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Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance G.R. No. 148496 March 19, 2002 Facts: Petitioner Virgines Calvo, owner of Transorient Container Terminal Services, Inc. (TCTSI), and a custom broker, entered into a contract with San Miguel Corporation (SMC) for the transfer of 114 reels of semi-chemical fluting paper and 124 reels of kraft liner board from the port area to the Tabacalera Compound, Ermita, Manila. The cargo was insured by respondent UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. On July 14, 1990, contained in 30 metal vans, arrived in Manila on board M/V Hayakawa Maru. After 24 hours, they were unloaded from vessel to the custody of the arrastre operator, Manila Port Services, Inc. From July 23 to 25, 1990, petitioner, pursuant to her contract with SMC, withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator and delivered it to SMCs warehouse in Manila. On July 25, the goods were inspected by Marine Cargo Surveyors, reported that 15 reels of the semi-chemical fluting paper were wet/stained/torn and 3 reels of kraft liner board were also torn. The damages cost P93,112.00. SMC collected the said amount from respondent UCPB under its insurance contract. Respondent on the other hand, as a subrogee of SMC, brought a suit against petitioner in RTC, Makati City. On December 20, 1995, the RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner liable for the damage to the shipment. The decision was affirmed by the CA. Issue: Whether or not Calvo is a common carrier? Held: In this case the contention of the petitioner, that he is not a common carrier but a private carrier, has no merit. Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as ancillary activity. Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1733 deliberately refrained from making such distinction. (De Guzman v. CA, 68 SCRA 612) Te concept of common carrier under Article 1732 coincide with the notion of public service, under the Public Service Act which partially supplements the law on common carrier. Under Section 13, paragraph (b) of the Public Service Act, it includes: x x x every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street railway, traction railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both, with or without fixed route and whatever may be its classification, freight or carrier service of any class, express service, steamboat, or steamship line, pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf or dock, ice plant, ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water supply and power petroleum, sewerage system, wire or wireless communications systems, wire or wireless broadcasting stations and other similar public services. x x x Philippine Charter Insurance Corp. vs. Unknown Owner FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation (PCIC) is the insurer of a shipment on board the vessel M/V National Honor, represented in the Philippines by its agent, National Shipping Corporation of the Philippines (NSCP). The M/V National Honor arrived at the Manila International Container Terminal (MICT). The International Container Terminal Services, Incorporated (ICTSI) was furnished with a copy of the crate cargo list and bill of lading, and it knew the contents of the crate. The following day, the vessel started discharging its cargoes using its winch crane. The crane was operated by Olegario Balsa, a winchman from the ICTSI, exclusive arrastre operator of MICT. Denasto Dauz, Jr., the checker-inspector of the NSCP, along with the crew and the surveyor of the ICTSI, conducted an inspection of the cargo. They inspected the hatches, checked the cargo and found it in apparent good condition. Claudio Cansino, the stevedore of the ICTSI, placed two sling cables on each end of Crate No. 1. No sling cable was fastened on the mid-portion of the crate. In Dauzs experience, this was a normal procedure. As the crate was being hoisted from the vessels hatch, the mid-portion of the wooden flooring suddenly snapped in the air, about five feet high from the vessels twin deck, sending all its contents crashing down hard, resulting in extensive damage to the shipment. PCIC paid the damage, and as subrogee, filed a case against M/V National Honor, NSCP and ICTSI. Both RTC and CA dismissed the complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not the presumption of negligence is applicable in the instant case.
HELD: No. We agree with the contention of the petitioner that common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are mandated to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. he Court has defined extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods as follows: The extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for shipment requires the common carrier to know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding damage to, or destruction of the goods entrusted to it for sale, carriage and delivery. It requires common carriers to render service with the greatest skill and foresight and to use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage, including such methods as their nature requires. The common carriers duty to observe the requisite diligence in the shipment of goods lasts from the time the articles are surrendered to or unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation until delivered to, or until the lapse of a reasonable time for their acceptance, by the person entitled to receive them.] >When the goods shipped are either lost or arrive in damaged condition, a presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that diligence, and there need not be an express finding of negligence to hold it liable. To overcome the presumption of negligence in the case of loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods, the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence. However, under Article 1734 of the New Civil Code, the presumption of negligence does not apply to any of the following causes: 1. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity; 2. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; 3. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; 4. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; 5. Order or act of competent public authority. It bears stressing that the enumeration in Article 1734 of the New Civil Code which exempts the common carrier for the loss or damage to the cargo is a closed list. To exculpate itself from liability for the loss/damage to the cargo under any of the causes, the common carrier is burdened to prove any of the aforecited causes claimed by it by a preponderance of evidence. If the carrier succeeds, the burden of evidence is shifted to the shipper to prove that the carrier is negligent.
