Foucault and History: The Lessons of a Disillusion Author(s): Grard Noiriel Source: The Journal of Modern History, Vol.

66, No. 3 (Sep., 1994), pp. 547-568 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2124485 . Accessed: 17/09/2011 10:05
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Review Article Foucault and History: The Lessons of a Disillusion*

GerardNoiriel
Ecole Normale Superieure and tcole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (Paris)

The currentinterestin Foucault's work in American historicalresearch' is reminiscent of the situationin Franceduringthe 1970s, ata time when projects(which unfortunately failed) had been envisioned between philosophers and a certainnumberof historians. In analyzing the causes of this failure, I would like not only to uncover the misunderstandingsthat hampered this partnershipbut also to contributeto the discussion that has arisen in the last few years on both sides of the Atlantic regardingthe cufrent trends of historical research and the crisis of "interdisciplinarity."2
PRISONAND THEIMPOSSIBLE DIALOGUE I. THE IMPOSSIBLE

Immediately after the publication of Discipline and Punish,3 the dialogue between Foucault and French historians reached its height in the debate on the history of
* A firstversion of this study was presentedrecently at a conferenceorganizedby Olivier Zunz at the University of Virginia History Department.This study is also greatly indebted to the critiques of Allan Megill and Jacques Revel. It was translatedby Alex Dracobly and James Petterson. ' His works were introducedinto the mainstreamof Americanhistoricalresearchthanksto the studies of A. Megill, "Foucault, Structuralismand the Ends of History," Journal of Modern History 51 (1979): 451-503; and M. Poster, "Foucaultand History,"Social Research49 (1982): 116-42. Interest in Foucault has increased over the past few years, as shown by American historians' embrace of the "linguistic turn"; see A. Megill, "The Reception of Foucault by Historians,"Journal of the History of Ideas 48 (1987): 117-41; the collective works edited by ArthurStill and IrvingVolody,Rewritingthe History of Madness: Studies in Foucault's "Histoire de la Folie" (London, 1991); and the recent colloquium "Foucault and the Writing of History Today,"held at the University of Chicago, October 1991. 2 In France,the Annales editorialcommittee recently launcheda debateregarding the relations between history and the social sciences. The initial results of this debate were published in the journal's sixtieth anniversaryissue; see the editorial "Tentons l'experience," Annales: Economies, societes, civilisations 44 (1989): 1317-23. In the United States the extensive and lively discussions borne of P. Novick's book, That Noble Dream, the "ObjectivityQuestion"and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge, 1988), demonstrates similar preoccupations;see AHR forum, "The Old History and the New" (with T. S. Hamerow, G. Himmelfarb, L. W. Levine, J. W. Scott, and J. E. Toews), American Historical Review 94 (1989): 654-98: and the critiquesdelivered at the 1989 annualmeeting of the American HistoricalAssociation published as "PeterNovick's That Noble Dream:The ObjectivityQuestion and the Futureof the Historical Profession,"American Historical Review 96 (1991): 675-708. 3 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison (1974; English trans., New York, 1977).
[Journal of Modern History 66 (September 1994): 547-568] ? 1994 by The University of Chicago. 0022-2801/94/6603-0005$01.00 All rights reserved.

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prisons.The most important articlesof this debatewere publishedin a collective work which will serve as a guideline for my own study.4The basis for the encounter betweenFoucault andFrenchhistorians hadalready beenestablished by a series of earlierconvergences.In the first place, Foucault'sconcernsdiffered from those of other philosopherswith regardto the centralrole he assignedto had certainlyadopteda historicalperspective-in history.Previousphilosophers particular, Foucault'sthesis director,the philosopherGeorges Canguilhem,a specialistin the field of the historyof science.SBut the rupture Foucaultbrought aboutin philosophicalthoughtand practice-which constitutesthe fundamental reasonfor his interestto historians-was createdby his refusalto privilegethe his own work of historical canonical texts of the discipline by undertaking documentation. Foucaulthimself recognizedthe stakes inherentin this choice: " 'Theoretical' or 'speculative' has long hada rather reflection distantandperhaps somewhatdisdainfulrelationship with history.One readhistoricalworks, which were often of very high quality,in searchof raw materialthat was considered 'accurate'. Then all that was required was to reflectupon it, to provideit with a meaningand truththat it did not have on its own. Free use of others'work was permitted-to the extentthatno one even thoughtof hidingthe fact thatone was on work alreadydone; that work was cited shamelessly."6 Foucault elaborating On the one hand, it addedthat this division of labor had become problematic. assumed a hierarchybetween those who "think" and those who "go to the use of the material archives."On the otherhand,throughan uncritical produced ran the risk of unwittinglyadoptinga numberof the by historians, philosophers of history.In reactionto this problemFoucault underlying assumptions developed a methodwhichconsistedof "a way of testingthoughtwith workin history." This himselfgo "to the bottomof the mine."7In addition required thatthe philosopher to his own work, Foucault organized long-term cooperative projects with historianswhich resultedin the publicationof several annotated archivaldocufromhistorians his workin turnimmediately receivedfavorableattention ments;8 withan interestin the social sciences.It was thanksto Philippe AriesthatFoucault for his dissertation.9 In theAnnales,RobertMandrou wrotethat founda publisher it was a "decisivethesis . .. , 700 pages of rarebeautythatwill be crucialto our

4 M. Perrot,ed., L'impossibleprison (Paris, 1980). Aside several historical studies of prisons, this work assembles the elements of a debate between Foucault and historiansthat arose from a meeting sponsored by the "Societ6 d'Histoire de la Revolution de 1848." 5 See G. Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological (1965; English trans., New York, 1989). This work concerns a study in the "longue duree" of the evolution of biological norms. 6 Interviewin the French newspaperLiberation,January21, 1983, cited in D. Eribon,Michel Foucault (1989; English trans., Cambridge, 1991), p. 274.

7 8

Ibid.

M. Foucault, I, Pierre RiviWre, Having SlaughteredMy Mother,My Sister and My Brother: A Case of Parricide in the 19th Century(1973; English trans.,New York, 1975); also M. Foucault andA. Farge,Le desordredes familles: Lettresde cachet des archives de la Bastille (Paris, 1982). 9 M. Foucault, Madness and Civilization:A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (1961; English trans., New York, 1965).

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of the classical period."'0 Foucaultwas likewise generousin his understanding praise, devotingthe entire first chapterof TheArcheologyof Knowledgeto an that Braudel's "new history" and the concept of the attemptto demonstrate "longue duree" were compatiblewith a philosophy of the "epistemological role in Foucault'selection, break."" Braudelwould in fact play an important several months after the publicationof The Archeologyof Knowledge,to the College de France.After the publicationof Discipline and Punish, Foucault interactednot so much with the "historiensdes mentalites"(like Mandrou)as with specialists in the history of the working classes. Besides their common was of a politicalnature.Most interests,the mainreasonfor this rapprochement in militancy foundthemselvesinvolvedin the "anti-institutional" socialhistorians constituting the centralaxis vogue afterMay 1968,withthe themeof the "prison" converged.12 aroundwhich militantpolitics and historicalpreoccupations Despite this favorable context, the dialogue was rapidly cut short. In the of prison, MauriceAgulhonexpresseddisapproval introduction to L'impossible arguing tone whichthe debatehad all too rapidlyacquired, the "epistemological" that the notion of collective researchremainedmere wishful thinking.Foucault the divergent pointsof view.13 Severalyearslater,Arlette likewise acknowledged that continuedto pit at the misunderstandings Fargeexpressedher astonishment Foucaultagainsthistoriansand deploredthe "strange"situationof a perpetual 14 standoffand a "debatethatwas begun but never finished." reasonfor this failurewas As emphasizedby JacquesRevel, the fundamental that the dialoguebetweenFoucaultand Frenchhistoriansrestedon a misunderthe fundamentally philosophical natureof standing:historiansunderestimated himselfhadneverhidden:"From thatFoucault work,'5a characteristic Foucault's its inceptionmy projectdifferedfrom thatof historians.For betteror for worse, in they posit 'society'as the generalhorizonof theiranalysisandthe background relationto which they must situate a given object ('society, economy, civilisation'). My general theme is not society but the discourse of the true and the false."'6 He subsequentlyadded that ever since his earliest works it was the problemof truth-"the very question of philosophy"-that had remainedhis to the that, contrary It is in fact necessaryto remember constantpreoccupation. of Foucault linkedto thatmightbe createdby the leftistappropriations impression
10

Annales: la folie a l'epoqueclassique," See R. Mandrou, "Troiscles pourcomprendre

Economies, societes, civilisations 17 (1962): 771-72.

