From Havana to Miami: U.S. Cuba Policy as a Two-Level Game Author(s): William M.

LeoGrande Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Spring, 1998), pp. 67-86 Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/166301 . Accessed: 16/01/2012 06:52
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FromHavanato Miami: U.S.CubaPolicyas a Two-Level Game

William M. LeoGrande

or thirty years, Cuba was a focal point of the Cold War. Before the demise of the Soviet Union, Cuba's close ideological and military partnership with the communist superpower posed a challenge to U.S. foreign policy, especially in the Third World (see, e.g., Dominguez 1989). With the end of the Cold War, Cuba retrenched, ending its aid programs for foreign revolutionaries and regimes. Without the Soviet Union's sponsorship, Cuba could no longer afford the luxury of a global foreign policy exporting revolution. Instead, its diplomats focused on reorienting Cuba's international economic relations toward Latin America and Europe, building friendly relations with former adversaries. Ordinarily, such a massive shift in the international system would be expected to produce a significant change in U.S. policy, as it did in the cases of Russia, Eastern Europe, Angola, and even Vietnam. But U.S. policy toward Cuba changed hardly at all. That is an anomaly we endeavor to explain herein, using Robert D. Putnam's (1988) theory or "metaphor" of international bargaining as a two-level game. (For elaborations on Putnam's model, see Evans et al. 1993). The two-level game model also provides a coherent explanation of President Bill Clinton's handling of the 1994 Cuban refugee crisis and the 1996 shootdown of two small planes by Cuban fighters. Putnam argues that in any international bargaining situation, national leaders are actually involved in two negotiations simultaneously: the international negotiation (level 1), wherein the leader seeks to reach agreement with other international actors; and a domestic negotiation (level 2), in which the national leader must persuade his domestic constituency to accept ("ratify") the level 1 agreement. For leaders, the problem is that rational moves in the level 1 game may prove impolitic at level 2, or vice versa. The set of all possible agreements that domestic constituents will ratify is called the level 2 "win-set." To achieve a successful agreement, the leader must locate the intersection, if any, between his constituency's winset and what the other level 1 negotiators will accept (that is, the level 1 "win-set"). The negotiation is complex because each negotiator is playing a similar two-level game. Putnam's contribution lies in his emphasis on the interactive nature of the international and domestic processes.l

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Games can become quite complex, especially when issues are "heterogeneous"-that is, when domestic constituents are divided in their preferences such that negotiated agreements that increase utility for some decrease it for others. In such circumstances, "side payments" to injured constituents may be an essential tool for winning their acquiescence to an agreement. Allied nations not directly involved in a negotiation may also have a stake in its outcome. Putnam treats allies as a type of level 2 constituency, whereas Knopf (1993) treats them separately as a "level 3" game. Finally, nations may be involved in more than a single level 1 negotiation simultaneously, such that the outcome of one negotiation affects the outcome of the other. Cuba's experience dealing with both the United States and the Soviet Union is perhaps the best example of such a complex game. In the three-and-a-half decades since Fidel Castrocame to power in 1959, the United States has only rarelyengaged in explicit bargaining with the Cuban regime. From the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 until the early 1970s, the U.S. policy was simply one of maximum economic and diplomatic isolation aimed at destabilizing Castro. During the 1970s, the United States and Cuba engaged in two rounds of negotiations aimed at normalizing relations-one under Gerald Ford and one under Jimmy Carter. Neither succeeded, however, and the arrival of Ronald Reagan signaled a return to the unbridled hostility of the 1960s. The absence of explicit negotiations during most of these years does not render Putnam's model inapplicable, however. Throughout this period, U.S. sanctions against Cuba can be seen as implicit bargainingcoercive diplomacy intended to change Cuba'sbehavior. At various points, Washington articulatedits bargaining position quite explicitly, listing what Cuba would have to do to secure a normalization of relations. One interesting facet of this case is how and why the U.S. bargaining position shifted over time, moving away from a primary focus on foreign policy issues and toward Cuban domestic political arrangements. DETERIORATINGRELATIONS: LEVEL 1 ISSUES DOMINATE The early years of the U.S.-Cubanrelationship were determined primarily by international factors. Analysts disagree as to whether the deterioration in relations was caused by irreconcilable differences between the two countries' interests or by misperception and poor diplomacy, but few attributethe downward spiral to domestic political dynamics. In a detailed study of the U.S. domestic political reaction to the Cuban revolution, Richard Welch concludes that the executive branch and public opinion "were seldom at odds" in their reaction to the revolution. "[T]herelationship of official policy and majoritypublic opinion was a manifestation of pressure exerted by each side in a process of mutual reinforcement" (Welch 1985, 103).

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The issues that precipitated the deteriorationof relations were largely security-related, and the most importantwas Cuba's growing relationship with Moscow. Yet domestic factors were never entirely absent. To the extent that the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrationsfaced significant criticism of their Cuba policies, it came from the right.2 Conservative Republicans, led by Senators Barry Goldwater and James Eastland, lambasted both presidents for not being tough enough on Castro. The conservative press, especially Time magazine, echoed their complaints, and public opinion was decidedly hostile to Castro.A May 1960 Gallup poll found that 81 percent of the public had a negative opinion of the Cuban regime, and only 2 percent a positive opinion. A year later, Gallup found that 63 percent of the public supported a trade embargo on Cuba "so long as Castrois in power" (Wattsand Dominguez 1977, 23-24). Such opinions, combined with criticism from the right unmatched by any significant defense of Cuba from the left, created a "hawkish" atmosphere that reinforced the executive branch's hardening attitude toward Castro's government (Welch 1985, 160, 170-71).3 Even during the 1962 missile crisis, when the international stakes were as high as they could be, John F. Kennedy was not immune to the influence of domestic politics. Indeed, the crisis began when the CIA intensified its surveillance of Cuba in response to Republican criticismthat Kennedy was doing nothing in the face of a Soviet arms buildup on the island. Senators Kenneth Keating and Homer Capehartwere the most vocal as the 1962 Congressional election campaign heated up. The Republicans stood to gain a political windfall if Kennedy mishandled the crisis. "We've just elected Capehart ... and Ken Keating will probably be the next president," Kennedy said half-jokingly shortly after the crisis began (Neustadt and May 1986, 8). On the Cuban side, domestic factors may have weighed more heavily in the early years of antagonism with Washington. Castro came to power at the head of a coalition composed of diverse political forces that had united to overthrow the old regime. The issue of U.S.-Cuban relations became caught up in the domestic struggle between the radical and moderate wings of the revolutionarycoalition; the deteriorationof bilateral relations served to undermine the political standing of the moderates, many (though not all) of whom were pro-United States. Theodore Draper (1965) goes so far as to argue that Castro sought confrontation with Washington as a way of consolidating domestic control. As relations between Washington and Havana deteriorated, Castro effectively appealed to Cuban nationalism to rally public support and to justify repressing his opponents. Throughout the 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations remained frozen in hostility. Washington's key demand for normalization was that Cuba end its support for Latin American revolutionaries and sever its ties with the

