SPECIAL PROCEDURE | UP COLLEGE OF LAW | MEETING 3 E2014 Rule 74 Summary Settlement of Estates

A. Extra-judicial settlement by agreement between heirs 1. Substantive Requirements 2. Procedural Requirements 3. Two-year lien 4. Annulment 1. MONSERRAT V IBAEZ (1950) Ponente: Bengzon, J. DOCTRINE: When a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether married or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court. QUICK FACTS: Vicenta Salamanca died intestate leaving 1 son and 4 daughters as heirs. Ramon, the son, filed a petition for appointment as administrator. The sisters opposed on the ground that they were all of legal age and they do not want to be burdened with an administrative proceeding. CFI of Laguna held that the proper remedy is an action for partition. SC affirmed CFI. FACTS: Nature: CFI of Laguna. Petition for appointment of as administrator. SC. Special civil action against Judge Ibaez. Vicenta Salamanca died intestate with assets valued at P30,000. Her heirs are one son and four daughters. Ramon, the son, filed in the CFI of Laguna a petition for his appointment as administrator. The four sisters opposed. Four sisters contention: They were all of legal age; that the debts and obligations of the estate had already been paid; that they did not want to be burdened with an administrative proceeding,; and that Ramons remedy was to sue for partition. Ramons contention: It is not known whether there are any debts because these may be shown only in the administration proceedings; that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to the bulk of the hereditary estate but only ion the manner of partition does Sec 1, Rule 74 of ROC will apply; that his substantial rights have been impaired by the order of CFI; and that the administration proceedings may not be left in abeyance. CFI of Laguna. In favor of the sisters. Judge Ibaez stated that the proper remedy is an action for partition, inasmuch as all the heirs were of age, there were no debts of the estate, and requiring the Montserrat sisters to institute partition proceedings. Litigation begun by Ramon will be held in abeyance. *The sisters filed an action for partition within one week. One month after, Ramon filed a special civil action against Judge Ibaez alleging that he committed a grave abuse of discretion. ISSUE: WoN the heirs are bound to submit the property to a judicial proceeding, if there were no pending obligations left by the deceased. DECISION: NO. SC affirmed CFIs decision. HELD: (as quoted in Fule v Fule) When a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether married or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court. In such case, judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings. Notes: On the assertion that it is not known whether there are any debts: According to the affidavit of the sisters, there were no debts. Anyway, the creditors are protected even if, without benefit of administration, the estate is distributed in an action for partition. On the properties belonging to deceased which were allegedly sequestered by the sisters: As to what property belonged to the deceased, it may properly be ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially when the property is in the hands of one heir. On substantial rights: He was not required to incur any extra expense in the form of court fees, because it was the adverse party who had to initiate another action. On administrative proceedings left in abeyance: It is enough to state that it will undoubtedly be dismissed soon, inasmuch as the partition suit has already been instituted, because the court has clearly intimated in its order that the administration proceeding will be suspended pending the presentation of the other suit. 2. VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ V TAN (1952) Ponente: Bautista Angelo, J. DOCTRINE: Rule 74, Section 1 does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action of partition. While section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. Said section is not mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of the word may. QUICK FACTS: Abelardo Rodriguez, one of the heirs of the deceased, petitioned to be appointed as administrator of the estate in spite of the estate having no debts and all heirs being of age which according to the widow and other children of the deceased were not in accordance with Rule 74, Sec1 of the Civil Court Procedures1.
Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs . If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filled in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial
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FACTS: Nature: TC. Petition for administration of the intestate estate CA. NA SC. Petition for certiorari to nullify CFI Judges ruling appointing Abelardo Rodriguez as estate administrator after overruling the opposition to the institution of the intestate estate proceedings of the late Flaviano Rodriguez. Flaviano Rodriguez died in Feb1944 in Paranaque, leaving an estate valued at P10k to his heirs - his widow and 7 children (including Abelardo Rodriguez) who were already of age. The heirs entered into a verbal agreement not to liquidate the estate and place the same under administration of the widow and each heirs being entitled to a portion of the income in equal shares. After 8y, Abelardo filed a petition for administration of the intestate estate, in spite of his knowledge that the estate had no debts and all the heirs are of age. The widow and the other children contended that the court should dismiss the case in view of Rule 73 Sec1 of the Civil Rules of Court. Abelardo alleged that although there was a verbal agreement, it was not followed because it was one of the children and not the widow who administered the estate and refused to give Abelardo his share in income. CFI of Rizal. Ruled ifo of Abelardo, overruling the opposition and appointing Abelardo as administrator of the estate. Court of Appeal. NA ISSUE: WoN CFI erred in maintaining the administration proceedings and in appointing Abelardo Rodriguez as administrator of the estate considering that the estate has no debts and all the heirs entitled to share in its distribution are all of age? DECISION. NO! SC affirmed CFI decision. HELD. Rule 74, Section 1 does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action of partition. While section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. Said section is not mandatory or compulsory
settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent. The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the nest succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.

as may be gleaned from the use made therein of the word may. When a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings. Notes: SC also pointed out that the core issue of the widow and the other children is not that Abelardo erroneously instituted the petition for administration of the estate but that they want the persons they recommended to be appointed as administrator instead of Abelardo. 3. PEREIRA V CA (1989) Ponente: Gancayco, J. DOCTRINE: When the legal heirs are all of legal age, and there are no debts due from the estate, heirs may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator. Exception: When there is a compelling reason to warrant a judicial administration of the estate. Good reason will depend on the circumstances of each case. QUICK FACTS: Widow and sister of decedent are fighting over right to administer estate of the deceased. Sister filed for issuance of letters of administration in her favor, which widow Victoria opposed. The question raised to SC is the necessity of the judicial administration, given that the only heirs are of legal age and the estate leaves behind no debts. FACTS: Nature: Annulment of project of partition Cast of characters: Andres Pereira decedent, PAL employee, died without a will and without any debts Victoria Pereira petitioner, legal spouse Rita Nagac respondent, sister of Andres Suit: issuance of letters of administration in favor of Rita Filed by: Rita Venue: RTC Allegations: 1) Rita and Victoria are the only surviving heirs 2) Andres left no will and no debts 3) Andres left several properties namely: 1) death benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and SSS, 2) savings deposits with PNB and PCIB, 3) 300 sqm lot in Las Pinas 4) Half of spouse Victorias salary as an auxiliary nurse in London is part of decedents estate Opposition and Motion to Dismiss Filed by: Victoria Allegations: Page 2 of 20

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There is no estate for purposes of administration, because 1) the death benefits belong exclusively to her, being the sole beneficiary, 2) the savings deposits were used for the funeral expenses, and 3) the only real property was extrajudicially settled between between Rita and Victoria 2) Even if the estate does exist, the letters of administration should be issued in her favor as surviving spouse Response of Rita: It is the function of the court to decide what properties form part of the estate of deceased and to appropriate them for herself. RTC: appointed Rita as administratrix and ordered her to take custody of all real and personal properties of decedent and file inventory CA: Affirmed ISSUE: 1) 2) Minor issue: W/N Andres estate exists (Court cannot decide, remanded to TC) Main issue: W/N a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there are no debts left by decedent (NO) 1) 2) 3) There are no debts. The only conceivable reason why Rita seeks to be administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the properties for her own purposes.

4. GUICO V BAUTISTA (1960) Ponente: JBL Reyes DOCTRINE: QUICK FACTS: Action by involving the liquidation and partition of the estate left by the spouses Mariano which are objected by the children on the ground that the estate is subject is to obligations, hence liquidation and partition are premature. FACTS Mariano G. Bautista died intestate on December 5, 1947 and properties had already been extrajudicially partitioned among his heirs; Gertrudes Garcia died intestate on August 31, 1956 leaving as her legitimate heirs Gertrudes Garcia, during her lifetime, made several deeds of donation of some of her properties in favor of all the defendant-children but did not provide that the properties donated would not be subject to collation, so that the donees are legally bound to bring into the mass of the estate by way of collation the value of the properties received by them in order that the net hereditary estate may be divided equally among the heirs; Gertrudes Garcia left outstanding obligations to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and the G.A. Machineries, Inc. Grandchildren filed for the liquidation and partition of the estate. MTD filed by Children: Complaint is premature because the deceased left certain debts. So lower court dismissed the complaint Grandchildren appealed to SC maintaining that the action for partition and liquidation may be maintained nothwithstanding that there are pending obligations subject to the taking of adequate measures for the payment or security of creditors

DECISION:. 1) The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court. However, the court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties. General rule: judicial administration and appointment of administrator is necessary (Sec. 6, Rule 78) Exception: When all heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, heirs may institute extrajudicial partition in writing (Sec. 1, Rule 74) However, this does not preclude heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the requisites of the exception are complied with. Ratio: A judicial administration is always long and costly and the process is superfluous. Exception to the exception: If there is good reason for heirs to choose judicial administration. (Here, the Court cited some ex amples of good reason, which I find unnecessary to put in detail here, because the Court did not apply the good reason doctrine.) HELD: There is no compelling reason to necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the deceased. 1) There are only 2 surviving heirs, both of age.