" M. Foucault, New York,1976). TheArchaeology (1969;Englishtrans., of Knowledge 12 The historian for the 1971 responsible was, along with Foucault, PierreVidal-Naquet in which a number of Foucauldian d'Information sur les Prisons," of the "Groupe creation historians wereregrouped. 13 ed. (note4 above),pp.6 and318. Perrot, 14 207 (1984):40. litteraire A. Farge,"Facea l'histoire," Magazine 15 ed. A. des scienceshistoriques, J. Revel, "Foucault Michel,1926-1984,"in Dictionnaire Burguiere (Paris,1986),pp.290-92. 16 Perrot,ed. (n. 4 above), p. 55. The subtitleof the Annalesis Economies, societes,
civilisations.

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the conditions of his receptionafter 1968, his firstmajorwork,on madnessin the classicalperiod,was actuallya scholarlyresponseto questionsraisedby French in a thesis writtenin the tradition university philosophers.17This workoriginated of the philosophyof science, as defined by the major works of Brunschwig, Bachelard,and Canguilhem.Foucault's work was heavily influencedby the philosophicaleducationhe had received, most notably at the Ecole Normale and Superieure immediately following WorldWarII. At thattime, existentialism phenomenology were at the peakof theirrenown,yet they remained contestedby in the late theirprincipalenemy,conceptualphilosophy.Structuralism's triumph 1950s signaled both the rallying of a new generationof intellectuals-the existence of which dependedupon a forcefulbreakwith past masters-and the emergenceof an unexpectedally for a previously subordinate philosophy of science. In allying themselves with the structuralists, philosophersof science obtainedtheir revenge againstthe princes of Frenchphilosophy.The Orderof Things effectively representeda settling of accounts with Sartre,'8and its As archeologicalmethod was a virtual "war machine"against hermeneutics. HubertDreyfus and Paul Rabinowhave shown, it was for reasons internalto failureof TheArcheologyof Knowledge-that philosophy-the methodological Foucaultthoroughlyreworkedhis project during the 1970s, emphasizingthe on Merleau-Ponty genealogicalmethodbased on Nietzsche and, contradictorily, (who had also projecteda "genealogyof truth").'9 In insistingon theunityof theFoucauldian project GillesDeleuzehasexpressed, in moreradicalfashion,the notionthatthe entiretyof Foucault's workis subject to requirements properonly to the field of philosophy.Accordingto Deleuze's of a readingof Foucault,any historicalformationconsists of the articulation "voir"and a "parler," with speakingand seeing understood as pureelements,a prioriconditions fromwhichall ideasareformulated. Due to the radicaldifference separatingthe "enunciable"and the "visible," the fundamental problemthat Foucaultprogressivelysought to resolve throughhis theory of power-which could also be relatedto the centralquestionthatconfronted Kant20-was thatof of these two mutuallyirreducibleforms. This is why Foucault a coadaptation fromany specificuse, whose as diagrams detached conceptualized powerrelations function was to actualize "voir" and "parler,"thereby bringing about their Theprison,in the nineteenth was a new way of "seeing" synchronization. century, crime, and delinquency(penal law) a new way of "saying" it. The prison,
See R. Castel, "Les aventuresde la pratique,"Le debat 41 (1986): 42-43. See G. Lebrun,"Note sur la phenomenologiedans Les mots et les choses" (paperdelivered at the "Foucault philosophe" colloquium, January9-11, 1988, Paris), cited in Eribon (n. 6 above), p. 157. The manuscript of Les mots et les choses (The order of things) contained numerousdirect attackson Sartre,attacks which were deleted only upon preparingthe book for publication. '9 H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralismand Hermeneutics: Withan Afterwordby Michel Foucault (Chicago, 1982, French ed., 1984). 20 "If the 'I think' is not directed toward an indeterminate ('I am') as Descartes believed, but towarda purelydeterminable'space-time', how could these two irreducibleforms be coadapted?" See G. Deleuze, Foucault (1986; English trans., Minneapolis, 1988), p. 61.
'7 18

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nevertheless, derived not from penal law but from discipline. It was panoptism, as a diagram or as a category of power detached from any specific use, that brought about their synchronization. Under such circumstances we can only agree with Deleuze's conclusion. Foucault's work is historical research and not the work of a historian. He does not write a history of mentalities but of the conditions governing everything that has a mental existence, namely statementsand the system of language. He does not write a historyof behavior but of the conditions governing everything that has a visible existence, namely a system of light. He does not write a history of institutions but of the conditions governingtheirintegrationof differentrelationsbetween forces, at the limits of a social field. He does not write a historyof privatelife but of the conditionsgoverningthe way in which the relation to oneself constitutes a private life. He does not write a history of subjectsbut of processes of subjectivation,governedby the foldings operatingin the ontological as much as the social field.2' By underscoring the "interdisciplinary" qualities of Foucault's first major work-Madness and Civilization22 -Fernand Braudel was the first to accredit the idea that Foucault and historians were addressing the same subject, thus giving rise to misunderstandings which have continued to develop ever since and which were in full evidence during the 1970s prison debate.23 The arguments Foucault developed during this period demonstrate, I believe, the inescapable contradiction inherent in the philosophical nature of his project. His desire to establish a genuine cooperation with historians explains both his rejection of the traditional division of labor between those "who think" and those "who go to the archives" and his numerous precautionary remarks aimed at showing that he did not question the legitimacy of historical practice.24 But later, in returning to the philosophical question of the true and the false within his own work, he reestablished the break he claimed to have abolished by presenting himself as the judge and arbiter of historical work. When Foucault explained that his problem lay in distinguishing "historical knowledge from a history that produces the true/false division upon which this knowledge is founded,"25 he was in fact questioning the foundations of historical knowledge. In The Order of Things, the theme of the "death of man" represented an implicit, yet virulent, critique of the object of history as defined by the founders of the Annales.26 In The Archeology of Knowledge, Foucault used the
Ibid., p. 116. Foucault, Madness and Civilization (note 9 above). 23 In a complementarynote to Robert Mandrou's account, Braudel wrote: "This requires a mind capable of being, alternatelyand not solely, a philosopher, psychologist, historian"; see FernandBraudel'spostscriptto Mandrou'sarticle,Annales: Economies, societes, civilisations 17 (1962): 772. 24 He thus notes that "any historianhas the right to remain indifferent"to his philosophical preoccupationsand that the difference between his work and that of other historiansreflects two "means of production,"both equally legitimate; Perrot,ed., pp. 56 and 32. 25 Ibid., p. 51. 26 "The object of history is, by nature,man. Let us say, men." See M. Bloch, The Historian's Craft (1947; English trans., New York, 1953), p. 25.
22