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Soviet Union-a demand that, if met, would have left the island defenseless and economically bankrupt. Havana, for its part, insisted that Washington unilaterallydrop its economic embargo as a precondition for discussions on any other issues. There was, to put it mildly, no intersection between these win-sets, and both sides knew it. DETENTE WITH CUBA? LEVEL 1 SECURITYISSUES RECEDE By the early 1970s, however, U.S. officials had begun to reassess policy toward Cuba. The economic sanctions imposed in the 1960s had failed to depose Castro, and the flowering of detente made him seem less threatening. If Washington could have normal relations with China and the Soviet Union, why not with Cuba? In Congress, both Democrats and moderate Republicans openly criticized the immobility of U.S. policy. In 1971, SenatorsWilliamFulbright, Frank Church, Edward Kennedy, and Charles Mathiasintroduced legislation to lift the U.S. embargo. In 1973, an informal caucus of House Republicans known as the Wednesday Group added its voice to those calling for an end to economic sanctions against Cuba. During 1974 and early 1975, a number of members from both the House and the Senate traveled to Cuba, and unanimously called a change in policy on their return (Brenner 1983, 44-50). Cuba, meanwhile, moderated its support for revolutionaries abroad. One by one, LatinAmerican countries were normalizing relations with the island, and pressure was rising within the Organization of American States (OAS) to repeal economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed in 1964. A major State Department review of U.S. policy in 1975 concluded that the security issues at stake in Cuba had receded to the point of being "trivial." Washington was paying a substantial price for maintaining the policy of hostility, both domestically and in its relations with the rest of LatinAmerica. "Ifthere is benefit to us in an end to the state of 'perpetual antagonism' it lies in getting Cuba off the domestic and inter-American agendas," the report concluded (Shlaudeman 1975). A few months later, a State Department assessment of the "U.S.domestic scene" concluded that the weight of opinion in Congress, the private sector, and the public at large favored normalization with Cuba. "Some strong conservative opposition will emerge, and perhaps some demonstrative Cuban exile terrorist acts," Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-AmericanAffairs William D. Rogers wrote to Secretaryof StateHenry Kissinger, "Butthe opposition will be isolated" (Rogers 1975b). Indeed, public opinion had shifted significantly in the early 1970s after President Richard Nixon's trip to China. A 1971 Harris poll asking people whether they favored normalization of relations with Cuba found 61 percent opposed and only 21 percent in favor. But by 1973, the balance

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had changed: a majorityhad come to favor normalization; 51 percent to 33 percent. Half a dozen polls throughout the decade found support for normalization gradually growing (Watts and Dominguez 1977, 25). In 1974 and 1975, Kissinger initiated a series of secret meetings between U.S. and Cuban diplomats to discuss the reestablishment of normal relations (Kornbluh and Blight 1994). Washington dropped its demand that Cuba sever its relationship with the Soviet Union, and Cuba dropped its demand that the United States lift the embargo as a precondition for talks. Publicly, the Ford administration took a number of conciliatory steps. It eased the economic embargo by exempting the subsidiaries of U.S. corporations in third countries, negotiated an antihijacking treaty with the Cubans, and voted in 1975 to relax the OAS sanctions. Washington's policy changed because security concerns had diminished in significance while level 2 sentiment, both domestic and allied, had shifted from "hawkish"to "dovish."Consequently, Washington's win-set on Cuba had expanded: Kissingerwas willing to coexist with a communist regime in Havana so long as it did not behave in ways that upset the balance of superpower relations.4 In late 1975, however, two events changed this calculus. Ronald Reagan launched a conservative challenge to Gerald Ford for the 1976 Republican nomination, raising the political cost of any change in Cuba policy; and Castrosent thirtythousand combat troops to Angola, demonstrating that Cuba's ability to pose security problems for Washington was not so trivial after all. Washington reacted to the Angolan intervention by making Cuban withdrawal from Angola a new precondition for the normalization of relations (LeoGrande 1980). Jimmy Cartercame to office intent on resuming the normalization process, partlybecause he was more responsive to LatinAmericanopinion than was Kissinger, and he regarded Cuba (along with the Panama Canal) as a major obstacle to improved interamericanrelations. A new round of bilateraltalks produced a treatyon maritimeboundaries, the release of four thousand Cuban political prisoners, and the establishment of diplomatic "interestsections" in both capitals-a move just one step short of normal diplomatic ties. Once again, however, the gradual movement toward normalization was interrupted by events in Africa. In 1978, the Cubans deployed twenty thousand troops to Ethiopia to defend the new Marxist government in a border war with neighboring Somalia. The Ethiopian deployment was closely coordinated with the Soviet Union, and it severely weakened U.S. influence in the strategic Horn of Africa.5 Cuba's African interventions demonstrated that its terms for normalwith the United States were not so broad as to include the relations izing abandonment of the rest of Cuban foreign policy. Cuba construed its interests as still antagonistic to Washington's and insisted on pursuing them vigorously (a pursuit that paid handsome dividends for Cuba's relations

