid;fortheysaythatxapaisrationalelation,whereas
isirrationalelation, andthattEp'ljnc; is throughtheears,
whileEU<PPOO1JVT] is throughdiscourse.,23
Alexander's report slightly differs from Aristotle's since Alexander
claims thatProdicusdistinguished fromxapa,EU<ppOOUVTj, and
tfp'IjJL, whereas Aristotle mentions thatProdicus only distinguished
xapa,EU<PPOOUVTj, andtEP'linc;'.Aristotleseemstobemoretrustworthy,
foratleasttworeasons.First,Alexander'saccompanyingreportonthe
Stoicscontainsmistakes.FortheStoics,E'lJ<PPOOUVTj isarationalemotion
(Ev:n;a8ELa), notanirrationalemotion(:n;a8oc;); assuch, EV<ppOOUVT] is a
22 112b21-6. My translationis influencedbyW. A. Pickard-CambridgeinJonathan
Barnes, The Complete Works ofAristotle, vol. 1, Princeton University Press, 1984.
Notethatthisis theonlyinstanceof'eu<j>poauvTj' inAristotle'sesotericwritings.
Onapossibleinstanceof'euljJpoauvlj'intheexotericwritings,seen. 116.
23 In AristtopIIp.96(= SVF434)
EpicurusonEVc/JpoOVVTj and 'Evepyfla (DL 10.136) 229
speciesofxapa,notof Second,inhiscommentaryonPlato's
Phaedrus,Hermias'accountofProdicus'distinctionbetweenpleasure-
termsconformstoAristotle's:' ...Prodicusinventeddiscriminationbe-
tween words; for example, regarding the difference between tEp\jnc;,
xapa, and EU<PPOOUVll, hesaidthattEp'llnt; is pleasure of fine
things throughthe ears,xapais pleasure ofthe soul,andEV<PPOOUVll
ispleasurethr,aughtheeyes.'zsHermias,thus,corroboratesAristotle's
claimthatProdicusdistinguishedtfp'ljnc;,xapa,andEV<PpoOUVll, andhe
clarifies thatProdicus distinguished these pleasures as fine auditory,
psychological, andvisual respectively.26 Hermias' andAristotle's tes-
timonies, along withAlexander's, albeitpartlyconfused, supportthe
conclusion that Prodicus himselfdid notdistinguishbetween and
EU<PPOOUVll asbodilyandpsychological pleasure respectively. Rather,
asI have suggested,PlatoadaptedsomeofProdicus''distinctionsfor
parodiceffect. Indeed,thedistinctionbetweenbodilyandpsychologi-
calpleasureinProtagoras conformstothebroaderdistinctionbetween
bodyandsoulthatisemblematicofSocraticandPlatonicthought.For
example,inhisMemorabilia XenophonreportsthatSocrateskeptcon-
troloverthepleasuresofhisbody(tWV OLa wu OWf-lCi'tOC;
andinbookoneofRepublicPlatohasCephalussay:'asthepleasuresof
thebody(atKata toaWf-la wither,mydesireforconversation
d
't 1 ,28
an 1 sp easuresgrows.
Insum,ProdicusdiddistinguishEV<pPOOUVTj fromsomeotherkinds
ofpleasure;however,thereisnogoodreasontobelievethatProdicl,ls
identified EU<pPOOUVTj as a psychological, let alone mental pleasure.
Plato adaptedProdicus' distinction, whateveritwas, andinthepro-
cess created a distinction, partly onetymological grounds, between
EV<PPOOUVll as intellectual pleasure and as bodilypleasure.Ar-
istotle dismissedbothPlato's and Prodicus' distinctions, perhaps on
thegroundthatforAristotleallpleasuresareidenticalquaunimpeded
activitiesofthenaturalstate.Finally,theStoics,perhapsunderthein-
24 SeeOL7115(= SVF431); [Andronicus]OnPassions 6(= SVF432).
25 Comm in PIt Phdr 238.22-239.2. Note that this testimony is not cited in Oiels-
Kranz.
26 Wehavenoexplicitorgoodevidencetothinkthatit isinaccurate,saveforthefact
thatHermiasisalatesource.
27 XenMem15.6.3
28 R1328d2-3
230 DavidWolfsdorf
fluenceofPlato,adaptedthe distinctionwithintheir
conceptionofJtu81) anduJtu8tLaL, maintainingthat is a kindof
vicious irrationaljudgment,while u<j:>pOOUV1) is a speciesofvirtuous
rationalemotion.
IV 'Eu<j:>poOUV1)'totheTimeofEpicurus
The results oftheprecedingsectionprovideuswitha contextfor the
philosophicaluseof 'u<j:>POOUV1)'. SinceProdicusappearsnottohave
distinguished u<j:>pOOUV1) as a psychological pleasure, Epicurus at
leasthadPlatoasa precedent.Ontheotherhand,ifEpicurusdiduse
'u<j:>POOUV1)' torefertobodilypleasureofsomekind,hisusagewould
bebothun-Platonicandun-Stoic.Ofcourse,Epicuruswashardlysym-
patheticto theOldAcademyandtheStoa,butweneedbetterreason
thanthistothinkthatindeedheappropriatedtheword'u<j:>poouvTI' to
refertoaspeciesofbodilypleasure.
Reason to think that in On Choices Epicurus used the word
'u<j:>poauvTI' to referto bodilypleasurederivesfrom thefact thatthis
usageconforms to the traditional useof'u<j:>poauv1)'. 'Eu<j:>poauvTI' is
veryrareinpre-Hellenisticphilosophy.It doesnotoccurinanyPreso-
craticfragment. It occurs four timesinPlato,atleasttwice underthe
influenceofProdicus;onceinAristotle,again,citingProdicus;oncein
Heraclides Pontus/
9
andinnoothersurvivingphilosdphicalworkor
fragmentuntilEpicurus'OnChoices.Indeed,inprosethroughthethird
century, 'u<j:>POOUV1)' is,withoneexception,veryrare. Theworddoes
notoccurinThucydides,Isocrates,orinanyAtticorator,exceptonone
occasion whereDemosthenes cites from Solon's elegies.
3D
It occursonce
amongHippocraticwritings datablepriorto thethirdcentury/lonce
ina fragment from the astrologist Critodemus/
2
andfour times ina
treatise on palomancy (divination by muscle twitches) attributed to
29 Fr. 55.24Wehrli (= 39 Schutrumpf),apudAthen512a, fromHeraclides'dialogue
OnPleasure
30 19.255
31 Demorbsac 14.2.TheonlyotheroccurrenceintheHippocraticcorpusisatLex4.5,
butthisisalatetext,andtheusageisunderStoicinfluence.
32 8.1,p.259.7;herethewordisconjoinedwithu8AL\jJla andU[lEpqlvla.
Epicuruson Evc/JpoOVVT/ and 'Evtpyna (DL 10.136) 231
Melampos.33Theonlyproseauthorthroughthethirdcenturyinwhich
'u<j:>poouv1)' occurswithsomefrequency(18times)isXenophon/
4
who
thusseemstohaveanidiosyncraticpredilectionfortheword.Iwilldis-
cussXenophon'susesbelow, following thediscussionof'u<j:>poauv1)'
inpoetry.
In contrasttoitsrarityinproseandphilosophicaltexts,'u<j:>poauv1)'
is relatively commoninArchaic andClassicalpoetry. For example, it
occurs inHomer's Odyssey, the Homeric Hymn to Hermes, Theognis,
Anacreon, Solon, Pindar, Bacchylides, Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound,
andEuripides'Helen andBacchae.
35
InGreekmythologyEu<j:>poOUV1) is
oneofthethreeGraces.
36
Forexample,inhisfourteenthOlympianode
.Pindarrelatesthatthegodswouldnotorderabanquetordancewithout
theassentoftheGraces,andhedescribesEu<j:>poOUV1) as.'<j:>LA,1)aL!!OA,Jl'
(a loverofdance).37Pindar'sepithetis consistentwitha traditionthat
associatedEu<j:>poauv1) thedivinityandu<j:>pOOUV1) theexperiencewith
festivities. Forexample,intheHomericHymn to Hermes, Hermesgifts
Apollo witha lyre and enjoins him: 'Fromnow onbring <the lyre>
confidentlyto therichfeast, thelovelydanceandgloriousrevel,a de-
light (u<j:>poauv1)v) bynight andday.'38 Likewise, inApolloniusRho-
dius,theArgonautsburnabonfirethroughoutthenight'incelebration
33 68.2,4;91.4;182.2
34 Mem 2.1.29.3, 3.8.10.4; Oec 9.12.2; Smp 8.21.6; Ap9.1; Cyr 3.3.7.4, 7.2.28.3, 7.4.7.1,
8.1.32.4, 8.7.12.2; Hiero 1.3.1, 1.18.4, 1.29.3, 6.1.2, 7.5.1, 8.3.6; Ages 9.4.3; Rep Lac
7.6.4
35 HomOd 6.156, 9.6,10.465;hMerc 449,482;Thgn766, 776,1068,1256,1284, 1324;
Anacr96.4D;Sol3.10,20.2;Pi0 1.58,14.14,P 3.98,4.129,11.45;N4.1;13.10;APr
538;BEp3.87,10.53,11.12;EHe11470, Ba377
36 ThefollowingpassagefromHesiod'sTheogony,whichappearstohavebeenespe-
ciallyinfluentialinantiquity,isourearliestexpressionofthisidea: ' ...Eurynome,
thedaughterofOcean,beautifulinform,bore<Zeus>threefair-cheeked Graces,
Aglaea,Euphrosyne,andlovelyThaleia:(907-9)
37 14.13
38 IV480-2;mytranslationisinfluencedbyH. G. Evelyn-White,Hesiod. The Homeric
Hymns and Homerica, HarvardUniversityPress, 1914. See also IV 449. Likewise,
fragmentoneofXenophanesbegins:'Nowthefloor,thecups,andhandsofallare
clean.Onedresseshimselfinplaitedgarlands;anotherbearsfragrantointmentin
adish. Themixing-bowlstandsfullofcheer(EvljlpoaVvTlC;); vesselsofwine,mild
and flower-fragrant, attend: (DK B1.1-5, translationinfluenced byJ. H. Lesher,
Fragments. Xenophanes ofColophon, UniversityofTorontoPress,1992.)