21

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to distinguishbetween "good" and "bad"historians,opposing same argument structuralist"new history," adorned with all possible virtues, to the "old" history-dated history,one might say-bogged down in its obsession with the But Foucault then went on to challenge clues, memory, and mentalities.27 it for not method,reproaching historyin the nameof the "genealogical" structural Short the arbitrariness andhistoricityof the categoriesit employed.28 questioning historians could not have followed Foucaultinto this to philosophy, of converting that domainfor, as MaxWeberso often insisted,"All scientificworkpresupposes the nature of the the rules of logic and method are valid.... Furthermore, varieswidely accordingto of scientificwork and its presuppositions relationship as propositions perceivedFoucault's Forthis reason,historians theirstructure."29 into accountandthatrelieduponsuperficial thatdid not take "reality" "theories" arbitrarily gathered,for the sole purpose of illustratingtheses documentation, which only an "army of historians"would be able to verify. According to knowledgeof sourcesexplainedwhy he was not Foucault'ssuperficial Leonard, familiarwith the facts he studied;he "[did] not perceive them from within." Agulhon stated that his lack of objectivitywas also evident in his refusal to recognizethat, thanksto progressin the "rightsof man,"today's prisonersare than underthe ancien regime.30 For Foucault,these treatedmore "humanely" an antitheoretical a perspective inherent to historical practice: betrayed arguments rootedin the belief thatthereexists an accessible "reality"indepenempiricism dent of the researcher'spreliminaryconstructions.Foucault asserted that by confusingthe "social" and the "real"historianssequesteredthemselvesin the delusionof total history.They confusedthe analysisof a problemwith the study thathe chose his material themfrom understanding of a period,which prevented he retained In his analysis,moreover, only solely in termsof his objectof research. to the relations proper thoseelementsthatallowedhim to establishthe explanatory of wanting"to say everything." absurdthe requirement object,thus rendering had effectivelybegun, and historians Once the dialoguebetweenphilosophers the illusion of a "common language" was quick to dissipate. Both sides to be "commonpointsof interest"were discoveredthatissues thathad appeared specificto theirrespectivedisciplines.Historyhad by problems actuallymotivated who polemicbetweenFoucaultand Sartre, been at the centerof the philosophical believed that the archeologicalmethod denied history. In response, Foucault me for this. Thereis a sort of mythof stated:"No historianhas ever reproached
27 This "subjective"conception of history was defended by the firstgenerationof the Annales; see L. Febvre, A New Kind of History: From the Writingsof Febvre (1953; English trans., New York, 1973). 28 In an article on Nietzsche, Foucault affirms that "the historian's history finds its support outside of time and pretends to base its judgments on an apocalyptic objectivity"; see M. Practice: Selected Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy,History,"in his Language, Counter-memory, Essays and Interviews(1971; English trans.,Ithaca,N.Y., 1977), p. 152. Thus, in a certain sense, Foucault's strategy,vis-a-vis history, has been first to use Braudel against Febvre, then Febvre against Braudel;with regardto the opposing conceptions of history of these two authors,see G. Noiriel, "Pourune approchesubjectivistedu social," Annales: Economies, societes, civilisations 44 (1989): 1435-59. 29 Max Weber,From Max Weber:Essays in Sociology (New York, 1958), p. 143. 30 Perrot,ed. (n. 4 above), pp. 10 and 315-16.

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have.... In fact it has beenquitesome time sincepeople Historythatphilosophers andothersput as MarcBloch, LucienFebvre,the Englishhistorians, as important Foucault's an end to this myth of History.",31Historians,however, interpreted For FernandBraudel,the primary work in terms of their own preoccupations. He interestof TheHistoryof Madnesslay in its studyof "collectivepsychology." context,and meaning,the concessionsmadeto phenomenology, thusemphasized very issues that Foucault,later in his book, incessantlycriticized.During the workon the prisonprivileged interested in Foucault's followingdecade,historians attemptingto illustrateit throughstudies of the the notion of "confinement," realityof penal servitude,factories,and hospitals,insteadof recognizingthat it concept. was in fact a philosophical Robert At this point the "dialogue"led to a dispute over "misreadings." who had been the firstto point out the interestof Foucault'sworkfor Mandrou, rejectedthe historyof mentalities, becamemorecriticalwhenFoucault historians, to which Mandrouhad devoted his life's work.32Conversely, philosophers work.Deleuzecriticized of Foucault's denounced"misinterpretations" repeatedly or congratulate him for for stickingto confinement, Foucault thosewho "reproach having analysedit so well." He denouncedthe "new fools" who invoked "a universaland eternal consciousness of the rights of man which must not be subjectedto analysis.This is not the firsttime an idea has been called eternalin and is not even aware orderto maskthe fact thatit is actuallyweak or summary of those elementsthatmightsustainit (such as the changesthathave takenplace In responseto Deleuze, Jacques century)."33 in modernlaw since the nineteenth Leonardspoke ironicallyof the philosopher'sstaturecomparedto the "needy artisansof historicallabor";he laterwonderedabouttheories "which leave the Among historiansless well disposed business of tidying up to the jobbers."34 toward Foucault,the debate took a more aggressive turn. Charles Carbonnel Frenchhistorians by sayingthathe justifiedhis thesis topic on nineteenth-century of metaphysicians, logicians,and wantedto "denyto the outrageous imperialism other epistemologists a domain which they had only obscured through the effect of esotericlanguageand systematica priorism." deforminganddestructive His conclusion was an orthodox critique of Foucault's "received ideas"-a make whichFoucault wouldof courseignore,given "theuse philosophers critique rest."35 of that which disruptsthe systems on which theirfragilereputations
TRADITIONS II. THE FORCEOF DISCIPLINARY

One of the essentialreasonsfor the failureof the dialoguebetweenFoucaultand historianswas that the variousdisciplineshad thoughtit possible to establisha
La quinzaine litte'raire(March 1968), cited in Eribon (n. 6 above), pp. 164-65. See R. Mandrou, "Le statut scientifique de l'histoire," Encyclope'dieuniversalis (Paris, 1968): Foucault, "in his Archaeology,comes to the point of assertingthe uselessness of historical discourse, at least as he knows it" (8:429). 3 Deleuze (n. 20 above), pp. 50 and 90. 34 J. Leonard, "L'historienet le philosophe" in Perrot,ed., pp. 9-28. 35 C. 0. Carbonnel,Histoire et historiens (Toulouse, 1976), pp. 7 and 575.
31 32

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"spontaneous" cooperation, relyingmainlyon the goodwillof thoseinvolved.Yet they were unwittingprisonersof their respectivedisciplinary traditions. This is suggested by the fact that the very same polemic between philosophersand the historians hadtakenplaceat the beginningof the centuryin France. Contesting imperialism of "positivist" historians who had established theirsupremacy in the universityin the name of a historicalscience foundedon the cult of the fact, Durkheimian philosophersattemptedto impose a "social science" (sociology) foundedon the epistemologicalprinciplesof Kant and Auguste Comte. Kant's worksfurnished the arguments thatfurthered.the of disputeover the foundations science: realityis not given, it is fabricated and this explains by the researcher, workmustbe subordinated to the theoretical construction of the why all empirical object.Comtismreinforcedthe Kantianpositionby assigningto philosophythe power of judging science's criteriain termsof a universalmodel of the natural of the sciences, contrasting those which sciences. Comteestablisheda hierarchy to those which aremore aremore "concrete" situatedat the bottomof the ladder, the Durkheimians "abstract" placedat the top.Armedwiththeseprinciples, began a lengthypolemic againsthistorians,whom they accusedof being incapableof constructingthe object of their research.Whereas the goal of any scientific for the Durkheimians, was to discoveruniversallaws, historians endeavor, sought to restorethe pastby meansof an empiricistapproach whichconfusedthe "real" with the objectof knowledge.36 If Foucauldian philosophyrejectedAugusteComte'sscientism,it nevertheless remained,as we have seen, deeply influencedby the Kantianprinciplesthat assigned philosophythe role of supremearbiterin the dispute over truthand falsehood.The arguments also illustrate the tenacityof the developedby historians the profession.It shouldbe pointed antitheoretical empiricismthatcharacterized out that Foucault's interlocutorsdid not belong to the currentof "histoire For the most partthey were identified evenementielle" fustigatedby Durkheim. with the Annales, the historiographical movementthat arose in the 1930s and of "positivist" historians embraced the Durkheimian critiqueof the "empiricism" the in orderto promotea "new history."37 By adoptingphilosophical arguments, of "new history," thatthey were now speakinga language proponents persuaded commonto philosophy, hadforgotten thatthe relations betweendisciplinesarenot merelya questionof words:they also involve professional practiceswhicharefar more constraining thantheirdiscourses. In the case of France,the conditionsunderwhich the new universitieswere createdat the end of the nineteenth centurywere decisive.The 1880-90 reforms of the "social (which mark the true beginnings of the professionalization sciences")took place in the contextof the politicalstrugglesthatthe republicans
For an account of this debate, see P. Besnard, ed., The Sociological Domain, the Durkheimiansand the Founding of French Sociology (Cambridgeand Paris, 1983). 37 The harshest indictment at the beginning of the century by Durkheimian philosophersociologists againsthistorianshas become a sort of manifesto for the new history,republishedby the Annales; see F. Simiand, "Methode historique et science sociale," Revue de synthese civilisations 15 (1969): historique,vol. 6 (1903), and reprintedin Annales: Economies, socie'te's, 1-22.
36