2)

ISSUE: WON the action for partition and liquidation is premature until estates debt are paid. DECISION: YES HELD: YES The law allows the partition of the estate of a deceased person by the heirs, extrajudicially or through an ordinary action for petition, without the filing of a special proceeding and the appointment of an administrator for the purpose of the settlement of said estate, ONLY IF "the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians" (sec. 1, Rule 74). in the case where deceased dies without obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an Page 3 of 20

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administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled. In the case where the deceased left pending obligations, obligations must be first paid or compounded with the creditors before the estate can be divided among the heirs; and unless they reach an amicable settlement as to how such obligations should be settled, the estate would inevitably be submitted to administration for the payment of such debts. a) In the regular estate proceeding offer the advantage of requiring all creditors of the deceased to disclose themselves and submit their respective claims within a comparatively short period (12 months under Rule 87, unless claims are contingent), otherwise, they are forever barred; b) while in ordinary judicial partitions, the creditors claims are only extinguished by the expiration of the period extinctive prescription. An heir, therefore, may have an interest in making sure that the share allocated to him will be freed from invisible claims, so that creditors may not later appear and initiate the very estate proceeding sought to be avoided, and he may properly object to an action for partition this ground. Unless, therefore, all the heirs are agreeable to assuming personal liability for all the decedent's obligations, those known as well as those undisclosed, regular estate proceedings can not be avoided. It is no argument that under regular administration, the estate will incur greater expenses. As a matter of fact, plaintiffsappellants include in their complaint a prayer for the appointment of an administrator during the pendency of this case, in view of the existence of debts of the estate and the lack of agreement among the heirs as to how debts would be paid.lawphil.net ** Obiter: major objective in filing this action for partition is to have an early determination of the question WoN the donation inter vivos received by the defendants from the deceased are subject to collation. But there is no reason why this question can not be determined just as expeditiously in special proceeding, because even before the known debts of the estate are settled and paid and pending the expiration for the filing of other claims, the issue can, upon motion of the heirs, be set for hearing, tried, and definitely settled. 5. REBONG V IBAEZ (1947) Ponente: Feria, J. DOCTRINE: If the registered or annotated contingent interest of the creditors or other heirs has not yet terminated or ceased, for the period of 2 years have not yet elapsed, then the court has no jurisdiction or power to order the cancellation of said lien or annotation. The law neither authorizes interest of substitution of a bond for a lien or registered interest of any description which have not yet terminated or ceased. QUICK FACTS: Rebong wants the lien in the TCT subjecting the property to the claims of the creditors and heirs of the deceased original owner within 2 years, be cancelled and in lieu thereof that a bond be authorized to answer for any such claim of the creditors and heirs.CFI Judge Ibanez denied her petition. Hence the petition for certiorari. (Justice Perfecto in his concurring opinion said it is not certiorari but mandamus because Rebong is compelling the court to do its duty to cancel the lien.) FACTS: Nature: Petition for certiorari (GAD of CFI Laguna Judge Ibanez) Rebong petitioned the CFI to cancel the lien or annotation made on the CTC issued to her of a land she inherited extrajudicially so that she could mortgage it. In lieu of thereof, she filed a bond (5K equivalent to the value of the land) to answer for any such claim of the creditors and other heirs of said original owners. She based her petition on Section 112 of Act 496 (Land Registration Act which placed all public and private land under the Torrens system): SEC. 112. ... Any registered owner or other person in interest may at any time apply petition to the court, upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate; ... and the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security if necessary, as it may deem proper; . . . . TC Judge Ibanez denied the cancellation of the lien/annotation and in effect ruled that the property is subject to the claims of creditors and other heirs within 2 years, in accordance to Rule 74, Sections 1 and 4. ISSUE: WoN CFI Judge Ibanez committed GAD in denying the cancellation of the lien or annotation DECISION: No. SC Affirmed CFI; Denied Petition for Certiorari. HELD: According to Section 112, , the court "may order the xxx the entry or cancellation of a memorandum xxx," upon application of a registered owner on "the ground that registered interests of any description xxx have terminated and ceased, or that new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate." Applying now these provisions, it is evident that since the registered or annotated contingent interest of the creditors or other heirs of Rebongs predecessors in interest established by section 4 of Rule 74 has not yet terminated or ceased, for the period of 2 years have not yet elapsed , CFI Laguna Judge Ibanez had no jurisdiction or power to order the cancellation of said lien or annotation. Neither section 4, Rule 74, of the Rules of Court, nor section 112 of Act No. 496 authorizes interest of substitution of a bond for a lien or registered interest of any description , whether vested, expedient, inchoate or contingent, which have not yet terminated or ceased. 6. MCMICKING V SY CONBIENG (1912) Ponente: Moreland, J. Page 4 of 20

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FACTS: In 1902- Margarita Jose died in China leaving an estate consisting of personal property partly in Hongkong and partly in the Philippines. Engracio Palanca was appointed administrator and Mariano Ocampo and Dy Cunyao became his sureties Palanca then took possession of all the property of the said Margarita Jose. Mariano Ocampo, one of sureties of Palanca, died testate. Court ordered administrator to furnish a new bond. Appointed new sureties. Doroteo Velasco was appointed administrator of estate of Mariano Ocampo with Mariano Velasco and Pio de la Guardia Barretto as sureties of the said administrator. 1904 - All heirs (daughter and 3 sons) of Mariano Ocampo entered into an agreement which court approved and delivered to the devisees and legatees of the said Mariano Ocampo, to partition the estate, leaving no property with administrator Velasco. At the time the agreement, no committee had been appointed to hear claims against the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo. Engracio Palanca was removed as administrator of the estate for absconding with properties of Margarita Jose. Jose McMicking, was appointed in his stead. Claim was presented by Micmicking to it estate of Mariano Ocampo as surety of palanca.and admin Doroteo Velasco was directed to to pay such. Meanwhile, in 1905, Pio de la Barretto (surety of Doroteo Velasco) died and Conbieng was appointed administrator. In 1909 then, upon application by McMicking, a committee was appointed for his claims against estate of Pio de la Baretto. The claim was disallowed by the committee. Mcmicking appealed to CFI manila. CFI denied. Hence this appeal. ISSUE: WON Doreoteo Velasco, and hence, surety Pio de la Baretto can be held liable for claims presented 2 years after partition of estate. (NO) HELD: 1. After partition, Velasco was no longer administrator of the estate of Mariano Ocampo, deceased. He was in effect, discharged. As to him the estate had been wiped out as a legal entity. It had ceased to exist for the following reasons a. The whole estate was, by virtue of these sections, taken from the administrator and turned over to the partitioning persons. No security was required or given for its safekeeping or return. b. The persons to whom the estate was thus turned over became absolute owners of the same, subject to be devastated, wholly or only partly, on the happening of certain events and the taking of certain proceedings thereon. But even such divestiture could not have been avoided by the payment by the parties, or any of them, of the debt which was the moving cause thereof. On sureties: Since principal not liable, sureties are also not liable. On debt presented after partition: Pertinent provisions, then sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They are as follows: SEC. 596. Settlement of intestate estates, without legal proceedings, in certain cases. Whatever all the heirs of a deceased person are of lawful age and legal capacity, and their are no debts due from the intestate estate, or all the debts have been paid by the heirs, the heirs may, by a family council as shown under Spanish law, or by agreement between themselves, duly executed in writing, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in court. SEC. 597. In such case distributees liable for debts . But if it shall appear, at any time within two years after such settlement and distribution of the estate, that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, any creditor may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall be paid, with interest; and the administrator appointed by the court may recover the assets of the estate from those who have received them, for the purpose of paying the debts; and the real estate belonging to the deceased shall remain charged with the liability to creditors for the full period of two years after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers thereof that may have been made. The administration contemplated by section 597 is a new administration and one entirely apart from any other administration theretofore had. This section requires the appointment of a new administrator, with a new undertaking. The administration under the section is distinct and separate from any administration which may have been in progress at the time of the partition and division under section 596. This is clear for the following reasons: After the partition and division provided for in sections 596 and 597 have been fully consummated, no further administration of the estate can be had unless there occur the following requisites: a. There must have been discovered a claim against the estate "within two years after such settlement and distribution of estate." b. The creditor holding the claim must be the person who moves the court for the appointment of an administrator. The requirements of section 597 not having been met, there could be no administration under section. (1) In the case at bar no debt was discovered during the prescribed period. It was nearly four years after the partition of the estate and the taking possession by the heirs of their respective portions before it was even discovered that Palanca had been guilty of converting the property of the estate to his own use; and, so far as the records shows, it was nearly five years before the Page 5 of 20

2. 3.