232 DavidWolfsdorf
(ev<j>poOVVTlOLV) oftheirvictory.,39Apolloniusisinfacttheonlypoetof
thefourthorthirdcenturiesinwhomthewordoccurs. Thissuggests
that 'ev<j>poovvrl' is, aboveall, athomeinArchaicpoetryandassuch
thatinsubsequentcenturies 'ev<j>poovvrj' mighthavebeena word of
elevateddiction.
Aparticularlyclear,lateexampleofthetraditionalfestive connota-
tions of'v<j>poovvrj' occurs inPhilo: 'Amongforms ofperfect excel-
lence,v<j>poavvTj isafestival ofthesoul.Butonlythewiseman
celebrates (Eoptasn) such a festival Here the author con-
joinsthetraditionalsenseofthewordwithaphilosophicalideadrawn
fromtheStoics.Thefestivesenseof'ev<j>poovvTj'iswellcapturedbythe
translation'good-cheer'.Throughoutthepaper,Ihave,however,opted
for 'delight',mainlybecauseitssemanticrangeisbroaderandbecause
itisgrammaticallymoreaccommodating.
Thecontextsinwhich'EV(j>pOOVVTj' occurinthemedical,astrological,
andmantictexts citedaboveare toovaguetoenableusto determine
themeaningofthewordjustfromthosepassages.However,thesense
of'good-cheer'or'festivedelight'iscompatiblewithallofthem.
41
Xenophonuses 'ev<j>poOVVTj' ina morevariedway. Sometimes,he
uses 'v(j>poovvTj' as a semantic equivalent to 'i)CloVrj,.42 Sometimes,
'EV<j>poovvrl' has the traditional festive sense.
43
On two occasions,
'EV(j>poovvrj' is used to distinguish better or higher pleasures from
'i)6ovrj'.44 Finally, in addition to the uses I have noted as tradition-
39 4.69. Thewordalsooccursat2.1149,4.1037,and4.1167.
40 desacrAbeletCain111 vol. 1p.247,9Wendl(= SVF609)
41 Cpo Diogenes Laertius' claim that the Epicurean sage 'will take more delight
(ElllppaLvw8m) thanothersinspectacles.'(10.120)
42 Hiero 1.18.4;Cyrop8.7.12.2;Ap9.1
43 Hiero 6.1.2;Cyrop7.4.7.1
44 Hiero 7.5.1; Cyrop 8.1.32.4 (however,inthis case theword'Eu<j>poauvm' isexplic-
itly modifiedby the phrase 'auv to ICUA0'). It is perhaps also noteworthythat
'Eu<j>poauvTI' occurs at Mem 2.1.29.3 where Socrates is paraphrasing Prodicus'
Choice ojHeracles toAristippusinadmonitionofAristippus'hedonisticlife-style.
DavidSansone, 'Heracles at the Y', Journal ofHellenic Studies 124 (2004) 125-42,
has argued thatXenophon ishere transmitting Prodicus verbatim. I agree with
Vivienne Gray's skeptical reply; 'The Linguistic PhilosophiesofProdicus inXe-
nophon's'Choice ofHeracles'?' Classical Quarterly56 (2006) 426-53. More tothe
presentpoint,thereisnoindicationthattheuseofpleasure-termsinXenophon's
representationof Prodicus'ChoiceojHeraclesissystematic,letaloneconsistentwith
Epicuruson Ev(jJpoavvT/ and 'EvepYa (DL10.136) 233
allyfestive, Xenophonuses 'u(j>poovvTj' to refer to perceptualplea-
45
sures.
This reviewofthe use of ' eu(j>poOVVTj' upto the time of EpicutUS dem-
onstratesthateU<j>poavvTj wasnottraditionallyassociatedwithrational
pleasuressuchasthoseofreasoningandcontemplation,butratherwith
festive pleasures suchas those associated witheating, drinking, and
dance,inotherwords,withbodilypleasures. Platois theonlyauthor
priortoEpicuruswhouses'EU<j>pOOUVTj' torefertorationalpleasures.
Plato'suseis,indeed,informedbytheetymologyoftheword,butthis
is idiosyncratic. Consequently, the objection that 'EU<j>POOVVTj' at DL
10.136cannotrefertobodilypleasuressincethe(j>po-root oftheword
implies intellectual or rational pleasure is untenable. EpicutUS could
verywellhaveappropriated'uQ:lpoavvTj' torefertobodilyorpercep-
tualpleasure;indeed,thefactthat'EU<j>pOOVVTj' belongstoanelevated
semanticregisterwouldhavefUrtherlegitimizedthisappropriation.
V Epicurean EUQ:lpoauvTj
If in DL 10.136 Epicurus could have used the words 'xapa' and
'UQ:lPOOVVTj' torefer topleasures of the soulandbodyrespectively, it
maybequestionedwhetherelsewhereinhiswritingshedidandalso
whetherhisEpicureansuccessorsdid. Withregardto'Xapa',Plutarch
reportsEpicurusasclaimingthat'thestablestateofthefleshandthe
confidentexpectation ofthiscontainthehighestandmostsecurejoy
(xapav)forthosewhoareabletoreason.,46Here,confidentrationalex-
pectationyieldsjoy.47RecallthecommentofthescholiastonDiogenes
Laertius10.66: Therational<componentofthesoul>islocatedinthe
the distinctions Herrnias attributes to Prodicus. In Xenophon's version all four
pleasureterms(r\60vrj,xapa,tep,jnc;,andEu<j>poaUv1]) occur.But,forinstance,Vice
saysthatHeracleswilltasteall pleasures (tEp:n:VWV) andwilldelight(tEp<j>8d1]C;)
insoundsandsights.(Mem 2.1.23,24);Vicespeaksofenjoying(Ev<j>pavOd1]C;) sex,
thenlatercriticizesthehard-wonpleasures(Eu<j>poauvac;) thatVirtuerecommends
(Mem 2.1.24,29).
45 Mem 3.8.10.4;Smp8.21.6;Cyrop7.2.28.3;Hiero1.29.3;perhapsalsoRep Lac7.6.4
46 nonpossevivsec Ep l089d(= Us68.34-6)
47 Cpo ibid.1087b(= Us433): 'Whensomepeopleshouted,'alwaysthebanquet-table
isdeartoyou!'hereplied,'everydelightfulmovementthroughthefleshyieldsa
certainpleasure(r\60vrjv) andajoyofthesoul(xapav'ljJuxfic;).'
234 DavidWolJsdorJ
breast,<afact>clearfromfearsandjoy Andcomparethiswith
Lucretius: '<therationalpartofthesoul(animus hasitsseatfixedin
themiddleregionofthebreast. Herewefeelthepalpitationofthrob-
bingfear, herethesoothingtouchofjoy (laetitiae).'48 I emphasizethat
Lucretiususestheword'[aetitia',ratherthan'vo[uptas'.Thereisalsoone
instanceofacognateof'xapa'inEpicurus'ownwritings.InhisLetterto
Idomeneus Epicuruswritesthat'hissoul'sjoy'(to Kata Xa'[,pov)
overcomeshis physical suffering.
49
Here Epicurus is referring to joys
derivedfromrecollectionofpastphilosophicaldiscussions.Thus,there
is some positiveevidence that Epicurus and his successors used the
word'xapa'torefertopleasuresofthesoul,thatis,rationalpleasures,
andthereisnostrongnegativeevidencethattheydidnotorcouldnot
usethewordinthisway.
In thecaseof'Ev<ppoaUvTj', theevidenceisstillmorescarce.Indeed,
onereasonwhypuzzlementsurroundstheinstanceof'Ev<ppoaUvTj' in
(E)isthatthisistheonlyinstanceof thenounamongEpicurus'surviving
50
texts. Theparticiple hasbeenreconstructedfrom
afragmentofEpicurus'On Nature.
51
However,thetextistoofragmen-
tarytoextractasenseofthecontextandthustheparticiple'smeaning.
Thereisoneinstanceoftheverb 'E1J<ppaLvw8m', inSententiaVaticana
48: 'Wemustendeavortomakewhatliesaheadbetterthanbehind,so
longasweareontheroad(EV 664)).Andwheneverwereachthelimit
weshouldwithequanimitytakedelight(Ev<ppaLvw8m).' On
this, CyrilBaileycomments: 'Anotherrathercommonplaceaphorism,
whichinthetopicoflifeanddeathhasa connectionwiththatwhich
precedes.'52Theprecedingaphorism,Sententia47,towhichBaileyhere
refers,concludes:'Andwhencompulsiondrivesus,spittingonlifeand
those who vainly cling to it, we will departwith a glorious song of
triumph,shoutingthatwehavelivedwell.'Accordingly,inthecaseof
48 3.141-2
49 DL10.22
50 ThenounoccursinUs 359,buthereHippolytusis describing,notquotingEpi-
curus'position.Forothersimilarexamplesofthecognateverb,seePlutnon posse
1092d-e,1095c, 1097e-f.lowetheseexamplesto Purinton(1993, n.l7).Note that
Purintondoesnotdiscussthetwoinstancesof'EUq,pOOUVTj' amongthefragments
ofDiogenesofOinoanda.IdiscusstheseinsectionV.
51 PHerc1431inVH
2
VI84coL 3,7
52 C. Bailey,Epicurus. The ExtantRemains,ClarendonPress,1926,383
Epicuruson E7'Jc/>poavvT/ and 'EvEpyew (DL 10.136) 235
Sententia48,Baileytreats' astheroadoflifeand asdeath,
itslimit.Moreover,onemaysuspectthatBaileyhasinmindEpicurus'
owndeath,atwhichtime,aswesawabove,hewrotetoIdomeneusthat
thejoysofrecollectinghispastphilosophicalconversationsovercame
thephysicalpainsofhis illness. In this case, thefestive connotations
of'E1J<ppoauvrj' are clearlypresent. Onthe otherhand, thereisnoin-
dication thatthe delightEpicurusproposes one take isbodilyrather
thanmental;rather,itclearlyappearstoberational.Still,indefenseof
myproposalthat'E1J<ppoauvTj' in(E) isusedtorefertobodilypleasure,
it mustbeemphasizedthatinSententia48 Epicurusdoesnotusethe
noun'E1J<ppoaUvTj', onlythecognateverb.