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backedby out againstthe conservative parties(RoyalistsandBonapartists) carried explain, to this day, the These circumstances the Churchand the aristocracy. of the "rules of the game" in the French university:Parisian particularities state control, and the cult of science (as opposed to religious centralization, For historians,these innovationsresulted in a fundamental "prejudices").38 in the universities, who were fromthe lower contradiction. Most of the historians historians-who had or middleclasses, struggledagainstthe aristocratic-amateur the discipline,which they considereda simpleextensionof untilthen dominated the cult of ancestry-on the basis of boththeirspecializedskills, borneof a long and their refusalto compromisewith the social world technicalapprenticeship, and the powersthatbe in the name of the demandsof scientificknowledge.But they were also backed by the republicanpowers, which had need of a new "collective memory"capable of securingnationalreconciliationbased on the This is why the values of the FrenchRevolutionand the cult of the fatherland. schools functionsin secondary to assumeeducational historians Republicrequired of programs, establishment etc.)39and to work and universities(teachertraining, of the foundingmyths of the Republic.In within society on the vulgarization the most eminentrepresentatives the Stateacknowledged its debt,honoring return of the new profession:election to the Academie Fran,aise was consideredthe was historian career.In otherwords,if the republican apotheosisof a historian's expected to be a "scholar,"he was also obliged to be a "professor"and a lessons, writing school manualsand "writer,"accomplishingtasks (preparing booksfor the generalpublic)whichhadnothingto do with the normsof scientific This contradiction work as definedby the professionat the end of the century.40 withinthe historicalprofessionbetweenknowledgeandpowerexplainsthe vigor of the polemics that subsequentlyset the partisansof scientific history in Butthe debatewas even moreacutein that to thoseof narrative history. opposition Prior the main disciplinesof the new universitywere pittedagainstone another. to the 1880s, studentsof literature had receivedonly a generaleducation,which such as Micheletor Taine,were also philosophers explainswhy majorhistorians, and writers.The republicanreformsbroughtabout disciplinaryspecialization, professor,the which resultedin threedistinctuniversitypositions:the literature of university In termsof boththe number positions andthe historian. philosopher, and public prestige,historiansespecially benefitedfrom these transformations. The disciplines that were adversely affected attemptedto discredithistory by On the one hand,therewere the "lettres"who mobilizingopposingarguments. reignedin the salons and the universitywas regrettedthe days when literature
38 Parisis the site of the most prestigiousand most numerousposts, and it is Parisianprofessors who retain the greatest amountof institutionalpower (control of publicationsand nominations). Most professors are civil servants on the payroll of the Ministry of National Education. Since 1945 the pay scale (based on seniority and position) is the same for all French universities. 39 In rejecting any clear distinction between secondary and university education, the Third Republic merely followed the Napoleonic tradition.The "agregation,"a competitive examination, leads to positions in both areas, and most university professors are first employed in secondary education. 40 See G. Noiriel, "Naissance du metier d'historien," Geneses 1 (1990): 58-85.

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simplyone of the privilegedsites of high society.Accordingto them, history,in its attemptto imitate science, denied its own strengthsby mutilating"human realities"and severing itself from the people. On the other hand, history was confronted by the new generation of Durkheimian philosophers who, as we have seen, combated history in the name of sociology, on the very terrain of
"science."41

Fromthe inceptionof the modemuniversity, historyand philosophyoccupied antagonisticinstitutionalpositions which brought their divergences to light. Durkheim andhis studentsrepresented a disciplinesituatedon the marginsof the andthey affirmed theirmarginality university, as the conditionof trueknowledge. Their perspectivealso reflectedthe limited social experienceof an intellectual community"cut off fromthe world,"whose essentiallyliteraryeducationled its members to overestimate the importance of theoretical reflection andthe powerof words.The marginal statusof these intellectuals, whethersufferedor willed, also helps explaintheir "revolutionary" epistemology-an expressionof theirdissatisfactionwith the worldand of theirdesireto overturn its foundations, at least in thought. This idealization of rupturemanifested itself in a refusal of any with "common fortheDurkheimcompromise sense";thisexplainstheimportance ians of abstractlanguage, inaccessible to simple mortals, and their manifest disdain for the vulgarization of knowledge.That refusal also translated into a with other that prohibited all "conversation" conceptionof "interdisciplinarity" disciplines,previousor concurrent philosophiesincluded.Since knowledgewas all intellectualproductionwas evaluatedin terms of a given "nonnegotiable," theoreticalscaffolding, and only those elements that suited the model were retained.42 of its History'sinstitutional positionlikewise explainsthe maincharacteristics in CharlesSeignobos'sreasoning, discourse. As clearlyillustrated epistemological in the first comprehensive defense of history against philosophicalcritiques,43 historians hadto reconcilethe contradictory of demandsof the "centrist" situation theirdisciplinewhich,as we have seen, was splitbetweenthe poles of knowledge and power.Historyhas always represented an essentialdimensionin the life of societies. This is undoubtedlywhy, in most languages, the term "history" designatesboth the reality to be known (historyas "past") and the discipline responsible for elaboratingthis knowledge. This confusion has predisposed historians to considerthatwhat is important in historyis limitedto those events which the powersthatbe and public opinionconsider"historical." The privilege Seignobos and other Sorbonne historiansaccorded political historyis thusunderstandable. By definition, historians evolvedin the socialworld
41 Regardingthe relationsbetween social identity and logical identity,see the analyses of J. C. Passeron, Le raisonnement sociologique: L'espace non-Poppe'riendu raisonnement naturel (Paris, 1991), pp. 57-88. 42 The notion of philosophy as the production of concepts that exclude any possibility of "conversation"was also recently developed by G. Deleuze and F. Guattari,Qu'est-ce que la philosophie? (Paris, 1991). 43 These principles are shown in C. Langlois and C. Seignobos, Introductionaux etudes historiques (Paris, 1898); C. Seignobos, La methode historique appliquie aux sciences sociales (Paris, 1901), ttudes de politique et d'histoire (Paris, 1934).

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like fish in water and were thus hardly inclined to question the theoretical foundationsof their discipline. For these historians,history was above all a "practicalactivity" which, as with physics or zoology, did not depend on Reflectionon historywas limitedto a smallminority for its progress.44 philosophy most often in responseto attacks who acted as the profession'sspokespersons, from the "outside"-that is, from otherdisciplines.45 Defininghistoricalknowledgein termsof analysisand synthesiswas a way of inherentto the discipline. Analysis allowed for the reconcilingcontradictions method" basedon sourcecriticismandpresupposed, of a "historical development a division of laborand with the exigencies of professionalization, in accordance of of knowledge.The importance a portioningand a "crumbling" consequently of synthesisderivedfrom this situationsince it alone allowed for the restoration of a total history(in most cases a the whole of the "past"withinthe framework of the publicandthe powersthat "historyof France")satisfyingthe expectations since synthesiswas be. But this also reflectedthe profession'sideal of community forthesake weresupposed to gather together themomentwhenall the "producers" conrevealedhistorians' Theseprinciples of erectingthe commoti"masterpiece." Just as historiansrejectedany questioningof the ception of interdisciplinarity. of legitimacy.46 foundations of knowledge,they also refusedto enterinto quarrels theexistenceof otherdisciplines,it was onlybecause Yetif theyso readilyaccepted they perceivedhistory to be the point of convergencefor all knowledge.The on thebasisof thisall-encompassing disciplinehadin factbeenentirelyconstructed method"was only a revivalof since the "historical of interdisciplinarity definition centuryby philologyand techniquesperfectedat the beginningof the nineteenth This was Seignobos'spositionwhenhe definedsociology as one of hermeneutics. methodwas thatthe historical sciences"andwhenhe asserted history's"auxiliary evidence.47 necessaryto all disciplinesthatuse documentary
ANNALESHISTORIANS OF EMPIRICISM AMONG III. THE PERSISTANCE

