REGULATION THEORY: THE ROAD FROM CREATIVE MARXISM TO POST-MODERN DISINTEGRATION Stavros D.

Mavroudeas Department of Economic Studies University of Macedonia

Science & Society vol.63 no.3

Abstract
Regulation Theory aims, on a historicist and institutionalist basis and via a middle-range methodology, to explain capitalist development. However, both its theoretical and methodological perspectives are unfit for this purpose. Middle-range methodology prioritises superficial features of reality, fails to implement dialectical abstraction and, consequently, cannot grasp neither the deeper roots not the actual course of historical evolution. Historicism cannot grasp historys essential determinations and institutionalism autonomises improperly institutions and politics from socio-economic relations. Therefore, Regulations multi-factor intermediate concepts have limited explanatory power. Instead of being able to capture both the essential unity and the formal separation of socio-economic relations, they end up with an inordinate juxtaposition of economics, politics etc. The lack of a general-theoretical framework led Regulation from an initial mild structuralism to an equally mild post-structuralism and post-modernism. This journey created further problems to its already unstable theoretical structure, exacerbated its explanatory inefficiency and led to its present crisis of identity.

I. Introduction Regulation Theory (RT) has been an extremely influential trend within Radical Political Economy in the 1980s, although recently its popularity has been severely curtailed leaving footholds only to areas such as Regional Development and Labour Process theory. Its main merit - like some other similar theories, as the Social Structures of Accumulation (SSA) - was considered its ability to provide a set of intermediate concepts which would operationalise Marxist Political Economy in actual historical evolution. It was believed that RT could (a) capture better the historical specificities of different periods of capitalist development, (b) solve the structure-agent riddle and, (c) understand the significance of institutional forms. Much of these beliefs were proved unfounded and its current state of retreat and/or crisis is tantamount to that. RTs main attraction - but also deficiency - is its close identification with specific periods of historical reality. Radical Political Economy - this distinct trend born out of the

university radicalism of the 70s - was exasperated by the retreat of the radicalism of the 70s. Much of this radicalism derived from an extremely reductionist conception of class and social structure which led to a simplistic and undialectically abstract theory. The return from reductionist abstract theory to the level of concrete took the form of middlerange theory (Mavroudeas (1990), Sayer (1995)). The latter, in contrast to general theories - covering the whole spectrum, from the most abstract laws and concepts to the empirical analysis of the concrete, in a unified framework - reject abstract general laws and the necessity of an all-embracing theory which are deemed to be either redundant or a distant accessory. It substitutes both with intermediate concepts with an immediate identification with the most concrete phenomena. These concepts are not linked to a general theory but are based on empirical observations perceived as indisputable (stylised facts). These stylised facts are supposed to encapture important facets of historical reality and, thus, to mark different epochs. This type of reasoning has significant problems. Stylised facts - in contrast to dialectical materialist abstractions from concrete historical reality - are supposed to be theory-free but also historically accurate. However, they are usually founded on theoretical influences and perceptions which are neither explicit not necessarily coherent and, therefore, represent an eclecticist reading of historical realityi. The next step is the construction of a theory based on the intermediate concepts and the periodisation derived from the stylised facts. Consequently, both concepts and periodisation vindicate, in a circular way, the initiating empirical perceptions. Middlerange theories major weapon - their close identification with a particular historical epoch gives them immense popularity during the course of the particular epoch (if and when it has been identified correctly) but, on the other hand, invalidates them when it ends. Then, more fundamental questions re-emerge, requiring a general theory. In this case, middlerange theorys agnosticism and/or referential pluralism becomes a major weakness. These problems are nowadays more or less evident even to former supporters of the middle-range approach (Sayer (1995), chs.1-2). However, back in the 80s and early 90s neither the middle-range character nor the problems associated with it were recognised. But the recent wisdom is not without crippling misconceptions. For example, Sayer (1995, p.20) maintains that a proper analysis should combine abstract politicaleconomic theory and middle-range theory. This is an impromptu treatment of concepts and scientific approaches. If - contrary to the post-modernist visions of a fragmented world - reality is a contradictory whole, then Marxist Political Economy should study the dialectics of abstract and concrete not (more or less) separately but as a continuum. On the other hand, for typical middle-range theory (as exemplified by Merton), general theory is not necessary and, if it can be constructed, it is merely a secondary derivative. This study will argue that these two perspectives cannot be combined because they are

inherently conflicting. This does not imply that abstract theorising - particularly in the reductionist version of early Radical Political Economy - is unproblematic. Rather the rediscovery of the Hegelian elements in Marxian dialectics - by many older (Zeleny (1980), Ilyenkov (1982)) and newer writers (New Dialectics) represents a promising route which can grasp accurately historical reality in both its abstract and concrete expressions. The focus of this paper is on the theoretical structure of Regulation, rather than the empirical evidence. Empirical support to the theoretical critique is drawn from a number of influential studies addressing specifically this field (Brenner-Glick (1991), Dumenil-Levy (1988) etc.). This theoretical critique attempts to contribute on three points. First, to verify RTs middle-range nature. Second, to establish that the middle-range methodology is undialectical and fails to grasp accurately historical reality. Third, to question the validity of RTs theoretical structure. It should be noted that Brenner-Glick (1991) refer also in passim, without elaborating further, to the middle-range character of Regulation in their powerful rejection of RTs empirical perceptions. From another side, Kotzs (1994) critique brings forward several important deficiencies of RT. However, it disputes only the close association of SSA with RT and argues that the formers conceptual framework is superior without touching upon their common middle-range nature. Part II of this study gives an outline of RT and presents the common elements of the newer middle-range theories (SSA etc.). Part III delineates the typical middle-range perspective and contrasts it with the Marxist dialectics of abstract and concrete. Part IV focuses on RTs methodology and conceptual framework and its shortcomings. The final part analyses RTs subsequent stages of evolution and the attendant theoretical weaknesses. The general conclusion is that RT failed on all three aspects that were considered its main merits. The recourse to middle-range intermediate concepts and historicism has been proved unable to explain coherently historical evolution. Additionally, instead of a solution to the structure-subject relation retaining a role for structures and at the same time permitting degrees of freedom for agents (seen primarily as social classes) - RT proceeded from initial mild structuralist positions towards post-structuralist and postmodernist relativism and methodological individualism, with equally dismal results. This leads to the final aspect. RT, instead of overcoming the orthodox neo-classical dichotomy of economics-politics etc., has been continuously slipping towards a downgrading of socio-economic relations and the prioritisation and randomisation of politics and ideology. Its multi-causal intermediate concepts are simply juxtaposing elements from all these spheres in an eclecticist manner and without actually being able to analyse both the essential unity of social relations and its formal fetishist dichotomisation in separate spheres.

II. Regulation and the newer non-orthodox middle-range theories II.1. RT: a summary presentation Regulation emerged in the middle 1970s in France when certain authors (Aglietta, Lipietz, Boyer etc.) produced an institutionalist and historicist theory of capitalism. This was based on two key concepts: the "regime of accumulation" (RoA) and the "mode of regulation". (MoR). The RoA represents the form of distribution of surplus between capital and labour required in each period in order to co-ordinate production with social demand. It covers the essential economic conditions for the operation of the productive system (technology, organisation of the labour-process, relations between the departments of production). The MoR designates the necessary institutional forms and social compromises for the reproduction of the RoA. The RoA is posited at the level of the compulsory economic structures, whereas the MoR is less determinate, since it relies on concrete, historically specific institutional forms. More than one MoR can be implemented in a certain RoA. Which will prevail is a question open to the indeterminacy of history. However, not every MoR is suitable for every RoA. Two types of RoA are usually considered. In extensive accumulation pre-existing production processes were incorporated into a capitalist framework without major changes. The traditional way of life - as expressed in the patterns of consumption - was not radically recomposed. The combined development of the two departments of production was achieved with difficulty and the pace of accumulation encountered recurrent obstacles. In intensive accumulation production was reorganised radically on capitalist lines. A new mode of life for the working-class was created by establishing a "logic" that operates on the totality of time and space in daily life. Consequently, a social consumption norm was formed which no longer depended on communal life but was stratified according to the divisions of social groups within the working-class. The two departments of production were integrated and, hence, the pace of accumulation became more regular. Additionally, two MoR are recognised. In the competitive MoR - which is considered more appropriate to extensive accumulation - there was a posteriori adjustment of the output of the various branches to price movements which were highly responsive to changes in demand; wages were adjusted to price movements so that real wages were either stable or rose slowly. In the monopolist MoR income distribution is socialised via a series of compromises between capital and labour (wage formation in relation to inflation and productivity). Market relations (pure pricing adjustment mechanisms) play only a minor role in adjusting social demand and production. This role

