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Zach Groffsky
Background: In this paper I will discuss Frances involvement in the Thirty Years War,
and the factors that led to their ascendancy at the wars close. Specifically, I will be
discussing the importance of Realpolitik in French political thought through the actions of
Cardinal Richelieu and Cardinal Mazarin, and examining the ways in which Realpolitik
throughout the 16th century. Surrounded by territories controlled by Spanish and Imperial
Habsburgs, the French crown grew increasingly worried about Habsburg influence
further encroaching on its borders and recognized the need to divide the Holy Roman
Empire. By the time French forces officially entered the Thirty Years War in 1635, what
had started as a religious conflict quickly turned into an international struggle for
dominance in Europe. However, despite Frances eventual victory, she was terribly
unprepared for battle at the onset of the war. The French monarchy lacked the necessary
funds to raise an adequate army, and found itself without prominent leadership or proper
military strategy. On the other hand, the Habsburgs boasted larger armies, better
generalship and more advanced methods of fighting. Even so, despite their many
disadvantages, France was able to emerge from the Thirty Years War as the preeminent
power in Europe. A new form of political thought, Realpolitik, emerged during the latter
half of the war and focused on physical, material gains over ethical or intangible issues,
allowing the French diplomats necessary freedom and flexibility to operate both
domestically and abroad. Cardinal Richelieu, and later, Cardinal Mazarin, invoked the
ideals of Realpolitik to weave through the complexities of the Thirty Years War,
propagating Frances ascension to the Western worlds greatest power despite its initial
handicaps.
The emergence of Realpolitik is the primary factor that led to Frances eventual
supremacy. It shifted French aims, as it allowed them to place their sights on obtaining
territories and alliances that were previously unlikely. As Henry Emery explains in his
political affairs the problem of morals does not enter, that might makes right, the strong
must of necessity prey upon the weak in order to increase their strength, emphasizing
that achieving the end result is of the utmost importance, and it matters not if the methods
to reach it are ethically questionable.1 These ideals are evident in Frances war campaign,
as they cared not of the spiritual significances of allying with Protestant countries, nor of
the emotions of the volatile French citizens. Instead, Cardinal Richelieu and Cardinal
Mazarin employed intellectual, advanced strategies that foresaw outcomes of the many
gave France a distinct ability over its enemies. Furthermore, Realpolitik allowed these
French political heads to remain undistracted by emotional or cultural issues and focus on
actions that benefitted their country. Following these ideals, Cardinal Richelieu
Mazarin with power and leverage during his negotiations at Westphalia. Nonetheless,
before one can examine the vital role of Realpolitik, one must first understand Frances
participation in the Thirty Years War and several minor factors that also contributed to
Frances involvement in the Thirty Years War did not officially start until 1635.
avoid open war against the dominant European power of the time. However, as Spains
power grew and a Habsburg victory at Nrdlingen vastly depleted Protestant forces,
Habsburg influence. While the threat of conflict did not materialize until the latter stages
of the war, the seeds were planted long before. The War of the Mantuan Succession,
where France and Spain fought over control of northern Italy, marked one of the first
violent conflicts in a series of fierce encounters between the two powers and generated an
from Louis XIII to Cardinal Richelieu, dated 4 August 1634, that argued at length the
case for a vigorous open war against Spain in order to secure a beneficial general
peace.2 France recognized the need to curtail Habsburg expansion, and was ready to
The declaration of war came on May 19, 1635, after Spanish troops arrested the
Richelieu, read, Since you have failed to release the archbishop of TrierHis Majesty
declares that his is resolved to avenge this offence by force of arms, for it is of concern to
European stability rather than an aggressive act of foreign policy. The declaration of war
on the Holy Roman Empire came soon after, with the renewal of the French-Swedish
alliance at Wismar in March of 1636. Much like the war with Spain, confrontation with
Germany was virtually unavoidable, since this part of Europe had been the theatre where
it had opened long before.4 As of the spring of 1636, France had officially entered one of
2 Parker, Geoffrey, and Simon Adams. The Thirty Years' War. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1984. 126. Print.
