REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY, VOL. LXII, NO.

3, SEPTEMBER 2004

The Gift Paradox: Complex Selves and Symbolic Good

Elias L. Khalil

Abstract Symbolic utility involves appreciation and esteem and expressed by symbolic products (gifts), while substantive utility entails ordinary welfare satised by substantive products. For neoclassical theory, both utilities are symmetrical or fungible and, hence, substitutable along the uni-dimensional utility function. If they are substitutable, though, why would agents be judged as crass if they intentionally remind the recipient of the cost of the substitution? For normative sociological theory, the judgment of crassness would arise if the agent mixes moral norms with non-moral substantive interests. The two are supposed to be non-fungible, stemming from multiple selves. If both utilities are non-fungible and stem from multiple selves, though, why do we call agents who spend on gifts beyond their means fools, while those who spend very little cheapskates? It seems that there must be a supervising, single self that makes decisions on the proper division of the budget between substantive products and gifts. But this invites the single-self idea from the back window, reverting back to the neoclassical approach. We would be caught in a vicious cycle of anomalies. To get out of the cycle, this paper identies the critical issues and suggests an alternative, complex-self view. Keywords: unitary-self view, multiple-self view, complex-self view

INTRODUCTION Symbolic products or gifts express outwardly the tastes for appreciation, respect, esteem, and other symbolic utilities. Such symbolic utilities are signaled by the way the gift is wrapped or is attached with kind words. Such symbolic signaling is generally called gift wrapping. In contrast, substantive products satisfy the tastes for warmth, food, aesthetics, conversations, and other substantive utilities.
Review of Social Economy ISSN 0034 6764 print/ISSN 14701162 online # 2004 The Association for Social Economics http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals DOI: 10.1080/0034676042000253972

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I employ the term gift loosely to denote only the gift wrapping, as when one sends a Christmas card, or to denote a present, i.e., the card as well as a substantive product. Further, I use the term gift to refer to the expression of appreciation towards others as well as towards ones self. Self-awarding gifts are abundant as in the examples of birthday parties, wedding celebrations, and the purchase of status goods. The gift poses a paradox for neoclassical economic theory. Another face of the paradox also confronts normative sociological theory. For neoclassical theory, symbolic utility and substantive utility are symmetrical. If so, the agent substitutes smoothly between the two as they maximize the unidimensional utility function. However, this view, called here the unitaryself view, invites an anomaly: If the two utilities are fungible, why would agents refrain themselves from revealing the cost of the smooth substitution by, for example, hiding the price tag of a gift? Obviously, they do not want their action to be called crass. Or in case it is a money gift, why would agents commit crass acts if they intentionally remind the recipient of the cost of the gift? And why would the recipients commit prostituting acts if they accept gifts or payments for their labor services attached with insults, unkind words, or improper respect? For normative theory, agents do not reveal the price of the gift or remind others of the trouble of getting the gift because they follow a moral norm that is non-fungible with other norms. Some norms concern the pursuit of substantive utility. Other norms concern the pursuit of symbolic utility such as esteem, pride, appreciation, and so on. So, according to the normative view, agents have multiple selves. However, this normative solution, called here the multiple-self approach, invites the other face of the same paradox: If the two utilities are non-fungible, why would we judge agents as blunderers and fools if they spend too many resources on gifts, whilst judging agents as cheapskates if they spend too little resources on gifts? For these judgments to work, there must be a supervising, single self that makes decisions on the proper division of the budget between substantive products and gifts. To insist that there is no such a supervising, single self means that one can excessively demand appreciation, honor, and attention without being able to judge such demand as excessive. Put dierently, the theoretical machinery of the multiple-self view cannot come to grip with distinguishing the gift proper from excessive appreciation. Examples of such excessiveness include selfadulation, narcissism, self-aggrandizement, and self-reverence. These tastes might be externalized when the agent makes others into fetish or idols of worship and veneration as epitomized in the Madonna phenomenon.