GACAL V. PAL
Held: We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree with the trial court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the
Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have been foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under the same provision, it is to be noted that when the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of a family. PAL vs. CA and ZAPATOSG.R. No. L-82619 September 15, 1993 Facts: Private respondent was among the 21 passengers of Flight 477 that took off from Cebu bound for Ozamiz City. The routing of this flight was Cebu-OzamizCotabato. The pilot received a radio message that Ozamiz airport was closed due to heavy rains and inclement weather and that he should proceed to Cotabato City instead. Upon arrival at Cotabato City, the PAL Station Agent informed the passengers of their options to return to Cebu on the same day and then to Ozamiz, or take the next flight to Cebu the following day, or remain at Cotabato and take the next available flight to Ozamiz City. Flight 560 bound for Manila would make a stop-over at Cebu to bring some of the diverted passengers; that there were only 6 seats available. Private respondent chose to return to Cebu but was not accommodated because he checked-in as passenger No. 9 on Flight 477. He was forced to stay at Cotabato City despite the local war between the military and the muslim rebels. He tried to ferry the Ford Fiera loaded with PAL personnel but said pick-up vehicle did not accommodate him. The personnel of PAL did not secure his accommodation in Cotabato City. He received a free ticket on a flight to Iligan, but chose to buy his own. He lost his personal belongings, including a camera. Issue: 1. WON PAL can properly invoke the defense of fortuitous event of bad weather in Ozamiz to exempt itself from paying damages to the PR? NO
ISSUE: Whether or not common carriers assume risks to passengers such as the stoning in this case? HELD: In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in the business of transporting passengers and goods, a common carrier does not give its consent to become an insurer of any and all risks to passengers and goods. It merely undertakes to perform certain duties to the public as the law imposes, and holds itself liable for any breach thereof.
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
Held:1.PAL remissed in its duty of extending utmost care to private respondent while being stranded in Cotabato City.PALs diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a fortuitous event. Nonetheless, such occurrence did not terminate PALs contract with its passengers. Being in the business of air carriage and the sole one to operate in the country, PAL is deemed equipped to deal with situations as in the case at bar. The relation of carrier and passenger continues until the latter has been landed at the port of destination and has left the carriers premises. Hence, PAL necessarily would still have to exercise extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination. PAL grossly failed considering the then ongoing battle between government forces and Muslim rebels in Cotabato City and the fact that the private respondent was a stranger to the place. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. Because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Since part of the failure to comply with the obligation of common carrier to deliver its passengers safely to their destination lay in the defendants failure to provide comfort and convenience to its stranded passengers using extra-ordinary diligence, the cause of non-fulfillment is not solely and exclusively due to fortuitous event, but due to something which defendant airline could have prevented, PAL becomes liable to plaintiff. 2. The award of moral damages was excessive and was reduced by the Court. There was no clear basis that PAL failed to entertain the plaintiff and answer its queries. In fact, the manager accommodated him in his office. Moral damages are not intended to enrich the private respondent. They are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of the defendants culpable action. The plaintiffs claim on loss of business opportunities was based only on pure speculation. It must depend on competent proof.