3 Wilson, Peter H. "French declaration of war against Spain, 19 May 1635" The Thirty
Years War: A Sourcebook. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan,
2010. 217. Print.
However, Frances impact on the conflict was not immediate. The first four years
saw no significant French victories, mainly due to poor leadership, an overly ambitious
strategy and undisciplined troops. Middle-class tradesmen and peasants were required to
subscribed to a method of war by diversion, where they hoped to keep their influence
in Germany minimal. The main focus was Spain, as they believed Philip IV to be the
greatest threat to European peace and stability. France realized that if Spain were
weakened, then the emperor would no longer make war according to the appetite and
passion of the Spanish.5 For example, a Spanish-led coalition invaded France in 1635,
forcing French troops into disarray and retreat, thereby crippling Frances military plans.
If not for Spains massive fiscal commitments in other regions, they would have likely
reached Paris and forced French surrender. Still, despite the inability to win any
important battles, actions in the first four years helped facilitate French victories after
1640. France supported Sweden and the Protestant party by successfully creating
doorways into Germany and ensuring that a defeat like Nrdlingen would never occur
again. Richelieu also spent this time period accumulating supplies and procuring friendly
5 Ibid., 136.
Groffsky 6
After 1640, the tide of the war vastly changed. France saw her first major victory
in 1643 at Rocroi, where her armies defeated the Spanish without the assistance of the
Protestant League. Additionally, the Habsburgs negotiated the Peace of Prague in 1635,
revoking their insistence on full Catholicization of German lands and signing what many
succeeded in reconciling the Holy Roman Empire with its domestic enemies, it actually
weakened the Emperors position moving into the final stages of the war. Before the
Peace of Prague, devastation to German lands and populations was limited because both
sides were fighting on their homeland. Conversely, the Peace of Prague led to an
operations in which they held no regard for the well being of the land or its inhabitants.7
Geoffrey Parker discusses the reasons for the increased carnage in the latter years of the
war, asserting: it was not that more foreign countries were involved in the war than
beforeon the contrary there were less. It was the attitude of the interventionists that had
changed.8 The last four years saw sheer destruction of German lands, as buildings and
fields were scorched, children were slaughtered, and women were brutally raped. By the
Battle of Prague in 1648, France and her allies had essentially brought the Thirty Years
War to a close and transitioned into peace negotiations in paramount position. Due to the
length of the conflict, internal issues within Habsburg nations restricted their ability to
wage war.
6 Helfferich, Tryntje. "The Peace of Prague (June 12, 1635)." The Thirty Years War: A
Documentary History. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2009. 165-76. Print.