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with Moscow, not coincidentally). If Ford and Carterhad been under the impression that the Cubans would restrain themselves in exchange for better relations with Washington, they were mistaken. Carter had little incentive to accept Cuba's terms. By 1980, the demise of detente had revived security concerns about Cuban behavior, and Ronald Reagan'srun for the presidency marked a shift in domestic opinion toward a more hawkish posture on foreign policy issues generally. Finally, relations between Cuba and the Carteradministrationwere fatally poisoned by the Cuban government's 1980 decision to allow wholesale, uncontrolled migration to the United States through the port of Mariel. The 1980 Mariel boatlift brought 125,000 Cuban refugees to the United States. Coming in the midst of the 1980 presidential campaign, this event for the first time engaged the attention of the U.S. public toward Cuba, to President Carter's detriment. Unable to stanch the flow of unrestricted immigrants, Carterappeared weak and indecisive. Because of the Marielboatlift, immigrationwas one of the few issues Washington negotiated with Cuba during the Reagan years. Reagan took a hard line toward Cuba from the outset, blaming Fidel Castrofor the rising tide of revolutionary wars in Central America. Reagan imposed new sanctions, including a revived travel ban; tightened the economic embargo; and created Radio Marti,a U.S. government-run broadcast of news and commentary to Cuba (LeoGrande 1986). Despite waxing and waning levels of hostility, however, the three decades of U.S. policy toward Cuba before the end of the Cold War were produced by the same dynamic. ForWashington, the central issue was the security problem posed by Cuba'srelationship to the Soviet Union, and this level 1 concern structuredU.S. policy. Public opinion might be somewhat more hawkish (in the 1960s) or dovish (during the early 1970s), but the attentive public on Cuba was small and the issue's salience low. For policymakers, the level 2 game was decidedly secondary. Nevertheless, Kissinger's brief flirtation with normalizing relations foreshadowed how the dynamic of U.S. policy might change after the Cold War, when U.S. security concerns diminished and level 2 concerns-domestic and alliedcame to the fore.

CUBA AND THEEND OF THECOLD WAR

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union had profound economic consequences for Cuba. In 1988, the Cubans conducted approximately 75 percent of their trade with the Soviet Union and another 15 percent with Eastern Europe. When the Eastern European regimes collapsed in 1989, their trade with Cuba fell to almost nothing.6As the Soviet Union disintegrated, Cuba had to renegotiate trade agreements

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with the newly independent states and establish contracts with the private firms that arose as the centrally planned economy was privatized. The biggest blow to Cuba, however, was the loss of Soviet economic assistance. By the late 1980s, the Soviets were providing between three billion and four billion dollars a year in economic aid, mostly in the form of subsidized trade prices. These subsidies ended when the Soviet Union collapsed. The loss of aid severely reduced Cuba'simport capacity, and the resulting shortages of key raw materialslike fuel and fertilizercaused huge production losses in both manufacturing and agriculture. Cuba's sugar crop, which remained the principal source of foreign exchange earnings, was eight million tons in 1990, but by 1993 it had fallen to just four million tons. Consumer goods of all types became extremely scarce, unemployment rose, and the standard of living contracted abruptly. By most estimates, Cuba's gross national product fell between 35 and 50 percent from 1988 to 1993. A lonely socialist country in an increasingly capitalist world, Cuba gradually and grudgingly initiated economic reforms in order to reorient trade relations with market economies in Western Europe and Latin America. The need to attracttrade, capital, and tourists from the capitalist countries superseded Cuba's penchant for promoting revolution abroad. Troops came home from Africa,Cuban advisers no longer instructed Latin American revolutionaries, and military ties to Russia shrank to almost nothing. By 1993, all the principal security issues that had prevented a normalization of relations with Washington had disappeared. In Washington, however, the goal posts had been moved. As the security issue faded from the agenda of U.S. Cuba policy, the promotion of democracy rose to replace it. The idea that U.S. foreign policy should promote democracy has a long pedigree, but it was eclipsed during most of the Cold War by the realist argument that security and the balance of power were preeminent concerns. President Carter'semphasis on human rights was a significant exception to this (at least during the first two years of his term, before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), and it foreshadowed subsequent developments. When the end of the Cold War made containment irrelevant as an organizing principle for foreign policy, democracy promotion emerged as a consensus candidate to replace it. Both George Bush and Bill Clinton embraced this new aim, though not (as China policy demonstrated) to the exclusion of more traditionaleconomic and security interests. With Cuba, however, U.S. security concerns were nil and potential economic interests modest, so it was no surprisethatthe promotion of democracy became a key element in the revised agenda of U.S. demands. This shift was reinforcedby the growing political power of conservative Cuban Americans. The Cuban exile community had always been the most vociferous advocate of a tougher policy toward Cuba, but until the 1980s, its political

