PROPER TY AND POWER

THEORY AND DECISION LIBRARY

AN INTERNATIONAL SERIES
IN THE PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY OF THE
SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
Editors
GERALD EBERLEIN, University of Technology, Munich
WERNER LEINFELLNER, University of Nebraska
Editorial Advisory Board:
K. B 0 RCH, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
M. BUN G E, McGill University
1. S. COLEMAN, University of Chicago
W. KROEBERRIEL, University of Saarland
A. RAPOPORT, University of Toronto
F. SCHICK, Rutgers University
A. SEN, University of Oxford
w. STEGMULLER, University of Munich
K. SZANIAWSKI, University of Warsaw
L. TONDL, Prague
A. TVERSK Y, Stanford University
VOLUME 27
LESZEK NOWAK
Dept. of Philosophy, Poznan University
PROPERTY AND
POWER
Towards a Non-Marxian Historical Materialism
D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY
A MEMBER OF THE KLUWER .. ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS GROUP
DORDRECHT/BOSTON/LANCASTER
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Nowak, Leszek.
Property and power.
(Theory and decision library; v. 27)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Socialism. 2. Communism. 3. Historical materialism.
I. Title. II. Series.
HX73.N681983 335.4'119 82-16528
ISBN-13: 978-90-277-1595-1 e-ISBN 13: 978-94-009-6949-0
DOl: 10.1007/978-94-009-6949-0
Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company,
P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, Holland.
Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada
by Kluwer Boston Inc.,
190 Old Derby Street, Hingham, MA 02043, U.S.A.
In all other countries, sold and distributed
by Kluwer Academic Publishers Group,
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All Rights Reserved
Copyright 1983 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording or by any informational storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.
T ABLE OF CONTENTS
EDITORIAL NOTE
FOREWORD
INTRODUCTION
PART I: ON THE NECESSITY OF SOCIALISM
A. THE MARXIAN METHOD
1. The Marxian Methodology ~ An Outline of the Idealizational
Interpretation
2. To Surpass Marx with the Aid of His Methodology
B. THE MARXIAN AMBIGUITY. A PROPOSAL FOR A
NON-MARXIAN THEOR Y OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC FORMATION
vii
ix
xix
3
10
3. The Ambiguity of Marxian Historical Materialism 18
4. The Marxian Ambiguity: An Attempt at a Solution. A Non-
Marxian Theory of Socio-Economic Fonnation (Model I) 32
5. The Peculiarity of Slavery: The Development through Luxury
(Model II) 63
6. The Peculiarity of Feudalism: The Double Cycle (Models I I I ~ I V 78
7. The Peculiarity of Capitalism: An Attempt to Pose the Problem 101
C. THE LIMIT A TIONS OF MARX'S DISCOVERIES.
THE GENERALIZATION OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM
8. The Basic Limitation of Marxian Historical Materialism
9. An Attempt at a Marxist Theory of Power
10. Generalized Historical Materialism: Some Main Notions
126
137
169
vi T ABLE OF CONTENTS
D. THE FUNDAMENTAL MISTAKE OF MARX AND THE
THEOR Y OF SOCIALIST EVOLUTION
11. Preamble 188
12. The People's Struggle and the Supra-Class Struggle. The Role
of the Political Momentum in the Motion of Socio-Economic
Formation (Model IP) 189
13. The Peculiarity of Capitalism: The Necessity for the Disappear-
ance of the Working Class Struggle Leads to Socialism (Model
VP) 211
14. Conclusion. The Problem of Part II 236
PART II: ON THE NECESSITY OF SOCIALISM IN RUSSIA.
TOW ARDS THE MATERIALIST REINTERPRETATION OF
THE MARXIST IMAGE OF RUSSIA'S HISTORY
15. Introduction. Socialism in Russia: Modern Dogmas 239
16. The Totalitarian Anomaly: The Breakdown of the Double Cycle
in Russian Feudalism (13th-16th Centuries) 246
17. Property and Power in Russian Feudalism 270
18. Tsarist Russia Was the Best Developed Capitalist Country 285
19. The February Revolution Was a Totalitarian Revolution 319
20. Totalitarian Society in Russia: March-October 1917 342
21. The October Revolution Was Not a Social Revolution at All. It
Was instead the Result of Anti-Totalitarian People's Movements 356
22. Conclusion: The Myth of the Communists 372
REFERENCES 379
INDEX OF AUTHORS CITED 383
EDITORIAL NOTE
Professor Leszek Nowak, the author of this book, was interned on 13 Decem-
ber 1981 at the start of martial law in Poland. He was therefore unable to
cooperate with us during the production process. A Dutch friend of his,
Dr Theo A. F. Kuipers, took decisions about editorial problems in the manus-
cript, read the proofs, and composed the List of References and the Index
of Authors Cited.
In view of the developments in Poland and the content of the book it is
of importance to state that the manuscript reached us in August 1980.
vii
FOREWORD
THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE:
THE POLISH ROAD FROM SOCIALISM ON
1. The history of all hitherto existing societies is a history of class struggle
- not only that between the exploited and the exploiters, but also that
between the ruled and the rulers. And in modern times, there is in some
societies a struggle between those who are exploited and oppressed at the
same time and those who at the same time exploit and oppress.
2. The struggle between the owners and the direct producers results
from the fact that the former exploit the latter, that is, they take from
their labour more than they give back. It is possible since only they, the
exploiters, have a monopoly of the disposal over the m ~ n s of production,
and the major part of society must provide them with their labour force.
Increasing exploitation finally leads to the revolution of the masses - and the
owners are forced to make concessions in order to avoid re-occurrences.
That is why an increasing number of owners gradually transform their rela-
tionships with the direct producers, making the latter more interested in
their work thanks to the advantages they can get from it. Within the class
of owners a split occurs: the progressive type of property ownership separates
and, as it assures a more effective production, gradually spreads, while the
traditional type of property ownership gradually disappears. In this way,
evolutionarily, the new socia-economic formation appears. Revolutions do
not transform one socio-economic formation into another, but they do force
an evolution leading to the new rearrangement of property relations, that is,
to the new socio-economic formation allowing a greater degree of liberation
of work.
And it was so until and including capitalism. The revolutions of slaves in
the middle of the slave formation led to the evolutionary process of making
husbandmen of them, with the right to use a parcel of land, that is, the
feudalisation of slavery. The revolutions of serfs and of the town poor in the
middle of feudalism led to the capitalisation of feudalism. At the same time,
every new formation brought with it a greater degree of liberation of work:
a serf was more liberated than a slave and a capitalist worker is more liberated
than a serf. This mechanism of transforming the revolutions of the exploited
into evolutionary changes of property relations leading to a greater liberation
of the direct producer ended in capitalism: a man living under socialism is
ix
x FOREWORD
incomparably more down-trodden than a capitalist worker. For, from capital-
ism on, quite new laws of historical movement begin to work.
3. Thus, class division originates not only in economics but also in politics.
Just as economic inequality arises from the monopoly of the disposal over
the means of production in the hands of a minority, so also political inequality
arises from the monopoly of the disposal over the means of coercion in the
hands of a minority. In the latter case we have to do with the class division
between rulers (disposers over the means of repression and control) and
citizens (those who actually do not dispose over them). The interests of the
ruling class consists in enlarging the range and intensity of their control over
the citizens. Just as exploitation is a peculiar feature of property not
controlled by direct producers, so oppression is a feature of power that is
not controlled by the citizens.
The power based on the monopoly of coercion is, however, a purely
destructive factor. Private property has to produce goods in order to exploit
labour; and the more it wants to acquire, the greater must be the production.
Instead, power not controlled by the citizens only destroys - independently
of the good intentions or programs of the rulers. In order to enlarge the
sphere of regulation. the class of disposers of coercion destroys what con-
stitutes the core of social life - autonomous social relations in which people
come to act in common. Such relations, strengthening people's solidarity
and enabling individuals to perform common actions, are for the authorities
the greatest enemy. One rules more easily and regulates a larger area of
citizens' acts if nobody can find support from another, when every citizen
stands alone - deprived not only of any material means of resistance but
also of solidarity with others - in the face of the state moloch. It pushes
its armies into clamp-downs or, if needed, into sharper means of persuasion
agendas between live people, separating them with bureaucratic intermedi-
aries in order to diminish the number of things about which a man making
an agreement with anothel could make a decision accounting for the common
interests of both, and nothing more. The authorities, if they are not con-
trolled by the citizens or, more accurately, by their material force, destroy
the vivid tissue of social life. transforming all the relations of man to man
into relations of a petitioner-the state moloch-a petitioner. The programs
by which rulers justify their activity are of no importance and soon trans-
form themselves in to the ideological mystification of their actual relations
with the citizens and of the actual nature of their destructive activity. Not
from good or bad political programs does such an activity originate, but
from the monopoly over coercion. And the degree of destructiveness depends
FOREWORD xi
basically on the resistance of the citizens. The latter, in turn, is dependent
upon whether they, or some of them, dispose of the material means o[forming
social life, i.e., means of production or means of production of consciousness.
That is why one may predict in advance that where the power seizes the means
of coercion and nothing more, its destructiveness is less than where it disposes
additionally of the means of production, and incomparably less than when the
power disposes in addition of the means of production and of the production
of consciousness.
4. Before our times. property was always separated from power; and both
the classes of disposers of material means, the owners and the rulers, coop-
erated and competed with each other. Their interests were always partly
in agreement, partly in conflict. The range of the agreement resulted from the
fact that it was the armed force of the state that could make the owners
secure from the revolutionary movement of the direct producers, and the
best way to secure the state from the citizens' movements was to split them
by forming an alliance with the strongest of the citizens, that is, with the
owners. Such was the material foundation of the alliance the classes of the
disposers of the means of production and of coercion were making. But there
were also foundations for a conflict. For the general bureaucratization of
social - and particularly economic - life brought about by the spontaneous
activity of the class of rulers causes the ineffectiveness of the economy which,
in turn, hurts the interests of the owners. That is why they secure the
autonomy of the economy and also protect their direct producers from the
repressiveness of the state apparatus when it goes too far; subjugated citizens
are bad producers and they do not allow for great profits.
Till late capitalism. the picture of social development is, therefore, the
following. At the beginning the state is under the strict control of private
property, and the latter increases the exploitation in order to gain more and
more profits. This leads, however, to an increase in the class struggle of the
exploited and, finally. to their joint revolution. Then it turns out that it is
the state alone whose armed intervention can save the owners from the
necessity of making immediate concessions. Supporting the owners the state
becomes a subject of attack by the masses: the economic class struggle takes
on an economico-political character, and the direct producers-citizens fight
against both oppressive classes at once. As a rule they lose. The centralized
forces of coercion show their indispensability and the position of the state
in the class interrelations (owners-rulers-the people, i.e. both direct producers
and citizens) becomes strengthened. The owners do not, however, allow
the complete constraint of the masses (as their own direct producers) and,
xii FOREWORD
after a shorter or longer period of reversions of revolutionary disturbances,
the evolution of the property relations in favour of the direct producers
occurs in any case. The unitary class of owners is split into the traditional
one keeping the relations of ownership hitherto, and the progressive one
introducing new relations, more advantageous for the direct producer,
and, thanks to this, economically more effective. The role of the state in
suppressing the revolution(s) and the split of the hitherto unified class of
owners into the two sub-classes with divergent interests makes the state
able to play the role of a third party, more and more independent of either
class of oppressor. The state makes alliances based on the simple rule: make
an alliance with the weaker class of owners against the stronger one. And so
at first it supports the progressive property but, when it turns out to be the
leading economic force of society, the direction of alliances is changed and
the traditional one turns out to be the state's ally. By doing this the state
strengthens its position in society, releasing more and more of the control
of private property and bureaucratizing the whole of social life more and
more. All this fatally affects the state of the economy and citizens' liberties.
Finally, the opposition of the mass of citizens (both direct producers and
progressive owners) leads to political revolution. The old state is, as a rule,
overthrown; and new disposers of coercion, replacing the old state apparatus,
become rigidly controlled by the class of (progressive) owners. The beginning
of the new socio-economic formation, with the progressive form of property
dominating, is again the collapse of the power of the state.
So it was in the classic formations of the European line of development.
A city-state in ancient times, the feudal diffusion in the Middle Ages,
bourgeois democracy - here are different forms of the control of private
property over the state. The liberation of the power came in the middle
of a formation when it played an indispensable role in making private
property secure. And it became dominating in the last phase of a formation.
The statisation of social life in the era of the Roman Empire, or of the
absolute monarchies - or the process of statisation of capitalism that is taking
place nowadays - are also phenomena of the same nature.
S. In capitalism, however, the mechanism outlined above changes signifi-
cantly. For It is the only formation where the constant and continuous
progress of the productive forces takes place. That is why capitalists have the
opportunity of making direct concessions to the advantage of the working
class, not necessarily to revise the property relations. And the improvement
in the standard of living of the working class turns out to be advantageous
in the long run for the class of capitalists as a whole, since by increasing the
FOREWORD xiii
purchasing power of the workers it makes it possible to reduce the crises of
overproduction. Finally, the working class is disarmed and ceases to be a
serious threat for the capitalist mood of ownership. The workers become
more and more well off, but that is why they cannot gain a share in making
decisions at the level of an enterprise or higher - the capitalist relations of
the political democracy and of the lack of economic democracy are kept
going. The working class turns out to be the first class of direct producers
that is historically powerless, being unable to push the system (by revolution)
into an evolutionarr movement.
Stopping the class struggle of the workers allows the gradual institution-
alization of economic life. The state captures more and more positions in
the economy. More and more decisions with greater and greater significance
are made in the corridors of power, and more and more decisions made by
private persons must count on what has been decided within the overwhelm-
ing bureaucratic structure of the state. This leads to the institutionalization
from below - "only an organization can communicate with an organization"
(Galbraith). Corporations grow in the economy and eliminate more and
more the so-called owners. whose role is limited to the more and more illusory
control of bureaucratic actions of the technostructure. And their profits
become something that reminds one of a rent based on the purely juridical
title of ownership; the real property, i.e., the possibility of making economic
decisions, comes into the hands of the economic bureaucracy.
The economic bureaucracy does not aim at the maximisation of profits
(taking care only to have "sufficient" ones - as long as it has to pay the
"capitalist rent" to the alleged owners), but maximizes influences - as does
every bureaucracy. The economic bureaucracy maximizes its power over
economic actions. and regulates consumption. It would rather create a
consumer with apprupriate means of persuasion than adapt itself to his
needs. In this way it achieves a purely "political capital" - a definite range
of regulation over types of human activities. That is why it is in the interest
of the state power to make a fusion with the economic power. As a result
of the spontaneous process. a unitary bureaucratic machinery arises that
begins to control both political and economic life thanks to the joint disposal
over the means of coercion and means of production. The double class of
rulers-owners forms, then. and will undoubtedly reject the democratic in-
stitutions stemming from the times when the powerful class of the private
capitalists hampered the class of rulers with a system of political competi-
tion in the face of all the citizens. The disappearance of the class struggle
by the working class and the disappearance of private property enables the
xiv
FOREWORD
fusion of bureaucratic power and bureaucratic property, that is, the
totalitarianisation of state capitalism. No social force still existing in
capitalism is able to stop this spontaneous movement; nor will democratic
traditions and convictions play any more Significant role than at other times
in history. The process of the fusion of property and power is already taking
place in modern Western countries revealing itself in the form of more and
more common social crises.
6. The above image is not only a prediction or, rather, a sharpening of the
trends one may observe today. It is also a description of what had happened
several tens of years ago in tsarist Russia. The peculiarities of its historical
development, discussed in the book, resulted in the economic domination
of the state still in the feudal formation. And the development of a capitalist
economy with its tendency to centralization and bureaucratization only
accelerated this specific process of the fusion of property and power. Already
by the end of the last century the role of the state in the state economy
corresponded approximately to that in today's Western countries. The process
of forming a great bureaucratic structure, including both the political and the
economic sphere of society, led to the appearance of the class of rulers-owners
- people who due to their position in the bureaucratic apparatus were making
more and more economic decisions. It was this class - and not the alleged
"bourgeoisie" - that made the February Revolution overthrow tsarism. Its
policy caused the people's resistance on the eve of which the Bolsheviks
seized power. They filled the same social structures, becoming the same as
their predecessors: rulers-owners, a double class monopolizing the means of
both coercion and production. The type of their ideology was without any
significance - it soon began to mystify the true nature of the system with
Marxist- Leninist slogans.
The rise of socialism in Russia was not an accident at all. Thanks to its
historical heritage, which had allowed the state to become the greatest
owner, Russia outdistanced more technologically advanced countries in
historical development. For the latter, since capitalism, is measured not
by the level of the development of productive forces, but by the level of
the accumulation of the material power in the hands of a minority, that is,
by the level of accumulation of class divisions: disposal over means of produc-
tion with that over means of coercion (totalitarianisation), disposal over means
of coercion with that over the means of production of consciousness (fascisa-
tion), disposal over all the material means of society (socialization). In this
movement leading from capitalism to socialism Russia was ahead of the
historical development and is showing all countries the image of their future.
FOREWORD
xv
It is, then, a myth that the communists won in Russia and today possess the
Eastern part of the world. In Russia the double class of rulers-owners won
and soon also seized the mass media, additionally acquiring in this way the
dignity of priests, i.e., disposers of the means of production of consciousness.
And that is what they are: rulers, owners and priests at the same time. And
that they are communists has no greater significance than that the bourgeoisie
was once upon a time of the protestant faith. This influences only the kind
of ideological mystifications they use. And those offered by Marxism were,
in fact, quite convenient: the idea of the working class as the liberator of the
whole of humanity was, and is, actually maintained; while the role of the
working class was, and is, constantly decreasing; the idea of the domination
of economics was, and is, actually maintained while it undergoes constant
bureaucratization. Marxism owes its success since late capitalism to the fact
that it turned out to present the appearance as the essence.
7. In this way the first socialist society in the world arose. A minority
disposes of the means of coercion, production and indoctrination, all three,
whereas the majority does not dispose of any material means but is oppressed,
exploited and indoctrinated. This minority joins the roles of the old rulers,
owners and priests, and deserves not the scanty name of the "party apparatus"
- concealing the material basis of their power by stressing the formal shape
they assume - but the name of the class of three-lords. The rest of society
being deprived of everything which is material - that is, which is essential
in social life - constitutes the people's class of socialist society. In this way the
accumulation of the class divisions reached its apogee: the oppressive classes-
rulers, owners and priests - join together in one class of three-lords. *
8. In the successive cycles of releasing control which eventually appear,
the threshold of patience of the people goes up - the people's class more and
more easily and efficiently fights for the liberation of new regions of social
practice from the domination of the three-lords. And the latter are forced
to make more and more concessions in the successive cycles.
This cyclic movement following the phase of submissiveness is seen most
clearly in Poland. Only one factor was decisive here: the social resistance to
the class of three-lords. The armed resistance (after the war, economic
resistance) - mainly by the peasantry - and spiritual resistance - mainly thanks
to the Catholic Church. Actually the resistance of the people's class meant
* For the operation of the class of three-lords, the attempts to desocialize the people-
especially in the thirties and forties of this century in Russia - and the rise of cycles of
releasing control, see the concluding chapter of the book, especially pp. 373 -3 77. (Ed.)
xvi FOREWORD
that our society never entirely submitted. It profited in 1956 when in Poland
comparatively large areas of social practice were more Significantly released
from the bureaucratic network than in other socialist countries.
Well-known waves of the limitation of autonomy occurred leading - as a
result of pressure upon private agriculture - to successive food crises. The
latter, together with the general bureaucratization of the economy, period-
ically forced by the class of three-lords, led to general collapses. It was the
resistance of the people's class that got out of them - as a result the system
was forced to loosen control, that is, to rationalize social life. And so it was
until the next cycle. The class of three-lords leads the system to crises, the
people's class leads it out of them.
9. Poland is, then, a country where the greatest regions of social practice
are outside the control of the class' of the three-lords, and their control on
the rest is much less than in other socialist countries. It is the source of the
unusual development of the democratic opposition in our country which, in
turn, enlarges this sphere of autonomy by conscious activity. The require-
ment of the independent social institutions plays a fundamental role in the
program of the Committee of Social Self-Defence "KOR". Poland is, then,
the best developed socialist country: for it outdistances all others in the
process of slipping away from socialism. Our country is at such a stage of
the development of socialism the Soviet Union will be when the kolkhoz
system is disturbed by authentically social (Le., family or really cooperative)
agriculture, when the Orthodox Church gains autonomy in matters of faith
and when the intelligentsia liberates itself from the delusions of the official
ideology, or, rather, from the fear the official ideology seeks to rationalize
and dress in the form of the one and only aggressive faith.
Poland is the most developed socialist country. She outdistances all the
other countries of the type in leading away from the system which is -
unfortunately - as much a historical necessity as is its decline.
That decline is taking place already today - if we leave aside the illusion
that socialism is something of the future, the illusion that constantly mixes
the ideal and past reality. For socialism achieved its apogee in the period of
the destruction of social bonds ("Stalinism"). From that time on there is an
evolutionary process of decline. In the successive cycles more and more
regions of social life will become liberated by the resistance of the masses and
the political opposition will give them more and more adequate ideological
representation - such is the historical role of the so-called democratic opposi-
tion in socialism. We shall have less and less socialism around us: and more
and more of a new, hitherto unknown form of social life. One thing alone
FOREWORD xvii
can be said about it: that it will be a truly classless society, without political,
economical and spiritual classes, that is, without monopolies of the disposal
over means of coercion, production, and indoctrination.
For such a society, where no material means will divicie people into classes,
the Polish people's class is fighting today. And the power of this struggle and
the helplessness of the class already not entirely triple-ruling testifies to the
fact that we are the witnesses of one of the fundamental steps liberating
us from socialism. Let us listen today to the voice of the Polish people's
class. Let us listen to it carefully. as we can hear in it the sound of our own
future.
August 1980 L. N.
INTRODUCTION
1. THE TRAGEDY OF THE THEORY OF SOCIALISM
In the district town Vokhrovo, on the square near the railway station, the dekulakised
rich displaced from the Ukraine were dying. Day in day out corpses have been lying
there; the hospital cart has been driving up; and the coachman Abram has been loading
them up.
Not all of them were dying: many were idling about the dusty, ins conspicuous streets,
limping with bloodless, bluish legs, thick from dropsy, looking at every passer-by with a
dog's pleading glance. In Vokhrovo nobody was giving alms - the inhabitants themselves
formed lines to the shop already in the evening to get rationed bread.
Thirty-third ... (I. Tiendriakov, Demise, English translation after the Polish edition
of the Russian novel ZRon).
This picture of collectivization excerpted from one of the modern Soviet
novels is hardly a creation of literary fiction. Here is what - according to
Khrushchev's testimony - one of the prominent party workers in the Ukraine,
Demchenko, said to A. Mikojan:
Anastas Ivanovich, I ask whether Comrade Stalin, whether anybody at the Politbureau,
knows what is going on in the Ukraine? Well, if not, I shall give you an idea of it. Recent-
ly there came to Kiev a train filled with corpses of people who had died of starvation.
It picked up corpses all along the route, from Poltava to Kiev. I think someone had
better inform Stalin about the situation (Khrushchev Remembers, Boston-Toronto 1970,
p.74).
And Khrushchev himself recalled that he got the idea of what collectivization
had meant as late as 1930, when the party organization attached to the
Industrial Academy in Moscow responsible for some kolkhoz in Samara's
district had sent him with a delegation to deliver to the kolkhoz a certain sum
of money allocated for the purchase of agricultural equipment.
We spent several days only in the kolkhoz, but were shocked with the situation we met.
Peasants were dying of starvation. The meeting to which we were to deliver the money
was convened .... When we said to them that the money was designed for the purchase
of farm equipment, we were told that this was not of interest to them: all they wanted
was bread. Literally, they begged us to give them something to eat .... We shared [with
them] the food we had taken with us (ibid., p. 72).
xix
xx INTRODUCTION
Nothing need be added to this information to grasp what collectivization
was. But to grasp does not yet mean to understand. The identification of a
phenomenon and its explanation are quite different things.
It is science that gives us explanations. Let us take, then, the recent book
of one of the most serious students of socialism, A. B. Ulam, Stalin. The Man
and his Era, to understand why collectivization took place in the Soviet Union
and why it proceeded in the way it did.
Here is the author's explanation:
The modern industrialized economy forced a drastic transformation of Russia's agricul-
ture which was primitive, ineffective and uneconomical. As long as husbandry was spread
among 25 million individual peasant holdings, there was no hope for employing more
rational, mechanized methods. . .. There was no manpower for the future industrial
enterprise unless villages having a more rationally organized, more concentrated, pro-
duction would make free millions of needless hands for the work in towns (A. B. Ulam,
Stalin. The Man and his Era, New York 1974, p. 291).
But great farms need machines and all sorts of industrial equipment. But
where to get them from in the face of undeveloped industry?
It seemed to be a vicious circle - the country did not have a well developed industry
because of the lack of a sound agricultural basis, while the agriculture remained back-
ward because there existed no strong industry .... There were two ways to overcome
this vicious circle: one through foreign credits and investments, the other through
internal savings. [The first would be in the existing international situation only a miracle.]
It remained for Russia to adopt the other way, more painful and slow ... : taking out
savings from their own nation by force ... and allocating them for industrial develop-
ment (ibid., p. 292).
It was the principal cause of collectivization. But Soviet collectivization was
something more, it was also the tragedy of millions of people. And so, the
author continues.
the statistical and economic data cannot explain the tragedy of collectivization by
themselves, [for) like all man-made cataclysms [the collectivization] was a result of
ignorance and obsession. [It was) ignorance as to the facts of economic life together
with an obession for the kulaks that led to the leaders of the Soviet Union in 1926-
27 making the complex of social and economic decisions which inevitably brought
catastrophe (ibid., p. 290,295).
Summing it up: there was an objective, economic necessity for collectiviza-
tion, and it was done in so brutal a manner that it resulted in the "death of
millions" on account of "ignorance and obsession".
This explanation seems to be quite convincing. And this is actually what
INTRODUCTION xxi
arouses the suspicion that it is totally false. "Quite convincing" means only
this: "not going beyond current stereotypes". Each of us is inclined to assent
when reading such an explanation just because it does not force us to question
our views, but confirms what we knew before. It was actually we ourselves
who already thought that this "savage Russia" had to be moved into the
direction of "modern development" with the aid of coercion, since the latter
was, and maybe even still is, the only means which is able to compensate for
the effects of centuries oflasting backwardness in a relatively short time. The
quoted author thinks the same as we do, but expresses our views in a more
clear and systematic way. that is why he convinces us rather easily.
But true explanations are never "quite convincing". They do not confirm
widespread opinions, but contest them and are sometimes astonishing. What
they, in general, meet with is not broad agreement but rather strong resist-
ance. And there is nothing surprising in it. True explanations go far beyond
what common sense brings to our minds - they reveal hidden mechanisms
lying beneath known phenomena, and sometimes they interpret the phe-
nomena themselves in an extraordinary way. All this forces people to think
in a different manner than that in which they are used to think. And this is
actually what evokes their resistance. This well-known psychological regularity
concerns all people, including scientists themselves. The latter are, however,
much more disposed to forget it than the other people. Not surprising:
only scientists are able to cover their human weakness with the authority of
Science.
Common sense is, however, a relative thing: present-day common sense is
constituted, to a rather high degree, by yesterday's theory. Let us look for
this "yesterday's theory" in the explanation of collectivization given by Ulam,
the outstanding Sovietologist. It is not an especially difficult task. Here is the
author's reasoning.
Soviet Russia was an industrially backward country, and all modern
societies have to develop their own industries; therefore Soviet Russia, too,
had to develop its own industry.
In order to expand its industry, Russia had to modernize its agriculture;
but she could not, since the industry she had was very old-fashioned.
There were two ways out of this vicious circle ... ; etc. And here are the
elements of the social theory silently assumed by the author:
(1) all social processes possess, as their indispensable components, economic
determinants; hence (2) it is impossible to explain processes of the kind
without reference to economic factors that, at least partly, evoked them; (3)
in modern societies it is industry which plays the dominant role, and therefore
xxii INTRODUCTION
(4) industrial production is the criterion of economic progress and, hence,
it shows the place a given society occupies in the spectrum of social devel-
opment; (5) if a given country is to keep its place in this line of historical
development, it has to expand its industry, and (6) the more a country is to
accelerate the more the country has to develop its industry in an accelerated
manner. Because (7) Soviet Russia was a country with a backward industry,
then ... ,etc.
It is rather easy to see that this ''yesterday's theory" lying beneath the
explanation of collectivization given by the outstanding American Sovietolo-
gist may be identified as Marxian historical materialism. Or, rather, as what
has passed from this theory to so-called "modern social science" and has
become a rightful component of present-day common sense. It is Karl Marx
to whom we are indebted for our common sense. It was Karl Marx who has
formed our present-day sense of obviousness.
These "obvious truths" are, however, quite dubious. The Marxian historical
materialism with its idea of the domination of the sphere of economics
provides quite good relationships between economics, politics and social
consciousness within societies such as slave or feudal one,s, where the produc-
tion of material goods plays, in fact, a predominant role. But where is the
guarantee that such is always the case? Who has given the justification for the
thesis that material production is constantly, for all societies, the main factor
of development? Karl Marx? No, he did not do this. One might even say he
could not, since it is actually dialectics which forces us to think in terms of
constant changes, which prohibits the isolation of one factor as being the
essential cause of a given phenomenon for ever . . . . The supposition that
the sphere of economics is the main factor for ever and for all societies is a
typical metaphysical assumption which cannot be maintained in the light of
dialectics which claims that the essence of all phenomena is changing ....
Why, in short, is one obliged to assume in advance that socialist society
is of the same type as the Marxian image of capitalist society? Why must it
be so reasonable to assume a priori that if a capitalist society has to expand
its industry, so has a socialist society? Even the simplest observation reveals
that socialist countries differ a great deal from capitalist countries. But, if so,
then the assumption that economics is, as is usually maintained, the basis of
capitalism and plays the same role in socialism is not only not obvious any
more, but even seems to be controversial to the highest degree. Let us take a
somewhat closer look at it.
The basic assumption of the author that Soviet Russia had to expand its
industry takes its origin from an extrapolation to socialism of the Marxian
INTRODUCTION xxiii
solution for capitalism. According to Marx, capitalist society has to develop
its industry because a predominant role is played in it by the class of owners
of the means of production who wish to maximize surplus value. And in
modern times it is an industry which enables the owners to gain their profit
in the best way; and capitalist society is organized in such a way that the
capitalists, and only they, may fully satisfy their material interests. That is
why in capitalist society all the productive branches of economy imitate the
structure of industry and all the non-productive domains of the economy are
adapted to make the development of industry as rapid as possible.
However, in socialist society there is no class of private owners. Why, then,
does such a society have to develop its industry? It is a matter of fact that it
does so. But it is only a matter of fact, not a necessity. In order to prove that
socialism has to develop its industry as capitalism has to, one is obliged to
identify the social forces dominating in it and to define their material interest
as that which requires the expansion of industrialization; this was precisely
what Marx did for capitalism. But this is precisely what has not been done for
socialism. It is not known which social force it could be, neither in what
their material interest consists in and why it leads just to industrialization.
What is actually done is the mechanical extrapolation of the Marxian thesis
to Soviet Russia not accounting for the fact that for this very country the
Marxian justification for this thesis loses its validity.
Obviously, there always exists the possibility of retreating into deeper
layers of common sense and of giving the following deep explanation: Soviet
Russia had to industrially expand, since it was what the leaders wanted. But
why did the leaders aim at iP- Well, they wanted to have their country
strong and powerful.
In this way we come to a much worse common sense than that of the
Marxist type -- namely, the pre-Marxist one. This type of common sense has
already been criticized by the author of Capital. And he was entirely right
in doing this. There is no worse model of explanation of social processes
than that of an individual action with its alternatives, preferences, and means.
Leaders are not the leaders of a nation (though they willingly present them-
selves as such) but are those of great social forces. And being the leaders of
the strongest of them they may pass for the leaders of a nation as long as
their wishes correspond to the material interests of the groups of people they
represent. Once they begin to want something different, sooner or later they
cease to be the leaders. A leader may want only that which is comprised by
the material interest of the social category he represents. An outstanding
leader is the one whose will persistently precedes the yet unformed interests
xxiv
INTRODUCTION
of the given category, whereas a mediocre one can hardly cope with them or
with their changes.
But, if this is so, then, going along this line of reasoning, we come to the
starting point repeating our initial questions: Which social forces in the Soviet
Union have had a material interest in industrialization? What did this interest
consist in? Why was it industrialization which could satisfy it? In short,
whose material interests did the hero of the book, Stalin. The Man and His
Era, represent, and how?
These are the questions one should begin with when trying to explain the
process of collectivization instead of adopting as self-evident what seems to
be self-evident to everybody. And what seems to be self-evident today is
based on yesterday's discoveries by Marx. That is why the head of "The
Russian Research Center" at Harvard University, one of the most serious
sovietological institutions in the world - in that thoroughly written book on
Stalin and the society in which he lived - tacitly accepts the basic ideas of
Marxian historical materialism. Investigations concerning socialist societies
do not go beyond the cognitive horizon Marx had created one century ago
and for quite different societies! It does not mean that the investigations in
question are of the Marxist type: they are even worse. As we have seen, to
the Marxist-like, economistic explanation of collectivization the supposition
of "ignorance and obsession" was added, and this is what any serious Marxist
would commit himself to. Quite so, since the basis of the system which
forces people to make an obsession cannot be obsession itself but somebody's
interest in it. If people on the mass scale fall into the obsession with kulaks,
then evidently there appear social forces whose material interests entail the
elimination of the kulak.
The tragedy of the theory of socialism consists in the simple fact that it
does not exist at all. Further, attempts at such a theory are not able to release
themselves from the outdated elements of Marxian historical materialism.
Meanwhile every serious Marxist ought to expect that the dialectics of the
development of social reality, and the dialectics of the development of
knowledge about it as well, have made this theory both false and socially
reactionary.
The tragedy of the theory of socialism consists also in the fact that its
cognitive weakness makes it impossible to reveal the fully reactionary role
played by Marxian theory in modern times. The criticism from this point of
view dissolves in morally right, but far too vague, formulas, whereas Marxism
itself gives the best means for a much more serious and profound criticism
of the social role played by itself on both sides of the Elbe. The cognitive
INTRODUCTION xxv
weakness of the theory of socialism leads it to eclecticism. Having recognized
the poverty of Marxian assumptions for the explanation of socialist societies
it adds ad hoc to the Marxian motifs pre-Marxian ones obtaining in the effect
of that which is far from the best theory - an eclectic description of phenom-
ena. In this way elements of yesterday's theory of society become extended
with elements of the day-before-yesterday's theory. And instead of deepening
our understanding of socialism, today's science about this system deepens the
layers of our common sense it comes from.
2. THE LACK OF A VIABLE THEORY OF SOCIALISM EXPRESSES
THE POVERTY OF OUR UNDERSTANDING OF MODERN
HISTORY. THE DOGMA OF THE "DEVELOPED WEST"
AND OF THE "UNDEVELOPED EAST"
The explanation of systems that call themselves socialist seems to be an
important, surely the most important, matter for understanding the modern
world, even though a partial one. So the poverty of the theory of socialism
expresses the poverty of our understanding of the modern world in general.
The basic component of the widespread philosophy of history may be rather
easily identified - it is the economistic vision of society. Let us compare
three typical theories of history.
According to the Bolshevik philosophy of history (for some reasons which
will become clear later, I prefer the term "Bolshevik" better than "Com-
munist"), modern history is developing in the way Marx predicted: from
capitalism to socialism, the latter being a more human society, and the basic
mechanism of the transition is that of class struggle based on economic
inequality and leading to a socialist revolution organized by the communist
party. Social democrats deny that existing societies identifying themselves
as socialist ones in fact embody Marxian ideals and maintain that the more
human society emerges from the capitalist one in an evolutionary way due to
mechanisms which eliminate step by step the economic inequality between
people. And lastly, the bourgeois view revives nowadays with the hope that
the economic troubles socialist countries face force them to accept a more
"reasonable" pattern of economic growth which along with the natural
process of rationalization of the capitalist economy will give us a future
convergent society.
All of us are used to thinking of the three visions of the modern world in
the terms they themselves present to us, that is, in terms of the differences
between them. However. what divides them and opposes each other is of a
xxvi INTRODUCTION
superficial nature; their nucleus is common to all of them. In order to prove
this, let us consider the basic assumptions of the concepts in question. First,
all of them accept the idea of social development - capitalist society is
to transform itself into another form of society. Not surprising in the
case of the two versions of Marxism, but it is the case also for the modern
bourgeois view. It was only in Marx's time that "bourgeois" meant a view
treating capitalist society as being the ultimate result of the historical process.
Even this alone testifies to the great impact Marxism has had upon modern
thought. Second, this new form of organization of society which is supposed
to emerge from capitalism is to be "higher" than the latter with respect to its
economic efficiency. Third, the three typical versions of society commonly
share the view that it is an economic factor which is principally responsible
for the transition from the capitalist to a future form of society.
Therefore, one may notice that the three doctrines in question assume
the same general vision of history according to which (1) social history is
composed of some stages, which (2) are ordered along the lines of increasing
economic efficiency, and (3) the transition from one stage into another is
dependent upon the work of economic factor(s): what is economically more
effective in the last resort outweighs all the rest. But these are purely Marx's
assumptions. In fact. Marx imposes on us our general scheme of historical
development. It is only filled in in different ways and that enables people to
think of themselves as being antagonists. But what they have in common,
the nucleus their doctrines share, is of the greatest importance, since this is
actually what gives us the entirely mystified image of the modern world.
It is much more important that both communists and social democrats
consider socialism to be economically more effective in comparison to
capitalism than that they differ concerning the strategy of achieving it. It is
much more important that both Marxists (and here we refer to communists
and social democrats alike) and bourgeois thinkers pay attention to the
economic necessities as those which are supposed to decide about the future
society, than that they differ in the way they understand the economic
factors. For precisely the common nucleus of all the philosophies of history
in question is responsible for neglecting the most fundamental processes of
today which do not take place in the field of economics at all. Our econo-
mistic, Marxian common sense is quite insufficient for understanding what is
going on around us.
One of the consequences of the commonsensical, that is Marxian, vision of
history is the opinion that Western societies proceed along the same line of
historical development as socialist societies. The latter are considered to be
INTRODUCTION xxvii
backward, to comprise a sidetrack of history. The Marxian view, which pays
so much attention to the role of productive forces, is a really good ideological
justification for the belief in the priority of the technically more advanced
capitalist societies. However, it is a dogma only, since for a longer time really
significant historical processes were taking place and still do, outside the field
of economics conceived of in the traditional manner. And the Marxian view
was playing, and still plays, a purely ideological role in Marx's own sense -
obscuring the actual course of events by replacing it with imaginary ones.
It would be rather misleading to formulate the theses of this book at
this stage of our considerations. One can only formulate rather vague ideas
introducing them: .
I. The dogma of the "developed West" and "undeveloped East" follows
from the acceptance - conscious or not - of the principal elements of the
Marxian philosophy of history;
II. the dogma in question is a total falsehood resulting from the theoretical
mistakes Marx committed;
III. it is only a Marxist criticism of the Marxian theory which makes it
possible to reveal the mistakes in question; that is why, however, this criticism
does not lead to overthrowing Marx's theory but to surpassing it; in this
way a non-Marxian, but still a Marxist, social theory may be built that in a
special case reduces to the Marxian one, but being more general allows for the
explanation of what Marxian theory mystifies;
IV. the generalization of Marxian historical materialism allows also for the
understanding that the dogma in question plays a really important ideological
role in obscuring actual processes; above all, those of them which had made
no longer timely in the East, and make no longer timely in the West, the
significance of economics for the whole of social life.
All social interests can be best satisfied in the darkness. Marxisn, which
had thrown upon social phenomena more light than any other doctrine until
now, was, and is, since the rise of socialism only an ideological mask which
mystifies the actual course of events. In both parts of the world.
PART I
ON THE NECESSITY OF SOCIALISM
A. THE MARXIAN METHOD
CHAPTER 1
THE MARXIAN METHODOLOGY - AN OUTLINE OF THE
IDEALIZA TIONAL INTERPRETATION
In order to understand why Marx is today the great, possibly the greatest,
theoretical injurer in social sciences, one has to realize that a century ago
he made one of the greatest discoveries in the field of the methodology of
social science. *
The Cali/eo of the Social Sciences
Great scholars not only invent new theories, they also invent them in a new
way. Galileo did so; and so did Marx.
In Galileo's time a common sense physics, based on everyday experience,
ami which collected observations and attempted to make some generaliza-
tions, was dominant. It was strongly influenced by Aristotl,e's paradigm. And
so, for instance, according to Aristotle, the observation of moving bodies
shows us that two factors influence their movement: the external force
and the resistance of the environment operating on a given body. If they
balance each other, movement does not take place; if it is to occur, the
external force has to prevail over the resistance. The question as to how
the body would behave if no resistance took place (e.g., in a vacuum), was
classified by Aristotle as senseless: nobody need worry about it, since "no
one has so far observed a vacuum in the world".
Galileo knew well enough that a vacuum could not be perceived since there
is no such thing among existing bodies. But this did not prevent him from
posing the question that did not make any sense in Aristotelian physics: how
would the body move if the environment did not interfere? For instance, how
would a sphere move on a plane, if "we did not account for the resistance of
air interfering with the sphere piercing its way through it?" (Galileo, Dialogue
Concerning the Two Chief World Systems: Ptolemaic and Copernican, Polish
translation, Warsaw 1962, p. 155); and if it is assumed also that the sphere
* The exposition of the idealizational interpretation of Marxian methodology presented
here will be very brief and sketchy. The reader may find a fuller one in my book, The
Structure of Idealization. Towards a Systematic Interpretation of the Marxian Idea of
Science, D. Reidel, Synthese Library, Vol. 139, 1980.
3
4 CHAPTER 1
in question is a "perfectly round one, so that all external forces and chance
obstacles are removed" (ibid., p. 155). The answer to this question is known
today as his principle of inertia:
(1) if the moving body is an ideal sphere rolling on an ideally smooth
plane, and no environmental resistance occurs, then its movement
is constant and steady on the horizontal plane.
The statement describes the ideal case in which no secondary factors (resis-
tance, the shape of the moving body, etc.) are acting. This ideal case is what
models the principal components of actual movements: that is why the
abstract statement (1) may be approximately applied to at least some actual
cases of movement. So, Galileo applies the following statement in explana-
tions which shows some admissible deviations from the ideal case:
(2) If the moving body is sufficiently close to an ideal sphere and
rolls along a short, sufficiently smooth surface, and the resistance
of the environment is small enough, then its movement is a
uniform movement along the straight line.
As one may notice, the methodological breakthrough made by Galileo
consisted in introducing a "reverse" method of theory construction. Not
from observation to generalizations of facts, but from it counterfactual
model to the facts via making the model more realistic. Only within such a
context may his epistemological remarks be understood properly:
experiences which clearly speak against the annual movement are seemingly so contrary
to the theory that ... I cannot find the words to express my admiration for Aristarchus
and Copernicus who managed to pu t reason into a frame which forced the senses to
withdraw their trust in the apparent meaning of sensory data; [this proves how great is 1
the elevation of these minds which accepted these views and took them as true ones
overcoming the testimony of their own senses with the sharpness of minds and preferring
that which reason dictated to what senses and experiments seemed to offer (ibid., pp.
353-354).
Marx was, roughly, in a situation resembling that of Galileo. The political
economy of his times was dominated by the trend he called the ''vulgar
economy". Here is the flat description of that orientation given by Marx:
All that vulgar economy wants to do and, in fact, does is that it describes, explains and
apologetically synthesizes the images of the agents of bourgeois production, who remain
within the power of the relations of this production. No wonder it feels at home in the
external form of appearance of these relations, which are there senseless and prima facie
full of contradictions - which is natural since science would be superfluous if the form
THE MARXIAN METHODOLOGY 5
of appearance of things and their essence were simply identical (K. Marx, Capital, vol.
III, Progress Publishers, Moscow 1968, p. 825).
The vulgar economy applies, then, the method of observations and their
generalization. For instance, it observes that the increase of demand raises
prices, while the increase of supply diminishes them, and generalizes this
in the so-called law of supply and demand which is - according to Marx
- no law at all. As Galileo wanted to know how the movement of a body
would be if no resistance occurred, so Marx wanted to know what the price
of a commodity would be in the ideal case of equilibrium between demand
and supply:
In reality, supply and demand never coincide, or, if they do, it is by a mere accident,
hence scientifically = 0, and to be regarded as not having occurred. But political econ-
omy assumes that supply and demand coincide with each other. Why? To be able to
study phenomena in their fundamental relations, in the form corresponding to their
conception, that is, to study them independent of the appearances caused by the move-
ment of supply and demand (ibid., p. 186).
And so, his law of value saying what prices are dependent upon neglects the
influence of fluctuations of demand and supply showing as the principal
factor the amount of the socially indispensable work for making a given
commodity (its value):
(3) "if supply and demand are balanced, the market prices of com-
modities correspond to their values" (K. Marx, Wages, Price
and Profit, in: Works [Polish edition], vol. 16, Warsaw 1968,
p. 141).
The simplifying assumption that demand equals supply is removed in the
third volume of Capital and this basic form (3) which is applied in the first
two volumes of the work is modified: the case of non-equilibrium on the
market is admitted and "the supply and demand" are said to "regulate ...
the deviations of the market price from market value"; in this way "the
market value ... forms the center of fluctuations for market prices". Namely,
the increase of demand raises the price above its standard given by the value
of the commodity under consideration, while the increase of supply lowers
the price below that standard; this is called the value accounting for market
fluctuations. And so Marx modifies his basic law of prices as follows:
(4) if supply and demand are not balanced, then the market price
of a given commodity corresponds to its value accounting for
market fluctuations.
6
CHAPTER 1
One may see that the same method as in the case of Galileo is applied
here: not from facts to a generalized description of them, but from counter-
factual models to facts via making the models more and more realistic, that
is, accounting for not only the basic determinants (this is actually what the
first, most abstract model does), but also some secondary determinants; in
this way the explanations may become more and more complete. "May"
- if the first abstraction is made properly, that is, if what is accounted for
in it is, in fact, principal for the investigated phenomena.
The Method of Idealization
As has been shown in numerous works of the Poznan milieu, the method
in question (the method of idealization) was generally applied by Marx
in his theoretical work, especially in Capital; the method was not under-
stood, neither in the tradition of Marxism which soon turned out to go
along with the cumulative, inductivist manner of theory construction, nor
by opponents whose criticisms are often based on simple misunderstanding
arising from ignoring the method Marx was applying; the method is generally
not elaborated in modern trends in the philosophy of science (all of them
ignore it); the Marxian ideas may serve as the starting point for some work
both in the field of methodology (the idealizational interpretation of the
Marxist philosophy of science) and in the field of dialectics, since it suggests
a definite interpretation of this so unclear part of the Marxian theoretical
heritage.
The method consists, roughly, in the following: (1) adopting some
counterfactual assumptions (idealizing conditions), (2) formulating some
hypotheses that could be valid under these assumptions (idealizationallaws),
(3) correcting the laws by removing these assumptions and modifying the
consequents of the laws (concretization); this ends usually in approximating
a given idealizational statement as a close enough explanation of the actual
phenomena.
Science seen from that point of view is something that reminds one
rather of a caricature of reality than its description. It is a peculiar char-
acteristic of caricature that it does not present a given person or situation,
but exaggerates some features of it omitting the remaining ones. And this
is what science in fact does: simplifies the complications resulting from
the co-occurrence of a multiplicity of factors and builds some simple models
of them in order to underline what factors have the most influential impact
upon the data.
THE MARXIAN METHODOLOGY 7
The Development of a Theoretical Orientation
An idealizational theory is composed of the sequence of models (sets of
statements with a decreasing number of idealizing conditions) of increas-
ing realism: the initial, basic model is composed of the set of idealizational
laws; further models contain gradual concretizations of them; the last one
contains factual statements (with zero idealizing conditions) being ap-
proximations of the last idealizational model. The key role for making
an idealizational theory is played by essentialist presuppositions telling
an investigator what should, and what cannot be, abstracted from. The
presuppositions, together with the idealizational theory itself, constitute
a theoretical orientation. Here is the simplified image of the development
of such an orientation.
Every idealizational theory allows us to make approximate predictions
only. The image of the essential structure of a given phenomenon presup-
posed by such a theory never contains all the factors influencing it; it may
happen also that not all of the factors treated as influencing the investigated
phenomenon in fact do so. Thus there is always some discrepancy between
predictions and the actual course of events observations tell us about.
At the beginning these discrepancies are considered to be merely a result
of the incomplete enumeration of secondary factors. And the theoretician
tries to search for some additional influences and enrich his image of the
essential structure of a given phenomenon with some new secondary factors.
Then he introduces into his theory new idealizing conditions (omitting
just the newly discovered secondary factors), establishes laws containing
in the consequent the same formulas but equipped in their antecedents
with the new idealizing conditions, and concretizes them obtaining better
approximations to the observational data. In this way he obtains a new
theory with the same idealizational laws (inasmuch as holding under an
increased number of idealizing conditions) but with a greater number of
concretization levels which lead to more precise explanations and more
accurate predictions (provided that newly discovered factors in fact influence
a given phenomenon). It is said in such a situation that the new idealizational
theory dialectically corresponds to the previous one (I. Nowakowa, 'The
Conception of Dialectical Correspondence', Dialectics and Humanism 1,
no I, 1974). Let us add that in this case the identity of the theoretical
orientation is preserved: its essentialist presuppositions are still maintained
and the basic laws, as a result, remain unchanged (to be strict: only the
repertory of idealizing conditions in their antecedents is enlarged). The rule
8
CHAPTER 1
of dialectical correspondence describes the standard way of improvement
that a normal theoretical orientation faced with new observations undergoes.
Each normal theory undergoes a number of corrections of the type.
Nevertheless, if some discrepancies with regard to the facts are not eliminated
despite numerous attempts at doing this, then the opinion spreads gradually
among scientists that the theory must have its foundation in the inappro-
priateness of the essentialist assumptions of a given orientation. Usually,
this change of attitude requires a rather deep revision, sometimes in the
field of the philosophical vision of the world underlying the essentialist
presuppositions of the theory. A new proposal revises the actual essentialist
presuppositions of the former one, and a new repertory of principal factors
is accepted together with a quite new way of idealization: new factors are
abstracted from, even those which were earlier treated as principal ones.
Hence new idealizational laws, at least a part of them, equipped with new
antecedents and consequents, are proposed and subsequently concretized.
However, at least some of the previously employed factors are still treated
as significant - otherwise it would be difficult to understand how it was
possible that the preceding theory succeeded in making approximately true
predictions. Some elements of the previous theoretical orientation (some
idealizing conditions with appropriate corrections, etc.) are then retained
in the new one. The latter is called a dialectical negation of the former;
there is still in that case some "range of continuation" though much less
important than the "range of negation" - in the case of dialectical corres-
pondence the reverse was the case.
For the new theoretical orientation, despite some elements which it
continues, is a new theoretical unit in the development of science; a given
"-ism" disappears and is replaced by the new one, the latter containing,
however, some elements of the former. And this is, according to the ideal-
izational interpretation of Marxian methodology, the usualy destiny of
every theoretical orientation: at first it undergoes some corrections trying
to adapt itself to the growing body of empirical data, but at last it disappears
in the new theoretical orientation which preserves some elements of the
former but reorganized within a new structure; the new theoretical orien-
tation undergoes some further corrections according to the rule of dialectical
correspondence, etc.
The Dialectics of the Development of Marxism
It can be shown that the image of the development of a normal theoretical
THE MARXIAN METHODOLOGY 9
orientation fulfills the requirements of the so-called categorial interpretation
of dialectics (L. Nowak, The Foundations of Marxian Dialectics. An Attempt
at a Categorial Interpretation, Warsaw 1977). But even without recalling
any definite interpretation of dialectics it is seen that this image agrees with
dialectical intuitions. For according to it, the usual destiny of every normal
theoretical orientation is to vanish in the new one, to be dialectically negated.
If so, the same concerns Marxist social theory. Its destiny is also to become
dialectically negated, that is, to vanish in the new one that will preserve some
elements of the Marxist grasp of social matters. For anyone who accepts
the idealizational conception of science on the meta theoretical level, the
only way to be faithful to the Marxist epistemology is to cease to be Marxist
on the theoretical level. Not by simple rejection but by dialectical criticism
of Marx himself.
CHAPTER 2
TO SURPASS MARX WITH THE AID OF HIS
METHODOLOGY
Dialectics: The Categorial Changeability of Reality
Science is, then, a systematically and consciously applied caricature of reality
serving to its explanation. For to explain a phenomenon means to show its
essence - according to the old philosophical tradition. However, in order to
do this, the phenomenon is to be deformed, not described, that is, some of its
properties are to be eliminated and the focus is to be on the remaining ones;
until this stage an explanation resembles a caricature. Moreover, this deforma-
tion is reduced - gradually properties that were eliminated in the first stage
are introduced and the initial idealization is modified coming closer and
closer to the actual form of the phenomenon to be explained; this stage is
what distinguishes caricature and science. Science is a caricature; one could
even say that it is basically a caricature; but it is not only a caricature.
One could perhaps add that the idealizational approach to science has
nothing in common with dogmatism which is allegedly (e.g., according
to K. R. Popper) inevitably contained in all types of essentialism.
First, nobody knows which of the competing images of the essential
structure of a phenomenon is adequate. One may be convinced - but never
with complete certainty- as for the latter ex post only, that is, by con-
structing projects of the idealizational theory of the given phenomenon and
testing them one by one. That one is chosen which turns out to give the
smallest discrepancy with the facts, being at the same time able to cover
with this measure of deviation no fewer facts than its rivals. Thanks to this
it is assumed also to presuppose that the image of the essential structure
of the phenomenon in question is closest to the structure itself. Therefore
this project is considered as the best deformation of the phenomenon in its
initial, the most idealized model. Experience does not constitute the issue
of the theory. but it is the criterion of the choice among theoretical proposals
our imagination is able to create. In this the idealizational theory of science
is indebted to Popper's hypotheticism, differing from it in the definition of
the aim of science (to reconstruct the essence of phenomena) and of the
main means to employ (the deformation of phenomena through idealizing
them).
10
TO SURPASS MARX 11
Second, the accusation of dogmatism is groundless also because it is
assumed within this interpretation of Marxism I am referring to here that the
essence of phenomena is historically changeable. This is what I shall try to
comment upon a little bit more carefully.
According to the current grasp of dialectics in Marxist philosophy,
in contradistinction to metaphysics, dialectics treats nature not as the state of calm
and immobility, of stagnation and invariability, but as the state of constant motion
and transformation, where there is always something born and growing, and something
decaying and ceasing to be (1. Stalin, On Dialectical and Historical Materialism, from the
Polish translation, Warsaw 1949, p. 8).
Let us add at once that this kind of grasp has not sunk into oblivion together
with the author quoted. Even a cursory look at the content of expositions
of Marxist philosophy shows that it still endures.
But it is quite sufficient to rouse oneself from the slight depression
announcements of the kind always put us in to perceive at once the full
absurdity contained in them. What do they actually tell us? That when
motion is claimed in Marxian dialectics as the ontic property
of reality, then what is actually meant is what every Johnny learns about
in his first school years or maybe even before: that the Earth moves round
the Sun, that clouds move in the sky, that winds blow, that children grow,
that - in sum - all that is at some time such and such will become at some
other time not-such-and-such; that things change. This is actually what every
adult John knows because this is what our commonsense has to say. If
dialectics would claim precisely this, it would simply be needless as repeating
in a rather superficial and,boring way what is known to everybody.
It is, in fact, entirely unintelligible how it is possible to state that every-
thing changes and to be of the opinion that it was worth saying this. And
even to see in this a philosophically relevant truth. Even further, to consider
this as the last word of "scientific philosophy". It is offensive to workers
to treat this commonplace as the expression of their outlook. All of this
is unintelligible on the theoretical plane. On the ideological one, things
become much more comprehensible.
It is hard to understand too even on the theoretical plane alone -
how non-Marxists may be accused of "contaminating the metaphysics".
Would there be philosophers, in fact, "metaphysicists" oddly blind to the
facts that trees grow green and then turn yellow, that people come into the
world and then die, that in general everything changes?
The dialectics of philosophical discussions reveals itself in this way: if
12
CHAPTER 2
you make your opponent believe trivial falsehoods, you must pay for this
with the triviality of your own truths. It should be, therefore, the first
desideratum a dialectician poses for himself that the distinction between
dialectics and metaphysics is to be made in such a manner that dialectical
truths can be reasonably questioned and metaphysical falsehoods can be
meaningfully considered to be adequate. A good dialectician understands
what it must be worth to be a metaphysicist.
There are in the classical works of Marxism some formulations suggesting
an interpretation of dialectics of the type under consideration. However,
as I have tried to show elsewhere (The Foundations of Marxian Dialectics.
Towards a Categorical Interpretation [in Polish] ), Warsaw 1977; Foundations
of Categorial Ontology. Towards the Enlargement of the Categorical Inter-
pretation of Dialectics ([manuscript in the Polish publishing house ksiqika i
Wiedza]), their texts admit also of an interpretation which fortunately
differs from the current one a great deal. One may even think that from the
historical point of view this interpretation, I call it the cat ego rial one, is
more legitimate.
The basic idea of the latter is that Marxian dialectics deals not with motion
in the colloquial meaning (Le., the changeability of things), but with motion
in a special sense, namely with the changeability of hierarchies of factors
influencing phenomena occurring in things themselves. The thesis of dialectics
so conceived would not, then, be that things change but that their essential
structure changes and, hence, that regularities governing things vary over
time. Things can change even while their essence is stable and also the regu-
larities they undergo. Their motion becomes interesting from the dialectical
point of view (in its categorial interpretation), if it is a symptom of the
transformation of their essence, that is, the hierarchy of factors influencing
their properties. And this also implies that the hierarchy of dependencies
things undergo varies. If the motion which is referred to in the current
interpretation of dialectics be a superficial one - whereas that from the
categorical interpretation of dialectics, a deep one - then the idea in question
could be expressed by saying that dialectics deals with the deep, not with
the superficial, motion of reality. In other words, the proper objects of
dialectics (in its categorical interpretation) are the transformations of one
essential structure of a phenomenon into another.
The thesis of metaphysics would not state, then, an absurdity - that
things do not change - but would claim instead that for each property
(magnitude) F, its essential structure (the hierarchy of factors influencing
F) is the same in every two periods of time. A (categorical) metaphysicist
TO SURPASS MARX 13
would maintain, then, that all the changes things undergo take place under
the stability of hierarchies of factors influencing their (things) properties.
It is rather easy to show serious people assuming such a point at view. It
is a (categorially) metaphysical assumption to claim that generalizations of
the theory of value apply to the isolated unity's behaviour or to the authority
governing in a communist country, or to the conduct of a man in the market
economy as well (ef. L. Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance
of Economic Science, London 1946, p. 20). Metaphysics so conceived must
not be declared, it is usually tacitly presupposed for instance, in such a
definition of capital as the following: the capital of a society expresses
itself in the entirety of goods of any kind possessed by the society (by its
individual members or their associations) in a given period of time (1. R.
Hicks, The Social Framework. Introduction to Economics, Oxford 1948,
p. 37). Under capital so defined, fall both a capitalist's property and a
worker's savings, and also a feudal's grange, and ancient slaves, etc. This is,
however, a quite different point of view than that which Engels expressed
as follows in his review of the first volume of Capital:
What strikes us in this work particularly is that the author does not treat the theses of
political economy as eternally valid truths - as is usually the case - but as the result of
a definite historical process .... A fter the appearance of his work it is unthinkable for
instance to include under the same head - from the economic point of view - slave
work, villein service and free hired labour; it is not possible - for the laws under which
modern, great industry, based on free competition, falls, fail to apply immediately to
relationships governing in ancient times or to the mediaeval guilds (Works, from the
Polish translation, Warsaw 1968, pp. 239-240).
The latter point of view is that of categorially interpreted dialectics: for
at least some properties and periods of time, the essential structures of those
properties undergo transformations within these periods. They consist either
in changes of the repertory of principal factors (qualitative changes) or in
changes of the repertory of secondary factors (quantitative changes). What
they imply is also a change in the hierarchy of dependencies defining a given
property (magnitude) -- either in the form of the regularity being varied (in
the case of qualitative changes) or in the form of its forms of manifestation
which change in time (in the case of quantitative changes).
Let us omit, however, the technical details of the categorial interpretation
of dialectics - by the way, it abounds with them, being an idealizational
theory of reality composed of several models of increasing realism. Let us
concentrate, instead, on its basic idea. According to this, at least some phe-
nomena - and this concerns social phenomena for sure - have a historically
14 CHAPTER 2
changeable essence. And, if so, then there follows from this the following
methodological conclusion: if in time t, for phenomenon F, the idealizational
theory T is adequate, then in time t' the theory is not an adequate one
assuming that the essential structure of F is in t' different than in t. If the
change in question is of a quantitative nature, then at least the law of theory
T may be applied in t' (being still a relative truth, i.e. it recognizes the
principal factors); if in t it reconstructed the principal factor(s) properly, then
it still does in t' requiring alone a different concretization than in t. But if
the change is of a qualitative nature, then what was in t a relative truth is
not of the same character in t', and a quite new theory, that is, one initiating
itself with a quite new idealizational law, is indispensable for period t'. In
this case a new deformation of reality is necessary. The theoretical mind
must invent a new caricature of it.
The Mystification of Reality
Here is the situation which is typical in the social sciences: for a given period
there is established, after a long period of efforts and corrections, some
idealizational theory which is relatively true; however, qualitative changes
are occurring and the essential structure of the phenomenon the theory is
about requires a new idealizational theory with a new law; but the strongest
obstacle for inventing such a theory is the old theory. In fact it is a double
obstacle: first. it imposes the interpretation of the new facts, potentially
confirming the new theory, in the old terms; and second, it is an ideological
obstacle. The latter point requires some explanation.
It is known from classical Marxism that social theories are ideologies
expressing the interests of great social groups. It is also known that those
interests are not always expressed directly. Sometimes in the form of general
human ideals quite definite particularistic interests are expressed. For
instance those of the bourgeoisie. Or - let us contribute this to classical
Marxism in the form of the ideals of the working class at first and then
of the "whole nation", or the interests of the class of disposers of the forces
of coercion, of the means of production or of the means of the production
of consciousness.
For as long as a given social category scarcely fights for a dominating
position in a society, it needs a theory that would be essentially true; other-
wise the actions it undertakes will be inefficient. Therefore, the criterion of
ideological selection includes, in the period of the struggle for power, the
criterion of truthfulness. A social theory becomes an ideology of a given
TO SURPASS MARX 15
category if it rationalizes its interests best, but on the limiting condition
that it shows a sufficiently high cognitive level. When, however, the category
in question in fact occupies the dominating position in the society, then the
cognitive component of its ideology becomes not only useless, but even
harmful for it. The more truth about the society is available, the more it is
visible that this category subordinates to its egoistic interests those of the
rest of society. That is why, a mature dominating category of the society
(for instance, a class in the Marxian sense) needs only a theory which is
essentially false, that is, such a theory which instead of the essence shows
an appearance. For such a theory, and only such, diverts attention from the
actual sources of social inequality (for instance, from the exploitation).
If in the society under consideration qualitative changes have occurred
as a result of its subordination to the given minority, then a natural candidate
for such a mystifying theory will be actually that one which was an ideolog-
ical banner of the new lords in the period of their march towards power.
From the one side it allows them to keep their ideological identity; and
from the other it pronounces a falsehood about the present times. This
essentially false image of contemporary society is attained in a hardly iden-
tifiable form - namely. by telling the truth about times long past. In this
way the theory gives an entirely erroneous interpretation of contemporary
society, suggesting that the most essential components of social life are those
which were such long ago. but today only appear to be. In this way the
theory allows us to be indignant at relationships long past and at the same
time covers the present inequalities with the thickest curtain. The thickest
curtain because it is the curtain of nonunderstanding.
The Task of the Present Book
In this way we come to the point where the main task of the present book
may be defined. That Karl Marx is a great, certainly the greatest, theoretical
injurer of the present times means that his social theory, and above all his
historiosophy, is a mystification of our era. It is, first, essentially false to
pay attention to such social mechanisms (e .g. the class struggle) which are
today quite a secondary phenomenon of existing societies. It is also, second,
an ideology that is quite erroneously expedient for the dominant social
forces of our times, presenting the appearance as the essence, and also ration-
alizing their interests by referring them to the social movements from before
the century. This concerns first of all those societies that call themselves
socialist ones. But not only them -- also modern capitalist societies should
16 CHAPTER 2
be indebted to Marxism for very many things it has - already - done for
them.
That is why Marx's theory, above all his historiosophy, should be sur-
passed by the construction of a new theory which would save all that which
was and still is cognitively worth while in Marxian Marxism but revealing
at the same time all Marx's faults and attempting an explanation of what
falsified his theory in the space of the last century. There is no one way to
find such a theory except by attempting to do it. The proof of such a theory
is in the work on it. One attempt at such work is contained in the present
book. I shall try then:
(I) To criticise the theoretical faults and social mystifications made by
Marxian historical materialism.
(2) To build - with the aid of Marxian methodology as understood in
the preceding part of the book - a historiosophic conception that: (a) in
a special case- that for slavery and feudalism - would pass as a theory of
the Marxian type; (b) would allow us to explain those historical processes
taking place in capitalism that falsify the Marxian historical materialism;
(c) would be a theory of societies where the Marxian historical materialism
alone plays the purely ideological role, that is, of socialist societies.
It is quite understandable that a single author can do nothing more than
to initiate such a programme. This is precisely the deepest intention of
this book. The whole social thought of our times is there in the shadow of
Karl Marx. Marxists should be the first to seriously try to get out into the
light of day.
B. THE MARXIAN AMBIGUITY. A PROPOSAL FOR A
NONMARXIAN THEORY OF SOCIOECONOMIC
FORMATION
CHAPTER 3
THE AMBIGUITY OF MARXIAN HISTORICAL
MA TERIALISM
The Marxian Ambiguity
At a definite level of their development the material productive forces of society fall into
a contradiction with the existing relations of production or ... with the ownership
relations, within which they have been developing so far. Those relations change from
the forms of development of the productive forces into their bonds. An epoch of social
revolution then takes place (K. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy. Introduction [from the Polish translation), Warsaw 1953, p. 5).
The history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles. Freeman
and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word,
oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an
uninterrupted ... fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconsti-
tution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes (K. Marx,
F. Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, Moscow 1948, pp. 40-41).
In these two passages there are contained, I believe, two different philosophies
of history. According to the first philosophy, the decisive factor in historical
movement is the contradiction between the productive forces and the
relations of production. it is presupposed here that the productive forces
"must" develop themselves, otherwise the society cannot exist at all. What-
ever, then, turns out to be an obstacle for the development of the productive
forces, will be sooner or later wiped out. The contradiction between the
productive forces and the relations of production consists in the fact that
the former cannot be applied so efficiently - under the given relations of
production as their technological capacity allows. And this contradiction
may be solved in one way only - by setting up such productive relations
that will not resist the application of the new productive forces and even
facilitate this. But until a particular time, the further growth of the produc-
tive forces will lead to the reappearance of the contradiction between the
new productive forces and the relations of production in question, the
latter being resistant to this technologically possible new production, etc.
According to the first Marxian philosophy of history the social development
consists in constant dissolutions of reoccurring contradictions between tech-
nology and the social forms it works in.
18
MARXIAN HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 19
Which category of people is, then, the actual subject of social history
according to the first Marx's historiosophy? The answer though never for-
mulated clearly in his works - we shall see later on why - seems to be quite
obvious. The actual subjects of history are the disposers of productive forces,
that is, people who make decisions concerning the ways they are to be applied
and the goals they are to serve. It is the disposal of productive forces which
enables people to get social supremacy over the rest of society. After all,
the way the social product is derived depends on who disposes the productive
forces of the society and how. Disposers, or owners, of the productive forces
are inclined to acquire as much as possible. That is why the development of
productive forces is advantageous for them - the more new value they can
yield, the more the owners can acquire. If, then, the way in which production
is organised or the type of relationships with the direct producers (slaves,
serfs or workers) do not allow the employment of the potential capacity
of the productive forces, then the owners rearrange them in such a way as
to adapt the organization of production or their relationships with the direct
producers to the level of the productive forces. In other words, they change
the social framework of production in order to gain as much as possible from
the productive forces' technological capacity. For the more new value is
produced, the more they can gain. The motion of society consists, then, in
the development of productive forces, and the subjects of history are people
who transform, so to speak, the technological development of productive
forces into the social development of the relations of production. It is the
only category of people who have their interest in doing this, namely, the
disposers of the productive forces.
No doubt that this is a consistent historiosophy. However, what do the
oppressed classes do in history at all? Do they really do nothing apart from
the volitionless application of the productive forces bringing to the owners
more and more surplus value? This consistent and clear Marxian philosophy
of history based on the idea of the contradiction between the productive
forces and the relations of production seems to be so non-Marxist, that one
feels forced to refer to ideas concerning the class struggle.
It is, however, a quite different Marxian historiosophy that makes use of
the idea of the class struggle. The course of history depends basically on the
masses and, especially, on the in tenseness of their struggle with the exploiters.
When the existing economic relations become untenable for the direct pro-
ducers, that is, when the intensity of the exploitation passes beyond some
critical point, the revolution starts: the fight between the direct producers
and their oppressors on a mass scale. Until now the results of the struggle
20
CHAPTER 3
have always fallen to the new exploiters - they have always become the
new ruling class, taking the revolutionary explosion of the people for their
advantage. It is only the working class which for the first time in history has
eliminated exploitation as such and built the first social system which is not
based on the exploitation of the people by a powerful minority. In this
vision of history it is the class of direct producers which is the real subject
of historical movement, and it is revolution which is the mechanism of the
transition of one society into another.
As can be seen, the second Marx's historiosophy is also clear and con-
sistent. However, what does the growth of the productive forces and their
contradiction with the relations of production do in history at all?
Here it is, then, the problem of Marx's ambiguity: how to adjust one his-
toriosophy with the other. Who ultimately, are the true subjects of history:
those who own the productive forces or those who do not? Whose actions
possess historical significance in the sense of leading to the emerging of the
new society out of the given one: the actions of the owners adapting pro-
ductive relations to the requirements of the productive forces, or the actions
of the exploited people who oppose the sweat of their labour? In other
words, what, finally, is the mechanism of the transition of one socio-econo-
rnic formation into another: the contradiction of the productive forces and
the relations of production or the contradiction of interests between the
owners and the direct producers?
An Analysis of the Overhasty Solution
The simplest way to solve a problem is to liquidate it. This was, and is, the
usual way of solving the problem of the Marxian ambiguity - if it was notic-
ed at all. As a rule, it was not, and is not, seen by Marxists. One example
only: V. I. Lenin quotes in one of his works the two formulations we have
referred to above while not seeing any problem. And he even reinforces the
dualism of the Marxian grasp of history writing - in the space of two pages -
that "to reveal the roots, without any exception, of all the ideas and trends"
one should look only in "the state of the productive forces" and that "the
class struggle is the motor of [historical] events" (Y. I. Lenin, Karl Marx,
Warsaw 1951. pp. 21--22; after the Polish translation).
K. Kautsky was one of those rather rare Marxists who noticed the pro-
blem and tried to provide some solution to it. He aims to prove that the
Marxian philosophy of history is theoretically quite homogeneous and that
the impression this is not the case follows from the difference between the
MARXIAN HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 21
languages historical materialism is presented in A Contribution to the
Critique of Political Economy on the one hand, and The Communist Mani-
festo on the other. It is, however, an accidental difference of the two
expositions of the same theory. The languages in question are easily mutually
translatable which makes any suspicion of incoherence within historical
materialism quite senseless. Here is the author's argumentation:
Marx speaks here (in A Contribution ... - L. N.) incessantly only about the conflicts
between the productive forces on the one hand, and the productive and ownership
relations on the other. A theoretician has the right to deal in abstractions and he is
sometimes forced to do so. But we obtain a false image and easily fall into mysticism
if we do not constantly have in mind the concrete phenomena out of which the abstrac-
tions were drawn ....
. . . the conflict between the ownership relations and the productive forces is, in
fact, the conflict between the people who own the latter and the people who apply
them and make the production .... Such a conflict presupposes the existence of differ-
ent classes. Therefore social revolution is the outcome of the victory of the class of
people who apply the productive forces and feel themselves to be more and more
restricted in their use and in the appropriation of the results of production by the
existing relations of production and of ownership over the class of people who enjoyed
the hitherto existing relations of production and of ownership.
Hence, all of this is based on the same ideas which entailed the thesis of 'The Com-
munist Manifesto' that the history of all existing societies is the history of class strug-
gles (K. Kautsky, The Materialist Understanding of History, vol. 2, part II, Warsaw 1963,
pp. 193-194;after the Polish translation).
Let US ask, however, which class of people "enjoys the hitherto existing
relations of production and of ownership". The answer is obvious: the present
class of owners, that is, the ruling class of a given socio-economic formation.
And the class which "feels more and more restricted in the appropriation of
the results of production" by the existing relations is supposed to fight
against the former. But the class of the latter kind may be identified in one
way only: it is the class of the new owners (e.g., the bourgeoisie that has
risen within the feudal society). In other words the "class struggle" Kautsky
means is the economic rivalry of the two classes of owners. He translates,
then, the conflict between the productive forces and the relations of produc-
tion into the rivalry of the two ruling classes the former and the new ones.
But the main thesis of The Communist Manifesto does not even mention this
type of class relationship, being concerned exclusively with the struggle of
the "oppressed and the oppressors", that is, the present owners and the pre-
sent direct producers. Kautsky translates the thesis that the motor of history
is the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of
22
CHAPTER 3
production into the thesis that the motor of history is the "class struggle"
of the two subsequent classes of owners. However, the latter was not said in
'The Communist Manifesto'. Kautsky remains all the time within the first
historiosophy of Karl Marx.
Not surprising, since he did not even notice what the point is: Kautsky did
not understand the problem of the Marxian ambiguity at all. It seems to him
that the relationship between the philosophy of history exposed in 'A Con-
tribution .. .' and that exposed in 'The Communist Manifesto' is the same as
the relationship between the language of economic abstractions and that of
human actions. It seems to him that it is quite sufficient to translate one into
another in order to have the problem disappear. As we have seen, it is not.
This is because the question is of a quite different nature from what Kautsky
thinks.
For there are two economic contradictions discovered by Marx that are
hidden in the two types of social conflict. The first consists in the fact that
the productive forces are technologically capable of giving a larger production
than they actually do, but that it is the state of the relations of production
which does not allow for this (the contradiction between the productive
forces and the productive relations). This economic mechanism may be, at
most, a basis for the conflict between the new and the old class of owners;
the interests of the former are connected with the new, but those of the
latter consist in keeping hold of the old relations of production. The interests
of the exploited class cannot be defined in terms of this economic contradic-
tion at all. The class in question is not interested in the development of the
productive forces (in fact, it was a slave who devastated more effective means
of production). Similarly, the interests of the direct producers cannot be
defined in terms of the relations of production - the class of old owners is
interested in keeping hold of the old ones whereas the new class of owners
sees its material interests in setting up new ones. It would be rather hard to
maintain that a feudal peasant had his material interests in the loss of his
small-holdings and to become a worker not possessing anything, living in a
quite new social milieu, etc. Instead, it was the bourgeoisie that was interested
in the new, capitalist type of relations of production. In short, the class
struggle in the proper sense of the term, that is, the fight of one antagonistic
class of a given society against another, cannot be defined in terms of the
contradiction between productive forces and productive relations.
The other economic mechanism is the contradiction between the material
interests of the present class of owners (i.e., those appropriate to a given
socio-economic formation) and the present class of direct producers (e.g.,
MARXIAN HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 23
owners of slaves and slaves themselves, etc.): the higher the surplus value, the
lower the variable capital is, and the reverse. This mechanism is the basis for
the class struggle taking place within a particular socio-economic fonnation.
However, it was not responsible for the transition from one formation into
another. It would be an obvious historical falsehood to maintain, for instance,
that the struggle of the slaves against their lords led slavery to feudalism ....
At any rate, one may easily notice that the two social conflicts in question
(the struggle of antagonistic classes, and the rivalry of the two subsequent
classes of oppressors) have. so to speak, some hidden economic mechanisms.
Also the two economic contradictions have, so to speak, their social embodi-
ments in the fonn of the two types of conflict. If so, the problem does not
lie in finding the way to translate the contradiction between productive
forces and relations into the language of social actions. The problem consists
instead in the logical contradiction between the two historiosophies one may
fmd in the works of the Marxist classics: they present the contradiction
within economic relations sometimes as the source of social development,
and sometimes as the (antagonistic) class struggle. And this may be put in the
following way as well: the classics of Marxism present, as the source of social
development, sometimes the rivalry of the new class of oppressors with the
old one, and sometimes the contradiction between the surplus value and the
variable capital. The problem of the Marxian ambiguity may be expressed
both in the language of economic contradictions and of human actions. It
does not depend on what kind of language has been chosen to describe social
reality since it is connected with reality itself.
The problem of Marx's ambiguity originates instead from the dualism in
the explanation of historical events one may notice in the works of the
Marxist classics - sometimes they refer to the relationships of the productive
forces and the relations of production, sometimes they use categories con-
nected with the (antagonistic) class struggle, and in both cases they feel free
from further explanations: that is. both the category of the contradiction
within the economic basis and that of the class struggle play the role of the
(actual) last resort. In other words, the classics sometimes proclaim the his-
toriosophy in which the decisive role is played by the owners of the produc-
tive forces, and sometimes they interpret the social world in terms of the
other philosophy of history, according to which the subject of history is the
class of direct producers. And the interconnection between the two not only
is not obvious but is even controversial to the highest degree. Marxian histori-
cal materialism is a doctrine theoretically unhomogeneous - it is composed
of two self-consistent but mutually incompatible theories of history.
24
CHAPTER 3
The Importance of the Problem of the Marxian Ambiguity
The importance of the problem in question can hardly be denied, so it seems.
It is a quite different grasp of the genesis of feudalism when one seeks it in
the formation of colonization (this is what the first historiosophy suggests)
from when one seeks it in the struggle of slaves with their owners (and this
is what the second historiosophy induces). It is one thing to explain the
formation of capitalism referring to the process of the nascency of the
bourgeoisie, of the revival of the market economy, etc. (as is suggested by
the first historiosophy), and another, theoretically quite different one, to
explain this by referring to the struggle of serfs with feudal lords (as this
would be induced on the account of the second Marxian historiosophy). If
one opts for the explanations of the first kind, one rejects the idea of 'The
Communist Manifesto' that the whole social history is the history of class
struggles and his declarations have nothing to do with the theory he in fact
adopts. As a result, he assumes - independently of the number of quotations
from 'The Communist Manifesto' - that slaves' upheavals or peasants' wars
have had no historical importance for the transition of a given society from
one formation into another. If one opts for explanations of the second kind
one violates simple historical facts -- it is not true that slaves set up the feudal
relations or that serfs established the capitalist mode of production ....
As a rule, Marxists opt for one of the two philosophies of history contained
in our tradition, and save themselves in the case of clear incompatibility with
the facts by recalling elements of the other which are latent in the ambiguity
of the basic concepts of historical materialism. In the language of Marx, the
term "class struggle" has two meanings - in one it denotes the struggle of the
direct producers against the owners; elsewhere it denotes the struggle between
the new and the old owners. Similarly, the term "revolution" has two mean-
ings - in one it signifies the particular intensity of the fight of the oppressed
against the oppressors; elsewhere it signifies the change of the relations of
ownership which turns out to be to the new oppressors' advantage. In this
situation many possibilities for the defence of historical materialism arise for
a vulgar Marxist - whenever the discrepancy with reality is too large, he, or
she, may make use of the hidden ambiguities in the basic categories of the
language of the Marxist classics. Here is a typical example:
Spontaneously developing productive forces require - for their continuous, unrestricted
development - the incessant, appropriate adoption of the relation of production to
them themselves. In a society which is based on the existence of the antagonistic classes
this cannot occur. ...
MARXIAN HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 25
According to the development of a given formation the relations of production
become more and more backward with respect to the level attained by the productive
forces. Relations of production that are at some stage propitious for the development
of the productive forces begin to become restraints for this.
The contradiction resulting from this achieves a particular intensity in the decadent
phase of every formation which is based on the antagonism of the classes and expresses
itself in the sharpened conflict of the social classes. It constitutes an objective, economic
foundation of the social revolution .... The contradiction between the relations of
production and the productive forces, being the fundamental force of the process of the
development of humanity, is not the contradiction between people and things, but
the one between people, between social groups, classes - objectively opposed to each
other in the process of production .... This is above all the antagonism between the
class that represents the new type of relations able to secure the unrestricted develop-
ment of productive forces, and the ruling class representing the type of relations stopping
this development (H. Landau, The Marxist Theory of Revolution (Marksistowska teoria
rewolucji), Warsaw 1963, p. 19;my italics - 1. N.).
One may notice that the author of the quoted passage accepts the first
Marxian philosophy of history according to which masses do not play any
significant role in the transition from one formation into another. The author
feels that this grasp leads to undesired consequences and masks this by
employing equivocal Marxian terms. And so, many times she uses the notion
of antagonism in contexts neutral as far as the second Marxian historiosophy
is concerned, but when she passes to the problem of transition, she employs
the ambiguous term "the conflict of social classes" covering the antagonistic
class struggle and the rivalry of the two subsequent oppressing classes as well.
In this way, accepting the first Marxian historiosophy, she makes an impres-
sion that she accepts the second one with its idea of the struggle of the anta-
gonist classes. The cognitive content of the first has been, then, presented
in the words of the second.
The Genesis of the Marxian Ambiguity
What is the origin of the ambiguity of Marxian historical materialism? Why
did one of the greatest minds in the history of social thought commit a rather
simple inconsistency in making his theory? One can think that this has
ideological roots. Great people make mistakes u n ~ r the pressure of their
expectations, the more so in the social sciences.
The dramatic vision of history as being determined by the struggle of the
oppressed and the oppressors had been invented as the justification for the
stipulated pattern of socialist revolution. The revolution was to be a result
of the struggle of the working class against capitalists, and this was what Marx
26 CHAPTER 3
had wanted to justify as the manifestation of a general historical regularity.
That is why Marx needed the idea that the struggle of the antagonist classes
of capitalist society which is supposed to lead to the new, socialist, formation
is only a special case of the general regularity. In all the formations there are
two classes fighting each other and, what is more, the fall of the formation
and the rise of the new one emerging from it are results of this struggle.
Marx had not known yet what his "philosophy" would be but he knew
already- in 1843 - that "Philosophy cannot fulfill itself without the de-
struction of the proletariat, and the proletariat cannot destroy itself without
the fulfillment of philosophy" (K. Marx, A Contribution to the Hegelian
Philosophy of Law. An Introduction, in: Works, vol. 1 (Polish translation),
Warsaw 1960, p. 473). Not having his philosophy of history yet, he knew
already what is the historical mission of the proletariat, that is, he knew
already what his philosophy of history should claim. That is why Marx's
historiosophy from 'The Communist Manifesto' is a simple generalization of
his project of the overthrowing of capitalism and the transition to socialism.
It is precisely the historiosophy of the class struggle. The role he wanted to
ascribe to the working class, he had ascribed to all the oppressed classes in
the history of mankind - their resistance against exploitation was believed to
overthrow formations and to lead to the rise of new ones. The young Marx
was univocal: the (antagonistic) class struggle was in the historiosophy of the
'Manifesto' the basic, and sole, mechanism of the historical motion. No doubt
that it had played its ideological role properly - in the hot time of the Spring
of the People (I 848). Marx, to be sure, did not even consider how it could be
that slaves fighting against their lords were setting up feudal relationships ...
When in a more qUiet time Marx elaborated his philosophy of history in
a more careful manner, it looked quite different. There appeared the basic
laws of the determination of the relations of production by productive forces,
of the superstructure by the economic base, of the social consciousness by
the social being. On the other hand mature Marx strove at the same basic
aims as in his youth, and he grasped the socialist revolution in the same way:
as the explosion of the struggle of the two antagonist classes of capitalist
society. His new historiosophy, however, did not justify the historical mission
of the proletariat - it was quite evident that it was the bourgeoisie which
stimulated technical progress and not the working class. The latter could not,
then, be presented in the light of the new historiosophy outlined in 'A Con-
tribution to the Critique of Political Economy' as a representant of the
development of productive forces, the latter being stopped by the capitalist
relations of production. Therefore, Marx had no choice - he had to retain
MARXIAN HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 27
his old historiosophy of the 'Manifesto' since otherwise the ideological idea
of the mission of the proletariat would lack any scientific justification. He
was, however, too great a scholar not to feel his own inconsistency. That is
why, he constantly vacillated in the additional justifications for the mission
of the working class: once it was the law of absolute pauperisation, elsewhere
the contradiction between the private appropriation and the social nature of
production, etc. Marx felt that his general historiosophical justification for
the concept of the proletarian revolution is insufficient.
As a result the Marxian historical materialism remained a theoretically
ambiguous doctrine: to the body of the basic laws referring, in the last resort,
to the idea of the contradiction between the productive forces and relations,
the concept of the (antagonistic) class struggle was added. Young Marx was
univocal, but inadequate. Mature Marx improved the adequacy of his concept
but at the price of becoming ambiguous.
The Two Interpretations of Marxian Social Thought
An indirect argument in support of the latter claim is. to be found in the
history of Marxist social thought. The ambiguity of Marxian historical mate-
rialism was one of the reasons for which that thought came to be split into
three trends. The first continued the ambiguity of the original version (the
orthodox trend), while the other two tried to eliminate it, either by stressing
the idea of class struggle and abandoning the idea of the laws of motion in
history (the praxistic t rend), or by stressing the idea of objective laws and by
reducing the role of class struggle to a none too important modifier of the
process of history (the nomological trend).
Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein by Lukacs has been the fundamental
work that shaped the praxistic interpretation of historical materialism. In
his opinion, the nomological interpretation of Marxism (in the form of 'the
Marxism of the Second International') stating that a socialist revolution is
to take place on the strength of objective regularities was merely a mystifica-
tion of the situation in which the individual lived in a bourgeois society. He
(that individual) viewed his social reality, of which he was one of the co-
makers, as 'Nature', alien to him, to the 'laws' of which he was subjected. He
could not aspire to abolishing those 'laws', but at the best to availing himself
passively of them for his own egoistic advantage, and thereby to isolating
himself still more from the other individuals, and thus to increasing to that
atomization which is characteristic of capitalist society. That false conscious-
ness of bourgeois society also permeates the theoretical doctrine of social
28
CHAPTER 3
democracy and eliminates from it that which is fundamental for genuine
Marxism, namely the dialectics of class struggle. In Lukacs' opinion, Marxism
states that only a social class can be the subject of the process of history, and
hence the real subject of history. Further, this role can be played only by
such a class which, owing to its position in the social structure, arrives at the
consciousness of both its own place and of the social whole, and can there-
fore engage in global praxis and transform the entire socio-economic order.
The revolutionary praxis of such a class thus means the abolition of 'objective
forms of social life', and hence means the transgression of so-called social
laws. At the time of a revolution it turns out that those laws can be abolished
by the real subject of history. The Russian revolution is thus legitimated not
by falling under 'objective laws' given in advance, but by being a result of the
struggle waged by the real subject of history, a struggle as a result of which it
abolishes the 'laws' of bourgeois society.
1
This interpretation stressed, to legitimate the October Revolution, only
one motif in the Marxian philosophy of history, and in fact disregarded the
nomological motif. This can even more clearly be seen in the works of those
Marxists who today expand the praxistic interpretation of historical mate-
rialism. Since there is nothing in history except human praxis, then historical
reality covers not only that which is dominant, but also that which is rare
and exceptional; not only that which really is, but also that which can be
tomorrow, if we begin to act in a defmite manner (M. Markovic, 'The Con-
cept of Revolution', Praxis 1-2 (1969), p. 51). History thus is what men
make it to be through their actions and their struggle. And what they do,
against whom and how they fight, depends - among other things - upon
what they want to do, what their hopes and aspirations are. And also upon
how much they believe in the possibility of making their plans true, i.e., upon
how much they have liberated themselves from the disabling belief in the
myth of historical necessities. In particular, that myth vanishes in revolu-
tionary periods. This is not without reason: the revolutionary praxis is not
only not subject to deterministic regularities, but nor is it to statistical ones;
political action abolishes the law of great numbers and simply cannot be
subject to a sociological law (M. Markovic, 'Gramsci on the Unity of Philos-
ophy and Politics', Praxis 3 (1967), p. 337). History thus has for us a meaning
not because it is subject to some laws that resemble the laws of Nature, but
because we impart to it that meaning by our own action: the sense of history
is in history itself; in history man explains himself and that very historical
explanation is the only sense of history (K. Kosik, The Dialectics of the
Concrete, Boston/Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1977, p. 145).
MARXIAN HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 29
The praxistic interpretation of historical materialism thus disambiguates
that social doctrine, but does so at the cost of eliminating from it the concep-
tion of the laws of motion of history.
Exactly the reverse is done by the nomological interpretation of historical
materialism. That conception was expanded by 'the Marxism of the Second
International', which stressed the motifs in the works of the Marxist classics
expressing the conception of the laws of motion of history, the laws referring
to the contradiction between the economic base and the superstructure. Class
struggle occurred in that picture of history only as the implementation of
necessary regularities. And it could be successful solely if the objective con-
ditions that evolved in accordance with those laws were 'mature'; otherwise
class struggle can be successful in the sense of a given class winning power
owing to a special coincidence of historical circumstances, but even then it is
not successful in the historical sense: it brings about the restoration of the
old system in a new attire.
At present the nomological interpretation of the Marxist social theory also
is continued at the theoretical level. A very coherent version of such an inter-
pretation of historical materialism was given by O. Lange (Political Economy,
vol. I, Pergamon Press, 1963). As he sees it, the structure of a socio-economic
formation is determined by two laws: the law of a necessary agreement
between production relations and the nature of productive forces, and the
law of a necessary agreement between the superstructure and the base; these
laws determine the conditions of 'the inner harmony, the internal balance of
social formations'. The third law determines how a formation develops; it is
the law of the progressive development of productive forces, which states that
in the sphere of production 'habit and routine can never prevail for long since
new external stimuli are continually appearing, forcing men to alter their
behaviour'. The development of the productive forces that takes place as a
result of the operation of that law brings about contradictions between these
forces and production relations, which brings new production relations into
being. "In such a case the social formation disintegrates and a new one
emerges in its place" (ibid., p. 32). ''The interest of the dominant class" is
merely "an additional factor which strengthens the conservative character of
the production relations and the superstructure" (ibid.); the same applies to
the interest of the exploited class, whose interest is merely an additional
factor of development. As a result of all this it is not the class struggle which,
in this interpretation, is the motive power of history (being merely an addi-
tional factor) but a contradiction between productive forces and production
relations.
30
CHAPTER 3
Thus the nomological interpretation of historical materialism also dis-
ambiguates that theory, but at the cost of eliminating the conception of class
struggle.
The orthodox interpretation in turn preserves both motifs, but at the same
time preserves the ambiguity of the Marxian approach. These two motifs were
joined together quite mechanically by J. Stalin. In his interpretation, within
a given formation there develop spontaneously certain productive forces
which necessitate appropriate changes in production relations.
Until a certain time, the development of productive forces and changes in production
relations take place spontaneously, regardless of human will. But this goes on only until
a certain moment, when the newly emerging and developing productive forces become
mature. When this occurs, the existing production relations and their representatives
become that "insurmountable" barrier which can be removed only by the conscious
activity of certain classes (J. Stalin, On Dialectical and Historical Materialism [Polish
translation J ' Moscow 1945, pp. 140 -1).
Characteristically enough, Stalin skips the problem as Kautsky did (see
above): he does not say which classes represent the development of the
productive forces, the present oppressed class or the new class of proprietors.
This mechanical joining of both Marxian motifs can be found in present-
day expositions of historical materialism written from the position of the
orthodox interpretation. The law of the necessary conformity between pro-
duction relations and the character of productive forces is expounded first,
without any reference to the concept of social class, but the emphasis is on
the fact that that law describes the essential condition of the functioning and
development of society. But later it turns out that next to the conflict
between the productive forces and the relations of production something else
also aspires to the same role of the essential factor of social development:
"one cannot understand any phenomenon, any social change without its
relation to the classes, in abstraction from the mutual relations and the con-
flicts among the classes" (A. Sheptulin, The
[Polish translation] , Warsaw 1973, p. 313). The latter statement is, of course,
falsified by the former, because there are social phenomena which can be
understood 'without relation to the classes': they include the conformity
(or a lack of conformity) between production relations and the character of
productive forces in the interpretation advanced by that author.
Marx and Marxists
Of the three trends within the Marxist social thought only two, the praxistic
MARXIAN HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 31
and the nomological, are worth calling an interpretation of Marxism. The
orthodox trend, which is still the most influential one and which constitutes
the theoretical basis for the official ideology in socialist countries, amalga-
mates the two Marxian historiosophies in the same way that Marx did, that
is, mechanistically. It is, to be sure, historically much more accurate than the
remaining two, precisely because it is in the same way inconsistent as the
Marxian historical materialism is. However, its systematic value is r;lther low,
since it does not try to eliminate Marx's ambiguity but simply continues it.
This perhaps merits some attention since the usual attitude that the
majority of independently thinking Marxists adopt is that Marx had made the
great theory which has not been properly understood until now and which
has been misunderstood by the current Marxist way of understanding Marx's
ideas. In particular, this attitude is adopted as far as the social theory of the
classics is concerned. It seems to me, however, that this is entirely wrong. To
a certain extent the attitude is rational as far as the methodology of the
author of Capital is concerned, and also of its philosophical assumptions. But
the faults contained in the heritage of the social theory of Marxism are
Marx's own. This must be so, since they are so deeply contained within the
tradition in question that it seems to be impossible to think that they were
introduced from outside.
In short, the point of view according to which "Marx is good, but Marxists
are bad" seems to lose its validity just for historical materialism. Within this
field, it is rather Kautsky, on the one hand and Lukacs, on the other, who are
"good"; and Marx, Engels, Lenin who are "bad". The former were at least
consistent, while the latter committed the sin of eclecticism. But in science,
as opposed to politics, compromise is the worst thing one may do. In fact,
eclecticism is a compensation for the insuffiCiency of mind by the poverty
of character.
NOTE
1 I am adopting here some interpretational ideas by S. Kozyr-Kowalski in his papers on
Lukacs' philosophy.
CHAPTER 4
THE MARXIAN AMBIGUITY: AN ATTEMPT AT
A SOLUTION. A NON-MARXIAN THEORY OF
SOCIO-ECONOMIC FORMATION
(Model f)
Of the two interpretations of historical materialism, neither the nomological
nor the praxistic (see above Chapter 3) seems to be a satisfactory one. The
former ignores entirely the role of the (antagonistic) class struggle inter-
preting it as the means of realization of the regularities working outside
human actions. The latter, in turn, abandons what seems to be the utmost
contribution of historical materialism to social sciences, namely, the idea
of socio-economic formation whose structure and motion undergo objective
laws. The cognitive content of the question how to solve the Marxian am-
biguity is, then, the following: how to combine the idea of class struggle with
that of socio-economic formation being in an at least rough agreement with
historical facts.
The question under consideration is, obviously, also of ideological im-
portance. The acceptance of the "theory" of class struggle is a symptom of
the moral solidarity with exploited people in history: slaves, serfs, workers.
It is not a mere accident that people who renounce historical materialism
become, as a rule, over-historical humanists transcending in their evaluations
all the limits given by this theory; the class exploitation is for them one of
numerous social evils not distinguishing itself among others. In this way, the
whole force of the moral indignation so peculiar for Marxist early writings
disappears in shallow generalities everybody accepts on any occasion. What
is really necessary is to keep the moral content of the Marxian historical
materialism and to improve its cognitive content as well. This implies that
the new historical materialism is to be a weapon against the new forms of
oppression that have risen in societies calling themselves socialist ones and
using Marx's theoretical faults to cover their inhuman nature.
That is why both the nomological ("Kautskian") and the praxistic
("Lukacsian") interpretations of Marxian historical materialism are equally
wrong. It is not an interpretation, but it is a revision only, that could pretend
to solve the ambiguity of the Marxian social theory. In other words, not just
one more attempt at the "discovery of Marx's real intention", but the open
rejection of what hinders us today and the clear introduction of new ideas
32
A NON-MARXIAN THEORY 33
instead, is to be the way a serious Marxist should attempt to follow. Being a
Marxist, he remains within the methodology given by Marx and shares with
him the moral attitude enlarging the latter against those who have made of
the Marxian ideas only the cover for hiding the social inequality and oppres-
sion on a scale unknown to any of the "class societies".
ADAPTATION AND REVOLUTION: ASSUMPTIONS FOR
THE SOLUTION
The Nature of Marxian Dependencies
The non-Marxian historical materialism is to be an historical materialism at
any rate. That is why the Marxian methodology (see Section A) is accepted
here. This includes not only the idea of idealization but also some more
specific ideas that will be gradually introduced. One of them is the Marxian
view of the nature of social dependencies.
The best way to reconstruct the methodological rules governing some-
body's mode of investigation is to look at his investigations themselves. Let us
see, then, in what way the Marxist classics explained social phenomena. Here
is Engels' description of the mechanism of the transition, in England, from
the system of cottage industry (under which each textile worker operated
his own spinning-wheel at home) to the factory system (under which the
workers are brought together in one building):
The first invention which fundamentally changed the position of the English worker
was that of the spinning jenny, ... On the other hand some families could not afford
to buy a jenny and they had to live on the earnings of the head of the household from
weaving. So began the division of labour between spinning and weaving which has since
become more and more marked .... Meanwhile industrial change continued. Here and
there moneyed men began to assemble spinning jennies in factories and drive them by
water power. This enabled them to work with fewer spinners and to sell their yarn more
cheaply than the individual spinner who worked his machine by hand. The spinning
jenny was continually being improved, so that machines soon needed to be modified or
even replaced entirely. The capitalist who used water-power might still make a profit for
a time with relatively obsolete machinery, but this was not possible for the hand-spinner.
In these developments may be seen the genesis of the factory system (F. Engels, The
Conditions of the Working Class in England, Macmillan, New York 1958, pp. 12-14).
This passage shows the method of explanation that is pecular to the social
writings of the classics of Marxism. Here it is. Someone invents a new device
which ensures increased labour productivity and hence, ceteris paribus, offers
an opportunity for increasing the surplus product to be appropriated by its
34 CHAPTER 4
owner, but on the condition that the mode of production is reorganized
(a new division of labour, a new system of management, etc., is introduced).
The owner of that device wants to increase his surplus value, and as an
employer he can also make decisions (or order them to be made) concerning
the mode of production. By comparing the various possible systems of
organization of production applicable in a given case (those transmitted
by tradition, those worked out by experts, etc.), he chooses that one which
in his opinion will ensure, when accompanied by the use of the new device,
an increase of the surplus product. If that expected increase does not take
place and if the failure cannot be explained by the working of some addi-
tional factors, the owner will conclude that he made a mistake and will try to
reorganize production again. If he is late enough in adopting that system of
production which is the most effective of the alternatives known at the
given time (that is, the system of production which, when accompanied by
the use of the new device, results in yielding the greatest surplus value),
then he will go bankrupt. This accounts for the fact that after a sufficiently
long period following the introduction of a new device, those systems of
production are adopted which objectively ensure the greatest surplus product
in the whole of production. In other words, Engels' understanding of the
formula that productive forces (e.g., a new device) determine the relations
of production (e.g., a division of labour) is the following: out of the set of
systems of production available at a given time, that one becomes widespread
which yields the maximum new value; out of it the owners of the productive
forces appropriate their surplus value leaving the rest (the variable capital)
to the direct producers.
In a similar way the notion of determination is employed within the
theory of evolution - the natural conditions are supposed to determine
the species in the sense that they select those species which are of low adap-
tive value, and those become widespread which possess properties allowing
for the survival of the highest percentage of given populations.
Alienation of Work and the (Economistic) Class Struggle
The property of the productive forces generates the basic division of economic
society (e.g., a slave or feudal society) between those who dispose of the
productive forces, that is, make decisions concerning the goals the latter are
to achieve, and those who do not. The criterion of property is, then, a factual
not a juridical one: it reduces to the actual disposal of what is to be appro-
priated. Therefore, owners of the productive forces are simply identified as
A NON-MARXIAN THEORY 35
the disposers of them, while direct producers are the people who do not own
(in this sense) productive forces but use them yielding the new value. This
new value, achieved in the process of production, is portioned out according
to the existing system of appropriation in two parts: the surplus value (which
the owners allocate for themselves) and the variable capital (which they
leave to the direct producers).
According to the Marxian idea, the struggle of the two classes is supposed
to play the basic role in history. It is, undoubtedly, an impressive conception.
Even more so with respect to the moral content it presupposes. That is why
one should save of it as much as possible - being, moreover, in agreement
with at least the elementary facts history teaches us.
In the Marxist tradition, there are several elements which, in variom
combinations, form the models of the struggle of the antagonistic classes,
models that function in the various Marxists' conceptions. The first element
is an increase in the absolute pauperization of the direct producers, i.e., a
lowering of the variable capital falling to the direct producers. When that
process continues, the desperate masses are supposed to rise against the
owners of the means of production. Another element is an increase in the
relative pauperization of the direct producers, i.e., a progressive differentia-
tion between the level of incomes of the owners of the means of production
and that of the incomes of the exploited masses. The third element is a
growing revolutionary consciousness of the exploited masses, which makes
them fight against the oppressors. These three elements have occurred in
various combinations in the conceptions of the various Marxists. For in-
stance, in Kautsky's conception, a rising rate of exploitation under capitalism
results in a relative pauperization of the proletariat, which creates favour-
able conditions for the acceptance of that revolutionary consciousness
which is being spread by revolutionary intellectuals through the intermediary
of the social-democratic party.
Nevertheless none of those elements is a good explanation of the sources
of class antagonism. The element of the class consciousness of the direct
producers itself requires explanation by factors which used to be mentioned
in the tradition of historical materialism as more fundamental. A class for
itself differs in class consciousness from a class in itself, and yet direct pro
ducers as a class in itself also happened to fight against the owners of the
means of production. Historical data also show that a low level of living
standards rather counteracts mass movements: utter poverty atomizes in
dividuals by making each of them seek separately some means to survive at
any price, and thus prevents solidarity in social actions (J. C. Davies, 'Towards
36 CHAPTER 4
a theory of revolution,' American Sociological Review 27 (1962. It has also
turned out that the indignation of the direct producers caused by a dispropor-
tion in incomes has its limits: a sufficiently high level of incomes is enough to
make an increase in relative pauperization cease to work as a factor that
induces the direct producers to fight against the owners of the means of
production. We can exaggerate in order better to bring out the point and say
that if a direct producer has not only his chains to lose but his motorcar or
a second home as well, he is not inclined to fight against the owner of the
means of production simply because the latter has much more goods of the
same kind. He is at most inclined to use measures that would lessen the gap.
On the other hand, it is legitimate to suppose that the main cause of a
fight of the direct producers against the owners of the means of production
is to be seen in the difference between the direct producers' economic needs
and the means which the economic system provides for their satisfaction. By
analogy to the Marxian concept of the amount of socially indispensable work
we could define the concept of the socially indispensable level of (economic)
needs. It is the value of those goods which suffice to meet all the needs typi-
cal of a given category of person in a given period. That SOcially indispens-
able level of the needs of the direct producers will differ for the various
countries and for the various periods, but it is constant for a given society
in a given period. To use a simple example, the amount of calories sufficient
for the present-day British worker differs from that sufficient for the present-
day Indian worker, but within each of these two societies it is now more or
less constant. In both cases it differs, of course, from that which was suffi-
cient one hundred years ago.
That socially indispensable level of the needs of the direct producers
(briefly: their level of needs) can be expressed as a value in the Marxian
sense of the term, because so far we mean economic needs only. It is thus
comparable with such magnitudes as the variable capital (that part of the
social product which falls to the direct producers) and the surplus product
(that part of the total value of the new output which falls to the owners
of the means of production). Now the difference between the level of the
(economic) needs of the direct producers and the variable capital that falls
to them will be termed the economic alienation of the direct producers, or,
briefly, the alienation of work. This is, obviously, not any explication of the
Marxian concept of the alienation of labour; the term is used here because
the magnitude thus defined describes the measure of non-satisfaction of the
(economic) needs of the direct producers.
That the alienation of work is negative means that the level of the needs
A NON-MARXIAN THEOR Y 37
is lower than the variable capital falling to the class of direct producers. That
it equals zero means that the level of the needs of direct producers is, at a
given time, equal to the variable capital they receive (as means of subsistence,
wages, etc.). That it is positive at a given time means that the variable capital
falling at that time to the class of direct producers is lower than the level of
the (economic) needs shown at that time by the class of direct producers. As
can be seen, the alienation of work conceived in this way is a macro-economic
magnitude that characterizes the whole class of direct producers in a given
society at a given time. Its status thus resembles that of the total social pro-
duct or the total surplus product falling to the owners of means of produc-
tion. It can also be seen that the alienation of work is relativized in three
respects: to the class of direct producers in a given society at a given time. It
would be useless pedantry to repeat that triple relativization each time (the
more so as we make the idealizing assumption under which we shall consider
one society only), but it is nevertheless always assumed.
Now the intensity of the struggle of the exploited class on the economic
level (briefly: the economic class struggle) depends in a decisive degree upon
the level of the alienation of work. By economic class struggle we mean all
those actions on the part of direct producers which result in abstention
from work under given ownership relations. The form of economic struggle
of the exploited class that consists in the refusal to engage in productive
work under given ownership relations includes strikes, desertions, rebellions,
etc. The intensity of the economic struggle waged by the direct producers
is defmed by the frequency and duration of that separation of manpower
from the means of productions under existing ownership relations. That
intensity is thus not measured by the violence of the measures used: this
is why mass desertion of serfs to a free territory may mean a greater inten-
sity of class struggle than short clashes on barricades, after which everything
comes back to normal.
Thus the intensity of the struggle between the class of direct producers and
the class of the owners of the means of production depends upon the level of
the alienation of work in a given society at a given time. Obviously, the level of
the alienation of work is not the only factor that affects the economic struggle
between the oppressed and the oppressors. Another important factor is, for
instance, the rapidity with which the alienation of work increases. Neverthe-
less in this place, only the level of the alienation of work will be analysed
since it is the main factor of the intensity of economic class struggle.
It is reasonable to suppose that the relationship between the intensity
of the economic struggle waged by the direct producers and their economic
38 CHAPTER 4
alienation is not a simple monotonic relationship of the following type: the
greater the alienation of work the greater the intensity of the economic
struggle waged by the direct producers against the owners of the means
of production. This is because there is such a value of the alienation of
work for which the difference between the level of the needs of the direct
producers and their share in the variable capital is so small that it does not
induce the exploited people to engage, on a major scale, in an economic
struggle with the owners of the means of production. If the economic needs
of the direct producers are largely satisfied, they do not risk mass actions
against the prevailing ownership relations, but rather seek means of reducing
the distance between the level of their needs and the means they obtain for
the satisfaction of their needs under those relations. For instance, they may
increase the productivity of their work if that is remunerated by increased
income; they may threaten with strikes, negotiate with the owner of the
means of production, and the like. Thus, the intensity of the economic
struggle against the owners of the means of production falls rapidly if the
value of the alienation of work remains below a certain level which we
shall term the threshold of class peace. On the other hand, there may be
such a small value of variable capital that the difference between that capital
and the level of the needs of the direct producers is so great that it also does
not induce the oppressed people to engage, on a major scale, in an economic
struggle against the owners of the means of production. People who live in
utter poverty are not inclined to fight for an improvement of their condition.
That value of the alienation of work above which the intensity of the class
struggle against the owners of means of production falls rapidly shall be
termed the threshold of declassation of direct producers. Finally, it seems
doubtful whether there is any single value of the alienation of work for
which there is an 'optimum' of the class struggle against the owners of the
means of production. It seems more reasonable to assume that there is an
area of the values of that magnitude, obviously contained between the
threshold of class peace and the threshold of declassation, for which the
intensity of the struggle waged by the oppressed people is approximately
the same and at the same time greater than for the values of the alienation
of work outside that area.
On the whole it may be supposed that the curve which shows the depen-
dence of the intensity of economic class struggles upon the alienation of
work is flattened and falls down steeply at both ends after passing certain
values of the latter magnitude, constant for a given society and for a given
period. Diagrammatically this could be shown as in Figure 1.
n t ~ n s l t y
of class
strugglt
at the
economic
level
A NON-MARXIAN THEORY
Threshold
of class
peact
Interval of
rcvolutlonlzmg
alienatIOn
Fig. 1.
Threshold of
dcclassotlon
39
Of course, the hypothesis outlined above concerning the form of the
relationship between the level of the alienation of work and the intensity
of the direct producers' fight against the owners of the means of production
is strictly theoretical in two senses of the word. First, it is based on many
idealizing assumptions (society treated in isolation, constant population,
constant increment of the alienation of work, etc.) which would have to be
removed so that the hypothesis could be concretized (see below).
Second, the terms in which that hypothesis has been formulated are
theoretical terms for which the appropriate operationalizations would have
to be found. By operationalizing that hypothesis we could approximate it
for certain classical periods and societies in order to check empirically whe-
ther the said curve is really flattened and falls down steeply at both ends
beyond certain critical points. If the result is positive, we can then approxi-
mate concretizations of that hypothesis in order to find out whether the
necessary corrections are in order, etc. All this obviously requires research
of an empirical kind different from what I am able to do here.
It is obvious that these assumptions concerning the class struggle are
based on rather sketchy and imcomplete data. However, they are at any
rate more exact and more complete than those which are recalled by the
orthodox Marxist to support his "theory of revolution". For the latter is
mainly based on data from one century before and on the tough decision
to ignore all of what happened later.
Idealizing Assumptions of the Theory of Socio-Economic Formation
According to the principles of Marxian methodology discussed in Section A,
the non-Marxian theory of socio-economic formation must also be of an