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alleged claim against the estate of Mariano Ocampo was fixed. (2) No creditor made his application. Impt to note: Since the method of ascertaining claims against the defendant's estate is not being prescribed, no objection to a partition can be urged by a creditor whose claim has not been paid, due to the faulty method adopted by the partitioning parties to ascertain claims, or, even, the absence of any effort at all to ascertain them. SUMMARIZING, we have seen that lack of opportunity, either by want of notice or otherwise, and the consequent failure to present a claim before partition, is, under the sections we are discussing, of no consequence whatever in so far as the validity of the partition is concerned. We have also seen that the fact that there were debts outstanding and unpaid at the time the partition took place is of no importance so far as the validity of the partition is concerned, leaving out account the question of fraud to which we have already adverted and left undecided. We have also seen that the fact such claim exists and is valid and subsistent against the estate is of no consequence whatever with respect to the right of its holder to require an administration of the estate unless such claim is discovered and presented within two years. The fact that the claim in the case at bar was, during a certain period, a contingent one is of no importance. The sections under discussion make no distinction between claims. JUDGEMENT AFFIRMED. 7. GERONA V DE GUZMAN (1964) Ponente: Concepcion, J. DOCTRINE: The action to annul a deed of extra-judicial settlement upon the ground of fraud in the execution thereof must be brought within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud. QUICK FACTS: Petitioner Gerona seeks to annul the deed of extra-judicial settlement executed by respondents de Guzman upon the ground of fraud. FACTS: Petitioners Gerona alleged that they are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman (died on 1941); that Placida was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that after the death of Placida, Marcelo married Camila Ramos, who begot him the 7 respondents all surnamed de Guzman; that Marcelo died on September 1945; that subsequently (May 6, 1947), respondents executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman", fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, although they well knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs; that respondents had thereby succeeded fraudulently in causing the transfer certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of land, issued in the name of said deceased, to be cancelled and new transfer certificates of title to be issued in their own name, in the proportion of 1/7th individual interest for each; that such fraud was discovered by the petitioners only the year before the institution of the case. Petitioners demanded their share from respondents but the latter refused contending that the deceased Placida of whom petitioners are successors-in-interest, was not entitled to share in the estate of Marcelo de Guzman, she being merely a spurious child of the latter, and that petitioners' action is barred by the statute of limitations. Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, the present action for partition of the latter's estate is not subject to the statute of limitations of action; that, if affected by said statute, the period of four (4) years therein prescribed did not begin to run until actual discovery of the fraud perpetrated by respondents, which, it is claimed, took place in 1956 or 1957; and that accordingly, said period had not expired when the present action was commenced on November 4, 1958. TC CA ISSUE: Whether or not the action to annul the extra-judicial settlement in question is barred by the statute of limitations DECISION: Yes. Action is barred HELD: Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations operates as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property. When respondents executed the aforementioned deed of extrajudicial settlement stating therein that they are the sole heirs of the late Marcelo de Guzman, and secured new transfer certificates of title in their own name, they thereby excluded the petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and, consequently, set up a title adverse to them. And this is why petitioners have brought this action for the annulment of said deed upon the ground that the same is tainted with fraud. It is already settled in this jurisdiction that an action for reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive or implied trust, resulting from fraud, may be barred by the statute of limitations. Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-judicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud in the execution thereof, the action therefor may be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place, in the case at bar, on June 25, 1948, when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively, for the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement constitute constructive notice to the whole world. 8. PEDROSA V CA (2001) Ponente: Quisumbing, J. Page 6 of 20 For respondents. Affirmed/Reversed TC.

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DOCTRINE: The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will not apply when the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. QUICK FACTS: Maria Elena Pedrosa, adoptive daughter of the decedent, Miguel Rodriguez, seeks to annul the extra-judicial partition of the estate of her adoptive daughter. Miguel Rodriguez siblings oppose her action, saying that she is estopped from assailing such extra-judicial partition since she was represented by her mother in the settlement of the estate. FACTS: Nature: Action to annul the partition of the estate of Miguel Rodriguez (Background: Maria Elena was adopted by the Rodriguez spouses in 1946. The CFI of Ozamiz approved the adoption in the same year. In 1972, the adoptive father, Miguel Rodriguez died intestate. It was only then that his siblings brought suit to annul the decree of adoption. The CFI dismissed their action BUT pending appeal to the CA, the siblings and the adoptive mother, Rosalina, entered into the extra-judicial partition of Miguels estate, as discussed below.) TC. On January 28, 1987, Maria Elena Pedrosa filed an action to annul the extra-judicial partition of the estate of her father, Miguel Rodriguez, which was entered into by her mother, Rosalina and the siblings of her father. Said partition took place on March 11, 1983. In the partition, several parcels of land belonging to Miguel were adjudicated by the siblings and the wife to themselves. The siblings successfully transferred to third parties the parcels of land which they acquired by virtue of the extra-judicial partition. The action filed by Maria Elena was DISMISSED. CA. AFFIRMED the decision of the TC and DENIED the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Maria Elena. ISSUES: (1) WON the action for annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition had already prescribed; (2)WON said deed is valid and binding on Maria Elena; (3) WON the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which had already been transferred to the respondent buyers. DECISION/HELD: (1) NO. Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period: (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1[19] of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians. Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case. The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that: [The action to annul] a deed of extrajudicial settlement upon the ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively. (2) NO. Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on publication of extrajudicial settlement. It states: The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issued before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was when publication was done in the instant case. The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. (3) NO. Could petitioner still redeem the properties from buyers? Given the circumstances in this case, we are constrained to hold that this is not the proper forum to decide this issue. The properties sought to be recovered by the petitioner are now all registered under the name of third parties. Well settled is the doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose. 9. PADA-KILARIO V CA (2000) Ponente: De Leon, Jr., J. DOCTRINE: There is no law requiring partition among heirs to be in writing and registered. The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 that partition be put in a public document and registered, has for its purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. QUICK FACTS: Dispute over a portion of a land which is part of the intestate estate of Jacinto Pada between a compulsory heir and the spouses in possession and claiming to have been assigned the rights of the other compulsory heirs. FACTS: Nature: MCTC. ejectment suit Facts: Jacinto Pada died intestate leaving a residential and coconut land. Subject of the controversy is the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. During Jacintos lifetime, his half-brother Feliciano obtained his permission to build a house on the lot. Petitioner Page 7 of 20

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Verona (granddaughter of Feliciano) has been living there since 1960. In 1951, the heirs of Jacinto executed an extrajudicial partition through a private document. This was never registered. Most of the heirs were represented by their children in the execution of the document. The northern portion of the land was allotted to Ananias and Marciano. The former, through his daughter sold his share. Daughter of Marciano sold the share to respondent Silverio. Silverio demanded the petitioner spouses to vacate but the latter refused. Silverio then filed an ejectment suit. A month after, a Deed of Donation was executed by the heirs in favor of Verona. As Answer to the suit, spouses invoked the Deed and claimed that the extrajudicial partition was invalid and ineffectual for being executed without SPA. MCTC in favor of petitioners Silverio failed to prove ownership while petitioners proved community ownership reversed Conveyance to Silverio was never questioned by coheirs for more than 40 years estoppels and laches Deed of donation illegal and invalid affirmed Voluntary division of estate is conclusive and confers upon heirs exclusive ownership Donors had no interest nor right to transfer mere afterthought DOCTRINE: QUICK FACTS: Conditional Sale of property was executed between Tan and the Benoliraos and the Taningcos. Tan failed to make good on his promise to pay, but is nevertheless demanded the return of his downpayment and the rescission of the contract, arguing that the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Lamberto Benolirao constituted a novation of the original contract that he entered into with the Benoliraos and Taningcos. FACTS: Nature: Action filed by Delfin Tan for specific performance for the refund of the downpayment for the property and the rescission of the contract of conditional sale The Benoliraos (spouses Lamberto and Erlinda) and the Taningcos (spouses Reynaldo and Norma) were co-owners of a 689-square meter parcel of land in Tagaytay City. October 6, 1992 the co-owners executed a Deed of Conditional Sale over the property in favor of Tan for the price of P1,378,000.00. The deed stated: a) An initial down-payment of P200k upon signing of the contract; the remaining balance of P1,178,000.00 to be payable within a period of 150 days from date hereof without interest (Tan therefore only had until March 15, 1993 to pay the balance); b) That for any reason, BUYER fails to pay the remaining balance within above mentioned period, the BUYER shall have a grace period of 60 days to make the payment, provided that there shall be an interest of 15% per annum on the balance amount due from the SELLERS; c) That should the BUYER fail to comply with the terms and conditions within the above stated grace period, then the SELLERS shall have the right to forfeit the down payment, and to rescind this conditional sale without need of judicial action; d) That in case, BUYER have complied with the terms and conditions of this contract, then the SELLERS shall execute and deliver to the BUYER the appropriate Deed of Absolute Sale. Pursuant to the Deed of Conditional Sale, Tan issued and delivered to the co-owners/vendors Metrobank Check No. 904407 for P200k as down payment for the property, for which the vendors issued a corresponding receipt. November 6, 1992 Lamberto Benolirao died intestate. January 20, 1993 Erlinda (widow) and her children executed an extrajudicial settlement (EJS) of Lambertos estate March 26, 1993 as a result of the EJS, a new certificate of title was issued in the names of the Taningcos and Erlinda and her children. Pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 74, the following annotation was made on the title: any liability to creditors, excluded heirs and other persons having right to the property, for a period of two (2) years, with respect only to the share of Erlinda, Andrew, Romano and Dion, all surnamed Benolirao Parties agreed to extend the period for Tans payment of the balance to May 15, 1993. Tan failed and asked for another Page 8 of 20