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significance was marginal.In 1981, partlyreacting against Ford and Carter's attempts at normalization, Cuban American businessman Jorge Mas Canosa founded the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF). Modeled on the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and well endowed by wealthy exiles, CANF developed into a powerful and sophisticated lobby that vehemently opposed any relaxation whatsoever in Washington's policy of hostility. Foundation directors and an associated political action committee, the Free Cuba PAC, contributed tens of thousands of dollars to dozens of sympathetic Congressional and presidential candidates in each election cycle-a total of $3.2 million from 1979 to 1996. No countervailing group, either within the CubanAmerican community or beyond it, could begin to match CANF'sinfluence (Stone 1993; Newhouse 1992; Kiger 1997, 76). While it is always difficult methodologically to attribute legislative outcomes to the work of any particularlobbyist, members of Congress on both sides of the Cuba issue agreed that CANF'seffortswere by farthe most extensive, expensive, and sophisticated. Mas Canosa's ready access to Congress and even to the White House was testimony of the success of CANF'sstrategy (Kiger 1997, 28-44). Attitudesin the CubanAmericancommunity were undoubtedly more diverse than CANFsuggested, but they were nonetheless preponderantly anti-Castro.In a 1988 poll, 96 percent said thatFidel Castro'sleadership had been "bad for Cuba," and 74 percent had a "very unfavorable" attitude toward his government (Watts 1989, 45).7 As the exiles of the 1960s and 1970s attained citizenship, they became an importantvoting bloc in Florida and New Jersey-a bloc that regularly voted 80 percent Republican in national elections. The Cuban American affinity for the Republican Party was reinforced by Reagan's creation of Radio Martiand Bush's creation of TV Marti,both of which CANFactively supported. In 1992, only 18 percent of Cuban Americans in Florida voted for Bill Clinton, despite the candidate's tough line on Cuba. The Cuban Democracy Act, which Clinton endorsed during that campaign, was one of CANF'striumphs. Drafted by Representative Robert G. Torricelli (D-NJ), it reinstated the ban on trade with Cuba by the subsidiaries of U.S. corporations based in third countries (which had been lifted by President Ford) and specified that the embargo could be lifted only in the event of democratic elections in Cuba.Earlyin his congressional career, Torricelli, a liberal on most issues, had favored relaxing the embargo on Cuba. But mindful of the growing importance of the Cuban American vote in NewJersey, Torricellideveloped a close relationship with CANFand Mas Canosa, who claimed credit for changing the congressman's mind about Cuba. Subsequently, Torricelli has been the largest congressional recipient of campaign funds from conservative Cuban Americans$120,650 since 1987 (Kiger 1997, 33-34; Birnbaum 1992).

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Initially, State Department opposition stalled the Torricelli bill in Congress. The bill's sanctions on U.S. companies operating abroad promised to cause diplomatic headaches with such major trade partners and allies as Mexico, Canada,and GreatBritain.President Bush judged that the incremental effect of tightening the embargo on Cuba was not worth the damage to relations with the other countries involved. That assessment changed in the summer of 1992, when candidate Bill Clinton endorsed the Torricellibill on a campaign trip to Florida. Clinton's position resulted partly from his relationship with Torricelli, who was chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere and who advised Clinton on Latin America during the campaign. But Clinton's move was also politically strategic, allowing him to outflank Bush on the right and challenge him in Florida. It produced some $275,000 in campaign contributions from Cuban Americans, including some CANF directors (Stone 1993). President Bush responded by endorsing the Torricellibill himself, and with bipartisanbacking, it passed easily.8 The rise of the powerful Cuban American lobby established the domestic game as the majorfactor shaping U.S. policy toward Cuba. As the only significant, organized group working on the Cuba issue, the Cuban Americans dominated the field. As Putnam points out, when the political costs of an international agreement fall disproportionately on a domestic group that is cohesive and politically mobilized, and the benefits from the agreement are diffusely distributed, the mobilized group often has the power to block ratification. That description fits the issue of U.S. Cuba policy perfectly. Although polls showed that a majorityof the public in the 1980s and early 1990s continued to favor normalization of relations with Cuba, the issue was not highly salient (Watts 1989, 9; Greenberg-Lake 1991). No domestic group stood to reap any significant gain from a relaxation of relations with Cuba, at least in the short term. In the longer term, some U.S. businesses would benefit, but few were actively clamoring to get onto the island, and almost none were pressing the government to change U.S. policy. On balance, Cuban Americans and their conservative Republican allies could exact a heavy political price from any president, Democrat or Republican, tempted to open relations with Cuba, and there would be little or no compensating domestic political gain. This made normalization effectively nonratifiable. The Torricellibill demonstrated how completely domestic dynamics controlled policy. Clinton embraced it in hopes of fracturingthe Republican electoral coalition in Florida;Bush embraced it to keep his coalition intact.

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THE REFUGEE CRISIS OF

AT IEVEL 2

1994:

HETEROGENEITY

Cuba jumped to the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda in August 1994 when a political crisis on the island led to a huge increase in the flow of Cuban refugees. Cubans had emigrated to the United States in successive waves, legally during the 1960s, illegally during the 1980 Mariel crisis. By the late 1980s, growing public fear that the United States was losing control over its borders had elevated immigration to a national issue capable of mobilizing popular sentiment. It was a latent but powerful factor that had the potential to upset the domestic political balance by rapidly expanding the scope of the conflict over Cuba policy. As Cuba's economic situation deteriorated in the early 1990s, the number of people trying to flee to the United States by setting out across the Straits of Florida on homemade rafts gradually increased from a few dozen annually in the late 1980s to 467 in 1990; 2,203 in 1991; 2,557 in 1992; and 3,656 in 1993 (Coast Guard data in CubaINFO 1994, 6).9 In early 1994, desperate Cubans began hijacking boats and planes. OnJuly 13,37 people, including women and children, drowned when the tugboat they had hijacked was rammed and sunk by pursuing tugs. On August 5, two police officers were killed when hijackers tried to seize a ferry in Havana harbor. The incident touched off widespread rioting along the waterfront; several thousand people chanted anti-Castro slogans, fought with police, and looted stores in the worst antigovernment demonstration since 1959. That same evening, an angry Fidel Castro denounced Washington for encouraging the hijackers by refusing to prosecute them and by limiting legal immigration. On August 11, following yet another hijacking in which a young naval officer was killed, Castro announced that police would no longer stop people trying to leave if they did not hijack boats or planes (Williams 1994a). As Cubans realized that the police would no longer interfere, the numbers departing on homemade rafts shot up from 50 a day in late July to hundreds. On August 17, the U.S. Coast Guard rescued 547 rafters at sea. For Lawton Chiles, Democratic governor of Florida, the surge of Cuban refugees represented a mortal political threat. Chiles was locked in a tight race for reelection, and immigration was a hot issue. The influx of refugees from Cuba, Haiti, and elsewhere had severely strained Florida's social services and provoked an anti-immigrant backlash among the electorate.10 As the number of rafters rose, Chiles warned the White House that he would declare a state of emergency and deploy the National Guard if necessary to control the flow of refugees into the state (Pincus and Suro 1994). President Clinton was sympathetic. The 1980 Mariel exodus had made President Carter appear weak and incapable of controlling U.S.