is exercised mainly by a complex set of institutions, conventions and rules which constantly aim at developing effective demand at the rate of production capacities. On the basis of the historically contingent correspondence between RoA and MoR, Regulation periodises capitalism as follows: i. The extremely lengthy period between 17th and mid-19th century is considered as the era of capitalisms establishment and of primitive accumulation. ii. From the mid-19th century till W.W.I extensive accumulation accompanied by competitive regulation predominated. iii. The period between the two world wars was an unstable transitional phase characterised by the emergence of intensive accumulation (mass production - Taylorism) but without mass consumption. The 1929 crisis - perceived as an underconsumptionist cum institutionalist crisis - marks this period. iv. After W.W.II, intensive accumulation is coupled with mass consumption and monopolistic regulation. This is the era of Fordism., in which the working-class consumption has been commodified and provides the needed mass market for capitalist mass production. v. Fordism enters a crisis in the 1970s and Post-Fordism is proposed as its successor. Emphasis is being put on the new information and communication technologies, small-scale production processes, the relaxation of standardised production tasks, the significance of the service sector, new life-styles as stimulants of consumption etc. However, the definition and the characteristics of this new configuration are far from clear. Seen from a wider perspective, Regulation's project is an attempt to construct a dynamic and historically concrete theory of the crises and transformations of capitalism on the basis of appropriate intermediate terms. It is a project that can hardly be objected in principle. But RT has chosen to accomplish this task by recoursing to middle-range theory; a choice that compromised seriously its project. An important consequence of this type of theory is its rapidly changing landscape. Indeed, a lot of things have changed within Regulation since its launching and many of its previous supporters have accused it for betraying its initial radical perspective. These accusations are rather unjustified - although it is true that most of RTs radical elements are now discarded - because it is its very constitutive structure that warranted both its previous radical theses and its present realignment to socio-economic orthodoxy. Regulations spinal column consists of a corpus of middle-range method, stylised facts, and intermediate concepts, which constitutes the common ground of all those diverse writers that come under its name. Noel (1987, p.327) praises RT, Segmented Labour Market theory and certain post-keynesian trends for their "theoretically informed

understanding of time-changing empirical patterns". Jessop (1990,1988, p.162) also declared that: Their research programme shows a clear commitment to concrete analysis of concrete conjunctures through a rich and complex range of economic and political concepts directly related to the nature of the capitalist exploitation and domination... it is only through the detailed conjunctural analyses which this method facilitates (but whose accuracy it cannot guarantee) that one can develop alternative strategies which have some chance of success... Both the state derivation debate and the regulation school have produced concepts at a middle range, institutional level; both are concerned with stages and phases of capitalist development rather than with the abstract laws of motion and tendencies operating at the level of capital in general; ... both are committed to conjunctural analysis... The set of stylised facts is the sine qua non counterpart of RTs middle-range method. It is based chiefly on a number of empirical perceptions about two historical periods: the interwar years and the post-W.W.II epoch. The second is the main benchmark, whereas the first is treated as a transitional era between the previous status quo and the new one. The other periods are theorised neither on their own nor via a general theory but according to the principles set in, and by comparison with, the benchmark period. The transitional period is essential in providing the links and also in operating as the measure for the application of those principles. II,2, The newer non-orthodox middle-range theories RTs similarity with a number of other theories (SSA, Flexible Specialisation (PioreSabel (1984)) etc.) is nowadays well-documented (Boyer (1991), Jessop (1992)), although significant differences also exist (Hirst-Zeitlin (1992), Kotz (1994)). Most studies recognise the equivalence of intermediate concepts (e.g. RoA-MoR and SSA) and the congruence of theoretical fields and stylised facts. All these trends seek to explain the historical evolution of capitalism by relating the capital accumulation process to a set of social institutions (not only economic but political and ideological ones as well). They, also, adopt a similar historicist perspective, since their aim is the creation of detailed conjectural analyses. Additionally, they share the same stylised facts; particularly regarding the 1929 crisis as an underconsumptionist one. The supposed subsequent creation of a capital-labour accord is founded upon the sharing of productivity increases and an appropriate institutional formation of consumption norms and wages. Finally, their periodisation of capitalism is cognate beginning with the era after WW.I which is considered as one of structural changes and continuing with Fordism and post-Fordism.

But what most studies miss is that these similarities derive from the common character of these theories, namely of being middle-range theories. These newer non-orthodox middle-range theories appeared in Radical Political Economy during the 1970s. The marxist variants of this trend were born out of the post60s crisis of the epigones of Western Marxism. The first steps were characterised by a relativisation and a relaxation of a number of crucial tenets of the theoretical traditions from which they were derived. There were references to the old general theoretical traditions, but in a remote and detached sense. In contrast, attention focused on specific historical periods (usually the period after W.W.II) - assuming that major transformations took place during them, which changed radically the nature and the operation of the social system thereafter - and a quest began for the theorisation of their specificities. This intentional relativisation and relaxation of many of their most significant and strict assumptions, in correlation with the recourse to the historically specificii, opened the way for the implementation of the middle-range methodology. Since it was supposed that the previous general theories could not explain the new situation, either because they were totally inadequate or because they needed significant changes, there was a recourse to the concrete and an attempt to discover within it the appropriate new theoretical tools. In this process, "abstract general laws", the supposed main attribute of general theories, were rejected and were substituted by the more lax and allegedly more appropriate intermediate concepts. This, partly justified, course was coupled with a growing disillusionment with the old general theories. The next step, after the relativisation of the fundamental concepts, was a relativisation of the very scope and method of theory. The middle-range methodology was, explicitly or implicitly, accepted as the scientific method par excellence and the need for even a detached and relativised general theoretical framework was discarded. "Essentialism", or its scapegoat, was exiled from the sphere of theory. The usual implication of this purge from "essentialism" for the marxist variants of those theories was that economism (posited as the basis of marxist essentialism) was denounced. Anti-essentialism led to a search for a multi-causal, non-reductionist theory. This eclectic multi-causality set the framework for the intermediate concepts of most of the middle-range theories (Noel (1987)) which are supposed to unify the economy with a number of other factors (politics, ideology, culture etc.). These factors were considered as more or less equally important and it was difficult or non-permitted to construct a coherent hierchisation based on relations of determination. The concrete, according to Marx, is the unity of many determinations. If a theory is organised directly at this level, then its concepts and their causality should be based on the whole variety of these determinations. The result is a set of eclecticist categories with ambiguous theoretical content and limited explanatory poweriii.

