4. REVILLA vs.

CA, January 27, 1993 Facts: Don Cayetano Revilla, a bachelor, owned 2 pieces of land with buildings in Manila and 6 parcels of land in his hometown in Bulacan. These properties are worth P30M. In 1978, he executed a 13-page last will and testament, bequeathing all his properties to his 9 nephews and nieces including petitioner, Heracio Revilla. To each, he gave 1/10 of his estate reserving the last tenth for masses to be said after his death and for the care of religious images he kept in a chapel in Bulacan. During his lifetime, Don Cayetano sought the probate of his will to which the CFI Manila admitted. However, the City Hall of Manila was burned by fire where the records were also burned. A petition for reconstitution of the records was filed and it was granted. After Don Cayetano died, Heracio Revilla filed another petition of a will wherein he instituted Heracio as sole heir of his uncles estate and executor of the will allegedly executed in 1982. The probate was opposed by Heracios 8 brothers and sisters on the grounds that: Since 1978 up to Cayetanos death, he never informed that he revoked the will executed in 1978 The 1982 will was not executed in accordance with law and the signature of Cayetano was different from his usual and customary signature Cayetano was of unsound mind when he executed the will That the alleged will was executed with undue pressure and influence That the 1978 will is void for the reason that it was executed under duress or the influence of fear or threats Cayetano acted by mistake and the signatures in the alleged will were procured by fraud and he did not intend that the instrument be his will at the time of fixing his signature The trial court disallowed the second will. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court. Issue: Whether or not the court erred in disallowing the second will.

Held: When Don Cayetano testified in the reconstitution proceedings, he was unaware of the second will which he supposedly made. He identified his first will and declared that it was his true and only will. He could not have executed a second will because he was sick in the hospital during that time (he stayed there for 2 months) and he could not sign any papers while he was confined in the hospital. During the reconstitution proceedings, the will was produced. It was placed in a browned envelope stating Buksan ito pagkalibing ko to which Cayetano agreed to open. He recognized the original will and acknowledged that he signed it. In the court records, Cayetano declared that he did not execute another last will and testament after the original will had been probated. Significantly, although the petitioner opposed the reconstitution of Don Cayetano's first will, he did not reveal the second will which Don Cayetano supposedly made only 2months before he testified in the reconstitution proceeding. If the second will already existed on November 27, 1982, it would have been Heracio's strongest argument against the reconstitution of the probate of the first will. Since the execution of the second will could not have occurred on the alleged date (September 13, 1982) appearing therein (for Don Cayetano was admittedly sick in the hospital then) it must have been procured at the time when the testator was a virtual prisoner, held incommunicado, in his house. Judge Eduardo Bengson had to issue an order commanding the petitioner to allow his 8 brothers and sisters to visit Don Cayetano. Only then were they able to penetrate the iron curtain that Heracio had placed around their uncle. A videotape, taken during their visit and shown in court, belied Heracio's allegation that Don Cayetano was displeased with his said nephews and nieces, that was why he left them out of his second will. Despite Judge Bengzon's order, Heracio did not cease his efforts to monopolize Don Cayetano and his estate. To isolate Don Cayetano and make him inacessible to the private respondents, Heracio transferred him from his own house in Manila to Heracio's house in Quezon City. The execution of the second will in an environment of secrecy and seclusion and the disinheritance of his 8 other nephews and nieces, justified the trial court's and the Court of Appeals' belief that undue influence was exercised by Horacio over Don Cayetano to make him

sign the second will (which Don Cayetano did not know to be such) in order to deprive his brothers and sisters of their rightful share in their uncle's estate. There was fraud because Don Cayetano was not apprised that the document he was signing with Co, Barredo and Lim ( as witnesses) was a second will revoking the dispositions of property that he made in his first will. Had he been aware that it was a second will, and if it were prepared at his own behest, he would not have denied that he made it. He would probably have caused it to be probated while he was still alive, as he did with his first will. But apparently, the instrument was foisted on him without his being aware of its true nature which the petitioner assiduously concealed, not only from the court and the private respondents, but from Don Cayetano himself. That the dispositions in the second will were not made by Don Cayetano is proven by the omission of Don Cayetano's reservation of one-tenth of his properties and the income thereof to pay for holy masses and to be spent for the maintenance of his family chapel. That provision in his first will, for his personal benefit, would not have been deleted by Don Cayetano if his only purpose in making a second will was to disinherit his nephews and nieces. But Heracio overdid himself. He wanted everything. *Assuming for the sake of arguments that the second will was executed, the testimonies of the notary public, as well as those of the three (3) instrumental witnesses were not given credit because of major contradictions in testimonies. 5. SEANGIO VS. HON. AMOR G.R. November 27, 2006; Azcuna, J.: FACTS: On September 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo. Petitioners opposed assailing among others that Segundo left a holographic will which is entirely a declaration of disinheritance affecting Alfredo, one of the private respondents. Private respondents opposed the probate on the ground that the holographic will did not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased. RTC dismissed the petition for probate easoning that the holographic will clearly shows preterition. ISSUE: A. REYES