idealizational nature. That is why the enlisting of some more important
40
CHAPTER 4
idealizing conditions is necessary: one has to know what is abstracted from
in order to know with which respects the ideal image of the movement of
socio-economic formation differs from the chaos usually called social reality.
By enlisting simplifying assumptions for our proposal of the theory the
possible ways of its concretization are shown.
The first of the assumptions is that of the polemical nature of what may
be found in Marxian writings. It is assumed here that the level of productive
forces is constant. It follows from this that in the society under considerat-
ion there are no advances in technology. The adoption of the assumption
that the level of productive forces is constant is indispensable in the theory
of economic society, be it alone for the fact that the historically earliest
form of that society, namely the slave-labour formation, satisfies the condit-
ion almost exactly. Within that formation there were almost no advances in
technology. And since that formation continued and, more important still,
was transformed into the feudal formation, it appears that - contrary to the
opinion common among the adherents of Marxist theory - development of
the productive forces is not necessary for defining the conditions under
which a socio-economic formation functions and changes. It is necessary
to assume that in every period the direct producers use some instruments
to produce things, for without that production would be impossible. The
assumption that those instruments change is not only not necessary, but
is even detrimental from the cognitive point of view, as it eliminates at once
from our considerations the properties of the slavery and of the transition
from slavery to feudalism. It is therefore not a coincidence that theorists
of historical materialism show little interest in the slave-labour formation:
all the examples used to illustrate general statements are drawn from the two
later formations. In a word, we have to make a distinction between the two
factors: the level of productive forces and the increment of productive forces.
It is claimed here that only the former is essential for social phenomena,
while the latter plays a secondary role.
The second simplification made here consists in the assumption that
the number of branches of production does not increase in the society under
consideration. The term branch ofproduction is used in its common meaning;
in that sense, agriculture and handicrafts are two different branches of pro-
duction. If we looked for theoretical foundations of the concept of a branch
of production in the Marxist tradition, we could perhaps identify that con-
cept with a sphere of the division of (productive) labour. I The issue will,
however, not be discussed here. Note only that from the fact that in a given
society there are, for instance, two branches of production it does not follow
A NON-MARXIAN THEORY 41
that in that society there are two types of ownership relations. The second
simplification adopted here is thus the assumption that in the society under
consideration the number of branches of production does not increase.
This assumption, too, was satisfied literally by a society based on slave
labour: in that society there were the branches of agriculture and handi-
crafts, but no new branch of production developed. Toward the end of the
Roman Empire its economy was undergoing a rapid naturalization, and class-
ical feudalism came to lack handicrafts as a separate branch of production:
the indispensable instruments of production, furniture, etc., were produced
in self-supporting rural centres. As is commonly known, this resulted in a
decline of towns and trade. But beginning with the 10th or the 11th century
handicrafts began to revive as a separate branch of production. Feudalism
thus does not meet the condition in question. We see again that the discuss-
ion of the functioning and motion of socio-economic formations without
the adoption of this condition leaves the characteristics of the slave-labour
formation aside, and hence cannot give a complete picture of the structure
and development of economic society.
There is also one simplification more, which does not require comments:
the accumulation fund equals zero.
The next two assumptions will disregard the issues of power and ideology
in the development of the economic society. Besides, a pure two-class struc-
ture of the economic society, consisting of two antagonistic classes, is accord-
ingly assumed. The owners are those who have the means of production at
their actual disposal; owing to that fact they appropriate the surplus product.
The direct producers are those who do not have the means of production at
their disposal although they use those means in their work when producing
the surplus product for the owners. It is assumed that the society under
consideration consists only of these two classes. And the conditions referring
to the disregard of the impact of politics and ideology upon economics
should be formulated thus: there is no state apparatus in the given society;
there is no organization of the disposers of the means of production of con-
sciousness in the given society.
These assumptions, being idealising ones, are excluded by the well known
theses of historical materialism (in the same way as the assumption that dis-
regards external action upon a physical system is excluded by the law of
gravitation) and this is why they have the status of simplifications. When we
remove those assumptions we obtain further models of the functioning and
motion of socio-economic formations, models which take into account both
the peculiarities and the impact of politics (the sphere of ideology) upon
42 CHAPTER 4
economics. It is also assumed that the society under consideration is fully
isolated from other societies, that ownership relations take on only one form,
that the size of the population is constant, etc.
So, the list of some more important idealizing conditions adopted here is
the following:
(A) the society S is composed of two classes only - the owners of the
productive forces and the direct producers;
(B) the society S is isolated from all other societies;
(C) there is no organization of the disposers of the means of repression
(state) in society S;
(D) there is no organization of the disposers of the means of production
of consciousness in society S;
(E) the level of productive forces in S is constant;
(F) the number of branches of production in society S does not in-
crease;
(G) the accumulation fund in society S is equal to zero.
The Balance Condition for the Economic Society
Societies of the considered type, that is, economic societies (e.g., slave or
feudal societies) are constituted in their internal structure by the ownership
relations of the productive forces. The disposal of productive forces is what
ensures that some people have the privileged position in a society of the
economic type, that is, gives them the opportunity to exploit others. The
ownership relations are defined by some social facts - namely, by who has
at his actual disposal such and such elements of the production process.
Hence, the system of ownership relations under which the direct producer
is owned by his lord is a different one than the system under which he is not
the subject of property and takes on lease a parcel of the land of his lord.
The socio-economic formation is a class of economic societies characterized
by the same system of ownership relations.
To define the balance condition for the economic society it is necessary
to find a condition of reproduction within the given system of ownership
relations. If the process of production did not take place, the society would
decompose into isolated small groups of people looking for the means of
subsistence. If the ownership relations change, the society of the given type
transforms itself into a society of another type, that is, a change of socio-
economic formation follows.
The process of production consists in combining manpower with the
A NON-MARXIAN THEORY 43
means of production within the framework of the given ownership relations.
If it results in a lowering of the level of the variable capital falling to the
direct producers below the level of satisfaction of their economic needs,
then they refuse to work. The form of this phenomenon - desertions, rebel-
lions, strikes, etc. - is less important. The important fact is that in such a
situation the combination of manpower with the means of production under
given ownership relations does not hold any more. Then, if the global variable
capital turns out to be "too low". the process of production will not be re-
created.
On the basis of our previous analysis one may define what "too low"
means within this context. It means that the variable capital falling to the
class of the direct producers is such that the difference between the level of
the material needs of the direct producers and this capital itself (that is, the
alienation of work) belongs to the interval of revolutionary alienation. The
interval of values of the variable capital under which the alienation of work
(in a given society and time) belongs to the interval of revolutionary alie-
nation can be termed the interval of the activating pauperisation. Therefore,
for the process of reproduction to be held it is that the global
variable capital does not belong to the interval of the activating pauperisation.
The variable capital falling to the class of direct producers is not the only
parameter the possibility of reproduction depends upon. The other para-
meter of the kind can be identified rather easily - it is the surplus value. If
it will be "too low", then the owners of the productives forces will change
the existing relations of ownership to interest the direct producers in the
results of their work, expecting that this will allow them to increase their
part in the greater new value. The interval of the values of the global surplus
value under which the majority of owners change their relation of owner-
ship will be termed the interval of the revision of the existing relations of
ownership. As a result of these activities of owners, the socio-economic for-
mation changes. Therefore, for the process of reproduction to be held it is
necessary that the global surplus value falling to the owners does not belong
to the interval of revision of the existing ownership relations.
Let us notice that in the case where the value of the variable capital is
"extremely low", so that the alienation of work falls below the threshold of
declassation, then the direct producers admittedly will not stop working but
the productivity of their work will be extremely low as well; beggars are
very bad workers. Let us call the interval of values of the variable capital
under which the alienation of work falls below the threshold of declassation,
the interval of atomizing pauperisation. Now, one may say that when the
44 CHAPTER 4
variable capital is so low that it belongs to the interval of atomizing pau-
perisation, the direct producers create very low new value, and also the part
of it falling to the owners (the surplus value) turns out to be lower and lower
in the subsequent cycles of reproduction. And, as a result, the owners will
be forced to change the relations of ownership in order to interest the direct
producers in the effectiveness of the production.
Summing up all the considerations one may formulate the following
balance condition for the economic society:
the process of production in the economic society is to give the
global variable capital a high enough value not to belong to the
interval of the activizing pauperisation (nor, the more so, to the
interval of atomizing pauperisation), and it is to yield a global
surplus value high enough not to belong to the interval of the
revision of the existing relations of ownership.
So, according to this condition it is to be so that the variable capital is high
enough (and, as a result, the direct producers still combine their manpower
with the means of production) and the surplus value is high enough (and, as
a result, the owners retain their relations with the direct producers) as well.
Therefore, a society that satisfies the balance condition is at least con-
ceptually possible. And the problem Marx did not notice may be expressed
in the question of the form: whether this conceptually possible society
which gives "enough" to both of its antagonist classes is historically possible?
In other words, whether both the antagonist classes are able to learn to
satisfy the balance condition by trials and errors? And when, if at all, this
turns out to be necessary?
Questions and Expectations. A Digression Concerning the Status of Valua-
tions in the Social Sciences
One can easily guess why Marx did not undertake considerations of this kind.
It would be impossible for him to imagine a worse form of society than that
in which he lived: capitalism as it was then. Hence he had even considered
the possibility of the persistence of such a society - it was precisely what was
to be revolutionarily rejected. A today's Marxist may with the greatest of
ease point to a society which is morally much worse than 19th century's
capitalism- it is the society which covers its real, hidden nature with the aid
of Marx's doctrine. That is why, a today's Marxist is able at least to pose the
question whether capitalist society can assure the persistence of itself. For
he knows. thanks to Marx. that the capitalist society is still based on exploi-
A NON-MARXIAN THEORY 45
tation. But he knows also what had not been known to Marx: that there are
societies which are based both on exploitation, violence and intellectual
coercion.
This intervention of evaluations into the course of the exposition preten-
ding to be a scientific one can put some readers on guard. That is why it
seems to be useful to make here some digression concerning the status of
evaluations in the social sciences.
The classical concepts of value-judgements in the social sciences have
established the alternative: no value-judgements may be theorems of social
sciences versus value-judgements may be the theorems of social sciences,
as they are based on some peculiar type of experience unknown to natural
science. The first thesis that of positivist descriptivism gives the foundation
for the well-known directive according to which everybody who plays the
social role of a scientist should refrain from evaluating what is the subject of
his discovery. The opposition against this conception which arose among the
antinaturalist philosophy of the humanities led to the following argumentat-
ion: if value-judgements are not based on regular experience (extraspection
or introspection) known e.g. in natural sciences, then one must not rule them
out as illegitimate; instead, it is quite natural to demonstrate that they are
based on a quite different type of experience, and that the latter is precisely
applied in the humanities. Therefore, the thesis ofaxiologism had been
opposed to that of positivist descriptivism: namely, that value-judgements
as based on axiological experience are admissible in social sciences.
The popularity of the two views in the methodology of the social sciences
made for a strong conviction that they are mutually excluding and comple-
menting each other. Therefore, whoever does not support one of them,
must be for the other. The course of reasoning according to which whoever
does not refrain from evaluations adopts an unscientific attitude has been
particularly obstinate in the numerous criticisms of Marxian theory. For
instance, J. Robinson in her well-known criticism of the theory of value
maintains that its role differs a great deal from the role other theories play
in the Marxian economy. It has no cognitive aim, being important for Marx
just "because of its suggestive force":
Both the Marxian way of treating profit as the 'unpaid labour', and the whole apparatus
of constant and variable capital and exploitation rate obstinately keep in front of the
reader's mind an image of capitalist process as a system of rubber sucking the labourer's
life. Marxian terminology draws its force from the moral indignation it is permeated
with (1. Robinson, Studies on Marxian Economy (after the Polish translation), Warsaw
1960, p. 32).
46 CHAPTER 4
But from the cognitive point of view "no important single point in Marx's
theory depends on accepting the theory of value based on labour" (ibid.,
p.32).
This can be interpreted as the charge ofaxiologism - Marx is supposed to
have accepted the theory of value not because he had justified it, but simply
because it allowed him to make a negative value-judgement of capitalism:
that each capitalist society is based on exploitation. This is why in fact "the
theory of value based on labour is a magical spell" (ibid., p. 33), not a scien-
tific explanation of the capitalist economy.
In fact, the basic theorems of the theory of value are of the evaluative
character. This concerns first of all the law of surplus value. Marx undoub-
tedly disapproved of the appropriation of the surplus value by the capitalist
and the statement stating this very fact was actually a negative value-judge-
ment for him. But it does not follow from this that the law of value is not a
statement saying something about reality; similarly, the statement "X is a
brave man" is both a sentence stating a kind of fact and a (positive) value-
judgement. It could be, and it is even likely to be, that Marx invented the
law of surplus value since he hated capitalist exploitation so much. But
this has nothing to do with the semantic nature of the statement "Each
capitalist takes his profit out of an unpaid worker's labour" nor with the way
the statement could be justified. It could be that a value-judgement is
wrongly justified, or even is not justified at all, but it need not be so; the
same holds. however, for non-evaluative statements.
The law of surplus value is both a proposition stating a certain regularity
of the capitalist mode of production and an evaluation disapproving this
very fact. However, Marx justified it in the same way as he justfied other
statements of his economic theory ~ he deduced the statement from more
general statements (from the theory of historical materialism enriched with
the assumption of the rationality of capitalists etc. - see L. Nowak, 'The
assumption of rationality in the Marxist and in Marx's theory', Ruch Prawn-
iczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny 4 (I 972), in Polish); he also - after
concretizations . empirically tested the whole body of theoretical statements.
It becomes clear that Marx assumed the third view concerning the status
of evaluative statements in the social sciences, incompatible both with posi-
tivist descriptivism and with axiologism. The view in question allows eval-
uative judgements to be components of a scientific theory but denies any
kind of special justification for them - they are to be treated as non-evalua-
tive components of it. This view was explicity stated by Engels when he
wrote:
A NON-MARXIAN THEORY 47
Scientifically, ... the appeal to morality and law does not move us forward even one
step: in moral indignation, even in the most justified case, the science of economics
cannot see any proof, just a symptom (F. Engels, Anti-Diihring, Polish translation,
Warsaw 1949, p. 147).
Both theses are assumed here. First, that value-judgments are admissible
in a scientific theory as non-evaluative statements are. And second, that
they must, however, be justified in the same way as the non-evaluative com-
ponents of the theory. This view may be called the thesis of anti-positivist
descriptivism.
It seems to me that the anti-positivist descriptivism which may be found
in the methodology of the Marxist classics (for more about it see my 'Evalua-
tion and cognition', Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the
Humanities 2, No. I (1976), and 'Value, idealization, valuation', Quality and
Quantity 7 (I974)) is quite a good reconstruction of the actual practice in
the social sciences. If so - which I may here only assume - then this view
seems to be an appropriate point of departure for our considerations as well.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC FORMATION:
THE INITIAL MODEL
Determination of the Relations of Production by Productive Forces and the
(Economic) Qass Struggle
Under the notion of the relations of production within the Marxist tradition
two different types of social relations are meant: the relations of the organi-
zation of labour and ownership relations. They differ not only "concep-
tually" - by definition -- but also "nomologically" playing quite a different
role in the determination of social phenomena.
Relations of the organization of labour (in short, organizational relations)
adapt themselves to the level gained in a given time by the productive forces
- in this sense that out of the set of systems of the relations of the kind,
that one spreads which allows for the highest new value, on the condition
that given productive forces will be employed. Instead, the way the' newly
produced value will be divided into the surplus value (for the owners) and
the variable capital (for the direct producers) depends not upon the pro-
ductive forces but on the existing ownership relations. It will also be divided
on the level of the needs of the direct producers: the owners dividing the
new value and aiming at gaining the highest proportion for themselves take
into account, however, the expected reaction of the direct producers. That
48
CHAPTER 4
is why, that system of appropriation spreads which maximizes the surplus
value, but under the given relationships of the direct producers and the
owners.
Marx's law of the determination of the relations of production by the
productive forces will be interpreted in the following manner:
(E 1.1) out of the set of historically available systems of production
(systems of relations of the organization of labour) that one
becomes widespread which - under the given level of the produc-
tive force attained in a given society - yields the greatest newly
produced value.
This law can be explained on account of the fact that owners intending to
gain as much as possible have their interest in the largest new production -
the greater is the new value, the more they can appropriate; that is why they
adapted organizational realisations to the applied technology; those of them
who are late in doing so are gradually eliminated out of the set of owners; as
a result, after some time the set of owners comprises those and only those
who have organized their production in the most effective way, that is, who
have applied an organizational system which yields the maximum production
in their enterprises - given the technology employed; summing it up, such
an organization system becomes widespread which maximizes the global new
value under the given level of productive forces.
The other statement speaks about the adaptation of the systems of appro-
priation to the existing ownership relations on the one hand and to the level
of the alienation of work on the other:
(E 1.2) out of the set of historically available systems of appropriation
that one becomes widespread which - under the existing owner-
ship relations and a given level of the needs of the direct pro-
ducers - yields the highest surplus product for the class of
owners of the productive forces.
This statement describes the process of adaptation of systems of appro-
priation to the state of inter-class relations. The set of those systems of
appropriation which in a given time are employed by the various owners is,
namely, given, Hence, at the initial moment different owners divide the
values newly produced by their direct producers in different ways; there are,
then, different individual surplus values and different individual variable
capitals. If some of them appropriate from the newly produced value such a
large part that this fact induces their direct producers to abandon work,
A NON-MARXIAN THEORY 49
and thus results in disturbing the process of production, then such owners
of means of production obtain, in the next production cycles, a smaller
income than do these who used a milder system of appropriation. On the
other hand, these owners of means of production who, for some reasons (a
wrong assessment of the direct producers' ability to resist, etc.), allot the
direct producers a fairly large variable capital, obtain themselves, in the next
production cycle, a smaller income than do those owners of means of produc-
tion who use a mere rigorous system of appropriation.
We can thus single out three groups of owners of means of production:
those who divided the newly produced value so that they obtained, in a given
production cycle, most but had to pay for that with a marked decline of
their incomes in the next cycle; these who divided the newly produced value
so that they obtained an average income, but will continue to obtain that
average income in the next cycle, too; and these who divided that value so
that they obtained the least individual surplus product. Now, beginning with
the second production cycle, the owners of means of production in the
first group will increase variable capital, while those in the third group will
decrease it. The individual surplus product in the whole class of owners of
means of production will become roughly the same (we disregard here the
individual differences in the productive property, in managerial abilities,
etc.). After a certain time those who permanently obtain the average income
will come to form the largest group. Thus the largest total surplus product
for the whole class of owners of means of production will be established
- and this is what (E 1.2) says.
Note that the reasoning outlined above is a fortiori applicable to those
cases in which a given owner of means of production divides the value newly
produced in his production unit so that the difference between the fixed
level of the needs of his direct producers and the variable capital allotted
to them is either below the threshold of class peace or above the threshold
of declassation, respectively. In the former case he would obtain an income
much smaller than others would, and he would accordingly try to increase
it at the cost of his direct producers. In the latter case he would at first obtain
an income much larger than others would, and his direct producers, reduced
to utter poverty, would be unable to rebel, but their productivity would be
so low that in the next production cycle the income of such an owner of
means of production would fall much below the average.
Now, while (E I .1) could be taken as a reconstruction of the law of deter-
mination of the relations of (organization of) production by productive
forces, (E1.2) could be termed the law of (economic) struggle between
so
CHAPTER 4
antagonistic classes. For -- on the assumption that the level of the needs of
direct producers is constant - maximization of the total surplus product
results in minimization of total variable capital, which leads to an increased
alienation of work. And, as is known, the intensity of the (economic) struggle
of the direct producers against the owners of means of production is in direct
proportion to the level of the alienation of work.
The Basic Cycle of Socio-Economic Formation
Let us consider now, by making reference to (ELl) and (El.2), how a socio-
economic formation develops. We, of course, adopt the assumptions (A)-
(G) (see p. 42) as well as some other simplifying assumptions mentioned
above: that the society under consideration is taken in isolation, that its
population is constant, etc.
Suppose that in the initial period the mechanism defined by (E 1.1) and
(E1.2) results in a level of global surplus product being fixed such that the
difference between the level of the needs of the direct producers and the
variable capital allotted to them - i.e., the alienation of work - is lower than
that level of the alienation of work which is accompanied by revolutionary
movements en masse. In other words, we assume that in the initial period the
operation of these two formulas keeps the value of the alienation of work
below the threshold of revolutionizing alienation. In that period, on the one
hand, there is -- on the strength of (ELl) - a growth of the live product
(the newly produced value) due to advances in organization, until that system
eventually becomes the most common which is objectively the most effective
for a given level of productive forces. On the other hand - on the strength
of (E 1.2) - there is a constant reduction of the share of variable capital in
the newly produced value, because the part of the surplus product that falls
to the owners of the means of production increases. This occurs because
some owners in their striving to increase their incomes change the system
of appropriation to the detriment of their direct producers. If they do not
meet with resistance on the part of the latter (whose individual variable
capital decreases but the value of the alienation of work still does not reach
for them the threshold of revolutionary disturbances), they obtain higher
incomes_ And other owners of means of production follow in their wake.
This process fixes a new average surplus product, higher than the former
one. This process continues until the difference between the level of the
needs of the direct producers and their global variable capital reaches the
value of revolutionizing alienation. This concludes the first phase of the
A NON-MARXIAN THEORY 51
development of a socio-economic formation, which will be termed the phase
of an increasing alienation of work.
The development of economic relations (other relations are disregarded
on the strength of the idealizing conditions) in the phase of an increasing
alienation of work can be described by the following thesis:
(1.1) if S is an economic society in which the conditions (A)-(G) are
satisfied, then in the successive periods of time out of the set of
historically given systems of production those become common
in S which - under a given level of productive forces - yield a
non-decreasing newly produced value, while in those periods out
of the set of historically given systems of appropriation those
become common in S which - under the respective levels of the
needs of the direct producers and for a given type of ownership
relations existing in those periods - yield an ever increasing
surplus product for the class of owners of the productive forces.
If in successive periods the level of the needs of the direct producers does
not become lower, then the global surplus product increases, whereby the
total variable capital decreases, so that the alienation of work increases. In
accordance with the theoretical assumptions formulated in the preceding
section, increased alienation of work brings about greater intensity in the
economic struggle between the direct producers and the owners of the
means of production. I f the total surplus product increases monotonically
in the successive periods. the level of the alienation of work in some period
or other rises above the threshold of revolutionizing alienation and class
struggle develops on a mass scale. All this, however, is based on the assump-
tion that the level of the (economic) needs of the direct producers does not
f a l ~ The question arises whether class struggle on a mass scale must develop
also if the level of the needs of the direct producers falls. It seems that the
answer must be in the affirmative. If we have to do with an occasional fall,
then the threshold of revolutionizing alienation is reached just one period
later. This is so because in a given period the increase of the surplus product
at the cost of variable capital does not increase the alienation of work enough
to make the class of direct producers rise en masse: this is due to the fact
that since their needs decrease (following, say, a general 'civilizational regres-
sion' of society at large) they are able to stand more. But then the new
level of their needs is fixed. or at least ceases to fall, and the mechanism
described above continues to work: there is an increase in the surplus product,
52
CHAPTER 4
a decrease in variable capital, and, accordingly, increased alienation in succes-
sive periods. The threshold of revolutionizing alienation is exceeded one
period later than would be the case if the level of the needs were fIxed.
When the level of the needs of the direct producers reveals a trend to fall
to a certain constant value (and is not just occasional) there may even be
- depending on the rate of that fall - a decrease in the alienation of work,
but after some time the rate of growth of the surplus product begins to
exceed the rate of the fall of the level of needs, and the alienation curve
begins to rise more and more steeply. After a certain number of periods
the threshold of revolutionizing alienation is exceeded again. And it may
be assumed that other downward trends than those which tend toward
a certain fixed level of needs, and a level above the threshold of reproduc-
tion of manpower of the direct producers, probably are not encountered
empirically.
Thus, under the assumptions made above, it follows from (Ll) that
in the society under consideration there is a rise in the alienation of work
until the threshold of revolutionizing alienation is reached. At most the
process can be shifted in time relative to that curve of growth of the alien-
ation of work which reflects a fixed level of the needs of the direct pro-
ducers. The process may be accelerated if the direct producers' needs
increase, or slowed down if there is a decline in the level of the needs of
the direct producers. In other words, it follows from (Ll), under all the
assumptions made, that the phase of revolutionary disturbances is inevitable
in the development of socio-economic formation. Although the struggle
waged by the direct producers takes place all the time with varying intensity,
it becomes a mass phenomenon once the threshold of revolutionizing
alienation is exceeded. Note that in connection with the function of the
state the struggle usually becomes an armed one, but this is due not to
its economic nature, but to certain additional circumstances. The economic
nature of revolutionary disturbances is such that slaves en masse desert
the large estates, peasants snatch the lands of feudal lords, and workers
go on strike or take over factories. It is only the armed resistance by the
state, which stands guard over the prevailing ownership relations and does
not permit a separation of manpower from the means of production, which
turns the economic struggle waged by the direct producers into a rebellion
of slaves, into peasants' wars, or clashes on barricades. Since in Model I we
disregard the role of the state (as 'the apparatus of coercion'), in the period
of revolutionary disturbances the economic struggle has a great intensity
but does not take on the form of an armed conflict on a mass scale. An
A NON-MARXIAN THEORY 53
armed upnsmg is thus a derivative, and not the fundamental, form of
revolutionary struggle.
Revolutionary disturbances in the economic life result in a complete
disorganization of production. Society then has to choose between 'anni-
hilation of the classes in conflict' (in practice, this means that society,
weakened in this way, falls a victim to conquests - which we disregard under
the assumption of the uniqueness of the society in question) or a change
in the prevailing ownership relations. If society is to survive it must tranform
its structure of ownership.
Now the phase of revolutionary disturbances can be described as follows:
(1.2) If S is an economic society and (A)-(G) hold, then after a certain
time m the alienation of work reaches the threshold of revolu-
tionizing alienation, and the direct producers en masse undertake
an economic struggle with the owners of productive forces, which
struggle brings about a disorganization of production; S then
becomes disintegrated or undergoes changes which lower the
level of the alienation of work below the threshold of revolu-
tionizing alienation.
These changes which weaken the economic struggle of the masses must
take place or else society disintegrates (e.g., regresses in its historical devel-
opment). Under the assumptions made, those changes cannot consist in a
suppression of the disturbances by an armed force, because the state does
not exist as a separate apparatus of coercion. The changes must, on the
contrary, consist in a modification of ownership relations. For suppose that
the previously existing ownership relations are maintained while a sudden
fall in the level of the needs of the direct producers brings the alienation
of work below the threshold of revolutionizing alienation. But then the
mechanism described by (1.1) begins to work again, and sooner or later the
level of the alienation of work rises and society enters anew the phase of
revolutionary disturbances. The only possibility of reducing the alienation of
work permanently - and that possibility, as is shown by the history of all
classical socio-economic formations, has usually turned into reality - consists
in modifying the ownership relations so as to induce the direct producers
to increase work productivity, usually by making them more interested in the
results of their work. If this occurs, then the surplus product can be kept at
more or less the same level as before, and the increase in the variable capital
falling to the direct producers is obtained not at the cost of the owners of
means of production, but from an increased newly created value produced
S4
CHAPTER 4
by the direct producers. The exploited people must thus themselves pay for
the social peace of the owners of the means of production.
In this way some owners of productive forces learn from the phase of
revolutionary disturbances that it is necessary so to change the ownership
relations that link them to the direct producers as to increase the work
productivity of the latter. If they do so they can keep or even raise the
level of their respective incomes while their direct producers also have their
incomes increased. This can consist, for instance, in liberating a slave (Le.,
in abandoning the appropriation of the person of the direct producer), in
replacing a slave, who is not in any way interested in increasing his work
productivity by a settler who merely has to pay a fIxed rent, etc. In this
way, in a given society there emerges a new class system, based on new
ownership relations. Those of the old owners of the means of production
who in their estates change the ownership relations become thereby owners
of means of production in the new sense. Within that new society there thus
emerge two pairs of antagonistic classes, the traditional and the progressive,
based on two types of ownership relations, the traditional and the progres-
sive. The difference between these two types of ownership relations consists
in the fact that the progressive ones induce the direct producers to be more
interested in the results of their work and its higher productivity. We accord-
ingly speak about the traditional owners of the means of production (direct
producers) and the progressive owners of the means of production (direct
producers), and also about the traditional and the progressive surplus product
(e.g., the income of a slave owner versus the rent of a feudal lord), etc.
Since progressive direct producers obtain a higher productivity from their
work, and since the progressive owners of the means of production allow,
without incurring any loss, an increase in the variable capital that falls to the
direct producers, the alienation of progressive direct producers decreases
rapidly. In the initial period, social peace prevails within the progressive
system of economy; the level of the alienation of work within that system
does not exceed the threshold of class peace. This need not mean any radical
rise in living standards within the new system. The alienation of work usually
falls below the threshold of class peace in the initial period of the progressive
stage of ownership relations as a result of a joint action of two factors: the
level of the needs of the direct producers falls after the revolutionary move-
ments and the resulting disturbances in the economy, while the variable
capital that becomes their share under the new system of ownership relations
increases. But when the new ownership relations become fIxed the relation-
ships described by (El.1) and (E1.2) begin to operate: within the progressive
A NON-MARXIAN THEORY 55
economic system there is an increase of the newly produced value, while the
surplus product rises constantly, which ultimately brings about a stronger
alienation of work.
The traditional system of economy also moves below the threshold of
revolutionizing alienation because the level of the needs of the direct pro-
ducers falls as a result of a general economic weakening of the country
after a long period of revolutionary disturbances. Hence the traditional
owners of means of production can prosper, too. Nevertheless the very
fact of the emergence and existence of a progressive economic system that
ensures a higher degree of liberation of the direct producers and causes, at
first, a marked decrease of the alienation of work, brings about a rise in
the level of the needs of the traditional direct producers. We accordingly
witness a new rise in the alienation of work within the traditional system of
economy, which the traditional owners of the means of production can
reduce in one way only (note that in Model I we disregard the economic
role of the state), namely by increasing the variable capital at the cost of the
surplus product, i.e., by dividing the newly produced value in a manner
more advantageous for the direct producers. This, however, results in a
reduction of the traditional surplus product. Hence keeping the alienation
of work in the traditional system at the subliminal level results in a lowering
of the incomes of the traditional owners of the means of production, for
whom the traditional system becomes less and less profitable. This is why
more and more owners of the means of production abandon the traditional
ownership relations and establish new ones, which makes the progressive
type of ownership relations expand. When the process of transformation of
the traditional owners of the means of production into progressive owners
takes on a mass scale we have to do with the transition from one formation
to another. Of course, pointing to the moment of transition would mean
adopting an arbitrary criterion: the process of tradition is an evolutionary
one. The new ownership relations - within Model I - take shape gradually;
the same applies to the emergence of the new scale-economic formation
from the old one; hence it is not possible to pinpoint, by economic criteria,
the moment at which the transition from one formation to another takes
place: that transition is evolutionary.
The third phase in the development of a socio-economic formation is
the phase of evolution in ownership relations, described by the following
thesis:
(1.3) if S is an economic society and (A)-(G) hold, then, after a
56
CHAPTER 4
period of revolutionary disturbances, next to the traditional
system of ownership relations there emerges a progressive system
of such relations and henceforth
(a) in the successive periods out of the set of historically given
systems of production those become widespread in the tradi-
tional domain of economy of S which - under a given level of
productive forces - yield a newly produced value not greater
than before, and in those periods out of the set of historically
given systems of appropriation those become common in the
traditional domain of economy of S which - under the then
rising level of the needs of the traditional direct producers and
for the traditional type of ownership relations - yield a de-
creasing surplus product for the traditional owners of means
of production;
(b) in the successive periods, out of the set of historically given
systems of production those become common in the progres-
sive domain of economy of S which - under a given level of
productive forces - yield a newly produced value not smaller
than before; and in these periods out of the set of historically
given systems of appropriation those become common in the
progressive domain of economy of S which - under the then
existing levels of the needs of the progressive direct producers
and for a given progressive type of ownership relations - yield
an increasing surplus product for the progressive owners of
means of production.
This thesis also describes the transition from one socio-economic forma-
tion (defined by the dominance of that type of ownership relations which
is termed traditional) to another (defined by the dominance of that type
of ownership relations which is termed progressive). This is so because the
continuation of the process described under (Ua) results in a gradual dis-
appearance of the traditional ownership relations, while the continuation
of the process described under (Ub) results in a gradual growth in economic
importance of the progressive ownership relations. When the progressive
relations come to prevail, that is, when the total product turned out by
society predominantly depends upon production regulated by those relations,
we have to do with a new socio-economic formation. The still existing tradi-
tional ownership relations form merely a residuum of the old formation.
Transition to a new socia-economic formation is evolutionary, and not by
A NON-MARXIAN THEORY 57
jumps. It is only transition from one political system to another which can,
but need not, take place by jumps. This is not taken into account in the
case of Model I because, under the idealizing assumption (C) the role of
the state is disregarded. The said assumption has been made because it is
the type of ownership relation, and not the type of apparatus of coercion,
which identifies a given socio-economic formation.
In accordance with Model I, described above, which reveals, it is claimed,
the essential features of the functioning and motion of socio-economic
formations, the history of a given formation has then three phases: the phase
of increased alienation of work, the phase of revolutionary disturbances,
and the phase of evolution of ownership relations. This can be illustrated by
Figure 2.
ALIENATION
OF WORK
/
/
/
L------------t- r - I I
Phase of Increasmg P h a ~ t of Phase of evolution
alienation of work revolutionary In ownership relations
disturbances
Fig. 2. -- = Alienation of the direction producers appropriate for a given socio-
economic formation. - - - = Alienation of those direct producers which are a marginal
type into a given formation (either residual - in the new formation marked by II, or
anticipatory -- still within a given formation).
The Critique of the Marxian Theory of Socio-Economic Formation
In the following passage:
At a definite level of their development the material productive forces of society fall into
a contradiction with the existing relations of production or - which is only a legal form
of this - with the ownership relations, within which they have been developing so far.
Those relations change from forms of development of the productive forces into their
bonds. An epoch of social revolution then takes place. According to the change of the
economic base the radical change in the whole Society sooner or later takes place (Marx,
A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 5; from the Polish translation).
Marx puts forward the following theses:
58 CHAPTER 4
(1) a revolution always occurs in the fmal phase of a socio-economic
formation;
(2) a revolution is a manifestation of the contradiction between the pro-
ductive forces and ownership relations
2
;
(3) a revolution is necessary, since it is indispensable for enabling a further
growth of productive forces;
(4) a revolution constitutes the mechanism of transition from one socio-
economic formation to another.
Now, if Model I, as outlined above, properly describes the basic trends
in the history of economic society, then none of these theses is true.
1. Let us notice that the Marxian idea of revolution inherits the ambiguity
of that of class struggle. For it may refer either to a struggle between an-
tagonistic classes, or to a struggle between the class of the new owners
of productive forces and the old class of such owners (e.g., between the
bourgeoisie and the feudal lords).
If by revolution we mean a particular intensity of a struggle between
antagonistic classes, then it does always occur, but not in the final phase
of a given socio-economic formation, but in its middle phase. This is what
follows from our model and which is evident in the light of historical data:
there was no particularly intense struggle between the slaves and their owners
at the time of the transition from slavery to feudalism, nor between the
serfs and the feudal lords at the time of the transition from feudalism to
capitalism. Revolutions in this sense took place, instead, in the middle phases
of formations: in the 1st century B.C. in Rome, and in the 9th-10th centuries
and again in the 14th-16th centuries in European feudal societies (notice
that in a feudal society there are two phases of revolutionary disturbance
- a peculiarity which cannot be explained in the light of our Model I, but
will be taken into account in one of its concretizations). At any rate the
intensity of the struggle between the two antagonist classes at the time of
transition to feudalism or capitalism Significantly decrease. This is entirely
inexplicable in the light of the Marxian theory of socio-economic formation,
but fully confirms the proposal outlined above.
If, in turn, by revolution is meant a particularly intense struggle between
the progressive class of owners and the traditional class, then it does not
occur in each formation: feudal lords did not struggle against slave owners,
but just emerged from the latter group. They were slave owners themselves
who rented ground to their slaves and in this way lessees were becoming
proto-serfs and lessors were gradually transforming themselves into feudal
A NON-MARXIAN THEORY 59
lords_ No kind of class antagonism between the new and the old class of
owners may be found here. There are only some special cases (see further
models) when such an antagonism between the new and the old class of
owners (e.g., between the bourgeoisie and the feudal lords) assumes the
form of open struggle. "Revolution" in the second meaning does not occur
in every socio-economic formation.
Let us observe that only the first notion of revolution may reliably be
termed a revolution. For the transition from one formation into another is,
in the pure form shown in Model I, an evolutionary process: the owners
of the productive forces who so far used to run production under the owner-
ship relations of one type themselves change these relations into another
type so that the direct producers become more interested in the result of
the production process.
But independently of these terminological stipulations one may state
that the Marxian thesis turns out to be false under the two meanings of
"revolution" as well.
2. Neither struggles between antagonistic classes nor transitions from one
formation to another have anything to do with an increase in the productive
forces. Model I is based on the assumption that the productive forces are
constant (E), and yet, as we have seen, it includes both a mechanism that
accounts for an increased intensity of struggle between antagonistic classes,
and one that accounts for transition from one socio-economic formation to
another. In the cases of both the mechanisms it is assumed that productive
forces are at work, but it is not assumed that they change. Struggle between
antagonistic classes and transition from one formation to another are thus
theoretically possible while the productive forces are constant. Both are
also empirically actual: in the slave-labour formation there was no increase
in productive forces, and yet there was both the phase of revolutionary
disturbances and the transformation of slavery into feudalism.
3. A revolution as it is understood here, i.e., an increased intensity of the
(antagonistic) class struggle, is necessary not because otherwise productive
forces could not increase (as if they have to by the very nature of things!),
but because of the class contradiction between the owners and direct pro-
ducers. And transition from one socio-economic formation to another is
necessary not because of the alleged contradiction between productive forces
and productive relations, but because it is the total effect of the decisions
which the owners of the productive forces must make in the conditions of
60
CHAPTER 4
the post-revolutionary period if they are to continue to gain their profit. An
evolution in ownership relations is thus a global result, unexpected by any-
body (and in this sense an "objective" result), a result of particular acts of
class exploitation in the conditions of the postrevolutionary period. Similarly,
an increased alienation of work was in the conditions of the pre-revolutionary
period a global (as well as an "objective") result of the same type of exploita-
tion. And while the latter brings about a revolution, the former causes the
transition from one socio-economic formation to another.
4. A revolution is, or rather revolutions are, because what is involved is a
certain phase of revolutionary disturbances, indispensable for a transition,
because without it the owners of the productive forces would not have
to modify the ownership relations. However, such a transition from one
formation to another consists not in revolution but in a slow evolution
in the ownership relations, and is carried out by the owners of productive
forces themselves. It is not the oppressed people, but actually the oppressors
which make the step of historically highest significance - the interfor-
mational transition. However, the phase of revolutionary disturbances
changes the conditions particular owners enact, and with this the oppressed
masses come into the arena of history. Thus without a revolutionary act
of the masses there would be no transition from one socio-economic forma-
tion to another, but this transition consists in the evolution in ownership
relations carried out by the owners themselves.
Hence, instead of the theses (1 )-(4) one can advance, within Model I, the
following:
(I') revolutionary disturbances always occur in the middle phase of
the development of socio-economic formations;
(2') a revolution is a manifestation of the contradiction between the
economic interests of the owners of the productive forces and those of
the direct producers;
(3') the phase of revolutionary disturbances in necessary, because it is
a result of an increased alienation of work being, in turn, a consequence
of the actions of the class of owners of productive forces under the con-
ditions of the initial phase of a given formation;
(4') the mechanism of the transition from one socio-economic formation
to another consists in an evolution in ownership relations resulting from
the actions of the class of owners of productive forces under the conditions
of the post-revolutionary phase of a given formation.
A NON-MARXIAN THEORY 61
The Non-Marxian Conception of Socia-Economic Formation and Interpre-
tations of Historical Materialism
The critique of Karl Marx is impeded very much, because after the century's
lasting vivid interpretative activity nobody knows yet what this author
claimed. No doubt that also the above criticism will meet the objection
of the "evident misunderstanding of the real Marx's intentions". But -
which Marx? For there are as many Marxes as interpretative concepts -
plus one. As far as the latest, historical Marx, is concerned one may easily
state that he exposed the nucleus of his social theory in A Contribution
to the Critique of Political Economy, 'Introduction', and (1 )-(5) are actually
contained in this short summary of the basic ideas of historical materialism.
Maybe in other places they are not, but one who would like to defend Marx
in such a way one is obliged to explain why one's author has committed such
simple logical contradictions stating one thing in one place and another
elsewhere. And in the quoted passage theses (I )-( 5) are contained. These
theses seem to be empirically false and theoretically incomprehensible.
That is why I am trying to reject the Marxian theory of socio-economic
formation based on the idea of the contradiction between the productive
forces and the relations of production and on the idea of class struggle
added ad hoc to the former. and to replace this conception by a proposal
of a non-Marxian theory of socio-economic formation.
This non-Marxian historical materialism - which will be exposed further
on as composed of more and more realistic models of socio-economic forma-
tion - is not one more interpretation of the Marxian social theory. For it
refutes some important ideas of the latter and, as we shall see, the refutations
of the kind will be still more and more. I do not claim, then, that the con-
ception I am trying to outline presents a kind of new key to the re-reading
of the classical texts of Marxism. The conception is to be understood as-
about reality, not about Marx's texts. Concerning the latter it claimed instead
that they do not contain the conception in question.
Why, then, is it maintained that this non-Marxian historical materialism
which I have started to expose is a historical materialism at all? The reasons
for such a claim are the following. First, historical materialism as proposed
here assumes the Marxian methodology and the Marxian dialectics. Of course,
if it is true - as I have tried to argue elsewhere
3
- then the idealizational
interpretation of Marx's method and categorial interpretation of his dialectics
are admissible from the historical point of view. Second, the theoretical con-
ception outlined here employs the Marxian conceptual apparatus. Productive
62 CHAPTER 4
forces, relations of production, antagonist classes, the surplus value, the
variable capital, etc. - all of them belong to the body of concepts employed
by Marx. However, this conceptual apparatus is employed here to construct
theses which were unknown to Marx and even contradict his views. However,
every Marxist has this right, doesn't he?
NOTES
1 Cf. the interesting attempt at the explication of this notion within the adaptive
interpretation of historical materialism made by P. Buczkowski, 'The division of labour
in historical materialism', Economista 6 (1970) (in Polish).
2 I am consciously abstracting here from the problems of an interpretative nature;
the position of the present writer concerning problems of the kind may be found in
'Theory of socio-economic formation as an adaptive theory', Revolutionary World 14
(1975), and 'How to Overcome Marx: The Attempt of a Marxist', Boston Studies in
the Philosophy of Science (forthcoming). However, one cannot avoid noticing that the
connection between the relations of production and those of ownership is one of the
most obscure points in Marx's and Engels' expositions of historical materialism.
3 The Structure of Idealization, D. Reidel, Dordrecht 1980; Foundations of Marxian
Dialectics (in Polish), Warsaw 1977, Foundations of the Categorial Ontology (in Polish,
in typescript).
CHAPTER 5
THE PECULIARITY OF SLAVERY: THE DEVELOPMENT
THROUGH LUXURY
(Model II of the Theory of Socia-Economic Formation)
Model I of the non-Marxian theory of socio-economic formation takes
into account what is common to all economic societies. That is why it does
not explain the peculiarities of a given society (e.g., a slave or feudal society).
Being built on a rather high level of abstraction the model is not able to
explain, for instance, how it was possible that feudalism has transformed
itself into capitalism. In order to show that the theory I am here trying to
outline is also of some systematic relevance for understanding historical
trends, I shall concretize the initial model of this theory. This is not an
additional task to that of the critique of the Marxian theory of history.
This is the latter task extended. To understand why Marx has failed in ap-
pointing the working class to be the destroying force of capitalism and
the force for building socialism, it is necessary to make a concretization
of Model I. And, what is more, the historical concretization of the model
is one which goes along with the line of historical development.
A General Theory of Socia-Economic Formation and Its Historical
Concretization
Historical concretization consists in such a development of the idealizational
theory that a further model in the concretizational sequence is descriptive of
a historically later form of society. So, if a given model of such a theory
reflects some features of a given form of society (e.g., slavery), then con-
cretizing it historically one obtains a model such that it reflects some features
of its later form (e.g., feudalism). In this way the "logical" structure of the
theory reflects the historical structure of the development of the subject it
presents.
What is of some importance here, at least in order to avoid possible mis-
understanding, is to differentiate between the two tasks. The first is to build
the theory of socio-econornic formation aiming at the reconstruction of the
historical sequence of societies. The other is to build the theory of particular
societies in this chain. The two tasks are connected with each other - some
remarks concerning this will be made later on - but they differ a great deal.
In the first case it is the general scheme of socio-econornic formation which
63
64
CHAPTER 5
is additionally made more specific by taking into account the peculiarities
of a given society. In the second case the point of departure is not the
general theoretical scheme but a realm of phenomena to be explained. That
is why in the case of the latter theory it is necessary to explain a "sufficient
amount" of phenomena with a "sufficient approximation" to be accepted,
while in the former case it is the general course of historical development
which must be explained first of all and having done this the theory must
alone prove that it is a good starting point for theories of the second type.
The Problem of the Peculiarity of Slavery
It is maintained in Marxist literature that the peculiarity of slave formation
in comparison with capitalism consists in the adoption of another rule of
conduct by a typical member of the ruling class:
The peculiar feature of the modern capitalist is the accumulation of capital, whereas
the peculiar feature of the noble in the Rome of the Empire times ... was the striving
for luxury and enjoyment (K. Kautsky, The Origins of Christianity, from the Polish
translation, Warsaw 1950, p. 46).
No doubt, this is true. But why? Since it was the typical attitude slave owners
took, there had to be some reasons for this lying in the deep base of the
slave society. Otherwise, some owners would have adopted a consumption
attitude, some would have accumulated wealth, some would have saved etc.
- according to personal inclinations that were widespread among them as
well as in every other (large enough) category of people. Since this was
not so, since all personal inclinations were alike to maximize enjoyment,
this must have had some deep causes in the economic base of the society.
What were they? We shall not find them in Model I, because what is
referred to in it is common to all socio-economic formations. That is why
the model must be concretized if this feature of slavery is to be accounted
for.
The Removal of the Assumption of the Lack of Accumulation
Among assumptions adopted within Model I there is the one saying that the
fund of accumulation in the society under consideration equals zero (see
assumption (G. It does not mean that the owners have to consume the
surplus value. It is not the case that an owner can either invest or consume his
profit; thesaurization is neither investing nor consuming, for instance. And
THE PECULIARITY OF SLAVER Y 65
neither is the gaining of more and more new land for a house in order to
strengthen its position. At any rate the assumption that accumulation in
a given society equals zero is now to be eschewed. Doing this we admit
realistically that accumulation takes place, that is, that some part of the
surplus value, even a very small one, is allocated to new production. This
realistic assumption which replaces idealizing condition (G) states the simple
empirical tendency - economic development (enlarged reproduction), though
slowly, was occurring throughout the whole pre-capitalist period and with
capitalism has accelerated significantly.
Taking into account enlarged reproduction we have to engage in the
long-lasting tradition of discussions in the Marxist orientation connected with
the so-called problem of the realization of surplus value.
The Controversy between Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Marx
The problem of the realization of surplus value is expressed in the following
question: how is enlarged reproduction possible under the assumption that,
in a given society, capitalist production is everywhere established and it is
a two-class society isolated from all other societies? The latter assumptions
are those adopted by Marx in Capital.
Here are the reasons that have inclined Rosa Luxemburg to pose the
problem under consideration.!
Let us assume that on the capitalist market there appears a mass of com-
modities of the value P. According to the general theses of Marx's economy
P is equal to C + V + M, where C is the value of the means of production
used for the production of a given mass of commodities, V is the value
of manpower employed in this, while M is the surplus value created by the
manpower. Now, whether capitalists will decide to allocate some fund (Ma)
for accumulation, that is. to invest some part of M, depends upon whether
this mass of commodities fmds a demand. If so, then the surplus value takes
on the form of money and the capitalists allocate some part, Ma, of the
surplus value to the means of production and wages. If not, then the capi-
talists, not having obtained the expected profit (M remains then in the
commodity form), do not accumulate and can even reduce production;
instead of enlarged reproduction a simple one, or even a narrowed one, can
take place. For capitalists to allocate a part of the surplus value to accumula-
tion it is necessary to have the latter in the form of money, that is, it is
necessary to have it realized. And to be realized, the surplus value must
66
CHAPTER 5
meet an "appropriate" demand on the market. What, however, is the meaning
of "appropriate" demand?
At the moment, when on the market there appears the product of the
value P = C + V + M, the demand for it equals only C + V + MC - it is the
demand for the means of production (C), for the means of consumption of
the workers (V) and for the means of consumption of the capitalists (Mc).
There is not yet the demand for commodities with value Ma (in short: the
demand for Ma), since the capitalists have not realized the whole surplus
value yet. Not knowing whether the surplus value will be realized, they do
not have, in turn, any motivation for investment decisions. However, since
they in fact accumulate, then the appropriate demand (Le., the demand for
Ma) had to appear. Where does it come from? This is actually the question
expressing the problem of Rosa Luxemburg:
An actual accumulation, that is, an enlargement of production, requires ... the enlarge-
ment of the effective demand for commodities. What is the source, however, of this
constantly increasing demand which gives the foundation for the incessant enlargement
of production in Marx's scheme? (R. Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital. A
Contribution to the Economic Explanation of Imperialism, from the Polish translation,
Warsaw 1963, p. 177).
And it is Rosa Luxemburg'S famous thesis that under Marx's assumptions
(that of the two-class capitalist society and its isolation) it is impossible to
find the source of this additional demand above C + V + MC. If so, then
Ma equals zero and no accumulation occurs at all. But this precisely means
that no enlarged reproduction is possible under Marx's assumptions. Marx
himself did not understand the trouble, mixing it incessantly with a problem
of rather low importance, namely with the question where the money in-
dispensable for the process of accumulation comes from (ibid., p. 205).
The conclusion of this brilliant critique is the following: Marx's theory
of reproduction is defectively constructed in its point of departure - its
idealizing assumptions eliminate just what cannot be abstracted from if
the phenomenon of enlarged reproduction is to occur at all. Marx's hierarchi-
zation of factors influencing the phenomenon in question is faulty - it does
not contain the principal factor(s) for it.
Therefore Rosa Luxemburg constructs the new theory of reproduction,
as it is known, taking into account from the very beginning both the existence
of the "third classes" inside the society under consideration and of other
non-capitalist societies on the outside (the non-capitalist environment).
All this plays the same role creating an additional demand for the capitalists
THE PECULIARITY OF SLAVERY 67
to enlarge production. At the early stage of the development of capitalism it
is the "internal non-capitalist system" (the small producers, husbandry, etc.)
which falls victim to capitalism making its development possible. For a
mature capitalism it is a non-capitalist environment which creates the addi-
tional demand indispensable for capitalist accumulation. But by doing this
the non-capitalist environment becomes gradually more and more capitalist
- in the backward societies there appears a capitalist industry which requires,
again, a non-capitalist environment for itself. This accelarated development
of capitalism has a limit of its own - that is, capitalization of the whole
world. When this would happen, the breakdown of the whole world system
of capitalism is inevitable. But this will not happen in this way, since the
breakdown will appear earlier: the economic troubles connected with a
gradual exhaustion of the non-capitalist environment lead to an increasing
resistance by the working class. When the proletariat becomes conscious
of the decreasing trend, the socialist revolution will abolish the capitalist
system.
The Generalization of the Problem of Rosa Luxemburg
Let us start with the observation that R. Luxemburg needlessly limits the
generality of her considerations by assuming too narrow a notion of the
realization of the surplus value as an exchange of the latter into money
on the market. It can be said quite generally that such (a part of the) surplus
value is realized which occurs in the form appropriate for the goals that
a typical owner of productive forces would aim at in a given historical period.
It can, but it need not, be the money form. It can be, for instance, such that
the surplus value is realized while occurring in the form of the means of
consumption even for an accumulating owner - if it is both differentiated and
large enough to fulfill the needs of both the owner and his direct producers;
and if for the latter the recovery of their labour force is in the form of
keeping them; and if, finally, for the enlargement of production no new
implements are necessary. Thus, for instance in the primitive agricultural
production of the slave type, it is possible even for an accumulating owner
to realize the surplus value without exchanging it for its money equivalent.
It follows from this that the more complicated the economy, and, espec-
ially, the more developed the division of labour it presupposes, the greater
the troubles with the realization of the surplus value. But the problem of the
realization of the surplus value occurs always when the production unit
ceases to give all that and only that which is necessary for the owner and
68 CHAPTER 5
his direct producers. There is no reason to limit the notion of the realization
of the surplus value only to special conditions that have occurred in quite
recent times.
The First Solution to the Problem of the Realization of the Surplus Value
The basic discovery of Rosa Luxemburg, if somebody who is not an economist
may say anything in matters like this, consisted in introducing the notion of
'realized surplus value' to the paradigm of Marxist political economy. In this
way the new theoretical line of development leading to the theory of Keynes-
Kalecki has been opened.
2
However, it soon became closed and called the
"wrong system of Luxemburgism" .
The idea in question may be formulated as the thesis that the surplus
value is the sum of the realized and of the non-realized (dead) surplus value.
The first occurs in a form appropriate to use in attainment of the typical
goals owners of productive forces aim at, while the second does not. If we
assume - but this time being quite conscious that this is only a simplification
- that there are only two goals owners want to achieve, their own accumula-
tion and consumption, then it could be said that Rosa Luxemburg has replaced
the Marxian equation M = Ma + Me by the following one: M = M" + Md where
M" stands for the realized surplus value (i.e., that which is able to be accumu-
lated or to be consumed by the owners); and Md stands for the dead, non-
realized, surplus value. And, according to the author, it is the realized surplus
value only which is the sum of the fund of accumulation and that of enjoy-
ment (i.e., of the consumption of the owners). There is no reason, moreover,
to limit the validity of this discovery to capitalism.
But, for the rest, Rosa Luxemburg fails.
Let us assume for the problem of realization of the surplus value all the
assumptions (A)-(G) adopted here. There are among them assumptions
(A) and (B) which are generalizations of Marx's formulations from Capital
- they are those which were claimed by Rosa Luxemburg to be the source
of the impossibility of finding a solution to her problem. Let us assume,
then, that in the society under consideration (a two-class, isolated society,
etc.) the following global value is produced:
P=C+V+M.
The demand for this global product is
D=C+ V+Mk
THE PECULIARITY OF SLAVERY 69
where Mk < M. The problem reduces to explaining how it is possible to
increase D to D'. If so, then the owners may diminish the dead surplus
value Md of the value of this growth DJ) = D' - D and will be inclined to
allocate this for accumulation, and an enlarged reproduction takes place. But
where does the growth of the demand come from?
The answer is surprisingly simple: from the increase of the consumption of
the owners. In fact, let Mk increase to
(Mk)' = Mk + MIlk.
Then the effective demand increases of D to D' ;:: C + V + (Mk + MIlk) and
the owners make investment decisions up to Ma ;:: DJ) ;:: MIlk. The growth
of the consumption by the owners creates the demand for the enlargement
of production. If the owners later possess new needs, then the use of the
dead surplus product becomes possible and it may be allocated for a new
labour force and new means of production indispensable for the enlarging
of production by themselves or by other owners. The new labour force
increases the demand for means of consumption, there occurs also the growth
in demand for new means of production and, as a result, the parasitism of
the owners in reducing the dead surplus value leads to the increase in produc-
tion. This corresponds to the theory of Keynes-Kalecki, that "the more is
consumed, the larger are the savings", which contradicts the common-sense
conviction.
This solution to the problem of the realization of surplus value is indeed
so simple that it needs to be explained why R. Luxemburg, an outstanding
economist, has not seen it. It seems to me that two matters were decisive
here. First, the limitation of the considerations to capitalism alone, while
capitalists are the main class of owners of productive forces whose consump-
tion does not increase significantly more than the rest of society. And second,
it would be rather strange to see from R. Luxemburg's ideological point of
view anything more in the increasing luxury of owners than the proof
that they are to be eliminated. And it follows from the first solution to R.
Luxemburg'S problem that the luxury of the owners in some historical
conditions plays an equally indispensable role for economic development
as the work of the direct producers. This deviates so much from ideological
conderrmation of the idleness of the class of owners, that one could not
blame the author of The Accumulation o[Capital for not noticing this simple
fact that the increase of luxury creates an additional demand for new produc-
tion as much as the needs of people living outside the given society. That
is why she has made so simple a mistake, writing:
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CHAPTER 5
It is, first of all obvious, that the source of this demand cannot be the capitalists ...
themselves, that is, their individual consumption. To the contrary, the accumulation
consists precisely in the fact that they do not consume themselves some ... part of the
surplus value but create with the aid of it new goods that will be used by somebody else
(R. Luxemburg, ibid., p. 177; my italics).
She has not distinguished here between consumption and its growth, not
seeing that it is the owner himself in the future production cycle who may
use the new goods - if his consumption increases.
The conclusion is, hence, the following: Rosa Luxemburg was perfectly
right in maintaining that Marx did not recognize the significance of the
problem of the realization of surplus value for the theory of reproduction.
She was not, however, right in claiming that it is impossible to solve that
problem on Marx's assumptions. This is precisely possible.
The Theses of Model II
This is also of some importance for the non-Marxian theory of socio-economic
formation. The first thing is obvious: the removal of assumption (G) turns
out to be theoretically possible because under assumptions (A), (B), ... ,(F),
non-(G), an enlarged reproduction in the society under consideration can
take place.
From the first solution to R. Luxemburg's problem there also follow some
corrections that are to be introduced into Model I after the removal of (G).
Let us observe, namely, that under assumptions (A), (B), ... , (F), non-(G),
upon which Model II is based, the growth in the consumption of the owners
(and not the consumption as such) is the only factor creating the accumula-
tive demand. No demand of the class-residua of previous formations may be
taken into consideration because of assumption (A). Such demand cannot
be created by the "environment" of a given society because of the assump-
tion of isolation (B) and so on. And within the society under consideration
one cannot find another source of growth in the accumulative demand. The
other class which is admitted in this society cannot give such an increase
because -- according to formula (El. 2) - the owners divide the new value
in a way optimum for themselves, that is, leaving to the direct producers
as little as possible. Thus, the increase in the demand of the latter is entirely
irrelevant to the mechanisms of enlarged reproduction: they have no value at
their disposal to make the growth of their demand economically effective.
Only the owners have such a support for the growth of their demand, namely
the dead surplus value. That is why the increase of luxury can be, under the
THE PECULIARITY OF SLAVERY 71
assumptions of Model II, the only source of the effective accumulative
demand.
Therefore, if within Model II an enlarged reproduction is to occur at all,
then this implies the constant increase in consumption ofthe disposers of the
productive forces (in short: of the lund 01 lUxury). And since it is known that
slave society was developing economically, though rather slowly, then the
conclusion is that the slave owners had to maximize the fund of luxury.
If so, then theses (1.1 )-(1.3) gain, within Model II, a more precise histor-
ical meaning: they do not speak simply about the maximization of the
surplus value, but of the maximization of some form of it, namely, the
fund of luxury. And so, thesis (11.1) is introduced which differs from (1.1)
in the one respect only that it contains the notion of a fund of luxury in
the place where thesis (1.1) refers to the notion of surplus value. In other
words, in the second part of (11.1) the fund of luxury is mentioned as the
criterion of adaptation:
(11.1) if S is an economic society and conditions (A)-(F) and non-(G)
are satisfied by S,
then in successive periods of time, out of the set of historically
given systems of production, that one becomes widespread in
society S which - under a given level of productive forces -
yields a non-<iecreasing new value,
and moreover, in those periods of time, out of the set of histor-
ically given systems of appropriation, those become widespread
in S which - under the respective level of the needs of the direct
producers and a given type of ownership relations existing in
those periods - yield an ever increasing fund of luxury for the
class of disposers of the productive forces.
The thesis gives us, then, not the vague information that the class of owners
maximizes the surplus value, but the more specific one, that it maximizes
a concrete form of the surplus value, namely, that of the fund of lUXUry.
Thesis (1.2) passes over to Model II without any modification, that is, by
way of the degenerated concretization. It will be indicated by '(11.2).' And
thesis (1.3) undergoes the same change as that in the case of (1.1) - the
criterion of adaptation is made more precise.
Slavery as the Classical Socia-Economic Formation
There is also one more conclusion discordant with current conceptions that
72
CHAPTER 5
follows from the analysis of Model I. It is the slave-labour system, and not
capitalism, which turns out to be the paradigmatic ('classical') example of
a socio-economic formation. This is so because the slave-labour system
literally satisfies the simplifying conditions (E) and (F), as it is not disturbed
by secondary factors (development of productive forces, emergence of new
branches of production) which are disregarded by those simplifying assump-
tions. And in fact, if we consider the extremely idealized nature of Model
II, the slave-labour system fairly well complies with our conclusions.
At first the position of the slaves was not too bad: the earliest form
of slavery, namely the patriarchal slavery, is sometimes called the mildest
of all known forms of exploitation. The slave was treated as a member of the
family, and in most cases worked together with his master; he was rather a
close servant who increased the number of working people in the family
than a person who supported his master thus freeing him from the necessity
to work. The slave thus treated as a member of the family also enjoyed a
fairly high standard of living; in many cases he preferred to remain a slave
than to buy his freedom, because by remaining an unfree member of a rich
family he was sure of a better standard of life than that he would have as
a freeman.
The growing differentiation in wealth among the various families resulted
in a large increase in the number of slaves employed by them. Estates were
enlarged by an incessant purchase of new land which gave rise to latifunds.
These required large numbers of hands, and hence rich families started buying
very large numbers of slaves. The slave owners themselves stopped doing
manual work, being replaced in that by their slaves, who, be it alone for their
numbers, could not any longer be treated as members of the family. But it is
typical of agriculture that at some seasons of the year it requires a great
number of hands, while at others the work stops almost entirely. A slave
owner could not sell his slaves in the autumn to buy (the same or other)
slaves in the spring, because he would have to sell them cheaply in the
autumn to buy them at a high price in the spring. He accordingly had to
find some employment for them in the winter. Slaves working on latifunds
accordingly came to be employed in the winter as craftsmen, namely as
weavers, tanners, potters, tool makers, etc. This resulted in the stagnation
of handicrafts proper, which in antiquity developed only in certain specialized
fields. An indirect effect of the new system of slavery was seen in the develop-
ment of the commodity-and-money economy: everything, in particular
the slaves themselves, the cost of buying, maintaining, and possibly losing
them, could be calculated in terms of money. Economic rivalry brought
THE PECULIARITY OF SLAVERY 73
about the emergence of big landed estates employing large numbers of slaves,
the vanishing of the patriarchal bonds between the master and his slaves, and
increased exploitation. The development of the commodity-and-money
economy, which was a further consequence of that system, tended to
intensify that exploitation by making possible an economic quantification
of the effects of the new system. As a result of all that the mildest form of
exploitation changed into a most odious one, for the slave was the most
defenceless of all direct producers.
There was only one factor which protected the slave: his master's fear
of the loss of the sum he paid for him. But the cheaper were the slave, the
weaker was the operation of that restraining factor. And the average price
of a slave was many times smaller than that of a good riding horse.
Over some eighty years the resistance on the part of the slaves became
a serious threat to Roman society. In 138-3 B.C. there was in Sicily a re-
bellion led by Eunus, which ended in the slaves mastering the whole island
and establishing there a kingdom with Eunus as the king. At the same
time there were major rebellions of slaves in Attica, in Asia Minor, and
on Delos (one of the greatest slave markets in antiquity). Thirty years later
there were new rebellions of slaves in Sicily, in Attica, and on Delos. After
the next thirty years the whole of Italy was shaken, for a period of nearly
two years, by the rebellion led by Spartacus. At that period the most pop-
mar form of class struggle on the part of the slaves, namely desertion,
was becoming more and more common. The slaves joined robber gangs,
whose number was increasing, or fled beyond the frontiers of the Roman
state.
After the crushing of Spartacus' rebellion 'the role of slavery in Roman
economy began to dwindle' (1. Wolski, Antiquity (in Polish), Warsaw 1971,
p. 407). There comes a revision of the classical ownership relation. The process
of freeing the slaves intensifies: a freedman, who was no longer his master's
property, proved a more faithful servant than a slave, who required a constant
and, as experience has shown, not very effective supervision. The process
of freeing slaves followed directly the said period of slave rebellions and
intensified so much that the Emperor Augustus passed a number of laws
which limited the numbers of the slaves that could be freed. But the number
of freedmen increased nevertheless, and they come to play an ever more
important role in economic life. In the course of time they even came to be
entrusted with important posts in the official hierarchy, and under Claudius
they played an essential role at the imperial court. liberation of slaves was
so common that already in the first century A.D. the laws that restricted
74
CHAPTER 5
the number of freedmen and their influence upon public life had to be
repealed as a dead letter.
Next to liberations upon the initiative of the slave masters there were also
more and more cases of self-liberation by the slaves. A slave master would
let a slave use a workshop or a plot of land; the slave then could expect an
income of his own and increased his productivity in order to accumulate
the amount needed for ransom and then bought his own freedom. There were
growing numbers of cases of ex-slaves who grew rich in that way.
Apart from the above form of revisions of the classical ownership relations
the owners of latifunds began to settle free people as lease-holders (co/ani) on
their estates. After paying the rent to the owner the c%nus kept the rest
of his income for himself. In this way, along with the traditional system of
ownership relations there began to take shape a progressive system based
on making the direct producer more interested in the results of his work.
Slave owners by leasing their land or workshops to the co/ani or to their
own slaves on an increased scale ceased to be slave owners, and their tenants
were more and more resembling serfs. Thus the tenants (co/ani or slaves)
had to pay the rent in money, but then they gradually began to change that
into the system of rent in kind, which is more convenient for a small-scale
agricultural economy. Thus began the process of naturalization of the Roman
economy. Latifund owners as a rule did not break all their land into leased
plots, but kept a part of it to be tilled by slaves. Since the work productivity
of the latter was growing smaller and smaller, the tenants were obliged to
do some additional work: a tenant had to work for six days in a year on
his lord's land. In the 4th century A.D. the tenants were already attached to
their lands (globae adscripti), and the landowners usurped for themselves
the right of judiciary power, enforcing that right by keeping an armed force
consisting of mercenaries. Slavery was turning into feudalism.
"The big ! ... /landowners found in the colonate a means of increasing
their / ... / estates, which could not be run on such a scale by using the slave
manpower." (Wolski, ibid., p. 480). Let us add: they found it because they
sought it, and they sought it because the foundations of the very social
system were threatened by a series of large-scale rebellions of slaves. Since
the slaves protested violently against their masters' incomes being increased
at their, the slaves', expense, the means of preserving the estates had to be
seen in a modification of the relations between the landowners and their
respective direct producers. By doing so the landowners ceased to be slave
masters and were becoming feudal lords, and the (free or unfree) tenants
settled by them on their lands were turning into serfs.
THE PECULIARITY OF SLAVERY
75
Thus slavery (the formation based on slave labour) seems approximately to
confirm Model II of the theory of economic society. Since patriarchal slavery
was the initial form of the slave system, it follows that in the first phase of
the development of that socio-economic formation there was a rapid increase
in the alienation of work: the needs of the direct producers were shaped by
'the mildest form of exploitation', and hence there was a constant hiatus
between those needs and the growing exploitation. All this resulted in a
series of slave rebellions. The strength of the resistance on the part of the
slaves forced the slave owners to modify the ownership relations, which
already during the imperial period took on the form of relations that re-
sembled those between lords and serfs.
The Peculiarity of Slavery: Luxury as a Source of Economic Development
Model II is a better approximation to the slave society than Model I as it
allows us to explain the phenomenon which was typical for the slavery -
the quest for luxury on the part of the owners of slaves. It is not a matter
of incomprehensible "deviation" of the ancient nobles (from the modem
standards established by the upstart bourgeois) that they enjoy more and
more than the whole class of people. The phenomenon in question has its
economic origins recalling the necessities of enlarged reproduction. With-
out that it is simple reproduction at most that would take place. Since,
as a matter of fact, enlarged reproduction took place, since every slave
economy was developing first of all because of its internal mechanism,
then - under our assumptions - the quest for luxury on the part of the
owners of the slaves had to appear. If so, then the maximization of enjoy-
ment was not an obstacle "despite which" the development was, "however"
occurring. In the conditions of the slave mode of production, this was the
main internal source of the development making it possible to put in motion
the gained reserves of the dead surplus value. The justified moral indignation
for idlers who exploited their slaves enormously in order to enjoy ingenious
meals of nightingales' tongues. should not prevent us from understanding the
economic role they were playing.
The Point of Departure j(Jr the Theory of the Slave Mode of Production
Model II adds only to Model I an idea that allows us to understand, as it
seems to me, one of the important features of the slave mode of production.
76 CHAPTER 5
However, it belongs to the general theory of the development of socio-
economic formation which I am trying to outline in this book, and it does
not pretend to explain phenomena occurring in slavery in its entirety.
Nonetheless, the theory in question is to be connected with the theory of
particular forms of the economic society. Assuming Model II as the point
of departure and referring the notions it contains to the slave society one
may concretize it by taking into account more and more factors significant
for phenomena taking place in this form of society.
And so, after removing assumption (A) one could explain the tendency,
peculiar to ancient Rome, to expel the small peasant property. This phe-
nomenon, so important for Rome's history, can hardly be explained on the
grounds of the Marxian theory of socio-economic formation, since the
regular economic mechanisms it refers to could not work in the case under
consideration. For great latifundia have not eliminated small peasant holdings
by way of regular economic competition, because the productivity of work
in the former was significantly lower than in the latter. And also latifundia
did not ensure the application of the higher technique of production -
on the contrary, the slave's work was a regression in this respect in com-
parison with the previous peasant's work. For the explanation of this process
of the expulsion of the small peasant property and the rise of the ancient
proletariat one could instead refer to the fact that the process was an addi-
tional source of the fund of accumulation, besides that of using the dead
surplus value. The process could then, be, explained in the similar manner as
R. Luxemburg has explained the process of the elimination of the pre-capi-
talist modes of production at the beginning of the capitalist development.
Also, the removal of assumption (B) could help us to understand the
economic function of wars in antiquity. They were not only the means of
enlarging the resources of labour power, but also of non-productive wealth,
that is, the resources of dead surplus value. Wars would then, be economically
subordinated to the quest for luxury, the latter being the principal mechan-
ism which makes enlarged reproduction possible in the conditions of a slave
society.
NOTES
Presenting this argumentation I follow the interpretation of R. Luxemburg's stand
given by J. Dziewulski, 'The genesis and main economic content of Rosa Luxemburg's
theory and present controversies concerning her views' (in Polish, manuscript for habilita-
tion), Warsaw 1978, School for Planning and Statistics Press.
THE PECULIARITY OF SLAVERY 77
2 Kalecki admits this in his Works about Business Outlook. 1933-1939 (in Polish),
Warsaw 1962, p. 7, note 1. See the argumentation by T. Kowalik Rosa Luxemburg.
The Theory of Accumulation and Imperialism (in Polish), Warsaw 1971, p. 5ff, 78ff.
CHAPTER 6
THE PECULIARITY OF FEUDALISM: THE DOUBLE CYCLE
(Models III-IV of the Theory ofSocio-Economic Formation)
The Rejection of the Assumption about the Stability of Productive Forces
Model II is still based on assumption (E) which postulates the constant level
of productive forces. Since Model II is theoretically possible and, as it seems
to have some empirical support, one may argue that the supposition concern-
ing the secondary role of the growth of productive forces is to a certain extent
confirmed. However, that the growth of productive forces (as distinguished
from some level of them) plays a secondary role does not imply that it plays
no role at all. On the contrary, the growth of productive forces in society
significantly modifies the image of the motion of socio-economic formation
attainable without recourse to it. But such an image is attainable. And that is
the point for the non-Marxian theory of socio-economic formation.
The Periodical and Continuous Growth of Productive Forces
The way condition (E) is rejected depends on the type of growth of the
productive forces. It might be so that in due time, thanks to new inventions
and improvements, a growth of the productive forces takes place but after-
wards they become stable again on the new level. This will be termed their
periodical growth. Instead, in the case of a continuous growth of the produc-
tive forces, we have to do with the stable stream of innovation. As we shall
see, the two types of increase in productive forces lead to quite different
consequences in the development of a socio-economic formation.
The Technically Accelerated Growth of the Productive Forces
In Model III assumption (E) is removed for the sake of the supposition that
the productive forces increase periodically. This, however, results in different
consequences depending on the phase of socio-economic formation in which
the growth in question is supposed to occur. Let us start by adopting the
following condition in the place of (E):
e ~ 1) the level of the productive forces in society S increases in the
phase of the increasing alienation of labour.
78
THE PECULIARITY OF FEUDALISM 79
Let there be given a definite level of productive forces in society S. Also given
is a set of alternative systems of production out of which - on the strength
of dependency (E 1.1) - the system maximizing the live product becomes
widespread. The latter is employed until the moment when out of a new set
of alternatives the new, and - under the given level of productive forces -
more effective organizational system looms. Such a development lasts, then,
until the optimum organizational system is found for the given state of
technology, that is such which yields the highest live product in this state.
Now, in Model II such an optimum system would be employed for ever and,
as a result, the same live product would be attained. At present, however,
after replacing (E) with (e-I), the situation changes.
If the increase of productive forces occurs after the establishment of
the optimum system of production (with respect to their initial level), then
it becomes possible that the effectiveness of labour is increased but only
provided that the organization of production is changed appropriately. And,
on the strength of (E 1.1), such reorganizations - with the method of "trial
and error" - are made until the moment when the new system of production,
the one optimum relatively to the newly attained level of productive forces,
is commonly applied. Of course, it must not be so that the increase in the
productive forces occurs after the establishment of the optimum system
of production. It might happen that this takes place before the adaptive
mechanisms (E 1.l) yields a system optimal with respect to the previous state
of technology. Then the old process of adaptation breaks and the new one
begins - but to the newly attained level of productivity.
As one may notice, the change condition (e-l) results in is that we now
have to do not with the establishment of the optimum system of organiza-
tion and the stable live product but with the process of the increase of the
optimums: the organization of production adapts itself always anew to the
changing level of productive forces in the phase of increasing alienation
of work. Therefore, in the first phase of society S, the process of the growth
of live product takes place whereas in Model II we had to do with the non-
diminishing level of this magnitude.
In the conditions under consideration all the advantages resulting from
technological progress are taken over by the class of owners. This class
makes a division of the live product into variable capital and surplus value,
attempting - on the strength of (E 1.2) - at maximization of the latter.
Hence this class takes over -- in the first phase of the development of society
S - all the technical surpluses, that is, the increases of the live product
resulting from the changes in the productive forces. The class in the first
80
CHAPTER 6
phase of socio-economic formation takes advantage not only of organiza-
tional, but also of technological progress. For the class of owners as a whole
is not forced in the first phase of society S - to behave in any other way.
It follows from this, in turn, that the phase of increasing alienation of
work becomes shorter in comparison to that of Model II. For, to be sure,
the appropriating technical surpluses do not diminish additionally the vari-
able capital of the direct producers (it is diminished on the general ground
exposed in Model I), but they are- as is known from Model II - designed
for the growth of the owners' consumption, which results in deepening
the differences between the standards of living of the two antagonistic
classes of society S, and leads to the additional increase in the alienation
of work. So the alienation of the direct producers passes the threshold of
class peace quicker and reaches the revolutionary interval sooner than in
Model II.
To sum up if the periodical growth of the productive forces takes place
in the first phase of society S, then the rate of growth of the fund of luxury
is accelerated which results in the increase of the level of needs of the direct
producers and hence in the acceleration of the growth of their alienation.
The quicker owners gain economic power, the earlier it is shaken by the
movement of the masses.
The Growth of the Productive Forces as a Means of Reducing the Class
Struggle
Let us assume now that the increase in the productive forces comes only in
the middle phase of socia-economic formation. That is, condition (E) is
replaced now not with (e-l) but with:
(e-2) the level of productive forces in society S increases in the phase
of revolutionary disturbances.
Let us consider the consequences this leads to.
Technical progress comes now at such a time as the masses are coming out
again and again against the exploiters. In such a revolutionary situation where
the majority of owners are threatened in their position, a typical owner
who obtains a technical surplus will be apt to make concessions to his direct
producers. This implies - within the rather poor possibilities our model
provides that a typical owner is inclined to add the technical surplus he
obtained to the variable capital of his employees. Since this is what a typical
owner does, the mass applications of the means leads to the reduction in the
THl PECULIARITY OF FEUDALISM 81
alienation of work. As a result, the danger of the disintegration of society S
is eliminated and, what is more, the owners obtain a means of reducing the
class struggle other than by changing the ownership relations. The technical
progress turns out to be. then, an anti-revolutionary means: it diminishes the
alienation of work and an anti-"progressive" consequence - it stabilizes
the (traditional) relations of property. Having the choice between the quick
reduction of alienation of their employees, thanks to the transfer of technical
surpluses to them, on the one hand, and the expected slow reduction of
alienation of work thanks to the change in the property relations, on the
other, the significant majority of owners chooses the first alternative. And in
this way they save their socio-economic formation: the dominating relations
of property remain dominating ones.
The Growth of Productive Forces as a Means of Slowing down the Evolution
in Property Relations
Finally let us consider the third possibility, when condition (E) is replaced
by the condition:
(e-3) The level of productive forces in society S increases in the phase
of the evolution of ownership relations.
So, society S comes out of the phase of revolutionary disturbances in the
way discussed in Model 11: some owners introduce the progressive relations
of production while the remaining owners still keep to tradition. But the
increase in the productive forces comes. This implies that the traditional
owners can stop concessions for their employees as far as the property rela-
tions are concerned. raising instead their variable capital from the technical
surpluses. As a result, the rate of change in ownership relations is slowed
down. It depends on the rate of development of the productive forces whether
the fall in the traditional fund of luxury, being a consequence of the slowing
down of the evolution in ownership relations, is only diminished, or entirely
stopped, or whether even some increase of the traditional surplus value takes
plate.
On the other hand, the technical progress also induces an additional
increase in the progressive surplus value. Therefore, the process of splitting
up the economy of society S is not stopped but slowed down. In general,
then, the growth of productive forces in this phase of evolution of the prop-
erty relations acts in the same conservative way as in the second phase, though
not so strongly.
82
CHAPTER 6
The Discussion of the Variants of Model III
It may be seen that there is no one Model III with the periodic growth of
productive forces but that six models of the type are admissible. What is
common to them is that they all weaken condition (E) in the following
manner:
(e) in society S there exists a periodic growth in the productive forces,
but they differ in which phase of the formation the said growth takes place.
That is why the models will be called the variants of Model III and indicated
by 'III-I, III---2, ... , III--6.'
And so, Model III-I is equipped with assumptions (A), ... , (D), (e-l),
not-(e-2), not-(e-3}, (F), not-(G) and admits the growth of productive
forces in the first of the three phases of formation alone. It presents the
accelerated growth of the alienation of work (see above); and the acceleration
of the alienation of work is an additional factor intensifying the class struggle.
As a result. not only is the phase of increasing alienation of work shortened
in Model III--1 in comparison with model II, but also the intensity of this
struggle is higher. The greater, then, is the chance of disintegration of such a
society. If, however. society S does not disintegrate itself (in practice: does
not become a victim of someone's aggression), then the intensified class
struggle follows the increased concessions becoming necessary. Since the
increase of the variable capital reduces the alienation of work directly and
quicker than the change of ownership relations, the amount of owners pre-
serving the traditional relationship of property grows in comparison with
Model II.
The growth of productive forces in the first phase of society S accelerates
the class struggle, and makes it sharper, increasing the chance of disintegration
of the society at large. If, however, such a society comes out of the revolu-
tionary disturbances, then it remains more traditional than that of Model II.
Such a growth in the productive forces makes the first phase of socio-eco-
nomic formation shorter but lengthens the phase of the evolution of property
relations, that is. keeps such a formation alive for a longer time and in this
sense acts conservatively.
Model IlI- 2 is based on assumptions (A), ... , (D), not-(e-l), (e-2), not-
(e-3), (F), not-(G), that is, it admits the growth of productive forces only in
the second phase of formation. The phase of increasing alienation of work
goes then normally, that is, as in Model II. The change comes only in the
second phase (see above). Few owners change their relationships with their
THE PECULIARITY OF FEUDALISM 83
employees and the traditional relations of property remain the dominating
ones. Revolutionary disturbances in Model III-2 end quicker and result in
consequences of a lesser rank - but only in the short run. For the traditional
mode of production remains as the dominating one and the mechanism of the
increasing alienation of work acts anew, which again leads to the revolution-
ary situation. In Model III- 2 there are, then, two or more phases of revolu-
tionary disturbance. For instance, a society with two revolutionary phases
develops as follows: the first phase of increasing alienation of work, the first
phase of revolutionary disturbance, the phase of the fall in alienation of work,
the second phase of increasing alienation of work, the second phase of revolu-
tionary disturbance, the phase of evolution of property relations. Models I
and II are three-phase models, and so is Model III-I, whereas Model III-2 can
be a six-, nine- etc. phase model. However, after the successive revolutionary
phases the number of owners getting rid of the traditional relationships linking
them with the direct producers grows steadily - it becomes more and more
evident that temporary concessions at times of revolutions do not improve
the situation in the long run and that reforms in ownership relations are
necessary. As a result, after a certain number of phase.s of revolutionary
disturbance (depending upon the rate of growth in the productive forces -
the greater it is, the greater the possibility of temporary concessions from the
technical surpluses), the evolutionary movement steadily leads to the domina-
tion of progressive property relations assuring greater liberation of work.
In Model III - 2 can be seen even more clearly than in III -1 that the
growth of productive forces plays a conservative social role: it allows for
keeping the traditional relations of property alive for a longer time than
models based on an assumption about the stability of technology.
This may be repeated as for the next model, III-3, based on assumptions
(A), ... , (D), not-(eI). not-(e 2), (e-3), (F), not-(G). Here thefactor under
consideration plays the conservative role as well, lengthening the third phase
of formation (see above). The model is a three phase one again but with a
lengthened phase of the evolution of ownership relations.
The next three models combine corresponding features of some of Models
III-I - III-3. Model III-4 is based on assumptions (A), ... , (D), (e-l),
(e-2), not-(e-3), (F), not-(G) and admits the growth of productive forces in
the phase of increasing alienation of work and in the phase of revolutionary
disturbance. The former is shortened and the latter is sharpened. If society
avoids the threat of annihilation, it comes into a multiphase development.
The model under consideration is. then, a multiphase one with the first phase
shortened.
84
CHAPTER 6
Model IIl-5 admits the development of productive forces in the phase of
revolutionary disturbances and in that of the evolution of property relations.
It is, then, a multiphase model with a lengthened last phase.
And, finally, Model III-6, based on assumptions (A), ... , (D), (e-l),
not-(e-2), (e-3), (F), not-(G), is a three-phase one again, but with a signifi-
cantly lengthened final phase; the two factors making the phase of evolution
in the ownership relations longer here join their actions, hence there arises
with this model the cumulative effect of phenomena observed in Models
III-I and III-3.
Let us add that these considerations suggest the features of a model based
on a continuous growth of productive forces - that would be a multi-phase
model with a shortened first and significantly lengthened last phase. The
more intensive the growth in the productive forces, the shorter the first
phase, the longer the last phase and the higher the number of inner phases.
The properties are worth remembering, since it is capitalism which is marked
by the continuous growth in the productive forces (see next chapter).
The Development of Productive Forces as a Historically Reactionary Factor
The above considerations also reveal something which is at sharp variance
with the Marxist tradition originating with Marx himself. Namely, the de-
velopment of the productive forces in all the models acts conservatively
strengthening the existing (traditional) relations of property. In all cases it
causes an increasing number of phases in our abstract society or the lengthen-
ing of its last phase. It stops. then, the movement of society.
This need not be a sufficient reason to call the growth in the productive
forces a historically reactionary factor - it need not be the case that social
development deserves the name of progress. But within our theoretical frame-
work, until now. it does so: every formation ends with the replacement of
the old property relations with such that assure a greater interest by the
direct producers in their efforts, that is, a greater liberation of work. This
agrees with the facts that a feudal serf was more liberated than a slave and less
liberated than a capitalist worker. Within the economic epoch a historical
progress takes place as should be expected from the Marxist point of view.
But this progress does not consist in the development in productive forces,
and, what is more, such a development is the basic obstacle for historical
progress. The latter is not expected from the traditional Marxist point of
view. The more so the idea which will be exposed and justified later on - that
historical progress ends in capitalism, and begins anew with the downfall of
this society which calls for Marx as its prophet.
THE PECULIARITY OF FEUDALISM 85
The Ideological Weakness of Marxian Historical Materialism
Contrary to expectations, the Marxian historical materialism turns out also
to be too weak from the point of view of solidarity with the oppressed classes
in the history of mankind. Marx did not understand the role of the anta-
gonistic class struggle, looking for the criterion of historical progress not in the
realm of relationships between the oppressed and the oppressors, but in the
realm of "objective" conditions of production. Not the improvement in the
economic conditions of the exploited class but "progress in production" is
to be the criterion for evaluating social systems. Marx condoles slaves but
admires only exploiters such as "dynamic" bourgeoisie. About the Spartacus
upheaval Marx can only say that it was "too early" - too early with respect
to the Moloch of progress in the productive forces, which had allegedly led
to the transformation to feudalism. This is not the only case when one is
obliged to accuse Marx not of being "too radical" but on the contrary - of
being too little of a Marxist.
The Social Nature of the Productive Forces
All this originates, evidently, from the Marxian ambiguity. But also from
Marx's false understanding of the nature of productive forces. He was inclined
to treat them as material means enabling people to "exchange matter between
man and Nature" and to grasp their development as the "expansion of
domination of man over Nature". But it is quite sufficient to ask in the way
numerous Marxists did, and do, against idealism -- which "man"? Is there
"man" outside the society he lives in, outside the class struggle? - in order
to see that Marx was preserving the rest of the Enlightenment's optimistic
naturalism quite to the contrary of the theory of class struggle.
Within the non-Marxian historical materialism productive forces are not
means making possible for "man" to dominate over Nature but they are
material means of domination of some people (the disposers or owners) over
other people (the direct producers). Productive forces are means of control
over the economic behaviour of the masses and actually this, and not their
technological capacity. is their basic feature from the point of view of the
theory of economic society.
If so, then a fact which is unexpected from the Marxian standpoint may be
explained: namely. that direct producers were never interested in the develop-
ment of technology. If the coincidence between their interest and the growth
in the productive forces was taking place, they would have to recognize this at
86
CHAPTER 6
last, with some trial and error. However, not the direct producers, but just the
owners, recognized that the increase in productive forces is advantageous for
them; and their last form, capitalists, are inclined fIrst of all to make technical
progress (see the next chapter). In the light of Model III this is not surprising
any more - the progress in technology stabilizes the existing relations of
ownership, with the existing form of domination of owners over direct pro-
ducers which a given form of property expresses. Technology should not be
evaluated from the point of view of unhistorical, "objective" criteria of
productive efficiency but from the point of view of the role it plays in the
relationship between the two antagonist classes of economic society. Who
had to remember this, if not the leader of Marxism? In fact, he was too weak
a Marxist.
Does ModelIII-2 Satisfactorily Approximate the Development of Feudalism?
It could seem that feudalism falls under Model III-2 in its six-phase version.
This is not, however, a satisfactory approximation. Revolutionary distur-
bances in feudalism, to be sure, occur in the two phases, nonetheless the fIrst
of them differs signifIcantly from the other as to its social nature. The point
is that the former (9-10th century A.D.) consisted in the liberation of towns
which at that time were settled or recovering after the naturalization of
economy. It was a form of class struggle - townsmen were feudal serfs fIght-
ing for liberation - but it was a peculiar form of such a struggle since it was
connected with the division of social labour. Instead of natural economy
where particular productive units were entirely self-sufficient, the commodity
economy was burgeoning with handicraft separated from agriculture. And
that cannot be accounted for within Model III-2. That is why it should be
concretized further.
The Rejection of the Assumption about the Stability of the Division of
Labour
Let us remove ,then, the assumption that the number of domains of produc-
tion is constant in a given society, that is, assumption (F). Instead of this
condition let us assume that
(f) in society S a new domain of production comes into being in the
first phase of revolutionary disturbance.
Since it is necessary for such a division of labour that the level of productive
THE PECULIARITY OF FEUDALISM 87
forces increases, the initial model treated will be Model III-2 and instead of
(F), condition (f) will be adopted among the assumptions of Model III-2.
The model obtained from III -2 by replacing (F) with (f) will be denoted as
Model IV.
Model IV: The Rise of the Dual Society
The society considered in Model IV in its first phase does not differ from that
of Model III-2 - the alienation of work increases according to the standard
principles known in Model III -2. However, in Model IV there exists a new
possibility of resistance for the direct producers - they may escape to the
rising domain of production. The greater, then, the alienation of work in the
old domain(s) of production, the greater the intensity of the passage from the
old domain(s) to the new sphere of production , that is, the rejection of work
in the old one by accepting the conditions of work in the new. As a result,
the rise of the new domain is an effect of the increasing class struggle. This
type of class combat (see the defmition of the class struggle in Chapter 4)
leads, then, to the rise of a new class of direct producers. For among the
people who escaped to the new domain of production there soon begins a
new class division based on the monopolization of the disposal over the new
productive forces peculiar to this sphere. And so, apart from the new direct
producers the class of new owners comes into existence. The new domain
generates the new class division into the new pair of antagonistic classes. So,
in society S, two pairs of antagonistic classes exist - the old, connected with
the old mode of production in the old domain(s), and the new, based on the
unequal relationship to the new means of production.
In this way the division of labour in the second phase of formational
development is a fundamental social phenomenon changing the structure
of the society which comes to be a double one, composed of the two sub-
societies including the two pairs of antagonistic classes. The rise of such a
society is a way of coming out of the revolutionary phase - the most active
direct producers were passing on to the new domain, improving their condi-
tions, and the total alienation of work decreased. After the first phase of
increasing alienation of work there occurs the phase of the rise of a double
society. The society begins to be composed of two relatively autonomous
parts that evolve in a quite different manner.
The Development of the New Sub-8ociety
The new sub-society conforms to the general trends known in Model III-2.
88
CHAPTER 6
And so, new disposers of the productive forces (or, new owners) maximize
the (new) surplus value exploiting the new direct producers not less than the
old producers. This leads, on the strength of our general principles, to the
growth of alienation of work and to revolutionary disturbances within the
new sub-society. Since - according to our assumptions concerning model
III-2 - the level of productive forces is stable from now on, then the only
solution to disturbances in the revolutionary phase of the new sub-society
is the modification of the relations of property peculiar to the new society.
The latter begins to differentiate into progressive new relations of property
and the traditional relations, the role of the first becomes more and more
important within the new sub-society on the strength of trends known from
Model III--2. This does not imply, however, that the socio-economic forma-
tion changes itself. Such a formation is defmed by the type of ownership
relations, whereas within the dual society there exist two such systems of
property relations. It is impossible to say anything about the domination of
one of them on the scale of the dual society at large without inquiring into
the economic relationships between the two sub-societies, which will soon
be done.
The Development of the Old Sub-Society
Quite different is the image of the motion of the old sub-society. After the
rise of the new sub-society the most dissatisfied direct producers leave it and
the level of class struggle ceases to make a threat for the old relations of
property. However, the fact in itself that there exists an alternative for an
old direct producer, and the fact that the level of alienation of work is there
at the beginning rather low, cause a constant pressure by old direct producers
on old owners. It takes the form of desertion from the old to the new domain
of production and the private armed forces of particular owners are too weak
to restrain them (and there is no centralized apparatus of coercion under our
assumption (C)). Since -- according to the characteristics of our Model IV -
the level of productive forces does not increase further, the old owners have
at their disposal only one possibility to keep the alienation of work in the old
domain(s) below the revolutionary interval -- to diminish the fund of luxury
by increasing the variable capital. In normal conditions they will never do so,
but the conditions under consideration are not normal ones and they must do
so, otherwise they would lose the labour power in their estates.
This leads to another threat. As we remember from Model II, the constant
growth of the (global) fund of luxury is in a parasitic society considered here
THE PECU LIARITY OF FEUDALISM 89
a necessary condition for enlarged economic production. Hence the limitation
of the fund of luxury in the old sub-society leads to hindering the economic
development in it - the effective demand of the old economy becomes less
and less. This deepens, in turn, the decrease in the old owners' incomes etc.
After some period of such a development advantageous for the old direct
producers, the old owners begin to make good their losses and contrary to
their objective position begin to diminish the variable capital increasing their
incomes in this way. According to the standard mechanisms this results in the
growth of the alienation of work in the old sub-society until the revolutionary
situation is reached.
In this manner the two different roads in the two sub-societies lead to the
same destination - to revolution. If revolutionary disturbances in the two
sub-societies temporarily overlap, the existence of the dual society is threat-
ened. If they do not, then the revolutionary situation in one cycle increases
the level of alienation of work in the other, and so the phase of revolutionary
disturbances in the latter sub-society is accelerated.
The Second Solution to the Problem of Realizing the Surplus Value
Let us consider now the economic relationships between the two sub-societies.
Model IV is to be a concretization of Model III-2 (in the six-phase version
of the latter), hence it must be that both sub-societies are parasitic in their
nature. In both sub-societies, then, the growth of the fund of luxury is a
necessary condition of enlarged reproduction. This, however, concerns only
the internal conditions for reproduction, whereas the sub-societies are parts
of the larger whole and create the external conditions of the type each for
the other.
The internal conditions of the realization of the surplus value are appro-
priate to those known in Model II (see Chapter 5 above). What is necessary is
the growth of the fund ofluxury in both the sub-societies:
= Co + Vo + +
, C (k k
Dn = n + Vn + Mn + flM
n
);
where indices "0", "n" symbolize the old and the new sub-society corre-
spondingly.
However, at the beginning the new domain exists in the old environment --
the share of its production in the total production of the whole dual society
is small. Here, then, R. Luxemburg's solution about the influence of the
90 CHAPTER 6
non-capitalist environment upon the capitalist enlarged reproduction fmds
its corresponding application; "corresponding", because she was considering
it only for capitalism. Let us consider, then, conditions for the enlarged
reproduction one domain creates for the other.
For the new domain, effective demand increases with external demand for
the increase of the constant capital in the old domain for the increase
of variable capital in the old sub-society and, finally, for the increase
of the fund of luxury in it What is concerned is obviously the
demand of the old domain for such products of the new domain that the
latter can supply. The symbols etc. have a similar meaning. And so, if
the old domain is agriculture, while the new one is handicraft in towns, then,
e.g., stands for the increase of demand for the agricultural implements
made in towns; stands for the increase of peasant demand for the
handicraft means of consumption (furniture, home utensils, etc.); Vi: stands
for the increase of demand in towns for the means of consumption made
in the countryside, and so on. Thus the growth in the effective demand for
the production of the new domain is defined by the two components: the
external one
n n Trfl kn
= + v 0 + ,
and the internal one defined by the growth of the fund of luxury of the new
owners In sum, for the new domain the demand for the accumula-
tion is as follows:
Quite similar is the demand for the accumulation in the old sub-society:
(
ko 0) a
= + =Mo
In the first stage, when the production of the new domain is much less
than that of the old one, the internal component of the growth of demand
for the product of the new domain is much less than its external component.
In other words, the demand on the part of the great old sphere of production
significantly surpasses the growth of consumptive aspirations of the new
owners within the new sphere. In this situation the latter factor ceases to be
the dominating source of the effective demand for the production in the new
sub-society in the face of the huge disproportion between the two domains,
even the greatest increase in the consumptive needs of the new owners is still
much less than the effective demand for the new domain of production on
THE PECULIARITY OF FEUDALISM 91
the part of the old one. The internal component AM!n is significantly less
than the external one Ada, and plays a secondary role. As a result, there is
already no economic coercion for the constant increase of the consumption
by the new owners.
This leads to the differentiation in the economic behaviour of the new
owners - some of them maximize consumption, some accumulation, depend-
ing on personal preferences. However, in the face of the huge demand on the
part of the old sub-society, those of them whose consumptive inclinations
significantly differ from the "average" will accumulate less than the others
and their fortunes will become relatively smaller in due time. On the other
hand, the "economic natures" out of the new owners will accumulate more
and more and, in the face of constant demand, this results in enlarging their
fortunes. This holds only for the global case of the economic behaviour
of the whole class where the increase in the fund of luxury stimulates the
economic growth; in an individual case it is quite the reverse, of course. That
is why the traditional economy, operating with the idea of a single producer,
has not seen a difference on the global scale - (M. Kalecki, The Theory of
Economic Dynamics (in Polish), Warsaw 1958, pp. 56ft'). This process leads
to the slowing down of the growth in the (global!) fund of lUXUry in the
new sub-society, and the means that are made free due to this are allocated
in the accumulation which still has a high demand on the part of the old
sub-5ocie ty.
As a result of the macroeconomic process in question a new attitude is
required in the new sub-5ociety on the part of the owners - they become
more and more investors and not the sluggards whose consumptive appetites
stimulate the economic growth. Not the maximization of lUXUry but the
maximization of investment becomes a new principle of the economic
haviour of the new owners. Which has nothing to do with the ideological
justification the new owners invent to rationalize their new type of conduct,
nor with the substantial type of their production. This is simply the result of
the economic inequality of the two sub-societies in the dual society.
The Economic Rivalry of the Two Sub-Societies
The results of the economic rivalry of the two sub-societies of the dual society
depend on their developmental possibilities, dermed by the ratio of the
growth of the effective demand for the production of a given sub-society
(ceteris paribus), relatively to its total production. Let us call the quotient
Pn = ADn/P
n
a developmental perspective of the new sub-society (where
92
CHAPTER 6
P
n
stands for the total product of the new sub-society); and similarly the
developmental perspective of the old sub-society: Po = tillo/P o' If the
increase tlD of the effective demand for the production of a given domain is
zero, then the developmental perspective p of such a domain is also zero
and the latter can only undergo simple reproduction. If that increase is
positive, the perspective p is positive as well, and the given domain enlarges
its production.
Out of the two domains that one will expand, diminishing the role of the
other, which is economically more effective in this sense that it is marked
with the greater quotient of the effective demand for their products to the
production itself: that is, that one which has a greater developmental perspec-
tive. This domain of production will become dominating in society Sand
relations of property peculiar to it will bear down the other type of ownership
relations. There is, then, no simple dependency of the type "what is new,
always wins" - from the notion of novelty nothing follows in itself. That
domain "wins" - in the sense that its relations of property become domi-
nating in the society at large - which has a better developmental perspective,
that is, which is economically more necessary for the society as a whole.
The Double Cycle of the Motion of Socio-Economic Formation
Within Model IV, after the initial phase of the increasing alienation of work,
there occurs a split in the unitary society into the two sub-societies with
a pair of two antagonist classes each. In the new sub-society, the known
mechanisms lead to the increasing alienation of work again and to the phase
of revolutionary disturbances; the only difference consists in the fact that in
the new sub-society the criterion of economic efficiency changes and the
owners maximize their investments, not lUXUry. Since, according to the
assumptions of Model IV, the growth of productive forces after the phase of
the splitting of society is again zero, the only way of coming out of the phase
of revolutionary disturbances is by the evolution of property relations. And
so, they differentiate into progressive and traditional relations according to
the general rule of our conception.
The old sub-society develops in a parallel way. It comes out of the phase
of the splitting of society due to the migration of the most dissatisfied direct
producers to the evolving new domain of production. The owners in this
society are still affected by the migration pressure of their employees and for
keeping them on their estates they have to increase the old variable capital by
diminishing their fund of luxury; in the conditions of the lack of a centralized
THE PECULIARITY OF FEUDALISM 93
apparatus of coercion the migration trend may be weakened by the private
armed forces the old owners have at their disposal, but not for too long a
time. This decreasing trend of the old surplus value leads to a decrease in the
alienation of work. And so in the old sub-society we have to do with a phase
of decreasing alienation of work, quite the contrary to in the new one.
The gradual decreasing of the fund of luxury in the old society is deepened
by the fact that in this way its developmental perspective falls down. As a
result, after some time revindication claims begin to appear among the old
owners and they more and more often try to recover their previous systems
of appropriations, to come back to the economic privileges they were forced
to get rid of. And the decreasing tendency in the alienation of work in the old
society is stopped and replaced by an increasing one. After a time comes the
phase of revolu tionary disturbances in the old society.
Both the sub-societies come out of the revolutionary situation by the
evolution of their property relations. In both of them more progressive
types of ownership relations, that is, those more advantageous for the direct
producers, come to being, and the normal competition within the progressive
and traditional property relations in each of the sub-societies takes place. At
the end in both the sub-societies progressive relations of ownership become
widespread.
This internal evolution in every sub-society does not, however, in Model
IV define the transition to the next socio-economic formation. This depends
on the economic rivalry between the two sub-societies and on the domination
of one of the (progressive) types of ownership by the other. As a result, that
type of progressive ownership relation becomes widespread in society at large
which is peculiar to the domain marked by the greater developmental per-
spective, in our sense.
Therefore the transition to a new socio-economic formation with the
ownership relations peculiar to the progressive state of the more effective
sub-society of the dual society takes place. If it is the new sub-society which
turns out to have the greater developmental perspective, then such a transition
is at the same time the end of the parasitic stage of development of society -
the class of owners of the new formation maximizes the fund of accumula-
tion, not that of luxury.
The Scheme of the Double Cycle of Socio-Economic Formation
Scheme I summarizes the above considerations and illustrates the sequences
of the phases of the dual society.
94 CHAPTER 6
increasing revolutionary evolution
alienation disturbances of ownership
of work relations
splitting
of society
unification
by rivalry
increasing
alienation
of work
decreasing revolutionary evolution
alienation disturbances of ownership
of work relations
Scheme 1.
The dual society is marked by the double developmental cycle: at first
it develops in one stream, next it splits into the two sub-societies each of
them developing in different ways, but fmally one of them evolutionarily
dominates the other, and one type of ownership relations (more exactly, one
of the progressive types of ownership relations) becomes a dominant one and
the society becomes unified again; the latter is, however, a different type,
that is, it belongs to another socio-economic formation - along with the
unification of relations of property the transition takes place by evolution.
The Development of Feudalism in the Light of Model IV
The form of property typical for feudalism consists in the division of the land
of a lord into his grange and the rest which is on loan to his serfs. The latter
are obliged to pay some rent to the lord and to work for some time on the
grange, and also to perform some additional duties (building the houses,
providing transport services etc.). The productive units (the granges with
the loaned parcels) were entirely self-sufficient - serfs had to be not only
peasants but also handcraftsmen. And rents included not only agricultural
products but also handicrafts. Hence the number of specialized serfs-hand-
craftsmen was small. In the face of limited demand from the manorial estates,
the town handicrafts die, and so does trade. The diminishing role of money
corresponds to it - different substitutes (e.g. animal pelts) played the role of
gold or silver. The economy of early feudalism is one-domain economy.
THE PECULIARITY OF FEUDALISM 95
It was also an economy with stable productive forces - until the lath
century no change in the implements of agricultural production or in the
methods of cultivation took place. At the same time, exploitation was in-
creasing: rents went higher and higher. In the lOth-lith centuries a change
occurs: new inventions, both in implements (e.g. the heavy iron plough) and
in the methods of land cultivation (two- or even three-field systems), spread.
But first of all there are new technologies of mining and dressing of metals, of
dressing of wood, skins, etc. They require special knowledge and skills, that
is, specialization. Handicraft turns out to be mature enough to be separated
from agriculture. On the other hand, the increasing exploitation of the serfs
inclines them to leave their landlords' estates and to move to the towns.
Handicraft concentrates anew in towns which leads to the renewal of trade.
The process of the emancipation of townsfolk proceeds sometimes through
armed upheavals against the lords. Towns liberate themselves from feudal
dependency and establish municipal governments.
As a result the two sub-societies split up: the municipal one with handi-
crafts as a dominating form of production and the rural one with agriculture.
In the new sub-society a class division soon took place and townsfolk became
differentiated into patricians and plebeians. Hence the period from the lath
to the 12th century can be interpreted as a time of splitting up the unitary
society of Model IV. From now on the history of the two sub-societies begins
to be differentiated.
Towns offer better possibilities for living and the removal of feudal depen-
dency, hence the migration of serfs to the towns increased. "In England ...
villages became empty ... as the effect of the migrations of many ... peasants
to the towns" (J. Kulisher, General Economic History o/the Middle Ages and
Modem Times, after the Polish transl. from the Russian, vol. I, Warsaw 1961,
p. 140). The feudal lords had to face the loss oflabour power. Migrations to
towns inclined a lord to make
concessions for his serfs in order to keep at least those who still remained with him.
Since some landlords started to make concessions, others had to imitate them, because
peasants escaped to where the charges were the smallest. ... Landlords in the end had to
accept the freedom of migration of peasants which was in practice already established
and the more enterprising of them attempted to attract new serfs with promises of
reduced charges (ibid .. p. 141).
In sum, there occurred a decrease of exploitation connected with the change
to money rent which was more appropriate for peasants in the face of the
recovery of a commodity economy. The 11th/12th-14th centuries was a
96 CHAPTER 6
period of improvement in the position of the serfs. This corresponds to the
phase of decreasing alienation of work in the old sub-society in Model IV.
The improvement in the economic position of a serf was, in fact, the only
possibility feudal lords had at their disposal: after the great technological
leap at the beginning of the millenium the productive forces were standing at
the same level until the 1 7th/ 18th centuries. But this resulted in a "relative
pauperisation" of the feudal lords and even to the decline in their living
conditions, hence after some time the opposite process began. For instance,
in the second half of the 14th century in England landlords
attempted to come back to the previous organization of labour. to the villein system.
Formally, they had the right to do that because peasants' freedoms were based only on
custom .... But the peasants did not agree with that and the violation of the customs
resulted in an upheaval (ibid., p. 149).
It was Wat Tylor's uprising that spread over the greater part of the country.
With the aid of the poor in London the insurgents seized the town and forced
the king to enact the edict abolishing villein services and serfdom, admitting
the freedom of trade on the territory of the whole country. In the end,
however, the feudal lords won, and the king refused the edict.
The course of development in the rural sub-societies in France, Spain, and
Germany was similar. In the whole of western Europe the second phase of
revolutionary disturbances was taking place, being in different countries
different only in time. Another typical thing for these disturbances is that in
all the countries the peasant upheavals coincided with the movements of the
poor to the towns, just as our Model IV allows us to expect.
After the separation of the townsfolk from the class of serfs, there occurred
the class division in towns between the owners of the means of handicraft
production and their direct producers; that is, roughly, between the masters
and the journeymen. The masters gradually improved their position more
and more while that of the journeymen declined. The title of master came
to be ancestral and available only for rich people, while the journeymen's
income decreased and their day of work was incessantly prolonged (even a
14-16 hour day of work was a usual thing in the 14th century). This evoked
the resistance of the poor in the towns. Strikes and disturbances became
common in 14th century towns. Often they are governed by associations of
journeymen that arose in the whole of western Europe testifying to the fact
that the interests of the poor in the towns were distinguished enough from
those of the patricians. It is not surprising, then, that "peasant wars" in the
14th-16th centuries were such only in the sense that the majority of the
THE PECULIARITY OF FEUDALISM 97
insurgents were peasants. However, in the whole of western Europe greater
peasant upheavals were taking place together with disturbances in towns.
Besides, the latter occurred also separately - in France after Jacquerie in
1358 and disturbances in villages in 1378-79, rebellions in towns took place
in 1381-82, and in Germany the peasant war of 1525 was preceded by five
town revolts in 1509-1513. One can say, then, that phases of revolutionary
disturbances in towns and in the countryside coincided as the result of the
reiterated wave of exploitation of the serfs and the constant increase of the
exploitation of journeymen.
The stormy period of the 14-16th centuries caused an evolution in
property relations both in towns and in the countryside. The processes that
were to lead to the subordination of the village to the town begin in both
sub-societies.
In the history of the guild system, two sub-periods are distinguished: the
rise (up to the 15th cetury) and the downfall (up to the 18th century). The
latter is connected with the gradual transformation of the guild system into
the cottage-industry system and with the rise of the manufacturing system,
both leading to the capitalist system of production.
Also in the countryside, transformations in ownership relations took
place. In England, after Wat Tyler's upheaval, the landlords faced the same
problem as before it: the lack of labour power. But peasants did not allow
the recovery of the villein services, and landlords had to find another solution
- by transforming ground land into breeding land. Looking for pastures leads
to new divisions of the land, with a loss for the poor and advantages for the
landlords and the rich peasants. The gradual capitalization of agriculture
followed where the owner, a landlord or a rich peasant, was inclined to take
the greatest profits of his land by producing for the market. The rural holding
was becoming an element of the market economy, that is, to use the Marxian
term, a "branch of industry": all the relics of previous property relations
(serfdom, villein services, communal property, etc.) were abolished. And the
factory system coming into being at that time found the released labour
power - the poor in villages deprived of the means of surviving thanks to the
capitalization of agriculture.
The Scheme of Changes in Social Structure in the Parasitic Stage
Let us complete these considerations concerning the parasitic stage of devel-
opment with the following scheme (Figure 3) revealing the way the structure
of a society was being transformed:
98
CHAPTER 6
owners of sloY( 5 feudal lords