BACHELOR EXPRESS, vs.CA Facts: The bus owned by Petitioners came from Davao City on its way to Cagayan de Oro City passing Butuan City. While at Tabon-Tabon, Butuan City, the bus picked up a passenger, that about fifteen minutes later, a passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed a PC soldier which caused commotion and panic among the passengers. When the bus stopped, passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were found lying down the road, the former already dead as a result of head injuries and the latter also suffering from severe injuries which caused her death later. The passenger assailant alighted from the bus and ran toward the bushes but was killed by the police. Thereafter, the heirs of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut, private respondents herein filed a complaint for "sum of money" against Bachelor Express, Inc., its alleged owner and the driver Rivera. The lower court dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the decision, hence the instant petition. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is negligent. Held: Yes. The liability, if any, of the petitioners is anchored on culpa contractual or breach of contract of carriage. Art. 1732, 1733, 1755 and 1756 are applicable. There is no question that Bachelor is a common carrier. Hence, Bachelor is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost
NECESITO V. PARAS FACTS: Serverina Garces and her 1 yr old son, Precillano Necesito were passengers on a Philippine Rabbit bus form Pangasinan to Manila driven by Bardonell. As the bus was traversing a wooden bridge, its wheels swerved to the right and the driver lost control. The bus fell into a creek and the mother, Severina drowned while the baby suffered injuries. An action for damages was filed by the heirs of Severina Garces( the husband) but the TC dismissed the claim saying the accident was not caused by the negligence of the driver, who was driving slowly due to the bad road conditions, but by a fracture in the right steering knuckle of the bus i.e. defective parts. ISSUE: Whether or not the carrier is liable for damages for the manufacturing defect of the steering knuckle and if it discharged its duty under Art. 1755 HELD: YES. ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for the all the circumstances. It is clear that the carrier is not the passengers insurer, his liability is based on negligence and Art. 1756 states that if a passenger dies, the carrier has the burden to prove that the carrier exercised the requisite diligence. American jurisprudence holds: "The preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it appears that the defect would have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which under the circumstances was incumbent upon it, with regard to inspection and application of the necessary tests. For the purposes of this doctrine, the manufacturer is
Bachelor Express Inc vs. CA The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident as it triggered off a commotion and panic among the passengers such that the passengers started running to the sole exit shoving each other resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus is within the context of force majeure. However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved
MARANAN vs. PEREZ Facts: Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela. Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Batangas and was found guilty. While appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Maranan, Rogelio's mother, filed an action to recover damages. The court decided in plaintiffs favor. Hence the instant petition. Issue: Whether or not defendant- operators could be held liable for damages Held: Yes. Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila Railroad Co., 97 Phil. 884, that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the passengers. The attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar are very different however. In the Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty employee. Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the passenger, in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage. In other words, unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the passenger here took place in the course of duty of the guilty employee and when the employee was acting within the scope of his duties. Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the safety of passengers against wilful assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees. The death of the passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from liability. The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers are new and were taken from Anglo-American Law. There, the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely.
Tiu vs. Arriesgado G.R. No. 138060, September 1, 2004 Facts: At about 10:00 p.m. of March 15, 1987, the cargo truck marked "Condor Hollow Blocks and General Merchandise" bearing plate number GBP-675 was loaded with firewood in Bogo, Cebu and left for Cebu City. Upon reaching Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu, just as the truck passed over a bridge, one of its rear tires exploded. The driver, Sergio Pedrano, then parked along the right side of the national highway and removed the damaged tire to have it vulcanized at a nearby shop, about 700 meters away. Pedrano left his helper, Jose Mitante, Jr. to keep
Held: No, The principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence." It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither
Magellan Manufacturing Marketing Corporation Respondent: Inc. J.Regalado: FACTS: On May 20, 1980, Magellan Manufacturing Marketing Corp., (MMMC) entered into a contract with Choji Co. of Yokohama, Japan to export 136,000 of anahaw fans for a consideration of $23,220. As payment Magellan received from Choji a letter of credit> Magellan (MMMC) through its president James Cu, contracted F.E. Zuellig a shipping agent, through its solicitor, one Mr. King, to ship the Anahaw through Orient Overseas Container Lines Inc., (OOCL) specifying that he needed an on board bill of lading and that the transhipment is not allowed under the letter of credit. On June 30, 1980, Magellan paid F.E Zuellig the freight charges and secured a copy of the bill of lading which was presented to Allied Bank. The bank then credited the amount of US$ 23,220 covered by the letter of credit to Magellans account. However, James Cu, Magellans president went back to the bank he was informed that the payment was refused by the buyer allegedly because there was no on board bill of lading and there was a transhipment of goods. As a result of the buyers refusal, the anahaw fans are shipped back to Manila by the respondents shippers for which demanded from Magellan pay of 246,043. 43. Petitioner Magellan abandoned the whole cargo and appellees for damages. The lower court decided the case in favor of private respondents. It dismissed the complaint on the ground that Magellan had given its consent to the contents of the bill of lading where it is clearly indicated that there will be transhipment. On appeal the appellate court affirmed the decision of the lower court but modified the liability of the petitioner because private respondent did not timely informed the petitioner that the goods were already Manila in addition to the fact that the private respondent had given petitioner the option of abandoning the goods in exchange for the demurrages. ISSUE: Whether or not there is transhipment when the goods are transferred from one vessel to another which belong to the same owner. HELD: Transhipment, in maritime law, is defined as the act of taking cargo out of one ship and loading it in another, or the transfer of goods from the vessel stipulated in the contract of affreightment to another vessel before the place of destination named in the contract has been reached, or the transfer for further transportation from one ship or conveyance to another. Court Of Appeals, Orient Overseas Container Lines And F.E. Zuellig,
ISAAC vs. A.L. AMMEN TRANS. CO. Facts: Plaintiff boarded defendants bus as paying passenger from Albay. The bus collided with a pick-up truck which was coming from opposite direction trying to swerve from a pile of gravel. As a result, his left arm was completely severed. Plaintiff chose to hold defendant liable on its contractual obligation. Plaintiff brought an action for damages which the lower court dismissed holding the driver of the pick-up car negligent and not that of the bus. Issue: Whether or not the common carrier is liable. Held: The bus was running at a moderate speed. The driver of the bus upon the speeding pick-up truck swerved the bus to the very extreme right of the road. Said driver would not move the bus further without endangering the safety of his passengers. Notwithstanding all these efforts, the rear left side was hit. This finding of the lower court was sustained. Also, of the carriers employee is confronted with a sudden emergency, he is not held to the same degree of care he would otherwise, he required in the absence of such emergency. By placing his left arm on the window, he is guilty of contributory negligence cannot relieve the carrier but can only reduce its liability (ART. 1762), this is a circumstance which further militates against plaintiffs position. It is a prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for passengers on a railroad to protrude any part of his body and that no recovery can be had for an injury.
Fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier's duty towards its passengers, allowance must be given to the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own. Not to be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. He cannot be subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In other words, inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a passenger's baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed. Calling a policeman to his aid, as suggested by the service manual invoked by the trial judge, in compelling the passenger to submit to more rigid inspection, after the passenger had already declared that the box contained mere clothes and other miscellaneous, could not have justified invasion of a constitutionally protected domain. Fortune Express Inc. vs. CA Facts: A bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norter, resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney, including two Maranaos. A constabulary agent investigated and found out that the owner of the jeepney was a Maranao and that certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses. The operations manager of petitioner was advised to take precautionary measures. Four days after the accident, three armed Maranaos who pretended to be passengers seized a bus petitioner bound for Iligan City and set it on fire. Atty. Talib Caorong, whose heirs are private respondents herein was a passenger of the bus and was shot and killed during the incident. The private respondents brought this suit for breach of contract of carriage. Complaint was dismissed in the lower court but its decision was reversed in CA, hence the instant petition, with petitioners contention that the acts of the Maranaos is caso fortuito. Issue: Was there breach of contract of carriage?
Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of wilfull acts of other passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. In the present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioner's employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made possible. Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager, Diosdado Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be taken, petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers. Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the circumstances, simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the passenger's constitutional rights. The acts of Maranaos could not be considered as caso fortuito because there was already a warning by the PC. No contributory negligence could be attributed to the deceased. The assailant's motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two Maranaos as a result of the collision between petitioner's bus and the jeepney in which the two Maranaos were riding. The armed men actually allowed deceased to retrieve something from the bus. What apparently angered them was his attempt to help the driver of the bus by pleading for his life. KAPALARAN BUS LINE V. CORONADO FACTS: On August, 1982, the jeepney driven by Lope Grajera was coming from Laguna on its way to Sta. Cruz. As it reached the intersection where there is a traffic sign yield, it stopped an cautiously treated the intersection as a Thru Stop street, which it is not. The Kapalaran Bus Line was on its way from Sta. Cruz, Laguna driven by its driver, Virgilio Llamoso, on its way towards Manila. As the KBL neared the intersection,
The payment made by the private respondent for the insured value of the lost cargo operates as waiver of its (private respondent) right to enforce the term of the implied warranty against Caltex under the marine insurance policy. However, the same cannot be validly interpreted as an automatic admission of the vessels seaworthiness by the private respondent as to foreclose recourse against the petitioner for any liability under its contractual obligation as a common carrier. The fact of payment grants the private respondent subrogatory right which enables it to exercise legal remedies that would otherwise be available to Caltex as owner of the lost cargo against the petitioner common carrier. EDGAR COKALIONG SHIPPING LINES, INCvs. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC. vs. IAC Facts: Private respondent Teofista P. Tinitigan, filed a complaint against petitioner for damages arising from defendant's alleged refusal to accommodate her on Pan Am Flight No. 431 from Sto. Domingo, Republica Dominica to San Juan, Puerto Rico notwithstanding the fact that she possessed a confirmed plane ticket purchased from Pan Ams Office at Sto. Domingo and thus causing her to suffer mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social
ISAAC vs. A.L. AMMEN TRANS. CO.,SUPRA Del Prado v. Meralco Facts: Teodorico Florenciano, Meralcos motorman, was driving the companys street car along Hidalgo Street. Plaintiff Ignacio Del Prado ran across the street to catch the car. The motorman eased up but did not put the car into complete stop. Plaintiff was able to get hold of the rail and step his left foot when the car accelerated. As a result, plaintiff slipped off and fell to the ground. His foot was crushed by the wheel of the car. He filed a complaint for culpa contractual. Issues: (1) Whether the motorman was negligent (2) Whether Meralco is liable for breach of contract of carriage (3) Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff Held: (1) We may observe at the outset that there is no obligation on the part of a street railway company to stop its cars to let on intending passengers at other points than those appointed for stoppage. Nevertheless, although the motorman of this car was
Trans-Asia Shipping Lines vs. CA (GR 118126, 4 March 1996) FACTS: Respondent Atty. Renato Arroyo, a public attorney, bought a ticket from herein