The historicism of the newer non-orthodox middle-range theories assumed the form of the occasionally dominant intellectual fashions of each period. Effectively, this meant that they opted for some more or less evident version of institutionalism and most of their intermediate concepts were referring to institutional forms. The attractions of this were manifold. Firstly, institutional arrangements proliferated widely in the post-W.W.II period and seemed to express, if not to encompass, all the ongoing transformations. Secondly, these arrangements appeared to provide the perfect explanation for the supposed structural incorporation of the whole working-class or major sections of it within capitalism. Thirdly, for European variants of the newer non-orthodox middle-range theories, Althusserian structuralism provided the initial inclination towards institutionalism. Despite its verbal adherence to the Marxian primacy of the economy, via its separation of different instances (economic, political etc.) and the pursuit of "regional theories" of these instances, it ended up with the "State Ideological Mechanisms". The latter, under a mainly institutional form and through the covert prioritisation of the "regional theory" of the political, tended to encompass all reality or at least all the field of theory. Last, but not the least, the institutional forms provide, perhaps, the most appropriate material for the construction of their multi-causal intermediate concepts. Not only are they immediately observable, but they also have a high and impressionable profile. On the other hand, they are not a crude, simple factor but they are founded on a wide variety of determining parameters (such as the economy, culture, politics, ideology, legal forms, social struggles etc.). The historicism and institutionalism of the newer non-orthodox middle-range theories was also informed by the philosophical trends and fashions of the times. Different philosophical traditions operated as their referential framework in different periods. It seems that at least the European versions started from some form of structuralism, since Althusserianism was still a dominant trend within Western Marxism - although already declining, at the beginning of the '70s. With the emergence of post-structuralism and postmodernism the referential framework of those theories moved towards the new fashion. Structural forms were rejected or weakened and the whole conceptual framework was relativised. Projects and strategies, fragmentation of the collective agents (such as classes) into more fluid and less structurally determined factors (volatile social groups organised on a short or mid-term basis, firms and even individuals etc.) became central for middle-range theories. The common descent and the theoretical and personal continuity between structuralism and post-structuralism has been established adequately (see Anderson (1988, p.40-55)). Wood (1985) has shown that this trajectory assumed flesh and bones in the journey of certain authors from Althusserianism to post-marxism; Poulantzas being its

forerunner. For them the explanatory primacy of discourse is based on the autonomisation of ideology and politics from the economy. This is supplemented with the randomisation of history and politics. The first implies that the discursive elements cease to be determined, even in the last instance, by the economy. This is part and parcel of their anti-essentialist and anti-reductionist drive and their quest for "openness" and an "unsutured" theory. On the other hand, the randomisation of history and politics initiates a recourse to historicism. The result is an awkward hybrid of (implicit) absolute determinism and absolute contingency, with the emphasis on the latter. Following their Althusserian structuralist past, Laclau and Mouffe theorise structures and laws in a rigid, static and nondialectical way (worthy, indeed, of mechanistic determinism) which, in return, enables them - but now under the new banner of post-structuralism -to reject them in favour of the indeterminacy of the historically specific. Callinicos (1985) distinguished two major post-modernist strands. The first, associated with Lyotard, draws heavily on a version of analytical philosophy of language. The second strand is post-structuralism, which is itself divided into two sub-strands. On the one hand, Derrida's textualism denies the possibility of ever escaping the discursive; discourse has no extra-discursive referents and encompasses all the aspects of reality. On the other hand, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari propose a version of "worldly poststructuralism", which, in contrast to Derrida's idealist theory, proposes an articulation of the discursive and the non-discursive. It is the "worldly post-structuralism" that provides most of the discreet links between certain newer non-orthodox middle-range theories, post-marxist theories and post-modernism (though Lyotard advances a variant of postmarxism, as well). It meets the post-structuralist and post-marxist theories of those deriving from Althusserian structuralism (typically represented by Laclau-Mouffe (1985)). According to Wood (1986, p.62): Laclau and Mouffe have followed the now familiar trajectory from structuralism to post-structuralism - though they seem uncertain whether the post-structuralist dissolution of reality into discourse can be regarded as a general law of history (as it were) or whether it is only in the modern age, and particularly with the advent of "industrial society", that social reality has dematerialized and become susceptible to discursive construction. The proliferation of such middle-of-the-road theories was founded upon the problem of the structure-subject relationship and the relation between economy, politics and ideology. RT supplied the ideal ground for such an experiment. It considered the structure-subject relation as crucial because it aimed to explain the crisis but also the reproduction of the system. Moreover, many regulationists shared a common social and

intellectual past with post-modernists and post-marxists. On the other hand, poststructuralism and post-marxism, apart from being the new trend, appeared to solve many of its broader referential problems. It is not strange, therefore, that there have been several attempts for relate post-modernism and post-marxism with RA. Lashs (1990, p.37) political economy of post-modernism maintains that a "regime of signification" is co-articulated with a RoA. On this basis, he defines the new restructured form of capital accumulation as "post-fordism" or "disorganised capitalism", which is characterised by a turn from mass production and consumption to the services and information economy, flexible production and specialised consumption. With regard to the social aspect, the working-class is being shrinked and fragmented, resistance is apportioned to decentralised and multi-collective (inter-class) social movements and individualism returns. Additionally, Lash argues that this new (post-fordist) RoA is being rapidly transformed to a regime of signification, because both the means and the forces of production acquire an increasingly cultural - rather than strictly economic - hue. The forces of production are no longer mediated by the material means of production but constitute issues of discourse and communication between management and workers. Lash suggests that the wide-spread implementation of quality circles and team briefings are obvious and undeniable proofs of this alleged transformation. Laclau and Mouffe also, when they attempted to give a solitary and vague economic reference to their elaborations they invoked the RoA. This does not mean that the RT or any other newer non-orthodox middle-range theory adhere heart and soul to post-modernism and/or post-marxism. On the contrary, they represent a middle-of-the-road choice. Their new post-structuralist overtures co-exist with significant doses of structuralism. In this sense, they are close to similar attempts in sociology, such as Giddens and Bourdieuiv ( Lipietz (1985, p.12), (1988) and AgliettaBrender (1984, p.14)). On the other hand, a change in the scope of their theory and their concept-building axis can be detected in certain cases. It is a shifting from a middle-range perspective informed by a latent and qualified structuralism to an even more randomised and relativised framework. When this middle-of-the-road position begins to crack, under the burden of its internal contradiction between structure and historical specificity, then considerable differences appear among the exponents and result in diverse associations with other traditions. This is typical for middle-range approaches. Even when they establish a certain degree of coherence, its unresolved internal contradictions, seldom in transformed forms, re-emerge and destroy it. III. Foundations for a Critique: Dialectics and the middle-range method

Late Radical Political Economy has a rather casual understanding of middle-range theory. It is considered as simply something between the abstract and the concrete. This intermediate level can - or must - correspond to a general theory through some form of dialectical abstraction. However Merton (1968, p.39), who introduced middle-range theory in contemporary social sciences, gives a different picture: Middle-range theory is principally used in sociology to guide empirical inquiry. It is intermediate to general theories of social systems which are too remote from particular classes of social behavior, organisation and change to account for what is observed and to those detailed orderly descriptions of particulars that are not generalized at all. Middle-range theory involves abstractions, of course, but they are close enough to observed data to be incorporated in propositions that permit empirical testing. Middle-range theories deal with delimited aspects of social phenomena, as indicated by their labels. For Merton it is difficult to have a general-theoretical analysis. If general-theoretical reference is required, then a middle-range approach - although not derived from a single general theory - can be consistent with a variety of such theories. He suggests that middlerange theory transcends the mock problem between (a) the general and the altogether particular, (b) generalizing sociological theory and historicism and, (c) the micro and the macro level. Hence, it is only through the aggregation of middle-range studies that ultimately a general theory may be produced. It is evident in his approach that general abstract theory is not necessary. Additionally, a general theory can be produced only through an adding-up procedure of middle-range analyses. This generalisation on the basis of middle-range analyses - by aggregating their common elements and discarding the more specific ones - is not equivalent to dialectical abstraction. Marxian dialectical analysis follows a different path. First, the basic level of analysis is that of the essence, whereas for middle-range theory is a rather obscure intermediate level between the abstract and the concrete. For Marx (1981, p.100) the only correct method of appropriating the concrete and reproducing it as concrete-in thought is by ascending from the abstract to the concrete. Dialectical abstraction should provide the point of departure and the foundation of the movement of investigation, through a continuum of mediations, towards the concrete. The starting point of the investigation is the "cell-form" or essence (Marx (1982, p.90), Zeleny (1980), Banaji (1979, p.17)). The movement from the essence to the concrete is continuous, so that in approaching the concrete forms in which the world exists we do not abandon the sphere of essence; rather, we now investigate this very essence in its form of appearance. This is a journey from the simple (the abstract) to the combined (the concrete is the unity of many