7 Parker, Geoffrey. The Thirty Years War. 156
8 Ibid., 157.
Groffsky 7
The length of Spain and Germanys involvement in the Thirty Years War
magnified their domestic problems. Spain had been on the decline throughout the first
half of the 17th century, and the inadequacy of Philip IV to set a clear path for the future
only furthered its demise. Furthermore, both Portugal and Catalonia revolted due to the
encumbrance of war, leading to additional strain on Spanish troops and resources. The
French supported these rebellions, and Portugal declared independence in 1641, greatly
diminishing the power of the Spanish navy. Additionally, Catalonia was virtually
annexed by France, symbolizing the greater shift in authority that was occurring in
Europes balance of power.9 Sentiments from civilians in the Holy Roman Empire echoed
those of the Spanish. The burden of war weighed heavily on its civilians, as villages were
frequently required to provide money, men and defenses at every threat of enemy
the many hardships he encountered, including the fact that he traveled approximately
fifteen thousand miles, marching back and forth across the empire, from Italy to the
Baltic, from France to Pomerania, and back again throughout the course of the war.10
Hagendorf began fighting in 1624, and many of his fellow soldiers began fighting as
early as 1609.11 The duration of Habsburg devotion war led to a serious lack of resources
Monetary issues limited Habsburg ability to make decisive military actions. When
a coalition of Spanish and Imperial troops invaded France, they came within a mere 120
kilometers of Paris before a lack of fiscal resources forced them to halt the invasion. If
they had the necessary funds to reach Paris, France would have likely been forced into a
premature surrender.12 The Imperial Habsburgs were also stretched thin, as they battled
French and Swedish troops across their western and northern borders. In an eight-month
stretch in Brandenburg alone, it cost the Holy Roman Empire almost 3,091,792 florins, or
almost $2 million dollars to fund its war efforts.13 In fact, Ferdinand cites the exhaustion
of supplies as one of the primary factors contributing to his decision to call for peace. In
mentions that the the ebbing of mine and my allies [arms and forces] and the almost
complete lack of resources were insurmountable problems that led to the call for peace.14
Still, the impact of these internal problems is miniscule when compared with the
Though he died before the war ended, Cardinal Richelieu was instrumental in the
and abroad, were required in order to ensure Frances continued well-being. For this he is
often credited as one of the first politicians to successfully utilize Realpolitik. His
strategic foreign policy and harsh, yet effective methods of raising funds were essential in
asserting France into a position to emerge victorious from the chaos. Richelieu foresaw
that the biggest threat to Frances security was the growing Habsburg power. As Richard
Lodge notes in his biography, The Life of Cardinal Richelieu, no one knew better than
12 Asch, Ronald G. The Thirty Years War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe: 1618-
48. New York: St. Martin's, 1997. 123. Print.
13 Wilson, Peter H. "Cost estimates for November 1638" The Thirty Years War: A
Sourcebook. 245.
14 Helfferich, Tryntje. "Imperial Instructions for the Peace Congress (October 16,
1645)." Emperor (own hand). The Thirty Years War: A Documentary History.
Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2009. 233-240. Print.
Groffsky 9
Richelieu that [France] was on the threshold of greater difficulties than those which he
intricacies of the conflict, as well as his ability to anticipate the effect of certain actions.15
expenditures. France lacked an efficient taxation system, as well as profits from colonial
Richelieu foresaw the many expenses of maintaining a powerful army, and cleverly
implemented policies that set new precedents for money collection. Subscribing to the
notions of Realpolitik, he cared not what the erratic French public thought of him and
invoked the most profitable approaches to obtaining resources. His methods for doing so
are often called into question, as he significantly raised taxes, sold government offices to
the highest bidders and created the position of Intendanttax collectors who were given
the right to override local authorities and communicate directly with the Royal
Council.16 Furthermore, much of this increased financial burden fell on the poor, as
many nobles were exempt from taxes. In order to prevent public rebellion, Richelieu
wisely incentivized loyalty to the throne by raising taxes on regions known to host
Habsburg sentiments.
his term. Furthermore, the Habsburgs tried to capitalize on the poors dissatisfaction with
from his harsh policies. However, despite the publics contempt, Richelieu never
15 Lodge, Richard, and Henry Ketcham. The Life of Cardinal Richelieu. New York: A.L.
Burt, 1903. Print.
16 Ibid.
Groffsky 10
waivered from his program and continued to obtain the required finances. It is estimated
that starting in 1634, before the declaration of war on Spain, France spent about 9.9
million thalers on military operations. In 1635, after the declaration of war, military
expenditures increased to about 16.5 million thalers, as the portion of the French budget
spent on military activities and subsidies to foreign allies increased from 71% to 95%.17
Richelieu also grasped the importance of increasing Frances army, stating in September
and necessity oblige.18 From 1633 to 1643, French infantry troops increased from about
102,000 to 218,000, further illustrating Richelieus success in raising funds and bolstering
Frances military strength. Richelieu also understood that France would be more prepared
the longer she could avoid battle, so he intentionally waited until 1635 in order to
improve Frances financial and her capability to sustain a long war. By strategically
entering the war in its latter phases, France was able to enter the conflict fresh, with
adequate finances to fund war on Spanish and German fronts at the same time. As Parker
notes in The Thirty Years War, an influx of funds late on in the conflict was well worth
having. It constituted a new factor in the balance of power.19 Richelieu was aware that if
he were able to attack the Habsburgs on several fronts, he would be able to spread their
resources thin enough to ensure French victory. Neither Ferdinand II nor Philip IV could
advantage.