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However, to invoke the idea of a supervising, single self may amount to inviting from the back window the neoclassical theoretical machinery and its consequent anomaly. It seems that we are caught in a vicious cycle. To solve the anomaly that faces the neoclassical approach, one needs to introduce a normative multiple-self theory. But in order to solve the anomaly that faces the normative approach, one needs to revert back to a neoclassical unitaryself theory. This paper aims to break the cycle of anomalies by showing that each anomaly that faces each theoretical machinery is one facet of the same coin, viz., the gift paradox. The paper suggests a way that presents the self as neither unitary nor multiple, but rather as complex. 1. THE UNITARY-SELF APPROACH The neoclassical, unitary-self view comes in three avors when it tries to explain the gift: 1) gift-as-strategy; 2) gift-as-taste; and 3) gift-as-trait. The third explanation, gift-as-trait, basically employs neo-Darwinian selection arguments to justify why agents use gifts when interest dictates otherwise. This explanation depends on the existence of the trait to give gifts at a critical ratio in order to explain the profusion of the trait in the population. Thus, the gift-as-trait hypothesis is basically tautological (Khalil 2003b). This paper focuses on the second explanation, gift-as-taste. This explanation is not the favorite explanation because it invokes new tastes, which violates the assumption that tastes are stable (Stigler and Becker 1977). The favorite explanation is instead, the rst one, gift-as-strategy. According to the gift-as-strategy model, the agent uses gifts to ensure cooperation in future interaction. The gift is treated as a signal and, hence, part of the constraint function in order to show that one can be trusted because cooperative behavior is incentive-compatible. So, the gift acts as capital that cements the stock of trust in the relationship. This explanation goes a long way as evident in the fact that rms provide gifts to employees, known as eciency wage, in order to ensure cooperation and non-loang behavior (Akerlof 1996). It also explains why rms invest in expensive architecture, name-brands, highly paid executives, and what Williamson (1983) generally calls hostages. However, this explanation fails when one gives gifts where one does not have to worry about reputation, as in single-shot games. This behavior would be particularly anomalous for the gift-as-strategy approach if the cognition cost is suciently low. This anomaly persists irrespective of whether one is awarding the gift to others or to the self.
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Gift-as-Taste To solve the anomaly, the unitary-self view advances, as a last resort, the second explanation, viz., the gift-as-taste idea. The idea amounts to stating that the agent gives gifts to others or the self because the agent enjoys the associated sentiments of admiration and respect. In this manner, the unitaryself approach appeals to the objective function, where these associated sentiments are modeled as ordinary tastes. That is, the neoclassical gift-astaste explanation amounts to treating symbolic products as analytically not dierent from substantive products. When the agent takes a rational decision, he supposedly chooses between symbolic and substantive products according to cost-eectiveness in order to maximize the single utility function. In this manner, gift wrapping or greeting cards make these associated sentiments available, which transform commodities into dierent ones. So, gift wrapping or the greeting card transforms a box of chocolate into another commodity in an identical matter to how almonds transform the same box into a dierent commodity. But is gift wrapping an ordinary trait, similar to the almonds in chocolate? It is obvious that gift wrapping has no innate utility, while almonds have nourishment value that stand on their own. In fact, one cannot consume gift wrapping, unless it is anchored in some kind of relationship or meaning, while almonds and other traits can be consumed independently. However, this dierence might be particular to the example of almonds. If so, the example would lack any theoretical value. So, to examine critically the neoclassical thesis that symbolic sentiments of appreciation and respect are substantive tastes, it would be more appropriate to juxtapose gift wrapping with other attributes that have ephemeral existence similar to gift wrapping. Squeamishness and Other Ephemeral Tastes Ephemeral, non-innate attributes of goods have recently received great attention from behavioral economists. They have been regarded as the source of a class of anomalies known as the availability heuristic (Posner 2002). For instance, one may refrain from eating a chicken after seeing someone slaughter it, or from eating a lobster after watching it being steamed alive. The same person would be ready to feast on chicken and lobster as long as no one reminds him with what he has the misfortune of witnessing a week earlier. So, the person refrains from the consumption not because of new knowledge, but simply out of squeamishness, i.e., associated memory that turns his appetite o. Likewise, if a person has fear of death, the person would decide not to buy