RTC

CA

ISSUE: WON petitioners could be ejected DECISION: YES. AFFIRMED Extra-judicial partition is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document No law requiring partition among heirs to be in writing and registered Requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 that partition be put in a public document and registered, has for its purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims Object of registration: constructive notice Intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are involved. Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules Donation is void Donors were not the owners Guilty of estoppel HELD: petition denied 10. TAN V BENOLIRAO (2009) Ponente: Brion

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extension, which was granted. Again Tan failed to pay. Tan refused to comply with the vendors demand to pay the balance within 5 days from notice (otherwise they would rescind the conditional sale, thereby forfeiting Tans downpayment). Tan argued that the annotation on the title made pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 74, constituted an encumbrance on the property that would prevent the vendors from delivering a clean title to him. Thus, he alleged that he could no longer be required to pay the balance of the purchase price and demanded the return of his down payment. Spouses would not refund Tans downpayment despite the latters demands. June 19, 1993, Tan filed the complaint before the Pasay RTC. In the complaint, Tan alleged that there was a novation of the Deed of Conditional Sale done without his consent since the annotation on the title created an encumbrance over the property. Hence his request for the return of his downpayment and the rescission of the contract. August 9, 1993 Tan amended his Complaint, contending that if the respondents insist on forfeiting the down payment, he would be willing to pay the balance of the purchase price provided there is reformation of the Deed of Conditional Sale. In the meantime, Tan caused the annotation on the title of a notice of lis pendens. August 21, 1993 respondents executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of Hector de Guzman (de Guzman) for the price of P689k. Thereafter, respondents moved for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the ground that it was inappropriate since the case that Tan filed was a personal action which did not involve either title to, or possession of, real property. October 22, 1993 RTC issued an order granting the motion to cancel annotation on the title. Meanwhile, based on the same Deed of Absolute Sale in his favor, de Guzman registered the property and TCT No. 28104 was issued in his name. Tan then filed a motion to carry over the lis pendens annotation to TCT No. 28104 registered in de Guzmans name, but the RTC denied the motion. RTC Ruled that respondents forfeiture of Tans downpayment was proper in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract between the parties. The RTC ordered Tan to pay the respondents the amount of P30k plus P1k per court appearance, as attorneys fees, and to pay the cost of suit. CA Affirmed RTC in toto. ISSUE: WoN the forfeiture of Tans downpayment was proper in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract. DECISION: No, the forfeiture was not proper; CA reversed. The Deed of Conditional Sale is considered terminated and the respondents were ordered to return the P200k downpayment to Tan, subject to legal interest of 6% per annum. The respondents were also ordered to pay Tan, jointly and severally, the amount of P50k by way of attorneys fees. HELD: While the contract is denominated as a Deed of Conditional Sale, the presence of par. (d) (see above) identifies the contract as being a mere contract to sell The annotation on the new title resulting from the extrajudicial partition of Lamberto Benoliraos estate among his heirs stating that any liability to creditors, excluded heirs and other persons having right to the property, for a period of 2 years, with respect only to the share of Erlinda, Andrew, Romano and Dion, all surnamed Benolirao was placed pursuant to Sec. 4 of Rule 74 for the purpose of warning third persons on the possible interests of excluded heirs or unpaid creditors in the property. This annotation therefore, creates a legal encumbrance or lien on the real property in favor of the excluded heirs. Where a buyer purchases the real property despite the annotation, he must be ready for the possibility that the title could be subject to the rights of excluded parties. The cancellation of the sale would be the logical consequence where: (a) the annotation clearly appears on the title, warning all would-be buyers; (b) the sale unlawfully interferes with the rights of heirs; and (c) the rightful heirs bring an action to question the transfer within the two-year period provided by law. By the time Tans obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price arose on May 21, 1993 (on account of the extensions granted by the respondents), a new certificate of title covering the property had already been issued on March 26, 1993, which contained the encumbrance on the property; the encumbrance would remain so attached until the expiration of the two-year period. Clearly, at this time, the vendors could no longer compel Tan to pay the balance of the purchase since considering they themselves could not fulfill their obligation to transfer a clean title over the property to Tan. What happens to the contract? The Court has held in numerous cases that in a contract to sell, the vendor remains the owner for as long as the vendee has not complied fully with the condition of paying the purchase price. In the case at bar, the contract to sell was terminated when the vendors could no longer legally compel Tan to pay the balance of the purchase price as a result of the legal encumbrance which attached to the title of the property. Since Tans refusal to pay was due to the supervening event of a legal encumbrance on the property and not through his own fault or negligence, the forfeiture of Tans down payment was clearly unwarranted. Notes: There are other issues in the case which I didnt include here ( lis pendens annotation, award of attorneys fees, computation of legal interest, etc.). Kindly refer to the original case for the discussions of those issues. B. Summary settlement 1. SAMPILO V CA (1958) Ponente: Labrador DOCTRINE: The provisions of Sec. 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Sec. 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians. Page 9 of 20

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QUICK FACTS: Widow executed an affidavit appropriating all the properties of her deceased husband to herself and selling them thereafter. Administratrix filed a case against the widow and the subsequent buyers to recover said properties. Widow raised the defense of prescription/statute of limitations, citing Section 4 of Rule 74. FACTS: Nature: Action filed by Felisa Sinopera to recover ( reivindicatoria?) one-half portion of four parcels of land allegedly belonging to the estate of deceased Teodoro Tolete. January 1945 Tolete died and left 4 parcels of land located at San Manuel, Pangasinan; he left as heirs his widow Leoncia, and several nephews and nieces. July 25, 1946 Leoncia executed, without any judicial proceedings, an affidavit stating that Tolete left no children nor brother, sisters, nephews or nieces, and that she (Leoncia) is the only person to inherit the properties left by Tolete (the affidavit was registered with the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan); she also executed a deed of sale of the parcels of land to Sampilo for P10k (sale was also registered with the RoD of Pangasinan) March 1950 Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of the estate of Tolete and was appointed administratrix June 17, 1950 Sampilo sold the parcels of land to Salacup for P50k (sale was registered with the RoD of Pangasinan) June 20, 1950 Sinopera brought the action to recover; notice of lis pendens was filed in the RoD and was recorded on the certificates of title covering the 4 parcels of land. Her complaint alleged that Leoncia had no right to execute the affidavit of adjudication and that neither Salacup nor Sampilo acquired any rights to the properties. CFI ruled in favor of Sinopera: rendered the affidavit of adjudication and the deeds of sale as null and void and declaring the usufructuary rights of Leoncia as terminated. CA modified CFI ruling by declaring that the deeds of sale are null and void only insofar as the properties therein conveyed exceed the portion that corresponds to Leoncia; ordered defendants to deliver one-half of the lands to Sinopera (as administratrix) for disposition, but reserved to Salacup his right to: (1) claim and secure adjudication in his favor of whatever portion of said properties may correspond to Leoncia and (2) bring an action for damages that he may have suffered against Leoncia and Sampilo. ISSUE: WoN Sinoperas right of action to recover her and her co heirs participation to the lands in question had already prescribed at the time the action to recover was filed. DECISION: No, her right of action has not yet prescribed; affirmed CA in toto. HELD: There cannot be any doubt that those who took part or had knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby; it is to them that the two-year period properly applies. As to those who did not take part in the settlement or had no notice, it is unreasonable and unjust that they also be required to assert their claims within the period of 2 years. To extend the effects of the settlement to them without any express legal provision to that effect, would be violative of the fundamental right to due process of law. In Ramirez v. Gmur, the Court held: It will be noted t hat while the law provides that the order of distribution may be had upon the application of the executor or administrator no provision is made for notice, by publication or otherwise, of such application. The proceeding, therefore, is to all intents and purposes ex parte It cannot be held that a purely ex parte proceeding, had without notice by personal service or by publication, by which the court undertakes to distribute the property of deceased persons, can be conclusive upon minor heirs who are not represented therein. The procedure outlined in Sec. 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution would affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect is made, either directly or by implication. The provisions of Sec. 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Sec. 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians. The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because not all the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial settlement, the CA having found that the decedent left aside from his widow, nephews and nieces living at the time of his death. Furthermore, there is nothing in Sec. 4, Rule 74 which shows a statute of limitations and a bar of action against 3 rd persons; it is only a bar against parties who have already taken part in the extrajudicial proceedings and not against 3 rd parties who are not parties thereto. Even if Sec. 4 of Rule 74 is a statute of limitations, the action is one based on fraud (widow executed an affidavit of adjudication declaring herself as the only heir to her husbands properties) and hence has a prescriptive period of 4 years (Art. 1146 of the NCC); this period does not appear to have lapsed when the action was instituted in March 1950. Notes: Court also briefly discussed the defense of Salacup and Sampilo that they were innocent purchasers of value, and found that such a defense was unavailing.