century,the universityexperiencedno Afterthe upheavalsof the late nineteenth majorchangesuntilWorldWarII. This stabilityexplainswhy the same conflicts during phaseof Frenchuniversities, wouldrecurduringthe seconddevelopmental
44 As Seignobos remarksin his debate with Simiand: "I want to remain on a practicallevel, inasmuch as this is possible in a theoretical discussion, by investigating how the practical problemsof historical work come into existence, for it is precisely these practicalconditions that Simiand overlooks" (Seignobos, ttudes de politique et d'histoire, p. 32). 45 This explains why French historians from Charles Seignobos to Fernand Braudel have deliveredtheirreflectionson history in articlesor conferences which were subsequentlypublished in collective works. 46 Rather violently attackedby the leader of Durkheim's successors, Seignobos nevertheless replied: "The difference between us is not that which exists between two generations:it is the naturaldivergence between a philosopher and a historian" (ttudes de politique et d'histoire, p. 30). 47 The logic of "inclusion"also explains the relationto precedinggenerationsor othercurrents as opposed to a ruptureor transcendence. of historical researchin terms of "complementarity," In its development, social history is thus considered as "a fragment of the total history of societies" (Seignobos, La methode historique appliquee aux sciences sociales, p. 313).

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One of the mainstakesof these conflictswas the creation the 1950s and 1960s.48 des HautesEtudes.The social sciences of the Sixth Sectionof the Ecole Pratique to free themselvesfrom the tutelageof history. hopedto use this new institution it into the of theAnnalesalso wishedto controlandtransform But the participants of their struggleagainstthe Sorbonne'spenchantfor political main instrument proposedby the Annales history.The new conceptionof "interdisciplinarity" logic. Oncehe hadacknowlfaithfulto Seignobos's"all-encompassing" remained LucienFebvre edged the sociologicalcritiquesof the Sorbonne's"empiricism," was unableto presentthe historical"method"as the basis for the establishment domain.If, for Febvre,the new historywas the point of of an interdisciplinary of the culmination convergencefor all knowledge,it was becauseit represented the "humansciences."Accordingto Febvre,the other disciplineswere merely able to clarify a single dimensionof humanexistence;only historywas able to restoreit in its totality. The success of the Annales allowed historiansto take control of the Sixth Section of the Ecole Pratiquedes Hautes Etudes to the detrimentof other In the beganto questionhistory's"imperialism." disciplines,which subsequently that furnishedthe 1950s, though, it was no longer Comtismbut structuralism method his archeological In preaching to be directed ammunition againsthistory.49 the "deathof man,"Foucaultalso took partin this battle,even andin announcing reelaboration FemandBraudel's werenot his only adversaries.50 thoughhistorians structuralist critiques,all the while remaining of the Annales projectintegrated Withthe conceptof the "longue notionof interdisciplinarity. faithfulto historians' pointfor duree"it was no longermanbut timethatbecamethe commonreference all the disciplines.5'For Braudel,all disciplineshad a stake in the problemof in its essence, the science of time, but only historycouldbe considered, duration, thus justifying its claims to hegemony over the other human sciences. Two from his On Historywill suffice to illustratethis point: "Historyis'a quotations it, andthanksto it, historyis a studyof society, dialecticof the time span;through of the whole of society and thus of the past and thus equallyof the present,past This is why history"hasgot a fingerin every pie andpresentbeing inseparable." by vocation";it "will alwayswish to grasp on the table"since it is "a synthesizer the whole, the totalityof social life."52The series of equivalencesthatprovided is clear:time = history= the social = the assumptions the basis for new empirical real. The other essential principlesof historicalresearchfollowed from these
48 PierreBourdieushowed how the universitycrisis which culminatedin May 1968 was based on disciplinarydifferences similar to those that arose at the end of the nineteenthcentury.See P. Bourdieu, Homo Academicus (1984; English trans., Stanford,Calif., 1988). 49 See J. Revel, "Histoire et sciences sociales: Le paradigme des Annales," Annales: civilisations 34 (1979): 1360-76. Economies, socie'te's, 50 In contrastto Durkheim,Foucault also had to protect philosophy from the emerging social sciences. Immediatelyfollowing WorldWar II Maurice Merleau-Pontyhad advocated cooperation between the social sciences and philosophy, the latter playing the role of "conductor"and producing the concepts required by the empirical disciplines. But structuralismfurnished the necessarytheoreticalfoundations,which allowed the social sciences to dispense with philosophy. 5' See F. Braudel, On History (1969; English trans., Chicago, 1980). 52 Ibid., pp. 69-70 and 76.

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equivalences:above all, Braudel's distrust vis-'a-vis "theories"put forth by of the progressof historical economistsor sociologists and his understanding in termsof continuity andcomplementarity-themost successfulhistory research being, for him, the sum of all possible histories. This rapidoverviewof the relationsbetweenhistoryandphilosophyin France This conditioning. the powerof disciplinary duringthe last centurydemonstrates is also illustrated,a contrario,by the failure of those projectsthat aimed to introducephilosophicalquestionsinto historicalthought.The attemptby Paul in this regard. Whereas Marc Veyne(a specialistin Romanhistory)was significant who spendtheirtime tracingrigid of theoreticians Bloch-in an ironicportrayal thatto thinkaboutthe studyof betweenscienceandnonscience asserted borders Veyne history is to "explainhow and why a historianpracticeshis trade,"53 produceda lengthy argumentin an attemptto situate history theoreticallyin relationto the sciences, thus taking into account,but inversely,the legitimacy Severalyearslater,in an hadsoughtto initiatewith historians.54 debateDurkheim Veyneaskedhis colleaguesto considerthe philosopher essay devotedto Foucault, for the good reasonthat Foucault,throughhis works,had as a "purehistorian" the Unfortunately, betweenhistoryandphilosophy."55 displacedthe "boundaries concrete of these limits in thoughtwas not sufficientto transform displacement This explainswhy PaulVeynes'scall receivedso littleresponse practices. research More generally,those who had hoped to develop a truly among historians.56 philosophicalhistoricalpractice(whetherbased on Foucault,Marx, or others) into the domainof history,they failed because,by importinga new "language" into that explains the discouragement condemnedthemselves to a marginality which many of them have finallyfallen.

IV.RELATIONS OF POWER AND THE REPRODUCTIONOF PROFESSIONALNORMS

The permanenceof the positions occupied by Frenchhistory and philosophy withinthe universitydoes not, in itself, explainthe continuityof thelrepistemoof these disciplineshas also playeda The institutionalization logical frameworks. part in structuringthe power relations that contribute significantly to the the discoursesof of professional norms.In spite of theirdifferences, reproduction philosophyand of history have until recently shareda refusal to examine the
Bloch (n. 26 above), p. 12. P. Veyne, Writing History:Essay on Epistemology(1971; English trans.,Middletown,Conn., 1984). According to Veyne, if history were to be fully realized, sociology would have no reason for being. 55 P. Veyne, "Foucaultrevolutionne l'histoire," in Commenton ecrit i'histoire (Paris, 1978), pp. 201-42. 56 Even Jacques Le Goff (who is more predisposedto theoreticalreflection than most French historians), all the while admitting that "this work presents Paul Veyne as one of the rare examples of epistemological historians,"considers that Veyne's work is based on "conceptualizing history which risks dragginghistory away from its propersphere, whethertowardMarxist in his finalities, Weberianabstractionsor structuralatemporalities"(J. Le Goff, "Introduction," Faire de i'histoire [Brussels, 1988]): xi and 34.
5 54