510V('5; str'l.
\
-----\ ',\
masWS
\
capitalists
\ Journeymen ___ __
Fig. 3.
Of course, capitalists include agricultural capitalists - that is why a part of
the peasantry transformed itself into capitalists. Besides, residual forms have
been omitted here - like slaves in feudalism or landowners living off the
ground rent in capitalism.
Slilvery and Feudalism. The Role o[Christianity
In this book, devoted to the discussion of the possibility of the Marxist but
not the Marxian theory of historical process, it is hard to consider more
carefully the internal structure of particular socio-economic formations.
This is necessary only as far as it reveals some theoretical faults in Marx that
disturb our present-day understanding. That is why, for example, all the
problems connected with the functioning of ideology are omitted here and
the focus is on the most important matters - the economic ones. Nonetheless,
it would perhaps be useful to consider some points that could theoretically be
posed only if our theoretical work was continued by the removal of some
additional assumptions adopted in Model IV .
The point of departure for the characteristics of the parasitic stage of
development was the observation that R. Luxemburg's problem can find a
simple solution on the grounds of Marx's theoretical assumptions (i.e., in
the two-class and isolated society) : it is, for the conditions of Model II, the
growth of the fund of luxury. The parasitic stage in social development
is defined by this type of solution: as long as the dominating role in the
stimulating of enlarged reproduction is played by the increasing of the fund
of luxury, economic development takes place at the price of the hard work
of the direct producers and the idleness of the owners. Compassion for the
former and contempt for the latter cannot blame us in understanding that for
enlarged reproduction both factors were necessary. Actually, the necessity for
the financing of development by the increase of lUxury led to the degeneration
THE PECULIARITY Of FEUDALISM 99
of the class of lords in Rome - that is why severe Christianity spread there so
largely. One of the main sources of the spreading Christian faith was, then,
the economic necessity of enlarged reproduction.
Feudalism is a more rationally organized class society (in the sense of
making itself more stable). The necessity for the fmancing of enlarged repro-
duction weights not the narrow strata of aristocracy, but is distributed on
the grades of the estate society. The higher the grade, the greater the weight
of the task of maximization of luxury. The whole estate hierarchy has as
its "social task" to maximize the fund of lUXUry - each grade in the way
appropriate to it. On the plane of individual behavior this gives the principle
of the maximization of income within the limits appropriate to a given grade
- the principle so peculiar to the feudal society. As a result this "consumptive
effort" is distributed over a much higher number of people than in slavery,
so that feudal luxury included keeping in courts more or less numerous
clienteles; the number of clients for maintenance depended on the place a
given feudal lord occupied in the hierarchy of the estate society.
In a word, the feudal hierarchy was one way for the institutionalization
of the phenomenon that in slavery was made in a quite spontaneous manner
- the maximization of the fund of luxury. The increase bf luxury, though
more rationally "organized", was taking place and was evoking the wave of
Middle-Age heresies proceeding under the same banner: return to the ideals
of primitive Christianity, the ideals of severity and simplicity. It was not only
an expression of opposition against feudal exploitation, as it is interpreted
in the Marxist tradition. It was the manifestation of the opposition against
such an exploitation which leads to the increase of lUXUry on the part of
the exploiters. Primitive Christianity was becoming for the second time an
ideological support for the struggle against debauchery resulting from the
necessities of enlarged reproduction.
For the third time it played this role during the Reformation, when a split
took place between catholicism and protestantism. The latter came to be an
ideology of the new class of owners that was already inclined to maximize
investments, not luxury, since it was so formed by the requirements of the
enlarged reproduction in a small sub-society that had to cope with the great
sub-economy of the old type. The requirements of enlarged reproduction were
the source of the spreading protestantism - in that case also determining the
consciousness. It is, then, a false Weberian idea to link the rise of capitalism
with the "spirit of capitalism". The latter was gradually forming the much
earlier motivating actions of the guilds; their early conditions of work, how-
ever, forced them to the typically monopolistic way of economic behaviour
100 CHAPTER 6
(W. Kula, Economic Theory of Feudalism. An Attempt at a Model, Warsaw
1961, pp. 86ff). It is not true that a guild did not maximize the income, but
it did so as capitalists of the monopolistic period not as capitalists of the
period of free-competition. It is the "spirit of free-competition" that arose
in the 17th century when the guild-system was decaying. The "spirit of
capitalism" in general arose along with the separation of town economy.
And it is quite understandable that it found its ideological sanction in the
form of protestantism much later; at the beginning, and for a long time, the
new sub-society was very weak. It was necessary to it to apply the principle of
mimicry - it could not call attention to its actual distinctiveness with such
bright "social colours" as ideological differences.
CHAPTER 7
THE PECULIARITY OF CAPITALISM:
AN ATTEMPT TO POSE THE PROBLEM
Feudalism transfonned itself into the society which was again unitary:
agriculture came to be a "branch of industry" (Marx) in it. In terms of our
abstract models such a society is one where the new sub-society has sub-
ordinated the old one, imposing the principle of maximization of investments
as the leading principle of the economic behaviour for economic activity
at large. This ideal type of capitalist society will be called in our abstract
terms a directional unitary society; in the case where the old sub-economy
won, it could be called a cyclic unitary society.
The Rejection of the Assumption about the Periodicity of the Growth of
Productive Forces
Therefore, assumption (F), which is simplifying in the general theory of
socio-economic fonnation, becomes a realistic one for the directional unitary
society (as it was for the society presented in Model II). Moreover, the
assumption admitting the periodical growth in the productive forces (e)
(see the last chapter) is also rejected. Let us replace it with a condition saying
that:
(e' ) in society S the productive forces increase continuously and in a
unitarily accelerated way.
It is assumed, then, that the productive forces increase in all periods, but the
difference between their level in subsequent periods is constant. Such an
assumption is approximately satisfied in capitalism but not in the first two
socio-economic formations in the classical line of European development
which is the subject of the first part of this book. The Model based on
assumptions (A), (B), (C), CD), (e'), (F), not-(G) is indicated as Model V.
The Third Solution to the Problem of the Realization of Surplus Value
In Model V, the conditions of the solution to the problem of the realization
of surplus value change again. In society S, which is again a unitary one, the
correction for the existence of the second sub-society disappears (if one
101
102
CHAPTER 7
omits some peculiarities of the transitional period) and the class of owners
in this society maximizes now the fund of accumulation and not luxury,
as do the owners of Model II. None of the solutions known for the preceding
models can be applied in Model V. One problem is to fmd a new answer to
the question: how does a society with the global product
P=C+V+M
increase the effective demand above the magnitude
D=C+ V+Mk,
requiring in this way some additional investments Ma .
And the answer is equally as obvious as that of Model II: it is the growth
of variable capital which is the condition for the owners to make some
additional investments. In fact, let V for any kind of reason grow from V to
V' = V + V. Then the effective demand in society S increases to