determinations). This process is supplemented with a movement from the concrete to the abstract. In this dual-way process the movement from the abstract to concrete is the leading or determining aspect (Ilyenkov (1982), p.138). In contrast, middle-range theories advance directly to study the concrete and produce almost immediately a set of intermediate concepts without any reference to abstract essences. Second, middle-range theories either refute or have a different understanding of the method of abstraction in general. In the first case, abstraction is rejected outright and it is substituted by the inductive-deductive method of positivism (usually, in the traditional form of successive approximation). In the second case, when abstraction is not altogether discarded, it is substituted by the contentless abstraction which is characteristic of the positivist method. Abstraction becomes either a purely logical trick, which enables us to approximate reality (similar to the neo-classical method), or an average of immediately observable factors. The first choice - abstraction as a purely logical tool -in a strong version, hinges on the more general proposition that logic stands outside the object of the study and that "reasoning" exists solely in the mind and has no organic relation with the world outside. In a weaker version, it denotes that not all theory, but only abstraction is merely a logical construction. From the point of view of dialectics both versions are equally unacceptable, since Marx's method does not separate logic from object as in the positivist "model-real world" dichotomy. In the dialectical world, the object under investigation determines the path and the movement of logic, while the latter retains its separate identity. According to Marx (1981, p.101-102), "the totality as it appears in the head, as a totality of thoughts, is a product of a thinking head, which appropriates the world in the only way it can... the real subject retains its autonomous existence outside the head just as before; namely as long as the head's conduct is merely speculative, merely theoretical". For Zeleny (1980, p.23), Marx's advance from Ricardo's fixed essence to a new materialist relativist-substantialist logic has nothing to do with the relativism which disputes the possibility of perceiving objective reality correctly; it is rather a presupposition of true objective knowledge. Instead of a dichotomy between reality and its appropriation by thought, characteristic of positivism, Historical Materialism posits a dialectical relationship between them, which is grounded in reality and operates simultaneously on both the level of theoretical or logical development and on the level of real historical events. This does not imply a crude and vulgar naturalistic identification of theory and objective reality: It would therefore be infeasible and wrong to let the economic categories follow one another in the same sequence as that in which they were historically decisive. Their sequence is determined, rather, by their relation to one another in modern bourgeois society, which is precisely the opposite of what it seems to be their

natural order or which corresponds to historical development. The point is not the historic position of the economic relations in the succession of different forms of society. Even less is it their sequence "in the idea" (Proudhon) (a muddy notion of historic movement). Rather, their order within modern bourgeois society. (Marx (1981), p.107-108) But, on the other hand, the level of theoretical development is derived from real historical events. Activity on this level, insofar as it diverges from and runs counter to the actual historical events (and the level of immediate appearances), is not an a priori construction, but reflects the "life of the material" in its essence and expresses the essential and necessary relations of reality. There is, therefore, a continuous dialectical oscillation between abstract dialectical development and concrete historical reality relating them through a continuous spiral pattern, each time at more complex levels (assuming more determinations). The weaker version (not all theory but only abstraction is a logical trick) confuses real with reasoned abstraction. The latter has to do with the discovery of categories which permit social relations to be understood, while the former is the consequence of a real process and has an immediate (non-mediated) material presence. Moreover, this conception does not imply that reasoned abstraction is a purely logical tool. Reasoned abstraction is no less realistic than real abstraction; it only does not have a non-mediated material presence (for example, abstract and social labour): Insofar as "the concrete" is opposed to "the abstract", the latter is treated by Marx first and foremost objectively. For Marx, it is by no means a synonym of the "purely ideal", of a product of mental activity, a synonym of the subjectively physiological phenomenon occurring in man's brain only. Time and time again Marx uses this term to characterise real phenomena and relations existing outside consciousness, irrespective of whether they are reflected in consciousness or not. (Ilyenkov (1982, p.33-34)) The second choice - i.e. abstraction as the average of immediately observable factors - represents an empiricist approach, which expects to find the determinants of essence almost directly underneath the immediate appearances and for which the movement of dialectical investigation is flattened down to a simple feed-back between immediately observable factors and perceived essences. This is often based on some statistical research; abstraction is, in fact, substituted for by quantitative techniques. The inescapable consequence of both these two methodological choices is a twinned dependence upon absolutism, at one time, and relativism at others.

Consequently, the relation between theory and reality is only bridged arbitrarily with a frequently remaining gap between theory and the historical process. The unavoidable outcome is a recourse to empiricism and historicism, in order to fill the holes in the riddled and shaky frame of the particular middle-range theory. Contentless positivist abstraction cannot progress from the abstract to the concrete through a series of specifications and mediations because it contains nothing that can be specified or mediated and, instead, it must attempt to grasp reality directly (Kay (1986, p.58-59)). History is called upon to dress in the wealth of the concrete the nakedness from any substantive content of the middlerange theories. Usually, this recourse to empiricism and historicism assumes the form of the intellectual fashion of that historical period (institutionalism, action theory etc.). Finally, middle-range theories are usually extremely vocal in their denunciations of "fixed essences", considering them as unable to grasp the multiplicity of real phenomena. Insofar as Marxism is concerned, this is a gross misinterpretation. Zeleny (1980, ch.3) shows that one of the fundamental differences between Marx's and Ricardo's conception of abstraction is that "while for Ricardo essence is something qualitatively fixed and nondifferentiable, Marx sees and investigates the alteration of that essence; he understands it as something historically transitory which proceeds through different levels of development and qualitatively changes". This dialectical method is necessarily absent from middle-range theories but nothing stands in its place to deal satisfactorily with the relation between theory and complex, concrete development. Indisputably, middle-range theories are particularly popular in periods when general-theoretical paradigms are in crisis. Their main thrust is that they enable many authors to continue working while their previous theoretical perceptions are, justifiably or unjustifiably, crumbling. Because of their inherently eclectic nature and their ability to conform with a wide variety of more general theories and trends, They facilitate an accommodation between the previous theses of their contributors (albeit in a transforming version) and the new intellectual fashions. On the other hand, this retreat from the level of high theory has little, and chiefly a negative, impact on the generaltheoretical and social problems causing the crisis. Merton's naive conception of a step by step building from below of one unified theory depends upon empiricism and historicism and is informed by positivism. It is impossible to construct any intellectually coherent and operationally efficient theory of any "macro" or "meso" period phenomenon without a general theoretical reference; and even the most "micro" phenomena require such a framework if their analysis is to be anything more than a theoretically informed description. Middle-range theories attempt to bypass this dilemma by juxtaposing arbitrarily and eclectically several abstract factors with the most concrete elements. This provides them with a quasi-general theoretical facade, insofar as a number of

assumptions from this level are necessary for the construction of a particular middlerange theory. On the other hand, the rest of the necessary framework of a general theory is evaded by turning it into a non-problem or by permitting each contributor the liberty to ascribe to one of a variety of different general theories. This referential pluralism results in an intellectual agnosticism with regard to problems of theory and policy concerning the long-run. IV. Middle-Range Theory and the Conceptual Framework of RT IV.1 The question of method The middle-range approach is almost openly accepted by the regulationists. For Boyer (1987, p.6-8), all general economic theories (Keynesian, neo-classical and Marxist) mistreat reality. He argues for a historicist-institutionalist approach based on intermediate concepts. If abstract concepts are required, then these can be drawn from a number of equally suitable general theories (Marxism, Keynesianism, institutionalism). This ostentatious display of general-theoretical referential pluralism characterises RT from its very beginning; setting aside the special case of Aglietta's first work. In CEPREMAP (1977) collective work, Lipietz was presenting its marxist pedigree, whereas Benassy proposed a neo-Keynesian interpretation; the rest concentrated on historical and quantitative research. The methodological attributes and consequences of its middle-range perspective did not take long to appear in each of its three major representatives (Boyer, Lipietz and Aglietta). Boyer (1991) begins with concrete historical cases (basically specific historical periods of specific national economies) and focuses upon their institutional forms. He employs historiography in order to produce a periodisation of the institutional forms. This is effected by searching for key-dates that mark significant changes in the institutional field and by comparing two phases: one during which the operation of the institutional forms (and the regulation by them of social relations) proceeds unhindered, and a second that is characterised by the crisis of the previous institutional forms and the transition towards new ones. Then he defines the implicit logic of every institutional form (each one expressing and regulating a social compromise on a specific subject) and examines its applicability. In doing so, the economist should bear in mind that there is no such thing as a general theory and that historical specificities are the primary determinants. Boyer suggests that econometric tests are of paramount importance in verifying the degree of correspondence of these ideal-type models to the specific historical periods. The third stage aims at the synthesis of all those partial regulations in an overall structure guaranteeing the reproduction of the whole system. This implies a macroeconomic and