Rule 75- Production, Allowance of Will Necessary

A. Meaning of Probate Page 10 of 20

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1. Due execution and extrinsic validity Probate Court (branch I): issued an order allowing the will to probate. CA: affirmed by CA and on petition for review. SC: dismissed the petition and remanded the same to the probate court after denying MR. For two years after remand of the case to the probate court, all pleadings of both parties remained unacted upon. Not long after, the probate court set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will but upon objection of Pastor, Jr. and Sofia on the ground of pendency of the recoveyance suit, no hearing was held. Instead, the probate court required the parties to submit their respective position papers. While the reconveyance suit was pending in another court, the probate court issued Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was no inofficious. Pursuant to said order, ATLAS was directed to remit directly to Quemada the 42% royalties due to decedents estate, of which Quemada was authorized to retain 75% for himself as legatee. Further, the 33% share of Pastor Jr. And/or his assignees was ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of Quemada. Being immediately executory, Quemada succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and garnishment. The oppositors sought MR thereof but in the meantime, the probate court ordered suspension of payment of all royalties due Pastor Jr. And/or his assignees until later resolution of oppositors MR. Pending motion, Pastor Jr. And his wife filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction assailing the writ of execution and garnishment issued by the probate court. CA: denied as well as the MR. Hence, this petition for review by certiorari with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction. ISSUE: WON the probate court resolved with finality the issue of ownership and intrinsic validity of the will.-- NO Ratio: In the special proceeding of a probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, the purpose of determining whether the property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve the issue of title thereto. The Order sought to be executed by the assailed writ of Execution is the Probate Order allegedly resolved the question of ownership of the disputed mining properties. However, nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the will , and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus, it allowed and approved the holographic will with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. It declared that the intestate estate administration aspect Page 11 of 20

1. SPOUSES PASTOR V CA (1983) Ponente: Plana, J. DOCTRINE: In the special proceeding of a probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, the purpose of determining whether the property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve the issue of title thereto. Quickfacts: Sps. Alvaro Pastor Sr, a Spanish subject, left a holographic will with only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favour of Quemada over the 30% of 42% if Pastor Sr.s share in ATLAS. The will was duly probated and Quemada was appointed as special administrator and filed action for recovenyance of properties in the name of Pastor Sr.s legitimate son (Pastor Jr.) and the latters wife, and later obtained a writ of execution and garnishment (in the probate court) over said properties subject of action for recovenyance. FACTS: Nature: TC. Petition for probate of will>intrinsic validity of will>writ of execution and garnishment over mining claims CA. Denied Pastor Jr.s petition for certiorari and prohibition SC. Petition for review by certiorari with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction to annul the order of Writ of Execution and garnishment issued by the Probate Court Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr., a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City on June 5, 1966, survived by his Spanish wife Sofia Bossio, who also died on Oct. 21, 1966. They were survived by their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (Pastor Jr.) and SofiaPastor (Sofia)- a Spanish subject, and an illegitimate child, Lewellyn Quemada a Filipino naturalized in 1936 and of Filipino mother. Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of Pastor Sr. with the CFI of Cebu, Branch I (probate court), which contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.s 42% share in the operation by ATLAS Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. (ATLAS) of some mining claims in Pina-Barot, Cebu.. After ex parte hearing, the probate court appointed Quemada as special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor Sr. whether or not covered or affected by the holographic will upon filing of P5,000.00 bond. Consequently, Quemada instituted against Pastor Jr. and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of estate which included the properties subject of the legacy which were in the names of spouses Pastor Sr. And Ma. Elena, who claimed to be the owners in their own rights, and not by inheritance, in CFI of Cebu, Branch IX.

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must proceed subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties. The Probate court did not resolve the issue of ownership of the properties listed in the estate inventory, considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending. It was therefore an error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the probate order adjudged with finality the question of ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion of said Probate Order directed special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute. 2. IN RE ESTATE OF JOHNSON (1918) Ponente: Street, J. DOCTRINE: The due execution of a will involves conditions relating to a number of matters, such as the age and mental capacity of the testator, the signing of the document by the testator, or by someone in his behalf, and the acknowledgment of the instrument by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to attest the act. The proof of all these requisites is involved in the probate; and as to each and all of them the probate is conclusive. The probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive only as regards the due execution of the will. Nature: appeal from the TC decision denying the motion of petitioner to vacate the March 16, 1916 order admitting the will of Emil Johnson to probate QUICKFACTS: Emil Johnson, a native of Sweden and naturalized US citizen, died in the city of Manila leaving a holographic will2 where what was given to his only legitimate daughter (Ebba Ingeborg) was P5,000. Petition to allow the will to probate was filed and after 3-week publication in the Manila Bulletin for the hearing of the application, and after such hearing, the will was admitted to probate by the CFI of Manila. Ebba now seeks to annul the order admitting the will to probate. FACTS: Nature: TC: motion to vacate the March 16, 1926 order admitting the holographic will of Emil Johnson to probate CA: n/a SC: Appeal to reverse the order of the TC denying its motion to vacate order of March 16, 1916 admitting the will to probate. Affirmed. On Feb 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson3, a native of Sweden and a naturalized US citizen, died in the city of Manila, leaving a will 4 by
By the will in question the testator gives to his brother Victor 100 shares of the corporate stock in the Johnson-Pickett Rope Company; to his parents in Sweden (P20,000); to his daughter Ebba Ingeborg, the sum of P5,000; to his wife, Alejandra Ibaez, P75/month, if she remains single; to Simeona Ibaez, spinster, P65/month, if she remains single. The rest of the property is left to the testator's 5 children Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor, Eleonor and Alberto. 3 Emil H. Johnson was born in Sweden (1877), but emigrated to the US and lived in Chicago, Illinois. In 1898, at Chicago, he married Rosalie Ackeson, and embarked for the Phil. Islands as a soldier in the US Army. He and Rosalie Ackeson had a daughter, Ebba Ingeborg. Even after he was discharged as a soldier, he continued to live in the Phil. Islands. His
2

which he disposed of an estate, with estimated value of P231,800. It was a holographic will, written in his own handwriting, and was signed by himself and 2 witnesses only, instead of 3 witnesses required by Sec. 618 of the Code of Civ Pro. Thus, it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence could not have been proved under sec. 618. On Feb. 9, 1916, a petition was presented in the CFI of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was a citizen of the State of Illinois, USA at the time of his death; the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of Illinois; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to sec. 6365 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The hearing on the application was set and 3 weeks publication of notice was ordered in the "Manila Daily Bulletin." After due publication, witnesses were examined as to the execution of the will. TC: by March 16, 1916 order, the document was declared to be legal and was admitted to probate and thereafter, Victor Johnson was appointed sole administrator. The order of CFI recites that upon the date when the will in question was executed Emil H. Johnson was a citizen of the US, naturalized in the State of Illinois, County of Cook, and the will in question was executed in conformity with the dispositions of the law of the State of Illinois. On June 12, 1916, or about 3 months after the will had been probated, the attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg Johnson entered an appearance in her behalf and noted an exception to the other admitting the will to probate. On Oct. 31, 1916, the same attorneys moved the court to vacate the order of March 16 and various other orders. The purpose of this proceeding is to annul the decree of probate and put the estate into intestate administration, thus preparing the way for the establishment of her claim as the sole legitimate heir of her father. TC: motion denied (On Feb. 20, 1917). Hence, this appeal. (Note: this is an appeal to the denial of the motion to vacate judgment and not an appeal to the TC order admitting the will to probate) ISSUES: 1. WON there was a violation of due process of law on the part of Ebba Ingeborg as to the publication requirement --- NO 2. WON the order of TC can be declared null and void upon the ground that Emil Johnson was not a citizen of the State of Illinois and the probate proceedings was not done in accordance with the law of that state NO 3. Propriety of admitting the will to probate (topical issue) HELD:
wife divorced her in 1902 on the ground of desertion. In 1903, he went to the US and procured a certificate of naturalization at Chicago. He made a visit to Sweden and returned to Manila where he prospered in business and stayed there until his death. He had 3 children w/ Alejandra Ibaez: Mercedes, Encarnacion, and Victor. The other 2 children in the will were borne to the deceased by Simeona Ibaez. 4 dated Sept. 9, 1915 5 Will made here by alien . A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country , which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands.