Whether or not the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will. RULING: A holographic will must be written, dated and signed by the testator himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deducted from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative deposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, is an act of disposition in itself. The disinheritance results in the disposition of the property in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. With regard to the issue on preterition, the court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was Segundos last expression bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. 6. NUGUID VS NUGUID JUNE 23, 1966 SANCHEZ, J.: FACTS: Rosario Nuguid , single, died in December 30, 1962.She was without descendants but was survived by her parents and siblings. On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid, her sister filed in CFI a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario on November 17, 1951 or 11 years ago, said will instituted Remedios as the universal heir thereby, compulsory heirs, the ascendants of the decedent, filed their opposition to the probate proceeding. They contend that they were illegally preterited and as a consequence, the institution is void. The courts order held that the will in question is a complete nullity. ISSUE: Whether or not the compulsory heirs were preterited , thereby rendering the holographic will void. Whether the court may rule on the intrinsic validity of the will. RULING: The statute we are called upon to apply in article 854 of the civil code which states: The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct time, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of GRN L-2344 17 SCRA 449

the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the d and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious The forced heirs, parents of the deceased, were received nothing by the testament. The one-sentence will institutes petitioner as the universal heir. No specific legacies or bequest are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir his/her share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. On the second issue, the case is for the probate of the will and the courts area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity of the will comes after the will has been duly authenticated. However if the case is to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. The practical conditions: time, effort, expenses and added anxiety, induced us to a belief that we might as well meat head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. 7. NERI GR No.L-47799, 74 PHIL 185 v. May AKUTIN 1943

children by his first marriage but upon the erroneous belief that he had given them already more shares in his property than those given to the children by his second marriage. Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if contested, shall annul the institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a case of preterition which annuls the institution of heirs. 8. Constantino C. ACAIN, petitioner vs. Hon. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. 72706, October 27, 1987 FACTS: Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the probate of the will of his late Uncle, Nemesio Acain, on the premise that the latter died leaving a will in which the former and his brothers and sisters were instituted as heirs. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court, Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, a legally adopted daughter and the widow of the deceased respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) Constantino Acain has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. Said motion was denied as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Consequently, Fernandez and Diongson filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC granted Fernandez and Diongsons petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for probate of the will. Due to the denial of Acains motion for reconsideration, he then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been pretirited. RULING: Article 854 of the Civil Code:

21,

FACTS: This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his will left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of the children by his first marriage, the herein petitioner. The omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated by the testator with the belief that he had already given each of the children portion of the inheritance, particularly a land he had abandoned was occupied by the respondents over which registration was denied for it turned out to be a public land, and an aggregate amount of money which the respondents were indebted to their father. ISSUE: Should there be cancellation of the will, in view of the omission of heirs? Is there disinheritance in this case? HELD: Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy on the ground that testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, without expressly disinheriting the

The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation. Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. However, the same thing cannot be said of the legally adopted daughter. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will and that both the adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child. The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. 9. NON vs. CA, February 15, 2000 Facts: 10. PEREZ vs. GARCHITORENA, 54 Phil 431

Belleza. Should the command be not respected, Belleza shall immediately seize the lot and turn it over to the testatrix near descendants. ISSUE: WON the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil are inherited by his heirs. HELD: This is not a case of simple substitution. The codicil did not provide that should Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix near descendants would substitute him. Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution. Here, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Also, the near descendants right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. It will only pass to them if the obligation to deliver is not fulfilled. Moreover, a fideicommissary substitution is void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second degree. In this case, the near descendants are not at all related to Dr. Rabadilla. This is also not a conditional institution. The testatrix did not make Rabadillas inheritance dependent on the performance of the said obligation. Since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional. The manner of institution is modal because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without affecting the efficacy of such institution. A mode imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. In a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate. The mode obligates but does not suspend. 12. NIEVA V. ALCALA (1920) Facts: Juliana Nieva, the natural mother of Segunda Maria Niev a, married Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born. Juliana died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from her ab

