Chapter 96

LPG Storage Tank Fire and Explosion Accident

Yingchao Dong, Wenhua Song and Fanghua Hu

Abstract The dangers of liqueed petroleum gas (LPG) have been analyzed. The storage tanks of liqueed petroleum gas have been xed at 20 m3, and the quantitative analysis of boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion occurring in tank discussed by the model. The results showed that when the distance between the target and the reball is 14.1222.32 m, there would be no discomfort with longterm exposure; within 8.0014.12 m there would be slight pain caused but no blisters; during 5.658.00 m there would be moderate damage creating rst degree burn/10 s, 10 % deaths/1 min; in the range of 4.615.65 m there would be more serious wounds (injuries/10 s, 100 % deaths/1 min); and less than 4.61 m there would be deaths (1 % deaths/10 s, 100 % deaths/l min). In addition, the design of the LPG station, which met the requirements of re protection, was conrmed and could provide design proposals for the spacing between the related constructions. Keywords Liqueed petroleum gas vapor explosion Fireball

Storage tank Boiling liquid expanding

96.1 Introduction
With worldwide energy shortage, for environmental protection and economic needs, liqueed petroleum gas (LPG), as chemical material and fuel with resourcerich, less pollution, and low prices, is attracting a lot of attention. It has been
Y. Dong (&) W. Song F. Hu School of Environmental and Chemical Engineering, Tianjin Polytechnic University, Tianjin, Peoples Republic of China e-mail: dychao2008@sina.com

Z. Zhong (ed.), Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Engineering and Applications (IEA) 2012, Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering 216, DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4471-4856-2_96, Springer-Verlag London 2013

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widely applied in industrial production and daily life. However, because of the ammable nature of LPG, leakage in LPG storage tanks will lead to re and explosion. Once such accidents happen, the affected area will be broad and serious. It will pose a threat to the buildings around and seriously affect the lives of the people around. This paper focused on predicting LPG tank re and explosion accidents. The scope and the impact of the accident damage were also analyzed quantitatively.

96.1.1 Risk Analysis of LPG

Propane is the main component of LPG, whose combustion heat value is 2,220 kJ/mol and boiling point is -42.10 C [1]. Therefore, LPG has a high combustion heat value and low boiling point. It will quickly gasify at a higher temperature. When the LPG decompresses suddenly, the liquid in the tank with a hot state will make the temperature reach a certain level, and then superheated liquid evaporates violently, ultimately causing an explosion. The explosion lower limit for LPG is 5 %, the upper limit 9.65 %, and the smallest ignition energy 0.20.3 m. The explosion gas will spread to the surrounding area rapidly, very easily forming explosive gas. Once exposed to an ignition source, it will explode again, called the boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion. The boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion of LPG is an explosion caused by the sharp gasication of the liquid. The explosion energy comes from the boiling liquid and vapor expansion. The main reason for boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion is when the tank has a large crack, and the tank liquid boils and gasies. When the containers temperature is too high or surrounded by ames, the LPG will produce high pressure; if the safety valve relief is not timely, it will cause a sharp decline in the tensile strength of the container material, owing to high temperature. When the container cannot receive the set-up pressure, the container will crack by reason of the increasing pressure, then lead to the boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion [2, 3]. The boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion accident may cause explosive shock wave, vessel fragment, and giant reball heat radiation, resulting in casualties and equipment damage. In this paper, using thermal radiation law, the hazard of LPG liquid expanding vapor explosion was evaluated [4].

96.1.2 Case Situation

There was an LPG storage and distribution station in the industrial district of the town. The station to the southwest side was close to Hollow Fiber Products Co. Ltd. On the south side of the station was a road of width 5 m, with the rest of the surrounding area as open space.