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a house that sits across from a funeral parlor. Similarly, if a person takes great pleasure from being close to nature, the person would purchase a house in the country. Posner (2002) argues that associated memories, which can be positive or negative, simply transforms the product from A to B. Such associated memories are ephemeral, i.e., the non-innate character of the product as it stands independently of the consumer. Nonetheless, such associated memories, for Posner, are simply substantive traits and, hence, can be easily handled by the unitary-self view. Likewise, Becker (1974, 1976, 1996) maintains that one can model associated memories as reference points, social inuences, and social interaction along the standard rationality approach. Concerning social interaction, Becker (1996 Ch. 9) shows that the consumption of a meal from a particular restaurant greatly depends on whether friends and colleagues eat at that restaurant. Agents derive pleasure not only from consuming the product but also from sharing the experience with friends and strangers. The dependence of utility on social interaction may explain the blockbuster or winner-take-all phenomenon: agents are ready to pay more to see a recently released lm, about which relevant others are talking, than wait until it comes out on video. It is true that the neoclassical theory can, without over-stretching, explain eects arising from squeamishness and social interaction as elements of the substantive utility function. The pleasure of eating a chicken involves more than simply the meat in the stomach. It also involves conversations over dinner that do not evoke unpleasant memories, garnishes that turn the appetite on, and dining in a popular restaurant about which everyone in ones social circle is talking. Such eects are ephemeral in the sense that the utility is not derived from something material. While one can consume the almonds independently of the chocolate piece, one cannot consume talking about the meal in a popular restaurant with ones circle of acquaintances without dining at the said restaurant or the experience would not be the same. Despite the ephemeral character of squeamishness and social interaction, it does not give rise to anomalies that the unitary-self model cannot explain easily. Although ephemeral, these attributes involve cost and, hence, the agent must apply the optimization calculus as he does with regard to decisions regarding any economic good. Given that these ephemeral products are substantive, does it mean that gift wrapping is also a substantive and, hence, unitary-self theory can easily model? Posner (2002) explicitly argues that gift wrapping is similar to squeamishness or pleasantness that transforms the product from A to B. That
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is, despite that gift wrapping is ephemeral, it is an ordinary, substantive product that can be handled easily by the unitary-self approach. A Critique of the Gift-as-Taste Explanation The main problem with the gift-as-taste view is the set of anomalies of crassness, shame, and the wife/prostitute continuum. Simply put, the neoclassical model cannot dierentiate between the contract made between a wife and a husband, and the contract made between a client and a long-term, multifaceted prostitute. As mentioned earlier, if the agent is rational why does he feels crass if he leaves the price tag on a birthday gift, or feels like prostituting when he sells his dignity? It is the anomaly of crassness, or its counterpart prostituting, that troubles the neoclassical account. Some authors have shown theoretically (Stewart 1992) and empirically (Titmuss 1970) that the supply of blood would decline if donors are given monetary compensation probably because they negate symbolic recognition of the donation. That is, the supply curve for blood is downward sloping. Critics have used this nding to reach the conclusion that the neoclassical, gift-as-taste must fail because people, when gifts as precious as blood at stake, are motivated by causes other than pecuniary, substantive incentives. However, this judgment of neoclassical theory is premature. Sophisticated neoclassical, gift-as-taste models do not deny the relevance of non-monetary, symbolic incentives. Neoclassical theory oers one way to explain how morality and morale inuence behavior. What is at stake is how to model such symbolic incentives. Should one model symbolic products, as Posner argues, qua squeamishness and pleasantness i.e. as features that transform the product from one kind of substantive product to another kind of substantive product? If one is to argue that Posner is wrong, it is denitely insucient to state that morality and ego-related goods matter. Rather, one needs to locate the dierentia specica of gift wrapping. Gift wrapping signals the context of consumption, while other ephemeral associative memories are not about context but rather about content. Gift wrapping provides meaning to the content: why does X give Y a box of chocolate? Is it to express appreciation of friendship? In contrast, the funeral parlor that sits across from ones house simply exerts a cost, a negative externality, on the dwellers of the house. It is not given by someone in order to express some sentiments about the relation. It just simply happened that the house has blue aluminum panels, a small backyard, big kitchen, a funeral parlor across the street, and so on. It is true that the parlor is totally