Two instances of 'E1J<ppoauvTj' do, however, occur amongthefrag-
ments of Diogenes of Oinoanda. In fragment 153 Diogenes distin-
guishesemptyandnaturaldesiresandsays ofthelatter: 'Nowthose
<desires>thatarenaturalseekaftersuchthingsas<arenecessary>for
ournature'sdelight E1J<ppoauvTjv).,53 Compare
fragment 155, which reads: '<Forwhat is naturalis easy to obtain,>
whilewhatisemptyisdifficulttoobtain.,54Fragments153and155are
influencedbysections127-31 oftheLetterto Menoeceus,55 whereinEpi-
curusdistinguishesnaturalandemptydesiresandproceedstocompare
thepleasuresofplainfare tothoseofaluxuriousdiet.Thescholiastto
Sententia29providesfurtherclarification: 'Epicurusregardsasnatural
andnecessary those desires thatbring relief from pain, for example,
drinkwhenwe are thirsty.'56 The fragments from Diogenes ofOino-
anda in fact simplify Epicurus' tri-fold distinction between natural
necessary, merelynatural, andemptydesires since they donotdraw
acleardistinctionbetweennecessarynaturaldesiresandmerelynatu-
raldesires.However,Diogenesclearlyhasnecessarynaturaldesiresin
mindwhenhecontrastsnaturalandemptydesires.Thissuggeststhat
by'ournature'sdelight' Ev<ppoauvTjv) infrag-
ment153,Diogenesmeansperceptualpleasuressuchasthoseofeating
anddrinkingplainfare.
53 19-13(MartinFergusonSmith,The Epicurean Inscription, Bibliopolis,1993,342)
54 Ibid.421. This,ofcourse,isalsocomparabletoSV15.
55 However, asSmithobserves, Diogenes 'seemsnottohavefollowed Epicurusin
sayingthatsomenaturaldesiresarenecessaryandothersmerelynaturaL'(1993,
584)
56 DL10.149
236 DavidWolfsdorf
Theotherinstanceof'EU<ppoouvrl' occursinfragment10:
... <sinceinourdreams,>asalsowhenweareawake,weejaculate,it
isnogoodarguingthatthedelight(E1J<ppoauvTjv)wederivefromthem
isunrealbecauseweareasleep.Therefore,onemustnotcallthesevi-
sionsempty,sincetheyactuallypossesssuchgreatpower.57
Diogenesisherereferringtowetdreamsinthecontextofanargument
that dream-images arenot, as the Stoics claimed, ontologically vacu-
ous.Diogenesinsiststhatdream-imagesmustbesubstantialsincethey
possesspowergreatenough(6UVU!!Le; toouutTj) toproduceejaculation
anditsattendantpleasure.ComparethisideawithDiogenesLaertius'
commentonEpicurus'viewoftheontologyofdream-images:'Andthe
visionsofmadmenanddreamersare true,for theycausemovement;
whereas thatwhichdoesnotexist doesnotcausemovement.,S8 Note
alsothatuseof'nJ<ppoouvr(inDiogenesOinoandainreferencetoejac-
ulationisconsistentwithpassagesinXenophonwhere'EU<ppoouvr(is
usedinreferencetosexualpleasure.Forinstance,inXenophon'sSympo-
siumSocratesremarksthat'aboydoesnotshareinsexualdelights(twv
, n, rh "" ,rh n)th d ,59
EV tOLe; U'l'pOuLOLOLe; EU'l'POOUVWV WI amanasawoman oes.
The following objection has, however, beensuggested against the
interpretationof 'EU<PPOOUVTj' inDiogenesfragment10 asreferringto
bodilypleasure: in the case ofwet dreams the 'sex' is in ourheads,
so to speak; thestimulationthatleadstoejaculationinthesecircum-
stanceswouldseemmoreproperlydescribedas'rational',incontrastto
thephysicalstimulationofactualintercoursewithanotherperson.But
howeverwe mightconceptualizepleasureexperiencedinwet-dreams,
in Epicurean psychology, as discussed in section II, dream-images,
whicharederivedfromtheexternalworld,areobjectsofperception,al-
beitmentalperception(6LUVOLU). Moreover,dreamsareirrationalpro-
cesses;theydonotinvolveAOYLO!!Oe;. Assuch,thepsychologicalsource
ofthepleasureisirrationalandthusthepleasurecannotbeapleasure
57 IV2-10. IfollowSmith'stranslation(1993, 372).
58 X32; see D. Clay, 'An Epicurean Interpretation ofDreams,'American Journal of
Philosophy101 (1980)342-65.
59 Smp 8.21.6. At Hiero 1.29.3, Riero says: 'In his sexual relationships withboys,
even more than with women, the tyrant experiences fewer delights ('twv
e'll<jlpoauvwv).'
Epicuruson Ev(jJp0(JvVT/ and 'EvtpYla (DL 10.136) 237
ofsoul, where this means a pleasure ofthe rationalpartofthe soul.
Moreover, the proximate source and salient cause of the pleasure of
ejaculation,whetherthisoccurswhenthesubjectisdreamingorawake,
is thephysicalprocessofejaculation.Assuch,thepleasureofejacula-
tionis a tactile perceptualpleasure. Moreover, the pleasuredoesnot
derivefromthecontactofthesexualorganwithanexternalbody;rath-
er, itderivesfromtherushofsementhroughandoutoftheSUbject's
body.60 Consequently,whether irrational 6WVOlU orejaculationis the
causeofthepleasurethatoccursinawet-dream,DiogenesOinoanda's
fragment10supportsthecasethatEpicumsmayuse'EU<ppoouvr(in (E)
torefertokineticbodily,thatis,perceptualpleasure.
61
Finally, letmeemphasizethatI amnotarguingfor thestrongthe-
sis that the words 'xupa' and 'EU<PPOOUVTj' are technical Epicurean
termsforkineticpleasuresofthesoulandbodyrespectively.Iamonly
arguing for the weaker thesis they are usedin(E) to refer to kinetic
pleasures ofthesoulandbodyrespectively. Inotherwords,theuses
of'EU<PPOOUVTj' inDiogenesOinoandasupporttheviewthatEpicurus
couldanddidusetheword'EU<PPOOUVTj' in(E) torefertokineticplea-
suresofthebody.
VI "EVUPYElq,'?
Letusnowturnto 'evEPYELm' in(E) - orrather, as a preliminaryto
thediscussionof'evEPYELm', letuspauseovera possibleemendation
of'evEPYELm'. AtleasttwiceinthemanuscriptsoftheLetterto Herodo-
tus,weread'evPYELu' wheninfactthetextclearlyshouldbeemended
toEpicurus'epistemologicalterm'evapYELu'. Forexample,at48, we
read: 'Forthere is nothinginthis thatiscontradictedby
if oneshouldlook insomewayattae; fVEpyetue;'. 2 Theorigi-
nalmusthaveread'... tae; evupyduc;'andthusmusthavereferredto
clearperceptions.It isworthconsideringwhetherasimilaremendation
60 cpo the remarkbythe scholiast onDL 10.66: 'Semenis derivedfrom theentire
body.'Oneoftheexplanations of theintensityofsexualpleasurecurrentinthe
fourthcentury, arguablyderivedfromtheHippocraticOn Generation, wasbased
onthepanspermatictheory,thatis,theviewthatspermisderivedfromthewhole
body.Cpo Aristotle'sexaminationandrejectionofthisexplanationatGA723b.
61 Cpo alsotheuseof'1CU1[EV]<jlPU(VEL' atfro 43.II.7-8inreferencetodream-images.
62 Theotherexampleisat52.
238 David Wolfsdorf
shouldoccurin(E),viz.,'vapyElq. Accordingly,theclause
couldbe rendered: 'joy anddelightare seenwithclarity (or through
clearevidence)askinetic<pleasures>.'Theuseoftheinstrumentalda-
tive 'evapyElq.' with is also attractive since itwouldhelp
explainthesyntacticalasymmetrybetweenthefirstandsecondclauses
of (E). The first clause reads: tranquility and freedom from pain are
(ELOW) katastematicpleasures.Soitisquestionablewhythesecondwas
notcomposedtoread:joyanddelightarekineticpleasures.
Now,theverb means'see'.Butseeingmaybeunderstood
moreconcretelyasa visualeventinwhichonedirectlyviewsa scene
bylookingatitorlessconcretelyaswhenoneunderstandssomething
or gains insight into a situation. As Liddell and Scott note, the core
senseof is themore concreteone.Hicks',Bailey's,andLong
andSedley'stranslationsof in(E) allfavoranon-concrete
sense:joyanddelightare'seentoconsistinmotionandactivity,'63are
'consideredasactivepleasuresinvolvingmotion,'64 andare 'regarded
askineticactivities.,65Assuch,theimplicitsubjectoftheactionofthe
verbisnotthesubjectwhoexperiencesjoyanddelight.Indeed,if there
isanimplicitsubjectatall,itisthereaderwhocomprehendstheiden-
tificationofjoyanddelightthatEpicurusarticulates. But,morelikely,
inthepassivevoicetheverbisfunctioningimpersonally,as'<j)a(vw8m'
may,toconveythatsomethingappears,comestolight,orsimplyisthe
case.
Purintonis exceptionalin translating as 'experience'; 'joy
anddelight '" are experienced inactivity.,66 In this case, the implicit
subjectoftheaction describedbytheverb is the subject ofthe expe-
rience of joy and delight. The Greeks' general term for experience,
'a'(o8TjOlt;', canbeusedto mean'perception'or'feeling'. Indeed,until
EpicurusGreekphilosophersdidnotemploywordstodistinguishfeel-
ingfromperception.Thus,followingPurinton,itmightbearguedthat
in(E) functionsinitsconcretesenseandinfactmorespecifi-
callyserves to conveyfeeling. However, thereis a compellingreason
63 Hicks(1925) 661
64 Bailey(1926) 121
65 LongandSedley(1987) Voll,118
66 Purinton(1993) 289-90. Cpo JeanBollack, La pensee du plaisir, Editions deMinuit,
1975,158: maislajoieetlagaite,c'estquandellessontenacte qu'ellessontper-
c;uesenmouvement.
Epicurus on Ev<ppoavv"f/ and 'EvEpyHa (DL 10.136) 239
againsttranslating withthemeaningof'experience':allof
Epicurus'usesof inthepassivehavethelessconcretesense.