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The factory covered an area of 12,000 m2; the area of construction was 8,600 m2. The factory was surrounded by a 2 m high solid brick wall enclosure all around. The storage tank area was set up to the southeast of the station; the west side of which was close to the hydrocarbon pumping station and gas cylinder warehouse, Northsouth layout. Besides, the tank car loading and unloading column was set up to the north of the lling room. The construction area of the storage tank zone was 480 m2; the storage tank depot set the four horizontal cylindrical tanks, followed by residue tank, 3#, 2# and 1# LPG tank from south to north. The volume of tank was 20 m3, diameter was 2 m, and maximum storage capacity 16 t. Moreover, the detailed performance data for distance between the 3# tank and stations among buildings is shown in Table 96.1 [5]. The pressure tank equipped with a ammable liqueed petroleum gas, if subjected to external ame baking for a long time, would have its strength to gradually reduce. When the tank intensity decreased to a certain extent, the tank would burst suddenly, leading to pressure reduction, and then liquid would gasify rapidly to cause burning. Consequently, there would be boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion accident taking place. Thus, in order to provide a reference to enhance the safe operation of the LPG storage and distribution station, the scope and size of the consequences for the boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion accident should be researched.
Table 96.1 The distance between the tank and the station outside building Distance (m) The tanks distance The 3# LPG tanks distance of standard The station Fire bank toe line East South West North Hydrocarbon pump Cylinder base The lling room Loading column Fire pool Water pump house Power distribution room The ofce Enclosing wall East South West North Outside the station Fiber products factorys wall The roads edge 3 6 9 6 13 24 30 39 33 62 80 80 80 24 24 116 50 180 34

20 20 20 20 40 40 20 30 20

30 20

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It was assumed that the LPG in 3# tanks were all let out during the region, and LPG tank boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion occurs under ideal condition, taking no account of factors such as temperature, wind direction, surrounding environment, and the effect of nearby tank re and explosion caused by 3# tank.

96.2 Quantity Calculation of LPG Boiling Liquid Expanding Explosion Consequences 96.2.1 Quantitative Calculation Results
The injury distance was calculated by reball heat radiation calculation model. According to the different heat radiation ux, the heat accepted by the target was calculated (shown in Table 96.2) [6, 7].

96.3 Analysis of the Boiling Liquid Expanding Explosion Calculation Results

Table 96.3 indicates contrast and analysis between four parameters. The four parameters were, the heat radiation ux at the distance between the LPG storage station facilities required by the code for design of the urban gas [5], the heat radiation ux at the distance between the LPG storage station facilities, degrees of damage of the reball thermal radiation in the required distance, degrees of damage of the reball thermal radiation [8].
Table 96.2 The evaluation results of 16 t horizontal storage tank re thermal radiation on human body damage Equipment damage The harm to the human Radiation Target body heat ux distance (kW/m2) (m) 37.5 25.0 4.61 5.65 Equipments were damaged completely In the absence of ame and long time radiation, wood burning minimum energy A ame, burning wood, the lowest energy of plastic melting 100 % person death/1 min, 1 % person death/10 s 100 % person death/1 min, severely person burned/ 10 s 10 % person death/1 min, Idegree burn Cause pain more than 20 s, but it would not blister Have no sense of discomfort after long-term exposure

12.5 4.0 1.6

8.00 14.12 22.32

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Table 96.3 The calculation results accident model The From 3 # tank distance (m) specication condition to receive radiation heat ux (kW/m2) Fire bank toe line East [37.5

analysis of tank boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion The actual distance to receive heat radiation ux (kW/m2) 12.525.0 Under the standard distance reball radiation damage Under the actual distance reball radiation damage

South

4.012.5

West

12.525.0

North

4.012.5

Hydrocarbon pump Cylinder base

1.64.0

\1.6

1.64.0

\1.6

The lling room

1.64.0

\1.6

Loading column

1.64.0

\1.6

Fire pool

\1.6

\1.6

Water pump house

\1.6

\1.6

Equipments were 10 % person damaged death/1 min, completely, 100 % I-degree burn, person death/ and wood 1 min, 1 % person would burn death/10 s with ame Cause pain more than 20 s, but it would not blister 10 % person death/1 min, I-degree burn, and wood would burn with ame Cause pain more than 20 s, but it would not blister Cause pain more than Have no sense of 20 s, but it would discomfort not blister after long Cause pain more than Have no sense of 20 s, but it would discomfort not blister after long Cause pain more than Have no sense of 20 s, but it would discomfort not blister after long Cause pain more than Have no sense of 20 s, but it would discomfort not blister after long Have no sense of Have no sense of discomfort after discomfort long-term after long-term exposure exposure Have no sense of Have no sense of discomfort after discomfort long-term after long-term exposure exposure (continued)