and the accumulation fund Ma can be higher than zero being, of course, not
greater than the dead surplus value (see Chap. 4 above). What is meant here
is evidently the growth of variable capital not the amount itself - the latter
is to be reproduced by simple reproduction. The increased demand of the
direct producers makes it possible to set the dead surplus value going and
to allocate it to new means of production and new means of consumption.
In order to make the increase in the production of means of consumption
it is necessary to make the growth of production of means of production for
the former, etc. The increase of the effective demand on the part of direct
producers leads to an economic boom. And this brings more surplus value
to the owners.
It follows from this that the dependency between the variable capital V
and the surplus value M is, as Marx maintains, inversely proportional, but the
dependency between V and the realized surplus value M' (see Chap. 4 above)
is not. Under low V, the direct producers create so Iowan effective demand
that the realized surplus value rapidly decreases, and owners do not have
motives for investments; the accumulation fund tends to zero while the dead
surplus product grows to the difference between M and the fund of the
consumption of owners Mk. Similarly, under great values of V a "worker is
too expensive", and the costs of investments are too great. One may say that
the dependency is of the type shown in Figure 4.
THE PECULIARITY OF CAPITALISM
REALIZED
SURPLUS
VALUE
The le\let of enlightened
(\
VARIABLE CAPITAL V
Fig. 4.
103
In a word, the increase in the incomes of the direct producers, though dimin-
ishing the surplus value V of the owners, increases also the realized surplus
value vr (until the level of enlightened exploitation is reached). If owners do
not increase the variable capital, they do have, in fact, more for themselves,
but in the conditions of Model V they "have more" value in the form of
commodities that cannot be sold. If, instead, they increase the variable capital
(but only up to the level of enlightened exploitation), then that additional
income will come back to them in the form of money spent by the direct
producers for the commodities that would otherwise be unsold.
All this seems to be so simple and obvious on the grounds of Marxian
political economy, equipped with some discoveries of R. Luxemburg, that it
requires an explanation why such outstanding economists as Marx and
Luxemburg did not see this. The only explanation I can see is that the theses
though being, in fact, obvious from the cognitive ("analytic") point of view,
are not so from the standpoint of Marxist ideology. It follows all the same
from these theses that the most convenient strategy for the class of capitalists
as a whole is to ... increase the variable capital (up to the level of enlightened
exploitation) for the workers. This denies so much of the vision of bourgeois
society as undergoing convulsions in the struggle of workers and capitalists
that it could be so that these obvious ideas simply did not come to the
outstanding minds. The history of science knows very many cases where great
scholars were so influenced by their assumptions that they did not see the
simplest things they were so close to. And in this case what matters is not
simply the theoretical blindness, but also, and even first of all, the ideological
one. That is why Marx did not see the problem of the realization of surplus
value at all, and R. Luxemburg, though she has formulated it quite clearly,
did not see the simplest solution, looking for it far away on the "external
markets".
104
CHAPTER 7
Is It Possible that the Exploiter Helps the Exploited?
Let us ask, however, how is it possible that the exploiter, that is, the one who
- according to Marx's great discovery - takes all his revenues from the
unpaid employees' labour, how is it then possible that this blood sucker
gets rid of some part of that value he took away from the exploited? It
is not especially difficult to prove the economic meaningfulness of such
activity if one assumes that the owner is a "perfect innovator", a "captain
of industry", etc. But how can we prove this from the standpoint of Marxist
political economy, that is, under the assumption that the owner is basically
an exploiter?!
Model V is based among others on assumption (e') about the continuous
and unitary accelerated growth of the productive forces. So, let us assume
that due to technical progress the global product of society S increases
from
P=C+V+M
to
Pr=Cr+ Vr+Mr:
where subscript T signifies that the growth (in the limiting case - a zero
growth in some component of product Pr) took place thanks to technical
progress. The difference Nr = Pr - P is the technical surplus (see Chap. 6
above). Pr is always greater than P; the relationship of V r to V or Mr to
M depends, however, on the system of appropriation applied by the class of
owners. Let us consider at first in a purely abstract manner some possibilities
that are open to the class of owners.
Here is the possibility which seems to be the only one admissible on the
grounds of Marxian political economy: the whole technical surplus is allocated
by the class of owners to itself. However, in this case it could achieve some
disadvantageous results. For due to technical progress the production has
increased but the conditions of realization have become even worse - the
dead surplus value has, under our assumptions,2 increased by the technical
surplus, but there is, in the conditions of model V, no compensation in the
effective demand for the technical surplus. And the greater the technical
progress, the worse is the result. The class of owners become more and more
"rich": but this is a "richness" that cannot be used for the goal a typical
owner in the directive unitary society aims at; this is the "richness" composed
of commodities which cannot be sold. That is why, this possibility of coping
THE PECULIARITY OF CAPITALISM 105
with the surpluses given by the development of technology is excluded from
a longer run.
The opposite possibility is excluded as well: why should the owners give
their direct producers the whole benefits of technological development?
Rather they would refrain from any technical progress at all.
The third possibility is that the class of owners allocates a part of the
technical surplus to itself and the rest to the class of direct producers. In
that case the effective demand of the latter will grow which makes it possible
to reduce the dead surplus value and, hence, the enlarged reproduction. There
is, however, no reason to give to the class of direct producers the whole
technical surplus - owners give only what maximally increases the effective
demand of the direct producers; except for some special cases it must not
be the whole technical surplus.
So, technical surplus NTis divided into two parts: one extends the surplus
value, the other the variable capita\. The optimal relationship (for the class
of owners) between the two parts is such that the variable capital is extended
by such a value tq V that the sum V + T V = V T is the effective demand
for the highest (in the limiting case -- for the whole) surplus value. In other
words, the optimal relationship for the class of owners is such a division of
the technical surplus NT = TV + TM under which the growth of the
effective demand minimizes the dead surplus product (in the limiting case
- the whole one). The class of owners, then, increases the variable capital
of the direct producers but not because of any humanitarian ideals but simply
because of the fact that otherwise it could not use its richness in the way
appropriate to itself. That is why the class of exploiters increases the variable
capital but only up to the limit which is profitable to it. And even this only
when it must do so.
How Is It Possible that the Exploiter Helps the Exploited?
If this is correct, then it is possible that the class of exploiters helps the class
of exploited people. However - how is it possible? That is, in what way
is it done?
In order to explicate at least a little bit of what is the intention of the
question, let us make a few remarks about one of the immortal methodolog-
ical problems of the social sciences - the relationship between the "global"
and "individualistic" approaches. It seems to me that in the incessant discus-
sions concerning the matter the two questions are often mixed. The first
is what kind of entities the global constructs (a class, a society, an economy,
etc.) are - whether they exist, then, somehow independently of actual
106
CHAPTER 7
individuals, or simply are some features or aspects of them. The second ques-
tion is, whether the regularities global constructs undergo are reducible to
regularities governing individuals' acts, or not.
And so, it seems to me - leaving the justification of this thesis for another
occasion - that to the first of the questions one should answer negatively,
while to the second one, positively. There are no separate entities existing
somehow outside individuals' acts - global constructs can be identified as
actual aspects (features, relations, networks of relations, etc.) of really
existing individuals, their acts or the results of the latter. Global entities
exist then, but as universalia according to Aristotle, not as universalia accord-
ing to Plato. However, these common aspects of individual beings undergo
quite different regularities than the individual entities themselves. For in-
stance, economic acts of individuals conform to the hallowed rule "You
can't have your cake and eat it," which fails, as we have seen in numerous
cases, for the social economic processes with classes as their subjects. In other
words, the essence of the same magnitudes defined both for global entities
and for individuals differs at least in some cases - we have to do here with
cat ego rial changes (cf. L. Nowak, Foundations of Marxian Dialectics. An
Attempt at the Categorial Interpretation (in Polish), Warsaw 1977).
Let us apply the distinctions to the questions considered here. No doubt
that actions of the exploiting class helping the class of direct producers
- which are, as we have Seen, possible on the global level - are entirely
excluded on the level of individuals. In normal conditions, no individual
producer will pass a part of his income to his employees in order to increase
the demand for his products. This is because he is quite aware that the
realization of his individual surplus value depends to a much greater degree
on the economic behaviour of other owners than that of his workers. That
is why a particular entrepreneur will not manipulate the demand of his
employees. A manufacturer of baby dummies will not increase the salaries
of his workers in order to enlarge the effective demand for his products.
Rather he will spend some additional money on advertisement, market
inquiries etc. Therefore, the fmancing of enlarged reproduction by increasing
the incomes of the class of direct producers does not occur in normal situa-
tions on the level of the individual behaviour of owners. It is a categorial
peculiarity of the macro-economic level.
How, then, is it possible at all? In other words, of what are those global
acts of the class of owners composed? Which are the individual acts the
process of financing of enlarged reproduction is an aspect ofin the conditions
of Model V?
THE PECULIARITY OF CAPITALISM
107
Despite appearances, the answer to this question is really simple. Let us
consider - under the assumptions of Model V - the conduct of a particular
owner X and his employee Y (let us assume that there is only one). Economic
acts of the two have their normal Marxian characteristics: Y manufactures
products of value p composed of individual constant capital c, individual
variable capital v and individual surplus value m. In normal conditions there
is no reason for the owner to increase the individual variable capital of his
worker. However, let us assume that Y rejected the idea of joining his labour
force with the means of production and that X has no opportunities to force
him to work nor to replace him with another direct producer. All he can do,
then, is to create such conditions for Y in order to keep him at work. To
do so, he must not - in the conditions of Model V - renounce a part of
his income. It is quite sufficient that he renounce a part of the growth of his
income resulting from technical progress, that is, increase Y's income by
t:qv. The rest (if any) of the technical surplus nTX may pass to himself,
increasing his surplus value by less than in normal conditions, that is, when
Y stood in work. So, in normal conditions a particular owner would appro-
priate to himself all the technical surplus. However, the conditions where
an entrepreneur is deprived of the labour force are not normal. That is why
our entrepreneur, facing the alternative: stop the production and lose the
expected revenues, or lose a part of the expected growth of income, always
chooses the second.
This is quite obvious. But the conclusions it leads to are not. First, our
owner in renouncing a part of the technical surplus on behalf of his employee
did not solve the problem of the realization of the surplus value. He was
not facing this problem at all. And even if he was, he would solve it in quite a
different manner than increasing payments to his worker - e.g., by changing
the sphere of production or by making some additional efforts in trade etc.
What he did face was quite another problem: how to survive in the difficult
conditions of the strike. And that was the question he was attempting to
solve by renouncing a part of the technical surplus. Second, solving his
individual problem of survival, X made his contribution to the solution of
quite a different macro-economic problem that he was certainly not aware of.
Giving to Y some means t:qv more, X supplied him means to buy some
commodities on the market manufactured by other owners. The effective
demand of Y has increased, then, in the face of the whole class of owners
by f:j,TV. And the global effective demand of the whole class of direct pro-
ducers has grown - thanks to the troubles X was having with Y - by the
same value which equals not D but
108
CHAPTER 7
D + .!lTv = C + (V + .!lTV) + Mk.
This does not especially help the economy as a whole: Y will buy only a
few commodities more. But let us admit that X gives work not to Yalone
but to some hundreds of people and that troubles with the direct producers
are not only X's peculiarity but concern the majority of owners. Then, D is
increased not by the microscopic value of the growth of the purchasing power
of one person but by the value of the growth of the global variable capital
of the whole class of direct producers as a result of the technical progress
in society S:
D' = C + (V + .!lTV) + Mk.
In this way, particular owners solving their only problem: "how to survive
as an owner of an enlarged fortune?", all together, not knowing what they
actually do as a class, solve the problem of the realization of the surplus
value.
In this way, the method of the realization of the surplus value applied
by the class of owners is not reducible to the ways of the realization of
the individual surplus products applied by particular owners; the latter
consist mainly in different competitive actions. Instead, the method is com-
posed of the actions made in order to satisfy individual objectives of quite
different types. In this assessment, then, the global acts of the class are
categorially (nomologically) different than individual actions of particular
members of this class, though the former do not exist outside the latter.
When Is It Necessary that the Exploiter Helps the Exploited?
At present we know it is possible that in the conditions of Model V the class
of exploiters increases the incomes of the class of exploited people. We know
also, how it is possible. The last question arises then: when is it necessary?
The answer is evident: when the majority of the class of owners has
troubles with their direct producers similar to those X of our schematic
example was having with Y; and so, only when the alienation of work
surpasses the threshold of class peace. This is the more, the greater is the
alienation of work, in particular in the revolutionary situation. In such a
situation the rejection of work concerns the majority of the whole class of
owners and becomes a serious threat for its social position.
In normal conditions, when the majority of direct producers quietly work
for their lords' revenues, the latter do not see any reason to renounce a part
THE PECULIARITY OF CAPITALISM
109
of their income for the former. As a result, the global effective demand does
not increase correspondingly to the increase of production, which results
in growing stocks of umealized values. It is the resistance of the exploited
which forces owners to allocate them some part of the expected advantages
that technical progress brings and to solve in this way the problem of the
realization of the surplus value - for themselves.
3
It is not the faith in
humanitarian ideals which forces the exploiters to solve the problem of
realization by improving the living conditions of the exploited. Nor wisdom.
It is the fear of the revolution which does so. If this grasp is not Marxist,
this word means nothing today!
The Description of the Project of Model V
Let us consider now the development of society S in the conditions of Model
V assuming, as ever, that in the initial period the level of the alienation of
work lies below the threshold of class peace.
Hence, the standard mechanisms start to operate: the adaptation of the
organization of production to technical progress and the increase of the
share of the surplus value in the growing live product; the latter, as usual,
leads to the growth of the alienation of labour. The only difference with
the previous models in this initial stage consists in the fact that both the
processes are much sharper in the conditions of Model V which follows
from the continuous and unitarily accelerated technological progress. Changes
in organization of production being results of adaptive processes, they come
more often, and so do the increases of the share in the surplus value. Since
as long as the resistance of the exploited does not force the majority of
owners to concessions, they allocate the whole technical surplus each time
to themselves. As a result, the distance in conditions of living between the
two antagonist classes grows (the stable fund of luxury is becorring greater
and greater as the stable share in the increasing magnitude) which additionally
causes the growth of the alienation of work.
The increasing surplus value is - in the conditions of Model V - allocated
the fund of investments; the share in the fund of luxury remains the same
(more strictly, it does not increase significantly). This results in the further
growth of production which gives still more surplus value, and so on. How-
ever, Rosa Luxemburg's problem requires to be posed anew: where does the
growth of the effective demand originate which is necessary for the constant
increase of the fund of accumulation? It is not given by the growth of the
fund of luxury, since in the directional unitary society the fund is (almost)
110
CHAPTER 7
stable. It is not given by the growth of the variable capital, either, since in the
first phase of the increasing alienation of work the variable capital is - on
the strength of the basic mechanisms - rather decreasing than growing. The
only difference in this first phase between Model V and the preceding models
consists in the fact that owners have the additional source of the growth
of the surplus value, namely technical surpluses. But each of them is taking
his technical surplus for himself, and so the conditions of purchase for the
whole class become even worse since the increased surplus value is allocated
for accumulation.
Since the matter is really important, let us consider it more carefully.
Given is a definite level of productive forces to which (let us assume that at
once) the optimum system of organization is adopted which leads to the
live product L = V + M. So, the global product in a given period is P = C + L.
A growth of the level of productive forces comes, and the adaptive process
leads (also, at once) to the new optimum organizational system which results
in the new live product LT. So, the new global product is PT = CT + LT,
where L T = L + NT, that is, the new live product is greater than the preceding
one by the technical surplus NT. In the new period the new live product
LT is divided as follows. First, the whole technical surplus is appropriated
by the class of owners (we are, according to our assumption, still in the
phase of the increasing alienation of work). Second, on the strength of
basic dependencies known still from Model I, the variable capital is decreasing
by some magnitude W which is appropriated by the class of owners: LT =
= V' + (M + W + NT) = V T + M T, where V' = (V - W) = V T. Further, accord-
ing to our assumptions concerning the directional unitary society, the fund of
luxury is simply reproduced, whereas the fund of accumulation is signifi-
cantly increased - by the value taken away from the direct producers and by
the technical surplus: ~ = Ma + W + NT.
All this directly follows from the assumptions of Model V. It must be so,
then, that the fund of accumulation is significantly increasing. But all this
leads only to repeating the question of Rosa Luxemburg: since the effective
demand is only this:
DT = CT + VT +M} =C+ (V - W) +Mk,
then it has even fallen in comparison to the last period: D = C + V + Mk by
the value W taken away from the direct producers' incomes; how, then is it
possible that the fund of accumulation ~ is even greater? How is it that
the decrease of purchasing power may result in the increase of accumulation?
THE PECULIARITY OF CAPITALISM 111
The conditions of Model V do not give an answer to this question. Previous
solutions to the problem of R. Luxemburg do not give any answer to it, and
the purely economic assumptions of Model V do not show by themselves
any new answer. The conclusion may only be: Model V is constructed incor-
rectly. Among the idealizing assumptions of that model must be one that
eliminates an indispensable factor for the capitalist enlarged reproduction, as
model V is to correspond to the capitalist type of society. In other words,
it must be so that one of the assumptions adopted in Model V eliminates
actually what cannot be eliminated by any idealizing condition - a principal
factor (for capitalist reproduction).
We shall try to identify that factor later on. At present, let us consider
what is going on in society S in Model V - if we assume for the sake of
consistency for a while that in the first phase of that society a definite
hidden factor acts by making enlarged reproduction possible. Let us assume
in the purely instrumental manner, then, that R. Luxemburg's problem for
the phase of increasing alienation of work has already been solved.
The growth of alienation leads as always to the revolutionary situation
- and the economic conditions of society S change rapidly. Isolated until
now, acts of breaking the process of production into particular units increase
on such a scale that this poses threats to the economic process as a whole.
At present particular owners do not try to make advantages out of the dif-
ficult situation of their partners counting that "maybe I will be saved", but
come on the larger and larger scale to the conviction that the benefits of
technical progress should also be allocated to their employees. The more
difficult it is to count on making some advantages in the bad general situation,
the more owners are inclined to make concessions to the direct producers
they employ.
In Model V assumption (C) is still valid, which eliminates the possibility
of the intervention of the state apparatus of coercion on the side of the
owners. That is why, as always, once society S enters the revolutionary
interval, the class of owners becomes powerless, and the only type of solution
is to make concessions in the direct producers favour. The continuous and
unitarily accelerated technological progress, however, opens up, new possibil-
ities before the class of owners in Model V.
A typical owner aimed to appropriate his technical surplus n
T
and some
part of the variable capital. Deciding to make concessions he resigns from
the extension of exploitation, but this is not sufficient. Since by w the owner
scarcely aimed to diminish variable capital v, and his employees have to feel
the improvement effectively if they are to come back to work or to prevent
112
CHAPTER 7
themselves from getting rid of it, then the owner has to effectively allocate
them some new value. (In the form of raising their wages, or by making condi-
tions of work better, etc. Since all this forces him to make some additional
expenses, let us treat it uniformily as the transfer of some value). However,
this new value is paid from the expected growth of technological progress,
that is, from the technical surplus. The owner does not take it, then, for
himself but divides it into the two parts: and the first is always
greater than zero, the second may be equal to zero. Now, the concessions a
typical owner makes is which is remunerated from the present or
future technical surplus.
The magnitude of the concession made by the typical owner expresses
his assessment of the further resistance of his employees. If the assessment is
too low, then his workers do not come back to work (or they leave it despite
the concession), and in the next period our owner has to increase the conces-
sion. If the evaluation is too high, then the situation in his productive unit
becomes normal but he incurs relative losses in comparison with other owners
and after a time corrects his assessment on his own part. As a result an
average concession, that is, an average value by which owners increase the
variable capital of their direct producers in particular productive units is
established. The multiplication of the number of owners making concessions
and this average value approximate the global concession: V. The
latter global value must be such that the alienation of work decreases below
the revolutionary interval. Of course, it need not be established at once,
it can also be corrected after some time. However, in this way the progress of
technology makes it possible for owners to drive the economy out of the
revolutionary phase. At the same time, however, the class of owners made
something it was not dreaming about - increased effective demand.
Therefore, leaving the phase of revolutionary disturbances, society S is
economically self-sufficient - out of fear the owners secure themselves the
possibility for the further development and further profits.
Let us consider what is going on next. rhe alienation of work decreases,
and the system obtains the mechanism of self-development due to the in-
creasing purchasing power of the class of direct producers. However, after
some time the usual mechanism starts to work anew. The number of owners
whose employees are quiet is large enough and the typical conduct of the
owner is to enlarge the share of the surplus value in the live product by taking
again the greater and greater part of the technical surplus until magnitude
reaches zero, and in the absence of sufficiently strong resistance begins
to reduce the variable capital of his employees. This leads, on the global
THE PECULIARITY OF CAPITALISM 113
scale, to an increase in the alienation of work and the threat for the ruling
class appears again: society S for the second time reaches the phase of revolu-
tionary disturbances.
Or, rather, it would reach it, if in the second phase of increasing alienation
of work the hidden "consumptive motor" started to work again creating all
the time an effective demand despite the decreasing incomes of the direct
producers. The intervention of this factor is equally indispensable in the
second phase of increasing alienation of work as in the fIrst one. And similarly,
it cannot be connected with the relations between the two economic classes
- and these are the only relations that are admitted in our model.
If, however, to assume for the second time that during the increase of
alienation of work this hidden factor works as well, then this process ends
with the second phase of revolutionary disturbances as a general rule. The
only difference that begins to reveal itself in the second revolutionary phase
is that - according to assumption (e') about the accelerated progress of
productive forces - the technical surpluses are in the second cycle greater
than in the fIrst one. A typical owner may then allocate for his employees
more of the expected growth of production (due to technological progress)
than before. The global result of accelerated progress by the productive
forces is that the economy comes more quickly out of the second phase
of revolutionary disturbances than it did out of the fIrst.
And this will be constantly repeated. The successive phases: of increasing
alienation of work, of revolutionary disturbances, of decreaSing alienation of
work, will repeatedly occur, and the only difference will be that the phases
of disturbances will end quicker and quicker. This is illustrated graphically
in Figure 5.
THE INTERVAL OF
REVOLUTIONARY
or S TURBANCES
THE THRESHOLD
OF CLASS PEACE
formational cyclt formational y l ~
Fig. 5. Such a sequence of phases: (A) of increasing alienation of work, (B) of revolu-
tionary disturbances, and (C) of decreasing alienation of work will be called a formational
cycle.
114
CHAPTER 7
The Cyclical Development of Socio-Economic Formation
If we put aside the still unsolved problem of the hidden "consumptive motor",
one can say that within Model V a new phenomenon appears: the cyclical
nature of the development of socio-economic formation. Such a single cycle
is a result of the changing class relations and is characterized in the same
manner as the whole movement in earlier models: by changes in the aliena-
tion of work resulting from the state of the class struggle. However, in preced-
ing models the whole motion of a given formation was a single "cycle" -
cyclicity was an extra-formational phenomenon, while in Model V it comes to
be an intra-formational one. In a sense, a single cycle is a "miniature" of the
motion of socio-economic formation. The cyclicity appears since within
Model V it is possible to come out of the revolutionary phase without a
change in the relations of ownership - due to the progress of the productive
forces. This enables the owners to save their ownership relations at the price
of periodical improvements in the economic position of the class of direct
producers. The progress of the productive forces stops the mechanism of the
class struggle leading - in the conditions of a stable technology - to the
transformation of one socio-economic formation into another. This techno-
logical progress turns out to be the force for conservation of the class division.
At that point the Marxian ambiguity reaches its apogee.
The Business Cycle in Free-Market Capitalism and the Formational Cycle
Let us consider whether there are some connections between the formational
cycle as described above and the business cycle known of the development
of free-market capitalism.
In the stage of the increasing alienation of work the (global) variable
capital of the working class gradually decreases which lasts until the top
point in phase B is reached; afterwards this trend is upturned and in the
part of phase B and in phase C the variable capital increases; next the latter
trend turns up again and the variable capital falls; and so on (see Figure 5).
A fall of the variable capital (that leading to a growth of the alienation of
work) entails a fall of the effective demand on the part of the class of direct
producers, whereas a growth of the variable capital (that resulting in a decrease
of the alienation of work) implies an increase of the purchasing power of the
masses. If the effective demand goes down, the dead surplus value rises;
if it goes up, the dead surplus value is reduced. The first phenomenon is
characteristic for the period of an "overproduction crisis"; the second one
THE PECULIARITY OF CAPITALISM
115
- for the period of prosperity. And hence the division into "crisis periods"
and "prosperity" periods would overlap with phase A and the ftrst part of
B and the second part of B with phase C, respectively. If the "transitional"
sub-period is omitted for the sake of simplicity, this could be graphically
illustrated as in Figure 6.
B
Fig. 6.
Let us consider this more carefully. Let society S be marked in the initial
period with the alienation of work below the threshold of class peace. Let
in this period I the global product be PI = C
I
+ VI + MI ;while the effective
demand, as usual, is C
I
+ VI + M'f. If this hidden "consumptive motor"
did not act, the enlarged reproduction would not - in the conditions con-
sidered here - occur at all. Let us still assume, however, that this secret
factor works giving the additional demand x for the new production, and
hence the effective demand in this period is DI = C
I
+ VI + M'f + x; let us
assume for the sake of simplicity that x is constant. Due to this, a fund of
accumulation may be invested from the dead surplus value M I - M'f. The
problem is, how is the fund? Disposers of the productive forces of previous
formations did not have such troubles: their fund of accumulation was deftned
by their additional demand for goods and services. Capitalists must assess
this increase in the demand - let it be 0
1
and be equal to the whole dead
surplus = 0
1
=M
I
- M'f; the dead surplus value will be zero.
However, we are still in the phase of increasing alienation of work where
the usual mechanism of the diminishing of the variable capital acts. It
must not take the form of a drop in wages; furthermore, the extension
of unemployment and the replacement of the work of men by that of women
Qower paid work), etc., are admissible and, as the history of capitalism
teaches us, actual. Anyway, the variable capital VI is diminished by some
value WI. As a result, in the next period 2, the product isP
2
= C
2
+ V
2
+ M2
where P
2
is greater than PI (at least by the value of the technical surplus
116 CHAPTER 7
PT) and V
2
is less than V I by the value of the wastage WI' As a result, the
effective demand is in the second period less than in the ftrst one by value
WI: D2 = C
2
+ V
2
(= VI - WI) + + x. If we assume that the wastage
of the (global) variable capital is still less than the value of our hidden effec-
tive demand (Le., if WI is less than x), then the same process repeats itself
in the second period. And so, capitalists assess the demand for enlarged
production investing in this degree, but the normal mechanism arising out of
the production leads to the further diminishing of the variable capital.
However, after some time the sum of wastages of the (global) variable
capital balances the value of the "consumptive motor": WI + ... + Wi -1 =
= x. Then, though global product Pi is still greater than that of the last
period, the effective demand will be only Di = Cj + Vi + + x, where Vi =
= VI - WI - W
2
- - Wi-1 = VI - x, and so D; = Cj + VI +Mf. The
additional "consumptive motor" does not help any more: capitalists make
assessment OJ and investment decisions to an appropriate degree, but will be-
come aware of this painful mistake in the next period where increased global
production Pi + 1 does not ftnd consumers and overproduction occurs. The
increasing exploitation liquidated the work of the hidden "consumptive
motor".
The reaction of the capitalists is, of course, to diminish further the "costs
of production". siflce the used implements must be replaced with the new
ones, this reduces itself to even further taking away of the variable capital,
and Vi + 1 is diminished even more. Thanks to this the purchasing power of
the masses becomes more limited and the selling conditions become worse.
The worse they are, the more the variable capital is cut off - the crisis
becomes deeper and deeper. The lack of investments results in stagnation:
the enlarged reproduction stops. The hidden "consumptive mechanism"
cannot help any more, unless it increases; this is, however, for a time excluded
- which agrees with the historical conditions of free-market capitalism.
Fortunately for the private capitalist economy, a class struggle is taking
place and the increasing alienation of work results in its growth. In the age
of crisis the destiny of the economy depends entirely on the intensity of
class struggle. Finally, the resistance of the workers forces the capitalists to
make concessions by increasing the variable capital. The working class be-
comes quiet again according to the drop in the alienation of work, but
simultaneously the increasing variable capital constitutes a greater and greater
effective demand. This reduces the dead surplus value accumulated during the
time of crisis and the economy may start anew.
The interpretation of the business cycle outlined above is undoubtedly
THE PECULIARITY OF CAPITALISM 117
simplified from the economic standpoint, but it makes it possible to show
that the principal cause of the crisis is the increase of capitalist exploitation
and the limitation of the purchasing power of society is only its result. And
the economy comes out of the crisis thanks to the struggle of the working
class which forces the capitalists to make concessions and leads to their
required (though not understood) improvement of the conditions of selling.
Capitalists evoke the crisis, workers liquidate it.4 Whatever one may say
about the soundness of this interpretation from the point of view of the
economic theory of capitalism, one thing seems to be quite evident: it is an
orthodox Marxist interpretation.
The Business Cycle as an Upturned Formational Cycle
But all the rest is not. For let us consider what follows from the class inter-
pretation of the business cycle of early capitalism. One of the consequences
is that the business cycle corresponds to the formational one in a definite
manner as in Figure 7.
f'

<J, <l.