17 Wilson, Peter H. "Military war organization and war economy" The Thirty Years
War: A Sourcebook. 246.
18 Helfferich, Tryntje. "Advice of Cardinal Richelieu of France (after September 6,
1634). The Thirty Years War: A Documentary History. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2009.
151-2. Print.
19 Parker, Geoffrey. The Thirty Years War. 134.
Groffsky 11
France with leverage and control in her attainment of alliances. With Philip IV of Spain
and Ferdinand II of the Holy Roman Empire leading the potent Catholic League,
alliances opposed to dynastic Imperial power. Richelieu constructed alliances with the
Protestant countries of the Dutch Republic and Sweden, while still ensuring that none of
these treaties disturbed [the Catholic religions] exercise in any of the areas of his
conquests.20 Without its large bankroll, France would have likely lost Sweden as an ally.
His ability to envision future outcomes was instrumental in securing these relationships,
and due to his efforts the wars focus shifted from a primarily religious struggle into a
wide-reaching political affair. As Mthivier observes in his book, Le Sicle de Louis XIII,
of power had always been defined by confession, and the employment of Realpolitik
renewed at the Treaty of Hamburg in 1638, was set to expire in 1641. Axel Oxenstierna,
the powerful Lord High Chancellor of Sweden, said of the French alliance, I say, as I
have always said, that there are many arguments to dissuade me from the French alliance.
I have had experience of their tricks in former years. They commit hostile acts against us,
20 Wilson, Peter H. "Richelieus reflections on French policy after 1630" The Thirty
Years War: A Sourcebook. 215.
21 Moote, A. Lloyd. Louis XIII, the Just. Berkeley: University of California, 1989. 422.
Print.
22 Wilson, Peter H. "Oxenstierna on the French alliance, 1640" The Thirty Years War: A
Sourcebook. 213.
Groffsky 12
especially Bernard of Weimars decision to join the French army and the increasing shift
of troops from northern Germany to Spain. Essentially, Sweden was nervous that their
war aims would be lost amidst Frances many ambitious and desires. However, Sweden
armys effectiveness. Oxenstierna realized that necessity is a great argument, and for a
handful of gold one must often sacrifice reputation.23 So, when the alliance was renewed
in 1641, Sweden bound herself, in exchange for subsidies at an increased rate, to fight
alongside Francenot for a limited period, but for the duration of the war.24 Without
these resources to offer Sweden, France would have been forced to face the Habsburgs
Sweden proved to be the strongest, most important ally of France throughout the
latter stages of the Thirty Years War. Initially, Frances influence was limited to
defeat at the hands of the Habsburgs at Nrdlingen, the Heilbronn League collapsed
northern Germany, and France needed an ally with an imposing army. The alliance with
Sweden proved to be a rewarding yet arduous one. Sweden, under the leadership of Axel
Oxenstierna, hoped for France to fully engage Habsburg forces in Germany, while France
hoped their influence in Germany to remain indirect and limited. Issues of control and
political goals also complicated the relationship. The Swedes wanted full control over the
French army, as they felt their military knowledge, strategies and leadership provided the
best chance to defeat the Habsburgs. France, on the other hand, refused to hand the reins
23 Ibid.
24 Parker, Geoffrey. The Thirty Years War. 144.
25 Ibid., 132.
Groffsky 13
to Sweden, as they felt that their massive monetary and resource contributions warranted
authority.