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problemof power within the institution.Foucault'swork, however, provides his assertionthat power is valuabletools for such an analysis-in particular, inherentin social relations because it constitutesan essential element in the Whatis at issue is not so muchthe "denunciation" of any community. structuring of power the understanding but,rather, of poweras a meansof its "suppression" in orderto manageit and make it more bearable.57 Foucaultnever appliedthese rules to his own world of power Paradoxically, characterin termsof the logic of "denunciation" relations,which he understood of The establishment of Frenchphilosophy. tradition istic of the "revolutionary" knowledge,however,is a consequenceof its institua specializedphilosophical tionalization,for the latter guaranteesthe transmissionof disciplinarynorms, by controllingthe labor marketand the trainingof students.Because primarily can ensure the existence of an audience capable of only institutionalization thatcharacterize judgingacademicwork,the routineandarbitrariness competently of this power seem to be the necessaryprice for the maintenance bureaucratic power, specializedknowledge.In his attemptto escape the yoke of disciplinary this audience; a broader Foucaultsoughtallies outsideof philosophyby targeting But by adapting one of the reasonsfor his dialoguewith historians. is, moreover, this "authorial"tactic he discovered another kind of dependence, that of in France(the At times of "revolutionary" politicalconjunctures fashionability. beginningof the century,the 1950s, May 1968), "radical"philosophershave have philosophers But duringperiodsof disillusionment interest. popular attracted always had much less success. Foucault became increasinglyaware that the value. generalimpactof his work was not necessarilyrelatedto its philosophical projectthat Thatis why, at the end of his life, he devotedhimself to a desperate a world of specialists.58 aimedat reconstituting explainswhy the acceptedconceptionof the "community" Among historians, the question of institutionalpower has always been taboo. Braudel,however, encountersdifficulties, occasionallyreferredto this problem.Interdisciplinarity accordingto Braudel,because of the conservativepracticesthat receive "the support of aged scholars and because of the institutionswhich open their embracingarmsto us when we ourselvescease to be dangerousrevolutionaries of the intellect."59 bourgeoisie andbecomegood bourgeois-for thereis a terrible with the logic of denunciation, By saying "us"(insteadof "them,"in accordance the power.of others),Braudelsuggestedthathe too was which only apprehends ensnaredin the web of power relations60and thus opened the way for an
57 See M. Foucault, The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, ed. G. Burchell, C. Gordon, and P. Miller (Chicago, 1991). 58 At the beginning of the 1980s, Foucaultthoughtthat "the moment a book went beyond the circle of those to whom it was really addressed,that is, those scholars who knew the problems which it dealt and the theoreticaltraditionsto which it referred,it no longer produced 'effects of knowledge,' but 'effects of opinion' "; his attemptsto found a series of books for specialists arose from this idea; see Eribon (n. 6 above), p. 292. 59 Braudel, On History, p. 57. 60 Braudelwas-almost sixty years old when he wrote these lines. He was editor of the Annales and the leader of the Sixth Section of the Ecole Pratiquedes Hautes Etudes. Twenty years later, after a long "resistance,"he entered the French Academy.

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in the functioning whichhe presentsas inherent analysisof a problem "objective" we can Althoughthis analysis has not yet been undertaken, of any institution. hypothesizethatthe oppositionbetweenthe "younger"and the "older"generaand the "bourgeoisat heart," points to the tions, between "revolutionaries" contradiction which,in the historicalprofession,takesthe form power/knowledge of an oppositionbetween "synthesis"and "thesis.",61 that the meaningof this opposition,we mustremember In orderto understand century, thosewho hoped withinthe university, as it emergedin the late nineteenth were dependent on those who controlled to acquirethe officialtitle of "historian" to provethemselvesthroughthe writingof the labormarket. They were required could of the "thesed'etat," of which,untiltherecentreform a thesis,thepreparation task, burdensome andfinancially thankless, lastfor morethanten years.A solitary, the candidate's perfectcomthatdemonstrates the thesis is usuallya monograph mand of historicalmethods and complete knowledge of the archivalsources. andadmission recognition is a prerequisite for professional Becausethe doctorate these hardships are accepted.But once the doctorate to the worldof "synthesis," is acquired, no longerinvolves "going to the archives"so much being a historian committees, on thesis committees,recruitment as exercisingpower(participation worksless specializedthana thesis, a reputation (by publishing etc.) andacquiring are more on subjectswhich interesta largeraudienceand which, consequently, posts, foracademic presses).Becauseof thecompetition by major readilypublished potentialcandidatesmust submitto the normsof the disciplineas well as demtheiroriginality in relationto the competition. Hence,youngscholarstend onstrate of criteria of historicalwork(valorizingthe number to emphasizethe "scientific" publications,specializedworks, originalresearch,and so on). Newcomers are to principlesthatthejudges themselvesno longerrespectsince judgedaccording theserulesdo not applyto theirworkof synthesis.This tensionis one of the forces conflict;recognizingthat fact allows for a sociological that drive generational Because of theirposition of the rise of new historicalparadigms. understanding fromother withinthe discipline,youngscholarsaremorereceptiveto innovations fields of knowledge,above all when these techniquesclaim to be "scientific." Nevertheless,success requiresthat these innovationsbe adaptedto professional
norms, primarily by the work of translation.62 The history of the journal Annales

of this process.63 offers an exampleof the importance In 1929 MarcBloch and LucienFebvre,the foundersof the Annales,although neitheryoung nor marginal(they taughtat the highly respectedUniversityof nevertheless remained distancedfromthe most prestigiouspositions Strasbourg),
61 This is one of the reasons for the lengthy battle against the thesis on the partof the historians of the Sixth Section of the Ecole Pratique. 62 The concept of translationis here employed in the sense Thomas S. Kuhn gives it when he compares various professional communities to differing linguistic groups which may intercommunicate only if there is a certain numberof researcherswho accept the task of translatingone group'sinnovationsinto another'slanguage;see T. Kuhn,TheStructuresof ScientificRevolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago, 1970). 63 This explains why the periods when the center of gravity of the discipline shifts toward "scientific history" are those of rejuvenationof the profession and high recruitment(end of the nineteenthcentury,the 1950s and 1960s).

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in Paris, the center of academic power. This situationexplains, in part, their intellectualmotivation,an attributethat was missing among those who, like statusand power.Provinciallife, moreover, Seignobos,had alreadyaccumulated allowedthemthe time necessaryfor research-time thatwas lackingfor Parisian with administrative tasksandthe social life of the capital. academicsencumbered who had converted FrancoisSimiand,a formerphilosophystudentof Durkheim for the economic and social historythat over to economics, was the inspiration Bloch andFebvreopposedto the politicalhistoryof theirelders.As a participant in the firstgreatdebatebetweenphilosophyandhistoryat the turnof the century, history of the Simiand had developed a radical critique of the "traditional" In requesting Bloch andFebvrewantedto give Simiand'scollaboration, Sorbonne. the impressionthat the Annales continued the traditionof the Durkheimian to history.LucienFebvreaskedSimiandfor permission challengeto "empiricist" intendingto place publish extractsfrom a nearly finished book on salaries,64 of a largerstudyof the economichistory research withinthe framework Simiand's of of France. From the outset, however, Febvre presented an interpretation Simiand'swork adaptedto the needs of the historicalcommunity-so much so to his own to be "perfectlycontrary" thatSimiandconsideredthis interpretation analyses.Simiandthus refusedFebvre'soffer.65 with historians the aim of which was to familiarize This processof translation, a work whose abstractcharacterwas completely foreign to them and which was to last twentyyears.The firstdecisive required a lengthyseriesof mediations, was ErnestLabrousse,an economist and studentof Simiandwho intermediary Labrousse introduced "converted" to historicalresearch.In two classic works,66 the fundamental principlesthat would increasinglybecome the paradigmfor retainedSimiand'smethodology(quantieconomicand social history.Labrousse of two economiccycles analysis,andhis articulation long-term tativetechniques), and recession),but he adaptedthem to the exigencies of historyby (prosperity and,above all, truearchivalresearch, language,emphasizing using a less abstract maincriticismof Simiand).In refusingto obscurethe role of "man"(historians' with social and practicethis meantthat price and salarycycles were correlated wouldbe recognized In spite of these efforts,Labrousse politicaltransformations. by the professionthanksonly to the tireless efforts of a historian'shistorian, to the Georges Lefebvre, a friend of Lucien Febvre and an early contributor Annales. His reviews of Labrousse'sbooks and the discussions he led at the Societe d'HistoireModeme completed,afterthe SecondWorldWar,the process of a chair of of assimilationbegun fifteen years earlier.With the establishment andof the Sixth Sectionof the Ecole economicandsocial historyat the Sorbonne condientitledthe "SectionEconomiqueet Sociale," the institutional Pratique,
F. Simiand, Le salaire, 1'evolutionsociale et la monnaie (Paris, 1932). See "Une correspondance entreLucien Febvre et FrancoisSimianda I'aubedes 'Annales,'" Vingtiemesiecle, revue d'histoire 24 (1989): 109- 10. 66 C. E. Labrousse,Esquisse du mouvement des prix et des revenusen France au XVIIIesiecle, 2 vols. (Geneva, 1933), and La crise de l'economie francaise a la fin de l'ancien regime et au debut de la Revolution (Paris, 1944).
65 64