Page 12 of 20

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#1 Ratio: The proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and the publication was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be probated. In In re Davis (136 Cal., 590, 596), "the proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of things the state is allowed a wide latitude in determining the character of the constructive notice to be given to the world in a proceeding where it has absolute possession of the res. It would be an exceptional case where a court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his property without due process of law, the proceeding being strictly in rem, and the res within the state, upon the ground that the constructive notice prescribed by the statute was unreasonably short." Although, the laws of these Islands contain no special provision similar to that of the states in the US, other than that allowing an appeal in the probate proceedings, we have a provision of a general nature authorizing a court under certain circumstances to set aside any judgment, order, or other proceeding found in Section 1136 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The use of the word "judgment, order or other proceeding" is not to be restricted to judgments or orders entered in ordinary contentious litigation where a plaintiff impleads a defendant and brings him into court by personal service of process. The utility of the provision is not limited to actions proper but extends to all sorts of judicial proceedings. Although the time allowed for the making of such application was inconveniently short, the remedy existed; and the possibility of its use is proved in this case by the circumstance that on June 12, 1916, she in fact here appeared in court by her attorneys and excepted to the order admitting the will to probate. #2 Ratio: Petitioner: argues that section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable only to wills of aliens; and that the epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made here by an alien and that the word "state" in the body of the section is not capitalized; thus, section 636 is not applicable to the will of a US citizen residing in these Islands. In Sec. 6367 of Code of Civ Pro, the words " another state or country" include the US and the States of the American Union, and the operation of the statute is not limited to wills of aliens. The instant petition does not assert that the testator was not a citizen of Illinois at the date when the will was executed but only that he was "never a resident of the State of Illinois after the year 1898, but became and was a resident of the city of Manila". But residence in the Phil. Islands is compatible with citizenship in Illinois; and it must be considered that the allegations of the petition on this point are, considered in their bearing as an attempt to refute citizenship in Illinois, wholly insufficient. As the CFI found that the testator was a citizen of the State of Illinois and that the will was executed in conformity with the laws of that State, the will was necessarily and properly admitted to probate. #3 Ratio: In Section 625 of the Code of Civ Pro it is declared that " the allowance by the court of a will of real or personal property shall be conclusive as to its due execution." The due execution of a will involves conditions relating to a number of matters, such as the age and mental capacity of the testator, the signing of the document by the testator, or by someone in his behalf, and the acknowledgment of the instrument by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to attest the act. The proof of all these requisites is involved in the probate; and as to each and all of them the probate is conclusive. The CFI is a court of original and general jurisdiction; and there is no difference in its faculties in this respect whether exercised in matters of probate or exerted in ordinary contentious litigation. The trial court therefore necessarily had the power to determine the facts upon which the propriety of admitting the will to probate depended; and the recital of those facts in the judgment was probably not essential to its validity. No express ruling is, however, necessary on this point. It is insisted in the brief for the appellant that the will in question was not properly admissible to probate because petitioner as a legitimate heir of the testator cannot be deprived of the legitime to which she is entitled under the law governing testamentary successions in these Islands. The probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive only as regards the due execution of the will. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 625, 614) If, therefore, upon the distribution of this estate, it should appear that any legacy given by the will or other disposition made therein is contrary to the law applicable in such case, the will must necessarily yield upon that point and the law must prevail. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be determined by the law of Illinois and not, as the appellant apparently assumes, by the general provisions here applicable in such matters; for in the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code it is declared that "legal and testamentary successions, with regard to the order of succession, as well as to the amount of the successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the laws of the nation of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the country where it may be situated. 3. MANAHAN V MANAHAN (1918) Ponente: Imperial, J. DOCTRINES: (1) In procedural law, the words authentication and probate are synonymous. All the law requires is that the competent court declared that in the execution of the will the essential external formalities have been complied with and that, in view thereof, the document, as a will, is valid and effective in the eyes of the law. (2) Once a will has been authenticated and admitted to probate, questions relative to the validity thereof can no longer be raised on appeal. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it cannot impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceedings QUICK FACTS: One and a half years later after Donatas will was admitted to probate, Tiburcia, sister of the deceased, filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial alleging among others that the Page 13 of 20

Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, order or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; Provided, That application therefor be made within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six months after such judgmen t, order, or proceeding was taken. 7 See footnote 3.
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court, in its order of September 22, 1930, did not really probate the will but limited itself to decreeing its authentication and that the will is null and void ab initio on the ground that the external formalities prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with in the execution thereof. FACTS: Nature: CFI Bulacan: MR and Motion for New Trial CA: NA SC: Appeal (to have the probate of Manahans will vacated) On August 29, 1930, Tiburcia Manahan instituted special proceedings for the probate of the will of the deceased Donata Manahan. Niece of testatrix was named the executrix in said will. The court set the date for the hearing and the necessary notice required by law was accordingly published. No opposition was filed and after the evidence was presented, the court entered the decree admitting the will to probate as prayed for. The will was probated on September 22, 1930. One year and seven months later, the appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial, praying that the order admitting the will to probate be vacated and the authenticated will declared null and void ab initio on the grounds (1) That she was an interested party in the testamentary proceedings and, as such, was entitled to and should have been notified of the probate of the will; (2) that the court, in its order of September 22, 1930, did not really probate the will but limited itself to decreeing its authentication; and (3) that the will is null and void ab initio on the ground that the external formalities prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with in the execution thereof. TC CA Denied MR and motion for a new trial NA (2) NO. Once a will has been authenticated and admitted to probate, questions relative to the validity thereof can no more be raised on appeal. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it cannot impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceedings. Also, inasmuch as the proceedings followed in a testamentary case are in rem, the trial court's decree admitting the will to probate was effective and conclusive against her, in accordance with the provisions of section 306 of the said Code of Civil Procedure.8 Other Notes: On the first ground (she was not notified with the probate proceedings, therefore, the probate proceedings was void), the Court held that she was not instituted as heir in the will, and was also not a compulsory heir. A non-heir person need not be notified under sec 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court. 4. BALANAY V MARTINEZ (1975) Ponente: Aquino, J. DOCTRINES: (1) The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated (or its formal validity established), the court should meet the issue. (2) Save in an extreme case where the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to pass first upon the formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code). QUICK FACTS: Leodegaria Julians will was denied probate as the will contained unusual provisions which were of dubious legality. The lower court denied probate and declared the will void, passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will before ruling on its formal validity. It also converted testate proceedings to intestate proceedings in light of the will being declared as void. FACTS: Nature: TC. Petition for probate CA. NA SC. Appeal by certiorari (from judgment declaring will of his mother as void and converting testate proceedings to intestate proceedings) Leodegaria Julian died testate. One of his 6 children, Felix J. Balanay, Jr., filed in the lower court a petition for the probate of his
SEC. 306. EFFECT OF JUDGMENT. . . . . In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or relation of a particular person the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will or administration, or the condition or relation of the person: Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate; . . . .
8

ISSUE: (1) WON the court, in its order of September 22, 1930, admitted the will to probate (or just limited itself to decreeing its authentication) (2) WON petitioner can still appeal with regard to extrinsic validity of the will after such will has been probated. DECISION: SC affirmed the decision of CFI Bulacan HELD: (1) YES. The court really decreed the authentication and probate of the will in question, which is the only pronouncement required of the trial court by the law in order that the will may be considered valid and duly executed in accordance with the law. In the phraseology of the procedural law, there is no essential difference between the authentication of a will and the probate thereof. The words authentication and probate are synonymous in this case. All the law requires is that the competent court declared that in the execution of the will the essential external formalities have been complied with and that, in view thereof, the document, as a will, is valid and effective in the eyes of the law.