The two also had differing goals, as Sweden yearned for control over the German
states along the Baltic Sea and cared little about Spain. On the contrary, Frances main
goal was to break up the empire of the Habsburgs, which they sought to achieve through
a multifaceted approach that involved campaigns in both Germany and Spain. Yet,
dissolving the Holy Roman Empire. While France provided funds to their allies, Sweden
Adolphus and later, Axel Oxenstierna. Swedish forces almost doubled those of France,
and their discipline and modern methods of fighting were unrivaled at the time.
negotiations of the Peace of Westphalia, where they would have negotiated on the side of
the Habsburgs. France needed Sweden for their military prowess, and Sweden required
France for its deep pockets and refusal to agree to peace while the Habsburgs were still in
power.
Alliances with smaller states were also critical in securing Frances eventual
victory. It mattered not the size of a nation, for many countries proved beneficial due to
their strategic geographic location rather than military contributions. Richelieu wisely
noticed this in advance, and started to declare Frances dedication to upholding German
Liberties, which were the traditional rights of the princes that became the rallying cry
for all those princes and estates who rose up to oppose the emperor.26 By aligning
26 Wilson, Peter H. "Richelieus reflections on French policy after 1630" The Thirty
Years War: A Sourcebook. 215.
Groffsky 14
Frances goals with those of north German princes, Richelieu succeeded in finding allies
located near the heart of Habsburg power. This allowed for easier access into Habsburg
lands, as well as more convenient routes for sending supplies. As he says in his reflection
on French foreign policy after 1630, if France had allies on all sides who had to join
forces with you, it is common sense that the Spaniards, attacked in various places by such
a union, would succumb under the force of [our] power.27 Alliances with Savoy, Parma,
and Mantua blocked Spains access into the Holy Roman Empire, helping to cut off trade
routes and supply chains between the Habsburgs and their allies. Alliances around French
borders were also consequential, as they created a buffer zone that helped protect France
against invading enemies and allowed for more efficient transportation of supplies.
Additionally, proxy wars in places like Grison were essential because they convinced
Italian princes to join the war by removing their fear of the Germans, thus improving both
the force and reach of the anti-Habsburg coalition. Lastly, alliances with the Dutch
Republic helped France wage naval war on Spain, while Sweden and Protestant German
After the death of Cardinal Richelieu in 1642, the Italian-born Cardinal Mazarin
succeeded his position and became the acting leader of French diplomatic relations.
Much like his predecessor, Mazarin embodied the notion of Realpolitik through his
domestic policies. Each decision he made revolved around what would contribute most to
strengthening Frances position, no matter how it affected his reputation within the
populations. Mazarin was able to gain domestic support despite the tension amongst
French citizens through the deliberate use of propaganda. He created a card game called
Gographie, which used prominent war figures as the illustrations on the cards. France