Compagnie de Commerce vs. Hamburg IHCR, an American Company, contracted HAL to transport 852 crates of agricultural machinery from Baltimore, MD to Hamburg, Germany and that after it reached Hamburg, the crates were to be delivered, at the order of the consignor, to Vladivostock, Russia. The crates were delivered via the vessel Bulgaria to Hamburg, at the expense of HAL. It was transferred to the German ship Suevia to resume journey from Hamburg to Russia. During Suevias journey, war broke out between Russia and Germany. Suevias captain ordered the ship to be placed on neutral
Issue: May the shipowner or agent, notwithstanding the total loss of the vessel as a result of the negligence of its captain, be properly held liable in damages for the consequent death of its passengers? Held: No. This question is controlled by the provisions of article 587 of the Code of Commerce. Said article reads: The agent shall also be civilly liable for the indemnities in favor of third persons which arise from the conduct of the captain in the care of the goods which the vessel carried; but he may exempt himself therefrom by abandoning the vessel with all her equipments and the freight he may have earned during the voyage. The provisions accords a shipowner or agent the right of abandonment; and by necessary implication, his liability is confined to that which he is entitled as of right to abandon "the vessel with all her equipment and the freight it may have earned during the voyage." Lawful acts and obligations of the captain beneficial to the vessel may be enforced as against the agent for the reason that such obligations arise from the contract of agency while as to any liability incurred by the captain through his unlawful acts, the ship agent is simply subsidiarily civilly liable. This liability of the agent is limited to the vessel and it does not extend further. For this reason the Code of Commerce makes the agent liable to the extent of the value of the vessel, as the codes of the principal maritime nations provide with the vessel, and not individually. If the shipowner or agent may in any way be held civilly liable at all for injury to or death of passengers arising from the negligence of the captain in cases of collisions or shipwrecks, his liability is merely co-extensive with his interest in the vessel such that a total loss thereof results in its extinction. Assuming that petitioner is liable for a breach of contract of carriage, the exclusively "real and hypothecary nature" of maritime law operates to limit such liability to the value of the vessel, or to the insurance thereon, if any. In the instant case it does not appear that the vessel was insured. Whether the abandonment of the vessel sought by the petitioner in the instant case was in accordance with law of not, is immaterial. The vessel having totally perished, any act of abandonment would be an idle ceremony. Yangco is therefore absolved from the complaints. CHUA YEK HONG vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MARIANO GUNO, and DOMINADOR OLIT
G.R. No. 74811 September 30, 1988 FACTS: Petitioner contracted with the herein private respondent to deliver 1,000 sacks of copra, valued at P101,227.40, on board the vessel M/V Luzviminda I owned by the latter. However it did not reach its destination, the vessel capsized and sank with all its cargo. Petitioner instituted a complaint against private respondent for breach of contract incurring damages. Private respondents defense is that even assuming that the alleged cargo was truly loaded aboard their vessel, their liability had been extinguished by reason of the total loss of said vessel. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Chua Yek Hong however CA reversed the decision by applying Article 587 of the Code of Commerce and the doctrine in Yangco vs. Lasema (73 Phil. 330 [1941]) and held that private respondents' liability, as ship owners, for the loss of the cargo is merely co-extensive with their interest in the vessel such that a total loss thereof results in its extinction. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Appellate Court erred in applying the doctrine of limited liability under Article 587 of the Code of Commerce as expounded in Yangco vs. Laserna, supra. HELD: As this Court held: If the ship owner or agent may in any way be held civilly liable at all for injury to or death of passengers arising from the negligence of the captain in cases of collisions or shipwrecks, his liability is merely co-extensive with his interest in the vessel such that a total loss thereof results in its extinction. (Yangco vs. Laserna, et al., supra). The limited liability rule, however, is not without exceptions, namely: (1) where the injury or death to a passenger is due either to the fault of the ship owner, or to the concurring negligence of the ship owner and the captain (Manila Steamship Co., Inc. vs. Abdulhaman supra); (2) where the vessel is insured; and (3) in workmen's compensation claims Abueg vs. San Diego, supra). In this case, there is nothing in the records to show that the loss of the cargo was due to the fault of the private
Facts: Private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros Navigation Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets for his wife, daughter, son and niece who were going to Bacolod City to attend a family reunion boarding the Don Juan. Don Juan collided off the Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don Juan sank. Several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The bodies of some of the victims were found and brought to shore, but the four members of private respondents' families were never found. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners exercised the extraordinary diligence required? Held: No. As with the Mecenas case, this Court found petitioner guilty of negligence in (1) allowing or tolerating the ship captain and crew members in playing mahjong during the voyage, (2) in failing to maintain the vessel seaworthy and (3) in allowing the ship to carry more passengers than it was allowed to carry. Also, the duty to exercise due diligence includes the duty to take passengers or cargoes that are within the carrying capacity of the vessel.