11. RABADILLA vs. CA 2000 FACTS:

G.R. No. 113725 June 29,

In the codicil of testatrix, Rabadilla was instituted as a devisee of a lot, containing the following provisions: 1. Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year, to give to Belleza 100 piculs of sugar until Belleza dies; 2. Should Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give the lot shall have to obligation to still give yearly the sugar as specified to Belleza; 3. In the event that the lot is sold, leased or mortgaged, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver yearly sugar to

intestate, the parcels of land in question. Alfeo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thus, the lands passed to his father, Francisco, by intestate succession. Thereafter,Francisco married Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was born Jose Deocampo. Francisco died on August 3, 1914, whereupon his widow and son took possession of the lands in question. On September 30, 1915, Segunda, as acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana, instituted the present action for the purpose of recovering from the parcels of land in question, invoking the article 811 of the Civil Code. Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate relative within the 3rd degree is entitled to the reserva troncal. Held: Manresa, in determining the persons in whose favor the reservation is established, says: "Persons in whose favor the reservation is established. In the interpretation of article 811 the reservation is established in favor of the parents who are within the third degree and belong to the line from which the properties came. "It treats of blood relationship It could not be otherwise , becauserelationship by affinity is established between each spouse and the familyof the other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor thetransmission of the properties of the family of one spouse to that of the other, which is just what this article intends to prevent."It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve is a legitimate ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which proceeds from the same legitimate family, and this being true, there can be no question, because the line from which the properties proceed must be the line of that family and only in favor of that line is the reservation established. Furthermore, we have already said, the object is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate family and it could not be otherwise. Article 943 denies to legitimate parents the right to succeed the natural child and vice versa, from which it must be deduced that natural parents neither have the right to inherit from legitimate ones; the law in the article cited establishes a barrier between the two families; properties of the legitimate family shall never pass by operation of law to the natural family.

Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:"A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed an intestate the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child." To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a flagrant violation of the express provisions of the foregoing article (943). 13. SUMAYA V. IAC (1991)

Raul Balantakbo inherited from 2 different ascendants the 2 sets of properties subject of this case: 1) A 1/3 interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of land situated in Dita, Lilio (Liliw), Laguna from his father Jose, Sr., who died on January 28,1945; 2) A 1/7 interest pro-indiviso in 10 parcels of registered lands from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, who died on November 3, 1950. On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving only his mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo, as his sole surviving heir to the real properties. On November 3, 1952, Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the said properties in an Affidavit entitled "Caudal Herederario del finado Raul Balantakbo." On December 21, 1959, Consuelo Joaquin vda de. Balantakbo sold the property inherited from Jose, Sr., to Mariquita H. Sumaya. The same property was subsequently sold by Sumaya to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc., on December 30, 1963. Also on December 30, 1963, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the properties inherited from Luisa Bautista, to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc. The latter in turn transferred and assigned all its rights to the properties in favor of Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. which properties are presently in its possession. On January 23, 1967, Villa Honorio Development Corporation transferred and assigned its rights over the

property in favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. The properties are presently in the name of the Cooperative, 2/3 share and the remaining 1/3 share is in the name of Sancho Balantakbo. The parties admit that the certificates of titles covering the above described properties do not contain any annotation of its reservable character. On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died. On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all surnamed Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo and Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also all surnamed Balantakbo, surviving children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the first named Balantakbos, filed suit to recover the properties which they claimed were subject to a reserva troncal in their favor. Held: On the question of registration of reserva troncal. Upon the death of the propositus, Raul Balantakbo, the reservista, Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo caused the registration of an affidavit of self adjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties were inherited by Raul from his father Jose, Sr., and from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista. Said affidavit was, in its form, declaration and substance, a recording with the Registry of Deeds of the reservable character of the properties. In Spanish language, the affidavit clearly stated that the affiant, Consuelo, was a lone ascendant and heir to Raul Balantakbo, her son, who died leaving properties previously inherited from other ascendants and which properties were inventoried in the said affidavit. Although the certificates of titles covering the properties in question show that they were free from any liens and encumbrances at the time of the sale, the fact remains however, that the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo stating the source of the properties thereby showing the reservable nature thereof was registered with the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and this is sufficient notice to the whole world. Thus, in Gatioan v. Gaffud, We held:

"When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein "Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebuttable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise, the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed.

14. MORENTE V. DELA SANTA 9 PHIL 387; DECEMBER 19, 1907 J. WILLARD:

FACTS: Consuelo Morente died leaving a will which states that (1) all her real setate shall pass to her husband, Gremersindo dela Santa; (2) that the husband shall not leave her brother after her death and not he shall not marry anyone; should he have children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property except 1/3 thereof and 2/3 should be given to her brother Vicente or his children if any; (3) after her death, husband should live in which the bakery id located.

Four months after her death, Gremersindo married again. Elena Morente, sister of the testatrix filed a petition in the probate alleging 2nd marriage of Gremersindo and asked for the annulment of the legacy. The CFI denied the petition.

HELD:

Affirmed.

Testamentary provision made

conditional and prohibitive against another marriage may be valid against a widow or widower.

Hewever, under the will of the testatrix, there are several directions given to the husband, but no one of these orders is attached that condition that he fails to comply with them, he shall lose the legacy. It is only in one event- having children- the disposition will change.

The will should be construed with reference to all the clauses and with reference to such surrounding

circumstances.

There being no express condition

attached to the legacy in reference to the second marriage, there can be no implied condition from the context of the will. In order to make a testamentary

provision conditional, such condition must fairly appear from the language used in the will. 15.