THE THRESHOLD S
OF THE CRISIS
CRISIS
Fig. 7.
It can be seen that the phase of the depression (the diminishing of effective
demand but with some surplus of the "consumptive motor" over the sum of
wastages of the variable capital) corresponds to that of the increasing aliena-
tion of work, the phase of crisis to that of revolutionary disturbances, and the
phase of prosperity to that of decreasing alienation. The point is, let us add,
not in the formal correspondence but in the identity of social mechanisms
- the mechanism of class struggle expressed in the formational movement
leads in the conditions of free-market economy to the consequences such
as shown in the business cycle. Using a more traditional phraseology one
118
CHAPTER 7
could say that the business cycle is a form expressing its hidden nature - the
formational cycle.
Of course, the outlined interpretation of the business cycle is a rough
project that should only be elaborated from the point of view of the theory
of economy. Nonetheless, it is hard to resist the surprise that such a simple
idea based immediately on historical materialism has not been used - as far
as I know - by Marxist economists looking for the explanation of the cyclic
nature of the capitalist economy in many different factors of a purely eco-
nomic kind. Should it not suit it, the idea that in the movement of masses
of commodities, leaps of prices, in the disarray on the money-market etc. the
"red line" of the class struggle winds its way? However, it should not.
For the formational cycle is nothing more than the accelerated (in the
conditions of the continuous and intensive growth of productive forces)
motion of socio-economic formation. The only difference is that instead of
the evolution of the ownership relations, an improvement in the living condi-
tions of the direct producers comes. This is due to the surpluses the progress
of technology gives to the owners. And this saves such a formation from
evolutionary disappearance: that is, it enables it to repeat itself in the succes-
sive cycles. They come rather quickly in comparison to the previous forma-
tions; however, capitalism is the first one with an incessant and intensive
growth of the productive forces. Capitalism is, then, the area of the ineffi-
ciency of the same mechanism of the class struggle that was so effective for
such a long time pushing class societies in the evolutionary transitions.
The revolutionary struggle of the exploited was never the cause of transi-
tions to new formations opposite to what Marx maintained. However,
for the two first formations it was able to push them into the evolutionary
transformations of the relations of ownership. In capitalism even this dis-
appears: the working class is only able to force capitalists to raise wages every
ten years (throughout this chapter a free-capitalist economy is being con-
sidered). Relations of ownership are unchangeable (see also Section D, Part I).
And the working class, despite persuasions, is not inclined to engage in their
change. In short: capitalism cannot be overthrown by the working class. This
does not mean that it is immortal. It is overthrown, but by quite different
social forces which make also of the working class a self-satisfied petit-bour-
geois mass.
How to identify these forces? That is the question for a non-Marxian
theory of socio-economic formation.
THE PECULIARITY OF CAPITALISM 119
An Attempt to Identify the "Consumption Motor" of Society in Model V
In order to pose the question properly let us come back to the gap in our
construction. What could this secret "consumptive motor" be? What assures
the economy a sufficient level of effective demand in the phases of increasing
alienation of work?
The simplest way would be to bend R. Luxemburg's steps and to state that
it is the "external environment" which creates the effective demand for the
society under consideration. The author of The Accumulation of Capital
treats, to be sure, the capitalist world-system as a whole, but it would be pos-
sible to find a rather simple way out. One could, namely, take into account
the sphere of influence of a given society in the non-capitalist environment
which creates an effective demand for it. This would require us, of course, to
reject assumption (8). The "consumptive motor" for a given society would
then, be its sphere of influence in the non-capitalist society.
However, this is entirely unacceptable. It would follow from this solution
that the lesser the sphere of influence a given society possesses, the greater
the troubles with the surplus value, the weaker the growth (enlarged repro-
duction). In consequence, a comparison as to the rate of growth between a
country having a great sphere of influence (e.g., a great colonialist country)
with a country having a small one would have to reveal great difference. This
is, however, evidently false. Table I gives the comparison between the rates of
growth of great colonialist countries and some non-colonialist countries from
the beginning of the capitalist development in a given country to the period
1924/29.
TABLE I
Average rates of growth (in %) over 10-year periods
Country Period Products in general Per person
Great Britain 1801/11-1925/29 27.9 14.1
France 1831/40 1929 20.1 17.0
Germany 1850-1925/29 25.1 13.5
Denmark 1865/69-1925/29 32.2 18.8
Norway 1865/69 1925/29 25.4 15.5
Sweden 1861/69-1925/29 31.9 23.8
Source: calculated on the basis of data given in: S. Kuznets, The Economic Growth of
Nations, Polish translation, Warsaw 1975, pp. 47-48.
120 CHAPTER 7
The conclusion is obvious: the principal source of effective demand cannot
lie outside a given society. Also the "extensive" factors (e.g., raw materials
or reserves of land etc.) cannot play the role of the "consumptive factor" we
are looking for. Otherwise, such countries as the U.S.A. or Canada would
greatly outdistance Denmark or Sweden in their rate of growth. And this was
not so. (See Table II.)
TABLE II
Average rates of growth (in %) over 10-year periods
Country Period Products in general Per person
United States 1800-1925/29 48.7 16.9
Canada 1870/74-1925/29 37.1 17.0
Italy 1895/99-1925/29 24.6 16.9
Japan 1874/791925/29 43.3 28.5
Source: ibid.
Also culture-type factors are excluded - the protestant "spirit of capital-
ism" did not have much to do with the matter, since for catholic Italy the
indices are quite similar; and none of the cultural factors could be suspected
of being the "consumptive motor" for in Japan things were also quite similar.
Another possible explanation is a historical one. One could suspect that it
was necessary for creating an effective demand that there should have been a
high enough level of production at the beginning of the industrial develop-
ment. However, the case of Japan falsifies the supposition. All today's (eco-
nomically) developed countries began their industrial growth with a relatively
high GNP per head about 200 $. Japan began with a GNP three times less
but the rate of her development was the highest (Kuznets, ibid., p. 36).
Another historical factor could be including the "internal non-capitalist
environment" in the range of influence of the capitalist market - the new
strata of population creating the new market demand as the natural economy
is liquidated. This factor can, however, act in the first phase of increasing
alienation, maybe in some subsequent ones, but certainly not all the time in
free-market capitalism. And the rates of growth, e.g., for England for tens
of years. are shown in Table III.
At the end of the 19th century in England there were no residues of
natural economy, and yet the economic growth was significantly accelerated.
THE PECULIARITY OF CAPITALISM
TABLE III
Average rates of growth for England (in %) over lO-year periods
Period
1801/11-1831/41
1831/41-1861/71
1861/71-1891/1901
Source: ibid.
Products in general
32.1
23.8
38.6
Per person
14.5
10.3
23.3
121
None of the prima facie obvious solutions is accurate. In order to identify
the "consumptive motor" let us look at drafts illustrating business cycles. For
instance, in J. A. Estay's book on Business Cycles (after the Polish translation,
Warsaw 1959) such a diagram is composed in the following manner. Periods
of prosperity are indicated by the colour white; of depressions with grey;
and of crisis with black. Moreover, the letter "w" indicates the fact of being
in a state of war with some other country or of civil war. The point is that the
letter "w" occurs exclusively on white ground.
Let us summarize our considerations. The "consumptive motor":
1. occurs in all capitalist societies; and
2. in each period of the development of such a society; and, moreover,
3. it is not connected with international (intersocietal) relations;
4. it does not consist in the employment of some special resources of a
given society;
5. it does not consist in the continuation of the high level of development
attained before the capitalist stage;
6. it is not any cultural factor (of the sphere of consciousness, attitudes,
etc.);
7. significantly increases its action during wars.
Such a factor is the state.
How surprising, one could say: everybody knows that the state creates
an additional effective demand, that this intensifies during a war etc. Sorry,
not everybody. Karl Marx did not know this. And also his supporters do not
know it today. For Marx maintained, and so do his followers today, that the
economic base determines the politico-legal surperstructure and accordingly
to this the state does not appear in Capital at all. In three big volumes of his
economic theory of capitalism Marx did not find the place for the analysis
of the economic role of the state though he discussed tens of technical factors
of a specifically economic nature. He was convinced that the state is only a
122 CHAPTER 7
committee organizing the interests of the bourgeoisie and he was planning
to introduce it in the further volumes of the proposed great work the first
part of which is known as Capital. And for somebody who understands the
Marxian method of idealization this is the most severe charge against him.
For the lack of a place for the state implies that Marx considered it as a very
secondary factor which may be omitted until the time all the purely economic
factors have been analysed in detail, that is, in further, derivative models of
his theory of capitalism. Until now Marxist economists introduce to the
theory of reproduction a small part of the state activity, namely armaments,
and then only in further derivative models. Besides this, the state is analysed
mainly in a purely empirical, descriptive manner aiming at proving that it is
still a committee arranging the interests of the bourgeoisie.
However, if the argumentation of this chapter is correct, then actually
the internal necessities of capitalist production show that the capitalist
economy is not independent -- it cannot, on the strength of its internal
mechanisms, assure for itself the effective demand needed for its develop-
ment. And since it was developing - and even in a way unknown in history
due to the intensive growth of the productive forces -- then such a factor had
to occur. And it did, but not in the sphere of economy but outside it, in the
sphere of politics. And actually the state has been since the very beginning
one of the main factors for the development of capitalism, creating some
minimal effective demand for its commodities. It is not a mere accident, as
we shall see in Part I, Section D, that the modern bureaucratic and militaristic
state was developing along with the development of capitalism. Clerks and
soliders, not producing themselves but using more and more specialized pro-
ducts, were, and are, creating the minimal effective demand for the capitalist
economy.
This will be analyzed in detail in Part I, Section D. What is important here
is a negative conclusion: that Model V for capitalist society, with variables
of a purely economic nature, turned out to be impossible to construct. Eco-
nomic variables were sufficient to construct models of slavery and feudalism,
but not to model capitalism.
The Necessity for Rejecting the Assumption about the Lack of a State
Apparatus
It follows from this that capitalism is not a socio-economic formation. Con-
trary to Marx, the set of principal factors determining its development does
not contain exclusively economic factors. It does contain a new variable -
the existence of the apparatus of coercion. In other words, the "base" of
THE PECULIARITY OF CAPITALISM 123
slavery and feudalism was in fact composed of elements of an economic
nature, while the "base" of capitalism is a mixed one, composed of some
elements of economics but also of politics. And this is not because of the
necessity of restraining a wandering economy, but because of the neces-
sities of the economy itself.
This fact expresses itself on a methodological level as the impossibility of
the construction of Model V. Therefore, this task of modelling the capitalist
society must be undertaken anew, but after the removal of the assumption
about the lack of the state, that is, assumption (C). This assumption elimi-
nates, as it turned out, one of the principal factors in the capitalist society.
The Falsity of the Marxian Idea of "Economic Base" and "Politico-Legal
Superstructure"
The more general conclusion that follows from all this is that the Marxian
view that the "politico-legal superstructure" adapts itself to the "economic
base" fails already for capitalism. The system which is within the Marxist
tradition treated as the classic exemplification of the. Marxian historical
materialism deviates most from this theory ... within the European line of the
development.
In order to consider the possibilities of constructing a historico-materialist
model of capitalism it is not sufficient to recall economic factors alone. It
is necessary to analyse in historico-materialist terms in what the state consists.
Only after this, in Section D, can we come back to the task of building a
theoretical model for capitalist society.
NOTES
1 It is suitable here, I think, to add the following. The economic considerations of
this book aim to show that it is possible to introduce the "production-consumption"
problematic also on the territory of Marxist political economy. If I am not wrong, the
main ideas of the Keynesian-Kalecki economy could be achieved within the Marxist
economy by the path opened by R. Luxemburg. The economic considerations of this
book may perhaps be treated as an attempt to supply this "lost link". From the eco-
nomic point of view as such they do not say too many new things: from the point of
view of Marxist political economy, however, they perhaps show in what way this path,
opened by R. Luxemburg, could be developed further. Of course, this goes beyond the
limits of the author's competencies and is, as every step of the kind, a risky venture.
But it was necessary: we shall see further on how much the solution of R. Luxemburg's
problem for capitalism changes the traditional, and wrong, Marxist views on the perspec-
tives of capitalism.
124
CHAPTER 7
2 There is among them the historically given assumption that within the directional
unitary society the fund of luxury is stable. As a matter of fact, obviously, it increases,
but this is a secondary source of the effective demand in capitalist society: that is why,
in its theoretical model we shall assume for the sake of clarity that it does not play any
role at all. Otherwise, the course of the chapter should be all the time interrupted with
restrictions concerning the increase of Mk which, in fact, is much less significant than the
increase of demand on the part of the masses of direct producers.
3 Let us here add that - as has been said earlier (see Chap. 4 above) - some silent sim-
plifying assumptions are adopted here. Especially, economic considerations are based
not only upon the general idealizing assumptions formulated on the level of historical
materialism but also upon some special conditions of the kind adopted in Marxian
political economy as exposed in Capital, vol. I. In other words, economic considerations
of our models proceed on the level of abstraction appropriate to the most abstract
economic model of Marxian economic theory (cf. L. Nowak, The Structure of Idealiza-
tion. Towards a Systematic Interpretation of the Marxian Idea of Science, Reidel 1980,
Chapters 1--11). Hence, the trade capital, banking system etc. are omitted; also assumed is
the lack of any organizations on the part of capitalists and workers; the lack of com-
petition among workers on the market of labour; etc. Under these assumptions the
relationship between the two antagonist classes is the only regulator of the employed
systems of appropriation - as it occurs in vol. 1 of Capital. Obviously, if the economic
solutions of the Marxian economic theory of capitalism are false - and this is, of course,
not excluded then this counts against the general theses of this chapter as well. It is
impossible, however, to discuss these matters here - both the space and the author's
competence arc too limited.
4 Let us make an additional remark. One may say that according to the proposed inter-
pretation, the cyclic nature of free-market economy reveals itself in disturbing and
restoring the relationship: the fund of accumulation = the surplus value - the fund of
luxury (or: the dead surplus value = zero). If the notion of the dead surplus in Keynesian
economics could be identified as the difference between savings and investments, then
Keynes' idea that the cyclic nature reveals itself in disturbing and restoring the relation-
ship: investments = savings would be formally analogical. This, however, covers some
substantial difference as resulting from a kind of assumed more general theory: it is
(non-Marxian) historical materialism and not psychology that is assumed here. That is
why the essence of the business cycle . according to the interpretation outlined in this
paragraph is not the fluctuation of the marginal efficiency of capital resulting from
entrepreneurs' optimistic or pessimistic predictions, but the changing state of the class
struggle which leads to the fluctuations of the effective demand and changes in accumu-
lating activity.
C. THE LIMIT A nONS OF MARX'S DISCOVERIES.
THE GENERALIZA nON OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM
CHAPTER 8
THE BASIC LIMITATION OF MARXIAN HISTORICAL
MA TERIALISM
The Fundamental Weakness of Marxian Marxism: The Sphere of Politics as
the Superstructure
Our considerations led to the point where it becomes impossible further to
continue Marx's idea about the domination of the "economic base" over
the "politico-legal superstructure". It has turned out that the construction
of a model of capitalist economics which would abstract from the role of
the capitalist state is impossible - at least on the ground of the theory of
socio-economic formation outlined in this book. Of course, if anyone does
not understand the Significance of the problem posed by Rosa Luxemburg,
or does not agree with the solution of this problem proposed here, then he
may be of a different opinion from the principal conclusion of our considera-
ti ons so far.
However, if the conclusion in question is correct, then one may state
that the economic theory of the capitalist economy developed in Capital is
basically incorrect - in the sense that it does not refer to the aspect which
is one of the principal factors for the functioning of capitalist economy,
namely, the economic role played by the state. It is not a mere accident
that problems concerning the "additional demand" have not been noticed
by Marx at all, and that it was Keynes only who gave them their proper
place in the field of the economics of capitalism. If so, Marx, when con-
structing his theory of the capitalist economy, made the very mistake Rosa
Luxemburg accused him of - he presupposed an improper hierarchy of
significance of factors influencing the economic phenomena. But his actual
fault in the field of political economy consisted in something different
from what Rosa Luxemburg suspected - not in the elimination of the "non-
capitalist environment" but in the elimination of the state within a given
capitalist economy.
Following the economic consequences of this mistake and bUilding a non-
Marxian, but still Marxist, political economy of capitalism transcends the
present writer's competence. One thing, however, seems to be clear enough
- that the abandoning of the role of the state in the economic theory of
Marx follows from his idea about the primacy of the "economic base" over
126
THE BASIC LIM ITA TlON OF MARXIANISM 127
the "superstructure" the state belongs to. This idea seems to be the weakest
point in historical materialism.
Justification for the latter claim could be found in the last chapter where
it was shown that the functioning of the capitalist economy is impossible
on pure economic principles. This justification, however, presupposes the
theoretical construction developed in this book. That is why it seems to be
suitable to recall here also some purely empirical argumentation.
The Prediction of the Withering away of the State
The measure of the validity of a scientific theory is the adequacy of its
predictions. Many of the predictions made by the classics of Marxism
turned out to be confirmed, but some do not. Among the latter there is
one prognosis which evidently testifies that Marx's way of grasping the
relationship between "economics" and "politics" is entirely false:
The intervention of the state organs into social relations becomes needless in one field
after another and dies by itself. Ruling the people is replaced by management of things
and of production processes. The state is not 'abolished', but dies (F. Engels, Anti
Diihring, Polish translation, Warsaw 1949, p. 276).
The evident falsity of this prediction does not by itself oppose the Marxian
historical materialism. The classics predicted, for instance, that only Russians
and Poles among Slav nations will be able to create and maintain their own
states. Nevertheless, this forcescast has not been drawn from the theory
of historical materialism but was a result of assimilation of some popular
opinions spread among the German intelligentsia in the nineteenth century.
And this is the reason why the falsity of the prognosis in question does
not contradict the Marxian historical materialism. The collection of beliefs
of a given author is something different than his theoretical system. Not
every author's belief belongs to his system and, besides, not everything which
belongs to the system is an element of the set of the author's beliefs.
In order to decide whether the falsity of the forecast concerning the
withering away of the state denies the Marxian social theory or is accidental
(as the falsity of the prognosis about the Czech's, Bulgarian's, etc., inability
to create their own states), the justification for it must be considered. Here
is Engels' reasoning:
The proletariat seizes the state authority and changes the means of production in the
state property first of all. Doing this it abolishes itself as the proletariat and also all
128
CHAPTER 8
class differences and contradictions; thus it abolishes the state as the state. The hitherto
existing society moving within the class contradictions needed the state, that is, the
organization of the given exploiting class which is to secure its external conditions of
production, and especially to retain the oppressed class in the conditions of exploitation
determined by the existing mode of production .
. .. Becoming finally the actual representative of the whole society, the state renders
itself needless. A t the same time when there is no social class to exploit ... the special
oppressing authority ~ the state ~ becomes unnecessary. The first act when the state
really represents the whole society constitutes simultaneously its last independent act as
the state. The intervention of the state organs into social relations becomes needless
in one field after another and dies by itself. Ruling the people is replaced by management
of things and of production processes. The state is not 'abolished', but dies (ibid., pp.
2 7 5 ~ 2 7 6 .
This reasoning does not allow any doubts: (I) the state in capitalism, as
in earlier formations, is the tool of carrying into effect the economic interests
of the owners of the productive forces; (2) nationalization involves the
disappearance of the class division in socialist society, hence the state ceases
to be a centralized organ bringing pressure to bear from one class on the
other, and (3) gradually, as such an organ, it dies. No doubt that premises
(1) and (2) are taken from Marxian historical materialism. No doubt
either that conclusion (3) is a false statement: the socialist state does not
wither away: rather, quite the opposite trend could be observed. If so,
then the falsity of the prognosis in question falsifies the Marxian historical
rna te rialism .
Of course, there is always the possibility of using the means employed
for centuries: to change the meaning of the terms involved. One may, then,
reconsider what in Engels' reasoning "the state", "withering away", etc.
mean. If one does so deeply enough, it is rather easy to obtain truth from
falsity.. .
Stalin's Defense of the Prediction of the Withering away of the State
The last person who had the courage to theoretically defend Engels' predic-
tion that
(I) the more class contradictions disappear, the more the state
withers away
was 1. W. Stalin. Later on, in the official Marxist literature, subterfuges and
perplexing silence has dominated.
Stalin states in one of his works that Engels' prediction "is right", if "one
THE BASIC LIM ITA nON OF MARXIANISM 129
considers the socialist state from the standpoint of the internal development
of the country ... isolating the country and the state from the international
situation in order to simplify the study" (J. W. Stalin, Problems of Leninism,
Polish translation, Warsaw 1949, p. 602). Thus Stalin equips Engels' predic-
tion with a simplifying assumption, obtaining the following forecast:
(2) if the connections between a given society and the rest of them
are abstracted from, then the more class contradictions disappear,
the more the state withers away.
Let us add that from the substantial, and not the interpretative point of
view, replacing the prediction (1) with (2) is fully justified - no doubt that
the "international factor" disturbs the working of the basic regularities of
historical materialism. Further doings of our author seem, however, to be
less convincing.
One can reconstruct them as follows. From the one side he approximates
the prediction (2) for the situation when "socialism has won in all countries
or in the majority of them", and thus "there is no danger of an agression
from the outside and there is no need to strengthen the army and the state"
(ibid., p. 602). He makes, then, the prediction:
(3) if the majority of the countries in the world will be socialist,
then the more class contradictions disappear, the more the
state withers away.
But - asks Stalin - how to decide this question "if socialism won in only
one, isolated country and thus the point cannot be discussed in abstraction
from international conditions?" (ibid., p. 602)?
Engels does not give the answer to this question .... Engels assumed as his point of
departure that socialism has already won more or less simultaneously in all countries
or in the majority of them .... It follows from this at the same time that one cannot
enlarge Engels' formula about the destiny of the socialist state in general to the par-
ticular and concrete case of the victory of socialism in one isolated country which is
enclosed within a capitalist environment ... and which must have at its disposal a well
trained army, well organized penal organs, and thus must have a strong enough state
- to have the possibility of defending the achievements of socialism against intervention
from the outside (ibid., pp. 602-603).
One would, however, be quite mistaken to think that in Stalin's view the
complement of thesis (3) is simply the thesis:
130
(3')
CHAPTER 8
if the minority of the countries in the world are socialist, then
despite the disappearance of the class contradictions in each
of them, there will occur the process of the withering away of
the socialist state, but greatly delayed.
For, as is commonly known, the author has put forward the doctrine of the
strengthening of the class struggle in the course of the building of socialism.
Therefore, he does not accept the thesis (3') as one could expect, but quite
the opposite one:
(3") if the minority of the countries in the world are socialist, then
in the face of the increase of class contradictions in the course
of the building of socialism, there will occur a process of
strengthening of the socialist state in each of them.
It turned out, then, that it is not the adventitious external factor which
weakens the tendency to the self-liquidation of the socialist state, but the
increase of the internal class contradictions which entirely stops it. The
tendency is not disturbed but does not occur at all! There must be something
important here for the real nature of socialist society to cover if our author
makes so strange a jump in his reasoning. In fact, there is. Let us notice that
the antecedent in the thesis (3") is entirely superfluous: if all the countries
were socialist, then the increasing of the class struggle inside each of them
forces the socialist state to be more and more strong. "First, it is necessary
to liquidate the kulak ... That's enough". That is why what was actually
maintained by Stalin was that
(4) in the face of the increase of class contradictions in the course
of the building of socialism, there will occur a process of strength-
ening of the socialist state in each of them.
And the thesis was simply purely ideological rationalization for the new
rulers to keep the means of repression in their hands and to retain in this
way the social inequality in a socialist society.
This conjecture may be supported by recalling the further destiny of
the doctrine of the withering away of the socialist state after the death
of Stalin. As usual, the doctrine is passed over in silence, but contradictory
doctrines are put forward from time to time instead. "The highest bonus
of ours is the socialist state", the leader of the Polish nation has said quite
recently. It turned out at last, then, that what was believed to wither away
as a superfluous excrescence of the transformed structure of the social
THE BASIC LIMITATION OF MARXIANISM 131
life is still necessary, even axiologically, and as such must persist. The only
change which appeared within the official doctrine of the socialist state
after Stalin's death is that - all the same - the hidden conditional (4) has
been changed into the unconditional statement
(5) in the course of the building of socialism there will occur a
process of strengthening of the socialist state in each socialist
country.
The reasoning leading from (I) to (5) is recommended to the sovietologists.
No doubt they are able to invent a new logic which justifies it. If they are
able to find the new logic in the demagogy of Lenin's speeches ... The
matter is the more urgent that also in their countries the rationalization of
the strengthening of the state becomes the more and more urgent social
task.
Speaking seriously, the passage from the doctrine of the withering away
of the socialist state to that of the (sociological, axiological, or whatever)
necessity of its existence has nothing to do with the logic of reasoning
but has very much in common with the logic of things. The intellectual
somersaults made by the official ideology confirm by themselves that it
tries ineptly to conceal something which must be important for the material
interests it mystifies. In order to become aware of what is hidden by it,
one should criticise the Marxian historical materialism more strongly than
we have done before.
The Two Fundamental Discoveries of Karl Marx
It is my deepest conviction that all of us are indebted to the author of Capital
for great, if not the greatest, discoveries in the history of social thought.
Precisely for the two: it is a matter of fact that he did not manage to make
the two discoveries together.
Pre-Marxian social thought - if a non-historian may say this so firmly
- was both idealistic and individualistic. Explaining the course of history,
scholars referred to rather easily recognizable factors: to the moral rules
people were observing, or to the ideals ("principles") particular historical
periods or nations were following, that is, to the ideal factors. On the other
hand, the subject of history was limited to individual persons' acts - mainly
the doings of eminent people: the masses were not accounted for at all.
Marx was a man who gave rise to a new, both materialistic and holistic
tradition, in the social sciences. The first of his discoveries was the materialist
132 CHAPTER 8
grasp of the determinants of historical motion. As the main factor for his-
torical change he has revealed the so little perceptible one as the productive
efficiency of the tools people use in everyday, dull work. The relations of
production adapt to the state of the productive forces, and to the former
the politico-legal institutions adapt in tum, while all of these (the "social
being") determine the state of social consciousness. This is said in Marx's
three well-known formulas:
(A) productive forces determine the relations of production;
(B) the socio-economic base determines the politico-legal super-
structure;
(C) the socio-economic conditions determine social consciousness.
Such a replacement of the structuralization of the social life from an idealist
into a materialist one is, in fact, a great scientific discovery. It is not, how-
ever, what constitutes the kernel of Marxian historical materialism
1
. More
strictly, not this alone.
For there is also another discovery rejecting the individualistic grasp of
social history. The real subject of history is the actions of the masses of
oppressed people depending upon the relationships of the class of direct
producers with the class of owners of productive forces - mainly upon the
relation of exploitation, its scope and intensity. What is taking place on
the scene of history basically depends on what the masses of direct producers
do, and even what they are striving to do. And also this discovery reject-
ing the "valet's grasp of history" belongs to the discoveries of the highest
importance.
There are two tasks concerning the discoveries in question. The first
was dealt with in the preceding section: it is the problem how to make one
discovery of the two. There is also, however, another limitation to them,
for they are still based on the legitimacy of the idea of the domination of
"economics" over "politics". Yet, both the attempt at the construction
of the theory of capitalism in the preceding chapter and the empirical argu-
mentation concerning socialism we have lightly touched upon in this chapter
suggest univocally that the idea is groundless. Therefore, even if the attempt
to remove the Marxian ambiguity presented in Section B is correct, the
non-Marxian theory of socio-economic formation is far from being a theory
of society in general. Neither capitalist society nor socialist society fall
under it. That is why Marxian discoveries have to be criticised not only
because no way of unifying them has been shown, but also because they
are in a sense limited in themselves.
THE BASIC LIMITATION OF MARXIANISM 133
The Limitation of Marx's Discoveries
It is many people's prejudice that the Marxian historical materialism applies
to the socialist societies as it does to the capitalist ones. But this is not
actually the case. As for the latter, we have seen that the economic theory
based on the Marxian idea eliminating the sphere of power from the field
of significant factors for economic processes, is impossible. How introducing
the factor of power makes possible the historico-materialist grasp of cap-
italism, we shall see in the next chapter. As for the former, the Marxian
idea of the primacy of economics seems to be quite worthless.
Let us recall the standard definition of socialism as a system with the
means of production as social property. It follows from the definition that
I am one of the owners of the means of production in my society. But what
does this say about my social status in my society? The evident answer is:
nothing, since everybody in my society is a partial owner of the means
of production. This implies that the definition of socialism referring to the
basic category of historical materialism, that of relations of property, is
lacking in any explanatory power. The theory in question fits socialist society
much worse than capitalist society - in capitalism the statement that such
and such a person is one of the owners of the means of production has
rather great explanatory power. The basic categories of the Marxian historical
materialism are not beside the point in the case of capitalism (thOUgh they
are not sufficient for themselves) as they are in the case of socialism. That
is why within capitalism Marx's theory is partly a science and partly an
ideology, whereas within socialism it is a pure ideology only.
In general, the categories of Marxian historical materialism lose their
validity for socialist societies. Let us take the simplest example. Let us ask
whether an economic plan belongs to the "socialist economic base" or rather
to the "socialist politico-legal superstructure"? It cannot belong to the eco-
nomic base since it is a set of rules of behavior for enterprisers enacted by the
state organs. Then, it must belong to the politico-legal superstructure. But if
this is so, how is it possible to explain from the Marxian point of view that
socialist firms aim mainly at the fulfillment of the requirement of the plan? Is
the "economic base" subordinated to the "politico-legal" superstructure?
Maybe the Marxian laws do not work? Yes, that is what actually takes place:
economy is not the "base" and politics is not the "superstructure" of a
socialist society. This standard Marxian order is insufficient even for capital-
ism and it is simply upturned for socialism: the Marxian laws do not work
at all.
134
CHAPTER 8
The Idea of the Generalization of the Marxian Discoveries
The impossibility of the historico-materialist theory of capitalism, and both
the falsity of the prediction of the withering away of the state and other
reasons because of which Marx's theory does not apply to the socialist
society, lead in the same direction - to the relationship between the "sphere
of economics" and the "sphere of politics" within Marxian social theory. Let
us look once more, then, at the basic discoveries of the author of Capital.
Let us begin with the analysis of the first which resolves itself into a
certain hierarchy of the following elements: the implements of production
(productive forces); relations of production; politico-legal institutions;
social consciousness. As long as we deal with societies of the economic
type (e.g., slave), the theory based on such a hierarchization of the com-
ponents of social life plays the explanatory role quite well. It is not neces-
sary, however, that precisely this hierarchy is the hidden structure of social
life. It might be so that such a hierarchy always plays this role or at least
does so in those societies where the Marxian historical materialism fails. But
what is specific and what is general in the Marxian hierarchization?
According to the general conclusions of our previous considerations let
us look at the "sphere of politics". One can distinguish here a special kind
of material implements - the means of repression. There is also a kind of
division in a society between those who have the means of repression at
their disposal (the analogue to the class of owners of productive forces)
and those who have not ('citizens', but in the factual, not juridical, sense).
One may also distinguish, by analogy to the relations of the organization of
labour, the relations of power among rulers (Le., people who dispose the
means of repression in a given society). And as the relations of production
adapt to the level of the productive forces, so the relations of power adapt
to the means of repression - more effective implements of the kind enable
such a reorganization of power which increases the scope of power of
the rulers over those who are deprived of the dispOSition of the means of
repression (citizens). Furthermore, this state of affairs is sanctioned by
the appropriate legal institutions (constitutional or state law), and on all of
these the political consciousness of the people depends.
Also in the sphere of politics one meets, then, the hierarchy of the same
type as the one known from Marxian social theory: implements of a cer-
tain type: social relations; legal institutions; social consciousness. Maybe,
what is general within the Marxian hierarchization is the relationship between
technology (but not necessarily the productive one), social relations of
THE BASIC LIMITATION OF MARXIANSIM 135
organization (but not necessarily relations of production), legal institutions
(here again - not necessarily sanctioning economic interests), and social
consciousness (again: it need not rationalize economic interests only). In
consequence, one could suspect that the first of Marx's discoveries is, so
to speak, in its very point of departure too narrow, too limited. Maybe
Marx has discovered only some particular case of a certain more general
structure, of the material structure of social life. The latter is what is common
to both the sphere of politics and that of economics, and perhaps also to
other spheres of social life. That particular case discovered by the author of
Capital is of the first rank of significance, as it allows for the explanation
of social development in so large a time framework. It is not, however,
general enough. Marx's discovery, although great, is still limited - as are all
real discoveries. Universally valid statements are only commonplaces.
Let us look now at the second of Marx's great discoveries in the field
of the theory of history. It reduces itself, in its deepest intention, to the
idea that it is the disposal of the productive forces which generates the prin-
cipal division of a society and that the struggle of both parts of this division
decides about the "direction of history". One may notice, however that
the disposal of another kind of material implements which are means of
repression generates the division of society as well. Society may be divided
into the class of those who have the means of repression at their disposal and
the class of those who do not. The armed minority (rulers) can be placed in
opposition to the unarmed majority (citizens) on a theoretical level because
of this simple reason that they oppose each other in real life. As the relation-
ship of exploitation is based, in the last resort, on the inequality in the
disposal of productive forces; as the relationship of domination is based,
in the last resort, on the inequality in the disposal of the means of repression
- both the social relations have their grounds in the possession (or in the
lack of it) of some material implements, or in the possibility of making
decisions concerning the goals, and ways, they are to be used for. As exploita-
tion leads to the resistance of the exploited people and to their struggle with
the owners of the productive forces, so does domination lead to the resistance
of the oppressed against the disposers of means of repression and to the
struggle of the former against the latter. It is silly to think that people oppos-
ing the system of prisons, torture and invigilations "in the very essence of
things" fight to improve their standard of living. And in the 20th century
this became much more silly than it was one century ago.
One may suspect, then, that also the idea of the class struggle is insuf-
ficiently general. Neither the concept of a class nor that of class interest
136
CHAPTER 8
are general enough, since they presuppose the view of the primacy of eco-
nomics over politics as the eternal, purely metaphysical truth. Not only
productive forces but also means of repression give rise to social inequality,
and the masses form history not only on the level of the economic but
also on that of political life. There are many types of material implements
which give rise to many types of social inequality among people, the latter
being decisive about the class divisions of a different nature; the economic
one is only one of them and must not play the role of the "last resort"
once for ever. It seems to be, instead, an imperative of the Marxist type
of thinking to consider the masses as a real subject of history both from
the theoretical and axiological point of view. One should not forget, however,
that masses of direct producers form only one kind of mass - another is
the mass of citizens, and maybe also some other. And there is no meta-
physical necessity, inherited in the over-historical nature of society, that
only direct producers form the course of the development. After the his-
torical period when it was the case, there begins another one - where the
decisive role is to be played by the masses of citizens.
Also, the second of Marx's greatest discoveries is, then, limited. And the
reason why it is so, is the same - the metaphysical assumption that economic
factors are throughout all human history the main components of it.
This is precisely what should be overcome. This is actually what makes
understanding of modern societies impossible for us. This is, in fact, what
is the best ideological curtain for the brutal material interest that govern
all of us.
NOTE
1 In contradistinction to what I have claimed some time myself: see 'On the Categorial
Concept of History', Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Human-
ities, vol. 2, no. 4, 1976, reprinted in: Communication and Cognition, vol. 12, no. 2,
1979.
CHAPTER 9
AN ATTEMPT AT A MARXIST THEORY OF POWER
The theory of power, or rather the lack of any, turns out to be the weakest
point of Marxian social theory. Let us try, then, to outline some main points
of the theory of power that would be both an application of the Marxian
methodological rules and also a striving to say about the sphere of politics
something more than that it is subordinated to economics. It must be very
convenient for politicians to consider themselves, and to be considered by the
rest of the people, as not having their own interests but being servants of the
"economy". Especially in those societies where the only active economic
agents legitimized for making economic decisions are politicians themselves.
Actually this is the main reason why Marxism is an official ideology of
societies of this kind.
POWER
Elements of the Theory of Power in the Marxist Classics
The theory of power that will be outlined below is based on two basic ideas.
First, that the disposal of the means of repression is in the sphere of politics
actually the same that the ownership of the means of production is in the
sphere of economics. This implies that the disposal of the means of coercion
is a separate criterion of the division of society into the (political) classes, and
it is actually such phenomena taking place within the sphere of politics which
we depend upon; and it is only one kind of society where the phenomena in
question are more dependent upon the struggle of (economic) classes (e.g.,
slavery or feudalism, to a lesser extent also capitalism). Second, within the
sphere of politics one can fmd the same hierarchization the Marxian historical
materialism fmds within the sphere of economics: implements of a certain
kind; the appropriate social relations; the appropriate social institutions; the
corresponding type of social consciousness (see the preceding chapter).
One should notice that some elements of the ideas in question may be
found in the works of the classics of Marxism, for instance in the famous
paper by V. I. Lenin 'On State'. There is contained there the thought that the
criterion distinguishing rulers from other people is the disposal of the forces
of coercion:
137
138 CHAPTER 9
When there appears such a separate group of people who take ruling as their sole occupa-
tion and who need for ruling a special apparatus of coercion, of compelling people to
submission by force - prisons, special troops of people, army, etc. - then there appears
the state .... The methods of coercion were changing, but whenever the state existed,
there was in each society a group of people who ruled, dominated and kept in their
hands the apparatus of the physical coercion, ... armed in compliance with the technical
level of each epoch in order to remain in power (Y. I. Lenin, 'On State', in: K. Marx,
r. Engels, V. I. Lenin, On Politics, Polish translation, Warsaw 1972, pp. 248,250).
It is clear, I think, that some of the elements of the ideas in question are
contained in the quoted passages. It is clear, one may conjecture, that not
all of them are there. What is lacking is the thought that inequality in the
disposal of forces of coercion leads in itself to the struggle between the rulers
and the ruled. What is lacking is, then, the understanding that the disposal
of the forces of coercion generates not the division of society into "groups"
but into social categories being comparable with (economic) classes. This is
excluded in advance by treating the rulers as the "political representatives"
of the owners alone, and the ruled peoples' protests as the reflection of their
economic interests alone. The possibility of grasping of internal laws of
motion in the sphere of politics is excluded in advance - in spite of the
promising point of departure - because of the acceptance of the assumption
that "The state is the machinery for the treading down of one class (sc.
economic class -- L.N.) by the other" (ibid., p. 252).
This is precisely what - being justified for one type of society only -
makes it impossible to see the peculiar material interests of the rulers and
the ruled enabling them to playa role comparable with that played by the
(economic) classes. This is actually what makes it impossible to see that
within the sphere of politics there work some internal regularities analogical
to the Marxian ones working in the sphere of economics, and that this is
what enables us to treat the former as being as autonomous as the latter, and
that the degree of the autonomy of both is historically changeable.
The Latent Mystification in the Modern Marxist Conception of Power
The more Marxism became a pure ideology, the stronger was the stress on the
secondariness of the state with respect to the economy. For Engels ('The
Origins of Family, Private Ownership and State', in: Works, vol. 21, the Polish
edition, Warsaw 1969, pp. 187-188) the state is a territorially organized caste
of functionaries disposing the "public authority" composed of "not only
armed people but also of material supplements such as prisons and all kinds
of institutions of coercion", and also possessing the "right to levy taxes".
A MARXIST THEORY OF POWER 139
For Lassalle the state is an unhomogeneous organization (administrative,
judiciary etc.) possessing "the real, factual means of power - the stable army
which is the actual constitution of ... society" (F. Lassalle, On the Essence
of Constitution , Polish translation, Warsaw 1960, pp. 98, 109,81).
For Labriola "The state is something as very real as the system of forces
sustaining the social balance, and impelling people, with the aid of compulsion
and repression, to respect this balance" (A. Labriola, Drafts on Historical
Materialism, Polish translation, Warsaw 1961, p. 181).
For Lenin "what constitute the essence of the state" are "armed troops,
prisons and other means of compelling people by force to submit" (op. cit.,
p.248).
For all those Marxists writing at the time when Marxism still combined
the functions of science and of ideology, the thesis that the state serves the
interests of the class which is economically the strongest one was a factual
(synthetic) statement. For modern Marxists playing mainly, and in many
cases exclUSively, the role of ideologists of the socialist society, the servant
role of the state to the class of owners becomes a defmitional property of
the state:
The state the political organization of the economically dominating class for the
crushing of the resistance of its class antagonists. Of its essence every state is an appa-
ratus of the dictatorship of the dominating class (N. Aleksandrow, 'Gosudarstwo', in:
Filosofskaja enciklopedija (in RussianL vol. I, Moscow 1960, p. 395);
The state is a means in the hands of the ruling class serving for the suppression and
oppression of the working people. of the exploited masses (A. Sheptulin, Filozofia
marksizmu-leninizmu (Polbh translation). Warsaw 1973. p. 347; in the original this
formulation is distinguished by italie;
Definition of state. A state is the public authority in a society, based upon the means of
extra-economic coercion monopolised in service with the economically dominating
class .... This authority ensures the persistency of ownership relations which are the
foundation of the economic domination of this class (S. Kozyr-Kowalski, and J. Ladosz,
Dialectics and Society (in Polish), Warsaw 1972. p. 287; in the original this formulation,
part of which has been quoted, is distinguished by italics).
In reality the state makes itself free from the influence of economics
each decade more and more and, in the end, subordinates the economy to
itself; but in Marxist theory exactly the reverse process holds - it stresses
the servant role of the state towards the economy, which should become
stronger and stronger, making of it, in the end, the defmitional property
of the state. Undoubtedly, it is the ideological process, in Marx's sense
140
CHAPTER 9
of the tenn, which serves to blur the essence of the phenomenon under
consideration. Apparently, the "modern Marxist theory of state" conceals
something. The question arises: what? This is precisely the principal question
of the present chapter.
Actions and Social Reliltions
Besides the two above-mentioned initial ideas, I am adopting here also some
more general ideas concerning the interrelations between the "level of social
practice" and the "level of social structures (systems}". According to the
leading motive of the presented conception, I shall try also in this point
to generalize one of Marx's solutions from Capital. The latter deals with
the relationships between labour and the relations of (organization of)
production.
Labour is according to the understanding in Vol. 1 of Capital - a
conscious, purposeful activity of a man leading to the transformation of
some material into a certain product. It is, however, its "genus proximum",
whereas its "differentiam specificam" is that it is done - for a given period -
within some constant relations of (organization of) production. It is, then, a
productive activity repeated in the framework of defmite relations connecting
economic subjects. The relations in question constitute a kind of relatively
stable structure composed of the relations of cooperation, division of work,
management, etc. That is why different processes of work may be undertaken
under the same relations of production, but the change of the latter leads to
the change of the former. With the relations of production being changed
only some component activities of the process oflabour may still remain. The
process in itself, that is, the entirety of the coexistence or of the succession of
particular activities, changes along with the transformation of the old system
of relations of production into the new one.
For an individual subject of a particular activity this organizational struc-
ture is something which is given, that is, something which his own acts,
whatever kind they would be, cannot vary. It can, instead, undergo a change
in the result of mass acts undertaken by the participants of the process of
labour- when they begin to change the partial activities of their own, then
the structure itself starts to alter as well. In this case new partial activities
start to proceed under the new type of interconnections between the partici-
pants of the process. If so, then the question concerning the conditions under
which the relations of productions vary reduces itself to the question as to
the conditions under which it becomes possible, and necessary, that the
A MARXIST THEORY OF POWER 141
participants of the productive process start to undertake other partial activi-
ties than those they usually do. The latter signifies that the structure of
interconnections between people participating in the process varies, that is,
that the new partial activities are undertaken under the new organizational
structure.
This point of view, one which seems to me to be a Marxian one, can be
generalized to cover the connection between actions and social relations in
general. The latter may be expressed in the form of the following (meaning)
postulates:
1. All the actions are undertaken under social relations of the appropriate
type holding between the subjects of those activities;
2. For a separate subject of the process, the totality of the relations in
question constitutes some independent whole given in advance which his acts,
whatever kind they may be, cannot alter at all; if he undertakes the activity
the structure requires, he helps it to keep its existence, but if he forbears
from this, nothing changes - the totality keeps itself due to other peoples'
activities as well ;
3. The totality under consideration is dependent upon mass actions alone
- if the significant majority of the participants of the process in question
alter their partial activities, then they come into new type of contacts among
themselves; this is the only way the old totality transforms itself into a new
one.
One could say, then, that interpersonal relations constitute a kind of
hidden structure of individual activities of the appropriate type. No change
of a particular activity alters the totality of the relations in question. It is
only mass-actions of the participants of the process under consideration that
may bind among the latter a new totality of relationships.
The Stmcture of Power
The internal structure of the phenomenon of power may be presented as
being fonnally analogical to that of production. The forces of coercion can be
shown to be a counterpart of productive forces. The disposal of the former
gives to some people prevalence over other people which is of the same type
as the disposal of the latter. That is why, society is divided not only into
those who dispose the productive forces (owners) and those who do not
(direct producers), but also into those who dispose the forces of coercion
(rulers) and those who do not (citizens).
Similarly, as in the case of productive forces, the basic sociological
142 CHAPTER 9
characteristic of the forces of coercion is not, so to speak, their technological
effectiveness (how many people may be killed, or imprisoned or invigilated
etc., in a unit of time? - this would be a measure of this type), but the social
inequality connected with the disposal over them. In other words, what is
sociologically relevant in the notion of the forces of coercion is the fact that
only some people have the possibility to decide for what goals and in what
ways the forces of coercion are to be used. Those who actually make effective
decisions concerning these will be termed rulers, while all other people will be
called citizens. These definitions are entirely lacking in any juridical connota-
tions. It might be so that a ruler in our sense is not legitimized in his social
role by legal or customary rules of any kind. Similarly, a citizen is somebody
who is lacking in the real world the possibility of making effective decisions
concerning the goals or the ways the forces of coercion are to be used. And
this is entirely different to what things are like in the world of law - even if
his own constitution calls him a ruler and gives him all the rights involved,
he remains only a citizen in our real, not fictitious, meaning.
Each ruler has his own sphere of control over citizens' acts (actions or
forebearances from them). Due to the possibility of recalling the forces of
coercion he is able to compel a citizen (citizens) to undertake some acts that
would be otherwise (i.e., without his dictate) not done at all. And similarly as
it is necessary to put aside the illusions owners make of themselves in order
to reveal the actual rule of their behavior, so it is in the case of the people
who govern other people. Just as the rule revealing the true nature of owners
tells us that they maximize the surplus value, so the true nature of rulers
is revealed by saying that what they maximize is the sphere of control. In
both cases the statements in question are abbreviated forms of some ideas
concerning inter-human relationships. An owner can maximize the surplus-
value due to the increasing exploitation of his direct producers alone, while a
ruler can maximize his sphere of control due to depriving citizens of their
capacity of making more and more decisions by themselves.
In both cases, that of an owner and that of a ruler, going along with the
illusions they, or their ideologists, produce of themselves leads to the worst
imaginable results. Only a vulgar bourgeois economist may believe that it
is a social interest that guides a capitalist - Marx was perfectly right in this.
Only a vulgar Marxist, however, may believe that it is the idea of the free and
self-realizing brothers and sisters that guides a party official. How vulgar these
ideas are, in fact, it is easy to recognize by proposing to a typical capitalist to
give away his fortune to the workers that have produced it, or to the chief
of the communist party to give the disposal over the secret police to the
A MARXIST THEOR Y OF POWER 143
self-government institutions (but lacking any cells of the party with their
"leading role"). Whatever they will tell us about the sincerity of their inten-
tions and their good will, one thing is certain - there is no possibility for
their resignation of the privileged position they occupy. With one exception
whose name is: force. The force of those who suffer from their privileges.
I do not see any reasons why in our theoretical analysis we should go along
with the words owners and rulers produce to cloud the actual state of affairs.
It would be cognitively more accurate to go along with the acts they under-
take to keep it. In fact, social theory is nothing more than making aware of
why the acts must be as they are in given conditions and in what conditions
the latter could be overcome.
The rulers form the social class that should be distinguished since it dis-
tinguishes itself in reality by having some material interest that remains in
contradiction with the interest of the citizens. Each ruler strives for the
maximum scope of control over citizens' acts, but it is much easier, and safer,
for him to enlarge his control over those acts that were not controlled until
the time being by any of the other rulers. That is why, all the rulers have
some interest in common - it consists in enlarging the whole sphere ofregula-
tion of the category of rulers over citizens' acts. More and more new types of
acts are to be subordinated to some of the rulers, the power of the whole
category is to increase that is, what the common interest of all of them
consists in. If social life has not reqUired enough such acts to satisfy the
growing appetites of the class of rulers, it becomes necessary to create super-
ficial ones, and the "overgrowth of bureaucracy" takes place. The greater
is the sphere of regulation over citizens, the lesser is the sphere of their
autonomy, that is the range of acts which still undergo decisions of those
who undertake them. Since people usually hate those who take from them
without any equivalence what they produce, there is a contradiction between
the interests of owners and direct producers. However, people at least in the
same way hate those who try to force them to make what the latter want
instead leaving the right of making decisions to those who are appointed to
undertake acts themselves. That is why there is a contradiction between the
interests of the rulers and those of the citizens. The greater the sphere of acts
controlled by the former, the smaller the area of acts left to those who under-
take them. So the greater the sphere of regulation of power (the class of
rulers) over the citizens, the smaller the sphere of autonomy of the latter.
The sphere of control and that of autonomy are negatively correlated as are
the surplus-value and the variable capital.
The counter-argument of the rulers' ideologist that it is rather good for
144
CHAPTER 9
a citizen if rulers play their function in the proper way since they arrange
many matters important for the citizen himself, lacks any convincing power:
especially if it is put forward by the modern embodiment of rulers' ideologist,
that is, by the Marxist- since the latter does not even try to recognize
whether there is a sphere of matters important for workers which may be
better arranged under private property than under the lack of it. And the
two cases should be equally treated. If they are not, the worse for classical
Marxism which mystifies the sphere of power making impossible the compari-
son of what is evidently comparable. Not to mention that the "explanations"
in question are purely ideological justifications of the privileged of this world.
Shouldn't one rather ask whether the subordinated desire to be deprived of
some part of the value made by themselves or of some sphere of their free-
dom, respectively, is in order to profit from what is recommended by our
ideologist? However, the workers' control over the private ownership is the
last question that may be discussed as long as capitalism exists in a given
society. And citizens' control over power is the first question that may not
be discussed as soon as socialism comes into being in it.
And it would be more advisable for Marxists to apply the Marxian method-
ology, as for the phenomenon of power, rather than to imitate the "method-
ology" of vulgar bourgeois social science. It would become, then, quite
evident that a Marxist should see in the phenomenon of power first of all the
contradiction of interests of the great groups of people resulting from the
different positions they occupy in the society due to unequal disposal of a
certain kind of material implements, namely - of the means of repression.
Maybe, it is necessary that forces of the type exist in every society. However,
it is entirely certain that no necessity compels people for ever to bear with
the small minority having them at their disposal.
Civic Alienation and the (Political) Class Struggle
For each society in a given time a certain scope of expected civic autonomy
may be ascribed. It is the set of acts (actions or forbearances from them) the
citizens of a given society feel to be dependent upon the decisions of their
own. Certainly, the scope of acts of the type may be different for different
societies and also may vary in a given society in time. However, for a given
society and for a given time it is established. Now, the civic alienation in a
given society depends upon the difference between the sphere of expected
civic autonomy and the actual sphere of autonomy the power leaves to
citizens; and also upon the severity of sanctions impending to those who
A MARXIST THEORY OF POWER 145
would have the courage to violate the power's interest, undertaking an act
which is forbidden or forbearing that which is obligatory.
The level of the Political struggle of the class of citizens against the class
of rulers primarily depends on the level of civic alienation. By the political
struggle the class of citizens carries on against the class of rulers (in short:
the political class struggle, as distinguished from the economic class struggle)
are meant acts of the enlargement of the actual sphere of civic autonomy
according to expectations proper to the class of citizens at a given time. The
relationship between the level of civic alienation and the level of political
class struggle is, similarly as in the case of the economic class struggle (see
Chapter 4), not a simple monotonic dependency. This is because there is such
a value of the alienation of the citizens which does not induce them to engage,
on a major scale, in the struggle against rulers but rather to negotiate with
them in order to liquidate the difference between the actual and the expected
sphere of autonomy to the end. Thus, the intensity of the political class strug-
gle (measured in the frequency of acts of disobedience enlarging the actual
sphere of autonomy) is very low if the value of the civic alienation remains
below a certain value which will be termed the threshold of (the political)
class peace, but the in tensi ty of the struggle increases rapidly if the civic
alienation surpasses that level. On the other hand, there is such a high threat
of repression for disobedience that nobody takes the risk to violate openly
the power's regulations. In such conditions of the police system civic resis-
tance disappears everybody limits his interests to his private sphere and no
kind of social cooperation among citizens can be made. People threatened at
every moment in their and their closest's life are not inclined to fight for an
improvement of their civic conditions in the face of power. In such conditions
the civic society transforms itself into the society of isolated atoms and the
rulers do not meet any serious resistance any more. The death of the society
means a full life for the power. That value of the alienation of citizens
below which the intensity of their struggle against the rulers falls rapidly
will be named the threshold of declassation of citizens. Between the two
thresholds there occur the interval of revolutionary alienation where the
political struggle of citizens against the rulers takes on the common fonn,
that is, a majority of citizens allow themselves to violate prescriptions im-
posed by the power.
So, it may be supposed that the curve which shows the dependence of the
intensity of political class struggle upon the civic alienation is of the form
shown in Figure 8.
146
INTENSITY
OF T HE POUT ICAl
CLASS STRUGGLE
CHAPTER 9
Threshold
of class peace
Interval of
revolutionary
alienation
THE CIVIC ALIENATION
Fig. 8.
The Balance Condition for the Political System
Threshold of
declassation
Until this point our considerations have shown the analogy between the
sphere of politics and that of economics. Differences begin when the question
as to the balance condition is posed.
For the economic system (see Chapter 4) the balance condition is that the
process of production gives a variable capital high enough not to induce the
direct producers to form a mass struggle with the owners, and a
high enough not to induce the owners to revise the relations of property. It
follows from this that the level of the variable capital also cannot be too low
leading to the atomization of the direct producers - in this case the result
would be a radical fall in the productivity of work which, in turn, would
cause a corresponding great fall in the surplus-value.
The citizens refrain from mass struggle against the rulers either if the
political alienation is high enough, or if it is low enough. However, this does
not entail that in the latter case the interest of the rulers is somewhat violated
- as was the case for the owners. On the contrary, precisely in such condi-
tions where the citizens are atomized, when they are declassed not being able
to bind any persistent social relations, the interest of the rulers may be ful-
filled the best. A beggar is a very bad producer but a subjugated citizen is
perfect raw-material for a ruler. That is why too low a level of economic
alienation results in the infringement of the owners' interest, whereas too low
a level of political alienation enables the rulers to fulfill their interest the best
- no resistance on the part of the citizens may be expected any more. The
class of owners that leads their direct producers to extreme poverty would
deprive itself of any fear of the revolution, but high profits as well. The class
A MARXIST THEORY OF POWER 147
of rulers that leads the citizens to extreme sUbjugation not only deprives
itself of any fear of a revolution, but also only then may enlarge its sphere
of regulation as much as possible. In short, too high alienation of work makes
further maximization of the surplus-value impossible, and even diminishes it,
while the higher is the civic alienation, the greater is the sphere of regulation
of the power over the citizens. Thus, the balance condition for the political
system is the following:
(v) the process of ruling in a society must bring either a level of civic
alienation lying below the revolutionary interval or must lead to
such a great sphere of regulation, or so intensive a repression, that
under it the level of civic alienation will be below the threshold
of citizens' declassation.
Too high an exploitation violates the interest of the exploiters. But the higher
the political oppression, the better the interest of the rulers is satisfied.
Property is an Issue of Less Social Contradictions than Power
If what has been said until now is true, then there follows from this the
important conclusion: the interests of the direct producers and of the owners
can be harmonized whereas the interests of the rulers and citizens cannot.
There is such a possible division of the live value into the surplus value and
the variable capital that further diminishing of the latter leads in its turn to
the diminishing of the former. There is no such division of social practice
into the sphere of regulation and that of autonomy, under which further
diminishing of the latter would lead to diminishing of the former. There is
a limit for property, there are no limits for power.
That is why we cannot even formulate for the political system the counter-
part of the question which has been posed for the economic one (Chapter 4).
In the latter case we have asked whether the abstract possible society giving
"sufficient" (in the sense of condition (w)) to the two of its antagonistic eco-
nomic classes is possible historically. Now a question of the type cannot be
posed at all. For a society giving "sufficient" (in the sense of the condition (v))
to the two of its antagonistic political classes is impossible even abstractly.
Determination of Relations of Power by Coercion Forces
Rulers form a social class connected with a kind of relations, namely relations
of power: of the subordination, of the division of competence, etc. The
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internal structure of the class of rulers expressed in the notion of relations
of power is connected by a simple dependency, being an analogue of the
Marxian one, with some categories introduced above.
Let us assume that: given is a set of rulers each connected with some
organizational relations (relations of power), each of them having a sphere
of control due to the application of, or the threat of using, force. Let us
assume now that there has occurred a growth in the level of the forces of
coercion, e.g., some new technical devices have been invented making possible
the deepening of control over citizens. However, it is still purely a technologi-
cal possibility - the invention of the tape-recorder does not by itself increase
the sphere of control of any ruler. Only if the latter want to use it to achieve
this goal and if they rearrange the existing organizational structure to employ
the technical potential of the gaining of new informations about citizens,
only on these conditions can a new invention of a technical nature influence
the relationship between the rulers and the citizens.
No doubt. however, that these conditions will be met each time when the
development of technology opens up new possibilities of a purely material
nature. For those of the rulers who do not employ these possibilities, what-
ever their motives would be, will find themselves in a much worse situation
than those who do understand the repressive potential the development of
technology brings along. The position of a ruler within the hierarchy of power
depends basically upon how large is the sphere of citizens' activities he con-
trols. One who makes use of the innovations the development of technology
(in the largest sense of the term) affords, improves his position at least rela-
tively, that is. in comparison with other rulers who do not do this. As a result,
the structure of subordination connections among rulers, that is, the net of
relations of power binding them, changes. Those who make use of the techni-
cal (in the largest sense) possibilities go up within the hierarchy of power
while rulers who are belated, or maybe full of scruples, lose their positions,
at least relatively.
As a global result of taking advantage of the possibilities opened up by
technological (sensu largo) innovations, that is, as a result of enlarging by at
least some rulers of their spheres of control due to employing the new means
of control, the change of the structure of subordination among the rulers
takes place. The structure somehow adapts itself to the new level of the
forces of coercion, but in such a way that the global sphere of regulation of
power over the citizens enlarges itself.
This is not the only type of change the relations of power undergo under
the influence of the growth of the level of forces of coercion. The latter leads
A MARXIST THEORY OF POWER 149
also to some adaptative processes of a, so to speak, praxiological nature -
to enlarge particular spheres of control it is necessary to change the division
of competence, of ways of gaining and transmitting information, etc. All of
them, however, fall under the same scheme: the relations of organization of
power are being changed in such a manner that the global sphere of regulation
enlarges itself due to the actual or potential use of new forces of coercion.
Relations of organization of power adapt themselves to the attained level of
coercive forces. This is the global result of the cumulated, particular rulers'
drifts towards the enlargement of their individual spheres of control by mak-
ing use of all the potentialities offered by the existing level of the forces of
repression. Whoever does not employ them loses influence and becomes, in
the end, defeated in the competition with other rulers.
All this may be formulated in sum in the formula about the determination
of the relations of organization of power by the forces of coercion:
(PI) out of the set of historically given systems of organization of
power that one becomes widespread in a given society - under
the given level of the forces of coercion - which yields the
maximum sphere of regulation of the class of disposers of the
forces of coercion over the rest of this society.
Thus, the organizational progress adapts itself to the technological one both
in the sphere of economics and politics. The difference lies in the criterion of
adaptation: maximization of the surplus value in the first, and maximization
of the sphere of regulation in the second case. Both, however, express the
prevailing of the oppressing minority over the oppressed majority.
DOMINATION
Power and Domination
At the beginning of this chapter we discussed the distinction between actions
and the social relations they presuppose, the latter being a kind of "hidden
structure" of the former. The distinction reveals something of importance as
far as the phenomenon of power is concerned.
The power consists in a kind of influence some people exert upon the
actions of some other people. As the result of the effective ruling some acts
that would otherwise not be undertaken are, in fact, done and some others
that would be otherwise done are. in fact, avoided. Generally, the method
which is applied by people making the power is enacting general or individual
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rules. And it is often force that guarantees the effectiveness of the rulers'
orders, though also custom and the faith of citizens in the legality of power,
etc. are other important factors influencing citizens' behavior. These things
are rather well known due to the sociology of politics starting at least from
M. Weber's famous distinction between the three types of power.
However, the current paradigm of the science of politics does not distin-
guish between power and domination. The latter, though strictly connected
with the former, is a quite different phenomenon undergoing quite different
regularities. Rulers have power over citizens if they interfere in the domain of
social practice influencing people to forbear from what they would undertake
or to undertake what they would forbear from. Rulers, instead, start to
dominate over citizens if they begin to interfere in social relations among
them. The actual subject of the domination, as distinguished from the power,
are not citizens' acts, but social relations that bind citizens themselves. When
power liquidates the private ownership of independent publishers or church,
etc., it does not rule, but interferes in social relations: it manifests its domina-
tion over society. The domination may be supported mainly by physical
force. People can in special circumstances ... on the basis of the faith in the
legality of the order, of the charisma of the ruler, etc .. - refrain from some
acts; they cannot, however, refrain from being held in some social relations
with other people on this or a similar basis. Or at least - they cannot refrain
from this on a mass scale. For actions and forbearances are in principle de-
pendent upon peoples' will, while the structure of social relations connecting
people together is much more independent from it. No kind of charisma of
the leader induces a typical merchant to forbear from trade, a typical peasant
to voluntarily get rid of his land or a typical intellectual to voluntarily break
off with his paradigmatic tradition. For all of this to happen as a rule, terror
is necessary, and on a mass scale.
With the aid of mass terror the rulers eliminate social relations indepen-
dent of them, making of the "civic society" - that is, the complex of inter-
personal relations binding citizens before and independently of the apparatus
of power an assemblage of mutually isolated individuals. Autonomous
social relations are replaced with artificial social relations that bind citizens,
not by themselves, but through the ruling apparatus as an intermediary
medium. What follows is the infiltration of cells of power into the deep
structure of social life. The dominating apparatus is not yet an external super-
visor that corrects only what is going on independently of it, as the ruling
apparatus is. It becomes, instead, an element of the internal structure of
social life imposing on the citizens not only acts but also relations they come
A MARXIST THEORY OF POWER 151
into. Thereby the control of the rulers over the citizens increases rapidly.
There is no better way for controlling peoples' behaviour than to introduce
the representatives of the dominating apparatus into the structure of social
connections. If one of the members of the (artificial) social relation is a ruler
who may always make recourse to the forces of coercion, then all the acts
undertaken by the citizens under the relation in question are directly con-
trolled by him. An independent workers' union could not follow all the
orders, but if each decision it makes must be confirmed by the party's cell,
the probability of disobedience radically falls. And the sphere of regulation
radically increases.
Let us call the division of social relations actually holding among citizens
into autonomous and artificial relations a system of domination. The system
of domination of a given society and at a given time delimits in a way the
actual sphere of intervention of the ruling apparatus into the sphere of social
relations. If the artificial domain of social life is empty, the ruling apparatus
makes power alone it controls peoples' behaviour, impelling, or compelling,
them to refrain from some actions and to undertake some others with the
aid of the giving of some rules. If it is not empty, then the ruling apparatus
dominates over some part of social life at least regulating human behaviour
through eliminating some and creating other interpersonal relations; in this
way the achievements of the apparatus in the field of the control of human
acts are secured much better.
The Formula of Domination
The interference with social practice is the first step the rulers undertake, and
only afterwards can the second be taken - interference in the domain of
social relations. Peoples' acts must be controlled if the power is to make an
attempt to dominate their source. That is why the liquidation of autonomous
social relations and replacing them with artificial ones can take place only in
those domains which are already regulated by the hierarchy of power. And
since the present relations of (organization of) power in a way delimit the
division of social practice into the regulated and autonomous spheres, then
the state of the domination over social relations being the deep structure of
the social practice depends also upon the existing relations of power.
The scope with which the power transforms itself into domination, that is,
the scope with which social relations are artificialized, depends primarily
upon the resistance it meets on the part of the citizens. The latter are influ-
enced, as we remember, by the level of civic alienation. The hierarchy of
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power goes so far in the infiltration of social life as the citizens allow it. This
is what may be stated in the formula:
(P.2) Out of the historically given systems of domination, that one
survives in a given society - under the relations of organization of
power existing in this society and the level of civic alienation -
which maximizes the set of artificial social relations.
If, then, a definite division of the sphere of social practice into the sphere of
autonomy and that of regulation is taken as the given one (it is established by
the existing relations of power - cf. (P.l, if, moreover, the level of civic
alienation is also taken as given, then out of the historically available systems
of domination, that is, the divisions of the sphere of social relations into
autonomous and artificial relations, that one survives which allows for the
minimum range of the former, and the maximum range of the latter. If the
change in the relations of power or in the level of alienation of the citizens
occurs, then after a time the same process will take place - that system of
domination will survive by "trial and error" in the new conditions which
minimizes the sphere of autonomous social relations.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISOLATED POLITICAL SYSTEM
Let us ask, now, what the development of the isolated political system is like,
if it is assumed that formulas (P.I) and (P.2) are at work. In other words, how
do the relationships between rulers and citizens develop if one omits the factor
that the rulers are at the same time influenced by the owners and the citizens
are simultaneously direct producers? Let us not believe with the vulgar Marxist
that this question based on the assumption of the isolation of the political
system from all others, e.g., from the economic system - is meaningless. He
calls it so since his lords have a serious interest in having the question not
posed. And particularly they do not want us to pose this question on the
ground of the Marxist paradigm.
The Basic Scheme of the Motion of the Isolated Political System
Let us consider, then, recalling formulas (P.l) and (P.2), the changes the
isolated political system, that is, the system composed of the sets of rulers
and citizens, and also the relations of organization of power, of domination,
etc., undergo in time. Since in this stage of our considerations we do not yet
build the theory of social formation this system plays the basic role in, I shall
A MARXIST THEORY or POWER 153
not enumerate the simplifying assumptions that are tacitly accepted in the
due exposition. Let us leave this for another book dealing especially with the
theory of socialism. At present the general ceteris paribus clause must be
sufficient: all the influences upon the relationships between the rulers and the
citizens which come out of the political system are omitted.
Let us consider. then. a society composed of rulers and of citizens, the
political alienation of the latter not belonging to the revolutionary interval.
Then, from the one side, according to (P.l) there occurs the incessant enlarge-
ment of the sphere of regulation of the hierarchy of power over the social
practice of the citizens. This takes place through organizational progress
within the field of relations among rulers which follows the technological
progress within the domain of repressive forces. Out of the different organiza-
tional possibilities. after some "trial and error", that one becomes adopted
which allows for the maximum enlargement of the range of regulation due to
the employment of the existing technolOgical (in the largest sense) capacities
of the forces of coercion. This leads, after some time, to such a system of
organization of power which is the objectively optimum one under a given
level of coercive forces. that is, it yields to the greatest possible scope of con-
trol under the condition in question . of the power over the citizens. As
long as no new development in the forces of coercion occurs, the system of
relations of power will be constant, giving to the rulers as much as possible.
On the other hand there occurs according to (P.2) an incessant diminish-
ing of the sphere of autonomous social relations, and the corresponding
enlarging of the range of artificial social relations, with cells of the power
apparatus being involved in the latter. For the fabrication of social1ife is the
best means of consolidating the achievements the power has made in the field
of the subordination of social practice. If a domain is controlled by the rulers,
then the best way to strengthen this is to liqUidate the autonomous social
relations which bind people within the domain and to replace them with
artificial ones.
The double growth takes place as long as it does not meet the mass protest
of the citizens, which is a result of the fact that at some time the increasing
level of civic alienation reaches the revolutionary interval. This is what ends
the first phase of the development of the isolated political system, namely that
of an increasing civic alienation. It is described by the following statement:
(Pol. I ) if in society S the political system is isolated from any external
influences, then
in successive periods of time, out of the set of historically
154 CHAPTER 9
given systems of organization of power those are adopted in
society S which . under a given level of coercive forces - yield
a non-decreasing sphere of regulation of the class of rulers over
the citizens' social practice, and moreover
in those successive periods, out of the set of historically given
systems of domination those are adopted in society S which -
under the existing relations of power and the eXisting level of
civic alienation enlarge more and more the set of artificial social
relations.
The mechanism described in the above formula must lead to the civic
alienation reaching the revolutionary interval. Under the constant level of
political needs of the citizens, the successive increasing of the sphere of regula-
tion leads automatically to the growth of civic alienation, and, after a shorter
or longer time, the level of civic alienation must reach the revolutionary
interval. Also the liquidation of autonomous social relations causes the in-
crease of civic alienation. In sum, if the level of the political needs of the
citizens is stabilizing, then the mechanism formula (Pol.l) evokes the mass
struggle of the citizens against the rulers.
Of course, the more so if the level of political needs of the citizens in-
creases.
The third possible case is that the level of needs in question diminishes in
successive periods of time. But this may tend only to some constant value;
it is the emptiness of the range of political needs that is the lower limit of
the latter. This does not imply, however, that the level of civic alienation
decreases, since the difference between the expected and actual sphere of
autonomy is only one source of civic alienation. The other is the intensity of
repressions, and the latter must increase along with the fabrication of social
life which causes a growth of civic alienation by itself. So, also the decrease
of the level of political needs of the citizens being the result of the fabrication
of social life leads again to the increase in civic alienation due to the repres-
sions the fabrication presupposes.
Thus, the processes described by (P.I) and (P.2), separately or taken
together, lead to an increase in the civic alienation attaining the revolutionary
interval. Changes of the level of political needs influence the speed, but not
the direction, of the changes the civic alienation undergoes.
Until this point the development of the political system is quite analogical
to that of the economic system. Now the differences begin.
First of all, the economic class struggle consists in the rejection of the
A MARXIST THEORY OF POWER 155
joining of manpower with the means of production under the given owner-
ship relations. This separation of the elements of productive process need not
occur in the form of armed fighting: desertions, strikes, etc. are other forms
of economic revolution. The political revolution consists, instead, in armed
fighting - it is a compulsion which employs the power apparatus against the
opposed citizens and compulsion can be the only answer to the latter.
If so, then the political revolution, that is, the particularly intense struggle
of citizens with the rulers, governs itself with the rules armed fighting gen-
erally undergoes. A better war technique and a better organization of the
forces of coercion stands against numerical prevalence and the spontaneous
will to fight with the oppression on the part of the citizens. The result de-
pends on military factors. The greater the prevalence of the power apparatus
in the domains of organization and technology, the smaller the chances of
the citizens are. However. the longer the period of growth in civic alienation,
the higher its level and the larger the circles of society, including possibly
even the forces of coercion, which are alienation, and thus the smaller the
chances of the supporters of the existing regime. Let us omit matters of the
kind hoping that at some stage the theory of war will be ~ l e to establish the
"laws of victory" that say to a theoretician of history something more than
common-sense tells him.
What is really important from the sociological point of view may be ex-
pressed in the observation that whoever wins, the existing power or the
citizens, nothing changes in the relations between the two. This thesis may
evoke a kind of indignation among popular thinkers. especially on the left
side of the modern political arena, who unmindful of Karl Marx's learning
still take programmes provided that they are politically likable - for inter-
ests, and rationalizations and the latter provided that they are ideologically
attractive enough .. for reality. Let us comment, then, a little bit.
The first point the case of military victory of the existing apparatus of
power - does not require special commentary, since it begins to behave in a
theoretically intriguing manner only in the next phase. For the present time,
it has simply suppressed the revolt and. eVidently, has enlarged its control
over the citizens.
What happens, however, if the phase of increasing civic alienation lasts
so long or the alienation is so common that the army joins the demonstrating
crowds'!
Against the existing power a politico-military organization composed of
the most active citizens always fights who - at least because of the require-
ments of conspiracy is not responsible to the mass of citizens. There is,
156 CHAPTER 9
then, always some elite of the movement of citizens, that is, those who defme
its goals and means of their fulfillment responsible to themselves alone (in
more elegant words: to The People and/or History). What is most important,
however, is that they dispose of the armed forces who constitute the kernel
of the movement. From the point of view of historical materialism they
simply constitute, then, the new class of disposers of the forces of coercion.
For the time being the latter are directed against the old forces of coercion
fighting for ideals of liberation. But ideals of any kind, including Marxist
ones, are not decisive for the course of events. What is decisive is, according
to non-Marxian historical materialism, the disposal of material means, includ-
ing the means of repression. And this forces us to say that inside the citizen
movement there exists in embryo a new class of rulers. As a result the citizens'
revolution consists, in fact, in the fight of the new class of rulers against the
previous one. The difference between them lies in the sphere of ideological
ideals ("liberation" against the "order") and the will (rather a "good" one on
the part of the new, and rather a "bad" one on the part of the old rulers).
There is no difference from the point of view of the actual social status of
the two.
That is why the day after the victory over the hated old regime it turns
out that the main danger for the victorious forces is ... the people itself.
And, speaking properly, its anarchistic tendencies threaten the achievements
of the Revolution. That is why it is necessary to strengthen the new, revolu-
tionary power in the name of the citizens. The former revolutionary army
is enlarged, organized and equipped as well as possible - for the defense of
the citizens' interests. Even if all this is done with so-called good intentions,
it does not change anything: the new class of disposers of the new forces of
coercion fonTIS itself and starts to do what it must do- to subordinate the
citizens to itself more and more. Only the ideology which it uses to conceal
the reality differs a great deal from the previous one. The reality is the same.
The pressure of the new hierarchy of power having at its disposal what the
regular citizens are lacking the new forces of coercion, gives rise to new
oppression and a new form of class division. The class division is the same as
before, because it is generated by the same, namely by the unequal relation-
ship to the forces of coercion. Only its form is different since other people
come into the class of disposers of the means of coercion and another ideol-
ogy mystifies this with the aid of different words.
The so-called "good will" does not change anything in the course of
events. Those of the new rulers who in fact believe in the ideals under the
banner of which they have started to fight with the overthrown regime find
A MARXIST THEORY OF POWER 157
themselves in a worse position than those who do not have scruples of the
kind. And when the former still try to fight for ideals, the latter enlarge their
influence going up in the hierarchy of power. After a time "true revolution-
aries" still having much to say have much less to decide. After some time
more it turns out that they "betrayed the revolution" becoming the "enemies
of the people". Even if the leader of the movement belongs to the category
of "true revolutionaries", this does not change anything. Arising from the
ranks of the new hierarchy of power pressure towards subordination, more and
more new domains of citizens' activity constitute the social force every leader
must reckon with. And the process of taking over the higher and higher posts
by people taking advantage from their superiority over other people, limits
his possibilities more and more. If he will not accept the achievements of the
hierarchy of power in his hidden but every-day struggle with the citizens, he
will be sooner or later overthrown. The popularity of the leader, his charisma,
sincerity, etc. may only slow down the process, not stop it. The direction of
the process is decided by the simple fact that not all the people remain in the
same relationship towards the forces of coercion. Nothing can stop the process
of the forming of the new class of rulers taking all the advantages of its
monopoly for the disposal of the forces of coercion. That is why, the phase
o/revolutionary disturbances is as described by the following statement:
(Pol.2) if in society S the political system is isolated from any external
influences, then
at a time when civic alienation reaches the revolutionary interval,
citizens on a mass scale undertake the struggle against the power
apparatus; as a result, either the existing class of rulers enlarges
its sphere of regulation over the citizens even more, or the elite
of the civic movement replaces the previous hierarchy of power,
becoming the new class of disposers of the new forces of coercion.
Some Ideological Digressions
Why must it be so? Why must every civic revolution lead, at best, to the
"personal change" within the same social order? (Not to mention that the
replacement of the old disposers of the means of repression by new people
may turn out to be much worse than the situation existing before - the new
system of power under new ideological banners starts to make up the losses
of the revolutionary times with increasing speed.) Why must it be so?
The explanation lies in the analogy between the sphere of politics and that
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CHAPTER 9
of economics. Both of them, and not only the latter as Marx maintains by
silence, are based on the inequality among people with respect to the disposal
of some material forces of society, in the last resort - of some material im-
plements. Power, just as property, begins with the differentiation of people as
for making decisions concerning the goals and ways they are to be used. It
is not so important for us to explain genetically how the process of differen-
tiation proceeds historically - as it is not so important for the theory of
evolution how to explain why at the "theoretical point of departure" animals
are differentiated in their properties relevant from the standpoint of external
conditions. What is important is that people are so differentiated, which gives
some of them the social prevalence over the rest, and that such individuals
always occur from the first category (this existential assumption is weak
enough, I think) who will make use of their superiority over those who are
lacking the disposal over the means of repression. And if so, then they who
gain success will be those who accumulate increasing influence in their hands
and eliminate the possibly more idealistic partners out of the hierarchy of
power. The latter as "enemies of the people" begin to belong to the people
itself. And that is all. The only thing which has to do with the process going
along within (the isolated!) political system is the inequality in the disposal of
material forces of society. All the rest is ideological bluster.
This should not be read as the "scientistic negative utopia". This will
explain itself, J hope, in further sections of the book. But even at this stage
of our considerations this may, I think, be easily understood. For from the
conception outlined in this book follows some very simple (theoretically, not
practically) condition for the real victory of citizens, that is, for the replace-
ment of the old disposers of the forces of coercion by the new ones not yet
having occurred. This condition follows directly from the definition of the
political classes. The class of rulers is such a group of people who accumulate
all the decisions concerning the use of the forces of coercion in their hands.
The political revolution will be an effective one only on the condition that it
will not lead to the new accumulation of the decisions of the type in the
hands of some minority. That is, if it will lead to the spreading of the deci-
sions of the kind among all the citizens. In short: if each flat will be armed,
then a new class of rulers will not occur. The point is not to take ideological
declarations of the powers of this world that it is only the state that has the
right to take care of us with the aid of arms which we lack, that this suffices
a "good Tsar" and a "humanitarian ideology". No power will be administra-
tive only, and no ideology serving it will be in fact humanitarian, unless a rifle
in the hands of every citizen will force the rulers and their ideologists to treat
A MARXIST THEORY OF POWER 159
their functions seriously. But this condition which is theoretically so simple -
the spreading of force throughout the whole society - can only be the result
of a very long and historical development costing enonnous sufferings. It is
even hard to imagine how costly this development is. And many social myths
must be overthrown in order to realize it at all.
The above remarks should not be treated as the exposition of a positive
stand. Their only meaning is a negative one - they contradict the too easy
interpretation of my position by classifying it into one of the over-used ideo-
logical shelves. To have the ideological position of the present author suffi-
ciently developed, it is necessary to make many more theoretical and histor-
ical considerations; otherwise it would hardly be understandable. Let us
continue, then.
The Basic Scheme of the Motion of the Isolated Political System (cant.)
Thus the phase of revolutionary disturbances ends with the persistence of
the old class of disposers of the forces of coercion or with the "personal
change" - the replacement of old people by new people, but the latter
occupying the same social position as the fonner. Now the paths of develop-
ment diverge depending upon what takes place.
Let us consider the first case. The armed defence of the citizens has
been destroyed and the ruling class is quite safe in its society. That is why
it increases the oppression of the citizens more and more. It is anything but
"blind revenge" we assume that the rulers are purely rational agents, noth-
ing more. Our assumption concerning a particular ruler is an exact counter-
part to that of Marx concerning a particular capitalist: it is presupposed here
that a ruler maximizes his individual sphere of control (as a capitalist maxi-
mizes his profit). And precisely such an assumption forces us to state that in
the conditions of the post-revolutionary period, when all the resistance of the
citizens dies out, the intensity of oppression increases rapidly and constantly.
In the so-called normal conditions the hierarchy of power is limited in
its natural tendency (according to (P. 1 to the enlarging of its sphere of
regulation. For under the given and constant level of political needs of the
citizens each enlargement of the range of control threatens the acceleration
of the growth of civic alienation and faces the danger of revolution. The
power apparatus under normal conditions must, then, act rather carefully,
keeping up a steady rate of subordinating more and more new domains of
social practice, or it must try to create abnormal conditions - that is why a
provocation is a favourite method in the working of power. Provocations,
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CHAPTER 9
however, are rather provisional means and work for a short time. Instead, a
suppressed revolt gives the hierarchy of power an enormous opportunity to
subordinate the citizens much more than before in a rather short time. By
enlarging the sphere of controlled social practice and by consolidating the
old and new achievements through liquidation of new areas of autonomous
social relations, the hierarchy of power deepens its prevalence over the class
of citizens. And it does so much more effectively than in so-called normal
conditions.
There is no worse business for private property than the mass economic
class struggle of the direct producers against the owners. There is no better
business for the power structure than the mass political class struggle of the
citizens against the rulers provided that the confrontation results in a
happy ending for the latter. For the controlled struggle of the citizens against
the rulers is a dream of all police systems and it is only the unpredictability
of this struggle and the fear of losing control over it that restrains the power
apparatus from employing the method as often as it would wish. Instead the
suppressed attempts at actual revolutions always give the hierarchy of power
great profit. Property comes out of the phase of revolutionary disturbances
with a broken backbone and must evolve by making concessions on the
part of the direct producer. The power apparatus, provided that it turns out
to be victorious. comes out of the period much stronger than it was and still
grows more and more.
What is the theoretical limit of this march of power? It can be easily
identified on the grounds of our general assumptions: it is such an increase
of the control over citizens and such a growth of the repressiveness of the
system that the class struggle decreases below the threshold of dec1assation.
This may be a stable state of affairs provided that the liquidation of auto-
nomous social relations and the replacement of them by artificial ones in-
cludes the most important areas of social life. Due to this the (isolated!)
political system accomplishes the balance condition (see above).
The political system attains the state of balance if either the level of
civic alienation does not surpass the threshold of class peace or it does not
surpass the threshold of declassation of the citizens. The latter situation is
much more advantageous for the rulers since they gain the balance with their
relationships with citizens on much better conditions than those which would
be attainable provided that the civic requirements are satisfied up to such a
degree which reduces the civic alienation below the threshold of class peace.
And the suppression of the citizens' revolution gives the hierarchy of power
actually the chance to achieve a state of balance, that is, to get rid of the fear
A MARXIST THEORY OF POWER 161
of the citizens rising up, and at the same time to deepen his superiority over
the citizens more and more. This is the simple reason why the victorious
hierarchy of power is never "gracious" for the defeated but, rather, is
"brutal". Precisely the latter, and not the former, is much better for its
material interest.
Only the system which has attained a Pyrrhic victory, still being full of
the fear of its citizens, only such a system can go back and try to achieve the
balance lowering the civic alienation below the threshold of class peace. Only
such a system of power can make concessions to its citizens: but this results
not from its force but actually from its weakness. It is the weak apparatus of
power that the citizens can negotiate with. And the weaker it is, the greater
the possibilities of the citizens are. Cases of this compromising type will not
be separately discussed since they fall under the alternative situation that will
be considered below.
Thus the first of the two situations under consideration, the situation
when the regime hitherto in power wins over the citizens who have revolted,
leads to the radical growth of oppression and to the attainment of a state of
balance by the political system:
(Po1.3 .1) if in society S the political system is isolated from any external
influences, then
in the case of victory of the hierarchy hitherto in power
over the rebellious citizens:
in successive periods of time, from the set of historically
given systems of organization of power those are adopted in
society S which -- under a given level of coercive forces -
yield a larger and larger sphere of regulation of the class of
rulers over the citizens' social practice; and moreover
in those successive periods of time, out of the set of his-
torically given systems of domination those are adopted in
society S which --- under the existing relations of power and
the existing level of political needs of the citizens - enlarge
more and more the set of artificial social relations;
the processes last until the civic alienation reaches the level
of the threshold of declassation of citizens.
The political system which has reached the state of balance lasts in immo-
bility. The destroyed social connections do not allow the citizens to organize
any kind of resistance against the power - people are concentrating on the
necessities of life concerning themselves and their families. Any kind of
162
CHAPTER 9
authentic social initiative disappears, social life dies out and goes on only
within the artificial institutions which do not express any interests of any
social category of citizens. This does not mean that they are simply "bu-
reaucratic perversions". There is a category of people whose material interest
is perfectly satisfied by them-- it is the class of disposers of the coercive
forces. It is the only category of people whose material interest consists
precisely in all the other possible categories of people having no material
interest at all. As a result the citizens become robots submissively executing
orders issuing from above and unable to go beyond the beaten tracks. Their
ability to defy new situations radically falls. The system which is optimal
from the point of view of the class of rulers is the most degenerate one in
every other respect: economic, cultural, etc. The omnipotence of the power
structure produces the universal weakness of the society.
Let us consider now what is going on in the second case, when the citizens
take over the power. As has been stated, the other class of disposers of the
forces of coercion forms itself from the elite of the civic movement. The latter
goes on simply in the old social structures making personal changes in them
alone: the elite ensures the monopoly for itself in the disposal of the forces
of coercion appropriate to the last word in technology, and makes in this way
the new division but into the same classes, that of rulers and that of citizens.
What the new hierarchy of power says has no importance. At the beginning
it says all things that sound good for the citizens - this corresponds to the
situation in the "political base" where the level of civic alienation has fallen
as an effect of the victorious struggle with the apparatus hitherto in power.
It might be even so that the level of civic alienation has fallen below the
threshold of class peace and the new hierarchy of power, being hidden under
the banners of the generally accepted ideology, is entirely safe.
But soon the new hierarchy of power does its best to have the threat rise
up. After a longer or shorter period of time - dependent upon the number
of the "true revolutionaries" inside the new political structure - the march
of the new hierarchy to power begins. The system reorganizes itself in such a
manner as to include as many social matters under its regulation as possible,
and simultaneously to ensure its achievements by the liquidation of the
appropriate autonomous social relations. In a word, dependence (Pol. I )
works again. And the story is repeated. Civic alienation increases and a new
phase of revolutionary disturbance begins. This time the masses of citizens
fight against those who previously fought in their name.
The result of the new revolutionary struggles is shown in formula (Pol. 2).
Either the hierarchy of power wins and dependence (Po1.3.l) starts to work
A MARXIST THEORY OF POWER 163
leading to the liquidation of the "civic society" or the citizens win. In the
latter case the process begins anew -- the successive "personal change" within
the hierarchy of power takes place and dependence (PoLl) starts to work,
etc. The process in question cannot repeat itself indefinitely. In the successive
periods of revolutionary disturbances the spontaneous forces of the class of
citizens exhaust themselves and in return it must succumb to a hierarchy of
power that it has just then formed itself. The weakened class of citizens
undergoes increasing oppression until declassation. At the end the victory of
citizens in the isolated political system leads to the same as their defeat - to
their declassation. In the isolated political system the victory of the citizens
at a given time means only the transfer of the date of final defeat. At each
case there is a time when a phase of constraint begins:
(Po1.3 .2) if in society S the political system is isolated from any external
influences. then
in the case of victory of the citizens over the hierarchy
hitherto in power, the elite of the civic movement takes the
position of the latter constituting the class of disposers of the
new coercive forces and from then on:
in successive periods of time, out of the set of historically
given systems of organization of power those are adopted in
society S which under a given level of the coercive forces -
yield a non-decreasing sphere of regulation of the class of the
present rulers over the citizens' social practice; and moreover,
in those successive periods of time, out of the set of his-
torically given systems of domination those are adopted in
society S which under the existing relations of power and
the existing level of political needs of the citizens - enlarge
more and more the set of artificial social relations; (this is the
second phase of an increasing civic alienation);
the processes last until the time when the level of civic
alienation reaches the revolutionary interval, and afterwards
there occurs the second phase of revolutionary disturbances
which leads either to the constraint of the class of citizens or
to the victory of the citizens and the reappearance of the
process under consideration - that is, to the third phase of an
increasing civic alienation, and next to the third phase of
revolutionary disturbances, and so on;
there exists such a period where the class of citizens suc-
164 CHAPTER 9
cumbs to certain of the successive hierarchies of power and the
phase of constraint follows.
Here, then, is the fundamental difference between economic and political
revolutions. The former lead, in the end, to the evolution of the ownership
relations and hence to the liberation to a higher degree of the direct pro-
ducers, whereas the latter lead, in the end, to the constraint of the civic
society. The former rather seldom give to a direct producer immediate ad-
vantages, but provide a serious improvement in the social position of the
whole class in the long run. The latter quite often give to a citizen hasty
advantages, but in the long run lead to the same as submissive agreement to
the oppression to an enormous increase of oppression leading to the declas-
sation of the citizens.
The difference takes its origin from the difference in the conditions for
balance in both spheres of social life. And the latter difference follows from
the dissimilarity of the material interests of the classes of rulers and of
owners: the declassation violates the interest of the latter while it enables
the fulfillment of the former to the highest degree. Exploitation is much less
of a social evil than oppression.
And not withstanding the claim made by doctrinaires under the banner of
Marxism-- Leninism trying for the last century to make people believe that
when they protest against the system of prisons, tortures and invigilations,
then "at bottom" they fight for greater salaries, the masses perfectly under-
stand the kernel of the matter - and fight with the systems of oppression
much more passionately than with those of exploitation. Until the moment
the power, sometimes arisen from the masses themselves, tears up the vital
tissue of social life . making of the citizens slaves entangled in the net of artifi-
cial institutions. For property can be forced to appease the conditions of
exploitation; power can only be overthrown - until the next one, arisen from
the victorious masses, has subordinated them entirely.
Some Ideological Digressions - Again
The reader is warned not to draw exhaustive conclusions. The differences
between the Marxian historical materialism and the proposed version of his-
torical materialism does not consist in the former being an optimistic philos-
ophy of history and the latter a pessimistic one. No philosophy of history has
been presented until now- what has just been presented are some elements
of the theory of power which, in fact, are rather depressing. Non-Marxian
A MARXIST THEORY OF POWER 165
historical materialism undoubtedly presupposes some pessimistic ideas and
had nothing to do with the the Marxian hurrah-optimism. This is not bad, as
the latter has nothing to do with the actual course of history.
The power is depressive as long as it is taken in isolation, that is, under
numerous idealizing assumptions removing all the interferences of economics,
culture, political tradition etc. upon the relationships between those who
dispose of the forces of coercion and those who do not.
Why is such an idealization necessary? Is it not a "superficial" one? Well,
this depends on the point of view. From the standpoint of an ideologist of
power (e.g., an official Marxist in a socialist system) it must be an artificial
procedure. The only one which is "natural" for him is to take the power in
as numerous complications as possible, so that nobody sees what kind of
regularities the power undergoes itself. Let all the villainies the power com-
mits itself be ascribed to the private property the power must serve by its
very definition. Here is the point. That is why such an idealization omitting
everything that is not connected with the power itself is necessary. Let the
power present itself in its pure, and naked, form. Let it be clear that actually
the power, and not the property, is the issue of the worst social evil. Let it
become clear what the basic limitation of the Marxian discoveries kept in the
darkness.
No doubt it is the author's evaluation, which inclines to such a theoretical
construction. This has nothing to do with the possible correctness of the
construction itself: it is, or it is not, true, both in the case of the evaluation
being morally justified as in the opposite case; at least the Marxian thesis of
anti-positivist descriptivism says so (Chapter 4). Maybe the present author
fails in his theoretical constructions. But he does not in his evaluation of
power - the common opinion of the people living in the so-called socialist
countries supports him very much. I mean the common, not the public,
opinion. The latter is only the mask people are forced to take in order to
conceal what they really think.
The Idealized Nature of the Image of Motion a/the Political System
Thus the three-phased, standard, image of the motion of the political system
is the following: the phase of increasing alienation, the phase of revolu-
tionary disturbances, the phase of constraint. This is graphically illustrated
in Figure 9.
In cases of five-, seven- etc. phase development, the first two (that of an
increasing alienation and that of revolutionary disturbances) take place in
166
THE LEVEL
OF CIVIC
ALIENATION
The threshold of dcdassatlOn
Phose of Increasing
CIVIC alienation
CHAPTER 9
Phase of revolutionary
disturbances
Fig. 9.
TIME
Phase of constraint
more than one occurrence, but the result is the same - the constraint of the
class of citizens.
In this way the isolated political system gains a state of balance and lasts
in immobility: the principles governing it are stable. If it is not thrown off
its balance by an external factor, then nothing in its state changes. What is
meant here is a factor external with respect to the political system of a
society not with respect to the society itself. Such a factor that does not
allow the political system to achieve its state of balance might be, e.g., the
economic system of a given society. All the matters of this kind are abstracted
from to find the internal structure of the political system itself.
It is hard for me to find proper words to stress how important it is not to
treat theses (Pol.l) (Po!. 3 .2) as simple descriptions of the actual state of
affairs but as idealizations of it. They are to be treated, then, like Marxian
schemes of reproduction (see, L. Nowak, The Structure of Idealization, D.
Reidel 1980, ch. I) or his theses of the theory of social class (see above
Section A) as underlying only some actual tendencies by taking them in
separation from all others. In order to obtain the actual state of affairs a
concretization is necessary. Nonetheless to make it, that is, to fmd the mutual
influence of the political system and, e.g., the economic one, it is indispen-
sable to know the internal regularities of both. And the latter is possible only
on the condition that the assumption of mutual independence is accepted.
Let us not believe with the vulgar Marxist that "sociology is not physics" and
A MARXIST THEORY OF POWER 167
that procedures of the type are impossible in the former field; let us, after all,
remind ourselves that his theoretical master had made a kind of comparison
between his own considerations and natural sciences. This purely - as it
seemed - methodological objection has a clear ideological meaning. It ex-
presses the fear of the vulgar Marxist of any kind of clearness in the field of
the science of politics as such. He feels in his bones very well that a closer
look at the internal structure of politics would be very dangerous for the
interests of his mandataries. For the latter, as all interests resulting from the
domination of a minority over the great majority of society, feel best in the
darkness.
De Tocqueville's Idea of Revolution
Let us note that the proposed grasp of the nature of power allows for the
defmite explanation of one of the most surprising, and the most beautiful,
sociological ideas, namely, Tocqueville's thought that
Revolution does not always break out when those who were in a bad position begin to
be in a worse. It is, as a rule, so that the people who without a word of compliance ...
were bearing the most severe laws -- reject them rapidly when their pressure diminishes
a little. The system which is overthrown by a revolution is almost always better than that
which has immediately preceded it (A. de Tocqueville, The Old System and Revolution,
Polish translation, Warsaw 1970, p. 239).
Let us try to place this idea within the framework outlined above. The idea
does not deal with the revolutions we were talking about in the middle stage
of the development of a political system. It deals instead with the revolutions
that are the results of throwing the political system off its balance under the
working of some external factors. In a given period the civic society is in a
state of constraint and no attempt at breaking the oppression can be made -
the artificial tissue of social life does not allow for it at all. But there occurs
a change due to the working of some external factors (e.g. economic ones)
and the chains become lighter. As a result the level of civic alienation increases
over the threshold of declassation and the less oppressed citizens come to be
much more dangerous for his oppressors than before being in much worse
conditions. The civic alienation under the work of some external factors
reaches the "high-middle" revolutionary level again and the revolution breaks
out. The revolution against less severe conditions than those which were being
borne "without a word of compliance".
Tocueville's explanation of his idea is less persuasive than the idea in itself
- people make revolutionary acts if they begin to believe that the situation
168
CHAPTER 9
can be improved. Maybe it is true on the psychological plane but far and
away insufficient on the sociological one. For people could act against the
system of constraint simply because under such a system no kind of social
action is possible. The latter requires some independent social relations bind-
ing people and constituting authentic social groups. But actually this is ex-
cluded in the conditions of the system of constraint which with the aid of
terror and forming a net of artificial institutions makes it impossible to act
socially at all. It is only after relaxing somewhat that social connections
may be recovered and the accumulated hate against the oppressors can be
given vent. The citizens fight against a "better" system not only because it
is more "worth rejection" than the "worse" one, but because it is for them
unbearable enough and moreover it can be overthrown. Rulers understand
this perfectly, and there is nothing they fear more than the liberalization of
constraint.
And. in general, it is only the combination of civic alienation and the
possibility of social action that gives political revolutions. That is why they
break out either if the political position of the citizens decreases itself (but
is not at its "worst") or if it increases itself (but is not at its "best"). Political
revolutions of the first type are evoked by the internal mechanisms peculiar
to the sphere of politics itself, while those of the second type are caused by
the working of some external factors, out of this sphere. The former are at
the stage of normal development of the political system tending to the con-
straining state of balance, while the latter follow from throwing this system
off its balance. The former are referred to in de Tocqueville's idea. It might be
said that this concept. beautiful in its anti-common-sense intention, becomes
fully understandable only if it is included in the body of the conception out-
lined here only. then, if it is transferred into the framework of the outlined
proposal of the Marxist theory of power.
CHAPTER 10
GENERALIZED HISTORICAL MATERIALISM:
SOME MAIN NOTIONS
It turned out in the last chapter that not only the disposal of productive
forces but also the disposal of coercive forces forms the basis for a division
of society into great groups of people having antagonistic interests and
carrying on a constant struggle. Let us try to proceed further with this
analogy, introducing some notions which are referred to all the time -
notions of a non-Marxian historical materialism.
Global Dependencies of the Marxian Historical Materialism
Let us remind ourselves of the three basic laws of Marxian historical material-
ism to which we have already referred:
(A) the productive forces determine the relations of production;
(B) the socio-economic base determines the politico-legal super-
structure;
(C) the socio-economic conditions determine the social consciousness.
These dependencies are "global" ones in the sense that they show interrela-
tions between the three spheres of social life: "economics", "politics" and
the "production of consciousness", all - with the exception of the first
- being treated as internally non-differentiated aggregates. Following the line
of argumentation exposed in the last chapter, let us try to go deeper into
the internal structure of the three spheres of social life, or of the three
momentums of society.
THREE MOMENTUMS OF SOCIETY
The Internal Structure of the Economic Momentum
The economic momentum (sphere) of society is differentiated in Marx's
formulas but, as we have seen (Chapter 3), this distinction into productive
forces and relations of production is extremely insufficient. It is even so
crude that it does not allow, as we remember, to combine thesis (A) and the
idea of class struggle. That is why a revision of Marx's grasp is necessary even
169
170
CHAPTER 10
within the field of the theory of socio-economic formation. 'This basically
consists in the replacing of formula (A) by the following two:
(El.l) out of the set of historically available systems of production,
that one becomes widespread in a given society which - under
the given level of productive forces in that society - yields the
greatest newly produced value;
(E1.2) out of the set of historically available systems of appropriation,
that one becomes widespread in a given society which - under
the existing ownership relations and a given level of needs of the
direct producers - yields the highest surplus value for the class
of owners of productive forces of that society;
(see Chapter 4).
I cannot myself engage in this place in problems connected with the
interpretation of Marx's and Engels' texts, being able only to refer to some
of my previous works 1 and summarize some of the ideas concerning what
is here called the economic momentum.
So, let us notice that the internal structure of the economic momentum
is characterized not by two parameters, but by more: the level of productive
forces, the type of relations of the organization of production, the newly
produced value (see (El.l)), and also: the type of ownership relations, the
level of economic needs (of the direct producers), the type of system of
appropriation, and the surplus value (see (El.2)).
The structure of the economic momentum is, however, even more com-
plicated. Besides the economic base, that is, the set of economic relations
characterized by the parameters that have just been mentioned, one may
distinguish within the sphere of economics also the legal institution regulating
those relations. For - according to Engels' famous formula - the "civil
law in its essence only sanctions the existing normal economic relations
among individuals". This may be interpreted in such a manner that:
(E2) out of the set of historically given systems of civil law, that one
is adopted in a given society which - given the economic base
of that society - ensures the optimum system of organization of
production and the optimum system of appropriation for the
class of owners of the productive forces in the most effective
way.
Let us add that according to the presented interpretation, the optimum
system of organization of production is that one which yields the maximum
GENERALIZED HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 171
live value, while the optimum system of appropriation is that one which
yields the maximum surplus value. So, the Engelsian formula is understood
here in such a manner that the civil law sanctions "normal economic rela-
tions" and is such a legal system under which the interests of the class of
owners is satisfied the best -- both in the "praxiological" dimension (in which
the optimum system of organization of production is introduced) and in the
"distributive" dimension (in which the optimum system of appropriation is
ensured). Of course, the notion of law is understood here, as in the whole
book, in its sociological, and not only in its juridical sense. Hence only the
"law in action" is treated as the law, independently of whether it is, or is
not, at the same time the "law in the law books".
The economic momentum also includes - besides some implements,
social relations and social (legal) institutions - the economic consciousness,
that is, the complex of views and values agents of production (both the
owners and direct producers) accept. What is meant here is the consciousness
of the typical agent of production rather than the collection of all individual
beliefs. Also in this domain is it so that "Thoughts of the ruling class are
ruling thoughts" (Marx and Engels). The thoughts of t,he ruling class are
simultaneously ideological thoughts, that is, "illusions of this class as to
itself" (Marx and Engels). This means that actual relations are in the ideo-
logical perspective upturned - they occur not in their essence but in their
appearance. The ideology makes, using again Marx's famous formula, "the
upturning of the essential state of affairs". Thus it makes it impossible to
reveal the essence of the phenomena it is about, that is, to obtain the essential
truth about the phenomena (see chap. 2). And making all this, the ideology
rationalizes the actual state of affairs advantageous for the class of owners
of the productive forces. Since it does so, it is in the interest of the latter
to include the consciousness of all the agents of production, including the
direct producers, in the clouds of the mystified vision of the structure of
economic relations.
These Marxian ideas may be interpreted as follows:
(E3) out of the set of historically given systems of economic con-
sciousness, that one becomes widespread in a given society
which - under the given economic conditions in that society -
ensures the most effective ideological rationalization of the
existing economic base of that society and of the optimum
system of civil law .
Let us add that the economic conditions of a society are composed of its
172 CHAPTER 10
economic base and the optimum system of civi1law, the latter ensuring the
most effective introduction of the economic relations optimum for the
class of owners of the productive forces.
The Internal Structure of the Political Momentum
It is the political momentum which characterizes itself with a quite analogical
internal structure. Referring to our considerations in the previous chapter one
may state that the counterparts of (El.1) and (El.2) are the two formulas:
(pl.1) out of the set of historically given systems of organization of
power that one becomes widespread in a given society which
- Wlder the given level of the forces of coercion - yields the
maximum sphere of regulation of the class of disposers of coercive
forces over the citizens' social practice;
(pl.2) out of the historically given systems of domination, that one
survives in a given society which - under the relations of organiza-
tion of power existing in that society and the level of political
needs of the citizens - minimizes the set of autonomous social
relations.
The two formulas, then, introduce to the characteristics of the internal
structure of the political momentum the following parameters: the level of
coercive forces, the type of relations of the organization of power, the
range of the sphere of regulation (see (El.l, and also: the type of relations
of power, the level of political needs of the citizens, the type of system of
domination, the range of the sphere of autonomous social relations (see
(El.2.
Let the political base of a society be the set of political relations charac-
terized by the above mentioned parameters. Then, the next dependence may
be put forward which says that it is the legal regulation of the political base
of a given society that adapts to the base itself. Thus, if, from the point
of view of the disposers of the coercive forces, the optimum systems of
organization of power and of dominations are spontaneously established,
then this very state of affairs becomes sanctioned by law - in the form of
legal acts or customs or obligatory doctrines" or the like. It is not
the law which states what is forbidden and what is not in the sphere of
social actions, but on the contrary, what has already been gained by force
comes to be an imperative for society, and what would be disadvantageous
for this comes to be forbidden. (This is certainly on the condition that during
GENERALIZED HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 173
our considerations concerning the political momentum the same assumption
is presupposed which was silently accepted during our considerations con-
cerning the economic momentum - namely that all the momentums are
treated in mutual isolation).
So, the next dependence for the political momentum turns out to be
quite analogical to (E2):
(P2) out of the set of historically given systems of state law, that
one is adopted in a given society which - given the political base
of that society - ensures the optimum system of organization
of power and the optimum system of domination for the class
of disposers of coercive forces in the most effective way.
The optimum system of organization of power is one which gives the maxi-
mum sphere of regulation of the citizens' acts, while the optimum system of
domination is one which most reduces the sphere of autonomous social
relations; obviously, the conditions of formulas (PU) and (P1.2) are pre-
supposed correspondingly. Thus, according to (P2) the state law (in the
largest sense of the term, including so-called administrative law) sanctions
normal political relations in this sense that such a system of regulation of
the political base is adopted which ensures the best interests of the rulers
- both in the "praxiological" dimension (the consolidating of the optimum
system of organization of power) and in the "distributive" one (the con-
solidating of the optimum system of domination).
Let us use the term "political conditions" to designate a given society's
political base and its optimum system of state law (that is, the one shown in
(P2. It might be maintained that as long as political momentum is treated
in isolation, it is the political consciousness which adapts itself to the political
conditions of the society. For when the relations among the rulers and
between the rulers and the citizens constitute themselves so as to satisfy the
best interests of the former, and when in addition this state of affairs becomes
sanctioned by law, then it becomes indispensable for all, both rulers and
citizens, to believe that this is what is necessary and desirable - according to
God's will, human nature or historical necessity. And the meaning of the
following thesis is that, out of the competing justifications of the kind, that
one wins and becomes the common opinion which best rationalizes the whole
structure of political life :
(P3) out of the set of historically given systems of political conscious-
ness, that one becomes widespread in a given society which -
174 CHAPTER 10
under the given political conditions of that society - ensures the
most effective ideological rationalization of the existing political
base of that society and of the optimum system of state law.
I am repeating that the sphere of politics, as the sphere of economics before,
is treated here in isolation from any external influences. This will concern
also the treatment of the third of the momentums, that of the production of
consciousness.
The Internal Structure of the Momentum of the Production of Consciousness
This domain of social life is of similar internal structure as the two considered
above. Similarly as in those cases one may distinguish here some other kinds
of material implements, namely - the means of the production of conscious-
ness: a strong voice once upon a time or a tv-set today. Spiritual forces of
society have, then, similarly as productive forces or coercive forces, a material
dimension (means of production of consciousness) and a personal one (the
clergy, intelligentsia, the propagandist apparatus of political parties, etc.);
let us call the latter the indoctrination apparatus.
The disposal over the spiritual forces of society divides the members of
it into the two categories: priests and faithful. Priests have the spiritual
forces of society at their disposal, making decisions as for what are the
goals and the ways they are to be employed, while the faithful are subject to
manipulation. The terms in question are to be used here in their generalized
meaning as compared with those of the domain of religious beliefs, but I
think this generalization is an appropriate one - a religion is nothing but
the way the indoctrination apparatus applies the presently available means
of production of consciousness to take possession of people's minds. The
peculiarity of religion expresses itself only in the fact that the indoctrination
apparatus is identical with the priests, whereas, e.g., in a socialist society, the
indoctrination apparatus employing the mass culture remains to the priests
in the same relationship as the coercive apparatus - it is the executor of
orders alone.
As the goal of a typical owner is the maximization of the surplus value and
that of a typical ruler is the maximization of the sphere of control, so a
typical priest aims at getting control over as many ideas people believe as
possible. The sphere of control of a ruler is composed of people's acts, while
that of a priest contains ideas people believe in and rationalize or project upon
their acts. A ruler effectively controls people if his orders are observed. A
priest effectively influences people if in the rationalization of their already
GENERALIZED HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 175
made decisions and in the planning of future ones they recur to the doctrine
he propagates. For the control a priest exercises is undertaken with the means
appropriate to the domain of the intellect: that is, by subordinating some
ideas that are spontaneously accepted by people in their everyday life to
the given unifying point of view expressed in the doctrine; and also by
the elimination (as "pagan" or "reactionary" or the like) of those spontane-
ously accepted beliefs that are at variance with the doctrine; finally, by
imposing on the people those beliefs which the doctrine follows but which
have not been spontaneously accepted by the people until now. One might
say that a typical ruler attempts to control the material life of citizens while
a typical priest does the same as far as the spiritual life of the faithful is
concerned. In both cases, the rationalizations they invent of themselves
have as much (or rather, less) in common with the reality they create. And
good will in both cases is equally powerless.
The priests have a similar kind of interests to those of the rulers: to
enlarge the sphere of regulation of the spiritual life of the faithful as much
as possible. The relations of organization of the priesthood, that is, those
of the division of labour, management, etc. adapt to the level of the spiritual
forces of society as the relations of organization of production adapt to the
level of the productive forces - and those of the organization of power, to
the level of the coercive forces. This dependence may be more easily seen
if we realize that it is the mass culture with its new media, the "owners of
public opinion", and the intelligentsia serving them, which is the proper
successor to the out-of-date religious way of controlling people's minds.
One could think that in the moment of the production of consciousness
there are in force some corresponding dependencies to these ofthe remaining
two moments. And so, out of the alternative systems of organization of
priesthood, that one is adopted which - under the given level of spiritual
forces - allows for the maximum enlargement of the sphere of regulation
of the spiritual life of the faithful. The priests have a full guarantee of inces-
sant enlarging of their spheres of influence only if they eliminate autonomous
relations of faith among the faithful, that is, such relations that strengthen
the intellectual or the moral independence of the faithful from the given
doctrine imposed by the priesthood (e.g., belonging to the alternative con-
gregations, and hence being under the impact of another category of priests;
remaining within a tradition excluded by a given official doctrine, etc.).
That is why it is a natural tendency of every category of priests to eliminate
the autonomous relations of faith and in this way to get the monopoly
over the regulation of the spiritual life of the faithful in its entirety. This is
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CHAPTER 10
a quite analogical tendency with those of the owners and rulers. And it may
be explained in an analogical way - it follows from the striving of particular
priests to strengthen their influence upon the spiritual life of the subordinated
people. The monopolization of such an influence, including the whole spirit-
ual life of a given person in it, is the best means of enlarging the sphere of
control of a priest over the people's thoughts. The monopolization and
integrity of the influence - that is what all the categories of priests, including
both the clergy, the tv-men and the party agitators, try to achieve. Quite so,
as in the previously considered cases the success of the priests in their activity
depends not only on their wishes and even not only on the means they have
at their disposal, but also upon the faithful's resistance. Intellectual and
moral independency plays within this sphere the same role as the economic
and political interests of the oppressed within the spheres of economics and
of politics.
There exists also within the sphere under consideration the legal regulation
of the production of consciousness (e.g., canon law) sanctioning the optimal
organization of the hierarchy of priests, and the optimal system of auton-
omous relations of faith (e.g., other types of religions are forbidden as
"pagan" , deviations are punished as "heresies", etc).
Finally, within the momentum of the production of consciousness, the
meta-consciousness may be distinguished, that is, what people think of
their roles as the priests or the faithful themselves and the values concerning
this which they accept. Now, when some people, due to the disposal of the
spiritual forces of the society, gain a privileged position, when the institutional
structure forms itself, sanctioning this division into the priests and the faith-
ful and the right of the former to impose their convictions on the latter,
then the tum comes for meta-ideological illusions, that is, for the ideology
within an ideology. The natural tendency each doctrine reveals for the
monopolization of its influence upon the faithful are rationalized by appeal-
ing to the allegedly exceptional position it takes as the expression of the
will of God, or of the eternal "human nature" or of scientific credentials
in ideology etc. There is no need to stress that these views are ideological
themselves: in the Marxian sense, that is, they present the appearance of
ideology as their essence. And so, there is also the correspondent of the
third component of the previously considered momentums: the dependence
according to which such a meta-consciousness becomes widespread in a
society which best rationalizes the interests of the priests.
This description of the internal structure of the momentum of the produc-
tion of consciousness is undoubtedly rather rough and ready. However, a
GENERALIZED HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 177
more detailed analysis of the matters involved is impossible in this place.
Fortunately, it is not necessary - the momentum in question has not so far
played a role comparable with those previously discussed.
2
Material Momentum of Society
Thus, in all three domains, Marxian laws (A), (B), and (C) establishing the
relation of determination are mutually "isomorphic", both structurally and
nomologically. That is, they have both the same internal composition and
similar internal dependencies. In all of them the dominant role is played,
on the one hand, by the effectiveness of some material implements, and by
the level of the needs of the masses, on the other. In all of them the disposal
of the appropriate materialforces (and in the last resort, material implements)
of a society constitutes the criterion of its three divisions. In all of them
the legal superstructure adapts itself to the base characterized by the material
factors, and an appropriate social consciousness adapts itself to the objective
conditions (characterized both by the base and the superstructure) - thanks
to their appropriate mystification.
That is why the three spheres will be termed the material momentums
of a society. They are actually "momentums" (both aspects and sectors)
of a society, and, besides, the dominant role is played in them by some
factors which are referred to within the Marxist tradition as material ones
- the effectiveness of some implements and also the needs of the masses.
Let us note that the generalization of the Marxian understanding also inherits
the solution of its ambiguity by taking into account the two material factors
together.
Let us notice that the economic momentum loses its exceptionality in
the more general perspective. It turns out to be one of the three material
momentums of society with the same internal structure and regularities
interrelating the parameters defming it. Now, when it is known that not
only the economic momentum is marked by the fact that the dominant role
is played in it by the disposal of the material means of society and the needs
of the masses, when it is known that not only the economic sphere of society
generates the class division, then the role played in society by economy
ceases to be self-evident and requires an explanation. Now, the alleged excep-
tionality of economy disappears and so its dominant historiosophic role
requires an explanation, since the formal analogy of the sphere of economics
with that of politics ceases to be a formal curiosity (as it was, e.g., for
Bukharin 3 who was criticized for this by Grarnsci) but takes a social content.
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Now, there appears the possibility of taking into account - within the
materialist, not the idealist, and class, not individualist, perspective - that
there are at least theoretically admissible types of societies where not the
economy but, e.g., politics plays the dominant role. For where is the guarantee
and what kind of considerations could such a guarantee give? - I mean,
the guarantee that in some conditions the class of rulers, for instance, cannot
subordinate the material interest of the class of owners to its own interest?
Is it not possible that what is maximized in some societies is first of all the
power of some people over the majority and that even the economic effects
are subordinated to it?
Now this becomes not a matter of speculative considerations, but simply
a matter of fact. That is, what is required is to investigate empirically what
kind of relations obtain between the class of owners and that of the rulers
for instance in a given society and not to engage into speculations as to the
impossibility of society without economy, etc. In fact, such speculations
are without any relevance - no society is possible without the working of
gravity, an appropriate interval of temperature, appropriate rules of heredity
and thousands of factors of a similar kind.
Now, history and current events become relevant to state which of the
material momentums has superiority in a given society. One may in advance
foresee that the results of such considerations will make the vulgar Marxist
mad. The better so. He has been living for tens of years in the world of
surface forms of which he is a servant. His madness is, then - according to
the Marxian concept of ideology - a criterion of truth. And even the essential
one.
This was for ideologists. And one more remark for scholars. The present
author is fully aware that the thesis about the structural and nomological
analogy of the three material momentums mentioned above will not tum
out to be an ad hoc thesis only on the condition that hypotheses (EI.1),
... , (pl.1), ... gain empirical support. He is also conscious that for too
many of them this has not been proved, that arguments were quoted to
support them recurring rather to our historical intuitions than to historical
facts. Unfortunately, I am unable to give at the present moment a better
justification for the theses under consideration treated as separate hypotheses
concerning particular spheres of social phenomena. They are in force under
the assumption of the mutual independence one of the spheres from another,
whereas it is typical for every society that all of the spheres are connected
with each other. To make the empirical testing of the theses under considera-
tion possible one would have to take into account some peculiar situations
GENERALIZED HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 179
in history ("crucial cases" as they are called in investigations of Nature) when
for some time the moments in question were approximately isolated one
to another; and to decide whether in those peculiar, and - to be sure -
rather exceptional and short periods, the hypotheses under consideration
were approximately satisfied or not. To find, however, such "crucial societies"
in "crucial periods" one has to be a historian, and not a philosopher.
This does not mean that the theses in question are unconfirmable in the
hands of a philosopher. They can be supported in an indirect manner: let us
assume they agree with our historical intuitions; let us try to build on the
basis of them a theory of standard (non-curious) societies, that is, what, for
instance, standard Marxists fail to make; if it explains some principal features
of historical development (e.g., why socialism was first built in Russia), then
indirectly this confirms the theory in its entirety, and among others its initial
assumptions such as hypotheses (EI.1), ... , (PI.1), ... ; and also our philo-
sophical point of departure - the thesis of the structural and nomological
analogy of particular spheres of social life .
TYPES OF SOCIETY IN GENERALIZED HISTORICAL MATERIALISM
The Three Class Divisions of Society
Each of the material momentums of society generates some class division. It
is the disposal of some material forces of society (productive, coercive or
forces of the production of consciousness) that constitutes the criterion
of such a division. The division is a real social fact which leads to the emerg-
ing of the two great groups of people, one of them privileged due to the
disposal over the material forces of society and the other - much more
numerous - oppressed. Their interests connected with a given sphere of
activity are, moreover, contradictory. The greater is the income of the owners,
the lower that of direct producers; the greater is the power of the rulers,
the lesser the autonomy of the citizens; the deeper is the control over the
spiritual life of the faithful, the less the latter have to say as far as their ability
to create their own lives is concerned. All these factors justify calling the divi-
sions in question class ones, and members of those divisions classes of society.
Of course, the notion of class which is employed here is more general than
Marx's notion. For the criterion of class division is not the differentiated
relationship to the means of production (productive forces), but - in general
- the differentiated relationship to the material means of society (its material
forces); and the former are only a special case of the latter.
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If the adventitious categories (organizers of production, the coercive
apparatus, the indoctrination apparatus) are omitted, then the class divisions
under consideration can be presented as in Figure 10.
owners of
productive forces
I direct producers
disposers of citizens
coercive force's
disposers of faithful
spiritual forces
Fig. 10.
Let us note once again that the terms "citizens", "the faithful" have no
"idealistic" connotations: the criterion of the division is the disposal of the
material forces of society (if in fact the latter includes some people of the
adventitious categories, this is omitted for the sake of simplicitly). It is
also obvious, as has already been mentioned above, that the three divisions
overlap. As a rule, all the direct producers and a majority of the owners
and the priests are citizens. And also usually the direct producers, and a
majority of the owners and the rulers, belong to the faithful. People usually
do different types of activities being irreducible to each other by defmition;
it might at most be that some of those interests have superiority over others.
The Main Moment of Sodety
Until now the material momentums of society were considered in mutual
isolation. However, it is known that they are not mutually independent.
From where is it known? Obviously - from Marxian historical materialism.
For formula (B) shows, roughly, the determination of the political momentum
by the economic one, while formula (C) shows the determination of the
momentum of the production of consciousness by both the economic and the
political momentums. And so, the socio-economic base may be identified
as the economic momentum of society, while the socio-economic conditions
are identifiable with the social system composed of both the economic and
political momentums. It is only formula (A) which defmes the internal
structure of the economic momentum, though in a very insufficient way and
leading to incompatibility with the Marxian theory of classes (see chapter 3).
This distinct role of the first of Marx's basic formulas follows from Marx's
view concerning the domination of economics in all societies.
GENERALIZED HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 181
Let us try to recognize what this distinct role of fonnula (A) within
Marxian historical materialism consists in. Of course, this is in order to
generalize the Marxian idea of superiority but not to believe him that the
economic momentum must be superior to all the others once and for all.
It might be conjectured that the sphere of economics, according to Marx,
is to dominate over the others, for instance over that of politics, in the
following meaning: the interest of the class of owners has priority over
that of the class of rulers; that is, in the case of conflict between them the
former is satisfied, in the long run at least, while the latter is not. Let us try
to transfer this idea, present in the whole of the Marxist tradition, to the
understanding outlined in this book starting with that part of the latter
which may be soundly qualified as "revisionist", that is, with the conception
of socio-economic fonnation. Let us consider the two class interests: that
of maximization of the surplus value and that of maximization of domina-
tion (Le., minimization of the sphere of autonomous social relations). It can
be said that the subordination of the political momentum to the economic
one means that in the case of conflict between the two above mentioned
criteria it is the former which is satisfied. If, then, a given system of social
relations allows for the maximization of the surplus value but not for the
minimization of the sphere of autonomous social relations, that is, if it is
advantageous for the class of owners but not for the class of rulers, then it
is adopted - at most after some "trial and error". But the opposite system
that would allow for the maximization and persistence of power giving
obstacles for the maximization of the surplus value for the class of owners,
would have to be rejected - at most in the long run. In the society under
consideration the interests of the rulers are, then, subordinated to those of
the owners.
And, in general, one could distinguish a basic criterion of adaptation as
that which is referred to in theses (El.2) or in (pl.2) or in the corresponding
thesis for the momentum of the production of consciousness; it is a basic
one in the sense that it expresses the main interests of a given class dominat-
ing in the corresponding material momentum. Now, let us consider the basic
criteria of momentums M and M'. Momentum M is said to be a superior one
to M' (and the latter to be subordinated to M), if in case of conflict between
the basic criteria of the momentums M and M', it is the fonner which is
satisfied while the latter is not. This possesses such a sociological interpreta-
tion that in a given society the interest of the class of tyrants (owners or
rulers or priests) connected with momentum M is satisfied before the interest
of such a class connected with momentum M'.
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Let us call the main momentum of a given society the material momentum
which is superior to all the remaining material momentums of the society.
Under the considered notion of subordination each society has - at most
- one main material momentum.
Basic Classes and Their Representatives
The class division generated by the disposal of material forces of the main
momentum of society will be termed the basic class division of that society
and its members correspondingly - the basic class of tyrants and the basic
class of the tyrannized. If material momentum M is superior to M' and M",
then the classes of tyrants generated by the latter two momentums will
be called the representatives of the basic class of tyrants generated by the
disposal of the material forces peculiar to momentum M. And so, if it is the
class of owners of productive forces that is the basic class of tyrants, then
the classes of rulers and priests are representatives of the former. In fact,
their material interests are to be subordinated to the maximization of the
surplus value. Only if it is irrelevant for the gaining of more and more income
for the owners of the productive forces may they enlarge their influence in
society.
Three-Momentum Societies
In the light of the previous considerations one may distinguish, at least
theoretically, such societies where the economic momentum does not play
the dominant role. Let us begin with societies where there are three different
tyrannical classes: owners, rulers and priests being separate social categories.
Such societies are called three-momentum societies. One of those momentums
is the main one while the other two are subordinated to it. The three-momen-
tum society occurs then in three subtypes depending on which of the three
material momentums is the main one: the economic society, the political
society and the hieratic society. Each of them also has three variants on
account of the fact that the two momentums subordinated to the main one
can be mutually independent or one of them can be superior to the other.
Two-Momentum Societies
The two-momentum societies are those where one category of people dom-
inates on the two planes over the rest of society, that is, either economically
GENERALIZED HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 183
and politically, or economically and mentally, or politically and mentally.
In such societies we have to do, then, with a category of people who are both
owners and rulers, or owners and priests, or rulers and priests, because they
have at their disposal the two types of material forces of society at once
making decisions concerning the use of them. Such class divisions we shall
call double ones and their members - double classes. A class which combines
the disposal over two material forces of society will be called a dyadic tyran-
nical class or a class of double tyrants, whereas a class which is being oppressed
on the two planes at once will be termed a dyadic tyrannized class.
The two-momentum society occurs in the three sub-types: economico-
political, economico-hieratic and politico-hieratic. The double momentum
dominates over the remaining one, e.g., the economico-politica1 momentum
is superior to the momentum of the production of consciousness in the case
of the first sub-type. In this case the double ruling class of owners-rulers
subordinates to itself the class of priests, but the disposal over the spiritual
forces of the society is separated from the joint disposal over the productive
forces and its coercive forces.
The One-Momentum Society
This disappears in the next type of society, namely in the one-momentum
society, where decisions concerning the use of all three types of material
forces of society are put into the same category of people. The same people
decide, then, what is to be produced, what is to be allowed and what is to
be put into the minds of the remaining people. The same category of people
plays, then, the role of owners, rulers and priests. That society is divided into
the two triple classes - that of the triple tyrants (owners-rulers-priests) and
that of the triply tyrannized (direct producers-citizens-faithful). As the
constitution of the economic society is exploitation and that of the political
society is oppression, so the constitution of the one-momentum society is
the combination of the exploitation, oppression and mental domination
over the same majority of people by the same minority of them. The three
forms of domination of one man over another one - the economic, politic
and spiritual, are not separated, but joined. The class tyranny reaches its
apogee in such a society, whatever its ideological self-identification would be.
No-Momentum Society
Three-momentum societies contain three overlapping class divisions. Two-
momentum societies are based on two of them, one being the double class
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division. The one-momentum society contains two triple classes. Finally,
it is also theoretically admissible that a society is none of them, and does not
include any class divisions. In such a society there is no differentiated relation
of people to any kind of material forces of society, and hence there are no
classes, either economic, or political or "spiritual" ones. In such a society
there is division neither into owners and direct producers, nor into rulers and
citizens, nor into priests and faithful. Everybody has, or may have, the
same share in the disposal of productive, coercive or spiritual forces of the
society. The latter presupposes not only the elimination of the exploitation,
but also the physical and the spiritual domination of man over man.
Marxian Society
Let us call a society where the economic momentum dominates over the
political and over the momentum of the production of consciousness, and the
latter is subordinated additionally to the political momentum, a Marxian
society. The Marxian society is, then, an economic society with the political
momentum dominating over that of the production of consciousness. Now,
the basic limitation of Marxian historical materialism can be expressed very
shortly, indeed: all societies are Marxian societies.
The Supra-Class Struggle. The People-Struggle
The generalized historical materialism allows us to imagine societies that are
not Marxian ones. It allows us also to theoretically admit historical tendencies
that are not noticed, or are erroneously interpreted, from the standpoint of
Marxian historical materialism.
The tendency of each tyrannical class is to multiply its domination, that
is, to combine the domination it commits with another one, and possibly
with the other two. The class which has one type of material force of society
at its disposal reveals the natural tendency to gain control over another one,
or, at best, over the other two of them. That is why the tendency to strengthen
the position of the owner with that of the ruler or the priest is what occurs
in fact in history. This is what can be called the supra-class struggle since
it occurs between different tyrannical classes. The result of such a struggle
depends on the relations of forces between the three tyrannical classes, the
latter being also dependent upon the class struggle in the generalized sense,
that is, the struggle between tyrants and tyrannized (owners - direct pro-
ducers; rulers -- citizens; priests - faithful).
GENERALIZED HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 185
Another tendency which is not seen from the standard Marxian point of
view is the struggle between the people, that is, this majority which is at the
same time exploited, oppressed and mentally dominated, and the tyrants
who possess at their disposal either productive or coercive or spiritual forces.
Not surprising, since this tendency, the people's struggle, occurs in its pure
form in the one-momentum society where both the class struggle and the
supra-class struggle disappear; however, it would be mistaken to think that
this type of society is not conceptualized by modem Marxism because of
purely cognitive reasons.
The role of the three historical tendencies, the class struggle (in the gen-
eralized sense), the supra-class struggle and the people's struggle is different
in different historical periods. It is the first of them only which is concept-
ualized on the grounds of Marxian historical materialism, and even this in
range limited to the struggle of the exploited against the exploiters. Not
surprising that Marx's predictions fail so much!
The Essence of the Marxian Doctrine and the Main Fault of Karl Marx
The essence of the Marxian doctrine, that is, both the theory and the pro-
gramme, consists in the following theses and/or programmatical stipulations:
(1) all societies are economic societies with the economic momentum
superior to the political one and to that of the production of consciousness,
and the latter being subordinated also to the political one;
(2) hence morally most desirable is a society without exploitation of
direct producers by owners;
(3) it is the class struggle which leads from one form of the economic
society to another:
(4) it is the class struggle which leads to the disappearance of the last
form of economic society and enable people to build a society without
exploitation.
It is the first thesis which is responsible for the faults contained in the
remaining ones. It is not the lack of moral sensibility that has inclined Marx
not to take into account that political oppression may occur after the over-
throwing of capitalism, but the lack of understanding that the disposal of
the forces of coercion is a self-contained source of class tyranny. And also
the lack of understanding that the rulers have their material interest in
subordination of the private owners and to become the rulers-owners, and,
if possible, to become the rulers-owners-priests. The limitations of his own
discoveries did not allow Marx to notice that the course of history leads not
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only from one economic society to another, but from the three-momentum
society (to be just, of the Marxian-type) to the two-momentum one, and
further to the one-momentum one. And that the class struggle is replaced by
the supra-class struggle which transforms the economic society into a much
more oppressive two-, and later one-momentum society, the latter being the
culminating form of class tyranny in the whole of social history. Marxian
historical materialism does not allow us to recognize that the "classless
society", in the sense in which it uses the term, is a society with class tyranny
accumulated to the utmost limit.
Not understanding any of this, Marxian doctrine does not give us any
hope, either; "us", that is, those who try to treat the matter seriously. But
there is such a hope. It is the accumulation of class exploitation, oppression
and stupefaction which generates the people. And precisely those who are
subjected to all three types of class tyranny at once, the people of a socialist
society, are making the really classless society, that is, society without exploi-
tation, oppression and mental domination together, in their everyday struggle
with the accumulation of tyranny unknown to the Marxian "working class".
NOTES
1 L. Nowak, 'Theory of Socio-economic Formations as an Adaptive Theory', Revolu-
tionary World 14, 1975; 'Historical Momentums and Historical Epochs. An Attempt
at a Non-Marxian Historical Materialism', Kritik und Analyse I, 1979; 'The Concept of
History in the Categorial Interpretation of Dialectics', Poznan Studies in the Philosophy
of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 2, no. 4, 1976; (with A. Klawiter and P.
Buczkowski), 'Historical Materialism as the Theory of Social Whole', Poznan Studies
... , vol. 6 (forthcoming); and in Polish works, especially in my book with A. Klawiter
and P. Buczkowski on historical materia1ism Historical Materialism: An Attempt at
a Systematic Interpretation (manuscript in one of the Polish publishing houses).
2 Two provisions must, however, be made here. (1) The way of grasping the momentum
of production of consciousness adopted here is purely sociological; that is, no reference
to the values (moral, social etc.) proposed in particular doctrines is made; it is obvious
that they are not equal from the point of view of the "quality" of the values they
propose. However, all of them, both those proposing dignified values and those quite
the reverse, function in the same way. The difference between them, essential from the
point of view of the evaluation of people engaged in the priestly activity, disappears
from the sociological point of view. (2) It is presupposed here for the sake of simplicity
that there is one division of priests and faithful. But this is only a tendency in a given
society and is not always satisfied.
3 N. Bukharin, Theory of Historical Materialism (Polish t r n ~ t i o n from the Russian),
Warsaw 1936, pp. 80ff.
D. THE FUNDAMENTAL MISTAKE OF MARX
AND THE THEORY OF SOCIALIST EVOLUTION
CHAPTER 11
PREAMBLE
Now, when we know about the class of the disposers of the forces of repres-
sion a little bit more than that it is directed to somebody else's interests in
the face of the lack of its own interests - that is, when we have at our disposal
some hypotheses concerning the nature of political momentum and not the
dogma that politics is an eternal servant of economics - it is possible to con-
sider in what way both the momentums, the economic and the political,
influence each other. In this book the interconnections will be considered
within the Marxian society alone.
The task is reduced, in principle, to the rejection of idealizing condition
(C) postulating the lack of a state organization and to the concretization of
the theory of socio-economic formation that has been developed in Section B
of Part I. This consists in determining how the internal regularities of the
political momentum modify the working of the internal regularities of the
economic momentum, that is, of the regularities of socio-economic formation
(see Model I, Chapter 4). The principal goal of such a concretization is not
so much to give a more precise and more full image of the development of
socio-economic formation but to solve the problem which could not be
solved, as it appeared, on grounds of purely economic assumptions, namely,
the problem of building a historico-materialist model of capitalist formation.
The latter is to help in the identification of Marx's main ideological fault due
to which his prediction of the coming Socialist revolution failed and to make
an attempt to defme more accurately the probable line ofthe development of
capitalist societies.
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CHAPTER 12
THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE AND THE SUPRA-CLASS
STRUGGLE: THE ROLE OF THE POLITICAL MOMENTUM
IN THE MOTION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC FORMATION
(ModeIIP)
ASSUMPTIONS
The Basic Structure of Society. The Rejection of Assumption (C)
As the starting point for our considerations let us take Model I of the the<\rY
of socio-econornic formation presented in Section B. In this model the
regularities of the development of such a formation reveal themselves in the
most clear form, which is then more and more disturbed (by the division of
labour, by the increase in productive forces etc.) in further, more concrete,
models. Hence, all the assumptions (A)-(G) of Model I (Chapter 4) are
accepted here except assumption (C) which is replaced with the realistic
condition saying that
(non-C) in society S there exist political classes, the disposers of the
repressive forces and the citizens, being separate social categories.
Therefore, the social structure of society S under consideration is as follows:
the class of disposers of the productive forces, the class of disposers of the
repressive forces, and the people, i.e., the class of direct producers being
at the same time citizens. The former are oppressive classes monopolizing
the disposal over the material means of society in their hands, whereas
the latter is the class of people lacking the disposal both over the means of
production and over the means of repression. The society in question, that is,
the ideal type of society characterized by conditions (A), (B), non-(C), (D),
... ,(G), is composed, then, of the three classes: the owners, the rulers and
the people.
In these terms the main result of all the previous considerations of Part I
of this volume can be put as follows: the Marxian model of the class structure
of a society as being composed of two classes, the owners and the direct
producers, fails already for capitalist society; it gives a sufficiently good
approximation (after the Marxian ambiguity is removed) only for feudal and
slave societies; the rejection of the Marxian limitation forces us to replace
such a two-class model by the three-class one as outlined above.
189
190 CHAPTER 12
Property and Power: the Relationship of Material Interests
The interconnections between the classes are grounded on their material
interests. This idea of Marx is fully maintained within the non-Marxian
historical materialism, being, however, understood in a more general way.
In particular, the interests of the class of rulers are conceived of as enlarging
the sphere of the citizens' actions that are controlled by the rulers (the range
of regulation of power; see Chapter 9). The interests of the owners are
conceived of in the Marxian way - as multiplying the surplus value. Another
nonMarxian idea is, however, that the interests in question are partly at
va.riance. Firstly, not only the people but also the owners are citizens (Le.,
non-<iisposers of repressive forces). The owners are subject to the tendency of
the rulers to subordinate as many citizens' decisions as possible in the same
way as the people are; the only difference is that the owners are stronger than
the people. Particularly, it is a constant tendency of each power which is
established enough, to control, next to govern, and last to monopolize the
decisions concerning the use of the means of production. That is, it is its
tendency to control, next to rule and last to replace private property, con-
quering in this way the domain of the economic praxis of society, hence
enlarging the range of regulation with the class of economic actions of the
citizens. It is the strength of the owners or the weakness of the rulers that is
able to stop this tendency. Secondly, the owners - in their egoistic interests
- impose some limitation to the drift of the rulers to the utmost subor-
dination of the weaker category of citizens, viz. the people. The latter is
composed of direct producers and their excessive subordination to the power
-- especially the one the rulers like most, the declassation of the people (see
Chapter 9) - would lead to the decline of the efficiency of work; subjugated
citizens are rather bad producers. And this would lower the profits of the
owners. Hence the owners assure their direct producers some kind of protec-
tion against the purely political lusts of conquest of the rulers.
Private property, does not, then, allow for the full maximization of
the power's interests: it does not expose itself to the action of power and
it protects the people against control by the rulers that goes too far. The
interests of the owners and the rulers, the material interests, Le. those con-
nected with the disposal over the material forces of a society, are partly
inconsistent.
In part, however, they agree each other. For it is the social movement of
the direct producers that stands in the way of the maximization of surplus
value. The owners need, then, a centralized armed force besides those each of
THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE 191
them is able to possess himself (armed servants, supervisors, etc). They need
it not so much in the flrst phase of the development of socio-economic
formation when the individual armed equipment of particular productive
units is roughly sufficient, but more when the struggle of the direct producers
becomes a mass one. And, dramatically, they require help from the state
when the "epoch of social revolution" comes, that is, in the centre of socio-
economic formation. Here are the interests of the owners in alliance with
those of the rulers.
As far as the interests of the rulers are concerned, it is the social movement
of the citizens that stands in the way of the maximization of the range of
regulation. The most powerful category of citizens is that of the owners -
they need not worry about the means of survival and due to the exploitation
of the direct producers the class in question has the opportunity to develop
the abilities indispensable in political life. That is why this category of citizens
is actually a potential source of leaders and ideologists of the citizens' move-
ments directed against the lordly claims of the class of rulers. The latter
understands, or learns from painful experience, that it is better to make
alliance with the class of owners against the people than to oppose the whole
class of citizens at once. Here is what the interests of the rulers in alliance
with the owners consists in.
Therefore, as a result of the alliance, the class of owners acquires armed
protection against the mass movements of the direct producers, whereas the
class of rulers disarms the class of citizens taking away from it the strongest
category, that of the owners. And both the classes of oppressors join their
efforts against the people. The one exploits them, the other submits them to
increasing control.
This coincidence of the interests of the two oppressive classes is a connec-
tion of the different and partly inconsistent material interests and not the
mystical "representation of economics in the area of politics". In particular,
the class of rulers pays quite a high price for the alliance with the owners:
the owners are taken away from its regulative aspirations and the minimum of
protection over direct producers must be kept. It is a matter of fact and not
arbitrary defmition of the notion of power (Chapter 9) whether, and when, it
stops to pay this price.
Two Types of Totalitarian Society
As the power has a tendency to subordinate the sphere of economic practice,
so property has a tendency to strengthen its distinguished position with
192
CHAPTER 12
political means, the use of force included. The former is explained by the
aspiration to enlarge the range of regulation and the latter is understandable
in terms of the maximization of profit: the political means are to yield the
owners some extraordinary profits. In other words, it is a natural tendency of
every class of oppressors to strengthen its own position, in face of the other
and in face of the people, with the use of the material means a given class
is still lacking. Hence the pressure of the owners to take possession of the
political devices of society (the type of political doctrine in force in a given
society, the shape of political institution, the repressive forces - in the last
resort) and of the rulers to take possession of the economic devices of society
(the type of economic doctrine, of economic institutions, the productive
forces - in the last resort). In the competition of the two oppressive classes
directed towards seizing devices subordinated to the other class, the supra-
class struggle consists.
A level of such a struggle can be "measured" by the amount of cases of
conflict of the main material interests of the classes (the maximization of
domination of the rulers over the citizens, the maximization of surplus value)
in which the interests of a given class prevail. The more the conflicts of
interests are solved on the part of the owners, the more Marxian (economic)
a given society is. And on the other hand, the more the conflicts of interests
of the rulers and of the owners are solved on the part of the former, the more
political a given society is. A Marxian (economic) society is one where a
majority of the conflicts between the maximization of surplus value and the
maximization of domination are solved so as to give priority to the interests
of the owners. A political society is one where a majority of the conflicts of
the type lead to solutions advantageous for the rulers.
One may easily notice that the best way to avoid the supra-class struggle
and conflicts between the interests of the two oppressive classes is for a given
class to captivate the main positions in the other material momentum. Doing
this, however. a given class transforms itself into a double-class (see Chapter
10) disposing over the material forces of the two types, both productive and
repressive. And a given society comes to be a totalitarian society as its ruling
class becomes a class of people joining in their hands both political and
economic decisions (Chapter 10).
Depending on the way a double class appears, one can distinguish between
the two types of totalitarian society. One of them comes into being as a result
of subordination by the owners of the rulers' position in society: the owners
gradually, and spontaneously, form the type of political consciousness of
society, employ more and more political institutions in order to secure their
THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE 193
economic interests, and last, but not least, seize the disposal over the re-
pressive forces. Because of the nature of the process of the increase of the
role of private property, this leads to the diffusion of power: a particular
owner accumulates not only economic decisions concerning his productive
unit but also political ones executed over his direct producers. As a result
a productive unit becomes a kind of separate unit, both economically and
politically and the interconnections between them grow weaker, and in the
extreme case disappear altogether. The double closs of owners-rulers uses its
additional political position in society to force the direct producers to give
more and more surplus work in order to appropriate more and more surplus
value. Political oppression becomes a means of obtaining extraordinary
profits. Such a society will be called an economically totalitarian one (or, for
short, E-totalitarian).
Instead, in case of the growing position of the rulers in society a politically
totalitarian society (or, for short, a P-totalitarian one) comes into existence.
The rulers seize the disposal over the productive forces and with the aid of
force change the content of the economic institutions; and all of this, together
with the action of the state apparatus, influences the economic consciousness
of society. This overturned order of change reflects the different nature of
the process in comparison to that of the subordination of the political mo-
mentum to the class of owners. In the present case, the class of disposers of
the repressive forces, organized in a hierarchical system, captivates the disposal
over the productive forces. Rulers become owners, and the greater the prop-
erty of a given person is, the higher position in the hierarchy of power he,
or she, occupies; evidently, the notion of property is understood here, as in
the whole book, in economic terms - as the actual disposal which can, but
need not, be sanctioned by law. A hierarchy of power becomes a hierarchy of
power and property, and a given society governed by the closs of rulers-owners
becomes even more centralized than before; not surprising - the hierarchy of
power gains additional means to strengthen its politically grounded position
- that is, one grounded in the last resort on coercion. The interests of such a
class of rulers-owners are politically grounded as well: they consist in the
increase of the range of regulation and consolidating them with the aid of
economic devices. And they are really powerful means of strengthening the
position of the rulers - the best way to destroy autonomous social relations
between people is to put persons in such economic conditions that make
continuation of the previous connections impossible (see Chapter 9); a
centralized factory annihilates commune-type relations between direct
producers peculiar to the work in small productive units. In such a politically
194
CHAPTER 12
totalitarian society a citizen is a cog-wheel not only in the state-machinery
but also in the state-economy.
In this wayan E-totalitarian society appears to be an extreme case of the
Marxian society, while a P-totalitarian one turns out to be an extreme case of
the political society.
Between the political society and the economic (Marxian) one there is
also another type where - in the ideal case - conflicts between the two
oppressive classes are not solved on the part of one of them but lead to
compromises. This means that in a majority of conflicts of the type neither
the maximization of domination over the citizens, nor the maximization of
surplus value is taking place, but such a solution comes out which satisfy both
classes in the face of them being unable to further their interests. Such a
society will be termed a balanced one. In a sense both the oppressive classes
in such a society are ruling classes against the people's class. It is obvious that
all the notions involved are fuzzy ones and the strict limit dividing the class of
Marxian societies, balanced ones and political societies may be established
only by virtue of arbitrariness, as the criterion of such a typology is that a
majority of conflicts between the maximization of domination over people
and the maximization of surplus value is solved on this or the other part, or
leads to compromises. All the three above mentioned types of society are
three-momentum societies, however (see Chapter 10), while an E-totalitarian
society and a P-totalitarian one are sub-types of a two-momentum society,
the totalitarian one, where both rulers and owners are the same category of
people. The difference between the three forms of the three-momentum
society and the two forms of the two-momentum totalitarian society is that
in the former there exist two separate classes of owners and of rulers, whereas
in the latter there is only one class of double oppressors (owners-rulers
or rulers-owners). Let us illustrate this typology by the simple schema of
Figure 11.
POll tlcolly- totalitarian soc let ItS
MarxlOn (economic) SOcletltS
Economically totalitarian SOcletltS
Fig. 11.
Two-momentum
SOCieties
Three-momentum
SOCieties
Two-momentum
SOcletltS
THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE 195
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC FORMATION:
ECONOMICS AND POLITICS IN THE MARXIAN SOCIETY
The Phase of the Diffusion of Power. The People Saves Society before E-
Totalitarianisation
Let us consider, then, the connections between the three elements of the class
structure of Society S under conditions of Model IP, that is, under assump-
tions (A), (B), non-(C), (D), ... , (G), in time. As always, let us assume that,
at the initial moment, the alienation of work and civic alienation occur below
the appropriate thresholds of class peace. Let us also adopt the assumption
that society S is at the beginning of the process a Marxian society, that
is, that the class of owners socially dominates the class of rulers which fact
expresses itself in the solving of conflicts of interests on the part of private
property. Such an assumption seems to be historically justified - in typical
cases the three classical formations started with an evident supremacy of
private property over the power; we shall see later on why this was the case.
Under these assumptions the usual mechanisms discussed in Chapter 4
start to operate: production increases and so does surplus product, which
leads to an increase in the alienation of work. However, the corresponding
mechanisms of the political momentum (see formulas (P 1.1), (P 1.2) of
Chapter 9) that - under the normal conditions of political momentum - lead
to the increase of the range of regulation and of artificial social relations, are
stopped in their working. For the pressure of the owners upon the rulers
operates more and more by taking the latter away from their distinguished
positions. The supremacy of the owners leads to the accumulation of some
political functions in the area of a given productive unit in the hands of the
typical owner. The class of owners seizes more and more political influence in
society and the more it does so the less the class of rulers keeps for itself. In
such conditions the latter is busy with defence of the state of possession
instead of captivating new domains of social practice. This trend goes towards
the economically totalitarian society where power is in the hands of the
diffused owners-rulers using it to increase their profits more and more.
However, there is another trend crossing the effects of E-totalitarianisation.
Namely, the usual increase of the alienation of work is significantly
accelerated by the deepening of the exploitation resulting from the seizing of
the political devices by the class of owners, using them in order to get more
and more surplus labour and hence surplus value. As a result, the alienation
of work crosses the threshold of class peace much earlier than in Model I -
196
CHAPTER 12
the earlier it does so, the greater the supremacy of the owners over the class
of rulers. The increasing resistance of the direct producers brings about
attempts to suppress them which may be successful in some productive units
but only accelerates the maturing of the common revolt.
And in the age of the common mass movements of the direct producers it
is necessary for the owners to make an alliance with the state.
And so, the two tendencies should be emphasized in the first phase, let
us call it that of the diffusion of power. The first of them is that particular
owners gain more and more political functions from the hands of the state
officials. As a result, their domination over the labourers increases, and they
use it to appropriate more and more profits from their work. In the limit this
leads to the fall of the centralized state as a factual disposer of the means
of repression, that is, to an E-totalitarian society with a state comprising a
symbol at the most. Due to this, the level of political alienation decreases:
the state apparatus is less and less able to force citizens to do things. However,
the alienation of work increases in an accelerated manner thanks to the same
reason: the accumulation of political functions in the hands of owners. And
an explosion of the direct producers against the owners, becoming more
and more rulers, can be the only means to save society from E-totalitarianisa-
tion. And this is the other significant trend of the phase of the diffusion
of power.
It depends on the rate of the two trends whether a given society becomes
E-totalitarian or not. If the alienation of work reaches the revolutionary
interval before the separate class of rulers disappears as a social category, then
the common revolution forces the class of owners to make an alliance with
the state and to restore its power. In this way the people saves the society
from E-totalitarian stagnation. If the latter process precedes the increasing
alienation of work, the revolution explodes already within an E-totalitarian
society. Let us come back, however, to the standard manner of development
of socio-economic formation: totalitarian societies undergo quite different
regularities than typical Marxian societies.
The Phase of the People's Revolutions. A Winning People Leads to P-Totali-
tarianism
The gradual accumulation of political devices in the hands of the owners
accelerates the revolution, in this way making the first phase in Model IP
shorter than that of Model I. And also the nature of revolutionary disturb-
ances in Model IP is different than in Modell.
THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE 197
In Model I, and in its purely economistic concretizations II-IV, where
economic mechanisms of development were considered alone, mass disturb-
ances could have, but need not have, an armed character. In Model IP, where
the revolution meets a common resistance of both owners and rulers, the
economic struggle of direct producers becomes necessarily a political struggle
and the direct producers become the people fighting against the two classes of
oppressors simultaneously.
This very fact that the intervention of the state on the part of the owners
necessitates an armed character of the revolution brings about the possibility
of the defeat of the owners. In Model I (and so also in further models) par-
ticular owners were entirely powerless in the face of really mass disturbances
of the direct producers. That is why, as a class they were always winning
- not having any chances in the stateless society, they were forced to make
concessions in the field of relations of property improving the position of
the direct producers. It was the price for keeping - as the class in the new,
progressive sense (see Chapter 4) - the disposal over the productive forces,
and with this - their estates and the possibility of multiplying them. At
present, in conditions of Model IP, they can lose an armed battle with the
people - it is only now that revolution becomes a game of military forces of
both sides: the joined classes of oppressors and the people. Let us consider
both cases, the victory of the people and their defeat, separately.
On the grounds of the internal regularities of the political momentum, the
victory of the people leads to the totalitarianisation of society (Chapter 9).
The elite of the people's movement gains power, since they are people who
dispose over the new repressive forces - the insurgent army. And - after a
shorter or longer period of internal ideological struggle - the elite starts to
behave as all the categories of disposers of repressive forces: it uses them to
enlarge and to consolidate its power. Whoever would like to treat seriously
the people's ideology, whoever would like to see in it something more than
the cover for the new class's interests, is eliminated. In this way the old class
division inside the people itself is restored. And even something more. For
the revolution was directed against both the rulers and the owners, and both
categories have fallen victim of the people's indignation. And so, the only title
to make decisions concerning the use of the means of production becomes
the position within the new hierarchy of power. The greater it is, the greater
possibilities it opens up for the factual property of the means of production.
In this way, new rulers become owners, and political oppression is joined with
economic exploitation by the apparatus of the new state. The "people's"
state is such only in the light of its own ideology. In reality it becomes an
198 CHAPTER 12
organization of the new double class of rulers-owners. The victory of the
people over the alliance of owners and rulers leads to the accumulation of
power and property in the same hands. And the actual people (new citizens-
direct producers) become deprived of that minimum protection on the
part of the class of old owners which they possessed before the revolution.
It stands in the face of the double class of rulers-owners that calls itself
representative of the people. A winning revolution of the people leads to
P-totalitarianism.
Such is anyway the hypothesis following Model IP. The model implies
that the people is able to overthrow a society based on exploitation but only
at the price of worsening its own position under the pressure of the new
rulers-owners. Ruining the Marxian society based on exploitation leads to a
P-totalitarian society based on exploitation and political oppression as well.
That is why it is more advantageous for the people's class to lose in the fight
with the old regime forces than to surrender to the new, much more inhuman
P-totalitarian system. It is cold comfort that the new class of oppressors-
exploiters originates genetically from the people itself - at least it is for
a majority of the citizens-direct producers who do not come into the new,
doubly-ruling class.
The communist utopias of the ancient and middle ages turned out to
be actually utopias not because the "productive forces were not matured
enough", but because of the fact that the alliance of state and private property
creates conditions for reproducing inside the people the same class division
as that which it fights against. And this necessitates in the aggravation of
the class division and in forming a P-totalitarian society whatever ideals it
presents in its ideology. This is the reason why "scientific socialism" turned
out to be one more utopia as well. The latter also did not recognize properly
the causes why the people could not fulfill its eternal dreams - in any socio-
economic formation.
The Phase of the People's Revolutions. The Pulsation of Revolution
It may happen that the people's revolution wins, but rather rarely. Usually,
the joined forces of the two oppressive classes, with their better technique
and organization, prevail over the force of numbers and revolutionary enthu-
siasm.
When the struggle is won by the oppressive classes, then this results in a
new situation in comparison with what took place after the triumph of the
class of rulers in the isolated political momentum (Chapter 9). The state
THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE 199
which applied its favourite method after the resistance is suppressed - the
declassation of the people - would disturb the interests of the class of owners.
The latter protect their direct producers before the mass terror as they watch
that the implements of production remain usable. That is why they allow for
the individual terror only when it is applied against the elite of the people's
movement. Due to the defeat, they are seen by history as militants for the
people's dreams, not as new oppressors.
In the case of the victory of the old regime's forces there occurs the
growth of the level of alienation of the people, but only for a short time
- enough to force a stop to the resistance, but not to declass the masses.
This, however, results in the decrease of the people's alienation after the
repressions are stopped and the level of alienation falls below the threshold
of declassation. Falling further it brings the society nearer to the revolu-
tionary interval again; "from above" this time. The people who patiently
suffered the terror start to revolt under the less stern system. For the latter is
painful enough but it does not paralyze the ability to resist. Therefore after
a time a new people's revolution appears that again ends in the victory of
the people and P-totalitarianisation or in their defeat and a short period
of declassation; in the latter case history repeats itself. This is graphically
illustrated in Figure 12.
The threshold
of declassatton
The revolutionary
Interval
The threshold
of class peace
Fig. 12.
Figure 12 presents a characteristic phenomenon of the Marxian society -
that of the pulsation of revolution. Model I admitted one revolution (and
so did further economistic models of Section B), while Model IP prejudges
that there are many people's revolutions in the centre of socio-economic
formation; provided, evidently, that a given society does not undergo totali-
tarianisation. Before reversions of revolutions can protect either concessions
on the part of owners ~ as in the isolated economic momentum, i.e., in
Model I; or a lasting declassation of citizens - as in the isolated political
200
CHAPTER 12
momentum. If both the momentums are taken into account at once - if, in
other words, the material interests of the two oppressive classes are influenc-
ing each other, then this results in a temporary declassation which in turn
entails the reversion of revolution.
The phenomenon of pulsation of revolutions explains the discovery of
Tocqueville (Chapter 10): that masses protest against oppression not when
it reaches its apogee but later on, when it diminishes. In fact: it is so starting
from the second people's revolution in a socio-economic formation - some
relief from the state's oppression causes the people's alienation to reach the
revolutionary interval again. A lost people's revolution leads after a time to a
newone.
The defeat of the first revolution makes it possible for the owners to keep
their relations of property. This revolution, in contradistinction to Model I,
does not push a given socio-economic formation into evolutionary motion
towards the new formation with a more liberated position of the direct
producer. However, revolutions happen again and again, as the owners cannot
allow the rulers to impose a durable declassation of the direct producers. After
some time the number of owners who do not want to risk further encounters
with the people increases. And so, after some delay, the phenomenon known
from Model [ occurs- the owners change their relations with the direct
producers, the relations of ownership, to the advantage of their labourers. In
order to keep the disposal over the productive forces the owners admit some
liberation of the direct producers.
And so, with or without the state, the fmal effect is the same - this is seen
in classical Marxism. It is not seen, however, that the formation transforms
itself into the new one evolutionarily, and not with a revolutionary leap.
Neither is it seen that things go in this way only due to the fact that the class
of owners does not allow the declassation of the direct producers by the
disposers of repressive forces. Traditional Marxism prefers to ascribe the
whole social evil to private property. It prefers not to know that the class of
disposers of repressive forces - mistakenly termed the "state" - fulfills its
own material interests best when crushing the autonomous social relations
between people incorporating all the citizens in the superficial bureaucratic
structure. And it prefers not to know that in Marxian society there is only
one effective force which is able to stop the oppressive tendency of the rulers
- the class of private owners. Not surprising: this kind of blindness is neces-
sary in order to welcome the liberation of the state as the "liberation of the
working class and the whole of humanity"; it is a necessary condition in order
for it to be an official ideology of socialist society.
THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE 201
The Phase of People's Revolutions. The Global Image
Let us summarize. The phase of people's revolutions takes the following
course in Model IP:
1. the alliance of owners and of rulers imposes on the people the necessity
to apply coercion against both the oppressive classes;
2. in the case of the victory of the people, the elite of the people's move-
ment takes the place of the old rulers constituting the new class of disposers of
the repressive forces; it transforms itself into the double class rulers-owners; a
winning people's revolution results in P-totalitarianism;
3. in the case of the victory of the rulers and owners the declassation
of the people comes, but rather temporarily; after a time the level of the
people's alienation descends and reaches again the revolutionary interval;
if a new people's revolution ends with the victory of the people, P-totali-
tarianisation follows; if it ends with its defeat, the process begins anew (see
point 2);
4. the victory of the alliance power-private property makes it possible to
keep hold of the previous relations of ownership; the reversions of revolutions
force the owners, however, gradually to change their relationships with direct
producers towards the greater liberation of the latter.
The Phase of Statization of Social Life. The Ineffectiveness of the State
Economy
Evolution of the property relations consists in their dissolution into two
types - the traditional and the progressive; the latter admit more liberal
conditions for the direct producers. This gradually reduces the level of the
people's alienation and some revolutions tum out to be the last people's
revolutions. This process divides the uniform economy into two, the tradi-
tional and the progressive, and so it does with the hitherto uniform class of
owners. The two classes appear, the traditional and the progressive, with at
least partly divergent economic interests; the intensity of this divergence
depends upon the concrete forms of economy they lead (Chapter 4). How-
ever, the more divergent the interests of the two classes of owners are, the
easier the class of disposers of repressive forces breaks the alliance and starts
to play the role of a separate social force. The alliance of private property and
power resulted from the threat of the people's resistance - and disappears
with the disappearing of it.
Facing the split among the two possessing classes, the political momentum
202
CHAPTER 12
begins to rule with its own, internal regularities (Chapter 9): out of the
historically given systems of organization of power that one survives which -
under the given level of repressive forces - allows for maximization of the
range of reguJation over the citizens' practice; and of the historically available
systems of domination that one survives which allows - under the given
level of resistance of the citizens - for the maximum manipulation of the
social life. First of all the influence of the state upon the sphere of economic
practice gradually increases: both in coordination of the economic acts of
particular private owners and in the state's own economic activity. This
process enlarges the state apparatus enormously and it requires more and
more new fmancial means. This forces the state's agendas to make economic
activities on an even larger scale - thanks to this the state becomes the third,
"public" exploiter appropriating the surplus value - and levies more and
more heavy taxes from the citizens. Newly captivated regions of social praxis
are subordinated to the hierarchy of power - hitherto autonomous social
relations among the citizens are destroyed with the aid of clerks or armed
people, and, instead, the network of bureaucratic connections between citizens
is established; all the relations man-man in these domains are replaced with
the relations man-state organ-man. In spite of the ideological declarations it
is not the "general interest" which is the functional meaning of this network,
but quite a particular interest - the interest of the disposers of repressive
forces (Chapter 9).
This statization of the economy leads, however, to the lowering of its
economic effectiveness. The hierarchy of power including more and more
economic acts into its sphere of regulation does not aim at any kind of
economic goals but mainly at a political one. It achieves the control over the
new sphere of social practice and consolidates it, liquidating the autonomous
social relations independent of itself, whether with "peaceful" or "war"
means. A private owner making a choice between the two systems of or-
ganization of production decides to use that one which yields a greater
production, and hence a greater profit to himself; and only exceptionally,
in special circumstances (e.g., disturbances among his labourers) would he
choose a system less profitable but allowing him to have a greater control
over his employees. Instead, the state organ prefers quite a contrary solution:
of such two systems it prefers that one which allows for a greater control
over the working people; and only exceptionally, in special circumstances
(e.g., the fmancial crisis of the state, etc.) would it make a choice giving more
autonomy to the direct producers but leading to a greater efficiency of
work. For a ruler, economic activity is the same as any other kind of citizens'
THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE 203
activity - a subject for fulfilling his peculiar interests: the deepening of
control over the citizens. That is why the state economy, where economic
decisions are made by rulers, is always less effective in the sense of satisfac-
tion of social needs than the private economy; not surprising, since the state
economy is only a part of the political activity of the class of disposers of the
repressive forces.
Therefore, the process of statization of social life occurring in the third
phase of socio-economic fonnation S in Model IP implies the worsening of
the economic development resulting from the spreading of the progressive
relations of property. The latter process proceeds slower in Model IP than in
Model I - the committal of the state in economic activity breaks the process
of the gradual transformation of ownership relations and of the liberation of
the direct producer. The statization of the economy within a socio-economic
formation is, then, a historically reactionary factor if we agree that the trend
of liberation of work is a manifestation of historical progress (Chapter 4).
The Phase of Statization of Social Life. A Lost Citizens' Revolution Leads to
P-Totalitarianism
The statization of the economy is only a part - though the most important
part - of the general statization of social life that follows in the third phase
of socio-economic fonnation in Model IP. Domains that were subordinated
earlier become much more intensively regulated by the hierarchy of power;
and new domains become subject to the ruinous influence of the institution-
alization of interpersonal connections. In this way, above the extinguishing
conflict of the direct producers and the owners (due to the evolution of
the ownership relations - Chapter 4) the political conflict of the rulers and
citizens comes into existence. Even in the sphere of the state economy,
purely economic conflicts become political in their nature as they are the
results of the drift towards domination over the state direct producers, and
only indirectly of the growth of surplus value.
On the strength of ordinary mechanisms of the political momentum
(Chapter 9) the increasing intervention of the state in the inner structure of
social life leads to the growth of the civic alienation which reaches at last
the revolutionary interval. The system comes into the "epoch of the civic
revolution". For it is not a "social revolution" in the sense of Karl Marx -
it is directed against the class of disposers of repressive forces, not against the
class of disposers of productive ones.
And, as every revolution, it may end in two ways. A lost citizens'revolution
204 CHAPTER 12
implies a serious step to P-totalitarianisation of society: it is a good oppor-
tunity for the state to manifest its tendency to the declassation of the citizens.
The period of the post-revolutionary terror lengthens in comparison to that
after the people's revolution - at present, the state being in growing conflict
with private property, it does not take into account the interests of private
property so much as in the centre of formation. After some time, however,
the terror is stopped in the face of the ruin of private economy. Of the first
citizens' revolution the victorious state takes some advantages,also in relations
with the class of owners, appropriating the estates of those owners who en-
gaged against it and allowing itself to gain further control over private prop-
erty. Of the first lost citizens' revolution, the state comes out strengthened,
whereas private property is weakened.
After a prolonged period of declassation the civic alienation lowers and
again reaches the revolutionary interval after a time - the state's oppression
ceases to paralyze the ability to resist and is still insufferable. It becomes
more and more unbearable particularly to that part of the class of citizens
that is economically growing, i.e. for the progressive owners; weaker owners,
mainly traditional ones, are forced to look for the protection of the powerful
state at the price of an increasing dependence on it. Hence, a greater part of
the progressive owners joins the reviving citizens' movement. The result of the
second revolution can be twofold as well. And again, let us assume in the
beginning that the state is a victorious force. In this case everything repeats,
but to a greater degree: the period of declassation extends again, and the state
strengthens its position against private property even more. And the fall of
civic alienation after some time leads to the new wave of revolution with a
greater share of progressive private property, and so on.
In the subsequent cycles initiated by the lost civic revolutions, a trend
reveals itself, however. For the antagonism between the class of disposers
of repressive forces and the class of progressive owners intensifies, the latter
feeling more and more threatened by the growing statization. And a greater
and greater part of the progressive owners joins the civic movement whereas
more and more traditional owners become dependent, and to an increasing
degree, on the state. As a result after the next lost citizens' revolution,
the terror is kept as long as all the citizens are dec1assed. In particular, the
expropriaters become expropriated but not by the masses. The state does this
by replacing them in the role of the exploiter of the masses. By "nationaliza-
tion", private property does not become "social" property, even if it is called
so, as long as the decisions concerning the goals it is to be used for belong to
the class of the disposers of the repressive forces. But, by "nationalization",
THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE 205
the latter class becomes a double class of rulers-owners. Now, the most im-
portant material forces of the society belong to the same people. The society
under consideration becomes a P-totalitarian one.
The Phase of Statization of Social Life. The Case of the Victory of the
Citizens: the State's Collapse. The Problem of the Transition
The series of lost civic revolutions can be longer or shorter depending on the
level of statization of the economy in the peaceful, i.e., intrarevolutionary,
period between the end of the people's revolutions and the beginning of the
civic revolutions. In the extreme case, when still in this period the strong
statization contradicts the interests of the rulers and of the progressive
owners very sharply, it may happen that only one civic revolution occurs.
Anyway, the series of lost civic revolutions leads to a P-totalitarian society.
Let us consider now the case when one of them is won by the citizens.
The leading role in the civic movement is played by the class of progressive
owners - they occupy a majority of the positions in the revolutionary elite.
The elite takes power after victory but it is under the pressure of the whole
class of progressive owners and cannot "alienate", at present remaining a
separate social force. It rather represents the interests, above all the economic
ones, of the victorious class of owners. This class liberates its sphere of
activity, that is, the economy, from the regulation of the state. And again
it assures to its labourers autonomy from the state which is indispensable
for their being good objects of private exploitation. And it uses the state
machinery to accelerate the downfall of the traditional form of property. The
latter dies gradually even without this - it is economically less effective than
the progressive one; and it is quite sufficient to leave it to itself to have it
disappear. The process of the evolution of property relations proceeding
already without any obstacles on the part of the state, or even accelerated by
the latter, leads to the end of the traditional form of property.
What is, however, really important is that the success of the civic revolu-
tion leads to a significant change in the relations between the (new) state and
the citizens. The state is seriously limited by the (progressive) class of owners
and its social role rapidly decreases -- sometimes to the purely administrative
one; and so does the level of political alienation - the amount of citizens'
activity controlled by the state is lower than ever before. This can be called
the state's col/apse; the new rules of the social game between the (progressive)
class of owners and the (new) class of disposers of repressive forces favour the
former. And it is so until the new phase of the people's revolution. It is more
206
CHAPTER 12
comprehensible now that our assumption concerning the prevailing of the
owners over the rulers in the fIrst phase of the formation (see above) is
justified not only empirically.
Another point concerns the problem of transition. Despite appearances
there is no simple connection between the winning civic revolution and the
transition from the old socio-economic formation to the new one. As has
been explained (Chapter 4), the transition is in its very nature an evolutionary
process and it can be approximated by the moment when the majority of
owners adopts the progressive relations of property. And this moment stands
in no simple and uniform relation with a possible victory of the civic revolu-
tion. It may happen that a majority of owners apply the progressive form of
connections with the direct producers before the winning revolution. And it
may happen equally well that this takes place only after such a revolution.
Whether the revolution explodes still in the old or already in the new socio-
economic formation depends on whether the level of civic alienation reaches
the revolutionary interval at a time when a majority of owners uses the
traditional or the progressive form of relations of property. And this may be
done in many ways.
The Image of the Motion of Socia-Economic Formation under the Influence
of the Political Momentum
According to the explanation presented, the motion of socio-economic
formation depends primarily on changes in the state of forces between the
two (economic) classes - that of the owners and that of the direct producers.
I would only maintain that Marx did not realize it consistently and hence
had to refer to the mechanistic historiosophy of the "progress of productive
forces" with the revolutionary transition at the end of a formation resulting
in new, higher possibilities for productive forces to develop themselves.
The non-Marxian Model I maintains, instead, that economic revolution
occurs in the centre of a socio-economic formation and pushes it in an
evolutionary movement towards the new formation which assures a greater
level of the liberation of work. Let us illustrate this graphically once more
(see Figure 13).
I would also maintain that the limitation of Marx's basic discoveries made
it impossible for him not only to notice the possibility of the existence of
non-economic societies (Chapter 10), but also to understand the signifIcant
modifIcations which the political momentum introduces to the movement of
socio-economic formation. Here are the most important of them:
Tht phase 01 IncreasIng
a l l l l ~ n t l o n of work
THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE
n. pnost 01
revolutionary
disturbances
r--
The phose of the evolUtion
of property relatIons
207
II
Fig. 13. The continuous curve presents changes in the alienation of work. The single
stroke" I" separates phases of a given formation, the double stroke """ separates the two
subsequent formations . The dashed curve represents the level of the antecedent alienation
of work (connected with the progressive property relations within a given formation) or
of the residual alienation of work (connected with the traditional property relations
within the next formation).
I. in the first phase of socio-economic formation, that of the diffusion of
power, the state collapses and the class of owners achieves a more and more
powerful position within society; a tendency, leading society towards E-
totalitarianism, occurs; this tendency is broken by the increasing wave of
direct producers' movements which forces both the classes of oppressors to
make an alliance;
2. economic revolutions take the form of people's revolutions as they
are directed both against private property's exploitation and the state's
oppression; the victory of the people leads to P-totalitarianisation of society;
the defeat implies - though with some delay because of the phenomenon of
the pulsation of revolutions - a gradual liberation of the direct producer
according to the spreading of progressive relations of ownership;
3. in the fmal phase of socio-economic formation the contradiction
between the economic classes (owners- direct producers) comes to the second
plane, because of the statization of social life that antagonizes citizens (at
least progressive owners and direct producers) against the disposers of the
repressive forces; the defeat of the citizens leads to P-totalitarianisatlon of
society, whereas the victorious citizens' revolution leads to the collapse of
the state, that is, to the significant growth of civic autonomy relatively to
the new class of disposers of productive forces originating with the elite of
the citizens' movement :
4. the liquidation of the old state can have a place within a given socio-
economic formation or in the new one as well.
208
CHAPTER 12
Let me illustrate these corrections graphically (adopting a special case
mentioned in 4 when the successful civic revolution takes place in the new
formation); some less important corrections described in the text above will
be omitted in order not to make the picture too detailed. (See Figure 14.)