67
Inview ofthis,I suggestthatwefollow Hicks, Bailey, andLongand
Sedley;andsoIhavetranslated as'areviewed,.68Inshort,
(E) stands,andweneedtogiveanaccountof'evEPYElm,.69
67 Forexample,seeDL10.38,72,andcomparetheotherinstancescitedbyseeUsener
(1977). Notethephrase 'brm[o8lj]I.I-(l1;wV [tw]v toil xaLpovwc;' atPHerc 1251 VI
3. G. Indelli, and V. Tsouna-McKirahan, On Choices and Avoidances, Bibliopolis,
1995, 104, correctlytranslatethis as 'perceptionsofjoy',ratherthan'experiences
ofjoy'.Consideralsotheuseof atDL10.130: 'tft Kat
OUI.I-<PEp6Vtwv Kat aOUI.I-<p6pWV AndconsiderJamesWarren'sdiscussion,
'EpicurusonthePleasuresoftheFuture',Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 21
(2001)135-79,especiallyat148-50,whichincorporatesC.C.W.Taylor'sstatement,
relatedtoPlato'sProtagoras, butnonethelessaproposhere: 'Theassessmentofac-
tions in terms of pleasures and pains does not, infact, demand a technique of
observationinanyordinarysense' (Plato's Protagoras, rev. ed.,OxfordUniversity
Press,1991,196).
68 Cpo Purintonwhodoesnottakejoyordelighttobeakindofpleasure,butrather
anintentionalstatewhoseobjectispleasure(1993, 287). Thus,heinterprets(E) to
meanthatjoyanddelight,whicharetakeninkineticpleasures,are experienced
inactivity; thatis, joyand delight'arise as states ofconsciousness in virtue of'
kineticpleasures(288). ButPurintonalsoobserves: 'Thisstillleavesunanswered
... onefinal question:whatdistinction,ifany, arewetomakebetweenxap6.and
EU<ppOOVVlj, eitherwhen,ashere,theyaremodifiedwiththephraseKala
orwhen, aselsewhere, theyappearwithoutmodification? This question, I con-
fess, I amnotsurehow to answer' (290). Purintonoffers twopossibilities.One,
EU<pPOOVVlj is a species ofxapa. This view, as henotes, follows the Stoics, who
regardxapaasa EuJta8Eta, specifically as a rationaljudgmentofthepresenceof
goodness.Accordingly,EU<pPOOVVlj istherationaljudgmentofthepresenceofself-
controlled actions. See SVF 432, whichhappensto beidenticalto thedefinition
giveninthePlatonicDefinitions 413e,andseeSVF431. Two,xapaisanepisodeof
joyatapleasure,whereasEU<pPOOVVlj is'thenameforthecontinuingmentalstate
whichonehasfor thewholetimethatoneisenjoyingaseriesofpleasures'(291).
Purintonprovideslittlesupportfor this distinction,althoughhesays'If Ihadto
commitmyselftooneoftheseviews,Isupposeitwouldbetothe<second>'(291).
Purinton'spositionis also tobe comparedwithBollack's (1975, 186) where the
distinctionbetweenbetweenkineticandkatastematicpleasuresin(E)ischaracte-
rizedasfollows: 'Ondistingueparla,desplaisirscinetiquesducorps,les 'mou-
vements'del'ilmequisesituenta l'interieurdel'ataraxie,sansl'adjonctiondela
jouissanced'unautreobjetsensible.Objectivantunetatpositifquisedistinguedu
simpleplaisircatastematiquedeladeliverancedumal,etquiesten acte parcequ'il
impliquelaconsciencedecetetat,l'espiritl'assirnileparanalogieaumouvement
desplaisirsphysiques,qui nousprocurentl'ideedubien:
69 Assuch,Ihavenoexplanationfor theshiftfrom'daLY' to'13/"EJtovtm' inthefirst
240 DavidWolfsdorf
VII TheStatusQuaestionisonEpicurusonKinetic
andKatastematicPleasures
InconsideringwhatEpicurusmeanswhenherefersto'E1Jp00uvr(and
'xapa'in(E) as'KaLa dVT]OLV EV PYELaL', weneedtoconsiderthecon-
ceptsdVT]0Lc; andEVEpynaastheypertaintohedonictheory.Inorderto
dothis,wefirstneedtoexaminetherelationbetweenkatastematicand
kineticpleasuresinEpicurus'hedonictheory.
DebatepersistsoverEpicurus'viewofkatastematicandkineticplea-
sures.Theheartofthedebatecanbesummarizedasfollows.First,the
majorityofscholarsacceptthatEpicurusinsomefashiondistinguishes
betweenkatastematicandkineticpleasures.Yetseveralscholars,Justin
Gosling,ChristopherTaylor, andBoris Nikolsky, maintainthatEpicu-
rusdoes notdraw this distinction or, as GoslingandTaylor say, that
it isnotanimportant one for Epicurus. Second, among the majority
whoaccept thatEpicurusdistinguishesbetweenkatastematicandki-
netic pleasures, some scholars, Carlo Diano, John Rist, ElizabethAs-
mis, andJeffreyPurinton,maintainthatkinetic pleasurespresuppose
katastematicpleasures.
7o
Others,EttoreBignone,CyrilBailey,Anthony
LongandDavidSedley,James Warren, andRaphaelWoolf, maintain
thatkineticpleasures mayoccuranteriororposteriorto katastematic
pleasures,andthusthatkineticpleasuresdonotdependuponkataste-
. 1
mattep easures.
71
and second clauses of (E). Ananonymous referee suggests thatperhaps noex-
planationis neededbeyond noting that Epicurus wasn't a particularly elegant
writer.
70 GiselaStikermightalsoagreeto thisview,althoughitisdifficultto besuresince
shedoesnotsituatehercontributioninrelationtoothers. Shemaintains thatki-
neticandkatastematicpleasuressharethepropertyofbeingfreefrompain.How-
ever,kineticpleasuresdifferfromkatastematicpleasuresinthattheformerhave
objects,whereasthelatterareobjectless.Moreover,kineticpleasuresareepisodic,
whereaskatastematicpleasuresare,inprinciple,lastingstates('EpicureanHedo-
nism',inEssaysonHellenisticEpisterrwlogyandEthics,CambridgeUniversityPress,
1996,3-17,at16-17).MichaelErlerandMalcolmSchofield,'EpicureanEthics',in
K.AlgraetaI,eds.,TheCambridgeHistoryofHellenisticPhilosophy,CambridgeUni-
versityPress,1999,642-674,seemsympatheticto thisview,althoughtheysuggest
that'perhapsEpicurushimselfneverindicatedhowhewouldclassifypleasuresof
restorationofthebody'snaturalstate...'(655).
71 MalteHossenfelderholdsarelatedview.Hemaintainsthatkatastematicpleasure
is thelimitoftheintensityofpleasureandthatkinetic pleasureis pleasurethat
Epicuruson EvtjJpoavvTJ and 'Evepyeta (DL10.136) 241
The debate, thus, reduces to two questions. Does Epicurus distin-
guishbetweenkatastematic andkineticpleasures?Andassumingso,
does he recognize restorative pleasures? The following three sections
discusstheevidenceandargumentsthathavebeenadducedinsupport
ofthevariouspositions.
VIII Nikolsky'sArgument
Nikolskymaintainsthatappealto(E)isthe'strongestargument<that>
theadherentsoftheauthenticityoftheEpicureanclassificationofplea-
sures <intokatastematicandkinetic> canputforward.,nHepresents
two objections to theviewthat(E) supportsEpicurus' distinctionbe-
tweenkatastematicandkineticpleasures:(1)'itisnotclearwhyEpicu-
rusgivespleasuresofthesoul(Xapaand1J<PP00UVT]) asanexampleof
kinetic pleasures,73; and(2) if'E1JQ>P00UVT]' in(E) is construedasrefer-
increasesasitapproacheskatastematicpleasureorthatdecreasesinintensityasit
recedesfromkatastematicpleasure.(,Epicurus- hedonistmalgrelui',inNorms
ofNature,G.StrikerandM.Schofield,eds.,CambridgeUniversityPress,1986,245-
63, at254-6) Therathersuigenerispositionsofthreeadditionalscholarsdeserve
mention.MichaelStokes,'CiceroonEpicureanPleasures',inCicero thePhilosopher,
J. Powell,ed.,ClarendonPress,1999,145-70, maintainsthat,inadditiontokatas-
tematicpleasure,Epicurusdistinguishestwotypesofpleasure,whichStokescalls
sensualistpleasuresandkineticpleasures.Sensualistpleasuresarepleasantmove-
ments of perceptual faculties; as such, it seems, they presuppose katastematic
pleasures.Butkineticpleasuresarerestorativepleasures.GabrieleGiannantoni,'n
piacerecineticonell'eticaepicurea',Elenchos 5 (1984) 25-44,maintainsthatkatas-
tematicpleasuresaresatisfactionsofnecessarydesires,whereaskineticpleasures
are satisfactions ofnatural,butnon-necessary desires. Inthis case, Giannantoni
understandsdesire-satisfactioninphenomenologicalterms,asthefeelingofthirst
slaked.Incontrast,PhilipMitsis,Epicurus'EthicalTheory,CornellUniversityPress,
1988,45-51,maintainsthatEpicurusconceivesofpleasurenotasafeeling,butas
anattitudetowardthings,inparticulartherealizationofgoodsandsatisfactionof
desires.Accordingly,katastematicpleasureisanattitudewhoseobjectisacertain
katastematiccondition,say,bodilyhealthormentaltranquility,whilekineticplea-
sureisanattitudewhoseobjectis someactivitysuchasthe stillingofhungeror
thetastingofhoney.
72 (2001)455
73 Ibid.
242 David Wolfsdorf
ringtobodilypleasure,'itishardtounderstandwhatmeaning... the
wordVEPYHUwouldhave:
74
Objection(2)isanon-starter.Theuseof'EVEPYELQ.' in(e)or'EvPYHm'
in(E) maybepuzzlingregardlessofwhether'E:ueppoauvrj' and'xa.pa'
bothrefertopleasuresofthesoulorwhetheronereferstopleasureof
thebody.Atanyrate,insectionXI,Iofferaninterpretationof'vPYELm'
in(E) thatisconsistentwithanEpicureandivisionbetweenkatastemat-
icandkineticpleasures.