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borders, just as the 1980 presidential election campaign began. Some twenty thousand of the Mariel refugees had been sent to Fort Chafee, Arkansas, for processing. Riots at the camp had embarrassed thengovernor Clinton and contributed to his defeat for reelection. "No new Mariel,"White House aides repeated to one another as the 1994 crisis developed. "RememberFort Chafee" (Greenhouse 1994b). Chiles, supported by Attorney General Janet Reno, who had been chief prosecutor in Dade County, Florida, before joining the Cabinet, convinced Clinton that the only way to staunch the flow of rafterswas to "demagnetize" the United States by denying them entry. Achieving this change was not so simple. Existing contingency plans, which had been designed to turn back boats carrying refugees, proved worthless. The Coast Guard could not turn back rickety raftsthat barely floated. But once the refugees had been rescued, what should be done with them? One option was to deposit them back in Cuba, but that was deemed too politically explosive. First, it would require the consent of the Cuban government, which had unleashed the human torrent in the first place; second, Cuban Americans would scream that Washington was delivering the freedom seekers back into the arms of Castro's totalitarianregime. On August 18, Clinton decided on detention. Cuban raftersrescued at the U.S. Guantanamo naval base at sea would be detained "indefinitely" in Cuba or, if Guantanamo filled to capacity, in third countries. A similar detention policy had successfully ended a surge of Haitian rafters the previous spring, and by putting Cuban and Haitian refugees on an equal footing, Clinton hoped to quiet human rights critics who had long complained about the differential treatment accorded the two groups (Williams and Devroy 1994). Whereas the detention of Haitians was an improvement over President Bush's policy of forcibly repatriatingthem to Haiti, however, the detention of Cubans reversed 28 years of leniency, during which Cuban refugees had been granted asylum. Not surprisingly, the detention policy provoked protests from the Cuban American community, whose leaders charged that Clinton was punishing the victims of Castro's regime rather than punishing the dictatorhimself. To quell these complaints, Clinton met on August 19 with Chiles and several CubanAmerican community leaders, includingJorge Mas Canosa. In exchange for their support of his detention policy, Clinton agreed to impose tough new economic sanctions on Cuba, including furthertravel restrictionsand a ban on the cash remittances that Cuban Americans had been sending to their relatives on the island. Halting the remittances, estimated at between $150 million and $500 million annually, was certainto damage the already deterioratingstandardof living of thousands of ordinaryCubans. As such, it was not universally supported among Cuban Americans, many of whom were more immediately concerned with their families' well-being than with punishing Castro (Nordheimer 1994).

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Clinton had decided on the detention policy without a clear sense of how to manage it in the long term (Devroy 1994). If refugees kept coming despite the threat of detention, the only way to end the crisis would be for the Cuban government to resume blocking illegal emigration. The new sanctions against Cuba, however, were a disincentive for Castro to cooperate. In reality, the detention policy did not initially slow the flow of rafters, who apparently did not believe that they would be detained indefinitely. Havana and Washington finally agreed to talk about the crisis in September. Washington was moved by the failure of the detention policy to deter the rafters; Havana by the domestic instability caused by such massive emigration. The Cubans demanded that the talks address the U.S. embargo, which they regarded as a major contributing cause of the emigration problem, and insisted that Washington drop the new sanctions on travel and remittances. Washington refused to talk about anything except immigration (Williams 1994b). The Cuban government eventually gave in. In the final accord, the United States agreed to admit a significantly larger number of Cubans who applied for legal immigration, and Cuba agreed to prevent people from trying to emigrate by raft.The restrictions on travel and remittances remained in place, and Washington made no promises of future talks on broader issues like the embargo (Suro 1994). As Cuban police began patrollingthe beaches again and confiscating rafts,the number of refugees fell dramatically.On September 10, the Coast Guard rescued 1,004; on September 12, only 283; on September 14, just 17; and on September 18, none. The acute crisis was over. Still, some thirty thousand Cuban refugees were detained at Guantanamo Bay and in Panama, and Washington had vowed that they would never be allowed into the United States. In exchange for Clinton's new sanctions against the Castroregime, conservative CubanAmericans had supported his detention policy. But once the crisis had passed, they began pressuring the administration to admit the detainees after all (Booth 1994). If Clinton agreed, he risked touching off another exodus from the island, and future threats of detention would be worthless as a deterrent. On the other hand, the indefinite detention was a human rights embarrassment, and tensions in the detention camps were rising. On December 8, rioting broke out among the 8,600 refugees detained in Panama. They broke out of their compound, destroyed nearly a dozen militaryvehicles, and stoned American troops, injuring more than 200. In late March 1995, two members of Congress from Florida returned from the Guantanamo camp warning that it was a "tinderbox"waiting to explode. Pentagon officials expressed similar concerns and complained that it cost them a million dollars a day to run the refugee camp (Devroy and Williams 1995b). Summerweather brought the danger of yet another refugee wave. In April,the flow of raftersfrom Cuba began to increase again, reaching 190-