.....
. "... .

-. .-

...........





.....
---. .. -
The pnase of the dlflu510n of the state The phos( of
peopLe's
revolutions




e
1--
--
--
.. ;"
.... : .
::: .. .
.. : :. .



--






Thc phase of statlZQtlon of social Life
Fig. 14. - = changes in the alienation of work. - - - = the level of the antecedent
alienation of work or of the residual alienation of work (as in Figure 13). ' , , , =
changes of civic alienation. ,-'-,-' = the alternative roads of development : to E-totali-
tarianism or to P-totalitarianism. = where the direct producers are fighting as the
people (against both the oppressive classes) and may be termed the people's alienation.
The Problem of Historical Illustration
One may maintain that the image of socia-economic formation outlined
above agrees with some historical trends to the extent proper for such abstract
constructs as our Model IP. And so:
1. The first phase of all three socia-economic formations (slavery, feudalism
and capitalism) is marked by the lower sphere of the state's regulation;
the state is under the strong influence of the class of owners. If so, then
the ancient "town-republic", the Middle-Ages feudalization of power, and
bourgeois democracy are phenomena of the same social nature: the class of
disposers of repressive forces is under strong control by the class of owners
and even takes some political functions of the former either factually or by
THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE 209
legal means. In some cases (e.g., feudalism in Western Europe) this led to a
state close to E-totalitarianism.
2. The revolutions taking place in the centres of slavery, feudalism and
capitalism were evidently directed against both private property and the state.
In the classical European societies a pulsation of revolutions occurred together
with the process of the liberation of the direct producers; the significant
exception, which will be analysed later on, is that of Russia.
3. The fmal phase of slavery, feudalism and capitalism is marked by
the growing role of the state's regulation. Bureaucratization of the Roman
Empire, absolute monarchies in Western Europe and the state capitalism of
nowadays are of the same social nature: the class of disposers of repressive
forces is gradually liberating itself from the influence of private property and
conquering more and more significant positions in the field of economy and
-last but not least - spontaneously institutionalizing social life.
4. In fact, a successful civic revolution has nothing to do with the transi-
tion: in England and in France, citizens' revolutions (mistakenly interpreted
in Marxism as "bourgeois" revolutions) accelerated the coming of capitalism
while in Gennany they were unsuccessful and under the old state's regime a
system evolved closer to P-totalitarianism than to classical capitalism.
The present author is perfectly aware that all these remarks cannot imitate
the historical analysis that would be necessary to think seriously of Model IP
as having some explanatory power. Unfortunately, the limits of space of this
book do not allow me to attempt to make such an analysis and the historical
considerations of this book have to remain limited to the analysis of the one,
but the most important, case: the development of Russia.
The lack of space forces me also to resign some of what would be needed
even theoretically - the further concretization of Model IP with respect
to assumptions (G), (F), (E) (see Chapter 4) that were already removed in
Section B yielding to Models II-IV. That is why some peculiarities of the
relationships between the state and private property in particular formations
are not accounted for - Model IP presents only what is common to all of
them, not what distinguishes each one from the other.
The Ambiguity of Marxian Historical Materialism as a Result of the Limitation
of Marxian Discoveries
Model IP allows for the explanation of the Marxian ambiguity mixing the
motif of the "antagonist class struggle" with that of the "objective economic
movement". It is evident now where Marx's idea of the revolutionary
210 CHAPTER 12
transformation of one socio-economic formation into another originated
from - namely, Marx identified as "social revolutions" leading to the new
formation what we call citizens' revolutions directed against the disposers
of repressive forces. The limitation of his grasp, narrowing the materialist
standpoint to the economic momentum alone, did not allow him to see that
this type of revolution is of a quite different character than that which we
call people's revolutions at the centre of socio-economic formation. And,
what is more, following the idea that in the fmal stage of the formation the
"contradiction between the productive forces and relations of production"
reaches it apogee, Marx was much more concerned with the former than with
the latter.
And this was not only a theoretical but also an ideological fault. A leftist
is obliged to be solidary with all the citizens against the state and also with
all the direct producers against the exploiters. A leftist is obliged, in other
words, to be solidary with the people, that is, direct producers-citizens
opposing both the oppressive classes. And this is what Karl Marx was lacking
in his historiosophy. It is entirely insensitive to the authentic people's strug-
gle against both the oppressive classes, because it is "too early" (like the
Spartacus upheaval - that was all Marx had to say about it), being "only" an
expression of the people's protest against economic and political oppression
and not what Marx liked most - an expression of the "releasing of productive
forces". The people's upheavals at the centre of socio-economic formation are
historiosophically (not necessarily historiographically) absent in the Marxist
science of history. In fact, they were "too early" with respect to false expec-
tations based on the dogmas of the Marxian historical materialism. The
whole interest of the conception, beginning with Marx himself, is directed
to the alleged "bourgeois" revolutions. For they seem to propel the Moloch
of the "economic progress". On the altar of the Moloch, Marx puts what is
in Marxism most precious - the identification with the worst oppressed in
social history, with the people. He prefers to identify with the bourgeoisie (as
long as it is "progressive historically") - because of her share in "economic
development". He offers condolences to all the exploited but admires only
"progressive" exploiters. Indeed, he was too weak a Marxist.
CHAPTER 13
THE PECULIARITY OF CAPITALISM:
THE NECESSITY FOR THE DISAPPEARANCE OF
THE WORKING CLASS STRUGGLE LEADS TO SOCIALISM
(Model VP)
ASSUMPTIONS
The Problem of this Chapter
Now, when we know a little bit about the way the activity of the class of
disposers of coercion influences the motion of socio-economic formation,
it is possible to pose anew the problem we could not solve on the grounds
of purely economistic models that were developed in Section B. I mean
the problem of the peculiarity of capitalism. It was insoluble, since the purely
economic variables could not explain from whence the effective demand for
the increasing accumulation arises in capitalist society (Chapter 7). Eliminat-
ing different possibilities we came to the conclusion that it is the state which
is the factor creating such a demand. It forced us to a closer consideration
of what the "state" is and to revealing the limitation of Marx's basic dis-
coveries (Section C). Accounting for the influence of the class of disposers of
the repressive forces upon the regularities of the movement of socio-economic
formation, considered in the preceding chapter, allows us to pose the problem
of the peculiarities of capitalism again.
The Point of Departure: Models IIP-/VP
As I emphasized in Chapter 4, the theory of historical process I am trying
to construct here is built according to the principle of historical concretiza-
tion (or, in more traditional Marxist terms, the principle of the unity of
''what is logical" and "what is historical"). This means that the subsequent
concretizations of the initial, most abstract, model present the idealized
image of the subsequent socio-economic formations. In this part of the
book this principle will not be followed - assumptions (G), (F), (E) that
are removed in order to obtain models IIP-IVP from Model IP are of a purely
economic nature and do not change too significantly the relationships between
the three classes: owners, rulers and the people in comparison with Model
IP. In Model lIP where the accumulation is accounted for (Le., assumption
(G) is removed) - with an exception concerning the problem of Rosa
211
212
CHAPTER 13
Luxemburg which will be discussed below - almost nothing in the theoretical
content of Model IP is changed. And the main ideas of the latter seem to be
supported in the history of Rome, which was the classic example of a slave
society:
1. The first phase is that of an evident domination of private property
over the state. The state organs are under the control of private owners
and serve their economic interests.
2. The situation changes during the period of slave upheavals. The army,
its composition and structure, acquires more and more independence. The
position of its commander becomes a political one and is less and less
subordinated to the state organs which still express the interests of those
who possess a great deal. Finally, the army becomes the issue of the power
- the political momentum liberates the immediate control of the class of
owners.
3. The process of statization of social life begins. It begins with the sharp
supra-c1ass struggle between the state and the private owners leading in the
extreme cases (Caligula) to the so-called Caesarenwahnsinn - bloody demon-
stration to aristocrats that they are serfs of the state - nothing more. The
increasing statization leads to the adscription of colons to land and to liquida-
tion of independent handicraft and trade - coercive associations were forced
under the state's supervision which, together with enormous taxes, led to
the collapse of the towns. The statization of the economy led to the economic
crisis in the 3rd century and weakened the state itself.
4. According to the enlarging statization, numerous upheavals occur:
they were directed mainly against the state. However, what does not agree
with the expectations based on Model lIP is that the revolutionary wave is
rather the people's than a civic one. Maybe this deviation could be explained
in some more concretized forms of Model lIP, e.g., by taking into account the
multinational character of the Roman Empire and the differences in the
interests of particular groups of owners. There was no winning civic revolu-
tion, probably because the intervention of the external factor, the barbarians,
did not allow the citizens to overthrow the parasitic state which was getting
closer and closer to being a totalitarian one.
Similarly, Model NP presents the image which is not so far from that
shown in Model IP either. The new thing is principally only one: the dualism
of feudal society, that is, its division into the two sub-societies, town and
rural, results in the appearance of two (economic) class divisions and in the
rivalry between the two classes of owners: bourgeoisie and feudal lords. This
additionally strengthens the tendency of the state to become a separate
THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE WORKING CLASS STRUGGLE 213
power. It also makes the state able to change the alliances based on the simple
principle: it is in the interests of the class of disposers of the repressive forces
to have an alliance with a weaker class of owners. That is why an absolute
monarchy at first supports the bourgeoisie against the feudal lords but when
the evolutionary process in the development of the former makes of it the
greatest economic power, the direction of the alliance changes and the state
supports now the aristocracy against the bourgeoisie. The latter has no choice
but to stay at the head of the civic movement directed against the class of the
disposers of coercion. The more so since the statization of social life peculiar
to the last phase of the development of formation hurts the economic inter-
ests of the bourgeoisie itself; and so does the state's present support for feudal
lords and hence feudal remnants in economic life. The "bourgeois revolu-
tions", so-called in the Marxist tradition, are, as it seems, civic revolutions
directed against the state and the feudal lords as its ally. The result of such a
revolution, if it was, sooner or later, successful, is the liberation of social life
and the erosion of the state, and the initial subordination, as in every socio-
economic formation, of the power to private property.
The Socio-Economico-Political Formation or the Quasi-Marxian Society.
Fourth Solution to the Problem of Realization of the Surplus Value
The society Model VP is intended to schematize is not, however, a usual
Marxian society and this kind of society is not a regular socio-economic
formation. For, as it has already turned out (cf. Chapter 7), it is impossible
to build a historico-materialist model of this society, i.e., a capitalist one, on
the grounds of purely economistic variables without taking into account
political ones. That is why it deserves rather the name of the quasi-Marxian
society and its type is called a socio-economico-political formation. Before
I try to argue that political variables are, in fact, indispensable for the charac-
teristics of the movement of such a society, let us consider the economic
meaning of the institution of the state.
Let us consider, then, society S under assumptions (A), (B), non-(C), (D),
(e' ) (about the continuous and uniformly accelerated growth of the produc-
tive forces - cf. Chapter 7), (F) (about the stability of the division of labour
- which agrees factually with the conditions of post-feudal society, cf. ibid.),
non-(G}. Let us formulate Rosa Luxemburg's problem again in model VP,
that is, for society S where besides the people (citizens-direct producers)
there occur the classes of the rulers (disposers of the repressive forces includ-
ing army, police, judicial apparatus, prison management, etc.) and of the
owners (citizens-disposers of productive forces).
214
CHAPTER 13
And so, in such a society the following value has been produced:
p= C+ V+M.
According to R. Luxemburg's discovery the effective demand for such a value
is not D = P, but less:
D=C+ V+Mk.
The problem arises, how is it possible in society S (under the conditions of
Model VP) that the owners make an enlarged reproduction? That is, who
makes the effective demand for goods with value equal to the value of the
global fund of accumulation Ma?
As we remember, the answer that such a demand is created by the growth
of the consumption of the exploited class is right but only in part. Only in
special conditions can this class force the class of exploiters to make conces-
sions- in the conditions of the increase of class struggle. Instead, in all the
periods when the alienation of labour increases, and there are such periods
(Chapter 4), the variable capital V, i.e., the fund of consumption of the
exploited, not only does not increase but even diminishes. In all the periods
of this kind, then, there must be another source of the demand for accumu-
lation.
And there is such a source: it is the existence of the class of the disposers
of repressive forces, and the forces themselves, that is, roughly, the existence
and activity of the state's bureaucracy and army, police, etc. The existence
of all the institutions creates some demand for goods E. And every new
demand for new anns, new means of the control of citizens, new people to
attend the means, etc., creates an additional effective demand t:.E. If so, then
in conditions of Model VP not only the growth of variable capital (t:. V) but
also the current state consumption E and its growth t:.E create the effective
demand for an increase of prodUction, that is, for an accumulation:
D' = C + (V + t:. V) + Mk + (E + t:.E).
From the value standpoint, in society of model VP, the fund of accumulation
Ma equals the sum of the increase of variable capital, of state consumption
and of its increase.
It follows from this that in the accumulating society with the continuous
and unifonn growth of productive forces (and such is capitalist society, cf.
Chapter 7) the state plays the two basic economic functions. First, it creates
a certain minimum of the effective demand which is present even if the other
source, i.e., the increase of the consumption of the masses, cannot be used.
THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE WORKING CLASS STRUGGLE 215
And, second, the existence and activity of the state and its services enables
society to compensate up to a certain point for the effective demand of the
masses falling down when their exploitation increases. In fact, during the
periods of the increasing alienation of work (cf. Chapter 7) the state creates
some minimum of the effective demand as it does all the time. But every
surplus activity of the state implying multiplication of the bureaucracy, of
the armaments, etc. during the periods in question is helpful for the private
economy. And the more it is, the greater such multiplications are, and the
longer the duration of the increase of exploitation reducing the purchasing
power of the masses and leading to overproduction (cf. Chapter 4). There-
fore, the economic interest of the owners agrees with the political interest
of the rulers from some vantage point from that of overproduction.
Let us add that R. Luxemburg fully recognized the role of the state as a
creator of effective demand. However, she admitted it was much less signif-
icant than the "non-capitalist environment" which was wrong since it was
only Great Britain of the colonial countries that possessed a significant source
of the effective demand in its colonies, as the oldest and relatively most
affluent.
Of course, the state plays the role of the source of effective demand in all
the formations. However, in parasitic ones, it was one of the additional factors
of the type the state consumption was implementing, namely, the luxury
consumption of the possessing classes alone. In the accumulating formation
instead, and such is the capitalist one (cf. Chapters 6-7), the state consump-
tion and its growth becomes in the face of the new economic behaviour of
the owners and their old tendency to exploit the direct producers one of
the indispensable sources of effective demand. Purely economic necessities
make the state one of the components of society that cannot be abstracted
from. In this sense the society we are concerned with in Model VP is a quasi-
Marxian one. In such a society at least some conflicts of interests between the
owners and the rulers are solved on the new principle - that of the indispen-
sability of state consumption for the economic growth of private property.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIO-ECONOMICO-POLITICAL FORMA TION.
ECONOMICS AND POLITICS IN A QUASI-MARXIAN SOCIETY
Let us consider now how society in Model VP develops. As far as economic
matters are concerned, the analyses contained in Chapter 7 are referred to;
because of the lack of space they will not be summarized here; only some
main ideas will be recalled.
216
CHAPTER 13
The Phase of the Diffusion of Power
Let us assume, as always, that at the initial point the level of the alienation
of work is below the threshold of class peace and so is the level of civic
alienation.
Thus, the regular mechanisms of the adaptation of organizational progress
to technical progress and of the increasing alienation of work are operating.
The former multiplies in the succeeding periods the live product whereas the
latter diminishes the share of the variable capital in it which at the same time
diminishes the purchasing power of the direct producers. This very fact does
not disturb the process of accumulation as long as the sum of the reductions
from the variable capital is less than the value of the state consumption.
However, when the consecutive diminution of the variable capital globally
surpasses the state consumption, the dead surplus value increases and the
owners first of all begin to limit their "costs of production", that is, reduce
the wages of their labourers which, of course, reduces their purchasing power
even more. As a result, the accumulating activity is stopped and a crisis of
overproduction takes place. Such is the economic side of the process. From
the social side the increasing alienation of work leads to the growth of the
class struggle and finally to revolutionary disturbances.
Relations between the rulers and the citizens do not change in this early
stage in Model VP in comparison to Model IP: it is the phase of the diffusion
of power when the class of rulers is dominated by that section of the citizens
who own the means of production.
The Phase of the People's Revolutions
The situation during the phase of the people's revolutions changes in Model
VP in comparison to that of Model IP. The owners in preceding formations
were, in the case of mass protests, facing the alternative: either to lose the
estates or to call in the state armed forces. Not surprisingly they preferred
the perturbations in production and a drop in the efficiency of work that
armed intervention implies in order not to make significant concessions to
their labourers. In Model VP another possibility appears: for in the conditions
of the continuous and uniformly growing progress of the productive forces,
conceivable concessions to the labourers can be quickly reimbursed by the
expected technical surpluses: in a way the concessions are rapid by the tech
nical progress.
Of course, at the beginning the owners would prefer to suppress the re-
sistance of the direct producers with the aid of the state's force. And, as we
THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE WORKING CLASS STRUGGLE 217
know of Model IP, the result of such a confrontation can either be P-totalitar-
ianisation of society (in the case of the victory of the direct producers) or (in
the case of the victory of the two oppressive classes) the temporary declas-
sation of the people, which leads after a time to a new revolutionary wave.
However, losses which the owners bear during the disturbances incline them
to use a possibility that technical progress offers, namely, to make concessions
that will be reimbursed by the expected growth of efficiency of the work.
And such an attitude is spreading among the owners. In this way they - con-
sciously - lower the level of the alienation of work and - unconsciously -
strengthen the purchasing power of the masses and solve the overproduction
crisis.
After a certain number of revolutions the proportion of owners making
temporary concessions for their labourers increases so much that the global
alienation of work in some succeeding wave does not reach the revolutionary
interval. The system comes out of the phase of the people's revolutions -
the mass protests do not transform themselves into the common struggle of
the people against the two classes of oppressors. What is most important, it
comes out of the phase of revolutions without the concessions to the direct
producers in the field of the relations of ownership. The progress of the
productive forces stops the process of the evolution of property relations.
And this leads to an important consequence. For the class of owners does
not split into the traditional and the progressive; and the reason for the
growth of the role of the state ceases. As we remember, in the conditions of
Model IP, the split of the uniform class of owners into the two with partly
inconsistent interests gave the state the opportunity to become a "third
force". This does not take place in Model VP. As a result, the state remains
a force subordinated to the powerful class of owners. Even its role as an
indispensable means of suppressing disturbances diminishes since the method
of concessions on the account of future technical surpluses comes to be
adopted more and more widely. Of course, on the strength of the internal
mechanisms of political momentum some growth of the sphere of regulation
occurs. But this is rather a low one - no external catalyzers operate, on the
contrary - there is still a powerful influence from private property stopping
the inner tendencies of the class of rulers.
The Phase of an Autonomic Cyclical Development. The Declining Tendency
of the Alienation of Work
And so, in the conditions of continuous and uniformly accelerating progress
218 CHAPTER 13
of the productive forces, private property comes out of the phase of the
people's revolutions being not fundamentally disturbed: the property rela-
tions remain the same. The role of the political momentum is in this way
still inconsiderable and the mechanism of the cyclic movement described in
Chapter 5 still remains valid.
For, facing the lack of resistance, the typical owner in his unrestrained
drift towards the increase of profit again begins to change the system of
appropriation to his own advantage. He starts by enlarging his share in the
technical surpluses and when he appropriates the whole of it, the process
of diminution of the share of the variable capital in the live product begins.
A result on the global scale is that the alienation of work increases and again
surpasses the threshold of class peace. However, the greater the threat for
the whole class of owners, the greater the number of owners making current
concessions. What is even more, they have possibilities of greater concessions
than before because of the accelerating nature of the growth of the produc-
tive forces. Therefore, the rate of the growth of alienation of work after the
threshold of class peace is surpassed lower in comparison to the last period
of the phase of revolutionary disturbances. That is, the curve illustrating
changes of the alienation of work increases lower after the threshold of class
peace is reached and comes down quicker. And this holds for the next cycles
as well. Figure 15 illustrates this.
The threshold of