The Duty to exercise due diligence includes the duty to take passengers or cargoes that are within the carrying capacity of the vessel. (Same Ruling with Mecenas)
Manila Steamship Co. Inc. VS. Insa Abdulhaman (100 Phil 32) Facts: Insa Abdulhaman together with his wife and five children boarded M/L Consuelo V in Zamboanga City. The said ship was bound for Siokon under the command of Faustino Macrohon. On that same night, M/S Bowline Knot was navigating from Marijoboc towards Zamboanga. Around 9:30 to 10:00 in the evening of May 4, 1948, while some of the passengers of the M/L Consuelo V were then sleeping and some lying down awake, a shocking collision suddenly occurred. The ship that collided was later on identified as the M/V Bowline Knot. M/L Consuelo V capsized that resulted to the death of 9 passengers and the loss of the cargoes on board.
The Court held the owners of both vessels solidarily liable to plaintiff for damages caused to the latter under Article 827 of the Code of Commerce but exempted defendant Lim Hong To from liability due to the sinking and total loss of his vessel. While Manila steamship, owner of the Bowline Knot was ordered to pay all of plaintiffs damages. Petitioner Manila Steamship Co. pleads that it is exempt from any liability under Article 1903 of the Civil Code because it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its employees, particularly the officer in command of the M/S Bowline Knot. Issue: Whether or not petitioner Manila Steamship Co. is exempt from any liability under Art. 1903 of the Civil Code? Held: NO. Petitioner is not exempted from liabilities. While it is true that plaintiffs action against petitioner is based on a tort or quasi delict, the tort in question is not a civil tort under the Civil Code but a maritime tort resulting in a collision at sea, governed by Articles 826-939 of the Code of Commerce. Under Art. 827 of the Code of Commerce, in case of collision between two vessels imputable to both of them, each vessel shall suffer her own damage and both shall be solidarily liable for the damages occasioned to their cargoes. The shipowner is directly and primarily responsible in tort resulting in a collision at sea, and it may not escape liability on the ground that exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of the ves sels officers and crew. ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. CA Facts: Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel owned by defendant ABOITIZ, at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila. Said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein disembarked, a gangplank having been provided connecting the side of the vessel to the pier. Instead of using said gangplank Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third deck which was on the level with the pier. After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement between the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation and defendant Aboitiz. The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its crane operator Alejo Figueroa was placed alongside the vessel and one hour after the passengers of said vessel had disembarked, it started operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel. While the crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from said vessel obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing to the crew of the said
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrierpassenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier's premises to claim his baggage. When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner's vessel. Even if he had already disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner's premises was not without cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only one hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard procedure in the case of petitioner's vessels that the unloading operations shall start only after that time.
Facts: Petitioner was paying passenger of respondent Philippine Airlines on board flight No. 946-R from Mactan Cebu bound for Butuan City. He was scheduled to attend the trial in the Court of First instance , Br. II thereat. As a passenger, he checked in one piece of luggage, a bull maleta. The plane left Mactan Airport, Cebu City at about 1pm and arrived at Bacasi Airport, Butuan City at past 2pm of the same day. Upon arrival, petitioner claimed his luggage but it could not be found. According to petitioner, it was only after reacting indignantly to the loss that the