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the highest monthly total since the end of the 1994 crisis (Crossette 1995). Administration officials weighed the domestic political cost of a new refugee crisis against the cost of further negotiations with Cuba to avoid one. They opted for negotiations, held secretly to insulate them from domestic political pressure. In May, Cuba and the United States signed a new agreement. Refugees detained in 1994 would be admitted to the United States after all; but to prevent the admissions from encouraging a new wave of rafters,all future refugees rescued at sea would be returnedimmediately to Cuba.The Cubans guaranteed that returnees would not be persecuted. In return for Cuba's cooperation, Clinton announced that he would formally oppose a new anti-Castrosanctions bill sponsored by SenatorJesse Helms (Devroy and Williams 1995a). Predictably,Cuban Americans were outraged by the decision to return future refugees to the island, and conservative Republicans echoed their criticism. Florida Democrats, on the other hand, generally praised the agreement as necessary to control illegal immigration (Greenhouse 1995). The 1994 immigrationcrisis changed the domestic political dynamics of U.S. Cuban policy dramaticallyby suddenly expanding the scope of the issue, mobilizing not only Floridians but also the broader U.S. public worried about immigration. Immigration, moreover, was a "heterogeneous" issue-one in which differentdomestic constituencies had conflicting interests. The segment of the general public newly mobilized by the crisis generally opposed further large-scale Cuban immigration, whereas most Cuban Americans favored an open-door policy (Navarro 1995).1 As the crisis wore on, the domestic cost of failing to find a solution escalated along with the refugee flow, first prompting Clinton to impose the detention policy and later,when thatwas inadequate, to negotiate with Cuba. Both those decisions were responses to the broad public concern over immigration and were generally opposed by conservative Cuban Americans. Clinton tried to limit the political damage to his relations with Cuban Americans by a "sidepayment"-the tougher travel regulations and the ban on remittances. The side payment succeeded in winning acquiescence to the detention policy in the short term, but it was risky. By imposing the cost of the side payment on the Cuban government, Clinton risked damaging prospects for a negotiated solution to the crisis. Luckily for Washington, the Cubans were anxious to end the crisis, too. The 1994 negotiated agreement with Cuba was nearly perfect from Clinton's point of view. He persuaded Cuba to halt the flow of refugees without having to make concessions on other bilateralissues (maximizing the outcome of the level 1 game), and he controlled the domestic political costs. The side payment to the Cuban Americans, however, could not resolve the basic conflict between their preference for open immigration and the general public's preference for strictcontrols. As soon as the crisis

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passed, the Cuban Americans began to lobby for admitting the detainees. The only way to resolve the detainees' status without encouraging a new wave of immigrants, moreover, was to return future raftersto Cuba. That policy, however, required a new agreement with the Cuban government. Fearful that Cuban Americans might block such an agreement, the administrationnegotiated one in secret. This time, no side payments were involved. Clinton opted to pay the political price of alienating the Cuban Americans ratherthan risk the greater political damage of another refugee crisis. THE HELMS-BURTON LAW On February 24, 1996, Cuban MiG planes shot down two small civilian aircraftin internationalwaters over the Straitsof Florida, killing their four crew members. The planes belonged to the Cuban exile group Brothers to the Rescue. For nearly a year, Cuban authorities had complained to Washington about the episodic violations of their airspace by this group, whose original purpose was to rescue rafters.Afterthe group dropped antiCastro leaflets over Havana in January, the Cuban government's patience ran out. Castro, who was also facing growing domestic dissidence, took an action bound to provoke a confrontation with the United States, thus allowing him once again to preach Cuban nationalism and demand national unity in the face of a possible U.S. threat. In Washington, outrage over the shootdown resurrected the HelmsBurton bill, the most punitive legislation against Cubasince the early 1960s. Cosponsored by SenatorJesse Helms and Representative Dan Burton, the bill allowed U.S. nationals (including naturalizedCubanAmericans) to sue foreign companies or individuals for damages in U.S. courts if the foreigners did business with property confiscated by Castro'sgovernment. and their families also were barredfrom entering Such foreign "traffickers" the United States. The explicit aim of these provisions was to deter foreign corporations (mainly European, Canadian,and Mexican) from investing in
Cuba.12

The bill's more significant provision, however, incorporated existing U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba into law. Previously, the U.S. embargo had been based on presidential executive orders; it could be tightened or loosened at the President'sdiscretion as conditions warranted. Thus it was possible for a president to launch secret talks with the Cubans, conclude an agreement, and spring it on the public as a fait accompliwhich was what Kissingertried to do in 1974-75. Helms-Burton prevented such a bolt from the blue by prohibiting the President from lifting or even relaxing the embargo until Castroand the existing Cuban regime fell from power.

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Before the Cubans shot down the two exile planes, President Clinton had opposed Helms-Burton, arguing that it contradicted internationallaw, would damage relations with key U.S. allies, and would clog the federal courts with lawsuits. The European Union denounced the bill and threatened to bring action against the United States in the World Trade Organization if it became law. Canada and Mexico argued that the bill violated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Allied leaders warned of retaliationagainst U.S. corporations if Washington tried to enforce the law's extraterritorial provisions. Like President Bush contemplating the 1992 Torricellibill, which threatened similarbut weaker sanctions, Clinton judged that the diplomatic problems posed by HelmsBurton were too severe. Moreover, Clinton'simmigrationagreements with the Cubans were based on his tacit promise to oppose tougher sanctions. In short, the political cost of angering the allies and risking another immigration crisis outweighed the cost of annoying conservative Cuban Americans. The Cuban attack on the two exile planes changed the political calculus by focusing the attention of a much wider public on Cuba. Coming just two weeks before the Florida presidential primary, the crisis gave Republican candidates a golden opportunity to castigate Clinton for "coddling" Castro. In response, Clinton reversed himself, endorsed a slightly modified version of Helms-Burton,and signed it into law on March 12 as the Cuban Libertyand Democratic SolidarityAct of 1996. Clinton's switch enabled him to mute the Republican attacks, take a tough posture against one of the world's few remaining communists, and revive the hope of winning enough Cuban American votes in November to swing a tight race in Florida or New Jersey.'3 Had he not reacted forcefully to Cuba's killing of four U.S. citizens, the domestic political consequences could have been dire. As with his earlier endorsement of the Torricelli bill, Clinton's position was primarilya function of domestic politics. The best evidence that Cuba had become an exclusively domestic issue was that Helms-Burton left the President virtually no discretion whatsoever in formulatingpolicy toward Cuba, and the President accepted it. By writing the U.S. embargo into law and barringits relaxation until the Cuban regime was replaced by a democratic government that excluded Fidel Castro,the statute demolished Clinton'sstated policy of a "calibrated response," responding positively to positive reforms in Cuba (Greenhouse 1994a). It seems highly unlikely that Clinton would have accepted such a Congressionally imposed straightjacketon policy toward the Middle East, Russia, China, or Japan, where Washington had substantial international interests at stake. The level 2 game on Cuba had wholly eclipsed the level 1 game.