The revolutionary Interval
The threshold of
class peace
Fig. 15.
And so, as the decreasing share of state coercion in suppressing revolutionary
movements leads to the end of the people's revolutions, so the increasing
technical progress leads to the weakening of the growth in alienation of work
in succeeding cycles. In due time, besides the disappearing armed intervention
of the state and the possibilities of making ever greater concessions on the
part of the owners, another factor comes into being. For the owners gradually
begin to learn to solve the conflicts with their labourers. They do not wait
until the moment the latter come into the streets but treat seriously their
THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE WORKING CLASS STRUGGLE 219
warnings and undertake correctional steps. An increasing number of owners
learn that it is better to make less concessions during the negotiations with
their labourers than to be forced to make greater ones during riots.
The relationships between the owners and the direct producers become,
then, more and more acceptable for the latter. Though they are still based
on exploitation, it remains a fact that more and more owners are ready to
have recourse to concession (repaid by the increasing efficiency of the work)
instead of coercion, and more and more among them are inclined rather to
negotiate than to wait for the increase of the indignation of the labourers.
And, what is more, the working of all the factors leads to the decrease of the
alienation of work in the successive formational cycles. In order to show this,
let us take into account an arbitrary formational cycle, as in Figure 16.
~ /0
A \:7
B F
Fig. 16.
Th. th,..hold 01
class ptacc
Let the (global) variable capital in the initial point A be VA . The alienation
of work falls below the threshold of class peace and the majority of owners
stop financing their labourers from the technical surpluses and even apply
systems of appropriation diminishing the variable capital step by step. SO,
in point B the variable capital is less than in A:
This causes an increase in the alienation of work which at point C again
reaches the threshold of class peace. Starting from this moment the majority
of owners apply correctional solutions in advance or make some concessions
when the labourers in their productive units actively oppose the exploitation.
As a result, at point D the variable capital is enlarged not only with the
amount L by which it was diminished before, but also with some additional
magnitude of the technical surpluses which the owners allocate to direct
producers. If, then, segment CE is divided into n periods, then at point E
the variable capital is
VE = VB +L + A}V+ ... +Ay.V= VA + A}V+ .. . +A1V,
220
CHAPTER 13
where At V denotes the growth of the variable capital reimbursed from the
technical surplus in period 1, etc. Anyway, the variable capital of the direct
producers in E is greater than that in A. Repeating this reasoning, one may
come to the conclusion that there is such a cycle in which the descending
alienation of work even at its highest point (in Figure 16 such a point of the
cycle is marked as D) remains below the threshold of class peace. The curve
symbolizing the alienation of work remains constantly below the threshold of
class peace.
This leads also to another conclusion. The direct producers become
richer and richer and have more and more to lose in case of disturbances
against the owners. As such, they prefer to correct the obligatory systems
of appropriation alone. Not only the owners, but also the direct producers,
prefer to have small but certain concessions than risky greater ones. Hence
the amplitude of successive cycles not exceeding the threshold of class peace
diminishes and the curve of alienation of work pendulates below that threshold
less and less.
As can be seen, model VP differs significantly from Model IP only in the
phase of autonomous cyclic development. In this phase:
1. the whole formational cycle (the period of increasing alienation of
work, that of disturbances and that of the fall in the alienation of work)
repeats itself in an accelerated manner without any changes in property
relations;
2. in the successive cycles the level of alienation of work decreases;
3. there is such a cycle where the highest increase of the alienation of work
does not exceed the threshold of class peace;
4. the level of civic alienation pendulates according to the ups and downs
of the alienation of work and in sum is still on a rather low level not exceed-
ing that of the first phase too much.
All this can be illustrated by Figure 17 as an image of the first phases
of the development of socio-economico-political formation.
As can be seen, the most important correction the influence of the pro-
ductive forces introduces to the mechanism of the motion of society is that
the stage of the lack of impact of the state is prolonged and the economics
left to itself finds a constant solution to the problem of Rosa Luxemburg. As
a result, society is in a state of balance: the two antagonist economic classes
are both satisfied in their interests (see condition (w) in Chapter 4) during
the phase of an autonomous cyclic motion. This very fact that society is in
a state of balance is, however, achieved thanks to the waves of class struggle:
the increase in the alienation of work leads to the worsening of the situation
THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE WORKING CLASS STRUGGLE 221
The threshold of
declassatJon
The revolutionary
interval
The threshold of
class peace

I
.I
------.-.------A ...... A-----------------

. .:

.... . . ~ . - - ~ ~ ~ - - - + - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' ~
The phase of the dIffusion of power The phase of The phase of the autonomous cyclical movement
the people's
revolutions
Fig. 17. --= the level of alienation of work . = the levels of civic alienation.
-.-'- = the possibilities of the transformation of society into E-totalitarian or
P-totalitarian form.
on the market, to recession (the purchasing power of the masses diminishes)
while its decrease results in improving the situation, in prosperity (the pur-
chasing power of the masses increases and stock-in-trade becomes sold which
strengthens the accumulative activity of the owners) (cf. Chapter 7). The
waves of class struggle, being suppressed below the threshold of class peace,
do not threaten the stability of society, however. Their revolutionary role
disappears and they become simply a means of keeping society in a dynamic
balance. The class struggle limited to a certain level is nothing more than the
best means to keep an enlarged reproduction - provided that the state is
still outside the scene.
Thegeneral conclusion is, then, that, due to the continuous and accelerated
progress of the productive forces, the class struggle ceases its character of a
force moving the formation of the evolutionary transition to the next one.
Contrary to Marx, the class struggle never was the revolutionary force of
society, but at least it forced society to evolve to another formation. Thanks
to the progress of the productive forces the class struggle becomes a means
of keeping the balance between the antagonist classes of owners and direct
producers alone, being unable to initiate even evolutionary changes. Indeed,
Marx has shown the two principal factors in socio-economic formation but
he did not know what to do with them. That is why he failed to notice the
new principal factor transforming such a formation into a quite new one: the
state.
222
CHAPTER 13
The Economic Collapse
The class struggle becomes, in the phase of an autonomous cyclical move-
ment, a means to solve R. Luxemburg's problem. However, it solves it worse
and worse. For only a threat of mass movements is able to extort from the
owners an improvement in the masses' economic standard. But the amplitude
of the waves of class struggle diminishes and the threat becomes less and less.
As a result, the standard of living of the masses grows slightly and at any
rate is unable to compensate for the technical surpluses that increase more
and more due to the accelerated progress of the productive forces. The
distance between the purchasing power of the direct producers (Plus that
of the state which is, however, still more or less stable) and the technically
accelerated production increases and so does the dead surplus value. This
can only lead to an economic collapse. However, this crisis of overproduction
is not solved by the masses - they are disarmed by the long period of an
increasing standard of living and cannot arrange the common struggle against
the owners. And the latter are afraid of the revolution, but not of the
atomized, divided petitioners separately begging for work. Hence the system
continues in stagnation: the crisis extends itself above the measure known
in preceding cases when the critical situation was solved by mass strikes and
demonstrations.
The disappearance of the class struggle leads, then, to a certain stalemate:
leading masses to the acceptance of the system the class of owners deprived
themselves of the only mechanism of solving overproduction crises. In such
a situation a new social force comes into existence: the state.
The Phase of Statization of Social Life
In the conditions of Model VP there are two components of the solution to
R. Luxemburg's problem: the growth in the consumption of the direct
producers and the state consumption and its growth. As long as the class
struggle lasted, it was the principal mechanism impelling an enlarged repro-
duction; the masses and not the state were solving R. Luxemburg's problem.
At present, when the mechanism of solving crises by the masses is stopped,
the only way to save the system becomes the increase of state consumption.
And the state following its own material interest sooner or later begins
to intervene in economic life. The material interest of the class of disposers
of coercion consists in making their sphere of regulation larger and larger.
It is the domain of economic practice which is in Marxian society extracted
THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE WORKING CLASS STRUGGLE 223
from state regulation. The economy lies, however, in ruins and its erstwhile
mechanism of solving the crisis does not act at all. That is why the class of
owners must allow the growth of state intervention in the economy.
First of all, the state tends to increase its own material power. Armaments
grow ever more becoming the foundation of previously unknown force on
the part of the rulers in comparison to the citizens. The growth of armaments
requires the planned development of technology and the latter requires the
constant growth of science. Both come to be fmanced mainly by the state.
And doing all this, the state increases its consumption and takes the economy
out of the collapse. Strengthening its power, the state on this occasion solves
the troubles of the private economy becoming a constant component of the
impulsion ofthe enlarged reproduction.
Another method of the state consists in stimulating the effective demand
of the masses. The class of disposers of the repressive forces is interested in
having the direct producers quiet - after all, they are a majority of the citizens
and the state at this very moment does not possess an opportunity to declass
the citizens: the class of owners is still too powerful. That is why the only
means of neutralizing the people in the face of the future supra-class struggle
with the owners is to keep the alienation of work below the threshold of
class peace. This requires the increase in the consumption of the masses which
is done by the secondary distribution of the gross national product: the state
transfers a part of the social wealth from the class of owners to that of the
citizens by means of taxes. What the direct producers had earlier to gain from
the owners by force, at present they obtain with the aid of the state. And
the class of disposers of the repressive forces has the two advantages in this;
it keeps the people in a state of class peace and the economy has enlarged
reproduction which is important for the state's material power itself. The
state replaces the mechanism of class struggle with social service. The latter
is much more convenient as a ground for the supra-class struggle against the
owners.
The two strategies of the class of disposers of coercion - that of the
"military state" and that of the "affluent state", seemingly so contradictory
- are realized for the fulftlment of its own material interests. But - in the
existing social conditions - they lead to the affluent and stable society of
consumers. Of course, nobody consciously applies these strategies. What the
rulers consciously plan and aim at is quite different they probably believe
what their ideology tells them. Justification of the strategies and the actual
grounds of their applications differ a great deal - as always.
In rich and quiet society the class of owners gradually and silently achieves
224
CHAPTER 13
more and more new positions. The state controls the economic life of society
more and more. Its economic sphere of regulation increases - there appear
an increasing number of cases where the allowance of a state organ turns
out to be necessary. The economy is every more statizated.
Also private property starts to adapt to the violating partner. It becomes
more and more important to have, besides the capital and labour force, also
some "political capital", that is, influences in the state apparatus where
more and more economic decisions with greater and greater significance are
made. And since, "the individual cannot effectively influence an organization
... Organization instead has effective connections with another organization"
(1. K. Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose, after the Polish edition,
Warsaw 1959, pp. 255/256), the acceleration of the bureaucratization of
the private economy follows. A subordinated system begins to reproduce
the inner structure of the more powerful one.
The institutionalization of productive units, together with the increasing
internal complication and external dependency on the part of the state,
leads to "bureaucratic alienation": an ever greater role is played in them by
the management apparatus. The economic bureaucracy makes more and
more decisions and gradually replaces the private owners in this. Or rather,
makes of them gradually the "paper-owners" alone, that is, owners in the
sense of the law, not of the economy. An owner of the means of production
(or a disposer of the productive forces) is a person who effectively makes
decisions concerning the use of them. With decisions coming into the hands
of bureaucratic institutions, property leaves private persons and the profits
they obtain from the institutions are something that reminds one of the
ground' rent in the beginning of capitalism rather than the surplus value.
This "bureaucratic rent" is paid for permitting the economic bureaucrats to
use the capital, that is, to own them in the economic sense of the term.
The economic bureaucracy does not, despite appearances, replace the
private owners. It maximizes, as do all bureaucracies, the influences, that
is, the sphere of regulation, not the surplus value. As long as it must pay
"bureaucratic rent" to the owners-in-Iaw, it attempts to have sufficient
profits, but not maximal ones. Its proper way of acting is enlarging the
range of matters that can be solved by an institutional decision. For a private
owner acts of purchase were something independent, something he could
not, in principle, influence. The economic bureaucracy affects the consump-
tion instead, limiting more and more the sovereignty of the consumer. A con-
sumer is in a way created by the bureaucratized economic system - it is not
yet so that production adapts itself to consumption, but the institutionalized
THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE WORKING CLASS STRUGGLE 225
system creates new needs in people by persuasion. What is, however, most
important is that this is entailed not by the "economic necessities" (as the
ideology of the bureaucrats puts it), but by the purely "political necessities"
- necessities that govern all the mass decisions of institutions: maximization
of influence - in this case in the field of market behaviour.
The Political Totalitarianisation of Quasi-Marxian Society
In this way the economic processes give an opportunity to free the class of
disposers of the repressive forces, which leads to the institutionalization of
economic life. The two enlarging bureaucratic apparatuses: the state's and
the economic one, include larger and larger spheres of civic activities under
a more and more strict control. In this situation a compromise is more useful
for both of them than a conflict and a fusion of the apparatuses follows.
This is a spontaneous process of the fusion of power - that is, a possibility
of making "public" decisions, with an (economic) property - that is, a
possibility of making economic decisions. The fusion is not suprising any
more, since the economic bureaucracy maximizes power over economic
decisions of people as the state maximizes power over their "public" deci-
sions. A fusion of the two bureaucracies makes possible, then, a considerable
enlargement of the sphere of regulation.
From the point of view of the non-Marxian historical materialism, this
process is of the highest importance. For it consists in making the double
class of rulers-owners, who dispose both the repressive and the productive
forces. And society gradually, evolutionarily transforms itself into a P-
totalitarian one.
The Socialisation of the Politically Totalitarian Society
P-totalitarian society, where the ruling class is that of rulers-owners, will
transform itself into a socialist one. The inner mechanisms of power trans-
ferred into the economy change the means of production into the means of
control of the citizens and lead to the radical growth of the range of regula-
tion and to the destruction of autonomous social relations (cf. Chapter 10).
This results, in turn, in the resistance of the citizens. After suppressing them,
the rulers-owners have the freedom to declass all the citizens for ever. In
order to do that they have to capture also the means of the production
of consciousness - terror is impossible in the conditions of freedom of
speech. That is why the rulers-owners have to become also priests. In this
226
CHAPTER 13
way the triple-class society arises: the P-totalitarian society transforms
itself into a socialist one. The latter is the most class-ridden society in history
- whatever its ideological self-presentation could be. Evidently, the best
self-presentation is as a classless society.
SOME REMARKS ABOUT THE EVOLUTION FROM CAPITALISM TO
SOCIALISM
The Point of Departure for a Theory of Capitalist Society
It is now an appropriate time to emphasize the following: the theory outlined
here describes what is common to a class of societies, and hence it does
not consider the historical peculiarities of any of them. The non-Marxian
historical materialism I am trying to formulate here reproduces only those
properties of the historically occurring societies that allow an explanation
of their historical order; hence the properties could be called the dynamic
or transformative ones. The conception in question contains some models
organized by the relation of historical concretization (cf. Chapter 4): II,
IV, VP reflecting in this way the historical order of societies typical for
our European line of development. The first of them reflects some properties
of slave society; the second of feudal society; and the third of capitalist
society; but the properties in question are those which decide that a given
society transforms itself into the next one, that is, they are dynamic properties
of the societies under consideration. In short, the weight of the work is in
the reconstruction of the historical trend within our line of development,
not in the explanation of particular forms of society within that line. The
latter task requires more specialized theories applicable to a given form of
society (e.g., slave or capitalist societies) and only to it. This requires also
specialized competences in the field of social sciences and of history that the
present writer does not possess.
In my opinion, however, the dynamic theory of historical process of
the type I am trying here to approximate, logically precedes specialized,
static theories of particular formations. A subsequent model of such a theory
of historical process could be at the same time the initial model of the socio-
logical theory of a given formation being concretized (structurally, not
historically) and hence followed by a sequence of more and more realistic
models approximating the given formation and only it. Diagramatically this
could be illustrated as in Figure 18.
THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE WORKING CLASS STRUGGLE 227
Theory of Theory of
Theory of
slave SOClct y
feudal soclcty capitalist socldy
Theory of
E====
historical
process
~ J