Regarding objection (1), Nikolsky takes 'Eu<!>poauvTj' to refer to
pleasures ofthesoul. Hisreasons are as follows: 'theacceptedmean-
ingofthisword('Eu<!>poauvTj'), itsetymology(from 'mind')and
thehistoryofitsusage[hereNikolskycitesPlato,Protagoras 337.], as
wellasanexpressstatementbyPlutarch,whoexaminedtheuseofthis
concept in the Epicurean school ... all run counter to such an inter-
pretation.'Thus,Nikolsky,likeothers/
5
hasmistakenPlato'sProdicean
useof'EU<!>poouvrj' atProtagoras 337casbeingrepresentativeoftheuse
of 'EU<PPOOUVTj'. We haveseenthat 'EU<PPOOUVTj' in (E) referstokinetic
bodilypleasure.
RegardingPlutarch'suse,Nikolskycitesthefollowingpassagefrom
Plutarch'sA Pleasant Life Impossible:
Relaxationsoftheflesh andthemindinenjoyment<thatis,thesorts
ofpleasuresPlutarchclaimsthattheEpicureansprincipallyextol>,if
theyaremoderate,arein' factneithergreatnorremarkable;andif they
areexcessive, thenwe regard themas basedonemptyandunstable
groundandasvulgarandreckless.Oneshouldspeakofthemneither
aspsychicnorasjoys (xapac;),butasbodilypleasures grin-
nings and luxuries, so to speak, in which thesoul also
hassomeshare.ButwhatjustlydeservetobecalledEveppoauvuc; and
xapac; arepureandfreefrompain,unmixedwiththrobbingorsting-
ing,andwithoutregret.Thegoodinthesethingsbelongsto thesoul,
andthis goodnessis trulypsychicandnoble, notalien orirrational,
74 (2001)456
75 (2001) 455 and n.57. Cpo Jeffrey S. Purinton, 'Epicurus on the telos', Phronesis 38
(1993) 281-320, at 192n20; Diana, 'La psicologia d'Epicuro ela teoria delle pas-
sioni',reprintedin Scritti Epicurei, LeoS. Olschki,Firenze,129-280,at179;Benedict
Einarson and Philip de Lacy, Plutarch's Moralia XIV, Harvard University Press,
1986, 57nb; andGoslingandTaylor(1984)389.
Epicurus on Ev<ppoavvT/ and 'Evipyela (DL 10.136) 243
butrationalto thehighestdegree, for itderives from the theoretical
andphilosophicalorthepracticalandhonorablepartsofthemind.
76
PlutarchiscriticizingEpicureansomatichedonismanddescribingthe
sortsof pleasure(Eu<ppoauvw;Katxapac;),pleasuresofthemind,thatthe
Epicureansfail toenjoy. Plutarchdearlyusesthewords'Eu<ppoauvac;'
and'xapac;'torefertorationalpleasures.However,thereisnoreason
to think thatPlutarch's choice of 'EVepPOOUVTj' inreference to rational
pleasuresreflectsEpicureanusage. Rather,inusing'EueppoauvTj' tore-
fertorationalpleasures,Plutarchisusinghisown,probablyPlatonic,
although perhaps Stoic-influenced, language. Moreover, contrary to
Nikolsky'sclaim,thereisnoevidencethatPlutarchhasexpressly'ex-
aminedtheuse ofthis concept (Ev<ppoauvTj) intheEpicureanschool.'
Plutarch uses 'EV<PPOOUVlj' several additional times in the text,77 but
neverinparaphrasinganEpicureanidea,letaloneinquotingfroman
Epicurean?8 Consequently, Nikolsky's argument that EpicufUs does
notdistinguishbetweenkatastematicandkineticpleasuresin(E) fails.
IX G,oslingand Taylor'sArgument
GoslingandTaylor presentfour objections totheview thatEpicufUS
regards thedistinctionbetweenkinetic andkatastematicpleasuresas
'important'.79By expressingtheproblemintermsofimportance,Gos-
lingandTaylorarehedgingorfudgingtheissue.Thequestionwhether
EpicufUsregardsthedistinctionbetweenkineticandkatastematicplea-
suresasimportantdiffersfrom thequestionwhetherEpicurusrecog-
nizesa distinctionbetweenthesekindsofpleasure.Iwillconsiderthe
relevance oftheir four objections to the view thatEpicurus does not
distinguishbetweenkineticandkatastematicpleasures.
First, at Tusculan Disputations 3.18.41-2, Cicero refers to the Epicu-
reanstatement, 'FormypartI cannotunderstandwhatthegoodisif
76 1092d-e
77 1097f2,5,1099f3,1100f2,1107a3
78 Cf. Purinton (1993, n.17) who says thatPlutarchdoesnotrecognize adistinction
between 'Et)(PPOOUVTj' and 'xapa'. This is correct, butirrelevant to the question
whetherEpicurususedtheword'eucjJpoouvTj'in (E) torefertobodilypleasure.
79 (1982) 366-71
244 David Wolfsdorf
one subtracts those pleasures perceived bytaste, those from hearing
andmusic,andthosesweetmovementstoogotfromvisualperception
ofshapes,oranyoftheotherpleasuresgeneratedbyanysenseinthe
wholeman... ,80 Cicero'slinederivesfromapassageinEpicurus'On the
End: 'I donotknowhowtoconceivethegoodifIwithdrawtheplea-
suresoftaste,sex,hearing,andthesweetmovements(KLVn
aw
;) ofthe
sightofform.,81 GoslingandTaylorinterpretthis tomeanthatabsent
theseperceptualpleasures,whicharekineticpleasures,therewouldbe
nogood. Butinthatcase, theyargue,ifEpicurusdistinguisheskatas-
tematicpleasuresfrom kinetic pleasures,'onewouldexpectEpicurus
toknowperfectlywellwhatwouldbeleftamongthegoodsifsensory,
thatis,kineticpleasuresweresubtracted:ataraxia andaponia.,82
Second, given Epicurus' view that the senses are the criterion of
goodness, commitment to the view thatkatastematic pleasure is the
greatestpleasureandgood'makesithardforEpicurusconsistentlyto
holdthatthegoodisgiveninperception.'83GoslingandTaylorhereas-
sumethatkatastematicpleasureisnotperceivedorfelt.
Third, Gosling and Taylor follow Cicero insuggesting thatifEpi-
curusdistinguishesbetweenkatastematic and kinetic pleasures, then
Epicurusischeatingbyusingtheword'pleasure'torefertotwoquite
differentconditions.Moreover,evenifkatastematicpleasureistherec-
ognitionoflackofpain, as, for example,Philip Merlanthinks, 'what
thesensesrevealasgoodisinfactsomethingquitedifferentfromwhat
is really good, for <the senses> give experience of kinetic pleasures
whereasit is the quite different katastematic kindthatis the good.,84
Observethatthis objectiondependsupontheprecedingone. Thatis,
GoslingandTaylor'smainconcernhereisthatwhereasthesensesare
regardedasthecriterionofthegood,perceptualpleasurecannotbethe
good, since katastematicpleasureis. Consequently,eitherEpicurusis
inconsistentorhedoesn'tinfactdistinguishbetweenkineticandkatas-
tematicpleasure.
80 Cpo De fin 2.7.
81 DL10.6
82 (1982)368
83 Ibid.369
84 Ibid.370
Epicurus on EvcjJpoavvT/ and 'Evipyew (DL 10.136) 245
Fourth, Gosling andTaylor arguethat'itwouldbesomewhatsur-
prising to find Epicurus allowing the existence of a state of a living
thing lacking both pain and sensory pleasure <that is, katastematic
pleasure>.'Inarguingthus,Gosling andTaylor seemto have a view
ofthelifeoftheEpicureansageasonewhoseblissfulnessisunrelated
toandindependentofperception.Hereagain,GoslingandTaylorfind
thisinconsistentwithEpicurus'commitmenttotheviewthatJra8Tj are
criteriaofgoodandbad.
85
Moreover, astheyemphasize,accordingto
Epicurus,lifeischaracterizedbyperceptionsinceitispreciselytheab-
sence ofu'(a8TjaLS thatgroundsEpicurus' claim that'deathis nothing
tous.'
Withregardto thefirst andsecond objections, GoslingandTaylor
misconstrue Epicurus'claiminOn the End thathecannotconceiveof
thegoodabsentperceptualpleasures.Epicurusdoesnotmeanthatper-
ceptualpleasure is the onlygood. Nordoes Epicurus meanthatitis
theoretically impossible to distinguish kinetic and katastematic plea-
sures.Rather,Isuggesthemeansthatperceptualpleasuresrevealkatas-
tematic pleasures. Perceptualpleasuresreveal katastematic pleasures
because,asImaintain,perceptualpleasuresdependuponkatastematic
pleasures.Thesmoothfunctioningoftheperceptualfacultiesindicates
the correlative katastematic conditions. Giventhis, Epicurus canalso
consistentlymaintainthatJra8Tj arecriteriaofgoodandbad.
MysimpleanswertoGoslingandTaylor'sthirdobjectionis thatki-
neticandkatastematicpleasuressharethepropertyofbeingfreefrom
pain.This,inEpicurus'view,constitutespleasure.
86
Idiscussthispoint
furtherbelow.
Regarding the fourth objection, whilethe Epicureansageis, like a
god,unperturbedandtranquil,87hislifeisrepletewithperceptionsand
thoughts,asthelifeofallhumansmustbe.Givenhisa:tapusLU, many
ofhisthoughtsandmentalactivitiesarekineticpleasuresofthesoul;
85 Ibid.370.TheyrefertotheLetter to Menoeceus 124,whereEpicuruswrites:'itisin
perceptionthatgoodandevil aretobefound.'Thus, theywrite: 'Goodandevil
arepleasureandpainrespectivelyandthese(asDiogenesemphasizesat10.34)are
theonlypathe. Onewouldexpecteverygoodstatetobeamodeofperception,and
perceptiontobetheformoflife.'(370)
86 ItisagoodquestionwhetherorhowEpicurusisjustifiedinidentifyingpleasure
inthisway.Iwillnotaddressthisquestionin thepresentpaper.It sufficesformy
argumentthatEpicurusholdsthisposition.