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THE ANALYTICAL VALUEOF TWO-LEVEL GAMES

The theory of two-level games applies well to the three-and-a-halfdecades of U.S.-Cuban relations since the 1959 revolution. From 1959 to 1974, relations were dominated by Washington's level 1 security issues. From 1974 to 1979, the reduction of security concerns because of detente and the dovish bent of level 2 domestic constituencies spawned two interludes of negotiations aimed at normalizing relations. Those talks failed, and from 1979 to 1991, security issues reemerged as detente was replaced by renewed Cold War tensions. During the same period, the rise of the hawkish Cuban American lobby reconfigured the domestic political balance to reinforce the U.S. government's policy of hostility. Securityconcerns largely disappeared at the end of the Cold War,but the promotion of democracy replaced security as the key U.S. demand in level 1 bargaining. No countervailing economic or security interests blunted the demand for democracy, as in the case of China, Vietnam, or North Korea. Coincidentally, immigrationemerged as a key issue, complicating the domestic game by dividing domestic constituents between the small but well-organized and well-funded Conservative Cuban American lobby and the general public, which mobilized only episodically at moments of crisis, especially refugee crisis. Most CubanAmericanswanted a hardline policy toward Castroand an open door for refugees. The general public, especially, but not exclusively, in regions with high levels of illegal immigration, was largely indifferent to U.S. relations with Cuba but strongly opposed to uncontrolled immigration. As President Clinton discovered, a policy that responded to the public's concerns about immigrationinevitably angered CubanAmericans. By identifying immigration as a heterogeneous issue, the two-level game theory provides a compelling explanation for the Clinton administration's handling of the 1994 refugee crisis-from the detention policy to the new sanctions against Cuba to the two negotiated agreements thatfinally resolved the issue-and Clinton's response to the Helms-Burton bill. The theory also suggests a new way to assess alternativeU.S. policies toward Cuba in the post-Cold War period. Debate has typically focused on whether a tough policy of sanctions or a more open policy of engagement is more likely to produce democratic change on the island. The difficulty of predicting how U.S. actions might affect regime changes in Cuba makes this debate largely irresolvable. But if a U.S. policymaker also puts a priorityon managing the domestic political game in such a way that the general public is not angrily mobilized by another refugee crisis, another evaluative dimension is added to the debate. A policy of engagement would give the Cuban government an incentive to continue cooperating on immigration issues, whereas hostility aggravates the economic difficulties that increase emigration pressures. Selecting the

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engagement option, however, is difficult because when the refugee problem is in remission, the general public opts out of the game, leaving the field to the Cuban Americans and making the short-term political costs of a policy change seem insurmountable. In short, the preponderant power of the Cuban American lobby in the level 2 game during noncrisis periods is a serious obstacle to formulating level 1 policy positions that might avert new crises. Once a crisis arrives, mobilizing the broader public into the domestic debate, the veto power of the Cuban American lobby disappears. But by that time, as is so often the case in moments of crisis, none of the available policy options are particularly good ones.

NoEs
1. Putnam uses "win-set"in several senses. At level 2, it is the set of possible agreements that can be ratified;thus each country has its unique level 2 win-set. At level 1, it is the set of possible agreements that all the negotiators will accept; thus any negotiation has a single win-set. Putnam, however, also speaks of a given negotiator's win-set; that is, the set of agreements that an individual negotiator will accept. Andrew Moravcsik (1993) substitutes the term acceptability-set for this latter meaning. This essay retains Putnam's usage, because the context normally makes clear which win-set is being discussed. 2. Even Kennedy's potshots at Nixon during the 1960 campaign implied that the Eisenhower administration should have been tougher with Castro, although Kennedy never put forth an alternative policy (Welch 1985, 64-65). and "dovish"when they are less 3. Putnam refers to constituents as "hawkish" willing or more willing to reach agreement than their national leader-that is, when the level 2 win-set is smaller or larger than that of the leader. 4. The key issues on the bilateral negotiating agenda were Cuba's demand that the United States lift the economic embargo; Washington's demand that Cuba pay compensation for U.S. property nationalized in the 1960s and Cuba's counterclaim for compensation for the damage done by CIAparamilitaryattacks; Cuba's demand that the United States return the Guantanamo naval base (which the United States had acquired under the Platt Amendment); and U.S. concerns about Cuban political prisoners (Rogers 1975a; Gantz 1975). The author wishes to express his appreciation to Peter Kornbluh at the National Security Archive for providing copies of these declassified documents. 5. Over the next two years, a series of small crises furtherdamaged U.S.-Cuban relations. In mid-1978, Washington blamed Cuba for an invasion of Zaire by Katangan rebels based in Angolan territory.Laterthat year, Cuba received MiG-23 fighter aircraftfrom the Soviet Union-planes that in some configurations (though not in this one) were capable of carryingnuclear weapons and might therefore have violated the 1962 missile crisis agreement. In 1979, the U.S. intelligence community discovered the existence of a Soviet "combatbrigade"in Cuba, which Washington thought (erroneously, as it turned out) was an escalation of the Soviet military presence. For a review of U.S. policy responses to Cuba'sinvolvement in Africaand a discussion of the crises listed above, see LeoGrande 1980.

