The U.S.

National Security Decision-Making Process

The national security decision-making (NS-DM) process is essential for the President of the United States in dealing with the national security and foreign policy matters. Any statement or decision regarding the national security and foreign policy has behind it lengthy and detailed deliberations within the administration. The National Security Council (NSC) -- the main forum for debating national security and foreign policy issues -- has supported the US presidents since decades. It has evolved from an unwanted bureaucracy imposed upon the President by Congress, during the term of Harry Truman to an interagency system involving the routine consultations of senior department and agency officials under the last administrations.1 The composition and responsibilities of NSC and its supporting staff structures have varied considerably from one administration to another underlining a fundamental principle for all the Presidents: the operation of the national security policy process is the result of what the President decides.2 During President Obamas term, the NS-DM process -- whether it was about surge into Afghanistan or Irans nuclear program -- revealed the presidential dominance over the bureaucratic politics3 as well as Obamas preference for centralization and multiple advocacies but no honest brokers.4 In both situations, the NS-DM processes succeeded in advancing the US national strategy with limitations. This paper aims to compare and evaluate the NS-DM process with respect to (1) selecting options regarding the 2010 surge into Afghanistan and (2) dealing with Irans nuclear program from 2009 to 2013. Then, I will focus my analysis on the effectiveness of the NS-DM process in advancing US national strategy. To this end, I will adopt as criteria of evaluation the diplomatic, military, and economic instruments of power. Not many scholars have discussed or analyzed these topics and little bibliography is available. However, a thorough analysis of all these aspects in conjunction with some concepts, theories,

and analytical tools provided by those who have investigated the domain of NS-DM might be not only practical but also necessary. In both situations, the surge into Afghanistan and Irans nuclear program, Barack Obama revealed his presidential leadership over the bureaucratic politics and organizational cultures.5 Jonathan Monten and Andrew Bennett stated in their article Models of Crisis Decision Making that in a crisis, bureaucratic actors set aside their narrow organizational and personal interests and the president dominates the policy process.6 This statement has been validated also in peacetime during the Obamas term. Although the Obama Administration had formal meetings regularly, the President has shaped the composition of meetings according to the topics under consideration and his needs rather than concerns with formally established National Security Council meetings.7 In contrast with his predecessor who favored decisions made on recommendations that reflected a consensus of his advisors, President Obama has preferred not to have recommended positions brought to him for a yes or no decision.8 He rather agrees to have detailed assessments of the pros and cons for each option meaning that every time the final decision belonged to him.9 In adopting the decisions on escalation of the war in Afghanistan, Obama favored a trend of deliberative multiple advocacy (effective analysis of alternatives), centralizing policy making in the White House. But he did not seem to make use of honest brokers in his deliberations. In fact, during the debates on Afghanistan, President Obama acted as his own honest broker.10 He rejected the opinions presented by his advisors and formulated his own option. In the Iran case, the President adopted a similar attitude. President Obama contradicted his advisors (see intelligence estimate on Irans nuclear capabilities11) when decided to adopt the European Phase Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).12 Given the

failure of opposition Green Movement to contest the results of the June 2009 elections in Iran13 and the poor results of economic sanctions, the Obama Administration aimed to put more pressure on Iran. EPAA came to emphasize this as the system has been designed to counter short- and medium-range ballistic missiles as potential threats from the Middle East. But EPAA was another decision that Obama made in the White House acting again as his own honest broker. The Obamas initiative was different from that launched by his predecessor and suggested by his staff to be continued. However, it looks like in recent times President Obama has given more credit to his diplomatic advisors as the last evolution have shown more openness on both American and Iranian sides to improve the dialog on nuclear weapons. From the theoretic point of view (realism, liberalism, idealism) the NS-DM process on surge in Afghanistan fell on unilateral/more intervention part14 as the decision was to increase the number of troops. However, there is also a balance of power realism as the President pragmatically adopted the solution of use of a time-limited but rapid reinforcement (surge) of troops.15 On the other hand, the NS-DM process on Irans nuclear program was more liberal and less intervention oriented as the Obama Administration opted for a policy of bigger carrots, bigger sticks.16 meaning that the US continues a dual-track approach of engagement and pressure with Iran as Secretary Clinton said.17 How much effectiveness had the NS-DM process and the Obamas decisions in advancing US national strategy toward Afghanistan an Iran? I will try to answer this question in the following paragraph. Effectiveness of the NS-DM process in advancing US national strategy At a first glance, it looks like in both situations -- the surge into Afghanistan and the Irans nuclear program -- the NS-DM processes succeeded in advancing the US national strategy with limitations. A short evaluation of diplomatic, military, and economic outcomes of Obamas