87 Cpo DL10.135.
246 DavidWolfsdorf
for example,heenjoysteachingandthecompanyoffriends. Likewise,
insofarasheishealthy,manyofhisperceptionsarekineticpleasuresof
thebody;forexample,heenjoyshismeals.Thus,onemayaskexactly
whatGoslingandTaylormeanwhentheyspeakofEpicurus'allowing
theexistenceofastateofalivingthinglackingbothpainandsensory
pleasure<thatis,katastematicpleasure>.'Byrecognizingsuchacondi-
tionEpicurusdoesnotmeantosuggestthatthesagewhoachievesit
livesintheabsenceofkineticpleasures.Thefollowingethicalfragment
indicates that he does not: 'Wellbeing and blessedness are not con-
tainedinabountyofrichesorinaheapofpossessions,norinpolitical
officesorpower,butinfreedomfrompain(UA,1JJtLa), ingentleaffections
(Jtpa6'tllC; Jtu8wv), andina dispositionofsoulthatrecognizesnature's
limits.,BB I take it that 'UA,1JJtLa' refers to katastematicbodilypleasure,
'Jtpao-tT/C; Jta8wv' refers to kinetic, if notmore specificallyperceptual
pleasures,and'adispositionofthesoulthatrecognizesnature'slimits'
referstokatastematicmentalpleasure.
In sum,Gosling andTaylor'sobjectionsfail to showthatEpicurus
doesnotdistinguishbetweenkineticandkatastematicpleasures.
X Diano's,Medan's,Rist's,LongandSedley's
andWarren'sArguments
Inowturntotheevidencefor theviewthatkineticpleasurespresup-
posekatastematicpleasures.Diana'sargument,thepointofdeparture
forthetreatmentofthisquestioninmodernscholarship,fundamental-
lyrestsonthefollowingpoint:Epicurusholdsthatpleasureisunmixed
withpain.Threepiecesofexplicitevidencesupportthisview. First,in
hiscommentaryonPlato'sPhilebusOlympiodoruscomments:'<Unlike
Platowhomaintainsthatcertainpleasuresaremixedwithpain,>Epi-
curusdoesnotbelievethatpainismixedwithpleasure.,B9Second,sup-
portfor thispurityofpleasureprinciplefromEpicurushimselfcomes
fromKyria Doxa3: 'Aslongaspleasureispresent,solongasitispres-
ent,thereisnopain,eitherofbodyorsoulorbothatonce.'AsDiano
argues,thenotionofrestorativepleasurewouldcontradictthispurity
principlesincerestorativepleasurewouldinvolveapleasurecounter-
88 Plutadaudpoet37a(= Us548)
89 =Us421
Epicuruson EveppoavvTj and 'EvePYEla (DL10.136) 247
90
acting a pain. Consequently, pleasureinrestoration cannot be con-
struedaskineticpleasureanteriortokatastematicpleasure.
Third,inOn theNatureofThings Lucretiusdescribesthepleasureof
eatingasfollows: 'thepleasurederivedfromtasteisconfinedtothepal-
ate. Oncethefoodhasplungeddownthroughthethroatandisallbe-
ingchanneledintothelimbs,thereisnopleasure:
91
Dianoemphasizes
thatherethepleasureofeatingisspecificallylocatedinthegustatory
faculty, notinthenutritivefaculty. Thus,pleasureisnotderivedfrom
therestorationofthedeficititself, andsothereisnorestorative plea-
sureproperlyspeaking.
Thefirst scholartocriticizeDiana'spositionwasMerlan,in1960.
92
MerlanbeginshiscriticismofDianowithtwoobjections.Theseobjec-
tionsrelyonappealstowhatMerlantakestobecommonsense.First,'if
thepleasureofeatinganddrinkingisoneofthepalatealone,itwould
follow thatthepalatealoneshouldbe able to experiencepleasurere-
gardlessofwhetherornotanotherpartoftheorganismexperiencesthe
painofhungerandthirst.,93Ristrightlycriticizesthisobjection:'Weall
know...thatit ispossibletoeatandenjoyeatingwhenwedonotneed
toeat,andif weovereattoexcessthepleasuremaycontinueinthepalate
whilewefeelpainelsewhere... ,94
Second,Merlanobjects: 'Theexplanationofthefactthatthepainof
hunger and thirstis removed only graduallybecomes veryintricate.
Wemustassumethatby'gradualremovalofpainofhunger'wemean
thatmoreandmorepartsof the organism,allofwhichfelt thatpain,
arerestoredtotheconditionofkatastematic v ~ sothat'gradualre-
moval'meansthatthepainofhungerisfeltinfewerandfewerpartsof
90 This is howDianocharacterizesBignone'saccount: 'ladetrazionedeldoloreav-
vrebbeperunaspeciedilottatrapiaceree dolore;quandoquestaevinto, seque
il piacere catastematico,il qualeessendo daluiintesocomela forma, nonKuta
cLbo<;,rnatemporalmente,ultimadelpiacevole,comprehenderebbequindisotodi
seancheil cinetico.' ('Noteepicuree',in1977,228-9)
91 4.627-9
92 Thatis, followingthedebatebetweenDianoandBignoneinthe1930s, inwhich
Dianoarticulatedhisposition.
93 Merlan(1960) 11
94 JohnRist, Epicuyus,CambridgeUniversityPress,1972,170
248 David Wolfsdorf
theorganism.,95Indeed,accordingtoDiano,thisisEpicurus'position.
96
Andsurelybeingintricateisnogoodreasontorejectaninterpretation.
Infact, onemayquestionwhethertheaccountisintricate.
Merlan'sappealstocommonsenseareweak.ButMerlan'sargument
alsodependsontextualevidence,specificallyonthefollowingpassage
from On Ends inwhichCicero is interrogatinghisEpicureanspokes-
manTorquatus:
Tell methen,"Isaid,"inthecase ofonewhois thirsty, is drinkinga
pleasure?""Whowoulddenyit?""Isitthesamepleasureashavinga
quenchedthirst?" "No,itisquitea differentkind.Aquenchedthirst
(restincta sitis) isastaticpleasure,whereasthepleasureofhavingone's
thirstquenched(ipsius restinctionis) iskinetic.
97
Merlanmaintainsthat, onDiano'sinterpretation,thekinetic pleasure
must refer not to the pleasure oftasting and being hydrated, butto
thepleasureoftastingalone.Thisisbecausebeinghydratedcannotbe
a kinetic pleasure, butmustbe a katastematic pleasure whose scope
widens as dehydrated organs are increasinglyrestored to their natu-
ral,hydratedstate.ButMerlanfindsitdifficulttobelievethat'voluptas
restinctionis' canrefertothepleasureoftastingalone.
98
Indeed,adher-
entsoftheviewthatEpicurusrecognizesrestorativepleasuresandthus
kinetic pleasures antecedent to katastematic pleasures often cite this
passagein defenseoftheirposition.
Iagree withMerlanthat, ceterisparibus,itwouldbemorenatural
totaketheword'restinctionis' torefertotheprocessofbeinghydrated,
whetherornotthis includes this activityoftasting. However,asRist
emphasizes,in the immediatelysucceedingparagraphofOn Ends ki-
95 Merlan(1960) 12
96 Cf. Rist (1972, 170): 'ifweeatwhenwearehungry, moreandmorepartsofthe
wholeorganismaregraduallyrestoredto theirnaturalstate,to theenjoymentof
katastematicpleasure,onwhich,ofcourse,kineticpleasuremaysupervene.'
97 2.9
98 Rist'sinitialresponseisthatthisisnotadifficultleaptomake(1972, 170): ' ... this
Merlanfindsadifficultleaptomake.ButthedifficultyisexaggeratedandDiano's
interpretationisright... 'RistdoesproceedtociteafurtherpassagefromOn Ends
andrefers tooneintheTusculan Disputations. Butthesepassagesdonotdirectly'
answerMerlan'sconcern.
Epicurus on Evc/JpoavvT/ and 'EvipYfla (DL 10.136) 249
netic pleasures are explicitly characterized as thosepleasuresthatin-
volvevariationoncekatastematicpleasurehasbeenachieved:
ButIcannotquitegraspwhatyoumeanby"variation"whenyousay
thatwhenwearefree frompainweexperiencethehighestpleasure,
and thatwhenweareenjoyingthethings thatexcitea sweetmove-
mentofthesenses,wethenexperiencekineticpleasurewhichcauses
avariationofpleasures.
99
Scholars generallyagreethatsuchvariation(varietas) refers tokinetic
pleasuresthatdependuponkatastematicpleasures.Forexample,Kyria
Doxa 18reads: 'Pleasureinthefleshwillnotincreaseoncethepainof
wanthasbeenremoved;itisonlyvaried(JtOLdA.AE'tm).' Consequently,
althoughonemayaccuseTorquatusofspeakingmisleadinglyorwith
inadequateprecisionwhenhereferstokineticpleasureinthequench-
ingofthirst, itwouldbeuncharitable tointerprethimto understand
the cause ofthe kinetic pleasure as the process ofbeing re-hydrated
ratherthantheactivityofthegustatoryfaculty. lOG
LongandSedleycommentontheCiceropassage:
Because such "variations" superveneupon <katastematic> pleasure
withoutincreasingit...itisoftensupposedthatCicerowasmistaken
inassociatingtheprocessofremovingpainwithkineticpleasure.But
hisevidence,if a bitmisleadinglyexpressed, is almostcertainlycor-
rect.Epicurusplainly recognizedthatwederivepleasurefromthepro-
cessofsatisfyingdesires,Le.removingpains.
101
LongandSedley, however, providenoevidence thatEpicurusrecog-
nizesrestorativepleasures;theyjusttakeitas'plain'thatEpicurusrec-
ognizesthatpleasureisderivedfrom desire-satisfaction. Thefactthat
satisfactionofdesire maybeaccompaniedby a sense ofgladness or
contentmentprovidesnoevidencethatEpicurusrecognizedrestorative
99 2.9
100 CompareSchofieldandErler: '<Cicero'sTorquatus>onceclaimsthatontheEpi-
cureanaccountthepleasureofquenchingthirstiskinetic...Butthisisanisolated
textwhoseinterpretationis fiercely contested.It isnoteasytoreconcilewiththe
otherevidence,includingtheexplanationofkinetic pleasureasvariationCicero
goesontogive'(1999,655).
101 (1987)Vol1,123,withmyitalics.
250 David Wolfsdorf
pleasuresasaspeciesofkineticpleasure.Gladnessthata deficitisbe-
ingrestoredisanattitudetowardarestorativeprocess.If Epicurusrec-
ognizedsuchanattitude as a pleasure- itselfa controversialclaim
- itwouldbe a non-restorative, albeitkinetic, rational pleasure,not
aphysiologicalpleasureofremedyinga nutritionaldeficit. Butrestor-
ativepleasuresarephysiologicalpleasuresofremedyingdeficits.