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subjective, but so is the color of the house. While the cost of the externality is subjective, it does not signify a judgment of the self and its accomplishments. But still, what is the analytical ground that dierentiates between context and content? While symbolic products are produced goods, they dier from other substantive products with regard to two interrelated things. First, the symbolic product does not generate or satisfy the symbolic eect as the case with substantive products and substantive eects. One does not celebrate because he buys a car with expensive label. Rather one buys a car with expensive label because hes already celebrated something. In contrast, one satises hunger (substantive eect) because one ate dinner. Second, and therefore, when one celebrates, the celebration is the context of something else such as passing an important exam. The context signied by the symbolic product is, after all, a context or meaning that is not a commodity in any ordinary sense (Khalil 2000). The context is not a scarce commodity. Context has no scarcity price or cost of production. Of course, gift wrapping, such as greeting cards and wrapping paper, are costly goods that may not have any substantive element. But the essential feature of the gift wrapping is not that it is costly. The recipient, with sucient communication, does not ultimately need the gift wrapping or the card to understand a particular context. If the giver does not wrap the gift, an apology can normally substitute for the gift wrapping if the receiver is convinced of the sincerity of giver. In fact, even if the gift is wrapped in velvet covering, but delivered with unkind words, the receiver would not enjoy the symbolic eect. There are three possible objections to the thesis that words are costless and, hence, the symbolic eect they convey is costless. First, we have the case of non-scarce goods such as dirt and air, and they are not symbolic products. In answer, the thesis proposed here is not that all non-scarce goods are symbolic. The thesis is not that words per se express symbolic products. The thesis is rather that, insofar as words are used to express symbolic eects, the symbolic eects are costless because the signal happened to be costless. The second objection is that words are not costless but rather cheap as shown by the fact that recipients usually prefer more expensive signals, such as gift wrapping and greeting cards, in order to be assured of the intent of the giver. In answer, if there were sucient trust, words would be as convincing signals of the intent of the giver as expensive gift wrapping. So, the symbolic eect is not contingent on the cost of the signal, and such cost is incurred to take care of an orthogonal issue, viz., the amount of trust between the giver and the recipient. To wit, the content of the gift stripped from the gift
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wrapping and the greeting card, such as the box of chocolate, is also nonessential for the conveyance of the symbolic product. The substantive product that usually accompanies the kind word or the gift wrapping can be seen also as a further conrmation of the givers intent, which is concerned with the orthogonal issue of trust. The third objection is that words are not costless: it takes time and eort to express and utter words. In answer, one can express nasty and unkind words as easily as one can utter gentle and kind words. That is, the switching of an unkind sentence with a kind one is free. This entails, as stated in summary next, that the optimization of a uni-dimensional utility function is selfcontradictory:
Gift wrapping, insofar as it acts as the signal of symbolic products, and not simply to arm trust, is a costless commodity. If the signal has a cost, it arises from an orthogonal issue, the issue of trust, which can be ignored if one wants to analyze its function as a signal of symbolic product. If this conclusion is granted, optimization calculus must collapse if neoclassical theory insists upon including symbolic utility at par with substantive utility. Such a uni-dimensional utility function cannot be optimized because symbolic products are free and, hence, are not included in the budget constraint. The agent cannot substitute between symbolic products and substantive products at the margin and optimize the choice if one element of the choice is free-ofcharge. The idea that there is a tradeo between symbolic and substantive utilities is self-contradictory. Symbolic products are non-scarce commodities to start with. That is, the agent does not face an economic problem with regard to judgment of selfworthiness because the judgment is involuntary, costless assessment of ones action or identity.