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were assembled.Nevertheless, tions necessaryfor the success of the enterprise in the 1950s and 1960s, of a success only becamedefinitivewith the recruitment, met theirneed for of historians who foundthatthe new paradigm new generation the normsof the profession.On the basis of a innovationwithouttransgressing vague Marxist ideology (which gave these young recruits, who were still to criticizethose who held powerat the top of arguments outsiders,Left-leaning was from the triadeconomy/society/politics the profession),a matrixconstructed This offeredbotha convenient"plan"for the manydissertations put into place.67 for a anda framework produced by this movement(mostlyregionalmonographs) total history (the history of France) which remainedthe highest stake in the was betweenthe various"historicalschools."The formerparadigm competition factoris not politicsbut explanatory thuschallengedin every aspect:the principal economics;historyis not madeby greatmenbutby classes,hencethe substitution "qualiof "quantitative" methods,such as statisticalanalysis,for the traditional The economic and social paradigm(social history) simultatative" method.68 of historical work: the exhaustive neously satisfied two central requirements and examination of archives,thanksto a perspectivethatleft nothinguntouched, the organization of a collective researchprojectwhich, in the 1950s and 1960s, allowed Labrousseto launch large-scale surveys of Europeansocial classes. social, colloquia,and research Journalssuch as the Annalesand the Mouvement organizationspopularizedthis work and established networks between the In addition,as the sole chairof economic and membersof the new community. controlleda positionthat social historyin Francefrom 1945 to 1967, Labrousse of historians, includingalmostall of the enabledhim to trainseveralgenerations of the "new social history"of the 1970s. leadingproponents basedon the Frenchcase, havea moregeneralapplication? Do thesereflections, addressed only througha systematiccomparison This questioncan be adequately in a numberof countries.I will limit myself to a few observations of universities in orderto show that the problemsraised here are not peculiarto France.The to the maintenance institutionalization of the disciplineshas certainlycontributed the academicworld. Durkheim,for of so-called nationaltraditionsthroughout of WilliamJames in example, vigorouslyfought the philosophicalpragmatism in acquiring its dominant statusin the culture."69 defenseof "French Pragmatism, between to the establishment of calmerrelations UnitedStates,greatlycontributed disciplines because contraryto the French case, where philosophy was long neverconcerned dominated by the influenceof positivism,in the U.S. pragmatism a readingof itself with the definitionof hierarchyof the sciences. In Germany, fromMax Weber fromthatin Franceled philosophers Kantsignificantly different
67 This structuralframework allowed for the development of a number of variations: in Braudel's work geography takes the place of economics, while for other authorsmentalities or civilization is substitutedfor politics. 68 This process is describedin J. Y. Grenierand B. Lepetit, "L'experiencehistorique: A propos de C. E. Labrousse," Annales: Economies, societes, civilisations 44 (1989): 1337-60. For Simiand's and Labrousse'srole in the new economic history, see also E. Le Roy Ladurie, The Mind and Method of the Historian (1973; English trans., Chicago, 1981). 69 E. Durkheim,Pragmatismand Sociology (1955; English trans., Cambridge, 1983).

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to Cassirer, by way of Husserland Dilthey,to reject "naturalist monism"andthe hierarchy of the sciences in favor of the specificityof the "humansciences."In the United States and Germany, the decentralization of academicpower and the professionalautonomyof history(which is much greaterin those countriesthan in France)have favored a "peacefulcoexistence"between disciplines and the establishment of professional networksvery differentfrom those in France.Nevertheless,the similarityof the problemsbeing debatedby historiansof different countries-the examination of theidentityof history, its fragmentation, its relations with other fields and with the public at large-is striking.These convergences certainly reflecttheeffectof theintemationalization of research overthepasttwenty years,70but they are primarilydue to the fact that historianseverywhereare confrontingthe same contradictions. Relying on the Americanexample, Carl Schorskehas shownthatthe current of historicalresearch is due to its splintering which requireit to borrowits conceptsfrom othersocial empiricistfoundations, sciences. The paradoxof history,then, is that it has a precise identityonly if it privilegesanoutsidedisciplineas partner, thuscondemning itself to anevergreater as the social sciencesthemselvesdevelop.7'Nonetheless, degreeof diversification it is necessaryto specify that behind this growing diversification of historical researcharehiddentwo very differentconceptionsof interdisciplinarity. The first emphasizesthe renewalof researchmethodsand themes withoutcontestingthe empiricistfoundationsof history.The best example of this is the social history developed after the Second WorldWar by EdwardP. Thompsonand Eric J. whichachievedimmensesuccessthroughout Hobsbawm, the world.72 The second of interdisciplinarity andextols a historythatis truly conception rejectsempiricism Fromthe 1970s onward,this tendencyis encountered in manycountheoretical. Stedman tries,notablyin GreatBritain,whereGareth Jones,one of the "founding fathers"of the "HistoryWorkshop," militatesfor historyto free itself from the supervisionof the social sciences by producing,thanks to Marxism,its own In Germany, the historiansof the "Bielefeld school" theoreticalinstruments.73 (H. U. Wehler,J. Kocka,and others)rely on Marxand Max Weberin opposing "social-scientific to traditional history"(historische Sozialwissenschaft) history.74 The same theoretical in the UnitedStateswith the exigencieshave also appeared

70 Undoubtedlybecause one always desires what one does not possess, French philosophy is very much in style today in the United States, while on the banks of the Seine Anglo-Saxon pragmatismis highly valued. 7 1C. Schorske, "Historyand the Study of Culture," New LiteraryHistory 21 (1990): 407 - 20. 72 See the fundamentalbook by E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, (London, 1964); and E. J. Hobsbawm, "FromSocial Historyto the Historyof Society," Daedalus 100 (1971): 20-45. 73 G. S. Jones, "The Poverty of Empiricism," in Ideology in Social Sciences: Readings in Critical Social Theory,ed. R. Blackburn(London, 1972), pp. 96-115; and Languages of Class: Studies in English WorkingClass History, 1832-1982 (Cambridge, 1983). 74 See H. U. Wehler, "Geschichtswissenschaft heute," in Stichwortezur "GeistigenSituation der Zeit," ed. J. Habermas (Frankfurt,1979), 2:709-53; J. Kocka, Sozialgeschichte: Begriff, Entwicklung,Probleme (Gottingen, 1986).