LongandSedleyalsocommentonDiano'suseofLucretius'passage
onthepleasureofeating:'Diano'sinfluentialtheoryisunconvincingin
general,andnotevenplausibleforthispassage.'102InrejectingDiano's
theory'ingeneral',LongandSedleyonceagainprovidenoevidence.
Butwithregardto theLucretiuspassagespecifically, theyemphasize
thatthepassage'impliesnothingaboutthepleasureofactuallyreplen-
ishingone'sstomach, to whichtastemakesnodifference.'lo3It is true
thatwhenLucretiuswritesthatoncethefooddescendsdownthethroat
thereisnopleasure(nulla voluptas est), hemeansthatthereisnoplea-
sureoftaste.Moreover,itistruethatabsenceofpleasureoftastedoes
notimplyabsence ofpleasureofreplenishingone'sstomach.
104
How-
ever, onemustaskwhyLucretiusismakinghisclaim. Canhemerely
be statingthat once we have swallowed ourfood, we do not derive
pleasurefromtastingit?Thisistooobvioustowarrantstating.It makes
moresenseifLucretius'purposeinmakingtheclaimis toemphasize
thatpleasureineatingderivesfromtheexerciseofthegustatoryfaculty
ratherthanthereplenishmentofanutritionaldeficit.
Long and Sedley's insistence that Epicurus recognizes restorative
pleasuresis especiallysurprisinginviewofthefact thatintheirpre-
sentationofEpicurus'hedonictheorytheystatethat'a readingofthe
Aristotelianmaterial<onpleasure>willgivetheproperhistoricalper-
spective<toEpicurus'theory>.'105It isAristotlewhovigorouslyrejects
thePlatonicviewofRepublic IXandPhilebus thatpleasuresarerestora-
tions to the natural state. For example, inChapter12 ofBook VII of
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotleargues:
Theprocessesthatrestoreustoournaturalstateareonlyaccidentally
pleasant;for thatmattertheactivityatworkintheappetitefor them
102 (1987)Vol2,125
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 (1987)Vall,121
Epicurus on Evcj>poavvT/ and 'EvepyEla (DL 10.136) 251
istheactivityofsomuchofourstateandnatureashasremainedun-
impaired.Indeed,thereareactuallypleasuresthatinvolvenopainor
appetite, e.g., those of contemplation, the nature in sucha case not
beingdefectiveatal1.
106
In the wake of Aristotle, Plato's restorative conception of pleasure
couldnotsimplybeaccepted. Indeed,insectionXI, I willarguethat
AristotleinfluencedEpicurus'hedonictheory,includinghisdistinction
betweenkatastematic and kinetic pleasure andhis use ofthe phrase
'KaLa dVT]OLV EVEPYW:lt' in(E).
Warrenisonemorerecentcommentatorwhoattemptstoarguethat
somekineticpleasuresarerestorative: 'itisclearthatkineticpleasures
arepleasureswhichareinvolvedintheprocessofremovingapainor
lack. Thepleasureexperiencedintakinga drinkandremovingthirst
wouldbeaparadigmaticcase.'107 Warren'sclaimisbasedonhisread-
ingofthefollowingpassagefromCicero'sOn Ends:
(i) The pleasure which we pursue is notjustthatwhich moves our
actualnaturewithsomegratificationandisperceivedbythesensesin
companywithacertaindelight<namely,kineticpleasure>.Thegreat-
estpleasure,wemaintain,isthatwhichisperceivedonceallpainedis
removed<namely,katastematicpleasure>.(ii)Forwhenwearefreed
frompain,werejoiceintheactualfreedomandabsenceofalldistress;
buteverythinginwhichwerejoiceispleasure,justaseverythingthat
distressesusispain. (iii)Therefore,thecompleteremovalofdistress
bringsforthpleasureasitsconsequence.Soquitegenerallytheremov-
alofpaincausespleasuretotakeitsplace.Thus,Epicurusdidnothold
thattherewassomehalfwaystatebetweenpainandpleasure.Rather,
thatverystatewhichsome deemhalfway,namelythe absence ofall
pain,heheldtobenotonlytruepleasure,butthehighestpleasure.lOB
This argumentcanbedistilled as follows. (i) claims thatthe greatest
pleasureiskatastematic,notkinetic;andkatastematicpleasureisiden-
106 EN1152b32-3a2
107 NotethatIamquotingfrom anEnglishdraftofWarren'spaper,whichwassub-
sequentlytranslatedintoFrenchandpublishedas'L'ethique',inLire Epicure et les
epicuriens, A. GigandetandP. -M.Morel,eds.,PUF,2007,117-43.
108 1.37-8.1haveaddedRomannumeralstothepassagetofacilitateexegesis.
252 David Wolfsdorf
tifiedasastatewhollyfreefrompain. (ii) presentsanargumentthata
statewhollyfree from painis pleasure.And(iii) claimsthatcomplete
removal ofpainproduces pleasure, not an intermediate state that is
neitherpleasantnorpainful. Inviewofthis, twobasic pointsshould
bemadeagainstWarren'sinterpretation. First,thepleasureproduced
bycomplete removalofpainis notkinetic,butkatastematic. Thus,if
drinking is the cause ofthe removal ofthe painofthirst, there is no
claimheretotheeffectthatdrinkingproduceskineticpleasure.Second,
thepassagedoessupporttheviewthatdrinkingandeatingremovethe
painofthirstandhunger. Butdiminutionanddissolutionofpaindo
notimplyrestorativepleasure.Consequently,thepassageprovidesno
evidencethatkineticpleasuresarerestorative.
Similarly, wheninthe Letter to Menoeceus Epicums writes that '(i)
plainfarebringsasmuchpleasureasacostlydietoncethepainofwant
hasbeenremoved,(ii)whilebreadandwaterproducethehighestpos-
siblepleasurewhentheyarebroughttohungrylips,'lo9 hemeansby
(i) thatoncethatkatastematicstateisachieved,kineticgustatoryplea-
surescanonlyvarythepleasure,notincreaseit, andby(ii) hemeans
anynutritiousdiet,regardlessofitsrefinement,willrestorethenutri-
tivefaculties totheirkatastematiccondition,whichis thehighestpos-
siblepleasure.
In theabsenceofanyfurtherargumentsfor theviewthatsomeki-
neticpleasuresarerestorative,IconcludewithDiano,Rist,Asmis,and
Purinton, thatEpicums doesnotrecognize restorative pleasures and
thusthatkineticpleasurespresupposekatastematicpleasures.Kinetic
pleasures are events inwhich the perceptualorrationalfaculties are
smoothlyorgentlystimulatedoractivated. lID Thesmoothnessorgen-
tlenessofsuchstimulationoractivationoccurswithintheparameters
orboundaries ofa katastematic condition offreedom from pain. The
katastematicconditionof freedomfrompainisoneinwhichthepercep-
tualorrationalfacultiesareintact,thatis,inthecaseoftheperceptual
faculties, healthy, or,inthecase oftherationalfaculties, undisturbed.
CompareKyria Doxa 3: 'Theremovalofallpainistheboundary(SpOS)
109 130-1.IhaveaddedRomannumeralstofacilitateexegesis.
110 cpoErlerandSchofield:'IncriticizingtheEpicureansPlutarchtakesitforgranted
thattheirconceptionofsensorypleasureisprimarilyofa"smoothandgentlemo-
tion"...Incomparisonwiththenumerouspassageswhichspeakofthepleasures
ofthesensesasgentleandagreeablemotions...'(1999,655)Cpo Plutadv Col 1122e;
an sen ger res pub 786c;non posse 1087e.
Epicurus on Ev(jJpoavvT/ and 'EvtpYfla (DL 10.136) 253
ofthemagnitudeofpleasures.' By this, I take Epicumstomeantwo
things. First, asstated,itis a conditiononanythingthatis a pleasure
thatitisfree frompain. Second, somepleasures,for example, certain
perceptual pleasures, may be accompanied by more intense feeling-
tonesthanothers;however,theyarepleasuressolongastheyremain
withintheboundariesoffreedomfrompain;inotherwords,solongas
theysuperveneuponanovLu orcnupuSLu.
XI "Evepyuu'in Aristotle and (E)
In light of the foregoing conclusion we are now in a position to ex-
plainEpicurus'useofthephrase'KaLa dVT]GLV Evepyum'in(E). First,
Aristotle coined the word ' EvepYLU,.m Indeed, the earliest instances
of 'Evepyuu' outside ofAristotle's writings occur almost exclusively
amongPeripatetics: Theophrastus, Eudemus,andStrato.
ll2
Moreover,
outsideofthePeripatos,inthefourthandfirsthalfofthethirdcentu-
ries,theword'Evepyuu'appearsalmostexclusivelyintheworksofphi-
losophers: onceinNausiphanes, onceinEpicums,namelyin(E), and
twice inPolystratus.
1l3
This suggests thatin (E), whichwasprobably
composedafewdecadesafterAristotle'sdeath,'Evepyuu'isatechnical
philosophicaltermofAristotelianpedigree.
111 Thisis theviewofGeorgeBlair, 'Unfortunately,It isa BitMoreComplex:Reflec-
tionsonEnergeia',Ancient Philosophy 15 (1995)565-80,n.l.
112 ThphrCP 1.12.5.2,4.1.3.5, 6.7.3.7, 6.7.5.3, 6.8.3.11, 6.8.8.5; Metaph 5a7,5b23, 7b13,
8all,9a4,lOall;fro 153a-cFortenbaugh;Eudemfro 37a;Stratfro 74, 134. Bradshaw
(2004) 50, claims that after 'Theophrastus, energeia rapidly passed into neglect
amongPeripatetics'andthattheinstancesinEudemusandStrataare'minor:But
the verbatimfragments of Eudemus, Strata, and other early Peripatetics are so
scantythatthisconclusionseemsunwarranted.It is,however,suggestivethatonly
oneinstanceofthewordoccursinthePeripateticProblems 920a6.