econometric modeling. Finally, the last stage requires the modeling of different RoAs, linked explicitly to specific historical periods. This, for Boyer, constitutes an alternative to the traditional marxist conception, which considers accumulation as equipped with lawstendencies which are ultimately enforced irrespectively of transitional and conjunctural factors . The time for the construction of "general hypotheses" will come only when a sufficient number of specific long-run studies of national economies has been gathered. For Boyer (1991, p.108) the ascendancy of the process of abstraction (whose beginning he attributes to A.Smith and which, he argues, resulted in the modern theories of general equilibrium) over a historical and institutional perspective was a major setback. Boyer appears suspiciously ignorant of the fact that Marxian dialectics differ radically both from the Ricardian fixed essences and Marginalist general equilibrium. For him abstraction equals general theory equals departure from tangible historical reality. This is a gross misrepresentation with regard to the Marxian dialectics. His conception derives from the "model-real world" dichotomy, which characterises neo-classicism and this makes his denunciations of orthodox economics sound completely hollow. Whereas Lipietz attempts persistently to cling to some version of Historical Materialism, the usual lapses of the middle-range methodology are evident. Despite his praises of dialectics and his denunciations of positivism, he proposes a crude collapse of the dialectics of essence and appearance in the simplistic distinction between "esoteric" and "exoteric". Lipietz (1985, p.14-15), on the one hand, declares that it is impossible to separate substance and form, the esoteric and the exoteric but maintains also that: the positioning of the dialectic between esoteric and exoteric within theory (at the very end of the Marxist theory of Capital) and in the texts (a few words at the end of "Capital", III, but mostly in "Theories of Surplus Value") has meant that this part of his work has remained little known or studied. To be precise, the distinction is there in Marx from the beginning of "Capital", but it only becomes a major source of contradictions right at the end. Through most of the work Marx shows how the real essence of things differs substantially from their appearance; but it is not until those appearances become objective elements of economic reality that the real problems appear. Lipietzs arguments are extremely problematic. Firstly, as Banaji (1979) shows, appearance is not external to essence (as the distinction esoteric-exoteric tends to imply). On the contrary, essence is not a static formless thing to which form has to be added, but rather a self-evolving substance. It is simultaneously the starting point (as "what requires only itself for its existence") and the initiator of the dialectical spiral (the movement by which it reflects into itself as the totalising unity of form and essence). Secondly, the

dialectics of form and content do not appear only at the end of the Marxian analysis but are explicitly present from the beginning. For Marx - contrary to Ricardo - appearance would almost always diverge from essence, although it is dialectically determined by the latter. This contradiction is recognised at every level of abstraction, from the higher one of Vol.I to the lower one of Vol.III. For this reason he begins "Capital" with the concept of the commodity. Furthermore, the distinction between "capital in general" and "many capitals", which Lipietz invokes as a justification for his methodology, is a further stage in the dialectical spiral of form and content. The structure of "Capital" is an "expanding curve" or spiral-movement composed of specific cycles of abstraction (Banaji (1979, p.27)). Each cycle of abstraction, and thus the curve as a whole, begins and ends with the sphere of circulation (the realm of appearances), which is finally, at the end of the entire movement, itself determined specifically as the sphere of the Competition of Capitals. Lipietzs errors are even more exacerbated when supplemented with the assertion of the "autonomy of the exoteric: How was it that the distinction between esoteric and exoteric, so important to Marx, got lost in the course of the historic debates between then and now? Part of the answer is that circumstances were responsible: it is only contemporary capitalism which has actually asserted the autonomy of the exoteric, particularly in the present crisis. (Lipietz (1985), p.13) This "autonomy of the exoteric" is quite questionable and its dressing in the historically-specific (the emergence and expansion of credit money, according to Lipietz) does not make it more plausible. Appearances are in no way autonomous from essence. The result is all too familiar. The esoteric-exoteric distinction is finally attributed to the difference between the standpoint of social relations and the direct standpoint of individual agents, and therefore covers broadly the same areas as the macro/micro distinction (Lipietz (1985), p.15). This position represents a recourse to individualism: agents are first and foremostly individuals; therefore, the macro/micro approach is necessary in order to relate them to the general framework. The relaxation and relativisation of the concept of structure follows swiftly. Structure is nothing else but the conceptualisation of the observed compatibility of individual trajectories. The latter are informed by the individual's dispositions (his "habitus"v) and perception of other actors intentions, expressed, ultimately, as an external social pressure by incorporated norms or explicit social institutions (Lipietz (1988), p.23,8). Thus, in the end, institutionalism, provides the proper coverage for individualism:

As far as economic agents are concerned, the independence or efficacy of external connections constitutes the only reality they come into contact with, determining their motives, their expectations, their behaviour and what Bourdieu would call their "habitus"... In fact social relations have no material existence outside this network of institutions, the permanence of these ways of behaving and so on. (Lipietz (1985), p.12) The end of the journey is a version of covert positivism. Lipietz takes Marx's wellknown premonition against the "realism of the concepts" and turns falsely into the proposition that "the Universal is no more than an intellectual systemization of our practical experience of the real, and it takes no account of the concrete nature of the real" (Lipietz (1987), p.11). The orthodox dichotomisation of theory and reality appears, again, in all its glory: The "capitalist mode of production" does not exist. It is a construction of our thought, which refers to the regularity with which certain contradictory social practices are reproduced. (Lipietz (1985), p.19) In later works there are significant additions in the conceptual framework as well as rearrangements of the hierarchy and the inter-relations of the concepts. These changes, although not unwarranted by the previous theory, alter significantly the status of Lipietzs approach. Lipietz ((1987), (1988), (1989), Lipietz-Leborgne (1987)) proposes a variety of new terms such as social and hegemonic bloc, social (or societal) paradigm, model of industrialisation and technological paradigm. His new organising formula is the following. The model (or pattern) of development - the more general principle - refers to the historically different solutions to the basically unchanged difficulties arising from the commodity-producing nature of capitalism, from the wage relation and from international relations. The adoption by one or several countries, with a hegemonic position in the world capitalist system, of variants of the same model marks the hegemony of this model. This pattern of development, then, can be analysed from three different angles: a) as a model (or paradigm) of industrialisation (i.e. as the general principles which govern the organisation of labour, but which are not confined only to industry), b) as a RoA (i.e. the macro-economic principle which describes the compatibility over a prolonged period between the transformations in production conditions and in the uses for social output) and, c) as a MoR (i.e. the ensemble of forms of adjustment of the expectations and