To solve the gift paradox, we need to see symbolic and substantive utilities as asymmetrical. To experience the symbolic eect, one does not need to consume the signal. The signal is helpful only insofar as a reminder such as an heirloom, as a reinforcement, or as a catalyst for social interaction as one celebrates his success. The symbolic product cannot satiate the taste for appreciation unlike how the substantive product is designed to satiate the taste for comfort, food, and so on. In other words, the symbolic product (the signal) is incidental to the symbolic eect which is not the case with substantive eects. In substantive eects, the signal is intimately connected to the eect as food is connected to hunger or clothing is related to warmth. In the case of symbolic eects, the signal is not intimately connected to the symbolic eect. The signal is used as a social or personal convention to solidify the symbolic eect. The symbolic eect has already risen spontaneously. Ultimately, there is no need for a signal to satisfy it as in the case with substantive products.
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How does one model gift wrapping, which reduces the budget, without conating symbolic utility with substantive utility? One does not demand symbolic products (gift wrapping) in the same way one demands substantive products. While symbolic products do not satisfy symbolic eects, substantive products do satisfy substantive eects. Symbolic eects would have risen and would have been satised prior to the purchase/ consumption of symbolic products. Symbolic products merely solidify and accentuate the already satised sense of achievement. In contrast, substantive eects are satised only after the purchase/consumption of substantive products. So, to model the symbolic eect, we should not start with gift wrapping or other costly signals. The signals do not satisfy the sense of achievement. The sense would have been already satised by the sheer fact of its spontaneous appearance the appearance simultaneously entails the satisfaction. Thus, even if signals are costly, they can be, at rst approximation, be ignored when we want to model symbolic eects. The attempt to optimize a function, which forcefully includes costless symbolic eects, is at the origin of judgments of crassness, vulgarity, and tastelessness (Khalil 1997, Prendergast and Stole 2001). The failure of neoclassical theory to attend to the non-ordinary status of symbolic utility leads to its inability to explain judgments of crassness, vulgarity, and tastelessness. The act of agents to remove the price tag from a gift is paradoxical in the neoclassical world of gift-as-taste: why should the extra information (the price tag), which is costless to transmit, somewhat tarnish the value of the gift and, hence, must be removed? 2. THE MULTIPLE-SELF APPROACH The normative multiple-self approach, dominant in sociology, comes in dierent varieties, some concerned with intertemporal choice and choice under uncertainty (e.g. passim Elster 1986). What concerns us here are the multiple-self theories related to the symbolic eects of integrity, pride, and appreciation that arise from pursuing duty, ambition, and obligation. The multiple-self approach can easily explain crassness, shame, the wife/prostitute distinction, and other similar anomalies associated with the neoclassical giftas-taste theory. The advocates of the multiple-self view advance a theory of the self where the agent is not only motivated by substantive utility but also by a separate utility related to esteem, honor, respect, and so on. So, for the multiple-self theorists, shame and crassness arise when the two separate accounting books, the substantive and the symbolic, are conated.