decisions with respect to the above mentioned issues may illustrates the effectiveness of NS-DM process in advancing US national strategy. From diplomatic perspective, Obama had made a priority to address Afghanistan even before being elected as President. Therefore, in his first year in office, when he was asked twice (early and late 2009) to reinforce the US effort in Afghanistan, he knew that he would need to take some early and decisive action.18 I can assume that NS-DM process has achieved to advance the US strategy in Afghanistan as the decision to increase the number of troops favored a counterinsurgency strategy shifted on protecting the civilian population and building Afghan capacity to govern rather than narrowly focusing on killing enemy personnel.19 It looks like a diplomatic end achieved with military means. The surge decision ensured not only a relatively quick strength in troops but also a timeline for beginning a drawdown in an attempt to narrow the mission, and tighten the timelines.20 However, Afghanistan should be approached in conjunction with Pakistan, as the later is the epicenter of US vital interest in Afghanistan. Denying safe haven to terror groups, ensuring that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) do not fall into the hands of terrorists, and preventing a substantial interstate war that could possibly escalate into nuclear war in Pakistan may be the key of success in Afghanistan.21 On Iran, President Obama has expressed the US strategy since his inauguration indicating that diplomacy and any other resources are being used to engage Iran.22 He also mentioned that the national security team is reviewing constructive dialogue where we can directly engage them.23 Was the NS-DM process successful in this case? The combination of carrots and sticks looked functional for Iran. Given the last evolutions between the US and Iran to the point of historical phone call that President Obama and new Iranian President Rouhani hold on

September 27th, 201324 the answer should be yes. However, there is no clear evidence that Iran will stop its nuclear developments. Militarily, the NS-DM process on Afghanistan was successful as the Presidential decision ensured the means, ways and ends to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and its violent extremist affiliates.25 At the end of over three months of intense debates, the President had decided
to increase the US effort in Afghanistan by an additional 30,000 troops.26 The Obamas decision was considered in Americas vital national interest.27 The troops were deployed at the fastest pace possible with a mission to target the insurgency and secure population centers, and begin the transfer of US forces out of Afghanistan by July 2011.28

The NS-DM process and the decision on Irans nuclear program must be considered in terms of US foreign security policy realism. Accordingly, if great powers such as the United States want to ensure global security, they should balance against other great powers [in this case, Russia] and also against hostile minor powers [Iran] that inhabit strategically important regions of the world.29 This indicates that missile defense will remain an important component of the US security strategy for the near future. Therefore, implementing the EPAA has become essential for the security of the US and its allies and partners in Europe. How much containment on Iran will bring the US phased adaptive approach is another question. However, there is a dilemma whether Obamas initiative has been designed to soothe Russian concerns raised by previous initiative of Bush Administration or of real concern for ballistic missile threats from Iran (see the cancellation of EPAA Phase 4 in March 2013).30 Economically, none of the two NS-DM processes as well as their outcomes were successful as both decisions implied serious financial support on short term. The cost of each additional Soldier on the ground in Afghanistan for a year was estimated at $250,000 and there were committed additional 30,000 troops. Consequently, the cost of the war was already 5

averaging the US one billion per day.31But in medium and long term the surge on Afghanistan may prove to be efficient as this solution settled the conditions for US forces to transfer responsibility of military actions to Afghan forces. On Irans nuclear program, I will refer only to EPAA and sanctions. None of them proved to be efficient. The Obamas approach to BMD presents some clear advantages compared to the initiative advanced by President Bush in early 2000s. EPAA evolves to the extent that the threat grows and becomes operational faster than the previous version. It meets current threats and may incorporate faster and easier the new technologies as they continue to advance. It also balances the sharing of the costs of the system with the European Allies and avoids a US official and continuous engagement in the European defense. But in short term, it requires massive investments as the goal is to operationalize the entire system by 2018. Nevertheless, the economic sanctions applied to Iran did not achieve the desired effects. In an economic world marked by a continuous rush for resources, the economic sanctions applied to a country could easily prove inefficient as other countries -- who do not subscribe to the sanction policy -- can take advantage of this vacuum. The result: in spite of severe economic sanctions and pressure by the international community, Iran continues with its nuclear developments. The US has not succeeded yet to achieve its National Security Strategys objective to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear program. To conclude, the NS-DM process is essential for the President of the United States in dealing with the national security and foreign policy matters. Since 1947, each president has established different composition and responsibilities of his supporting staff illustrating the idea that the NS-DM process is the result of what the President decides. During President Obamas term, the NS-DM process revealed the presidential dominance over the bureaucratic politics

as well as Presidents preference for centralization and multiple advocacy but no honest brokers. A short evaluation of diplomatic, military, and economic outcomes of Obamas decisions with respect to the surge into Afghanistan and the Irans nuclear program leads to the idea that NS-DM process succeeded in advancing the US national strategy with limitations in both situations. ENDNOTES
1