contradictory behaviour of individual agents to the collective principles of the regime of accumulation; these forms include cultural habits as well as institutions). Lipietz (1989) supplements and extends further the previous framework, proposing that RoA (designating an explicit macro-economic regularity) is built upon the technological paradigm (i.e. the general principles of organisation of labour and of the usage of techniques; in fact, it is the same with his previous term of the model (or paradigm) of industrialisation). Then, because, he argues, the imperatives of RoA are not translated functionally as norms of behaviour of the agents, a MoR is necessary. The latter delineates a space, and provides constraints and incentives which reduce the uncertainty with which individual agents are faced. The basis of MoR is primarily the sphere of politics. Struggles and their, more or less effective, resolutions via politico-social armistices and institutionalised compromises (since there is no struggle without end) provide the content of MoR. These struggles and compromises are in the domain of politics, just as competition, labour conflicts and RoA are in the domain of economics (Lipietz (1989, p.4). The implementation of these compromises is dictated and, at the same time, based on the existence on each occasion of a social bloc which is hegemonic. He defines the social bloc as a stable system of relations of domination, of alliances and of concessions between different social groups (dominant and subordinate)vi. A social bloc is hegemonic when it is able to pose its particular interests as the interests of the whole nation; setting, thus, the criterion for acceptability or non-acceptability of the aims of other social groups and blocs. RoA, MoR and hegemonic bloc construct a triangle (Lipietz (1988), p.4) whose coherence requires another element operating at the level of discourse and political representation: the societal paradigm. The latter is defined as the mode of structuration of the identities of individuals and social groups which are legitimately defensible within the "Universe of Discourse Political Representations". RoA, MoR, the hegemonic bloc and the societal paradigm are all, according to Lipietz, fruits of the conflictual historical evolution. Their reciprocal adequacy, as the all-encompassing model of economico-social development, is historically contingent without guaranteeing eternal stability. It is "mined" with contradictions; either those of the model or those that the model ignores. Therefore, two forms of struggle appear: (a) struggles within the paradigm and, (b) struggles against it, in the name of another paradigm. There is a major change of position in Lipietz's last formulation. Contrary to the previous, MoR is posited almost exclusively at the realm of politics. In addition, all his recent versions of the regulationist framework represent a shift towards even more relativisation and historical contingency coupled with a recourse to a covert methodological individualism. The structural parameters become even more fluid and

vague. In fact, they represent, to a greater or lesser extent, taxonomic formalisms rather than essential determinations. Moreover, while the economy is still considered as the founding level (the basis of the hegemonic bloc is the existence of RoA (Lipietz (1988, p.4)), politics and ideology achieve more than a relative autonomy; and Lipietz's recent positions exacerbate this even more. The randomisation of history and politics, additionally, is present from RTs very beginning. The latest acquisition of another level, that of the "Universe of Discourse and Political Representations", brings Lipietz even more closer to the post-marxist and post-structuralist formulations. This "Universe", now separated from politics as such (since the latter come under MoR), from the economy (attributed to RoA) and the society (belonging to the societal paradigm), informs and shapes all of them. Furthermore, there is not even a trace now of such "reductionist" and "essentialist" elements as the mode of production and the law of capital accumulation. Struggle achieves an even wider autonomy, albeit at the cost of losing its class character. Classes have a rather precarious existence. The instrumental agents are individuals and social groups. In addition, struggle is mainly confined within the existing social order. Despite classificatory formalisms, such as that of the struggles against the dominant paradigm, in fact RT (and Lipietz as its left variant) become more and more preoccupied with "realistic", attainable solutions. Hence, their main interest lies in the theorisation and policy proposals about struggles within the dominant social order. Agliettas approach has an eccentric character. Most readers bear in mind his path-breaking first work where Aglietta (1979, p.380) tried to elaborate concepts appropriate for historically concrete social relations (and thus a theory of regulation) on the basis of Marxs general theory of capitalism. However, in his later works (not published in English), Marxism is equated to liberalism as one of the ideologies (Aglietta-Brender (1984)) and rejected. In its place Aglietta-Orlean (1982) apply Girardianvii individualismcum-institutionalism in economics. The individual becomes the primary object of study and discursive elements and consumption/status relations (routines, styles, habits) rather than relations of production - is the vehicle for its socialisation. Capital is conceived as a mode of communication between different modes of production and Labour Value Theory is completely discarded. The outcome is a post-structuralist (and postmodernist?) theory. For many this abrupt change of perspective remains unexplained. A more thorough look can, however, discover middle-range elements in his first work and understand the surreptitious links between his works. For example, Aglietta (1979, p.187188) argued that it is impossible to conceive immediately the unity of the abstract social space and the concrete space of activities. An intermediary theoretical space is required; that of social forms. These are founded on structural forms, which are modes of cohesion

of basic social forms arising from the development of one and the same basic social relation. Basically, the structural forms are ensembles of factors (economic, politico-legal and ideological), which are usually expressed as institutional forms and linked to the state (Aglietta (1979), p.19). Aglietta fails to define properly both the social and the structural forms (see Robles (1994, p.71)). All this methodological construction, despite its nominal adherence to the dialectics of the abstract and the concrete (see Aglietta (1979), p.15), is quite questionable. His distinction between "abstract social space" and social forms is not at all clear; although, at some point (Aglietta (1979), p.187), it appears to denote the distinction between the level of essence (labour value) and the level of appearances (commodity circulation). If this is the case - and Aglietta is rather obscure on this point - it is just a formalism, without any significant impact on the development of his analysis. What is left, then, from his whole methodological construction, is the emphasis on the structural (institutional and historically specific) forms. These, initially within a mild structuralist and afterwards in a more relativised post-structuralist framework, have a permanent and unambiguous role. IV.2 RTs conceptual framework: more dark than light The shift towards post-structuralism is evident in the evolution of RTs conceptual framework. There is an almost continuous slippage away from essential economic (class) determinants and towards relativised, historically contingent, discursive interacting factors. Aglietta's initial formulation of the relationship between RoA and MoR was based on some acceptance of the primacy of the economic (class) structure over its political and institutional facets. The process of reasoning was the following (in order of greater generality and higher abstraction): law of accumulation abstract economic concept RoA concrete economic concept MoR institutional counterpart

In CEPREMAP (1977), the relationship between the last two concepts was relativised, with the rejection of a one-to-one relation between them and the assertion that more than one MoR can correspond to a RoA, but the logical hierarchy was not changed. What happened to the first concept? It was, it seems, neglected; not explicitly rejected but implicitly thrown to oblivion. Boyer, for example, substituted it with the modes of production and their articulation. This substitution, although still retaining traces of its predecessor, is a downgrading. There is not one set of fundamental relations but a historically contingent articulation of several such sets. Additionally, the mode of

production tends to be understood as simply a form of distribution of surplus between capital and labour in almost Keynesian terms. With regards to MoR, Regulation attempted, in its initial formulations, to propose it as the economic-cum-institutional meso-period basis of the social hegemony necessary for the smooth operation of capitalism. Firstly, it was not strictly economic since this area was covered by the longer long-run macro-economic concept of accumulation and by the long-run one of RoA. Secondly, it was not purely contingent and "concrete" since it encompassed meso-period economic and institutional variables or "regularities". In addition, it covered ideological and political factors (in contrast to RoA which was purely economic). Finally, it was not fixed but variable and dynamic: several types of MoRs could be employed in succession by a RoA and everyone is a discovery of historical contingency. Hence, it was with the one foot on the structural level (and moreover an economic and institutional one) and with the other on the individual, "subjective" level (that of the habits, individual actions of the agents etc.). The initial regulationist definition of MoR represented a middle-of-the-road choice, a blend of economic and culturalist elements, supposedly unifying the level of economics with that of society and of politics. However, the blend did not seem to hold very well together. For example, Lipietz's new formula re-introduces a variant of the Althusserian theory of instances. The only difference is that he does not suggest that regional theories of each instance should be created. These problems of definition mark RTs whole evolution. With the further distancing from previous general-theoretical traditions and the emergence of an openly middle-range theoretical period, characterised by the intermediate concepts, these problems were exacerbated further. How abstract and how concrete should these concepts be? For example (as Verhagen (1988, p.19-20) points out) RoA has been defined at a more abstract level: a situation where imbalances in the process of accumulation are limited. Its most "concrete" interpretation is given via a scheme of reproduction with two sectors (one for the production of investment goods and one for consumption goods). So when one wants to analyse a specific historical situation he is obliged to abstract important aspects of it (e.g. the state sector, the export oriented sector) which may be significant. On the other hand, it is difficult to distinguish different forms of MoR. The traditional distinction (that between monopolistic and competitive regulation) is of a rather high level of abstraction that it is almost impossible to apply it to concrete cases. This is the reason for its fall into disuse lately. RTs latest phase is characterised by the attempts around the creation of a new societalisation paradigm, more or less culturalist. At this stage the concept of the mode of production (or the law of capital accumulation) is eliminated, since it does not hold well with the "concretisation" of theory and the relativisation of history and is suspected of