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6. Ideologically hostile to Cuban communism, the successor regimes demanded that future trade be conducted in hard currency (of which the Cubans had little) and that Cuba pay off its accumulated trade debts. For detailed discussions of the economic impact that European communism's collapse had on Cuba, see Mesa-Lago 1993. 7. Whereas CANF opposed any sort of U.S. negotiations with Cuba, the broader community generally favored talks, especially about issues such as family reunification, travel, and human rights (Watts 1989, 46-49; Johns Hopkins University 1988, 2-5). The Johns Hopkins poll also found the community about evenly split as to whether conservative groups such CANF represented the community's views (Johns Hopkins University 1988, 5-8). 8. Although U.S. opinion generally continued to favor a policy of normalizing relations with Cuba, just as it had since the 1970s, the issue was highly salient among virtually no one other than Cuban Americans (Greenberg-Lake 1991). 9. An anomaly in U.S. immigrationlaw tended to encourage Cubans to make the dangerous voyage, even though such attempts at "illegalexit" were subject to imprisonment in Cuba. Under terms of the Cuban AdjustmentAct of 1966, Cuban refugees who reached the United States were automatically granted political asylum. Unlike other refugees, Cubans did not have to prove that they had a wellfounded fear of persecution in their country of origin. Cubans who wanted to immigrate legally to the United States, however, had to meet the same stringent standards as other potential immigrants, and Washington typically granted only about 2,500 Cuban immigrantvisas annually. A Cuban who wanted to come to the United States had a better chance of getting in by leaving illegally and risking the perilous ocean crossing than by applying for a visa. 10. A 1995 Florida poll by Schroth and Associates found that 73 percent of respondents supported banning illegal immigrants from access to government services (Adams 1995). 11. Cuban American attitudes toward immigrants were not unanimous. A 1995 Florida poll found that a third of Hispanic respondents supported banning illegal immigrants from access to goverment services (Adams 1995). 12. The law as passed permitted the President to waive implementation of the provision allowing such lawsuits for up to six months at a time. As of this writing, President Clinton has invoked the waiver in the face of strong European opposition to the law. 13. Cuban Americans make up about 9 percent of the voting population in Florida (less in NewJersey), and only 18 percent of them voted for Clinton in 1992. If, in an optimistic scenario, Clinton could double his Cuban American vote, he would increase his statewide total by 3.2 percent-which could be enough to win a close race. This strategy worked, after a fashion. Clinton did win more than 40 percent of the Cuban American vote in Florida in 1996, but the decisive issue in the state proved to be Medicare. Clinton carried the state handily, with 48 percent to RobertDole's 42 percent. It should be noted that CubanAmericans may not have voted for Clinton because he was tough on Cuba; Dole promised to be equally tough. Instead, the candidates' indistinguishable positions took the Cuba issue off the agenda. On domestic issues, Cuban Americans tend to share the opinions of most other Hispanics-positions which tend to be closer to the Democratic Party.

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Kornbluh, Peter, and James G. Blight. 1994. Dialogue with Castro: A Hidden History. New YorkReview of Books, 6 October: 45-49. LeoGrande, William M. 1980. Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959-1980. Policy Papers in International Affairs, No. 13. Berkeley: University of California. . 1986. Cuba. In Confronting Revolution: Security Through Diplomacy in Central America, ed. Morris J. Blachman, William M. LeoGrande, and Kenneth Sharpe, 229-55. New York: Pantheon. Mesa-Lago, Carmelo, ed. 1993. Cuba After the Cold War. Pittsburgh:University of Pittsburgh Press. Moravcsik, Andrew. 1993. Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining. In Evans et al. 1993, 3-42. Cuban Exiles Protest. New York Navarro, Mireya. 1995. U.S. Policy a "Betrayal," Times,8 May: A13. Neustadt, RichardE., and ErnestR.May. 1986. Thinking in Time:TheUsesof History for Decision-makers. New York: Free Press. Newhouse, John. 1992. Socialism or Death. New Yorker,27 April: 52-53. Nordheimer, Jon. 1994. Cuban Group Forges Link to Clinton. New YorkTimes,26 August: A12. Pincus, Walter, and Roberto Suro. 1994. Ripple in Florida StraitsOverturned U.S. Policy. Washington Post, 1 September: A31. Putnam, RobertD. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics:The Logic of Two-level Games. International Organization 42 (Summer): 427-60. Rogers, William D. 1975a. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-AmericanAffairs. Memorandum to the Secretary[of State][HenryKissinger]Subject:Meetings with Cuban Emissary.U.S. Department of State, 2 January.Washington, DC: National Security Archive, Cuba Collection. . 1975b. Cuba Policy After the OASGA [Organization of American States General Assembly]. Report to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. 17 May. Washington, DC: National Security Archive, Cuba Collection. Shlaudeman, Harry. 1975. Normalizing Relations with Cuba. Report for Assistant AffairsWilliamD. Rogers by his deputy. Secretaryof State for Inter-American March. Washington, DC: National Security Archive, Cuba Collection. Stone, Peter H. 1993. Cuban Clout. NationalJournal25, 8 (20 February):449-53. Suro, Roberto. 1994. U.S., Cuba Agree on Stemming RaftTide. Washington Post, 10 September: Al. Watts, William. 1989. The United States and Cuba: Changing Perceptions, New Policies? Washington, DC: Potomac Associates/Johns Hopkins University Central American and Caribbean Program. Watts, William, and Jorge I. Dominguez. 1977. The United States and Cuba: Old Issues and New Directions. Washington, DC: Potomac Associates. Welch, RichardE.,Jr.1985. ResponsetoRevolution: TheUnitedStatesandthe Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Williams, David. 1994a. After 35 Years, CastroStill Annoys Washington. Washington Post, 13 August: A13. . 1994b. U.S. Proposes "Floor"on Legal Migration in Talks with Cuba. Washington Post, 2 September: A29. Williams, David, and Ann Devroy. 1994. U.S. to Send Cubans Rescued at Sea to Guantanamo. Washington Post, 19 August: Al.