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Back to Kant The core of the multiple-self views with regard to symbolic eects can be traced back to Immanuel Kants (1969) notion of the categorical imperative. For Kant, the moral self, whom he called the self that demands and pursues symbolic products, stands independently from substantive utility. For Kant, the categorical imperative amounts to acting according to duty as dictated by the maxim that one acts according to rules that one would wish to be universal laws. There are other formulations of the categorical imperatives that need not concern us here. But basically the categorical imperative is about obligation that does not hinge on ones preferences, inclinations, feelings, or substantive tastes in general. For Kant, the categorical imperative or maxim has the power of moral law in the sense of duty, i.e., doing something for its own sake. This should not be interpreted that Kant was advocating strict particular rules. Rather, whatever is determined to be the particular rule or duty, it acts as a moral law. If ones duty is to fulll a promise, it is a categorical imperative in the sense that it is not, what he calls, a hypothetical imperative. A hypothetical imperative includes all actions that are permitted, i.e., not prohibited by the hypothetical imperative. So, such permitted actions can be subject to optimization eciency where the sole criterion is the assessment of options in terms of their expected substantive consequences. Modern Approaches Similar to Kant, modern normative sociologists argue that moral principles have the status of the categorical imperative. For instance, for Amitai Etzioni (1986), one should distinguish substantive ends, which generate pleasure utility, from ideal ends, which engender moral utility. Etzionis pleasure utility corresponds to Kants permitted ends, while Etzionis moral utility corresponds to Kants obligatory ends. The two kinds of ends or utilities are supposedly incommensurable (Harsanyi 1955, Sen 1977, 1995, Hirschman 1985). Sen (1977, 1995) regards duty, or what he calls commitment, to be counter preferential in the sense that it has a higher moral source that is bound to reduce welfare or what is called here substantive utility. Sen welcomes Harsanyis (1955) distinction between ethical and subjective preferences. While the former expresses what the person prefers on the basis of impersonal social considerations alone, the latter denotes what the person
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actually prefers on the basis of his personal interests or on any other basis (Harsanyi 1955: 315). This Kantian dichotomy draws a wide and unbridgeable distinction, as if the social good is metaphysically separate from individual welfare. Sen (1977) enriches this dichotomy by proposing the notion of meta-preferences (Frankfurt 1971). For Sen, the structure of the self is hierarchial, where the social good can be stratied into multiple levels, ranked by a higher principle of morality. A Critique of the Multiple-Self Approach The multiple-self explanation solves the prostituting or crassness judgment, which is anomalous for the unitary-self approach. It solves it by positing dignity as part of a utility function that is radically dierent, at least at rst approximation, from substantive utility. But once the theorist regards dignity as radically dierent from substantive utility, another set of anomalies emerges. If the two selves, the substantive and the symbolic, are radically separate, how does one decide the extent to which to pursue symbolic goods? Can the pursuit of dignity become foolish? Where should one draw the line between the treatment of others with respect, and excessive respect that can become a form of veneration? Even when the symbolic dimension is costless, still one has to decide what symbolic eects is worthwhile pursuing. In fact, the moral self can become out-of-control, where the agent can become moralizing, inhumane, and angry at the world. The categorical imperative (universality rule) may not help in reigning-in the out-of-control symbolic self. In fact, the symbolic self can become obsessed with self-glorication, ego-worship, and self-aggrandizement. If the two selves are divorced, how can one judge that the demand for gifts that celebrate the ego are excessive in one instance, but not excessive in another instance? What criterion can one use to judge that the demand for self-congratulation is unjustied? 3. THE SELF AS A COMPLEX ENTITY The approach followed in this essay can be characterized as methodological individualism in the sense that it starts with the individual decision maker to account for social phenomena. However, this should not be misconstrued as a reductionist approach. While the individual is the starting point of analysis, the individual is already pregnant with judgements of approval or disapproval, whether the act is crass, tasteful, or exhibit excessive amount of self-esteem bordering on arrogance and ego-worship.