796 Table 96.3 (continued) The From 3 # tank distance (m) specication condition to receive radiation heat ux (kW/m2) Power distribution room The ofce \1.6

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The actual distance to receive heat radiation ux (kW/m2) \1.6

Under the standard distance reball radiation damage

Under the actual distance reball radiation damage

\1.6

\1.6

Enclosing wall

East 1.64.0 South West North Fiber products \1.6 factorys wall

\1.6

Have no sense of Have no sense of discomfort after discomfort long-term after long-term exposure exposure Have no sense of Have no sense of discomfort after discomfort long-term after long-term exposure exposure Cause pain more than Have no sense of 20 s, but it would discomfort not blister after long-term exposure Have no sense of Have no sense of discomfort after discomfort long-term after long-term exposure exposure Cause pain more than Have no sense of 20 s, but it would discomfort not blister after long-term exposure

\1.6

The roads edge

1.64.0

\1.6

From Table 96.3, some conclusions could be obtained: (1) Code required the distance from the re-dike to the storage tank as 3 m, the heat radiation ux greater than 37.5 kW/m2, the injury degree that equipments were damaged completely, 100 % person death/1 min, 1 % person death/10 s, considered as unaccepted category. However, during the actual design, the distance between the accident storage tank and re dike was 6 m, hurt degree was 10 % person death/1 min, I-degree burn, and wood would burn with ame, which were considered as unaccepted category. And when the largest distance between the accident storage tank and re dike was 9 m, the hurt degree caused by the hot radiation was accepted. (2) The code required that the distance between the tank to the hydrocarbon pumping house, air bottle storehouse, lling house, loading/unloading pillars, wall of the station area, roads outside the station were 20 m, radiation heat ux was 1.64.0 kW/m2, the degree of injury was that cause pain more than 20 s, but it would not blister, considered as accepted category. While the actual design distance was greater than 22.32 m, within acceptable range. (3) Code required that the distance between tanks to the re water tank, water pumping house, power distribution, ofce, industrial enterprises were 40, 40,

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20, 30, 30 m separately, the thermal radiation ux was less than 1.6 kW/m2, the degree of injury was that have no sense of discomfort after long-term exposure, within acceptable range, and the actual design distance were acceptable.

96.4 Summary
LPG, as a re explosive gas, when LPG storage and distribution station had taken some safety measures, but if not pay attention to safety management, there would give birth to the boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion accident. Though simulation on the instance, the calculation results displayed that the no harm radius of the storage tank boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion was 22.32 m, and the liqueed petroleum gas storage and distribution station layout could fully satisfy the safety requirements when the explosion occurred. In addition, the design of the LPG station, which met the requirements of re protection, was conrmed and could provide design proposals for the spacing between the related constructions. Secondary explosion blast would cause great harm to the station equipment and personnel. Therefore, we should also strengthen the safety management and develop appropriate safety management system and an emergency rescue plan according to the specic circumstances of the station area.

References
1. Qi FQ, Zhao YS, He GY (2008) The re and explosion risk analysis of LPG tank. Ind Saf Environ Prot 34(1):2729 2. Zheng Y (2009) The defect cause analysis of the use of LPG storage tank. Safety (11):1921 3. Li XH, Wang JY (2006) The research of LPG tank failure in the re. Ind Saf Environ Prot 32(6):4345 4. Lin WS, Gu AZ (2000) The process research progress of LPG steam explosion. Oil Gas Storage Transp 19(12):612 5. Sun WD (2007) GB50028-2006, code for design of city gas engineering 34(3):2327 6. Fang JM (2009) The method of LPG tank re and explosion accident consequence simulation. Ind Saf Environ Prot 35(12):4445 7. Wang SM, Jiang JC (2001) The research of boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion mechanism and correlative theoretic model. Chem Saf Environ Prot 27(7):3034 8. Strehlow RA et al (1979) The blast wave generated by spherical ames. Combust Flame 35:297310