113 Nausiphfro 1.4;Polystr15.1,31.12Indelli.Thefirstextantinstanceofthewordbya
non-philosopheroccursC. 260inagrammaticalfragment(407.152)ofCallimachus,
thatis, inanextraordinarily erudite author. There is one instance inAntigonus
Carystus(168.1.6),butitisdifficulttoassignadatetohisCollectio. Thewordalso
occursonceamongthefragmentsof AristophanesofByzantiumandinHeraclides'
Descriptio Graeciae, alsodifficulttodatewithanyprecision.Giventhefrequencyof
thewordinPolybius,itisreasonabletoinferthatbythesecondcentury,'EvepYELU'
hadbeenaccepted intonon-theoreticalwriting. CompareBradshaw (2004) 51-3,
whosuggeststhatPolybiususesthewordwiththesenseof'vividness'or'vigor'.
1
,
254 David Wolfsdorf
Mostcommonlyamongthe earlyphilosophicalusesoutsideofAr-
istotle,'Evepyau'iscontrastedwith Forexa:rnple,Stobaeus
quotesthefollowinglinefromStrato:'Thatwhichperfects(ton:Aaovv)
istheMVUIJ,LS bymeansofwhichweattainEvepyau.'115AndPhilode-
musquotesNausiphanesassaying:'wearenotclaimingthatitisonly
themanwhocreatesaproduct(tovEVEpYOVVtu) thathasanarchitect's
condition nordowemerelylookattheproduction(Evepyauv)
itself,ratherwelookattheability(toMvuo8m)thatthemanhas,when
takingupthewoodandappropriatetools,tofashionaproduct(epyov)
onthebasisofhisarchitecturalskill.'116Inshort,'Evepyau'ismostcom-
monlyusedtoconveytheideaofactuality,incontrasttopotentiality.
In AristotlehimselfEvepyauhasaspecialassociationwithpleasure.
In thecontextofhedonictheory,EvepYELaisspecificallycontrastedwith
114
However,Theophrastusalsorecognizesthesenseof'evepYELu'astheactualization
ofform,onwhichcpo Metaph 8allandBradshaw(2004)48-9.
115
Stob2.7.4a (= Strato fro 134). Cpo F. Wehrli's commentsinStratan von Lampsakas,
Schwabe&Co.,1969,80.
116
PhilRhet IIp.48Sudhc34(= DK 75B1 =Nausiphfro 1). Thisinstanceof'evepYELu'
inNausiphanesisintriguingvis-a.-vis(E)sinceNausiphaneswasateacherofEpi-
curuS.DavidBradshawsuggeststhatAristotle'sProtrepticus 'isclearlythelikeliest
sourceofdirectinfluence'onNausiphanes'use.WhetherNausiphanesintroduced
Epicurus to Aristotle's Protreplicus orwhether Epicurus encounteredAristotle's
concept ofevepYELa bysomeothermeans,Epicurus musthavebeencompelled
bytheconceptionofpleasurethatAristotledefendsinthisexotericwork:'perfect
('E;l.E(U)andunimpededactivity(evepYELu)containsenjoyment(,0XU(pELV)' (58.15-
16Pistelli).Moreover,sinceAristotle'sprimaryaimistoencouragethepursuitof
philosophy,hearguesthattheexerciseofreasonisboththesupremeformofhu-
manactivityandthemostpleasant:'Therefore,livingpleasantlyandexperiencing
trueenjoymentbelongseitheronlyoratleastmostofall tophilosophers'(59.11-
13Pistelli). Thepassagecontinues: 'Fortheactualization(evepYELuv) ofthetruest
thoughts, whichis replete withwhatismostreal andwhichalways steadfastly
preservesitsendowedperfection('E;l.EL6'Tj,a), thisofall thingsis alsomostpro-
ductiveofdelight(EU<j>POOVVTjv). Consequently,itisalsofor thisreason,to enjoy
(,0XU(pELV) trueandgoodpleasures,thatthosewhopossessreason(voilv)should
practicephilosophy'(PistelIi59.13-18).If Aristotlecomposedthepassage,itwould
betheonlyoneinthesurviVingcorpuswhereheusestheword 'EU<j>POOVVTj' in
propria persona. The only other instance ofthe word is the one we have seen
in Topics. However, D. S. Hutchinson,M. R. Johnson, 'AuthenticatingAristotle's
Protrepticus', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 29 (2005) 193-294, at267, have
recently attributed these lines to Iamblichus. While this is consistent withtheir
resultsmorebroadly,unfortunatelytheydonotcommentonthispassagespecifi-
cally.
Epicurus on Ev(jJpoavvT/ and 'EvEpyew (DL 10.136) 255
Aristotledraws the distinctionbetweenEvepyElu and
mostexplicitlyinMetaphysics E> 6.
117
He asserts that aIdVTjOLS is a process
thatisorientedtowardanend orlimit butwhichisnot
anendinitself.Incontrast,anEvepyELaiscompleteandanendinitself.
Aristotleusesa numberofexamplestoclarifythisdistinction. Forin-
stance,buildingahouse,a contrastswithabuilthouse,thecor-
relativeEvepyau.ButAristotlealsocharacterizesseeingasanEvepyau.
Thismayseeminconsistentwiththeexampleofabuilthouse,forinthe
caseofseeingtheEvepyauseemstobeanactivity,whereasinthecaseof
abuilthouseitis astate.However,Aristotle'sviewisthatanEvepyElu
isnotsimplyanactivity,but,astranslatorsoftenputit, anactualityor
actualization.AsAristotlehimselfputsit,whenonesees,onehasseen,
thatis,hasachievedthesightofsomething.
l1B
Thus,anEvepyElu isthe
realizationofanend, whetherthatrealization assumes theform ofa
staticproductsuchasabuilthouseoradynamicfunctionsuchassee-
ing.Andthus,withregardtopleasure,asAristotlesaysinNicomachean
Ethics VII 14: 'Thereis notonlyEvepyElu ofmotion(IdVTjOlS), butalso
oflack-of-motion(aI<:LVTjo[U)i indeed,thereismorepleasureinstillness
thaninmotion (EV Note thathereAristotle uses
theword initsconventionalsense,ratherthaninthetechnical
sensehedeploysincontrasting andEvepyau.
OnthebasisofthedistinctionbetweenEvepyELaand inMeta-
physics E> 6, inNicomachean Ethics VIIAristotlearguesthatpleasureis
anEvepyau ratherthana Precisely, heclaims thatpleasure
is the unimpededEvepyau ofthenaturalstate. SinceAristotle denies
thatplantsandnon-livingthingsexperiencepleasure,DavidBostockis
righttoemphasizethatAristotlecannotmeanthatpleasureistheun-
impededactivityofanynaturalstate,butmorepreciselyofthepsycho-
logical faculties ofperception and intellection.
121
Aristotle articulates
his conception ofpleasure as an Evepyau ofperceptionand intellec-
tion specifically in contrast to Plato's view, expressed inRepublic IX,
117 See1048a26-b36.
118 It iscontroversialjusthowcoherentAristotle'sdistinctionis.
119 1154b27-8
120 Cpo Aristotle's remarkinEN X: 'eK wv,wv bE Kat on ou KuMl<; ;l.eYOlJOL
dVTjOLV yevEOLv dVaL (1174b9-10).
121 This is the mainpointofhis paper 'Pleasure andActivity inAristotle's Ethics',
Phronesis 53 (1988) 251-72.
256 David Wolfsdorf
Timaeus, and above all Philebus, that pleasure is a Kl,VT]OLC; or yevEOLc;.122
More precisely, Plato argues that pleasure is a restoration to the natural
state, where by 'natural state' is meant a state of physical or psychologi-
cal integrity or wholeness, such as bodily health or psychological hap-
piness. Thus, for example, on Plato's view, drinking when one is thirsty
is pleasurable because one is restoring a nutritional deficit. In contrast,
Aristotle argues that so-called restorative pleasures are only accidental-
ly (KaLa OUIA-[3e[3T]KOC;) pleasant. By this Aristotle means that the process
of restoration may coincide with a pleasant activity, but that the resto-
ration is not responsible for the pleasure. In the case of drinking water
when thirsty, drinking restores a hydration deficit by supplying needed
water! but the pleasure derives from the activity of the drinking, not
from the restoration of the hydration deficit - even though drinking
the water restores the hydration deficit. Aristotle supports this view, for
instance, by pointing to the fact that people who are not thirsty derive
pleasure from drinking. As such, the pleasure of drinking derives from
the activity (EvtP'YHa) of the gustatory faculty, assuming this faculty
is in a good condition! that is, in its natural state. For example, a sick
person might experience a drink as bitter that would normally taste
sweet. Moreover, in the case of the healthy person who is thirsty, the
restoration of the hydration deficit is not responsible for the pleasure of
drinking, but rather for the diminution of the pain of thirst.
The debate between Aristotle and Plato over the question whether
pleasure is a Kl,VljOLC; or an Evep'YHu is significant in the face of Epicurus!
claim in (E) that certain pleasures are 'I<:aLa KLVy\OLV EVEP'YHm'. Given
Aristotle's distinction between EVEpyELa and rdVT]OLC;, 'KaLa KLVT]OLV
EvepyELaL' might appear to be an oxymoron. Indeed, in one sense it
is. Yet we have also seen that Aristotle retains the conventional use of
'KLVllOLC;' when, in Nicomachean Ethics VII 14, he contrasts EVEpyna of
KLVll0LC; with Evepyna of UKLVT]o(a. Accordingly, I suggest that, under
Aristotle's influence, Epicurus in (E) is claiming that u<j:>POOVVlj and
xapa are kinetic actualizations.
The concept of a kinetic actualization is to be understood by con-
trast with that of a katastematic condition of freedom from pain! which,
in Aristotelian terminology, is a static actualization. In other words, a
katastematic condition of freedom from pain corresponds to Aristotle's
122 That Aristotle's account is principally directed against Plato, rather than Speusip-
pus, has recently been defended by Gerd van Riel, 'Aristotle's Definition of Plea-
sure: a Refutation of the Platonic Account', Ancient Philosophy 20 (2000) 119-38.
Epicurus on EVcj>poovvTj and 'EvcpyetO (DL 10.136) 257
notion of primary actuality, whereas kinetic actualization corresponds
to Aristotle's notion of secondary actuality. 'Eu<j:>pOOVVTJ and xapa,
then, are smooth operations or functionings of perceptual and rational
faculties respectively when these faculties are intact.
Temple University
Philosophy Department
748 Anderson Hall
Philadelphia! PA 19122
U.S.A.
dwolfsdo@temple.edu

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