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of classical The impactof this contestation emergenceof "new social history."75 wherethe powerof the historical discoursewill be muchlargerin thesecountries, thanin France.This explainswhy for aboutfifteen universityis less centralized questionshavebecome,for the firsttimein the historyof the yearsnow theoretical elementin the competition among stakes:an important discipline,genuineinternal to whatStedman Joneshoped forjobs andacademic prestige.Contrary researchers the dependency of historians didnot suppress for,however,thisevolutioncertainly continued to growsince In fact,thatdependency on socialsciencesandphilosophy. of historicalresearchcriticismis no longerbasedprincipally in the new currents on archivalquestionsor on fields of research(economic and social historyvs. politicalhistory)but on the legitimacyof the theoriesused. Moreandmoretoday, historian must in orderto be admired by his colleagues,the new interdisciplinary model.Thus,thereis an increasingly rapidcirculation appealto a new theoretical of these models which preventsthem from being truly (and "consumption") and one is obliged to drawfrom the assimilated by the communityof historians, stock of concepts fabricatedby disciplinesfor which it is the naturalvocation The Britishprovidea significant exampleof this evolution. (notablyphilosophy). Afterhavinghimselfrejectedthe Marxistmodelin favorof a theoryof language, Jonesis todayconsidered outdated who rely on by moreradicalauthors Stedman social JacquesDerrida'sphilosophyof deconstruction.76 Likewise, in Germany, who of Alltagsgeschichte, by thepartisans scientific historyis nowbeingchallenged debate.In of CliffordGeertzin a bitterepistemological mobilizethe anthropology the name of an alternative global conceptionof history,which explicitly seeks a "HansMedickargues thatonly anthropological history "histoire totalede 1'homme, is able to respondto the questionsaskedof social history,whetherit "likes it or The current of Foucauldian philosophy not"("ob sie will oder nicht").77 adoption the theoriesthat illustrates the samelogic as theyrepudiate by American historians new modelsstemming turn." fromthe "linguistic inspired socialhistoryto promote similar to those we discussed in the Here one discovers "misunderstandings" to the seminal volume she edited on the new Frenchcase. In her introduction Cultural historyhas drawnon the LynnHuntclearlyanalyzeshow cultural History, in orderto free itself fromthe long Foucauldian conceptof "discursive practice" tutelage of social history and to establish itself as a fully developed and now field of research.78 autonomous However,her analysesstill revolve aroundemThis is apparent in passagessuch piricistconcernsthatFoucaulthad repudiated.
75 See, e.g., D. Landes and C. Tilly, eds., History as Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1971). This evolution is encountered in many other countries, notably in Italy; see, e.g., L. Masella, Passato e presente nel dibattitostoriografico:Storici marxistie mutamentidella societa italiana (1955-1970) (Bari, 1979). 76 On this question, see G. Eley, "De l'histoire sociale au 'tournant linguistique' dans l'historiographieanglo-americainedes annees 1980," Geneses 7 (1992): 163-93. 77 See H. Medick, "Missionare im Ruderboot?Ethnologische Erkenntnisweisen als Herausforderung and die Sozialgeschichte," in Alltagsgeschichte: Zur Rekonstruktionhistorischer Erfahrungenund Lebenweisen,ed. A. Ludtke (Frankfurt,1989), pp. 48-136. 78 L. Hunt, "Introduction: History, Culture, and Text," in The New Cultural History, ed. L. Hunt (Berkeley, 1989), pp. 1-22.

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as this one: "Wherewill we be when every practice,be it economic,intellectual, social, or political,has been shownto be culturally conditioned? To put it another way,can a historyof cultureworkif it is shornof all theoretical assumptions about culture's to the social world-if, indeed,its agendais conceivedas the relationship of all assumptionsabout the relationship between cultureand the undermining social world?"79 These considerations implicitlyrefer to a historicaltotality,a of an intellectualconstruction of the object and "past"thatexists independently is the same for everyone.The historian'stask, in this instance,is to unveil those For Foucault,on the contrary, aspectsof the past consideredmost important. just as the conceptof sugaris not itself sweet,historyas an intellectual disciplinemust it is not the social not be confusedwith historyas the past.Accordingto Foucault, or culturalrealities of the "past"that define social or culturalhistory.Rather, historiansdevelop theirown conceptualization of the past, constructing the "social" andthe "cultural" as objectsof history.But becausethese paradigms do not referto thesame "past,"theyarein fact "incommensurable." Thatis why Foucault did not deny the possibilityof explainingdiscursivepracticesby social determinations.This question,he said, was not one thathe wantedto study,but it was a problem"connected" to his own.80He simplywantedhistorians to recognizethat the objectof research thathe haddefined,the analysisof discursivepractices, was as "real"as the "social"thathistorians criticizedhim for ignoringand constantly thatits elucidation its own hypotheses, required concepts,andmethodandnot the applicationof the putativelyuniversal,master-keyconcepts of social history.8' of thispositionhas further fueledthepolemicsamonghistorians Misunderstanding becauseproponents of the "linguisticturn"have often used the conceptof discursivepracticeto discreditand challengethe very legitimacyof social history, when what is at issue is more a questionof its primacy. These examplesshow thatthe majorproblemcurrently interdisciconfronting of research(since every scientific plinary history is not the "fragmentation" domain in development necessarily fragments itself) but the fact that the at the centerof a single professionalcommunityno longerspeakthe researchers same language.82 models on theirown account, By takingup externaltheoretical historianshave importedinto the heartof their disciplineforms of thoughtthat characterize "revolutionary" epistemology(a rejectionof relativismand a claim to totalizingexplanations). Yet the increasingdependencyof historyon external
79 Ibid., p. 10. My point here is not to attack empiricism, which is inherent in a historical approach,but to show that it is at work even in the thinking of those historianswho denounce positivism. 80 In Perrot(n. 4 above), pp. 29-39. 81 P. O'Brien, all the while relying on Foucault's work, criticizes him "for having left human actors out of his history of power" ("Michel Foucault's History of Culture," in Hunt, ed., pp. 45-46). This criticism is correct, however, as Gilles Deleuze has emphasized, only if one departsfrom the Foucauldianproblematic,limited to an analysis of discourse, and places oneself at the level of social relations; see G. Deleuze, "On the Death of Man and Superman,"in Foucault (n. 20 above), pp. 124-32. 82 On the two types of "conversation" which divide philosophersand historians,see A. Megill, and the Futureof Historiography," AHR forum,AmericanHistorical Review 96 "Fragmentation (1991): 695.

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theories and the fact that these theories are often poorly understoodby the historians who claimthemshows that,in all the countrieswe haveexaminedhere, the "normalscience" of history has remainedfirmly attachedto its empiricist foundations.The French example suggests that the principal cause of this but in the centralposition steadfastness is not to be foundin discursivestrategies occupied by history at the heart of the institutionof the universityand, more widely, at the heartof the social world.83
V. RETHINKING INTERDISCIPLINARITY What lessons can be drawn from this analysis concerning interdisciplinarity? If,

formof the followingMichelFoucault,one defineseach disciplineas a particular of scientificinnovation mustnecessarily knowledge/power relation, every strategy
take into account both knowledge and power, in order to transform both the forms of knowledge and the relations of power that prevailed in the discipline. In other

who areengagedin the same words,in orderto understand each other,researchers

relations of power must speak the same language. Under these conditions, though, how can the exigencies of communication between researchers and the necessities of opening up to other disciplines be reconciled? In my opinion, there are only two solutions to this problem. The first resides in what the sociologists of science term "hybridization." Segments of two or more disciplines join together to form a new field of knowledge which progressively obtains its own institutional autonomy, ranging from the control of pedagogy to the recruitment of researchers.84 During the debate on the history of the prison, Foucault himself had envisaged a solution of this sort, proposing to philosophers and historians a "historico-philosophical" study of the Enlightenment, which would, he said, test the solidity of their relations. To be viable such a project would have required the establishment of a new field of knowledge-the institutionalization of either a "historical philosophy" or a "philosophical history" practiced by philosophers with a knowledge of historical methods or by historians with training in philosophy. Hybridization, however, depends on the relative proximity of the disciplines in question, which hardly favors an encounter between history and philosophy, whose languages are to this day difficult to reconcile. The other solution has been practiced for quite some time now by historians, but it has never been studied in detail. It concerns the process of "translation" mentioned earlier with regard to the "economic and social history" of the Annales, by which the historian adapts innovations from other disciplines to the necessities and preoccupations of his own. That is, in order for the community of historians
83 According to the national traditions,the factors that contributeto this centrist position of course can vary extensively. It seems, e.g., that in the United States it is the professional associations especially and not the state, as in France, that structureand reproducethe forms of knowledge and the relations of power. 84 M. Dogan and R. Pahre, Creative Marginality: Innovation at the Intersections of Social Sciences (Boulder, Colo., 1990).

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to "seize"Foucault'swork,as PaulVeynewished,it would have been necessary for his partisans not only to read and cite him but also to translate him into the languageof historians. Undoubtedly, though,the passageof time was neededin orderto arriveat this point.85

I have triedto show how historiansmight benefitfrom the Foucauldianconcept of the "state of relations of power" in my latest book; see G. Noiriel, La tyranniedu national, appropriation le droit d'asile en Europe (1793-1993) (Paris, 1991).
85