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mother's notarial will where it was declared (a) that she was the owner of the "southern half of nine conjugal lots; (b) that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from her father, and (c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties. The will also stated that that after her husband's death, her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which she described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one half share of the conjugal assets. Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio (another child of the deceased) opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband (he was not instituted as heir in the will) and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties which he had received from the testatrix. Later, Balanay, Sr. withdrew his opposition to the probate and signed an instrument captioned "Conformation of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" (which was later contended as void by Avelina) wherein he manifested that out of respect for his wife's will he "waived and renounced' his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six children. In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be partitioned in the manner indicated in her will. Opposition of Avelina was denied by the lower court. However, another lawyer purporting to be the petitioners and some other children, filed a motion for "leave of court to withdraw probate of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and requesting authority to proceed by intestate estate proceeding." Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, through Atty. Jose B. Guyo, manifested their conformity with the motion for the issuance of a notice to creditors. They prayed that the will be declared void for being contrary to law and that an intestacy be declared. The lower court, upon this new motion, dismissed the petition for the probate, converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding, and ordered the issuance of a notice to creditors. Balanay, Jr. asked for the reconsideration on the ground that Atty. Montaa (he was already terminated and was not the counsel on record) had no authority to withdraw the petition for the allowance of the will. He also stated that his mothers will was sacred to them. TC denied the MR. TC Oppositors won. TC dismissed the petition to probate (see last par.) CA NA ISSUE: (1) WON the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void. (2) WON the will should have still been admitted to probate despite it containing illegal provisions DECISION: SC affirmed TC and held that probate court could pass upon intrinsic validity of the will before ruling on its allowance or formal validity given the unusual provisions in the will BUT declared also that the will should be admitted to probate since other legal provisions in the will that are valid can still be upheld. HELD: (1) NO. In view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. (2) YES. The lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will. Save in an extreme case where the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to pass first upon the formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code). The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of a purported testament is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that his estate should be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby". The law has a tender regard for the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will because any disposition therein is better than that which the law can make Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. So compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the wishes of the testator should prevail that sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the purpose of giving it effect. NOTES (with regard to illegal provisions in her will): The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she was a co-owner thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso. The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code. She did not assign the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in article 1080. Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. Page 15 of 20

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Her estate may remain undivided only for a period of twenty years. So, the provision that the estate should not be divided during her husband's lifetime would at most be effective only for twenty years from the date of her death unless there are compelling reasons for terminating the coownership (Art. 1083, Civil Code). Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugal partnership (Arts. 179[1] and 1041, Civil Code) but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate (Art. 1060[1] Civil Code), it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected. Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children and the surviving spouse. Surviving husband's conformity to his wife's will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights resulted to his one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition stated of the will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs. With regard to PRETERITION: The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, supra, where the testatrix instituted as heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights. (Husband is not in the direct line.) Other court errors: It is the executor or regular administrator who is supposed to oppose the claims against the estate and to pay such claims when duly allowed (See. 10, Rule 86 and sec. 1, Rule 88, Rules of Court). The probate court's appointment of its branch clerk of court as special administrator (p. 30, Rollo) is not a salutary practice because it might engender the suspicion that the probate Judge and his clerk of court are in cahoots in milking the decedent's estate. 5. MANINANG V CA (1982) Ponente: Melencio Herrera, J. DOCTRINE: Generally, the probate of a will is mandatory under Art. 838 of the Civil Code. The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered nugatory. The probate of a will does not look at its intrinsic validity. QUICK FACTS: Soledad Maninang filed in theCFI of QC a petition for the probate of the holographic will executed in her favor, by the decedent Clemencia Aseneta who died single at the age of 81, while private respondent Bernardo Aseneta, an adopted son claiming to be the sole heir of the decedent, instituted intestate proceedings with the CFI of Rizal. Bernardo S. Aseneta filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and void, as the only compulsory heir was preterited. The lower Court dismissed the Testate Case. FACTS: Nature: Petition to review the decision of the CA. On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital at age 81. She left a holographic will wherein she gave all her real and personal properties to Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family she lived continuously for around 30 years. She also said in the will that she does not consider Nonoy (Bernardo) as her adopted son as he made her do things against her will. On June 9, 1977, Dra. Maninina filed a petition for probate of said will with the CFI of QC. On July 25, 1977, Bernardo Aneseta, who claims to be the sole heir as an adopted son instituted an intestate proceeding with the CFI of Rizal. The two cases were consolidated before the Branch XI of the CFI of Rizal. Bernardo filed a Motion to Dismiss the testate proceeding on the ground that the will was null and void because he was preterited. Soledad opposed averring that as a rule, in a case for a probate of a will, the Courts area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will and that Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the decedent. CFI: ordered the dismissal of the testate case and denied consideration for lack of merit. It appointed Bernardo as the administrator of the intestate estate; CA: denied Ceritorari filed by Maninang and ruled that the CFI Judges order was final in nature, and therefore, appeal is the proper remedy, which she failed to avail of. ISSUE: Whether or Not the Court a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the testate case. HELD: YES. The SC set aside the Order of dismissal of the testate case. Under Art. 838 of the CC, "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court." The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered nugatory. Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The only purpose of a probate proceeding is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law. The Nuguid and Balanay cases, wherein the Court held that where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed, upon even before it is probated, the Court should meet that issue and that The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void provide the exception rather than the rule.

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NOTE: The court also discussed preterion as opposed to disinheritance. The concept and effect are totally different. The alleged preterition of the adopted son is not discernible at the face of the will. A purported will is not denied on dubious grounds. This issue should not be discussed in the probate of the will as it is an intrinsic issue. 2. Nature of Proceedings appeal, as otherwise there would be a multiplicity of resources to the higher Courts. ISSUE: 1. WoN the decree of CFI allowing the will to probate had become final; 2. WoN the order overruling estoppels has also become final; 3. WoN the will was impliedly revoked by the execution of deeds of conveyances in favor of the proponent Dimagiba. HELD: CA decision affirmed. 1. YES. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitely settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final and appealable; and it is so recognized by express provisions of Section 1 of Rule 109. This Section enumerates the different instances when appeal may be taken in special proceedings. There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly lodged against the decree was correctly dismissed. 2. YES. The presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, primarily designed to protect the testators expressed wishes. It would be a non sequitor to allow public policy to be evaded in the pretext of estoppel. 3. NO. The issue of revocation is predicated on par. 2 of Art. 957 of the Civil Code of 1950 (Art. 869 of the Code of 1889), which recites: "ART. 957. The legacy or device shall be without effect: xxx xxx xxx" (2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter case the legacy or device shall be without effect only with respect to the part thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should again belong to the testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise of the right or repurchase; The basis of the provision is a presumed change of intention on the part of the testator. The existence of any such change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, "no consideration whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with what she had ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or departure therefrom. Revocation being an exception, in the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of the Philippines does not apply to the case at bar. 2. BETTS V CA (1979) Ponente: Guerrero, J. Page 17 of 20

1. FERNANDEZ V DIMAGIBA (1967) Ponents: J.B.L. Reyes, Actg. C.J. DOCTRINE: The probate of a will is final and appealable under Sec. 1 of Rule 109. Where no timely appeal is filed, the probate decree becomes final and conclusive and appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the evidence on which it is made to rest. QUICK FACTS: Ismaela Dimagiba submitted to the CFI a petition for the probate of a will of Benedicta de los Reyes wherein she was instituted as the sole heir. Several persons claiming to be heirs (surnamed Reyes) opposed on the grounds of forgery, vices of consent, estoppel by laches, and revocation of will by two deeds of conveyances executed by the testatrix in favor of Dimagiba. The court upheld the finality of the probate of the will. FACTS: Nature: Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA. On January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba, submitted to the CFI a petition for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition was set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes, and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked. Grounds advanced for the opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent, and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances were finally set aside by this SC. CFI: The will was genuine and properly executed; but it first deferred resolution on the questions of estoppels and revocation, "until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication of the properties is opportunely presented." The MR and Petition foe New Trial was overruled. The court also appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for the sole purpose of submitting an inventory of the estate. After receiving further evidence, the trial court held that the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale." CA: The decree admitting the will to probate had become final for lack of opportune time to appeal. It affirmed the decision of the CFI. Appellants argue that they were entitled to await the trial Court's resolution on the other grounds of their opposition before taking an