27 Ibid.
Groffsky 15
subordinate, defensive position.28 This made people believe France was winning the
conflict, thus garnering more financial support and positive sentiments as it approached
its final stages. Additionally, Mazarin commissioned portraits of Louis XIII where he
abandoned his insignia of government, the crown, scepter and royal regalia, presenting
himself rather as the victorious commander of the army to appease and encourage the
public. By depicting Louis XIII as a military leader rather than an isolated monarch, it
made it appear as if the king was fighting for his people, helping to alleviate some of the
bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, as well as the territories of Breisach, Upper and
Lower Alsace and Sundgau for the French crown.29 Furthermore, Catholicism was
guaranteed in each of these places, despite protests from Frances Protestant allies. Here,
the values of Realpolitik caused Mazarin to ignore the desires of the Protestant League
regardless of their collaboration during the war, and instead seek outcomes that
exclusively benefitted France. The intricacies of Mazarins diplomacy also illustrate the
and attempted to manipulate allies against each other. For example, he attempted to make
peace with the Emperor in order to make the Spanish as incapable as possible to harm
[France].30 However, arrogance and contempt for the Spanish distracted Mazarin from
manipulator living in a world of fools and thought he could easily direct the negotiations
to obtain his personal desires.31 Mazarin had the opportunity to make a mutually
beneficial peace with Spain, but his longing to obtain the Spanish Low Countries and go
above and beyond the achievements of Cardinal Richelieu, led to yet another war that
would not end until 1659.32 Additionally, Sonnino and other scholars like Geoffrey
Treasure claim that Mazarins failure to reach peace with Spain led to the Fronde. By
allowing his personal vanities and emotions to cloud his judgment and pursue unrealistic
goals, Mazarin effectually displays the effectiveness of Realpolitik. If he had stuck to the
standards of Realpolitik and accepted the initial peace, France would have achieved a
Despite Mazarins inability to procure peace with Spain, France emerged from the
dissolved the Holy Roman Empire, as well as sealed the future of Spain as a monarchy
of the second rank and confirmed the France of Louis XIV as a dominant power over a
large tract of Europe.33 Cardinal Richelieu was the most influential figure in Frances
military and monetary deficiencies that had previously inhibited Frances ability to wage
Thirty Years War from a local religious conflict into a battle for supremacy and control in
Europeallowing France to ally with Protestant countries and ultimately arise from the
devastation as the superior power in the Western world. Cardinal Mazarins dealings at
Mnster also convey the value of Realpolitik, as a diversion from its philosophies
resulted in a less beneficial outcome for France. Realpolitik provided both Cardinal
Richelieu and Cardinal Mazarin the necessary liberty to pursue actions that defied
position of European dominance that would last until the early 19th century.
Works Cited
Primary Sources:
Groffsky 18
Helfferich, Tryntje. "Imperial Instructions for the Peace Congress (October 16, 1645)."
Emperor (own hand). The Thirty Years War: A Documentary History.
Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2009. 233-240. Print.
Helfferich, Tryntje. "The Peace of Prague (June 12, 1635)." The Thirty Years War: A
Documentary History. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2009. 165-76. Print.
Mazarin to DAvaux, April 7, 1646 (letter sent in Allemagne 79, fols. 34-
35). 81.
Mortimer, Geoff. "Military Life." Eyewitness Accounts of the Thirty Years War, 1618-48.
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002. 33-39. Print.
Wilson, Peter H. "Cost estimates for November 1638" The Thirty Years War: A
Sourcebook. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
245. Print.
Wilson, Peter H. "French declaration of war against Spain, 19 May 1635" The Thirty
Years War: A Sourcebook. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2010. 217. Print.
Wilson, Peter H. "Military war organization and war economy" The Thirty Years War: A
Sourcebook. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
246. Print.
Wilson, Peter H. "Oxenstierna on the French alliance, 1640" The Thirty Years War: A
Sourcebook. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
213. Print.
Wilson, Peter H. "Richelieus reflections on French policy after 1630" The Thirty Years
War: A Sourcebook. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan,
2010. 215. Print.
Secondary Sources:
Groffsky 19
Asch, Ronald G. The Thirty Years War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe: 1618-48.
New York: St. Martin's, 1997. Print.
Lodge, Richard, and Henry Ketcham. The Life of Cardinal Richelieu. New York: A.L.
Burt, 1903. Print.
Moote, A. Lloyd. Louis XIII, the Just. Berkeley: University of California, 1989. 422.
Print.
Parker, Geoffrey, and Simon Adams. The Thirty Years' War. London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1984. Print.
Poliensk, Josef V. The Thirty Years War. Trans. R. Evans. Berkeley: University of
California, 1971. Print.
Sonnino, Paul. Mazarin's Quest: The Congress of Westphalia and the Coming of the
Fronde. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2008. Print.
Wilson, Peter H. The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of
Harvard UP, 2009. Print.