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Ismael Mathay (QC Mayor) v CA, CSC, Tan et al 3 Consolidated petitions | 1999 | Ynares-Santiago, J. 1.

During Mayor Simons term, private respondents were appointed to positions in the Civil Service Unit(CSU); CSU created pursuant to PD 51 allegedly signed into law in 1972; 2. In 1990, Secretary of Justice rendered an Opinion saying PD 51 was never published so it was never deemed in force and effect; Thus, it cant be a basis for CSUs; 3. June 4, 1990, CSC issue a Memo Circular for the recall of all appointments in CSUs because PD 51 never became law; Private respondents are those affected; 4. For Quezon City employees, the effects of the circular were temporarily cushioned by a City Ordinance which established the Department of Order and Safety (DPOS); Section 3 provides for absorption of the CSU units into the DPOS; However, the regular and permanent positions in DPOS were not filled due to lack of funds and the insufficiency of regular and permanent positions created; 5. Mayor Simon provided a remedy by offering private respondents contractual appointments (June 5 to Dec 41 1991); These were renewed for the period Jan 1 to June 30, 1992; 6. Come Mayor Mathays term, the appointments were renewed from July 1 to July 31, 1992 but when were not renewed upon expiry; Non-renewal is the cause of the 3 petitions; GR 124374 and GR 126366 Respondents here appealed to CSC which held that the reappointment to the DPOS was automatic pursuant to the City Ordinance so it ordered reinstatement of respondents. Petitioner filed Certiorari to SC which referred it to the CA. CA dismissed.





6. Issue: CA err in ruling that CSC has authority to direct petitioner to reinstate private respondents in the DPOS. NO. Ratio: 1.

Law applicable is BP 337 and not LGC 1992 which became effective on Jan 1, 1992. a. Section 3 is invalid for being contrary to BP 337; b. Section 3 directs absorption of personnel of the defunct CSU into the new DPOS; the ordinance refers to personnel and not to positions; c. Hence, the city council, through the Ordinance, is in effect dictating who shall occupy the newly created DPOS positions;

Under BP 337, the power to appoint rests exclusively with the local chief executive and thus cannot be usurped through simple act of enacting ordinances that provide for absorption of specific persons to specific positions; CA erred in saying that the doctrine of separation of powers is not applicable to local governments; a. SC: powers of the city council and the city mayor are expressly enumerated separately and delineated by BP 337; Law clear: a. Power to appoint with local chief executive; b. Power of city council limited to creating, consolidating and reorganizing city officers and positions supported by local funds; i. Council has no power to appoint; ii. It is not in Section 177 of BP 337 which lists the powers of the council; expression unios est exclusion alterius; CSC substituted its own judgment for that of the appointing power when it ordered petitioner to reinstate private respondents; a. CSCs power is limited to approving or disapproving an appointment; CSC: were merely implementing Section 3 of the ordinance; a. SC: ordinance refers to the personnel of the CSU and resos of CSC call for reinstatement of named individuals, thus there is no room left for the exercise of discretion; b. Farinas v Barba: appointing authority is not bound to appoint anyone recommended by the sanggunian concerned, since the power of appointment is a discretionary power; c. When CSC ordered reinstatement, it technically issued a new appointment; CA: at time ordinance was enacted, private respondents were still holders of de jure appointments as permanent regular employees and therefore, by operation of law, were automatically absorbed in DPOS; a. SC: wrong premise; b. Assuming Section 3 is valid, the absorption contemplated therein is not possible because since CSU never legally came into existence, the private respondents never held permanent positions; c. Thus, respondents appointments were invalid ab initio; for them to enter Civil Service after cancellation of their invalid appointment, they have to be extended an original appointment;





Axiomatic: right to hold public office is not a natural right; it exists only by virtue of law; a. Since PD 51 never became law, it could not be a source of rights; b. Debugaldo v CSC: a void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure on the part of the holder of the appointment; While CA correct in saying that abolition of an office does not mean the invalidity of appointments thereto, this cannot apply at case because CSU was not abolished, it simply did not come into existence; As to concept of automatic absorption, another argument against it is the physical and legal impossibility given the number of available positions in the DPOS and the number of personnel to be absorbed;

GR 126354 CSC appealed decision of CA saying it has no authority to compel the mayor of Quezon City to reinstate one Labajo to the DPOS. SC says CSC is not the real party in interest; Labajo is; CSC has no legal standing. 1st 2 petitions granted.