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DOCTRINE: (1) The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings. (2) The primary purpose of the proceeding is not to establish the existence of the right of any living person, but to determine whether or not the decedent has performed the acts specified by the pertinent statutes. QUICK FACTS: Spouses Alsua entered into an extrajudicial partition of their properties with their children, and each spouse made a will in accordance with the partition agreement. When Doa Tinay died, Don Jesus was named executor. He cancelled his will and made a new one, providing the collation of the properties donated to his children. When he died, the executrix, also a daughter, filed a petition to probate the new will. The other children opposed and contended that Don Jesus was not of sound and disposing mind at the time of execution of the new will. TC granted probate. CA reversed upon appeal of oppositors. SC reversed CA and allowed probate of will. FACTS: Nature: TC. Petition for probate of will CA. NA to petitioner. Oppositors appealed to CA. SC. Appeal by certiorari CAs decision reversing the decision of CFI of Albay allowing the probate of the will of Don Jesus Alsua. On Nov 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doa Florentina Rella (Doa Tinay), together with all their living children (Francisca, Pablo, Fernando, Amparo), entered into an extrajudicial partition over the properties of the spouses. The spouses separately executed their respective holographic wills on Jan 5, 1955, which were in conformity and in implementation of the extrajudicial partition. The spouses filed before the CFI of Albay their respective petitions for the probate of their respective wills. When Doa Tinay died, Don Jesus was named executor. Thereafter, he cancelled his holographic will and made a new one on Nov 14, 1959. The new will provided for the collation of all his properties donated to his four living children by virtue of the extrajudicial partition. When Don Jesus died, Francisca Alsua Betts (daughter), the executrix as designated in the new will, filed a petition for the probate of the new will. Other childrens contention: Don Jesus was not of sound and disposing mind at the time of execution of the will, that the will was executed under duress or influence of fear or threats; or it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the main beneficiaries and of person or persons in collusion with them, or the signature of the testator was secured by or thru fraud; that the will was not executed according to the formal requirements of the law; and that the alleged will subject of probate contravened the Extrajudicial Partition they made in 1949. Franciscas contention: Oppositors are estopped in questioning the competence of Don jesus Alsua CFI of Albay. In favor of Betts. Allowed the probate of the new will. Court of Appeal. Reversed CFI. ISSUE: WoN the oppositors are in estoppel. DECISION: NO. SC reversed CA decision and reinstated CFI decision, allowing probate of the will. HELD: The controversy as to the competency or incompetency of Don Jesus Alsua to execute his will cannot be determined by acts of the oppositors in formally agreeing in writing jointly with the Francisca Alsua de Betts that their father, Don Jesus Alsua, be appointed by the court executor of the will of their mother in Special Proceedings No. 485, Testate Estate of Do;a Florentina Ralla de Alsua and in subsequently petitioning the court not to require Don Jesus Alsua to file any accounting as executor in the proceedings, which Betts claim and was upheld by the trial court as constituting estoppel on the part of the oppositors from questioning the competence of Don Jesus Alsua. The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings. Probate proceedings involve public interest, and the application of estoppel, when it will block the ascertainment of the truth as to the circumstances surrounding the execution of a testament, would seem inimical to public policy. Over and above the interest of private parties is that of the state to see that testamentary dispositions be carried out if, and only if, executed conformably to law. Notes: On the purpose of probate proceedings (as quoted from US case RE Canfields Will): The primary purpose of the proceeding is not to establish the existence of the right of any living person, but to determine whether or not the decedent has performed the acts specified by the pertinent statutes, which are the essential prerequisites to personal direction of the mode of devolution of his property on death. There is no legal but merely a moral duty resting upon a proponent to attempt to validate the wishes of the departed, and he may and frequently does receive no personal benefit from the performance of the act. One of the most fundamental conceptions of probate law, is that it is the duty of the court to effectuate, in so far as may be compatible with the public interest, the devolutionary wishes of a deceased person. To that end, the court is, in effect, an additional party to every litigation affecting the disposal of the assets of the deceased. On the extrajudicial partition of 1949: The so-called extrajudicial partition of 1949 is void and inoperative as a partition; neither is it a valid or enforceable contract because it involved future inheritance; it may only be given effect as a donation inter vivos of specific properties to the heirs made by the parents. B. Responsible Person

C. Discovery of will during intestate proceedings 1. CUENCO V CA (1973) SUPRA Ponente: Teehankee Doctrine: If in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already been appointed. Quick Facts: CFI QC admitted the Cuencos will to probate and appointed the widow as executrix of the estate. The Respondents (children of the decedent from his 1 st marriage) opposed CFI QCs order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because they filed an Page 18 of 20

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intestate proceeding in CFI Cebu before the probate proceedings were filed in CFI QC. SC held that CFI QC has proper jurisdiction because it is the first to take cognizance of the case and therefore has jurisdiction in exclusion of other courts. Facts: Decedent: Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco, died 25 Feb 1964 Petitioners: Surviving spouse (SS) and her children (2 nd marriage) Respondents: Children of the decedent from his 1 st marriage On 5 March 1964, Respondent filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the CFI Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R), alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. On 13 March 1964 CFI Cebu issued an order stating that Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a special administrator was not yet ready for the consideration of the said court, giving as reasons the following: It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding, the requisite publication of the notice of hearing not yet having been complied with. Moreover, copies of the petition have not been served on all of the heirs specified in the basic petition for the issuance of letters of administration. In the meantime, on 12 March 1964, Petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with theCFI QC for the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and testament (SP No. Q-7898). - She also filed in CFI Cebu an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss as well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the CFI QC shall have acted on the petition for probate of that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco." CFI QC in its said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament as having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as probated. Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent to bar the QC court from proceeding with case No. Q7898. CA: granted the writ of prohibition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of CFI QC because of an intestate proceeding having been filed first in CFI Cebu; annulled the order admitting the will to probate. Issue: W/N CFI QC has jurisdiction in proceeding with the testate proceeding. Decision: Yes. SC reversed CA decision. Held: In accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 2. CASIANO V MALOTO (1977) PONENTE. Fernandez, J. DOCTRINE. When a will is discovered during the intestate proceeding or after it has been filed/decided, the proper remedy is to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will in question. QUICK FACTS. The niece and nephews of the deceased (1) initiated an intestate proceeding believing that the deceased died w/o a will and (2) entered into extrajudicial partition of the estate. Subsequently, a will of the deceased was found prompting Aldina and Constancio to file an MR to the intestate proceeding which the judge denied, who also made a finding that the will has been revoked. Aldina and Constancio filed a separate proceeding for probate of the will but the judge dismissed the petition based on the finding of the first CFI judge that the will has been destroyed and revoked by the testatrix. FACTS. Nature. CFI of Iloilo. Petition for probate of the will of Adriana Maloto filed by niece/nephew Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto. CA. NA SC. Petition to review the order of CFI of Iloilo dismissing the petition for probate of the will. When Adriana Maloto died, Aldina Maloto Casiano (Aldina), Constancio Maloto (Constancio), Panfilo Maloto (Panfilo), and Felino Maloto (Felino), niece and nephews, respectively, commenced an intestate proceeding (SpecPro No. 1736) on 4Nov63 in the CFI of Iloilo in the belief that the decedent died intestate. They executed an extrajudicial partition of the estate, which was approved by the CFI, wherein they divided the estate equally in 4. On 1Apr67, a document allegedly the last will and testament of the deceased was delivered to the Clerk of Court which allegedly Page 19 of 20

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provides for bigger share for Aldina and Constancio. It also provides for legacies and devices to third persons. Subsequently, Aldina and Constancio filed in SP 1736 a motion for reconsideration, annulment of proceedings and allowance of the last will and testament of the deceased to which Panfilo and Felio filed an opposition. CFI of Iloilo (SP1736). Denied the motion on the ground that it was filed out of time (delayed) and also that the alleged will has been destroyed and revoked by the testatrix. SC1. Aldina and Constancio filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus but SC dismissed it stating that the more appropriate remedy of petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is for petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will in question. After the MR for the case above was dismissed, Aldina and Constancio then initiated SP 2176 for the probate of the alleged will. Panfilo and Felino opposed contending among others that the alleged will had been destroyed and revoked by the testatrix. CFI of Iloilo (SP2176). Dismissed the petition for probate of the will on the basis of the finding in SP1736 that the will has been destroyed and revoked. Court of Appeal. NA ISSUE: WoN the CFI of Iloilo (SpecPro 2176) erred in dismissing the petition for probate of the will? DECISION. 1) YES! SC set aside the CFI of Iloilo and directed the latter to proceed with the hearing. The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the probate of the alleged with of Adriana Maloto in Special Proceeding No. 1736 (intestate proceeding) and properly dismissed the same. HELD. It is not proper to make a finding in an intestate estate proceeding that the subsequently discovered will has been revoked.the more appropriate remedy is to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will in question.

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