"abstract laws". Furthermore, the distinction between the last two concepts (RoA and MoR) is blurred since there is a tendency towards an equalisation of the weight of economy and polity (similar to neo-Weberian trends). Hence, it is no longer obvious whether RoA is the fundamental and determining principle and MoR its, non-linear, institutional product but also requirement. Moreover, because many of the institutional regularities formulated under the concept of MoR are economic and, also, because RoA is increasingly defined in terms of struggle -and, hence, relativised and more dependent upon policies and strategies there is a tendency, implicitly or explicitly, to consider them as identical. Furthermore, class and class struggle are, openly or silently, substituted by the "new social subjects and movements". The lack of a theory of class - despite Aglietta's initial inclinations towards a class-struggle approach, which, however, remained superficial - facilitated this substitution. Naturally, and despite Lipietz's declaration of Regulation as its unreconstructed opponent, methodological individualism slips gradually in; openly in Agliettas Girardian methodology, more covertly in Boyer's regularities. It even creeps into Lipietz's recent endeavours on the structure-subject problem. RTs last stage of evolution is a showcase for this move from a mild and relativised structuralism to some version of equally mild and relativised post-structuralism. The role of structure is not rejected but it is relativised almost beyond recognition. It is within this context that although individualism is - besides certain exceptions - not openly advocated and, moreover, nominally denounced, its methodological aspects (in the form of a prioritisation of the individual as the main agent) achieve a subliminal existence. V. Conclusions Regulations evolution can be divided in three major periods. The first is marked by Aglietta's (1979) work. Marxism was accepted as the general theory and Regulation aspired to provide a methodological formulation and a historical interpretation of the latter appropriate for modern times. However, the middle-range perspective was already lurking underneath, in the articulation of a quasi-empiricist methodology with the stylised facts. In the second period, when the 60s radicalism ebbed away, the contradiction with the general theory emerged and the latter fell away, while RT assumed an explicitly middle-range character. On this basis it attracted support from other general-theoretical non-orthodox traditions (post-Keynesianism, institutionalism etc.) which were also in a crisis of identity. The common ground was provided by the middle-range approach and general-theoretical questions were either relegated to each author's allegiances or were approached agnostically. The last period is characterised by the realignment of all contributors around the stylised facts, the intermediate concepts and the methodology,

but also by a crisis of identity. RTs middle-range character is the very cause of this crisis. The alleged end of Fordism brought forward general-theoretical questions, which Regulation was unable to answer. As a response, it was attempted to reconstruct a new quasi-general theory - differentiated by both neo-classicism and Marxism - based on some theorisation of the societalisation process and the structure-subject relation. Marxist class analysis was, implicitly or explicitly, rejected and individuals and "horizontal" contradictions crept in. Post-structuralism and post-modernism, provided the vehicle for this move, which however failed, leading to the present weathering away of Regulation. RTs methodological problems take their toll in its theoretical structure and its periodisation of capitalism. Its middle-range perspective was standing uneasily with Marxist Value theory. The exacerbation of these problems led to the later abandonment of any value-theoretical reference. These frictions are reflected in a crucial area: the conception of the value of labour-power and the determination of wage. Labour-power is considered as commodified only in Fordism. Additionally, wage in Fordism ceases to express the value of a bundle of subsistence goods and is determined according to institutional arrangements reflecting class struggle in income distribution. There is only a weak and distant link to class struggle in production, since these institutional arrangements are supposed to reflect a linkage of wage to labour productivity. The corollary of this approach is the - popular among non-orthodox middle-range theories view of a social accord between capital and labour. RTs theory is heavily flawed on all these areas (Mavroudeas (1990, ch.III). First, the commodification of labour-power is one of the fundamental and sine qua non relations of the capitalist mode of production. Moreover, as historical evidence also suggests, working-class consumption from its very first steps was covered by capitalist commodities and not by petty-commodity production. The latter covered only a portion of workers consumption and it certainly did not dominated such a lengthy period as the regulationist era of extensive accumulation. Second, RTs conception of the wage as separated from the wage-goods bundle and linked institutionally to productivity departs from Marxs theory - resembling more to that of Carey - and also from historical reality, since the alleged linkage of wage to productivity has been disputed convincingly. RTs general macroeconomic model projects directly changes in the labourprocess to the overall macroeconomic structure. This has been accurately criticised by Brenner-Glick (1991) as an unwarranted primacy of class struggle in the labour-process. Indeed, although the sphere of production - and moreover the immediate production process - represent the determining moment of the total circuit of capital (see Fine-Harris (1979)), they are dialectically related to the other moments of this circuit. Their primacy cannot be generalised simplistically and mechanically but it should take into account that

whereas the capital-labour contradiction in production is the main antithesis of the capitalist system, this is expressed in the form of capital-capital competition in exchange. This dialectical contradictory relation of the primacy of production shaped and expressed according to forms of exchange cannot be grasped either by the older mild Althusserian structuralist nor the newer relativised and pro-postmodernist perspective of Regulation. Additionally, RT has three other crippling weaknesses. The first is that, although it stresses the importance of institutional forms, it lacks a coherent theory of the state. The second weakness is that although crisis is a central element of its theory, it lacks also a coherent theory of crisis. Regulation - based on the middle-range rejection of abstract general tendencies - does not recognise a general cause and an associated mechanism creating crises. Instead, it has only a formalistic typology of disconnection of economic structure and institutional arrangements. In its first stages RT discovered the driving forces of this disconnection in the immediate labour-process - inability to increase the level of exploitation - together with an almost-Keynesian emphasis on the lack of effective demand. The definition of Fordism as the functional linkage of Taylorist mass production where increased exploitation was smoothed by the indexing of wages to productivity with mass consumption - the working class gaining access to capitalistically produced commodities and, thus, providing the supposedly necessary market outlet - is a typical and also crucial example. On the other hand, in more recent works the driving force of the disconnection of economic structure from institutional arrangements is increasingly discovered in changes in consumption patterns - the end of mass standardised consumption pattern and the appearance of diffused consumption patterns - as well as the failure of previously successful institutional arrangements. This gradual withdrawal of the unwarranted emphasis on the immediate labour-process does not represent a dialectical conception of the total circuit of capital but rather a post-modernist emphasis on consumption as a field of cultural struggles and differentiations which have almost ceased to reflect class divisions. Moreover, institutionalism along quasi-Shumpeterian lines assumes an increasingly important explanatory primacy in more recent regulationist works. The third weakness is the lack of a coherent theory of international relations and the relationship between the national and the international dimension. It began with a Poulantzian emphasis on the national dimension which added international relations almost externally. On the other hand, under the pressure of the increasing internationalisation of capital in the 80s and 90s, appeared regulationist works theorising the international economic and societalisation aspects of regulation, such as Beaud (1987) and Lipietzs peripheral Fordism. However, these attempts have not solved the problem.