Alan G. Whittaker, Shannon A. Brown, Frederick C. Smith, and Ambassador Elizabeth McKune, The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System, (Annual Update: August 15, 2011): 6, available from http://www.virginia.edu/cnsl/pdf/national-security-policy-process-2011.pdf (accessed on December 18, 2013) 2 Whittaker, Brown, Smith, and McKune: 12 3 Jonathan Monten and Andrew Bennett, Models of Crisis Decision Making and the 1990-1991 Gulf War Security Studies (July 2010): 486, NSDM Course IP-6309 assigned reading 4 James Pfiffner, Decision making in the Obama White House, in Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2 (June 2011): 244, NSDM Course IP-6310 assigned reading 5 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences , Chapter III (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005): 102 6 Monten and Bennett: 487 7 Pfiffner: 245 8 Whittaker, Brown, Smith, and McKune: 27 9 Idem 10 Pfiffner: 255 11 James. R. Clapper, Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence , Director of National Intelligence, Washington, DC, January 31, 2012, p. 6. 12 The White House-Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy- A Phased, Adaptive Approach for Missile Defense in Europe, (September 17, 2009) available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FACT-SHEET-US-Missile-Defense-Policy-A-Phased-AdaptiveApproach-for-Missile-Defense-in-Europe (accessed on December 19, 2013) 13 Hayat Alvi, Bigger Carrots, Bigger Sticks: U.S. Policy toward Iran, in Case Studies in Policy Making, 12th Edition, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island (2010):101 available from http://www.usnwc.edu/Departments--Colleges/National-Security-Decision-Making/Documents/CaseStudiesInPolicyMaking12thEd.pdf (accessed on December 19, 2013) 14 IP 6301 in the Class Seminar Power Point Presentation 15 Tim Foxley, Deciding the surge: Obama reinforces the war in Afghanistan, in Malm Hgskola (January 2013): 10, available from http://afghanhindsight.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/deciding-the-surge-tim-foxley-jan2013.pdf, (accessed on December 18, 2013) 16 Massimo Calabresi, Can the U.S. Contain Irans Nuclear Ambitions? Time Magazine, 15 June 2009, available at http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1902841,00.html (accessed on December 19, 2013) 17 U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton talked to reporters after a meeting with Qatar Prime Minister AlThani in Washington, DC on 01/05/10. In response to a question about Iran, Clinton stated that "our approach, as you know, has always proceeded on two tracks; we have an engagement track and a pressure track. And as I've said, the results of our efforts to engage Iran directly have not been encouraging. available from http://www.payvand.com/news/10/jan/1035.html (accessed on December 19, 2013) 18 Foxley: 6 19 Pfiffner: 256

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Pfiffner: 258 David W Barno, Andrew Exum, and Matthew Irvine, Beyond Afghanistan. A Regional Security Strategy for South and Central Asia., Center for a New American Security (Washington DC, 201): 5, available from http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_BeyondAfghanistan_BarnoExumIrvine_1.pdf (accessed on December 19, 2013) 22 President Barack Obama, First Presidential Prime Time Press Conference, 9 February 2009, available from http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/barackobama/barackobamafirstprimetimepressconference.htm (accessed on December 19, 2013) 23 Idem 24 Jeff Mason and Louis Charbonneau, Obama, Iran's Rouhani hold historic phone call, available from http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/28/us-un-assembly-iran-idUSBRE98Q16S20130928 (accessed on December 18, 2013) 25 The White House, National Security Strategy, (Washington DC, 2010): 19, available from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss_may2010.pdf (accessed on December 18, 2013) 26 Bob Woodward, Obama's Wars, (New York, 2010): 160, NSDM Course IP-6310 assigned reading 27 Anthony R. Hale, Dimensions of Uncertainty in Presidential Decision-Making Involving the Use of Force, (U.S. Army War College, 2011): 2-19, available from http://nsfp.web.unc.edu/files/2012/09/Hale_UNCERTAINTY-IN-PRESIDENTIAL-DECISION-MAKING.pdf (accessed on December 18, 2013) 28 Idem 29 Sebastian Rosato and John Schuessler, A Realist Foreign Policy for the United States, in Perspectives on Politics Vol. 9 No. 4 (December 2011): , available from http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~lorenzo/Rosato%20A%20Realist%20Foreign%20Policy.pdf (accessed on December 18, 2013) 30 Tom Z. Collina, The European Phased Adaptive Approach at a Glance available from http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Phasedadaptiveapproach (accessed on December 19, 2013) 31 Hale: 2-26