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The individualist methodology followed here aims at explaining action without reference to social pressures or cultural norms. If one appeals to society and culture, the explanation begs the question because one still has to account for social norms and cultural institutions. The actual gift is a complex entity. It combines the gift wrapping to signal symbolic utility, on one hand, and substantive product to satisfy substantive product. For example, a greeting card (symbolic product) attached to a chocolate box (substantive product) is a complex entity. It consists of the gift proper, i.e. the greeting card, that delivers the symbolic eect and the welfareconferring product, the chocolate, that delivers the substantive eect. The gift proper, in this case the card, is gift wrapping broadly understood and, hence, does not dier from the label Lexus which costs $10,000 beyond what an equivalent car, withouta label, costs. The welfare-conferring product is the car in terms of all its mechanical and comfort features. The proposed solution to the gift paradox outlined above is that gift wrapping, even when it is more expensive that the substantive product, is not simply another feature of the product. Let us take for example a chocolate box. The gift proper aspect, i.e., the gift wrapping insofar as it expresses the symbolic element, does not relate to the box in the same way that almonds relate to the box. Gift wrapping expresses the context of the chocolate box as a whole, while the almonds are part of substantive utility and, hence, expresses the content of the chocolate box. To note, though, we can imagine that in some cultures where almonds are rare and, hence, may act in place of the wrapping paper to deliver the symbolic eect. So, the gift wrapping would have two functions: the gift proper as in the case of wrapping paper, and the substantive dimension as in the case of aesthetically pleasing wrapping paper. To make the discussion simple, we should abstract from the possibility that some gift wrapping, such as aesthetic wrapping paper, may have substantive elements. In this fashion, the term gift wrapping is used to denote items used to signal the context of the gift which, although they might be costly, confer no substantive eects. The context of the exchange is nothing other than the meaning of the substantive product. The symbolic product connects with the substantive product in the same manner that a set connects with its own members. Let us take a team of men who are professional basketball players in Paris. The common character that denes the set cannot be a member of the set. That is, the category Parisian males who are professional basketball players is not an individual such as Francis and Michael who make up the set. As such, the neoclassical treatment of the symbolic product as another substantive trait amounts to making the set a member of itself. On the other hand, the symbolic eect should not be radically separated from substantive
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taste as the multiple-self model does (Khalil 2003a). This would amount to severing the set totally from the members of the set. The unitary-self treatment of the set (symbolic utility) as a member of itself (substantive utility) makes it dicult to account for tactless behavior and, its counterpart, the sense of prostituting. Neoclassical theory fails to provide a dierentia specica that sets the marriage contract apart from the sale of sexual services, when the former is supposed to be characterized by appreciation while the latter is judged as indignifying and demeaning. On the other hand, the multiple-self treatment of the set as radically separate from the members of itself makes it dicult to account for excessive demand for appreciation and attention. There is no criterion to rely on that tells us when the demand for the symbolic eect is excessive because the model presents the symbolic eect as unrelated to the substantive eect and, hence, deny the theorist from any traction that allows us to judge the demand for symbolic eects (Khalil 1999). If the symbolic self is unrelated to the substantive self, the agent should have no bounds or qualications in the quest after symbolic eects, which could become foolish, narcissistic, zealous, and self-aggrandizing. For instance, if a seasoned attorney wins a minor settlement of $5,000 for his client, and the attorney celebrates the victory with a huge party, the multiple-self approach cannot make a judgement about the celebration. The spectator could not judge whether the celebration is excessive if, to start with, the spectator assumes that there is no relation between the party and the settlement of $5,000. If the multiple-self hypothesis is granted, the agent would have no analytical tool to judge whether admiration has become ostentation. Likewise, the agent could not judge whether respect has transformed into pomposity. Similarly, the agent has no basis upon which to delineate dignity from reverence (Khalil 2000). If we see the symbolic utility as a hallo or as a by-product of substantive utility, it would be possible to see the self as a complex entity. It is not a uni` -vis others. It is also dimensional plane where all tastes lie symmetrical vis-a not a community of selves where one cannot judge if one self is being satised excessively. To see the self as a complex entity, where the pursuit of symbolic eects are never direct, promises to solve the gift paradox. REFERENCES
Akerlof, G. (1996) Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange, in L. Putterman and R. S. Kroszner (eds) The Economic Nature of the Firm: A Reader, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ch. 19: 276 287.

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