RTs concomitant periodisation of capitalism is extremely problematic. Its method of periodisation, which is founded on the relationship between RoA and MoR, covers a number of fields (production-process, income distribution, capitalist competition, states economic functions, international regime etc.) and recognises accordingly different epochs. Whereas its aim to construct a stages theory is commendable, its middle-range methodology creates two unsurmounted problems. First, it recognises general patterns by just bundling together empirical cases and, implicitly, considering some of them - as the US in the case of Fordism - as typical. Inadequate quantitative formalisms instead of dialectical abstraction are implemented in order to derive these general patterns. The problem with this methodology is exactly the one against which it is arguing. It bends facts in order to confine them into its middle-range concepts or it ostracises them as irrelevant. Second, unjustified emphasis is placed on institutional forms, to the point that social forms are almost totally identified with institutions. This is a grave error since social relations cannot be confined solely to institutional arrangements but rather cover a more general and usually more important area. Dumenil-Levy (1988) and Brenner-Glick (1991) have criticised accurately RTs stylised facts and the attendant Fordism/post-Fordism periodisation. For example, the interwar period and the crisis of 1929 do not represent a transitional period in the sense that Regulation maintains. Furthermore, most of the elements that are supposed to constitute the post-W.W.II epoch were already in place long before. The extraction of relative surplus-value, mass production, rising mass consumption, the emergence of finance capital, credit money all date back to the 18th century. Additionally, even their institutional counterparts (social reforms, monopolisation, economic power of the state etc.) had been developing slowly since the second half of the 19th century. The critique delineated above should not lead to the conclusion that the initial task set by Regulation - the operationalisation of Marxist general theory in a historically dynamic context - was neither wrong nor accomplished. It simply suggests that the middle-range road is not the proper one. However, the task remains. REFERENCES Aglietta Michel (1979), A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, NLB Aglietta Michel - Brender Anton (1984), Les metamorphoses de la societe salariale, Calman-Levy Aglietta Michel - Orlean Antre (1982), La violence de la monnaie, PUF Anderson Perry (1988), In the tracks of Historical Materialism, Verso Banaji Jairus (1979), From the commodity to capital: Hegel's dialectic in Marx's Capital

in Elson Diane (ed.), Value: the representation of labour in capitalism, CSE Books Beaud Michel (1987), Le systeme national modiale hierarchise, La Decouverte Bourdieu Pierre (1977), Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge UP Boyer Robert (1985), Analyses de la crise americaine, CEPREMAP no.8501 Boyer Robert (1987). Wage formation in historical perspective, Cambridge Journal of Economics vol.3 Boyer Robert (1989), The eighties: the search for alternatives to Fordism, CEPREMAP no.8909 Boyer Robert (1991), The Regulation School, Columbia UP Brenner Robert - Glick Mark (1991), The Regulation Approach: Theory and History, New Left Review no.188 Callinicos Alex (1985), Post-modernism, Post-structuralism, Post-Marxism', Theory, Culture and Society, vol.2 no.3 CEPREMAP-CORDES (1977), Approches de l inlfation: l exemple Francais (Benassy J.-Boyer R.-Gelpi R.-Lipietz A.-Mistral J.-Munoz J.-Ominami C.) Dumenil Gerard -Levy Dominique (1988), What can we learn from a century of history of the U.S. economy?, Baercelona Conference Fine Ben - Harris Lawrence (1979), Rereading Capital, Columbia UP Girard Rene (1982), Le bouc emissaire, Grasset Hirst Paul - Zeitlin Jonathan (1992), Flexible Specialisation Versus Post-Fordism in M. Storper-A.J.Scott (eds) Pathways to Industrialisation and Regional Development, Routledge Ilyenkov Evald (1982), The dialectics of the abstract and the concrete in Marx's Capital, Progress Jessop Bob (1990), Regulation theories in retrospect and prospect, Economy & Society vol.19 no.2 Jessop Bob (1992), Post-Fordism and Flexible Specialisation: Incommensurable, contradictory, complementary, or just plain different perspectives? in H. Ernste-V. Meier (eds) Regional Development and Contemporary Industrial Response: Extending Flexible Specialisation, Belhaven Kay Geoffrey (1986), Why Labour is the starting point of Capital, in Elson D. (ed.), Value: the representation of Labour in Capitalism, CSE Books Kotz David (1994), The regulation theory and the social structure of accumulation approach in Kotz D.-McDonough T.-Reich M. (1994), Social structures of accumulation, Cambridge UP Laclau Ernesto - Mouffe Chantal (1985), Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Verso

Lash Scott (1990), Sociology of Postmodernism, Routledge Lipietz Alain (1985), The Enchanted World, Verso Lipietz Alain (1987), An alternative design for the 21st century, CEPREMAP Lipietz Alain (1988), Deux strategies sociales dans la production des nouveaux espaces economiques, CEPREMAP no.8911 Lipietz Alain - Leborgne Danielle (1987), New technologies, new modes of regulation: some spatial implications, CEPREMAP no.8726 Mavroudeas Stavros (1990), The Regulation Approach: a critical appraisal, Ph.D thesis, Birkbeck College, University of London Merton Robert (1968), Social Theory and Social Structure, The Free Press Noel Alain (1987), Accumulation, Regulation and Social Change, International Organisation no.41 Pilling Geoffrey (1986), The law of value in Ricardo and Marx in Fine Ben (ed.), The Value Dimension, Routledge Piore Michael - Sabel Charles (1984), The second industrial divide, Basic Books Robles Alfredo (1994), French theories of Regulation and conceptions of the international division of labour, Macmillan Sayer Andrew (1995), Radical Political Economy: a critique, Blackwell Verhagen Marinus (1988), Once more on the United States, Barcelona Conference on Regulation, mimeo Wood Ellen (1981), The separation of the Economic and the Political in Capitalism, New Left Review vol.12 Wood Ellen (1986), The Retreat from Class, Verso Zeleny Jydrich (1980), The logic of Marx, Blackwel

For example, the belief that post-WW.II capitalism was characterised by mass consumption derives from Keynesian influences and can make sense - although empirically unjustified - within an underconsumptionist theory. However, it represents a theoretical slay of hands when it is posited as an indisputable fact. ii Anderson (1988, p.21, 26-27) praises this "new appetite for the concrete" of the epigones of Western Marxism as a positive contribution to the abolition of the their academic character and the re-unification of theory with social praxis. However, relativisation together with the "middle-range" methodology led to exactly the opposite results. iii Critics of economism usually rely either on the neo-classical dichotomy between economics and politics or on the cruder Marxist versions of basesuperstructure. The neo-classical dichotomy is obviously unacceptable since it produces a theory void of social relations, methodologically individualist and restricting economic relations to exchange. On the other hand, a proper dialectical materialist approach should avoid separating economic from political relations whereas, at the same time, keeping a dialectical (i.e. contradictory and involving

feedback relations) primacy of the former. Wood (1981) but also the German State Derivation Debate (based on the work of Pashukanis) have advanced such a perspective. The capitalist system - contrary to previous class systems - while being based on a unified set of social relations, it fetichistically separates them in different spheres. Marxist theory should be able to discover both its essential unity (as social relations of production, primarily established at the economic sphere) and its formal separation. iv All these theories have close affinities with post-modernism. For Lash (1990) Bourdieu unconsciously belongs to the post-modern problematics; particularly his notion of the "cultural economy". v Bourdieu's theory of the "habitus", starting from a structuralist framework, attempts to transcend the structure-agent dilemma - similarly to the duality of structure theory of Giddens. It is defined as a set of internalised dispositions that mediate between social structures and individual practical activity. vi Individualism creeps into Lipietz's theory not only when individual agents are considered the main and primary subjects of MoR but also when he defines social groups. For Lipietz (1989, p.4), social groups are defined by their every day conditions of existence and particularly by their place in economic relations. It is difficult to find a more contradictory definition. Firstly, the every day conditions of existence belong to the sphere of appearances and, of course, classes do not appear immediately as such at this level, but only in exceptional cases. For example, it is difficult to see a homogeneous working-class at this level, except on critical occasions. Secondly, if by economic relations he means the fundamental class relations of production, then these also are not always and primarily immediately observable, especially in every day life. If, on the other hand, he implies "exoteric" (to use his terminology) economic relations (such as income differentiations, forms of income appropriation or hierarchical positions), then these are admittedly observable in everyday life. However, class does not have a position among them. What it is finally left from Lipietz's self-proclaimed ardent anti-individualism is the proposition that individuals do constitute collectivities and social groups. This is hardly a novel or significant proposition; let alone one that any prudent version of individualism will deny. What matters after all is that the main and primary determining agent is the individual. Ultimately, it is telling that these theses are more and more often supplemented with vociferous denunciations of the evil of the reductionist tradition, either marxist or individualist (Lipietz (1988), p. 4). vii For Girard (1982), social order is disintegrated because of rivalries that engender indifference, which then leads to crisis. Institutions are instrumental since they are supposed to derive from the exacerbation of these rivalries and, in turn, enforce the ambivalence of social order. Individualism is the methodological underpinning of this theory.