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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Edward A. Flynn, former Chief of Police, Arlington County Police Department (now the
Secretary of Public Safety for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts)
Type of event: Interview
Date: November 26,2003
Special Access Issues : None
Prepared by: Mark Bittinger
Team Number: 8
Location: GSA NCR Office, Washington, DC
Participants - Non-Commission: Edward Flynn
Participants - Commission: Mark Bittinger; Kevin Shaeffer
UNCLAS
1. Edward Flynn's Background:

2. DoD Historical Interview: p. 29, a frank conversation took place between the FBI and local
law enforcement. Flynn said that you have to be sensitive to the media. Various media were
covering the event, each with their own agenda. The spending of money was the focus of some
and the impression that law enforcement was supposedly not on the "same sheet of music."

3. Flynn's Security Clearance: "I still don't have a security clearance, and it's nobody's fault but
my own." He has never got around to filling out the required paperwork. He has partially filled
out the application for a secret clearance.

4. Security Clearance Issues: Issues that Flynn raised includes: is there anyway to amend the
security clearance process; how to address disparities among clearance levels (example: local
police department rep on the FBI's JTTFhas a clearance, but his chief has no clearance); it's not
possible to accommodate all 351 cities and towns in Massachusetts, each with a cleared
representative on the JTTF.

A private in the U.S. Army does not have a clearance, how is operational security and classified
information any different in civilian law enforcement operations?

5. Information Sharing: The JTTF-ACPD relationship was "pretty good." Paul "P.J" Reed was
the representative. But the JTTF is "inadequate" because of its dual purposes of investigation
and intelligence. Flynn sees a need for a group focused solely on intelligence. The information
sharing process needs to be inclusive and participative.

6. Intelligence Briefings and Products: Flynn says it's either "too much, or not enough." The
mountains of data and other law enforcement sensitive (LES) e-mailings he receives are not

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spam but are close to it. These mailings come from a variety of sources, the U.S. Attorney's
Office, DRS and others.

7. Flawed Strategy: Fighting a war on terrorism, is like fighting a war against land mines - the
focus is on a tactic and not on a perpetrator. Another approach would be to prosecute the war
against "terrorists motivated by radical Islam." "Weare spending a fair amount of treasury and
we've got to be smart about it."

"Nobody can respond by themselves." There is a need for regionalism. In Massachusetts they
are not perfect by a mile, but it's a start.

8. Relationship with other Federal law enforcement agencies on CT matters: Flynn said he could
not comment, as he had no knowledge.

9. Interaction with foreign intelligence and law enforcement counterparts: PERF convened a
meeting with British police, including the London Metro police and facilitated a visit to Northern
Ireland.

10. CT Information and Training: It is vendor-driven and there is no way of telling which ones
are charlatans. We need to spend more money on intelligence and in particular on identifying
patterns of behavior. Regarding intelligence training, the FBI is learning from the CIA, what is
needed now is a regional capability for intelligence analysis.

11. MOA ACPDIDPS: No MOU existed on 9/11; legal issues had prevented an earlier agreement
from being signed. Pentagon on Federal property and governed by Federal laws, but nobody
knows the traffic pattern around the Pentagon better than the ACPD. Within the first 20 minutes
traffic was moved away from the Pentagon. The strength that the police bring is that they move
to the threat and take action.

Other communities need to replicate the MOA because there are insufficient resources at any
Federal or military facility faced with a terrorist incident.

12. JOC, EOC, Jlf': Regarding the JOC, it's "remarkable how events can outpace structure."
The EOC still had its responsibilities. At the ICP Flynn, Plaugher and Maj. Gen. Jackson would
see each other. There was no nc. The FBI did not want to participate in a JIC, so Arlington
County filled invoid. It's "essential" to have JIC. The absence of Federal participation had an
impact on the morale of Federal agents.

13. Reservist On-call: This can be problematic. ACPD lost 60r 7 people to call-up. It can place
a great stress on a department when coupled with attrition. Need to reinvigorate the COPS
Office. Identify Guard and Reserve members in a police department and have a COPS grant
compensate on a one-for-one basis, without expanding FTE's, when reservists are called up.
Need to avoid creating a disincentive for police departments to hire Guard and Reserve
members.

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14. Structures and Relationships: Need to create structures to facilitate trust and relationships.
An example in the Washington, DC metro area is the COG. Various committees and
. subcommittees, some with 20 members and Flynn was able to develop strong relationships with
6 or 8 of these members.

15. Homeland Security Issues / Recommendations: Homeland security money is routed through
Flynn's office. Equipment money must be allocated to local jurisdictions in 45 days. Planning
money is spent later, after the fact. It's putting the cart before the horse by spending money on
equipment before spending money on planning.

Karl von Clausewitz' s famous axiom is, "He who tries to defend himself against everything
defends himself against nothing."

What is needed is "stakeholder meetings," where regional partnerships are mandated and are a
contingent for the disbursement of grant dollars. Flynn believes we need to prevent a vendor-
driven approach to equipment spending. Rather use grants to facilitate regionalism and regional
partnerships. Currently, Flynn sees the system as overwhelmingly "federal centric."

DHS needs to improve its State and local coordination office. It's got to be more than allocating
granting money. Federal, State and local integration and coordination needs to take place across
a range of issues.

The next iteration of grant money needs to include money for intelligence, in particular a
regional intelligence capacity with the realization that "more intel will go up the food chain, than
will come down the food chain." The entire intelligence area is "going to be spotty until a
template is imposed."

The Anti-Terrorism Task Force (the name has changed) is a well-meaning attempt, but "the feds
go their way and the state and locals go their way." "Operation Live Wire."

The system is built on RELATIONSHIPS, a trust level.

In Massachusetts, the State Police Intelligence Desk is now designated as the fusion point.

Flynn sees DHS a "still very much a work in progress," while the States are trying to develop
"best practices." The national strategy for homeland security is two-sided. First there is none
and secondly can there ever be an effective one? Focus on egalitarianism (who didn't get money
to buy stuff) versus an objective assessment of vulnerability and risks. In addition, there are still
different power centers in homeland security - FBI, DHS, DoD. Do we need a MI-5, another
Federal bureaucracy?

Governor Mitt Romney and Minter are co-chairs on a panel, but Flynn is not aware of any forum
to connect homeland security at the Federal level with homeland security as the State level.

We need a system at the State level where homeland security funding motivates States towards
strengthening mutual aid laws rather then forcing a cookie cutter approach on the States.

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Examples already in place are the Federal mandates and requirements that are attached to
Department of Justice and Department of Transportation grants. DHS needs to use grant money
is a similar fashion. Because "mutual aid laws are a patchwork quilt."

Flynn commented on rcs, the Federal Response Plan (FRP) and its Emergency Support
Functions (ESFs) and observed that there is no ESF for law enforcement. He believes that
"Diplomacy" needs to be codified into rcs. This activity can best be described as a combination
of community relations, protocol, and interagency courtesy.

Flynn maintained a strategic viewpoint by not being the police incident commander.

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