L
J
~ ~ ~
I I
I I
HistOrical
,
t t
SLAVE SOCIETY FEUDAL SOCIETY CAPITALIST SOCIETY
formations
Fig. 18. ====* = historical concretization; --+ = concretization; ---"""* = approxi-
mation. Models II, IV, VP comprise the theory of historical process built on the ground
of the non-Marxian historical materialism. The latter includes, besides the theory in
question also theories of particular material momentums (theory of the economic
momentum, i.e., Model I is an initial model for the theory of historical process under
consideration). The models are simultaneously initial models of idealizational theories of
particular formations. That is why they are marked as 11(-1) etc.
The sense in which the theory of historical process logically precedes socio-
logical theories of particular formations may become a little bit clearer
now: one has to adapt a conception of historical development in order to
build a sociological theory of a particular form of society. In this sense
historiosophy logically precedes sociology or, in other words, static theories
presuppose a dynamic one.
According to this point of view Model II would be an initial model for
a theory of slave society; Model IV for a theory of feudal society; and Model
VP for a theory of capitalist society. The first two I have discussed already;
therefore I will now concentrate on the last one. It is possible to argue that
Model VP, though so much idealised, allows one to grasp some important
tendencies peculiar to capitalist society. Here are some conclusions that
follow from Model VP and concern the tendencies in question:
1. In the first stage of capitalism the exploitation of the working class
increases so much that it leads to revolutionary disturbances - the working
class fights against the capitalists and the bourgeois state; in the first stage
228
CHAPTER 13
the state is under the strong influence of the class of capitalists, having full
freedom in relationships with the workers within their productive units:
and it is Marxism that is an ideological reflection of this stage of capitalism;
e.g., in England both the phases lasted until the 1840's.
2. The way in which capitalists solve troubles with the workers is to make
gradual concessions - in this manner the shortening of the labour day, raises
in wages, social achievements etc., occur; the concessions reduce the level of
the class struggle below the revolutionary interval without any changes in
property relations and without the necessity of declassation of the people
by the state; the spontaneous movement of the pressure of the capitalists
and of the resistance of the working class occurs which presents itself in the
sphere of economic phenomena as the business cycle - the capitalist exploita-
tion leads to the limitation of the masses' purchasing power; and it is the
next wave of the class struggle that forces the capitalists to make further
concessions enabling the working class to buy the overproduction; the sub-
sequent cycles lead, however, to the gradual increase of variable capital in
the hands of the working class and hence its conditions of living gradually
improve; at last the level of alienation of work reduces itself to about the
threshold of class peace and the capitalist society fluctuates over the state
of socio-economic balance; it is reformism in the labour movement which
is a reflection of the fact; it is not a mere accident that it appeared in England
at first, as in that country the real wage of workers rose in the second half of
the 19th century by 100%.
3. A weakening threat on the part of the working class through becoming
reconciled with capitalism liquidates, however, the hidden mechanism of
solving periodical crises of overproduction which led, for example, to the
Big Crisis of the thirties; it is the state that solves the crisis at the price of
great concessions on the part of the private owners; it keeps the prosperity
due to a great increase of public expenditure (mainly military) - its ideology
in this respect turns out to be the Keynesian economy; and thanks to the
secondary redistribution of the national product, with great advantages to
the working class, this makes the foundation for the doctrine ofthe "affluent
state" .
4. The global result of keeping society in a state of prosperity is - in
the face of the quiet working class being below the threshold of class peace
- enlarging more and more the state's sphere of regulation in economy;
this results - together with the natural processes of complication in economic
decisions and in achieving an indispensable knowledge which can be possessed
today by a team of persons alone - in the rise of economic bureaucracy
THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE WORKING CLASS STRUGGLE 229
(the ''technostructure'' in Galbraith's sense); gradually taking over the
(economic) property of the means of production from the former private
owners, the economic bureaucracy changes the criterion of economic activity:
it aims not at the maximization of profits (they have to be sufficiently high
alone in order to pay the "capitalist rent" to private persons owning-in-Iaw
the means of production) but at the maximization of control over the market
behaviour of the consumers; the consumer society is largely a result of the
bureaucratization of the capitalist economy.
5. The spontaneous fusion of the two apparatuses, that of the state and
of the economic bureaucracy, leads to the gradual rise of the supra-organiza-
tion of rulers-owners, a double class of the P-totalitarian system evolving
from state capitalism; the process is sometimes noticed but usually mistakenly
conceptualized (e.g., as an historically accidental formation of the elite of
power - in Mills' conception).
The Necessity of Socialism
Since socialism is a one-momentum society with triple-classes, from the
ideas outlined above follows the thesis that capitalism evolutionarily trans-
forms itself into P-totalitarianism and next into socialism. Of course, into
socialism in our theoretical sense corresponding to the only socialism we
know from experience - to the real-socialist systems of the East, the most
oppressive societies in history. The prediction about the socialist future
oftoday's capitalist societies is worth some discussion.
The Communist Illusion. If Marx Was Right, Capitalism Would Be Eternal
Let us start from the communist ideas based on the Marxian historical mate-
rialism, the ideas according to which the working class is a great liberator
of the whole of humanity. It follows from Model VP why this faith is a
pure illusion - since progress in the productive forces makes it possible for
capitalists to improve the working class's conditions ofliving without revision
of the property relations, the alienation of work stabilizes itself below the
threshold of class peace. The social force of the working class expires - in
spite of all the Marxian incantations chanted by communist parties. It might
be disapproved of, but this is a fact. I maintain that non-Marxian historical
materialism allows for the understanding of this very fact. If Marx was right,
capitalism would be eternal. There would be no social force able to change
the capitalist relations of ownership.
230
CHAPTER 13
If I am not mistaken, this conception allows us to understand also that
if capitalism is not eternal, then it must have something in common with
quite another social force than the working class. And this force can be
identified - it is the class of disposers of the repressive forces, which sub-
ordinates to itself more and more and makes a gradual fusion with the
economic bureaucracy forming in this way the class of rulers-owners. That is
why, despite the closed possibilities offered by Marxian historical materialism,
capitalism did not stop in immobility but presses forward to socialism.
The Liberal fllusion: What Is Democracy?
The line of argumentation outlined here is, evidently, hardly understandable
for the followers of liberalism opting for the overhistorical value of institu-
tions of bourgeois society such as parliamentary democracy. One thing should
be said in advance, then. No doubt that in the field of politics bourgeois
institutions are the highest achievement of the historical development, that
is, the best way of all we know to control the class of disposers of the means
of repression by the citizens. In this respect, I think, there is a full agreement
of the conception presented here with the liberals. However, it does not
follow from this that democratic institutions are a self-sufficient source of
social power as liberals usually maintain. The institutions do the same as
all the institutions (including the "absolutist" ones) do: evoke a kind of
tradition influencing citizens' views and attitudes. And that is all. From a
materialist point of view (which may be mistaken, of course, though I still
maintain it is not) it is far from being self-sufficient - all the views and
attitudes must rely on some material base and change inevitably with a
change in it.
What is, then, a material basis for democracy? Or, in other words, what
is a democracy in terms of the non-Marxian historical materialism? From
the standpoint of Marxian historical materialism, democracy is simply a
manner of making power by the bourgeoisie. This seems to me quite mis-
taken due to the lack of understanding of the materialist structuralisation of
the political momentum and the real - and only temporary - nature of the
subordination of the class of disposers of coercion to that of the disposers
of the means of production (cf. Chapter 10). From the standpoint of non-
Marxian historical materialism, democracy is a way of controlling power
by property with the aid of all the citizens. It is also, as I have declared, the
best way of making control over the rulers of all known in history. In fact,
political parties are sets of potential rulers ready to take over the disposal
THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE WORKING CLASS STRUGGLE 231
over the repressive forces. The rivalry between them enables the citizens to
control the state much better than they could in the case of one set of rulers.
And the institution of free elections which enables one set of potential rulers
to eliminate the others and to become actual ones, is a good means of con-
trolling their activity by the citizens, or rather by the strongest of the citizens,
that is, by the owners. In fact, democracy is a way of controlling the class of
disposers of the repressive forces by the class of disposers of the productive
forces.
But what, however, if the latter class disappears gradually in the over-
whelming bureaucratic structure making decisions of its own? The answer is
simple - in this way, due to the rise of the double-class of rulers-owners,
the democratic system loses its material base: that is, the divergency of
interests between the rulers and the owners ceases to exist and they can
rely on ideal factors alone, like the political tradition that has arisen during
its functioning. How weak it is against the material interests of the class
of rulers-owI).ers a materialist need not explain. He could only wish for an
idealist to be right in his contrary wishful expectations.
From the standpoint of non-Marxian historical materialism the disap-
pearance of the class of private owners implies that the only material interest
supporting democratic institutions ceases to exist, which in a shorter or longer
term will lead to the disappearance of the institutions themselves. In fact,
they are too strong a means of the control of power as for the interests of
those who gradually take over both power and property.
The Social-Democratic fllusion: The Nature of the State
At this point followers of socio-<lemocratic conceptions would oppose:
it is obvious that activities of the state depend on the people executing the
power, and what they do is basically dependent on what they want to do,
that is, upon their political doctrine; if they aim at social justice together
with democracy, they will make efforts to realise both goals; and in the
face of the gradual disappearance of private property they will at last suc-
ceed. This style of reasoning is quite popular. J. K. Galbraith showing so
much denouncing power in revealing the hidden interests of the technoc-
cracy combines this with a great deal of naIvete in treating the state. It seems
to him that it will be quite sufficient to release the state from the harmful
symbiosis it has with the technostructure in order to have the state realise
public interests alone. Hence the requirement to strengthen the state by
society which will lead to Socialism.
232
CHAPTER 13
This style of thinking is a combination of the rejection of the Marxist
methodology with the unconscious acceptance of Marx's faults, the Marxian
inability to treat the phenomenon of power in terms of material interests
included. Marxian methodology requires the treatment of all ideologies as
masks deforming the hidden interests of the classes. Instead of that, this
style of thinking treats the present ideology of the disposers of power quite
ingeniously: as they say they want this and this, they want this and this, and
also they act in order to have this and this realised. And, what is more, in
the face of the lack of resistance of private property (the only source of
social evil!), they, true democrats and socialists, will succeed in achieving
what they want (not for themselves, they are simply servants of the "general
will" of society!). The internal mechanisms of power forcing every ruler
to participate in the process of enlarging the sphere of regulation of the
whole class of rulers or be eliminated (cL Chapter 9) are entirely neglected
in social-democratic doctrines. As well as in the Bolshevik one. Theoretically
both social democrats and communists are indebted to Marx for his funda-
mental faults. We shall also see in the second part of this book how slight is
the practical difference between both sides.
The Peculiarity of Capitalism
The image of the capitalist fonnation that can be drawn from Model VP
is still highly idealised. It is still assumed that society under consideration
is isolated from all the other societies (condition (B)). That is why the image
of capitalism does not contain the imperialist expansion so peculiar for a
typical capitalist society of the second half of the 19th century. Therefore
Model VP does not explain imperialist means of yielding an extraordinary
surplus value to private capital and an extraordinary sphere of regulation
to the state which together (and not only because of the stream of capital)
leads to colonialism and at last to wars among metropolies. It is still assumed
also that there is a lack of influence on the part of the momentum of produc-
tion of consciousness (condition (D)) whereas the process of monopolization
of the means of production of consciousness in the hands of the rulers leads
to a fascisation of society. That is why the fascist way of development is
not accounted for. Rejection of the assumptions of the type is a separate
task that cannot be undertaken in this work.
Despite the highly idealised nature of Model VP, it even gives, I suppose,
a better approximation to reality than the Marxian historical materialism.
The basic reason is that even this so simplified model allows us to answer
THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE WORKING CLASS STRUGGLE 233
the question which keeps all Marxists awake at night: how has it happened
that the working class does not fight against capitalism in order to bring
Socialism about?
The answer is: why would the working class have to fight for this? Had
the slaves been fighting for the transition to feudalism? Or the feudal serfs
for the transition to capitalism? None of those classes fought for this in
the sense of conscious struggle and even then such a transition did not consist
in their struggle against the exploiters. It was only Marx who wanted to have
the working class fighting (and even consciously) for the transition to Social-
ism. And he rationalized his wish with the thesis that the antagonist class
struggle is an "engine of history".
Meanwhile the working class behaves in the same way as all the exploited
classes in history: it fights against the capitalists for the improvement in the
conditions of living. The only difference is that this struggle takes place
in the conditions of the constant progress in productive forces which makes
this struggle successful- the workers need not fight on barricades in order
to achieve what satisfies them. Is it not too little? Well, this depends on
the point of view. For doctrinaires it is; for workers it is not. None of the
exploited classes was a revolutionary force of Marxian societies. It was only
so that their resistance against exploitation was pushing society in an evolu-
tionary movement ending with a gradual transformation of the relations of
property. In the case of capitalist society even this mechanism failed - due
to the progress of the productive forces. The continuous progress of the
productive forces stopped the mechanism of the class struggle. And no
magic manipulations can bring it back to life. Neither blustering announce-
ments that "despite everything" the working class is "still" the revolutionary
force of capitalist society, nor the statement that we have at our disposal
too short a time to assess properly the militancy of the working class, etc.
Neither is anything able to replace the working class - in spite of the newer
ad hoc hypotheses - in its alleged historical mission: neither students nor the
peasantry of the economically less developed countries. Both the social
categories can at most help today's "Left" to confirm itself in the conviction
that "despite everything" it is "still" actually the "Left".
Meanwhile today's "Left" is much closer to the "Right" than both sides
are inclined to admit. It is the greatest injurer of nowadays that brings them
together - Karl Marx. Both the allegedly so opposed trends take their com-
mon basic assumption from his doctrine: that if capitalism is to decline, then
it must be caused by the working class. Hence the "Left" still maintains the
working class has revolutionary inclinations or looks for vicarious social
234 CHAPTER 13
categories, whereas the "Right" revives with the hope that the lack of such
inclinations signifies that capitalism is eternal. Both sides, however, do wrong
actually in what they commonly, though unconsciously, assume. For, the
working class is not a revolutionary force of capitalist society but socialism
is necessary. Not the Marxian one. The real one.
The Fundamental Mistake of Karl Marx. The Impossibility of (Marxian)
Sodalism and the Necessity of(Real) Socialism
It can be seen now what the fundamental mistake of Karl Marx consisted in.
For he has connected his ideal of Socialism with an essentially false theory.
The theory maintains that Socialism must be introduced in the class struggle,
whereas this struggle - in the conditions of the Marxian society with a
continuous and accelerated growth of productive forces - must die. The
theory neglects entirely the role of the class of disposers of coercion whereas
- in the conditions of the Marxian society with a continuous and accelerated
progress in productive forces - the state must play, starting from some mo-
ment on, the role of the disappearing class struggle in impelling the capitalist
enlarged reproduction which leads in the last resort to the rise of the double-
class rulers-owners, that is, to totalitarianisation. And the politically totalitar-
ian society transforms itself into socialist society with triple-classes. The
latter has nothing to do with the Marxian ideal - not the production for
satisfaction of all the needs but the maximization of domination over the
people constitutes its hidden nature.
And so, Marx's social theory according to which capitalism transforms
itself (1) rapidly by way of revolution, (2) by proletarian one, into (3)
Socialism, is in all points totally false. For, (1) capitalism is not an exception
(as Marx claimed) and transforms itself into the new formation by way of
the long-lasting evolution, in which (2) the share of the proletariat is none
for it is done by the gradual fusion of property and power. And (3) this
leads not to a classless society any more but to the most class-ridden society
of all known in European history.
The Marxian theory of the proletarian revolution can, instead, ascribe
to itself doubtless a great merit on the ideological scene: it could be hard
to mystify the essence of the socialist evolution carrying on in the oppres-
sive classes than to underline the alleged acts of Socialist revolution. Being
deeply convinced by the Marxian historical materialism one can interpret
all the rapid social transformations as Socialist revolutions - if they call
themselves such. And first of all, looking for the liberation of humanity
THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE WORKING CLASS STRUGGLE 235
one ignores the social reality, neglecting what leads in an evolutionary way
from state capitalism to and further to socialism. Pursuing the Marxian
miracles of the Socialist revolution, one misses the gloomy reality of socialist
evolution.
CHAPTER 14
CONCLUSION. THE PROBLEM OF PART II
The general conclusion of the first part of this book is the following: it
is necessary that three-momentum capitalist society, with single classes,
transforms itself evolutionarily into a one-momentum society, with triple-
classes. In this way an epoch of exploitation is ending and a new epoch of
domination of the triple-class of rulers-owners-priests over the people of
socialist society begins. This thesis concerns, obviously, only the line of
historical development that is called "European".
This thesis is, evidently, theoretical in its very nature - I would not like
to maintain that it has been proved empirically. What has been proved is
that the thesis in question agrees with a general line of the development
of capitalism and hence it could be taken, I think, as a starting point for
historical analyses in order to decide whether it is, or is not, true. (Despite
appearances, it is not so little: in the case of the Marxian conception of the
proletarian revolution such analyses are scientifically, not ideologically, quite
superfluous -- even a general look at the history of capitalism falsifies it
entirely. And it is the pressure of ideology, from the one side, and of the
theoretical vacuousness in his to rio sophy , from the other, that force so many
people to reinterpret the theory in so many ways in order to obtain fmally
something that could be similar to reality a little bit more than the original
Marxian ideas). Such analyses cannot be undertaken in this book. I can only
make an attempt to verify one of the most unexpected consequences of the
thesis on the necessity of socialism. The consequence in question is as follows:
it is not an accident that socialism arose in Russia, for tsarist Russia was sixty
years ago ahead of historical development, being the most developed (from
the standpoint of non-Marxian historical materialism) capitalist country;
the commonly accepted view that tsarist Russia was under-developed follows
from the Marxian historical materialism which is a false doctrine as has been
already shown. This consequence deserves, I suppose, a kind of historical
justification. Even one that a philosopher is able to offer.
236
PART II
ON THE NECESSITY OF SOCIALISM IN RUSSIA.
TOWARDS THE MATERIALIST REINTERPRETATION
OF THE MARXIST IMAGE OF RUSSIA'S HISTORY
CHAPTER 15
INTRODUCTION. SOCIALISM IN RUSSIA: THREE DOGMAS
OF LENINISM, TWO DOGMAS OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC
THOUGHT, ONE DOGMA OF BOURGEOIS THOUGHT
The Task of Part II
Of the many historical questions posed by the contents of part I, only one
can be dealt with in this book; but I think it is, the most important: why
did socialism actually arise in Russia? Our theoretical considerations led
to identification of the social force that leads to the socialisation of capi-
talism. This socialism - the one-momentum society with triple-classes - the
Western countries only head towards, but it already exists, and has existed
for several decades. How has it happened that tsarist Russia has preceded
the allegedly "advanced" countries of the West in the march to socialism?
The main expositions of this part of the volume aim at the answer for this
question alone; all the other expositions play an instrumental role in this
one.
The Problem of the "Criterion of Historical Development"
First of all an account must be given of what the statement means that
such and such a society is better developed than another.
The current practice in this respect may be described as follows. One
adopts a parameter-criterion (e.g., the level of productive forces or an ability
of a system to satisfy the economic needs of the society, etc.) and compares
particular societies as to the degree they fulfll such a function-criterion.
One which precedes another in a given respect is termed "better developed."
In the - rather typical -- case where the parameter in question is at the same
time a positive value in the light of the assumed axiology, the criterion of
historical development is simultaneously a criterion of historical progress.
And more developed societies turn out to be more progressive ones.
It is not so difficult to define the conditions of validity of such measures.
First, the parameter-criterion cannot be chosen ad hoc but it has to belong
to the class of variables of the assumed theory of historical process. Second,
the thesis that for such and such a society the criterion under consideration
takes on such and such a value (or: a given society precedes such and such
and is preceded by such and such societies in the sense of this criterion)
239
240
CHAPTER 15
should be a conclusion following from this theory. The first requirement is
obvious, hence let us develop the other one a little. It follows from it that
the establishment of such a function-criterion is inadmissible if this precedes
the construction of the appropriate theory of historical process. That is,
such a situation, where one first chooses a criterion of progress and maintains
that all societies are to behave in order that this criterion be fulfilled, should
be excluded. Nobody puts any society on the "altar of progress" - the
directive tendency of change is not a matter of arbitrary defmition but it
is a matter of fact. The processes do not go "in order" that a direction
invented by somebody be kept, but they sometimes lead to monotonically
increasing (or decreasing) results, with respect to some property. But they
need not. It is only a theory of historical process that can tell us whether
there is such a property that social mechanisms lead to its monotonic changes
in the subsequent stages of historical events. If there is, then the events in
question form a developmental line and the property under consideration
is a criterion of historical development. But not for ever. The mechanisms
in society change themselves; and for different epochs of a given society
different theories of historical process are in force. That is why what is a
criterion for development in one period of time need not be such a criterion
for another.
The idea that the level of productive forces is a criterion of historical
development is worth only as much as the nomological interpretation of
historical materialism, not more. As I have tried to show, the latter is not
worth too much. Rather is it so that the increasing level of the liberation
of work in the successive socio-economic formations constitutes such a
criterion: it follows from the non-Marxian theory of socio-economic for-
mation (cf. Part I B) that each time a level of the liberation of work has to
increase in the successive formations; for it is a split of the relations of
ownership which is a unitary mechanism of solving the class conflict. How-
ever, it is so only for some time. Afterwards the capitalist society evolves
into a P-totalitarian one and ceases to be a Marxian society. Accordingly,
the liberation of work ceases to be a criterion of historical development
and it is the multiplication of the class division (single classes transform
themselves into double ones and next into triple ones) which becomes such
a criterion. Instead of the (economic) class struggle the suppra-class struggle
becomes a principal factor responsible for historically relevant changes -
the monopolization of more and more material means of different types
in the hands of the same category of people. This process inevitably leads
to a socialist society where the accumulation of material power in the hands
SOCIA LlSM IN RUSSIA 241
of a minority reaches its apogee. Such a society where the process of ac-
cumulation of class divisions went farthest of all is the most developed
historically. And that's all.
Role of Evaluations in Historiosophy. The Problem of the "Criterion of
Historical Progress"
Of course, there is something more in it, something which disturbs the clarity
of sight on the direction of historical process - viz. our wishes. The criteria
of the "progress of the productive forces" or of the "progress of science and
technology" or of the "development of human creativity" etc. hide wishful
thinking -- one would like to have the criteria satisfied. If I reject them, then
that is not because I am a pessimist - quite the reverse - but simply because
I reject the theories they assume. It seems to me, instead, that it is the
non-Marxian historical materialism which is true. And the latter says that -
within the European historical line - Marxian societies, in their last form of
capitalism, expire and are replaced by non-Marxian societies. And here the
directional process is not the liberation of work any more but the multi-
plication of class divisions: raising the totalitarian societies with the class
of rulers-owners or the fascist ones with the class of rulers-priests, and this
process of monopolisation of the material means in the hands of minorities
leads at last to socialism with the class of rulers-owners-priests.
The evaluations of the present writer do not require any comments, I
think - the historical development turned out in the 20th century to be a
radical regress, quite the contrary to Marx's promises. The point is not to
fall into the "black utopia" and simply to try to understand this historical
trend and its final result - socialism. Only a theoretical analysis of socialism
can tell us whether the hitherto process-criterion - that of accumulation
of class divisions- is being replaced in our societies with something else,
and with what. In our societies, socialist ones, which are at the beginning
of this gloomy spectacle, the historical development turned out to be in
our times. Only this can tell us whether we have the right to be optimists
or pessimists. However, in order to have such a theory it is necessary to
understand the genesis of socialism, to understand how it could be possible
that the economically delayed Russia became the head of historical develop-
ment.
242 CHAPTER 15
Historiosophic Hypotheses and Historical Facts
This consequence of the theory expounded in Part I that Russia was in
1917 a better developed capitalist country than are today's technologically
(and not simply "highly"!) developed countries of the West is obvious in
the light of non-Marxian historical materialism. It is not, however, in the
light of what modern historiography teaches us. Quite the reverse, tsarist
Russia is placed far away from the Western countries. Therefore, if a his-
toriosopher is to go out of this unequal confrontation with specialists, he
must prove that this widespread opinion about the "developed West" and
an "underdeveloped Russia" is a matter of (bad) interpretations of facts,
not the facts themselves. In other words, a historiosopher must prove that
the opinion placing the "Spirit of History" in Western science and technology
conceals the falsity, and such that deforms the image of the history of Russia.
He must, then, leave his professional competences and, not accounting for
an obvious risk connected with it, attempt to reinterpret Russia's history in
terms of non-Marxian historical materialism.
The faulty interpretation of the history of Russia is, I suspect, forced
by the same thing that forces unsatisfied expectations for ocialism in the
West - by Marxian historical materialism. This doctrine is assumed (not
necessarily accepted) by historians to a different degree - by Marxists en
bloc, but also non-Marxists assume it in at least some measure: at least
in such measure as it is necessary to maintain the optimistic view that the
development of economy, technology and science is still a criterion of his-
torical progress. For such a view allows us to look at the "underdeveloped
East" - from the front.
That is why, in order to show as clearly as possible that it is the Marxian
historical materialism that imposes on us the theoretical interpretation
of Russia's history, I shall use as material for reinterpretation the Marxist
conception of the history of Russia. For it is seen in it most eVidently that
the historical facts of the history of Russia are arranged in sequences docile
to Marxian ideas.
One thing more should be said in advance. The present writer also thinks
that a proper executor of the task to reinterpret the Marxist image of the
history of Russia should be a historian, not a philosopher. I cannot, however,
help it that Marxist historians prefer to save Marx's schemes than to reinter-
pret the facts in the light of the non-Marxian theory of historical processes.
And somebody must attempt to revise these current schemes. If others,
who can do better, do not want to do it, one has to do it oneself. The only
SOCIA LlSM IN RUSSIA 243
consolation for him is that he is able to explain theoretically why the better
do not want to do better.
Three Dogmas of Leninism
It is not an accident at all that the history of Russia is interpreted in terms
of Marxian historical materialism. For it is the basis for the fundamental
ideological theses of V. I. Lenin accepted as a canon of historical thinking
about the genesis of socialism by all Marxists. And some of them also by
some non-Marxists.
The first dogma of Leninism says that in comparison to 19th century
capitalist countries tsarist Russia was an underdeveloped country with the
domination of the gentry whose interests were represented by the tsarist
state. Capitalism, however, was developing and it had to lead to the bourgeois
revolution - such was the character of the February Revolution, says the
second dogma of Leninism. And so, Russia finally came to the family of
capitalist countries being still the most backward of the great powers. Thanks
to this, however, Russia was the weakest chain in the world system of capi-
talism that made possible a Socialist revolution - the working class standing
ahead of all the people's masses had overthrown the bourgeois power and
took it itself in order to bring Socialist relations of production. For such,
actually Socialist, was the nature of the October Revolution -- says the
third dogma of Leninism.
It is a controversial matter whether - and if so, by how much - the
Leninist doctrine enriches Marxist thought. It remains outside any doubt,
however, that it enriches very significantly the ideological self-rationalizations
and mystifications the triply-ruling class in socialist society produces of itself.
For, since tsarist Russia was so "delayed" in its development, then somebody
had to take the role of the stimulus in order to make up for "century lasting
backwardness". It could be, of course, only the socialist state. It had first
of all, to develop itself: to reign over all the domains of social life in order
to sacrifice them on the altar of progress. Because the backwardness was
great, so were the sacrifices that had to be made. Well, sometimes the latter
were too great (e .g. after 1934 when the repressions hurt the communists
themselves). But this was the personal guilt of J. W. Stalin whose character
was really bad, as V. I. Lenin explained in his political testament. Fortunately,
the distortions have been overthrown and the period of great acceleration
is already closed. We can develop, then, in a more steady manner towards
the future communist society, according to the science of Karl Marx and
244 CHAPTER 15
according to its creative enrichment by V. I. Lenin who had shown that
even in the backward countries a bourgeois revolution can be transformed
into a Socialist one.
Who of the crowds of Marxist historians reproducing these theses without
end thinks at least for a while about the powerful interests hidden in them?
Which of the Marxist historians aims at the identification of those interests
according to the obvious rules of Marxian methodology? In fact, it is not
surprising at all that a philosopher must attempt to do this.
The Two Dogmas of Social Democratic Thought
The social democratic tradition opposes Leninism in the last point concerning
the October Revolution. As concerns the former two, it fully agrees. In fact,
tsarist Russia was a historically backward country. In fact, the February
Revolution was of a bourgeois nature. Actually, however, in view of Russia's
backwardness and the weakness of the Russian working class, the idea of
Socialist revolution in such conditions was a miracle. What was really possible
was only the one strategy, that one which was applied by the Russian socialist
parties except for the bolsheviks - to co-work in the capitalist development
of Russia and initiate gradual changes leading to ocialism. No doubt that
such a process of gradual evolution towards .ocialism would appear today
in Russia, as it does in today's well-developed countries, if the brutal and
arbitrary Bolshevik's action had destroyed it at its very beginning. The
Bolsheviks pursuing communist phantasies stopped the possibility of the
creation of true in Russia, pushing it from the way of normal
historical development to a blind alley of history.
As can be seen, the basic elements of both doctrines are the same: social-
ism is, after capitalism, the next socio-economic formation; the transition
to socialism may be done only at the instance of the working class; socialism
must reveal its supremacy over capitalism on the level of economics. In fact,
the differences are of an adventitious nature - both the doctrines continue
Marxian historical materialism with its myth of the working class as the
liberator of the whole of humanity.
One Dogma of Bourgeois Thought concerning Socialism in Russia
Bourgeois thought with its characteristic lack of any historical perspective
does not pose a question concerning the social nature of the October Revolu-
tion at all. This is not remarkable - in a particular coincidence (the war,
SOCIALISM IN RUSSIA 245
the political talents of Lenin, Kierenski's inefficiency, etc.} an elite of pro-
fessional revolutionaries seized power, and that is all. Not for the first time
did it happen so, and probably not for the last time. And since the country
where the Bolsheviks started to govern is a really great one, then the effects
are serious as well. When the great power adopted the communist belief
of its leaders as the state's ideology, the "problem of communism" became
a derivative matter of the international influence of the Soviet embodiment
of Russia and not of something they call "class struggle" or other things of
the sort.
The Bolsheviks, by seizing power, lost the chance the February Revolution
opened up for Russia. And all this story was possible only in the savage,
backward Russia, only there where the Bolsheviks could start their demo-
niacal experiment. It was the nature of the Russian nation that made it
possible with its immemorial compliance and obedience. This would be
unthinkable in the enlightened societies of the West that solve their troubles
rationally with a method of piecemeal engineering. With us (such developed,
such enlightened people) this could not happen at all!
Of the three Leninist dogmas concerning the genesis of socialism, bourgeois
thought accepts the first one, about the backwardness of tsarist Russia.
For the same, i.e. ideological, reasons. As Solzenitsyn rightly observed, it
is usually racism that is hidden in the "explanation" of socialism by reference
to the nature of the Russians. And, let us add, usually fear. If the conception
presented in Part I could be considered to be true, then this fear was the only
rational element in the bourgeois view of "communism" as an immanent
effect of "backward Russia".
The Thesis of Part II
The thesis of Part II may be formulated in advance: all these doctrines are
cognitively total falsities, for they are ideological mystifications of the
processes that were actually occurring in the history of Russia.
CHAPTER 16
THE TOT ALiTARIAN ANOMALY: THE BREAKDOWN
OF THE DOUBLE CYCLE IN RUSSIAN FEUDALISM
(I 3th-16th CENTURIES)
Two Roads to Feudalism
From "primitive community" (whatever this type of society could be) the
Slavs came to feudalism immediately; slavery was here never a dominant
mood of production, as some Soviet historians prove. As late as in 9th-10th
centuries a great majority of the population was free in a typical Slav society:
it is assessed at 88% as against 9% of slaves (H. Lowmianski, The Beginning
of Poland (in Polish), Vol. 3, Warsaw 1967, p. 513).
This peculiarity did not however, especially significantly influence the
structure of feudalism in Slav societies, in particular the East-Slav ones.
Kiev Russia developed in a quite typical manner for a feudal society (cf.
Chapter 5): after the unitary phase the productive forces grew, leading to the
split of the socio-economic system into the rural and town economies; in
both sub-societies the (economic) class struggle proceeded; the state was
under the strong influence of the class of feudal lords which resulted in the
feudalisation of power - in the territory of Kiev Russia, tens of small petty
states arose. In a word, the development of this society was quite typical in
the light of our theoretical model (cf. Chapters 5 and 12). But this held true
only until the time when the Mongols appeared on the Russian scene.
The Primitive Accumulation of Power: Russian Princes and Mongols
At the beginning of the 13th century the Mongols conquered North China
and Middle Asia and threatened Russian countries that were actually divided
into numerous petty states. The invasion met with armed resistance. In the
Riazan Duchy the invading Mongols demanded only tithes but "from every-
thing". But they heard a proud answer: "Only, when we die will everything
here be yours" (1. Ochmanski, The History of Russia until 1861 (in Polish),
Warsaw-Poznan 1974, p. 26). After the crushing defeat of the Riazan army
Moscow fell and next Kiev. The wave of the invasion went as far as the
Polish land. Everywhere Mongols met with resistance, everywhere the resis-
tance was futile. Russia fell to the "Mongolian shackles", At least the Soviet
historians say so.
246
THE TOTALITARIAN ANOMALY 247
In reality, the shackles were fairly peculiar. For the Mongols' way was
to dominate the conquered territories with the aid of local sovereigns,
giving them much autonomy. They did not disturb the local property
relations, legislation or religion, instead imposing on the population heavy
taxes. However, it was a prince who was responsible for gathering taxes
for the Mongols and in their name; a Mongolian clerk (baskak) only super-
vised his fmancial activities. Russian princes became economic representatives
of the Mongolian horde against their own citizens. Also their rule was based
on the military power of the invader who gave a juridical form to this: it
was a written agreement (jarlyk) of the khan which was indispensable for
a prince to seize power. In order to divide the princes among themselves,
the Mongols restored the throne of the grand prince having a supreme
authority over the other princes: of course, in the name of the khan whose
jarlyk appointment to that post became a subject of sharp competition
between Russian local sovereigns. In this way the system of dividing between
the rulers of a given duchy and its citizens came into being - the former
becoming representative of the invader both economically and politically.
The system deepened in due time. It became the usual practice that
Mongols leased taxes out to a prince who, of course, increased the required
sums and took the overpayment for himself. Russian duchies enriched them-
selves from the sacrifice of their own citizens, and a prince soon became
the first feudal lord in his duchy.
Increasing taxes pressed heavily on the population and evoked its resis-
tance. In 1259 Alexandr Nevsky, then a great prince, suppressed the "riot
of the mob" in Novgorod by force of arms causing the Mongolian clerks
to make a new census of the population for increased taxes, and forced
Novgorod to pay the tribute. This hero of Soviet historiography suppressed
also the people's upheavals of 1262 in Suzdal, Vlodimir, J aroslavl and other
towns. A Marxist historian says that those were "untimely anti-Mongolian
upheavals" and therefore the grand prince took the strange attitude ....
Let us add that this was at a time when a sharp struggle for power was taking
place in the Mongolian state which resulted in its division into four parts.
The explanations of the activity of the hero of Neva which Marxist historio-
graphy offers us differ sometimes, but they all have one thing in common:
an emphatic understanding. Sometimes it is said that he "had no interest"
in relations with Mongols being "occupied on the North"; sometimes his
"hidden patriotism" is shown that told him to suppress the riots (instead
of use the people's force against the Mongols) in order "to ward off Russia
from an even greater misery".
248 CHAPTER 16
It might be that such explanations are right in this case; it is a matter
for a historian, not for a historiosopher, to decide this. What, however,
should we say about the typical Russian prince who for centuries appeared
to his citizens as a Mongolian tax-gatherer, taking occasion to make his own
pile at their cost, who was competing for influences over them before his
Mongolian power-givers? A modern Polish historian defmes this cautiously:
the grand prince became,
as a representive of the Tartarian power, a true superior of other princes and he could,
if it was needed, recall the armed help of his principals. It was not surprising that the
Russian princes were scrambling for this post ... attempting with the aid of intrigues
to eliminate their rivals (T. Manteuffel, General History. The Middle Ages (in Polish),
Warsaw 1968, p. 294)
In fact: not surprising. It is an internal tendency of all power to enlarge
its sphere of regulation as much as possible. It is not surprising that this
applies also to Russia. What is peculiar here is twofold: the time and the
methods. It was the stage of the diffusion of power in Europe, and the
more outstanding sovereigns were employing everything they could in order
to overcome it. The two circumstances were, as we remember, decisive for
the transformation of an early, diffused power into an absolute monarchy
having a much greater sphere of regulation: the division of society into two
sub-societies and hence the division of classes into two pairs of antagonist
ones, and the necessity to strengthen the state in the face of revolutionary
disturbances in both the sub-systems. However, it was long-lasting, strenuous
work to raise the state from feudal ruins, to make of it a third social power
among the two exploitatory classes, to make and to exchange alliances
with them. So, it was centuries before absolute monarchies were established.
In Russia, instead. there appeared much earlier a chance almost rapidly to
liquidate the feudal diffusion of power - due to the throne of the grand
prince restored by the Mongols, or, rather, due to their military power
supporting this post. What was sufficient and necessary was to be obedient
to the khan's state. In order to have a great state of his own, it was sufficient
to be obedient to the other. Strictly speaking, to be more obedient than
the remaining rivals, to be most submissive. The power over Russia was given
for the maximization of obedience - that candidate won who turned out
to be the most submissive to the khan. It is not surprising that such a com-
petitive mechanism required special methods of action for overcoming the
diffusion of power. In the official works of the Marxist historians almost
nothing is said about the nature of the methods in question. Let us take,
THE TOTALITARIAN ANOMALY 249
then, the work of an author who had not been censored by any socialist
office for the control of publications:
To entertain discord among the Russian princes, and secure their servile submission,
the Mongols had restored the dignity of the Grand Princedom. The strife among the
Russian princes for this dignity was, as a modern author has it, "an abject strife -
the strife of slaves, whose chief weapon was calumny, and who were always ready to
denounce each other to their cruel rulers; wrangling for a degraded throne, whence
they could not move but with plundering, parricidal hands - hands filled with gold
and stained with gore; which they dared not ascend without grovelling, nor retain but
on their knees, prostrate and trembling beneath the scimitar of a Tartar, always ready
to roll under his feet those servile crowns, and the heads by which they were worn." It
was in this infamous strife that the Moscow branch won at last the race. In 1328 the
crown of the Grand Princedom. wrested from the branch of Tver by dint of denuncia-
tion and assassination, was picked up at the feet of Usbeck Khan by Yury, the elder
brother of Ivan Kalita. Ivan I. Kalita, and Ivan III., surnamed the Great, personate
Muscovy rising by means of the Tartar yoke, and Muscovy getting an independent power
by the disappearance of the Tartar rule. The whole policy of Muscovy, from its first
entrance into the historical arena, is resumed in the history of these two individuals.
The policy of Ivan Kalita was simply this: to play the abject tool of the Khan, thus
to borrow his power. and then to turn it round upon his princely rivals and his own
subjects. To attain this end, he had to insinuate himself with the Tartars by dint of
cynical adulation, by frequent journeys to the Golden Horde, by humble prayers for
the hand of Mongol princesses, by a display of unbounded zeal for the Khan's interest,
by the unscrupulous execution of his orders, by atrocious calumnies against his own
kinsfolk, by blending in himself the characters of the Tartar's hangman, sycophant,
and slave-in-chief. He perplexed the Khan by continuous revelations of secret plots.
Whenever the branch of Tvcr betrayed a velleite of national independence, he hurried
to the Horde to denounce It. Wherever he met with resistance, he introduced the Tartar
to trample it down. Bu t it was not sufficient to act a character; to make it acceptable,
gold was required. Perpetual bribery of the Khan and his grandees was the only sure
foundation upon which to raise his fabric of deception and usurpation. But how was
the slave to get the money wherewith to bribe the master? He persuaded the Khan to
instal him his taxgatherer throughout all the Russian appanages. Once invested with
this function, he extorted money under false pretences. The wealth accumulated by
the dread held out of the Tartar name, he used to corrupt the Tartars themselves. By a
bribe he induced the primate to transfer his episcopal seat from Vladimir to Moscow,
thus making the latter the capital of the empire, because the religious capital, and
coupling the power of the Church with that of his throne. By a bribe he allured the
Boyards of the rival princes into treason against their chiefs, and attracted them to
himself as their centre. By the joint influence of the Mahometan Tartar, the Greek
Church, and the Boyards, he unites the princes holding appanages into a crusade against
the most dangerous of them -- the prince of Tver; and then having driven his recent
allies by bold attempts at usurpation into resistance against himself, into a war for the
public good, he draws not the sword but hurries to the Khan. By bribes and delusion
again, he seduces him into assassinating his kindred rivals under the most cruel torments.
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It was the traditional policy of the Tartar to check the Russian princes the one by
the other, to feed their dissensions, to cause their forces to equiponderate, and to
allow none to consolidate himself. Ivan Kalita converts the Khan into the tool by which
he rids himself of his most dangerous competitors, and weighs down every obstacle to
his own usurping march. He does not conquer the appanages, but surreptitiously turns
the rights of the Tartar conquest to his exclusive profit. He secures the succession
of his son through the same means by which he had raised the Grand Princedom of
Muscovy, that strange compound of princedom and serfdom. During his whole reign
he swerves not once from the line of policy he had traced to himself; clinging to it with
a tenacious firmness, and executing it with methodical boldness. Thus he becomes the
founder of the Muscovite power, and characteristically his people call him Kalita - that
is, the purse, because it was the purse and not the sword with which he cut his way.
The very period of his reign witnesses the sudden growth of the Lithuanian power
which dismembers the Russian appanages from the West, while the Tartar squeezes
them into one mass from the East. Ivan, while he dared not repulse the one disgrace,
seemed anxious to exaggerate the other. He was not to be seduced from following up
his ends by the allurements of glory, the pangs of conscience, or the lassitude of humilia-
tion. His whole system may be expressed in a few words: the machiavelism of the
usurping slave. (K. Marx, Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century, ed.
by his daughter Eleanor Marx, London 1899, pp. 78-80.)
So wrote Karl Marx about Ivan Kalita. It is interesting whether a Polish
Marxist historian defining the same figure as an "outstanding monarch"
led "not by feeling but by reasons of State" whose policy was corresponding
to "aspirations of society" as he "found the grounds for Moscow's power"
is led by theoretical reasons of his master or rather by feelings towards the
neighbour superpower?
The theoretical reasons of Karl Marx ought not to be overestimated,
however. As we remember, he did not have anything especially materialist
to say about the regularities of the political process. It is not surprising,
then, that also in his beautiful characterisation of the Moscow policy an
evidently idealist tone appears. Meanwhile, the point is not that Ivan Kalita
was a craven person lacking any human scruples, for it happens in all popula-
tions according to an unknown but existing statistical distribution. What
could matter would be rather that only such features allowed for a success
in the conditions of the system of the "control of the controllers" created
in Russia by the Tartars. And that such a system opened up a possibility of
the accumulation of power on the scale of that which in Western Europe
only long-lasting social processes were able to realise. In Russia, for the great
leap in the development of power, for the enormous enlargement in the
sphere of regulation, it was sufficient to maximize obedience to the invader.
This led to the deepening of the natural division between the rulers and the
THE TOTALITARIAN ANOMALY 251
citizens, much more than in normal conditions. In order to enlarge his power
over the citizens, the ruler had to oppose his citizens and become a slave of
the conquerors. And being their slave, he attempted to make of the citizens
slaves of his own. The cowardliness and the lack of any human feelings
was, in fact, necessary to win in the competition calling into being the "best
servant of the khan". That is why these are properties the whole line of
Moscow princes characterizes of itself.
One should not, however, undergo national resentiments and fall into
idealism: every large enough population of sovereigns facing such a possibility
of so high a multiplication of power would, in those conditions, call into
being quite similar skunks without honesty and sensitivity who in the same
way would eliminate their more human rivals. So, one may, and even should,
be surprised and indignant facing the Moscow type of ruler. First of all,
however, one should try to understand that the system of "slave competi-
tion" for the rulers changed in the relationships of power - the citizens
within Russian feudalism.
Let us go further into the considerations of the author of Capital:
The policy traced by I van I. Kalita is that of his successors; they had only to enlarge
the circle of its application. They followed it up laboriously, gradually, inflexibly.
From Ivan I. Kalita, we may, therefore, pass at once to Ivan III., surnamed the Great.
At the commencement of his reign (1462-1505) Ivan III. was still a tributary to the
Tartars; his authority was still contested by the princes holding appanages; Novgorod,
the head of the Russian republics, reigned over the north of Russia; Poland-Lithuania
was striving for the conquest of Muscovy; lastly, the Livonian knights were not yet
disarmed. At the end of his reign we behold Ivan III. seated on an independent throne,
at his side the daughter of the last emperor or Byzantium, at his feet Kasan, and the
remnant of the Golden Horde flocking to his court; Novgorod and the other Russian
republics enslaved - Lithuania diminished. and its king a tool in Ivan's hands - the
Livonian knights vanquished. Astonished Europe, at the commencement ofIvan's reign,
hardly aware of the existence of Muscovy, hemmed in between the Tartar and the
Lithuanian, was dazzled by the sudden appearance of an immense empire on its eastern
confines, and Sultan Bajazet himself, before whom Europe trembled, heard for the
first time the haughty language of the Muscovite. How, then, did Ivan accomplish
these high deeds? Was he a hero? The Russian historians themselves show him up a
confessed coward.
Let us shortly survey his principal contests, in the sequence in which he undertook
and concluded them - his contests with the Tartars, with Novgorod, with the princes
holding appanages, and lastly with Lithuania-Poland.
Ivan rescued Muscovy from the Tartar yoke, not by one bold stroke, but by the
patient labour of about twenty years. He did not break the yoke, but disengaged himself
by stealth. Its overthrow, accordingly, has more the look of the work of nature than the
deed of man. When the Tartar monster expired at last, Iwan appeared at its death-bed
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like a physician, who prognosticated and speculated on death rather than like a warrior
who imparted it. The character of every people enlarges with its enfranchisement from
a foreign yoke; that of Muscovy in the hands of Ivan seems to diminish. Compare only
Spain in its struggles against the Arabs with Muscovy in its struggles against the Tartars.
At the period of Ivan's accession to the throne, the Golden Horde had long since
been weakened, internally by fierce feuds, externally by the separation from them of
the Nogay Tartars, the eruption of Timour Tameriane, the rise of the Cossacks, and
the hostility of the Crimean Tartars. Muscovy, on the contrary, by steadily pursuing the
policy traced by Ivan Kalita, had grown to a mighty mass, crushed, but at the same time
compactly united by the Tartar chain. The Khans, as if struck by a charm, had con-
tinued to remain instruments of Muscovite aggrandizement and concentration. By
calculation they had added to the power of the Greek Church, which, in the hand of
the Muscovite grand princes, proved the deadliest weapon against them.
In rising against the Horde, the Muscovite had not to invent but only to imitate
the Tartars themselves. But Ivan did not rise. He humbly acknowledged himself a slave
of the Golden Horde. By bribing a Tartar woman he seduced the Khan into commanding
the withdrawal from Muscovy of the Mongol residents. By similar and imperceptible
and surreptitious steps he duped the Khan into successive concessions, all ruinous to
his sway. He thus did not conquer, but filch strength. He does not drive, but manceuvre
his enemy out of his strongholds. Still continuing to prostrate himself before the Khan's
envoys, and to proclaim himself his tributary, he eludes the p,ayment of the tribute
under false pretences, employing all the stratagems of a fugitive slave who dare not
front his owner, but only steal out of his reach. At last the Mongol awakes from his
torpor, and the hour of battle sounds. Ivan, trembling at the mere semblance of an
armed encounter, attempts to hide himself behind his own fear, and to disarm the
fury of his enemy by withdrawing the object upon which to wreak his vengeance. He
is only saved by the intervention of the Crimean Tartars, his allies. Against a second
invasion of the Horde, he ostentatiously gathers together such disproportionate forces
that the mere rumour of their number parries the attack. At the third invasion, from
the midst of 200,000 men, he absconds a disgraced deserter. Reluctantly dragged back,
he attempts to haggle for conditions of slavery, and at last, pouring into his army his
own servile fear, he involves it in a general and disorderly flight. Muscovy was then
anxiously awaiting its irretrievable doom, when it suddenly hears that by an attack
on their capital made by the Crimean Khan, the Golden Horde has been forced to
withdraw, and has, on its retreat, been destroyed by the Cossacks and Nogay Tartars.
Thus defeat was turned into success, and Ivan had overthrown the Golden Horde, not
by fighting it himself, but by challenging it through a feigned desire of combat into
offensive movements, which exhausted its remnants of vitality and exposed it to the
fatal blows of the tribes of its own race whom he had managed to turn into his allies.
He caught one Tartar with another Tartar. As the immense danger he had himself sum-
moned proved unable to betray him into one single trait of manhood, so his miraculous
triumph did not infatuate him even for one moment. With cautious circumspection
he dared not incorporate Kasan with Muscovy, but made it over to sovereigns belonging
to the family of Menghi-Ghirei, his Crimean ally, to hold it, as it were, in trust for
Muscovy. With the spoils of the vanquished Tartar, he enchained the victorious Tartar.
But if too prudent to assume, with the eye-witnesses of his disgrace, the airs of a con-
queror, this impostor did fully understand how the downfall of the Tartar empire must
THE TOTALITARIAN ANOMALY 253
dazzle at a distance - with what halo of glory it would encircle him, and how it would
facilitate a magnificent entry among the European Powers. Accordingly he assumed
abroad the theatrical attitude of the conqueror, and, indeed, succeeded in hiding under
a mask of proud susceptibility and irritable haughtiness the obtrusiveness of the Mongol
serf, who still remembered kissing the stirrup of the Khan's meanest envoy. He aped in
more subdued tone the voice of his old masters, which terrified his soul. Some standing
phrases of modern Russian diplomacy, such as the magnanimity, the wounded dignity
of the master, are borrowed from the diplomatic instructions of Ivan III. (K. Marx, ibid.,
pp.80-83.)
It is a beautiful example of historical narration. . . . However, it is limited
to the surface of political phenomena and Marx does not make any effort
to reconstruct their deep structure. The image of things is the following:
the Gold Horde is for a long time in a state of serious internal crisis; in the
meantime, Moscow grows in power more and more - the territory of the
Moscow state increases since the time of Ivan Kalita to 1462 (the beginning
of the rule of Ivan 3rd - Ivan the Great) almost twenty times, and the
latter even enlarges it before the confrontation with the Gold Horde; the
latter has powerful external enemies who are faithful allies of Moscow.
It can seem that it is sufficient to stay at the head of the great nation to
immediately overthrow the Tartarian supreme authority. Meanwhile, Ivan
3rd shuffles, hedges to flinch in the decisive moment and the actual relation-
ship of forces reveals his allies themselves defeating their common foe. Could
it be possible that a consummate politician, a master of the political game
consisting in recognizing the opponent's potential, was not able to properly
state the actual disposal of forces in so simple a situation?
One could get rid of this puzzle of the "littleness of Ivan the Great" by
stating that he was "a coward, and that is all", but it was a puzzle not only
about him. In the history of Moscow it happened many a time that princes
took flight in the face of the Tartarian threat and that the defense of the
town was arranged by a "mob" electing leaders ad hoc or calling for them
from neighbouring countries. Not only Ivan "the Great", then, stood helpless
in a situation requiring action, but this was the rule (though not without
exceptions) in Moscow history. What is more, this trend was deepening -
as in the 14th century armed confrontations with the Tartars still happened,
so in the 15th century princes fought mainly among themselves and the
weakening Horde instead of undergoing an increasing pressure on the part
of Moscow that becomes more and more powerful, undergoes increasing
intrigues on the part of the Russian rulers. Here is a typical intrigue: in order
to gain the favour of the khan a certain prince bribes him; but not of his
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CHAPTER 16
own resources, not at all: the prince calls khan's clerks who are pleased to
plunder his own citizens in addition to the periodical tributes ....
If so, one cannot get rid of the puzzle of the "littleness of Ivan the Great"
for he was representing only an evident trend in Moscow policy. It is easy
to say that at the beginning of the Moscow state lies infamy and shame. In
what way, however, can this infamy and shame be rationally explained?
One thing is certain in advance: this has nothing to do with the "darkness
of the Eastern soul". Such "explanations" do nothing except express the
racial prejudices of their authors.
The trouble in the explanation of a phenomenon often consists not in
the lack of knowledge on our part, but in the fact that we know too much,
accepting some assumptions that are false. When an unexpected phenomenon
is met, then an equal weight is to be put on it and on our assumptions. Let
us control, then, our sense of obviousness.
Why does the policy of Ivan 3rd seem so puzzling for us? Well, this is a
rather easy question. For:
1. He stood at the head of a powerful nation hating the Mongols;
2. He possessed powerful allies;
3. The enemy was weakened a great deal thanks to long-lasting internal
struggles.
In this situation every experienced sovereign ... - well, we already know
that. Let us rather look at the premises. The truthfulness of the third element
cannot be questioned - in the 15th century the old Mongolian power was
only a dream. What about the former premises?
"Stood at the head of a powerful nation ... " ... Ivan 3rd? The same who
gathered the tribute from his own citizens in the name of the hated Mongols?
Who plundered the same population as he could on his own account but also
in the name of the hated khan? The same who "kissed the stirrup of even the
lowest of the khan's emissaries"? But Ivan 3rd did not introduce such a polit-
icalline. He was only a talented executor of the Muscovite political line which
then had a tradition of almost one hundred and fify years. And the political
line of Moscow's rulers turned out to be only the most effective one in this
all-Russian "slaves" struggle where calumnies constituted the main arm and
who were always ready to delate each other as against their cruel superiors".
In what sense could a typical Muscovite ruler be said to "stand at the head
of the nation"? The power stands at the head of the nation if it is supported
at least by some of the great categories of society. Who could support the
Muscovite rulers if they equalized all the citizens under the burden of the
Tartars? External coercion was the only guarantee for him to keep the
THE TOTALITARIAN ANOMALY 255
partial power over his own citizens. It was the basis of his profits and his
power. That is why there was no situation he would be more afraid of than
the independence of his country. This does not imply that he did not want
independence. He wanted it: for every ruler wants to have decisions free
from outside control in order to enlarge his control over the citizens inside
the country. He wanted, then, to liberate the country from Mongolian
supervision, but he was frightened of doing something in this direction
because he terribly feared his citizens, those whom he was plundering and
causing to rot actually in the name of the khan.
Karl Marx, in his splendid description of Moscow policy, had ignored
its main component - the strident fear of this power. A power always fears
its citizens, for - pace the political science people - it understands very
well that the citizens have no reason to love it, and it is satisfied if they
tolerate it. But the power that grows on fraternal blood, such a power must
be in deadly fear of them. So, when the time of liberation came, Ivan 3rd
did not take fright in the face of the Mongols - he was too great a politician
not to understand his lords' weakness. Ivan 3rd took fright in the face of
uncertainty, in the face of the independence he wanted and was afraid of
at the same time, storming between the desire for independence and yet
frightened to stay alone with his citizens.
There is no need to discuss premise 2 - he who lives in the paralysing
fear of his citizens must be distrustful and suspicious to a degree surpassing
the standards of cautious reservedness adopted in the normal political game.
Ivan 3rd, who so many times turned out to be a traitor, could not constrain
himself to rely on his allies. though temporarily but fully, while only on
this can one base firm actions.
The "puzzle of the littleness of Ivan the Great" explains itself in this way
- not by his character but by the character of the power he represented.
The latter explained, in turn, by the relationships between the rulers and
the citizens that were formed in the specific conditions of Russia controlled
by Mongols since the beginning of the 13th century up to the end of the
15th century. Let us summarize them:
(1) Russia was in the phase of the diffusion of power.
(2) The invasion of the Mongols and the specific nature of their domina-
tion created an entirely new and basic mechanism of political competition.
The stake in it is an enormous enlargement of the sphere of regulation, the
price that must be payed for it - the maximization of obedience to the
external superpower.
(3) The global effect of the process is the overcoming of feudal diffusion
256
CHAPTER 16
of power by the home power not in an alliance with some category of cit-
izens but due to support of the supervising external state. The home power
unified the state not on the ground of the alliance. with some category of
citizens against the other - as was the case in the Western countries, but
opposed the society at large being a representative of the strange, hated
superpower.
This was the social basis of the process of transformation of the proud
Russian prince (kniaz) into a Muscovite skunk whose way of ruling shook
the consciousness of the author of Capital still after four centuries. In that
case it is a pity that it did not shake his intellect. For a long time we would
have possessed a solid theory of politics.
The Point of Departure of Russian Feudalism
Russia came, then, from the phase of the diffusion of power to that of
statization (cf. Chapter 12) in a quite different manner than the countries
of the West. In a typical Western country such a transition was the result
of a long socio-economic development: the formation of the town economy
and the parallel development of both it and the rural economy leading to
the increase of the class struggle in them; and both the factors, that of the
division of society and that of internal disturbances in the two sub-societies,
allowed the state to became a third force (among the two classes of owners);
the phase of statization (when absolute monarchies appeared) occurred in
the constant struggle against some categories of society but in cooperation
with other ones at first the state-sponsored industry and the trade support-
ing the bourgeoisie (as the weaker of the two classes of owners), and next
the direction of the alliances changed and the state supported feu dais (as
the weaker class of owners later on). In Russia, instead, socio-economic
factors were almost excluded from the mechanism of the transition of the
stage of diffusion of power to that of statization: almost nothing had to be
varied in the sphere of economy or the relations among economic classes
in order for the state to become able to dominate over the life of the citizens
as it attempted to do in the absolute monarchies of the West. Everything
was done by the connection of the internal power with the external one.
And also: the statization that was, in an absolute monarchy of a typical
Western country, always a partial one (as made in an alliance with some
category against another), in Russia was total, directed against the whole
society at once. This was also enabled or, rather, forced by the character
of the internal power being a slave of the external one and opposing itself
THE TOTALITARIAN ANOMALY 257
to all the citizens at once. All the citizens had been equalized in the face
of the state.
A power that once alienates the whole of society does not possess a
way back - it must subordinate all the citizens entirely, even if it does
not feel itself to be strong enough to do that, or perish. And so it happened
after Ivan the 3rd "stole independence". The Moscow power remained
then face to face with the class of its own citizens without any external
support, meeting the alternative: either be demolished by the increasing
resistance of all the citizens or multiply the oppression so much that they
lose any willingness to resist at all. It is not a mere accident that the next
sovereign, after Ivan 3rd ("the Great"), who sank into the minds of the
descendants, bears the nickname - the Sinister. This time nobody feels the
need to grasp the term in quotations marks.
The First Double-Class in European History: Pomeshchiki
The prince, of course, did not rule by himself alone. His apparatus of power
was constituted by a category of people called dvorane:
These were free people, but also slaves (cholops) could be included. For their service
dvorane were paid on part of the prince's lands, and later on they gained the right
of use of the land for which they were paid. Dvorane, even being free people, did not
have the right of departure (that is, to let the prince down - L. N.) (K. Koranyi, The
General History of State and Law (in Polish), Vol. 2, Warsaw 1955, p. 306).
The more alienated from his own society a prince becomes, the more he
needs social support in the face of coming independence. In order to assure
this for himself, he tries to connect with himself those who were closest,
who were the only category of people close to him - his apparatus of power.
That is why he gives them land - but not the property on it. In order to
keep them in constant dependency on the throne, the prince keeps the right
of property himself. After the death of a given dvorianin the land comes
back to the prince who might, though need not, give it back again to a son of
his servant. In this way the prince makes a dvorianin additionally dependent
with respect to the fate of his family, and the children of a dvorianin in this
way are somehow automatically called to be dvorians again.
Let us note that - in spite of the opinions of Marxist historians equating
this with the institution of the feud known in Western Europe - the way
the prince equipped his servants in the land did not have too much in com-
mon with the feudal relations within a ruling class. Here are the differences: a
258 CHAPTER 16
vassal of a Western king was not a servant in his household; he was not
ascribed to his superior, either; he had a right of property (though in dif-
ferent degrees) not of the use alone; his children did not have to remain
the king's (ascribed) servants in order to keep their means of maintenance.
A dvorianin was a chelae adscriptae servant equipped with the right of use
of land belonging to the prince.
The "stealing of i n d e p e n d e n ~ e rapidly accelerated the process of giving
the land to the prince's servants. The land is taken away from the free
peasants (the so-called "black land") making of the former the serfs of the
donor:
In the hands of the prince and sovereign, 'black land' becomes the state's resources of
land with which he endows people who are his servants and actually for their service
with the central power (P. Lyashchenko, The Economic History of the U.S.S.R., Vol.
1: Pre-Capitalist Formations, after the Polish translation from the Russian, Warsaw
1954, p. 259).
The process is so rapidly increasing that
At the end of this (15th - L. N.) century the term 'dvorians' that was applied hitherto
to denote servants of the prince's household, acquired a broader meaning. A dvorianin
was not yet a servant of the prince's household, but one who for service with a prince
obtained the land (pomeste) (Koranyi, ibid, Vol. 2, p. 306).
The process of forming the category of pomeshchiki goes along with the
capturing of more and more new territories. And so, at the beginning of the
16th century, the Novgorod Land was merged in the Moscow Duchy, and
about half, and in some regions even two-thirds, of the new territory was
given as the right of pomeste. In the south of the country 80-90% of land
belonged at that time to pomeshchiki.
What was actually the category of people? The Marxist historians give
unclear explanations - for instance, the pomeshchiki were a stratum within
the class of feudal lords. However, this is quite misleading. Whatever kind
of feudal lords were they whose status of disposer of the means of produc-
tion (land and serfs attached) depended exclusively on the prince's will and
who could be at any moment deprived of it? What kind of feudal lords were
they, if they had to belong to the prince's bureaucratic-military apparatus,
in perpetuity and without the possibility of ridding him of his post? It is
only an attempt to pack the phenomenon in question into old Marxian
categories which cannot include it at all.
From the non-Marxian stand as developed in Part I of this book the
THE TOTALITARIAN ANOMALY 259
phenomenon can be understood quite easily: a pomeshchik was one who
joined the post in the service of the state and had a (limited) disposal over
the means of production (the land and the serfs ascribed to it). What is more,
he benefited the more, the higher his post. Thus, the category of pomeshchiki
can be interpreted as the class of rules-owners, that is, a double-class. And
so, formation of such a class was a component of the process of the polit-
ical totalitarianisation of society (cf. Chapter 13). The combination of the
function of a ruler (as occupying a post in the state's bureaucratic-military
hierarchy) and of a (limited) owner (as disposing - as long as he was obedient
- of the means of production) was a real peculiarity of the social structure
of the Muscovite society. It was the reverse process of what had been done
in early feudalism in Western Europe. There occurred there the same process
that took place in pre-Mongolian Russia - that of the diffusion of power
leading to giving some state's functions over to the hands of feudal lords; in
extreme cases one could observe there the process of forming of the category
of owners-rulers. Here, in Russia of the 15th-16th centuries, the concentra-
tion of power led to giving property to some extent over to the hands of the
rulers (in our theoretical terms), or the servants of the state. In short, in
early feudalism in the West, at most a trend to E-totalitarianism was occurring,
whereas in Russia the trend was to P-totalitarianism.
Evidently, the interpretation of pomeshchiki as a double-class of rulers-
owners is only a hypothesis. But accepting it, we become able to explain
some phenomena which are hardly explicable in terms of the traditional
Marxist conceptions. Let us consider two examples.
The first is that the social composition of the new category is a very
strange one from the standard viewpoint:
Moscow, while liquidating separate duchies and boyars' hereditary estates, took in
service not only former dukes and boyars but also townsmen, merchants, 'svoiezemec'
(free peasants in the Novgorod region - 1. N.), dvorians and even slave cholopes. With
all their diversity in the estate status and personal and political influences, Moscow
equalized them in one respect - everybody for his service with the monarch obtained
the land for temporary use (Lyashchenko, vol. 1, pp. 261-262).
Why did not the "political representation of the feudal owners" (as the
Moscow state was supposed to be in the light of the general formulations
of Marxist historians) prefer the "ruling class" in the distribution of land?
The answer from the standpoint of non-Marxian historical materialism is
really simple: the richer a given person is of himself, the worse a candidate
he is for the post of servant of the state; for the more independent he is.
260 CHAPTER 16
The best servants are poor people - they will be attached to the state with
the aid of beneficiary much more than a hereditary possessor of land.
Another trend to be explained is the increasing bureaucratization: more
and more offices of different types, including central ones called prikazes,
were created. Here the Marxist historians are entirely helpless being only
able to carp at their "excessive number", to be surprised that too many
prikazes had been created with "too narrow range of competences" each
(including a pharmaceutical one). In fact, it is really difficult to understand
this in tenns of the interest of the ( economically) "ruling class", i.e., the
feudal lords. What remains then, is to rely on common-sense and become
surprised. Meanwhile, the phenomenon in question was an evident conse-
quence of the gradual P-totalitarisation of society - the state was enlarging
more and more its range of regulation. The state was not interested in making
pharmacy for its own sake, but in making people more and more dependent
on itself: it may also have used the distribution of medicines as a way of
subordinating the citizens to itself. To be sure: citizens in a country with
private distribution of medicines are, ceteris paribus, less dependent on the
state than in a country where it monopolizes this k n ~ of activity. The
multiplication of offices is, then, a result of the class interest, but not the
economic classes. And from the point of view of the interest of rulers, there
is no limit above which one could assess the bureaucratization as "excessive"
- it is a quite natural process leading to the destruction of all the autonomous
social relations the citizens in given conditions allow to be destroyed.
The Structure of Moscow Society at the Beginning of the 16th Century
Let us break for a while the arduous clarification of historical phenomena
of deposits of the Marxian historical materialism and summarize at this
moment. Here is the social structure of the Moscow society at the beginning
of the 16th century:
1. The class of feudal landowners (roughly - the boyars);
2. The class of rulers-owners (roughly - the pomeshchiki);
3. The class of owners of the means of handicraft production and of
circulation (roughly - the town patriciate);
3. The class of feudal serfs (to the class 1 or 2),
4. The class of town direct producers (roughly - town plebeians).
It is obviously not yet a two-momentum society, but it differs Significantly
from the Western societies of the epoch of the absolute monarchy. The
struggle for P-totalitarian society in Russia was already beginning, however.
THE TOTALITARIAN ANOMALY 261
The Supra-Class Struggle: Of the Double-Class of Oppressors with a Single
One
It was the boyars who were the true enemies of the pomeshchiki. First of
all they were the only category of people able to compete with the latter
for posts and positions. For boyars were economically independent having
estates with the full right of property (the so-called votchinas), and besides
there existed a long political tradition (the so-called mestnichestvo) according
to which a position could be given according to the nobleness of the stock
to which a given person belonged. This was understood in such a manner
that the prince was not allowed - and this was a matter of long-lasting
custom - to appoint a given boyar to the post in which he would be sub-
ordinated to somebody whose antecedent was in turn subordinated to an
antecedent of this boyar. For generations special books were officially kept
on the ground of which controversies were settled concerning the admissible
positions of descendants of persons noted in them.
The boyars also constituted an obstacle to the economic development of
the class of pomeshchiki. The latter were going so quickly that soon all the
"black land" came to be distributed. The only resources of land were in
the hands of the boyars.
For two principal reasons for non-Marxian historical materialism, the
pomeshchiki had to fight against the boyars. Every double-class of oppressors
fights against a single one. The stake is a double-rule over the whole society,
both economic and political. The stake is, then, a P-totalitarian society.
This was the social source of the fact that
The system of pomeste which was quickly developing led to ... the lack of black land
to distribute. [That is why,] the grand princes, Vassil 3rd and Ivan 4th, started to take
the boyars' estates over (Z. Wojcik, The General History of the 16th-17th Centuries,
Warsaw 1968, p. 160).
The whole of the 16th century in Russia was a scene of the supra-class
struggle between the two possessing classes (and one was also a ruling class,
in the strict, not the Marxian, sense). The grand prince, though, soon put
on the Monomach's cap, called himself the tsar and undertook some other
theatrical gestures, but he turned out to be nothing more than a leader of
the class called into being by his alienation of society. He had no choice
than to be the leader of it.
In the times of Ivan the Sinister the rate of the Supra-class struggle accel-
erated. Even the beginning of his rule brought some strong accents. The
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CHAPTER 16
young tsar (the one who introduced the title) decided to marry a Russian
girl and not a daughter of an external sovereign. And he gave the order to
all the boyars having marriageable daughters
to go with the daughters-virgins immediately for inspection to our deputies in the towns .
. . . And anyone of you who fails to deliver the girls to our deputies ... is to expect
great disfavour and a stern punishment from myself (quoted after Wojcik, ibid., p. 165).
The commentary of the Marxist historian is decisively wrong: Ivan the
Sinister's matrimonial plans were realised in a "highly shocking" manner
(ibid., p. 165). This would have been proper, if the sovereign had made a
tour of the castles where there were "daughters-virgins" and personally made
a choice, or even made the "inspection" of them. This would be within the
norm of tsarist vagaries and deviations. In this case, however, nothing shows
of the tsar's vagaries or inclinations to other pranks. This was an overthought,
an entirely rational plan of political manifestation. The new tsar communi-
cated to his citizens, particularly to those who maintained the greatest inde-
pendence from the state, since they were economically the most powerful:
even with the daughter of yours you must render her to me, if such is my
will; and I will not show you the honour of seeing them personally - my
clerks will do that; and I will make a serf of you yourself.
Another sign of the near future was issued when the tsar selected among
his servants one thousand trustworthy people and gave them (for their use,
of course) estates in the surroundings of Moscow in return for the obligation
to serve the tsar immediately and as long as needed.
The occasion presented itself in 1564 when the tsar made gestures inter-
preted by his contemporaries as the rejection of the throne: he left Moscow
going to one of his castles and sent two letters from there - one to the
boyars with the charge of state treason; and the other to the town mob
where it was stated that the poor cannot be charged with an improper
attitude towards the state.
In this way the state left the boyars in the face of the people. In the
country, disturbances began. The boyars were threatened by mass movements
and sent a delegation to the tsar begging him to stay in power. Ivan the Sinister
condescendingly agreed to come back to the throne, but on the condition
that the boyars accept the political program that gained in history the name
"oprichnina" .
More than 30% of the state's territory was to be a separate area subordi-
nated exclusively to the state. The boyars' land (votchinas) in this area
were taken over by the "chosen thousand" (oprichniki - their number,
THE TOTALITARIAN ANOMALY 263
of course, was constantly increasing) while the boyars were displaced to
new land - of course, by the right of pomeste alone. It was not a mere
accident that the selected state land (oprichnina in the narrow sense of the
term) included the regions with the old private land's noblest stocks and,
at the same time, with the richest towns. The point is, of course, outside
the possibilities of Marxist comprehension - the double class of rulers-
owners the tsar was representing was cutting off the economic source of
the power of the alleged "ruling class" of the alleged feudal society in Russia
- that is why the state attacked the most powerful of the boyars. On the
new terrains enormous taxes were waiting for them.
The tsar soon lost control over his plan. More and more people wanted
to become servants of a state that allows one to become a landowner in the
place of a boyar: it is sufficient to charge someone with betrayal of the
state to possess his estates. And the mass terror began. Oprichniki were
transformed from the "chosen thousand" in a numbered, and constantly
increasing, centralized, separate organization with their own offices and the
treasure which is subordinated immediately to the tsar. They were running
allover the country with dog's crossbone and beson "biting" and "sweeping"
all those who were worthy to be accused of "treason towards the state".
This of course forced the real acts of treason - for the representatives of
the old boyars' stocks, the only chance to save their influences, next their
estates, finally their lives, was by appealing to neighbouring countries. This
resulted in new charges of treason, and so it continued.
When there occurred a lack of real charges, new ones were invented.
In 1567 the alleged secret letters of the Polish king to the members of the
former Boyars' Duma, in which he appealed for the support of Lithuania,
were intercepted. And they fulfilled their task properly - a new wave of
terror was begun. On similarly reliable data, Novgorod, the town with the
old republic and democratic traditions, was charged with treason. In January
1570 the tsar came there with a punitive expedition and seized the town
for several weeks torturing many thousands of townsmen; the proud spirit
of Novgorod was killed with 20-60 thousands of its inhabitants.
Not only was the mass terror directed by the state against all social cate-
gories (the most independent on the state ones). But also the system of
incredible exploitation was instigated incomparable with that on the part
of private feudal lords. New lords of the mercy of the state increased their
rent many a time, sometimes even ten times. The exploitation of the serf
masses grew rapidly also on the part of the state itself. At the beginning
of the 16th century taxes amounted to 4 roubles per unit of land while
264
CHAPTER 16
in the middle of it it was 8 roubles; at the beginning of Ivan the Sinister's
rule they amounted to 42 roubles and at the end of the century to 151
roubles per unit of land; despite the depreciation of money, the leap was
really huge. The impoverished country could not afford to give more and
Ivan the Sinister issued the "tsar's tithes" - the state's rent required from
work. All this led to mass scarcities: in the centre of the state the area under
cultivation diminished 2-3 times, and from the country being quite well-off
a hunger came. The reaction of the power was to entirely ascribe a peasant
to the land of his lord. It was not the feudal lords who brought about a
system of "almost slave" (Lenin) serfdom, but the rulers-owners, the double
class whose interests were represented by Ivan the Sinister.
The system of mass terror has mechanisms of its own and cannot be
controlled: when all the conflicts of interests among people, including the
slightest ones, can be solved with the aid of physical force monopolized by
the minority, the terror is all-inclusive and reaches at last its animators. So
it was in Ivan the Sinister's Russia. The oprichniki also attacked the modern
army organized by Ivan the Sinister - almost half of the military cadres
were destroyed. "The victims of the mass terror were the highest notables
and regular people" (Ochmanski, ibid., p. 113). In 1572 Ivan the Sinister
reformed the oprichnina so deeply that he forbade even the use of its name.
The people playing its role were called simply dvor and attacked the former
oprichniki. The latter were hanged, while deportees came back to the ruins
of their estates. This caused an internal struggle between the old and the
new owners- the state was plunged in chaos.
It was only a comedy Ivan the Sinister could play later on. In order
to play politics a sovereign requires the support of at least the rulers of
the apparatus of power and this was lacking - Ivan the Sinister lost the
support of the pomeshchiki. In 1574 he nominated one of the subordinated
Tartarians, Sain-Bulat. a "grand all-Russian prince" renaming him Symeon
Bekbulatovitsch, and he himself as a moderate "Moscow prince" bowed
low to him. After two years. however, Ivan the Sinister sent a "grand prince
of the whole of Russia" to Tver, coming back to the throne ... Let us
also add that the tsar personally killed his own son and personally tortured
people.
What Was the Oprichnina?
Of course, all this could be explained easiest in idealist tenus: Ivan the
Sinister was a fool and a sadist, and the slave mentality peculiar to the
Russian nation made it possible to realise his maniacal ideas.
THE TOTALITARIAN ANOMALY 265
In order to see how much explanations of the kind are worth, let us
assume that his offer to seize the Polish throne after Valesius' escape was
accepted. What could remain of his "maniacal ideas" in the most tolerant
and democratic country of Europe, as it was then? Likely he would be forced
to escape as his unfortunate predecessor had or simply disappear with them
altogether - Poland was not ready to accept even an absolute monarchy
not to mention a totalitarian state in the Russian style.
And it is not so that the "slave mentality" allegedly peculiar to the
Russian nation was a co-cause of the unbridled nature of the state apparatus,
but the increasing force of the state becoming not only a political but also
an economic power formed the national character of the Russians, full of
obediency and submissiveness to every oppressor. If the Mongols in the
13th century had also captured petty Polish states, then they would have
created the same mechanism of political competence as in Russia, and Polish
Piasts would have equalized the Polish nation under Mongolian shackles as
the Moscow princes did. And in the same way they would have alienated
themselves from their own nation, "stealing independence" in the face of
Mongolian weakness, and in the same way they would have called into
being a state apparatus containing a new double-class in order to gain a
kind of social support when their independence was threatened. And having
such a class, Poland would have brought to light a (more or less) similar
sinister attitude and our national pride - that we would like so much to
compare with the Russians' "slave mentality" - would have transformed
itself into the same anxiety about all power.
In the face of Moscow's 16th century history, Marxian historical material-
ism is almost as helpless as idealism. The "representation of the feudal lords"
attacks them with the aid of physical and economic terror. ... It is not
surprising that Marxist historians fall into simple inconsistencies, attempting
both to be faithful to Marxian historical materialism and to be in agreement
with historical facts. And so there appears a gap between the general declara-
tions full of the Marxian categories where the relationship to the means of
production is still maintained and the descriptions of facts where these
categories vanish altogether and those of the relationship to the state appear.
Of course, the latter are of a purely common-sense nature - the scientific
mood of reasoning is limited to the level of economics.
Non-Marxian historical materialism allows us, I would like to maintain,
to explain the phenomenon of oprichnina as a natural continuation of the
processes that were discussed earlier:
(I) The conditions of Mongolian control over Russia led to the alienation
of the state apparatus of the society;
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CHAPTER 16
(2) The governing elite transformed the state apparatus into the double-
class rulers-owners in order to assure itself a kind of social support in the
conditions of independence; in this way it became a realiser of the interests
of the new class;
(3) The basic interest of the new class, both on the political and economic
platform, was the elimination of the single class of feudal lords; the policy
of the Moscow state was only a realisation of this interest;
(4) The actions of the class of rulers-owners met the resistance of the
single class of feudal lords; in order to break it, the former destroyed the
hitherto autonomic property structure of feudalism;
(5) This resulted, however, in the collapse of the feudal economy; this
destroyed economically not only the old single class of owners but also the
new one of rulers-owners; the resistance on the part of the latter caused
them to become subsequent victims of the terror; at this moment only
Ivan the Sinister became a bloody tyrant - the Moscow power elite ceased
any kind of social support.
I f one can notice the footprints of maniacality in his behaviour, then it
was only after 1572 that he did not represent any actual social force. Only
at that moment did the terror become historically senseless. In fact, what
remained for him was an idealist policy - to bow low to a miasma of power
in order to teach people an overwhelming submissiveness to any symbol of
force. For he taught such submissiveness with the aid of materialist means,
by force and property; his policy of declassation was efficient for some time
and he could end his days without fear that his declassed citizens might
become able to efficiently resist.
The Reaction of the People: Bolotnikov's Revolution
According to the general rule of revolutions (cf. Chapter 9), they do not
come into being when the oppression is too high but when it is released
enough to overcome the atomisation raised by the terror. The leading force
of the citizens' resistance is that of those who meet both the explOitation
and the teror, that is, of the people. Such was also at that time; the struggle
of the boyars against the totalitarian state was nothing in comparison to
the explosion of the people's exasperation against both oppression and
exploitation.
As long as terror was the state's policy, the holding back of resources
was the only availaible form of class struggle. But it was sufficient the terror
limited its working to the instrument of the current fight for power at the top
THE TOTALITARIAN ANOMALY 267
of the state's hierarchy and numerous peasant's upheavals constantly broke
out (together with disturbances in the towns): 1584, 1586, 1591, 1593,
1594, and so on. All these were, however, introductory preludes to the great
explosion of 1607.
In 1606 the False Demetrius seized power, taking advantage of some
Polish magnates' support but first of all of the support of the people whom
he promised a more just policy. And, in fact, he enacted some laws in defense
of the interests of the peasantry: e.g., he annulled the statute allowing for
former owners to revindicate their escapee. And he also changed the political
atmosphere at the top of the state in the direction of more tolerance. When
the nobles, with Vassil Shuisky at their head, plotted against the new tsar
and were arrested, he ordered them to be judged in the court representing
all the estates of Russian society. And when the court sentenced Shuisky
to death, the new tsar reprieved him. All this was so unexpected in Russia
that it awoke the deepest hopes in the Russian people. Presumably, the
False Demetrius had to be something more for them than a "marionette
in Polish hands" (as Soviet historiography presents him today), if in the day
of the new, this time successful, coup d'etat the plotters had had to announce
to the Moscow mob that Poles murdered the tsar in the Kremlin. Of course,
the plotters themselves, with the same reprieved Shuisky, murdered him but,
then furious crowds killed two thousand Poles in the town.
Hearing of the death of the False Demetrius, numerous local upheaVals
took place in the form of a common people's war. It was not, however, a
usual peasant war as known in Western history - in spite of all the efforts
of Marxist historiography to present it as such. It can be seen in the best
of the acts of its future leader.
Bolotnikov, a former slave cholop and subsequently a Turkish galley-
slave, came back to his country hearing of the unusual changes under False
Demetrius's rule. The tsar turned out to have been killed, however. The
indignation was so common and it spread allover the society, including
among the noble strata. The former slave cholop organized a squad of nobles
in Putivl (with the aid of the voivode). The exploiters came to the terrains of
the peasant war and became an officer cadre of the large peasant army, while
Bolotnikov stood at its head. Despite the evidently anti-feudal watchwords,
numerous nobles supported the movement. For the movement did not limit
itself to anti-feudal aims, and as the people's movement it was directed both
against private property and state oppression - and the latter was not limited
to the serfs. Bolotnikov proclaimed both the annihilation of serfdom and
the ideal of a people's state where the people actually would take power.
268 CHAPTER 16
"Whole regions and towns proclaimed themselves in favour of him" (Wojcik,
ibid., p. 304). The insurrecting army besieged even Moscow, but at last
declined; among other reasons due to betrayal by some of the noble squads
which passed to Shuisky's side. The exploiting citizens felt less abomination
for the totalitarian system than the citizens exploited.
Official Soviet historiography cannot forgive Bolotnikov that his move-
ment was "polluted" as regards class character. It does not ask, however,
why all the social categories, including exploiters, joined the movement. And
it does not ask, either, which was the only one category that did not support
the citizens' movement. Not surprisingly! For the answers would reveal
clearly that it was a civic revolution (and not a class revolution in the Marxian
sense of the term) - a revolution directed against the double class of rulers-
owners hidden in the state apparatus. The pressure of the totalitarian state
was so unbearable for all the citizens that the exploiters joined the exploited
in the common struggle against the state's hydra as soon as a chance of
victory appeared.
The Retreat to Standard Feudalism
The shake-up Russian society underwent in its most common internal war
was so huge that it pushed it on the road of standard feudalism again. And
this revolution, like every other, resulted in a gradual evolution of the rela-
tions of power. especially those which were decisive for the class of rulers-
owners to be distinguished. The trend weakening the connexion between
property and power was evident. In 1618 it was determined, in the case of
the death of the possessor of the pomeste in the war, not to take it back
to the state but to leave it to his wife and children, and when he had none,
to his relatives. And also after the death of a pomeshchik even not in war,
his children and relatives were to obtain some shares of the pomeste. By
force of custom it was gradually decided that if a pomeshchik leaves the
state's service, and he has a son under age, then the means of maintenance
of the family were not taken out but were to remain with him on condition
that after the 15th year of life the son is to come to the state's service
becoming at the same time a proper user of the pomeste.
This trend of the separation of property and power deepened more and
more. In 1684 it was decided that a pomeste was to be inherited by children
of the pomeshchik and later on the exchangeability of pomeste into votchina
was introduced. The difference between the two forms of property disap-
peared. In the 17th century gradually the class of pomeschiki responsible
THE TOTALITARIAN ANOMALY 269
for the totalitarianisation of Russia one century previously vanished. A
unitary feudal class, after the long-lasting totalitarian anomaly, appeared at
the time when in Western countries feudalism was coming to its end.
Also the political role of the state was weakened:. instead of the centralized
state's machinery monopolizing all the power, a dualism of the state and of
the state's bureaucracy came in the 17th century into existence. This had
been typical for Western countries several hundreds years earlier.
The totalitarian anomaly broke the feudal development of Russia for
almost four hundred years and was stopped by the effort of the Russian
people. Bolotnikov's revolution pushed the society again along the road of
feudal development. But it was still a very peculiar feudal society. Peter the
Great was to be the first tsar who would reveal this openly.
CHAPTER 17
PROPERTY AND POWER IN RUSSIAN FEUDALISM
THE STRUCTURAL PECULIARITY OF RUSSIAN FEUDALISM
Russian Feudalism Does Not Fall Under Model IVP
The totalitarian anomaly was closed by the people's revolution. However,
Russian society never became a typical feudal society with its double cycle
leading, through internal transformations resulting from the class struggle, to
the evolution of unitary relations of property (cf. Chapter 6). It is seen at
fIrst sight. In the second half of the 17th, at the beginning of the 18th and in
the second half of the 18th century, Russia underwent strong waves of class
struggle, mainly. though not exclUSively, in the country. None the less no
evolution in the relationships between the owners and the direct producers
occurs. And there were among these upheavals huge peasant wars including
large territories of the country and lasting for many years (e.g., the Razin or
Pugachev upheavals). If the relations of property had remained stable, if no
evolution in them had occurred; if, in other words, the basic mechanism
of the motion of socio-economic formation had turned out to have been
stopped, this would have taken place due to the workirlg of a new signifIcant
factor annihilating the macro social effects of the class struggle.
A Russian Peculiarity: State Feudalism
It was the same factor which annihilated the class struggle in societies of the
West in recent times (cf. Chapter 13): the state. The totalitarian anomaly of
Russia had introduced it, however, in one formation earlier than in the West,
as an indispensable component of the "base" of society.
For though the double class of pomeshchiki disappeared as a consequence
of Bolotnikov's revolution, the position of the state within Russian feudalism
remained always very strong. The crucial point was that the enlarged bureau-
cratic organization remained to be the greatest landowner. In different
periods from a third to more than a half of all serfs were those of the state.
From a social point of view a state feudalism differs from the standard one
very significantly. In the latter, as in all Marxian societies, the classes of
270
RUSSIAN FEUDALISM 271
disposers of the productive forces and of the disposers of coercion fonn
separate social categories. In state feudalism the state organization is the
greatest owner, hence it is an intennediate fonn between the Marxian society
(where the two classes, of rulers and of owners, are in principle exclusive) and
the totalitarian one (where the two classes are identical).
So large was the state's sector of the economy that it had to influence the
course of the development of society. First of all the state apparatus that is
simultaneously an owner applies in its productive units different methods of
class struggle than those private owners adopt. The class struggle in private
units can remain an economic one. Such a struggle in the large state sector of
economy, even if resulting purely from economic reasons, cannot remain on
an economic level. For the state is not only an owner but also a lord of its
direct producers and dissent against its decisions as an owner is at the same
time a revolt against its position as a ruler. What is more, the interests of the
class of rulers require, as we remember (cf. Chapter 9), to declass citizens who
rebel against it. Such a rebellion is the best occasion, if suppressed, to enlarge
the sphere of regulation significantly and to strengthen this by destroying
autonomous social relations among the citizens. This applies also to the
situation where revolting citizens are the state's direct producers: the state
declasses them. It is even necessary for the state to do that - the revolt in
some state productive units can be transferred to all of them and a common
revolution against both private property and the state as such would then
threaten. Therefore, the first change that is followed by the fusion of the role
of a ruler and of an owner is that the state-owner cannot solve economic
conflicts in the way private owners are forced to do, that is, by economic
means alone, and the state-owner therefore declasses its direct producers-
citizens.
However, this strengthens its natural tendency to enlarge its sphere of
regulation at the cost of all the citizens. For it is not possible to declass
the state's direct producers leaving the rest quiet. To declass means that
autonomous social relations among citizens are stopped and are replaced
by artificial ones that make any further resistance impossible. And it is not
possible to destroy the autonomous social structure of some sub-class of
citizens leaving all the rest aside. The ruinous activity of the state can be
concentrated mainly on the state's direct producers but implies the strength-
ening of the repressive and/or bureaucratized activity of the state against
all the citizens. The social desert in the state's sector entails the stopping
of all the remaining domains. The conclusion is evident: in state feudalism
the repressiveness of the state apparatus and, in general, the severity of the
272 CHAPTER 17
relations of power between the state and the citizens are much more advanced
than in standard feudalism.
And another trend typical for state feudalism: the mechanism of solving
economic conflicts we discussed in Part I leads in the fmal result to some
liberation of the direct producer and hence to the increasing of their eco-
nomic efficiency. This is, however, entirely excluded in the state sector: the
subjugated direct producers can intensify their work as long as they feel the
whip of the supervisor. Such an economy then stagnates. But not only the
state economy ceases to develop. The stagnation in the state sector transfers
itself into the private sector. For the private owners acquire a powerful ally
which is able to suppress the resistance of their direct producers as well, and
is, as we have seen, even forced to do that. This stops the purely economic
mechanisms of making the private economy more effective that, in the
standard Marxian society, follow the waves of the class struggle. Organiza-
tional innovations are not so indispensable if the power of the state is also
able to force the private direct producers to work. No more indispensable are
the concessions private owners are usually inclined to make in the face of
losses which the revolts threaten. Not all the mechanisms cease in the private
sector, of course, but they all become significantly weakened. The whole
economy stagnates.
The state is always inclined to require concessions on the part of private
property for its support against the direct producers. The more so in systems
of the kind as state feudalism, where the repressiveness of the state to a
certain extent replaces the economic mechanisms of regulation of the rela-
tionships between the owners and the direct producers. As long as the state
must, it tolerates the richest of its citizens. But the richer a citizen is, the
more independent of the state organization he, or she, is. Hence, of all the
citizens, the richest are always hardly tolerable for the class of disposers of
coercion. The more so in state feudalism where it acquires an economic
self-dependence and must not change armed support for the private owners
with economic support.
Of course, state feudalism is not a politically totalitarian society - the
government is the greatest owner but not the only one. That is why the" state
cannot simply suppress the private owners as it does with the remaining
citizens. It still has to tolerate them and even to help in the common interest
against the direct producers. But the government already can press them a
little bit. Let them feel that they are also ordinary citizens subordinated to
the state. And so, in state feudalism the class of disposers of coercion makes
the private owners much more dependent on itself than is possible under
RUSSIAN FEUDALISM 273
standard feudalism. And all the disturbances in the social position of the
private owners are immediately employed by the class of rulers to capture
more and more new positions of its own.
In other words, in state feudalism the supra-class struggle between the
two classes of oppressors is the constant factor influencing social life - and
not the temporary one (in the third phase of formation) as in the case of
standard feudalism. Both the class struggle of the direct producers against the
(state and private) owners and the supra-class struggle of the class of disposers
of coercion against the private disposers of means of production are indispen-
sable components of the social system.
The Peculiarity of State Feudalism
It can be seen that state feudalism differs a great deal from standard feu-
dalism. So great, as Russia differed from the feudal countries of the West. Let
us summarize these peculiarities:
(1) The state-owner must solve the contradictions of economic interests
with its direct producers by a political method - by declassation;
(2) The state-owner increases oppression over all the citizens much more
than this can be done by a state lacking economic foundations of its own;
(3) The state-owner also makes dependent on itself the class of private
owners (though they are not declassed as all the rest of the citizens);
(4) The whole economy turns out to be ineffective.
All this may be explained thus: the state is a component of the "base" of
such a society. Therefore. the existence of the state and its relationships with
the citizens, and first of all the supra-class struggle, cannot be abstracted from
when analysing such a society.
The theoretical considerations concerning the conditions of enlarged re-
production led to the conclusion that the state is an indispensable component
of the "base" of capitalist society (cf. Part I B). And historical considerations
concerning the totalitarian anomaly led to the same conclusion: in Russia the
state is an indispensable component of society as well. The difference is that
in Russia it had happened already in feudalism.
STATE FEUDALISM IN RUSSIA
The State as the Greatest Owner
Though Bolotnikov's revolution stopped the process of enlarging the class of
274 CHAPTER 17
rulers-owners, it was, however, unable to liquidate the phenomenon of the
fusion of property and power. The state remained the greatest owner in
Russia. In 1678 the state possessed 33% of serfs, while the feudal lords owned
50%, and the priesthood 17%. In absolute numbers, the state's serfs amounted
in this time to 943 thousands of "men souls", while the nobles' serfs were
2,269 thousands (Ochmailski, ibid., p. 139). 279 thousands of villagers'
cottages were in the possession of the state at that time while an average of
cottages belonging to great feudal lords was about 500 (ibid., p. 141). And
such is the proportion, or disproportion, that remained and even increased
- the tsar's state continued to be the first feudal lord in Russia preceding
greatly the richest feudal stocks.
Also in the town sub-society the position of the state was significant.
There were special categories of handworkers who were serfs of the state and
working for it. The state also initiated the development of industry, especially
military industry. All the armament factories were state property. In the 17th
century the derivative domains - mining, metallurgy, etc. - also became state
property. They were the greatest enterprises of then Russia where "state
peasants and handworkers were employed under the direction of foreign
masters who had been specially brought over" (Lyashchenko, ibid., Vol. 1,
p.327).
The State as the Greatest Exploiter in Russia
From what has already been said it follows immediately that the state was the
greatest exploiter in Russia, that is, the state's surplus value was incomparably
higher than that of any single private feudal family. Thus, to put it in modern
terms, the "socialist sector" of the economy was significantly strengthened by
the enormous activity of the state in the field of the secondary redistribution
of the national product. The "state's tithes" introduced by Ivan the Sinister
were still kept. In 1614 an extraordinary tax (piatina) was introduced: it
included one fifth of the value of movables, and became transformed into a
constant tax. And the state, despite all its possessions, introduced more and
more new special taxes - for the standing army, for means of communication.
. . . In times of Mikhail Romanov the total taxes o u ~ l e in comparison to
Ivan the Sinister's times, while the value of money decreased by one quarter
(Ochmailski, ibid., p. 138).
The economic position of the state enabled it to take into its possession
an enormous amount of monopolies for particularly lucrative types of ac-
tivities, especially for selling highly profitable products. Take, for example,
RUSSIAN FEUDALISM 275
the huge profits the state's liquor licence was yielding - the prices were 5-10
times higher than the costs of production. And grain, caviar, hemp, yuft, silk,
etc. were included in the state's monopolies.
The treasury monopolies .. were expanded over all kinds of industries and industrial
occupations: over the building of mills and of public baths, over the production and sale
of tallow candles, of soup, kvas, pitch, doormats, whale-<lil, moccasins, horse-collars and
of a multitude of other ordinary products ... The state took on lease to itself even such
occupations as the writing of applications and documents for markets (Lyashchenko,
Vol. 1, p. 315).
In fact, it was an extraordinary commodity that was not included in the
monopolies of the tsars' state ...
The thesis I am putting forward - that the state was the greatest exploiter
in Russian society - is so trivial that one should be ashamed to formulate it
explicitly. One should be, but one is not. For one cannot find this thesis in
Marxist writings about Russia's history, which should be most trivial for a
Marxist: that the state which appropriated the surplus value of half of the
number of serfs the feu dais exploited, which played the leading role in
industry (where so appropriates the surplus value, as we, Marxists, know
perfectly), which redistributed. the national income appropriating enormous
sums of money, that such a state was the greatest exploiter of the working
people of Russia. Well, it is even not written that such a state was an exploiter
at all! Exploiters, and also oppressors, blood suckers etc. are exclusively
private owners, even the slightest, even those whose estate is microscopic in
comparison to that of the state's. The latter, instead, always "represents
progress" in economy, "opens chances for accelerated development", etc.
Sometimes it even allows one to look with some liking for blood suckers:
The leading great Russian tradespeople of the 17th century ... played a progressive role
- claims one of the Marxist handbooks of Russia - for they attempted to ward off a
transformation of the Russian state into a colony of the European capital.
One would be mistaken if one looked in all this for a Great-Russian nation-
alism. The point is much simpler: not to allow anybody who would read that
the state of the tsars was exploiting its citizens to get the idea that the Soviet
state appropriated their surplus value as well. It is awful to write how such an
activity is termed in Marxism.
The Russian State in Social Stmcture: Who Actually Was a Russian Noble?
The position of the state in Russian society led to the overturning of some
regularities of standard feudalism. Facing the ineffectiveness of the class
276 CHAPTER 17
struggle, the supra-class one became the leading factor of Russian history.
And the share of the state in suppressing the people's struggle was an occasion
for dictating heavy conditions to the victorious feudal lords. It is not a mere
accident that actually after the longest period of class struggle in feudal
Russia (40-70's of the 17th century and again at the beginning of the 18th
century) the state attempted to disturb its balance with the feudal lords' and
to obtain more advantageous conditions.
First of all the state empowered itself to defme who was, and who could
not be, a nobleman in Russia. It was not only labelling the divisions that had
factually already been made, but it was a sharp intervention in social matters.
As a nobleman was recognized one whose father was a nobleman - here the
interests of private property were undoubtedly observed. The state enacted,
however, also that nobility could be vested in somebody who was in the
state's service. The military service and the civil service were divided uniformly
into 14 ranks. Everybody started the state service from the lowest rank, and
everybody, a nobleman or not, was allowed to do so. Service in lower ranks
(14th to 9th) gave to a non-nobleman the so-called personal nobility that was
not a hereditary one. But reaching the 8th rank or higher in the service to
the state gave hereditary nobility - even if a state servant was a serf by
origin, he and his descendents became nobleman. And the state "law did not
differentiate between such a nobility and ancestral nobility" (1. Bazylov,
The Russian Society in the First Half of the 19th Century, Ossolineum 1973,
p.14).
Let us repeat once more: it was the Russian state who decided that those
who served it faithfully became noblemen, became equal to the descendants
of the ancient houses of Golitsyns or Trubeckis in the eyes of the law. The
law was a basic means of the state that was able to regulate who was, and who
was not, a nobleman: that is, who was, and who was not, empowered to have
serfs, to become an owner of the means of production. Such a law was a
"reflection of social interests" that are outside the question. But one of
them, and even one of the most powerful, was the interest of those who
were enacting it. And this detail is somehow not accounted for by Marxist
historians. Even if they describe in detail all the subtleness of the Ranks Table,
they do not follow with its consequences concerning the actual shape of
Russia's social structure and state in sum, stating, e.g., "Russia was becoming,
then, in the 19th century, a really noble monarchy and such it was to remain
for more than one hundred years" (Bazylov, ibid., p. 8).
In this short statement there are included two basic falsehoods: that
Russia was a regular feudal country and that it was such for so long a time.
RUSSIAN FEUDALISM 277
The Russian State in Social Structure: the Hierarchy of Power and the Towns
The Russian state aspired not only to defme who was, and who was not, a
nobleman, but also to defme who was, and who was not, a patrician. That is,
it intervened not only in the social structure of the rural sub-society but also
in the social structure of the town.
It was the peculiarity of Russian handicraft and trade that they did not
possess any kind of guild organization so peculiar to their Western counter-
parts. This was a result of the strong control of the state over the towns:
a guild organization with its tendency to monopolize production and sales
is a rather too strongly autonomous unit for the appetites of a state which
was in a position to control such a great part of economic life. The state
tolerates such units only if it is forced to do so. The Russian state was not.
Therefore in the 6 t h ~ 17th centuries craftsmen were usually serfs, a great
part of them being state serfs, and organizations of their own could not
exist. Instead, the organization was imposed by the state itself:
The dignity of a habitue (gost') was ascribed to the richest merchants by the tsar. A
person obtaining it was obliged to go to the capital and to perform a service for the
treasury organs. (Koranyi, ibid., Vol. 2, p. 329).
It is doubtful whether the state, by making rich townsmen its own clerks,
was following their interests rather than its own. The same interest dictated
numerous state monopolies and made impossible guild organizations - the
enlarging of the sphere of regulation as much as possible and the strengthening
of it by as deep as possible a bureaucratization of social life.
The Russian State in Social Structure: Recapitulation
It may, I suppose, now be seen a little better what kind of heritage the totali-
tarian anomaly left in Russian society: the greatest of the owners not only
joined property with power but also kept control of both the classes of
private owners in the two sub-societies of feudalism. The totalitarian anomaly
left in Russia what the state in the West could only attempt to achieve in
the final stage of feudalism employing the development of the capitalist
sector and the sharp divergences of interests between the feudal landowners
and the bourgeoisie. Hence at that time when in the West absolute monarchies
arose playing its game with the old and new classes of possessors, in Russia
there was quite another state of affairs. The absolute monarchy - if the
term is to be understood sociologically and not juridically - existed there
278
CHAPTER 17
from the very beginning. Therefore, the state was not attempting to become
an absolute monarchy but to become an exclusive owner, that is, to become a
totalitarian state.
The Role of Peter the Great
It is not an accident, let us repeat, that the Ranks Table was enacted after the
longest phase of revolutionary disturbances in Russia's history. The state
attempted to make up the arrears in its sphere of regulation which occurred
after Bolotnikov's revolution. What is the missing point is the so-called
"civilizing mission" of the same state that enacted the Ranks Table, the state
of Peter the Great. It is usually maintained that it made a great effort to
"civilize Russia" in the Western manner introducing education, Western
customs, industry, etc. Let us look a little bit closer at the matter.
Here is a typical example of the kind of state regulation: the state imposed
on the hereditary nobility an obligation to teach their children reading,
writing, and counting: this was executed in the form of systematic inspections
of all noble children. Those members of the "ruling class" who were shirking
their duty to pass state exams were punished on their own bodies and by
their parents' estates. And everybody who had shown up such a private
owner-ignoramus was rewarded with a part of the estate of the offender. Even
iiit was his own serf who, otherwise, was under the authority of his lord-of-
fender for life and death!
Marxist historians with their total inability to see class contradictions in
state-citizens relations are able to notice in numerous facts of this type only
the following: the state was introducing "civilization" in order to accelerate
"historical progress" in Russia. Is it also true for another of Peter the Greats
edicts stating that a noble's son from 15 years of age is to come into state
service for his whole life? In generalities about "progress" and "civilization"
the most important thing is missed: that whatever the private intentions of
Peter the Great could be, the interests of the class of disposers of coercion
expressed by his decisions required the hereditary nobility to submit to the
state. The education of noble children was quite a good means of doing this,
the more so because the state, making servants of its nobles, preferred to have
them rather educated to the degree the complexities of the service required.
Making the nobility dependent by numerous restrictions and rules, the state
was enlarging its sphere of regulation, strengthening its position against the
strongest of the citizens.
Another way of achieving this were repressions against the boyars. These
RUSSIAN FEUDALISM 279
were, however, selective - the state of Peter the Great was too weak to repeat
the mass terror in the style of Ivan the Sinister. The latter was based on the
double class of pomeshchiki that was dissolved in the class of nobles during
the 17th century. That is why the former had to fmd a social ally in his
supra-class struggle against the feudal lords.
What did a Western sovereign do when fighting against a social class but
unable to fmd any ally in society? He became eliminated or learned that in
the standard feudal society even the king cannot do everything. What did
the Russian tsar do in the same situation? He created such an ally! This
idea testifies to the personal greatness of the man who passed into history -
as we shall recognize, unjustly - under the name "the Great". For - in order
to fulfIl the totalitarian interests of the Russian state - he made an idea really
great and he did a lot to realise it. His intention was to build industry in
order to bring into being a social ally for the state in its fight against the
feudal lords, viz., the middle class, the bourgeoisie. This social system that in
the West arose spontaneously, becoming the ground for Western states to go
to social power, the Russian tsar wanted to create - in order to strengthen the
state even more in the face of the feudal lords, to build conditions enabling it
to make efforts to eliminate the feudal lords altogether taking over feudal
property, to resume Ivan the Sinister's work.
The greatness of Peter's idea is not so much in the device in itself (it fits
the tradition of state feudalism quite well - so did the Sinister attempt to
subtract a social category, and the First to add one), but in the means he
was using to make it take place. For he was conducting affairs as though he
understood that history creates social classes materialistically: that at first
factories, shipyards, towns are to be formed and that class itself appears
already during this work. Of course, the chances of realiSing this idea lay not
in his personal greatness but in the power of the state-owner. As it happened,
the chances turned out to be insufficient: created over tens of years, the
Russian bourgeoisie did not help the state too much in its totalitarian projects.
As we shall see, if Peter the First had lived longer, he would also have learned
that even in state feudalism the tsar cannot do everything.
The hypothesis that is being put forward here is, then, the following: Peter
the First was a representative of the interests of the state-owner that was
attempting to totalitarianise society, for the second time in Russia's history.
Only, other means were used - viz. the economic reforms of Peter the First.
They played a similar role as the distribution of land by Ivan Kalita who had
been threatened with independence.
280
CHAPTER 17
The Puzzles of Peter the First
I do not doubt that from the standard point of view of a Marxist historian
such a hypothesis can be only a "speculative misunderstanding". That is why
I shall try to show that, if it is assumed, one gains the possibility of explaining
some historical tendencies that are, I suppose, inexplicable from the standard
point of view of Peter the First as a forerunner of "civilization", or, in other
words, as one whose activity was directed by the Marxian Ghost of History:
the development of productive forces leading Russia to the power owed to
her.
Here is the first puzzle of Peter the Great: why did this Titan of progress
introduce the taxing of boyars' beards? One may put this question aside as
unimportant. And, in fact, it is unimportant - but only on the condition
accepted in advance that Peter the First was introducing Russia to the road of
"modern progress", If we want, however, to check metaphysical suppositions,
not to adopt them a priori, our decision to smile when hearing such a question
cannot be justified otherwise than in the light of actually what we want to
test. That is why this question requires an explanation, and not a teleological
one, i.e. in the light of what we think we know about the future stages of
society, but a historical one, i.e. in the light of the working of the factors
then - mainly relations between classes (including the class of disposers of
coercion and the group of owners). Again: why did this great sovereign, who
thought in perspective, devote so much time, energy and means to shaving
boyars' beards, taking care of their teeth (a rumour has it that he liked to
extract them personally), imposing on them a habit of smoking tobacco,
changing their way of dressing, etc.? Which of the heroes of history was doing
this so persistently and on such a scale?
On our hypothesis the matter explains itself without the forced smile the
experts on the subject offer us. For the social role of these funny facts is
the same as those which are not amusing at all, e.g. the fact that everybody
who started state service did so in the lowest rank. Both a descendant of a
prince and a serf in the state's service were equal - in the face of this state,
the state-owner, class differences in the Marxian sense were disappearing.
And so, the social meaning of the order for boyars to shave their beards and
of the equality of chances in the state service were exactly the same: the
state-owner was signalling to economically privileged citizens that they also
were subject to it. The state of Peter the First was too weak to say this
openly to the boyars and even less to realise this in Ivan the Sinister's style.
But it wanted this very much! Shaving beards and extracting boyars' teeth,
RUSSIAN FEUDALISM 281
Peter the First did not play the social role of barber but actually that of
autocrat - he was showing the strongest of his citizens that they were his
serfs, nothing more, that they must bear his intervention even in their private
matters. Refractories were sent to Petropavlovsk tower. The proportions
between the two means of manifestation of his autocratic will do not testify
about his indulgence (the more so that he had a liking to torture prisoners
personally) but only about the disproportion of forces between Peter the
First's state and that of Ivan the Sinister's. That is why instead of shaving
heads he had to limit himself to beards.
Here is another question which is surprising for the Marxist interpretation
of Peter's times: why did this promoter of modernness, building industry,
reviving trade, making the foundations of Russia's power on the sea, why did
this civilizor of Russia become her first sovereign to explicitly declare himself
to be an autocrat? Why did he actually introduce the most reactionary form
of ruling according to which the emperor is a "despotic monarch who is not
obliged to explain his affairs to anybody in the world", as the act of 1721
had it? The "spirit of capitalism" with the Monomach's cap on its head? In
what way was the most reactionary superstructure to be entailed by the rising
modern base?
On the grounds of our hypothesis it seems to be quite evident why Peter
the First actually introduced the title of the despotic emperor. For he was
planning that in the future the Russian state based on the alliance with the
bourgeoisie would be able to eliminate the feudal lords, and this political act
was a preparation for the new future position of the state in society.
And another puzzle: if Peter the First represented the interests of the
state-owner, then why did he not concentrate factory buildings in the hands
of the state but turned them to private hands? During his time 215 new
factories were built (as against 30 existing before him) by the state (directly
or indirectly, i.e. by subventions). They were turned to private hands and in
1723 a quite general act was enacted saying that all state factories were to be
passed to "particular persons". This policy can be explained in class terms,
but only as a way of creating a new class, the bourgeoisie, that could help the
state in its supra-{;lass struggle against the feudal lords. Peter the First was,
in fact, influenced by the West, but not so much by Western technology as by
the way Western countries employed the bourgeoisie for the strengthening of
the position of the state in the face of feudal lords.
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CHAPTER 17
Why Did Peter the First's Reforms Not Lead to the Totalitarianisation of
Russia?
None of Peter's efforts came to anything: the bureaucratic dependency of the
feudal lords on the state was too weak a means to totalitarianise society, and
the industrialisation of Russia did not make the townsmen's estates strong
enough to help the state in its supra-class struggle against the feudal lords.
Why did it happen so?
The proper answer is, I suppose, the following: the state was too strong to
do so. It was so strong that the internal interests of every hierarchy of power
- the interests demanding that the balance condition should be achieved
by declassation of all the citizens - were, in fact, able to be brought about.
And this caused an extremely low, almost slave, efficiency of work from
people submitted to both economic exploitation and political oppression.
And when the state created industry, it had no choice but to employ serfs in
the new factories, making of serf peasants serf workers. And a serf worker is
an even worse labourer than a serf peasant who happens sometimes to meet a
patriarchal lord.
The low efficiency of work was significantly strengthened by the low
effective demand of the peasant masses for industrial commodities. The
18th-century development of Russian metallurgy, for instance, was based
mainly on England's imports from Russia. When England developed its own
metallurgy and reduced its imports, Russian metallurgy rapidly fell away.
And the enormous poverty of the masses of peasants in Russia was caused
by the fusion of power and property in the hands of the state - the support
of coercion enabled both the state organs and the feudal lords to exploit the
masses much more than in the conditions of standard feudalism.
The conditions of state feudalism imply the stiffness of the masses, both
as producers and consumers. The interests of politics and economics are
contradictory. The state feudalism in Russia was the first system in the
European line of development to reveal this so sharply.
State Feudalism in Russia
The totalitarian anomaly ending with the "Sinister's acceleration" was an
enormous disturbance in the history of Russia. Peter the First's reforms were
a weak reflection of it. That is why the system of state feudalism that formed
itself in the 17th century as a result of the evolution forced by Bolotnikov's
upheaval quickly returned to the norm after Peter's reformatory activity -
RUSSIAN FEUDALISM 283
the noon as defined by this fundamental fact that the classes of rulers and
owners were not excluded from each other but the fust was a subset of the
second, the noon being, in other words, state feudalism.
The bureaucratic subordination of the nobility to the state gradually
disappeared after Peter the First's death: the time of obligatory state service
for a noble was reduced to 25 years and fmally was abandoned altogether.
None the less the Russian nobility always remained much more dependent
upon the state than anyone else - with the nobility enlarging itself more and
more owing to the number of people becoming nobles thanks to their service
to the state.
As Peter the First's attempt to build a totalitarian society turned out to be
ineffective, the system of balance between the state and the class of feudal
lords came into existence for more than one century. The state kept watch
over the system in its own interests - two attempts to overcome the class of
feudal lords and to replace them in their role of owners failed and the stilte
was looking out for a state of possession it could defend. That is why the
role of state-owner is ineliminable in Russia's history. That is why, in turn,
Russian society was only a quasi-Marxian one.
This resulted not only in the economic backwardness of Russia's agricul-
ture and the ineffectiveness of its industry actually at that time when in the
West the industrial revolution was taking place, but also in the aggressiveness
of the Russian Empire. The hierarchy of power becomes aggressive, that is,
attempts to enlarge its sphere of regulation at the cost of somebody else,
if its internal possibilities to enlarge are for some reasons stopped. And in
Russia they were: the peasantry was oppressed almost optimally under the
existing means of repression and of control; and the nobility, in spite of the
state's efforts, did not allow themselves to be made normal citizens. What
remained for the hierarchy of power was to become aggressive, to enlarge its
appetite for new activities to control outside the borders of the country. And
Russia's human and natural resources were making this policy of increasing
outside power possible. I suppose the real reason why Russia was so aggressive
was the submissivity of the Russian masses. An internal submissivity tends to
flow out to other countries.
General Conclusion: State Feudalism and Capitalism
The general conclusion of our considerations hitherto is composed of two
parts. The negative part is that the Marxian thesis that the state is a repre-
sentation of the economic base of society fails for capitalism and for state
284
CHAPTER 17
feudalism (though for quite different reasons). And the positive part is that
Russia, already in feudalism, joining property and power in the hands of the
state, achieved that social status that Western countries achieved only in
capitalism, and in the later stages of it. And the simple consequence of these
theses allows us to predict Russia's further development. For, what will
happen when the social forces that in Russia caused such a significant state
role under feudalism join their efforts with those who decide about the
increasing role of the state under capitalism? The answer is evident: Russia
will fit by capitalism as it was trailed by the "locomotive of history". How-
ever, it will not be the Russian working class.
CHAPTER 18
TSARIST RUSSIA WAS THE BEST DEVELOPED
CAPIT ALIST COUNTRY
The tsarist state stood for the feudal order as long as the latter, formed as the
result of the centuries-old struggle between the rulers-owners and the land-
lords, seemed to be immovable. It came back to the policy of Peter I as soon
as the hidden processes of the formation of a capitalist economy spoiled the
position of this social category that the first of the Russian emperors wanted
to subordinate.
THE TRANSITION FROM STATE FEUDALISM TO STATE CAPITALISM
The Primitive Accumulation in Russia
"When the frantic fights of the ruling feudal nobility were turbulently filling
the Middle Ages, the quiet work of the oppressed classes undermined the
feudal system in the whole of western Europe". So wrote Engels in the pas-
sage we have already had the opportunity to analyse. How did things go in
Russia? I refer here to a list of the sources of primary accumulation in Russia
given in one of the classic Soviet works on Russia's economic history:
That stormy process of primary accumulation and of the formation of the proletariat
(which occurred in England ... in the aspect of ... the expulsion ... of the once inde-
pendent small producers). in Russia developed at a slower pace and on a basis of serf-
dom, that is, assuminf! the form of various "grants" of state land ....
(a) Colonial Policy . ... The outright plunder and debauchery of the indigenous Siberian
population, the collection of tribute (in furs), the barter trade in the form of exchange
of valuable furs for glass beads and trinkets - such were, in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, the "idyllic" methods of the accumulation .... Later, the same manifestations
of colonial policy ... occurred u r i n ~ the advance of Peter I and his successors in Central
Asia, the wars of Nicholas, and, finally, the conquering, colonial despoliations in Trans-
caucasia and in Central Asia during the nineteenth century ....
(b) Wars and State Procurements . ... The huge industrial-mercantile fortunes of the
eighteenth century .. frequently had as their original and basic source wars, military
contracts, and plunder.
(c) Favoritism. Another prevalent source for the acquisition of some of the largest
285
286
CHAPTER 18
fortunes in Russia was favoritism, connected with the frequent palace revolutions of
the period, which brought counselors and favorites to the foreground .... It must be
accorded a place of prominence as a source for some of the largest fortunes ... .
(d) Foreign Trade . ... In the foreign trade of the seventeenth century, and even in the
eighteenth, monopolies (royal and state) predominated ....
(e) Domestic Trade. (See the section in the preceding chapter about the dominant role
of the state. where the data were quoted from the Polish edition of Lyashchenko's book
L. N.)
(I) Government Credit System. In the accumulation of large monetary fortunes in Russia,
... a prominent part was played by ... government debts, taxes, protection, and, finally,
leases ....
(g) Lease and Monopoly . ... Commercial and, in part, manufacturing monopolies, an
old heritage of the Moscow state, enjoyed vigorous expansion under Peter I and during
the time of his immediate successors, embracing almost all leading articles of internal
trade as well as foreign trade staples .... And although these were crown monopolies,
courtiers ... and others accumulated enormous fortunes for themselves ....
Yet all these sources of profit and enrichment pale in comparison with the system of
leases, particularly liquor leases .... Based on the unrestrained debauchery of the nation's
millions, the liquor leases proved a significant means of primary accumulation .... The
treasury's income from the lease of intoxicants amounted to ... 128 million rubles
during 1859 1863, constituting about 40 per cent of total government revenue ....
(h) Ransom Operations . ... On the whole, the landed nobility received through the
government in the form of manumission loans, in accordance with the decree of Feb-
ruary 19 [1861], as much as 870 million rubles over a period of thirty years. (Reprinted
by permission of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc .. from History of the National Economy
of Russia to the 1917 Rem/utian by Peter I. Lyashchenko. Copyright 1949, renewed
1977, by the American Council of Learned Societies.)
To draw the proper conclusion from the cited passages I shall add two
remarks. First, this is the full list of the "sources of primary accumulation"
given by the author. Other authors give lists partly different; however, they
do not differ from the one cited above from the point of view of the conclu-
sion referred to. Second, the author adopts a quite orthodox stand as far as
his theoretical interpretation of the economic development of Russia is con-
cerned. Assuming Leninist dogmas in this way, he is by no means inclined to
look for the facts confirming the thesis that Russian feudalism was a state
feudalism. And despite this and here is the conclusion announced above -
he is not able to show any source of primary accumulation in Russia without
referring to the economic or political role played by the tsarist state.
TSARIST RUSSIA 287
To a certain extent this was the case in every country: it is commonly
known that the role of the state in primary accumulation was serious every-
where. One may, however, suspect that this was the case nowhere else to such
an extent. Which fully confirms the thesis of the last chapter: that Russian
feudalism was a state feudalism.
The Current Conception of Capitalist Development in Russia
Processes of the type like those mentioned before lead to the development of
industry and to the formation of the bourgeoisie and the working class. This
is very well known and there is no need to present it once more - the more
so since such a presentation requires a type of competence the present author
does not possess. What is really needed is the reinterpretation of 19th century
Russian history. For it is usually presented under the assumptions of the
current conception of capitalist development in Russia: in the 19th century
Russia formed (standard) capitalism with the (standard) feudalism; this was
the objective process necessary for every (civilized) country; hence, even the
tsarist state representing the interests of the landowners responsible for the
long-standing underdevelopment of Russia, even such a state had to retreat
before the pressure of the economic necessities of social development; how-
ever, it was retreating step by step, slowly and unwillingly; at last the bour-
geoisie had become politically mature, being able to overturn the superstruc-
ture of the hostile economic system - it took place as late as in February
1917.
Here is an example of this interpretation. It is said about the key-moment
of the process in question, namely about the land reform of 1861 that it has
released the labour force for the capitalist industry, that is, it has fulfilled the
second - apart from the primitive accumulation - of the conditions of the
rise of capitalism:
during the realization of the reform the interests of the bourgeoisie were not officially
accepted by the government and the ruling class of landowners .... As a result, during
the realization of the reform all the problems were solved from the standpoint of the
landowners' interests reducing them simply to the question, how to suppress the serfs
in the way most plausible for the landowner. Nonetheless the reform was ... a bourgeois
one, since even the landowners were forced to make it in the effect of the necessities of
'the economic development of leading Russia to the capitalist road' (Lyashchenko, vol.
1, p. 603, italics mine - L. N.).
This is what the outstanding Soviet historian, the Marxist Lyashchenko, says.
And here is what the Marxist Marx says: "Among the Russian nobles there
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CHAPTER 18
exists undoubtedly a party of abolitionists, but it is ... very small". The
majority of nobles do everything they can for the "frustration of this under-
taking", that is, for the frustration of the affranchisement of the peasants
(K. Marx, 'The problem of the affranchisement in Russia', in: Works (Polish
translation), vol. 12, Warsaw 1967, p. 771).
Why do the landowners not want to fulfil historical necessity? Marx shows
two reasons. The first is of an economic nature: "A large part of the estates
run into debt with the state and their owners ask how they could'be able to
fulfil their obligations with the government" (ibid., p. 772).
The other is even more interesting: "From the point of view of the great
landowners, the affranchisement of the peasants will imply denying them
their rights. What actual means of defense against the emperor's power will
they then still have at their disposal?" (ibid., p. 772).
This is the most penetrating question concerning Russia that has been
posed in Marxist historiography. Unfortunately, the answer has not been
given. Neither did the author of the question answer it; but he stated several
sentences further in a quite Marxian-like manner: "it is not possible to release
the exploited class ... without making at the same time the collapse of the
whole state superstructure lying on this gloomy social base" (ibid., p. 772).
The doctrine of the state as an eternal "superstructure" did not allow Marx
to employ his penetrating insight again.
Nonetheless, such a serious divergence of opinions between the master
and his pupils inclines us to look at the matter a little bit closer.
Changes in the Structure o/the Class o/Owners o/theMeans o/Production
After the "bureaucratic oprichnina" of Peter I, the relationships between the
state-owner and the private feudal landlords had become in a way stabilized:
each of the two sides realized its interests in its own domain employing the
support of the other to fulfil them. It could not, however, last for ever. The
processes of the accumulation of capital were taking place that led to the
growth of industry and of the working class which is illustrated by Table IV.
These figures concern only those enterprises whose capitalist character is
doubtless. The general figure of people acknowledged by modern Soviet
historiography as workers is much higher, e.g., for 1860 it amounts to 859.9
thousands (F. Polyanski, The Primitive Accumulation 0/ Capital in Russia
(in Russian), Moscow 1958, p. 251).
The corresponding process is, obviously, that of the growth of the -eco-
nomic power of the bourgeoisie. And this section' of it which plays such an
TSARIST RUSSIA 289
TABLE IV
Year The Number of Greater The Number of Workers Employed
Industrial Enterprises in Them (in thousands)
1799 2094 81.7
1811 2421 137.8
1820 4578 179.6
1830 5453 253.9
1840 6683 453.8
1850 9843 501.6
1860 15388 565.1
Source: J. Ochmanski. The History of Russia Until 1861 (in Polish), Warsaw-Poznan
1974, p. 222.
important role during the primitive accumulation of capital - the merchants
- was increasing significantly also as far as the number of its members is
concerned: in 1836 the merchant estate counted 123,700 people, while in
1851 there were 180,300 (B. Grekov (ed.), The History of the Union of
Socialist Republics, vol. II (Polish translation from the Russian), Warsaw
1954, p. 24). All this led to the growth of the urban population: in 1811 it
counted 2.7 min. people (6.5% of the whole Russian population), while in
1858 there were 6.8 min. (9.1 % of it) (P. 1. Kabanov and N. D. Kuznecov
(eds.), The History of the USSR, vol. II, Moscow 1978, p. 3).
The old handicraft SUb-system transformed itself into the new industrial
sub-system, generating the class division into two new antagonist classes: the
bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
This process had to ruin the balance between the category of rulers-owners
and that of citizens-owners. Finally the social force appeared that Peter I had
tried to create. And now it is appearing by itself, slowly but steadily. What
could prevent the category of rulers-owners from aVailing themselves of the
opportunity?
Now, the rising bourgeoisie is a potential ally in the possible struggle of
the category of rulers-owners against the most powerful (because the richest!)
category of citizens ... against the landowners. And it was the perfect ally:
the ways of gaining surplus value in the conditions of the villein economy and in those
of the capitalist economy arc diametrically opposite to each other: the former presup-
poses giving land to the producer, while the latter presupposes releasing him from his
land (V. 1. Lenin, 'The Development of Capitalism in Russia', in: Works (the Polish
edition), vo!' 3, Warsaw 1954. pp. 190/191).
290 CHAPTER 18
Hence, for the strengthening of the ally precisely that is needed which is
necessary for the weakening of the enemy: the affranchisement of the land-
owners' serfs. The gentry devoid of serfs will lose the material foundations of
their power and finally will be reduced to the rank of the regular citizens of
the state. In the end the eternal trend of rulers-owners to equalize those of
the citizens who have had a privileged status due to their being owners, can
find conditions for its fulfilment. If the state is strong enough ... ! No doubt,
it will be. Table V gives some data showing the tendency to increase the
economic superiority of the state sector over the private one in agriculture:
Year
1812
1859
TABLE V
The number of state serfs
Absolute Relative to the
(in min) Whole Peasantry
(in %)
7.5 41.5
12.5 53.4
The number of private serfs
Absolute Relative to the
(in min) Whole Peasantry
(in %)
a
58.5
10.7
b
46.6
a The number of serfs in private estates achieved its apogee in 1839: 10.9 min.
b The figure for 1858.
Remark: all the figures show only men.
Source: Ochman ski, p. 220.
The growth of the economic power of the bourgeoisie is usually inter-
preted in Marxist literature in the standard terms of the development of
capitalism, that is, from the point of view of standard, Marxian historical
materialism. That is why the other trend, the growth of the economic power
of the state, is usually out of the account. However, if both are accounted
for, then things start to look quite different: the development of capitalism
begins to be not a self-contained process but only an opportunity for the
category of rulers-owners to become a double class, to eliminate the category
of citizens-owners. If so, then what the development of capitalism brings in
Russia is not the class struggle between capitalists and workers alone but the
supra-class-struggle between the rulers-owners and the citizens-owners, with
the bourgeoisie being the potential ally of the former.
In fact. things seen within such a perspective become more comprehen-
sible. The latter reveals, first of all, that something is changing in the Russian
state. As we may recall, Alexander I was still a tsar who rejected even the in-
dividual requests of some landowners to liberate their serfs. But his successor,
TSAR 1ST RUSSIA 291
Nikolai I, issued, in 1842, the act empowering serfs to make with their owners
contracts concerning services. In this way the serfs obtained the right to bring
accusations against their lords to (state!) courts. In Russia, serfs for centuries
underwent control by the absolute power of their lord - provided that the
latter did not do anything against the state. Then, in 1842, the state inter-
fered, for the first time since the totalitarian anomaly, in relationships be-
tween the two antagonist classes of the feudal society. In 1844 the state inter-
fered in them quite openly, guaranteeing the execution of the obligations
made by the serfs on account of these contracts. In this way the state stood
for the citizens-direct producers against the citizens-owners. The subsequent
step was made in 1846 when the state made it possible for serfs to redeem
themselves. And a year later the state empowered an association of serfs
belonging to a given estate to buy it if it was brought to an auction. The
tsar's fear of the influence of 1848 revolution and later on the Crimean War
restrained the process, but nonetheless it still endured. And under the next
tsar, Alexander II, new plans of far reaching reforms were elaborated.
In 1858 a special committee proposed the project of land reform which
"directly expressed the view of Alexander II" (Marx, 'On the liberation of
the Peasants in Russia', Works, vol. 12, op. cit., p. 865). The main resolution
was the abolishing of serfdom without any damages for the landlords. Serf-
dom was acknowledged as the arbitrary act of Boris Godunov that somehow
became a custom later on - which is, by the way, an open historical false-
hood. But since serfdom could be set up by the sovereign's will, it could be
abolished by his will as well. Serfdom was proclaimed to be an illegal institu-
tion since it presupposed the deprivation of laws that the human individual
cannot be deprived of at all. The natural laws of the human indiVidual cannot
be limited -- that is why no damage for the landlords was to be considered.
And moreover: there were two forces guaranteeing the execution of the
projected act and, in general, the future relations between the gentry and the
peasants: the state and the rural community (obshchina).
Karl Marx commented:
What do you think, Ladies and Gentlemen, of all this? Alexander II lays down 'the laws
which peasants possess by nature and which one could not deprive them of at all'. We
are living in strange times, indeed! ... the autocrat, the true samoderiec wsierossiiski,
proclaims the rights of man! (ibid., p. 866).
Well, if Marx in his beautiful history of the Moscow autocrats would not have
omitted Ivan N - if he would have analysed the internal policy of Peter I
(see Chapters 16 and 17) instead of explaining it by his external policy, then
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CHAPTER 18
perhaps he would have been a little bit less surprised. Maybe he would then
have understood that there is nothing especially surprising in the events in
Russia's internal policy discussed. That what was going on was the result
of the same tendency of the tsarist state - to be more exact, of the same
material interests of the category of rulersowners, which three hundred years
earlier had led to the expulsion of the boyars and mass murders, and more
than one hundred years ago: before the inclusion of the nobles in the network
of bureaucratic interconnections. Now the same material interest of combin-
ing power and profit led to the impairment of the economic foundations of
the strongest of the citizens:
Every chapter of the report contains a painful loss for the aristocracy. One of the
methods of exploitation by the nobles of their human capital was the hiring of the serfs
or allowing them, after they had paid each year a sum of money (abrok), to transfer
from one place to another. ... This custom was one of the main sources of profit for
the nobles. According to Chapter I, it is to be abolished without any compensation ....
According to Chapters III V the landlord loses the right to the free disposal of about two
thirds of his land and is forced to allot it to the peasants .... Even dwarowyje, i.e., the
domestic servant, of the lord. arc to get a salary, and they can redeem themselves if they
wish (ibid., pp. 866 867).
How could the state allow itself to be so short with the "ruling class"? A new
social force, the bourgeoisie, was rising, as was the economic power of the
state itself together with the economic weakness of the aristocracy. As a
result of the latter, the gentry was running into debt with the state for the
enormous amount of money lent on the security of 13 million serfs. Nine
tenths of the gentry were dependent in this way upon the state.
That is why, despite the many protests of the nobles, the main points of
this project were maintained in the land reform of 1861. The tsarist state was
not standing against the class of citizens-(land)owners any more, It possessed
a new ally whose forces were strengthened with the same act which was
impairing the material basis of those whom the state stood against for the
third time in Russia's history. At last. efficiently,
What Was the Affranchisement Reform of 1861?
Here is the current interpretation of the land reform of 1861 commonly
accepted among Marxist historians:
The reform of 1861 turned ou t to be a grea t success for the landlords (dworjan-pomiesz-
czikow) aiming at the transformation of their old, feudal relations into the capitalist road
without any revolutionary change of the former (P. I. Kabanov, and N, D, Kuznecov
(eds.), ibid .. voL 2, p. 25).
TSAR 1ST RUSSIA 293
However, Karl Marx, who has no special reputation as a historian of Russia,
understood this much deeper, seeing that the attitude of the state-owner put
the gentry in the following position: either the ruin,
or the immediate bankruptcy of a significant majority of this estate with the perspective
of the entire vanishing in this class of the bureaucratic nobles whose rank and position
depend entirely upon the government (ibid., p. 868, italics mine - L. N.).
The feudal lords facing such an alternative had undertaken the fight for gain-
ing the best conditions. And they had gained quite a bit. It is sufficient to say
that they kept after the reform 95 min. desyatins of land, while the peasants
got 116 min; and the former at that time comprised 20 thousand people,
while the latter comprised a thousand times more.
However, it was not the goal of the Russian state to make for social justice
in the empire. It had, above all, as all the institutions, no goal at alL The
Russian state represented only the interests of the state apparatus striving at
the subordination of as many people as possible, and as much as possible.
The relative independence of the gentry had its material basis in the serfdom.
That is why the institu tion of serfdom had to be abandoned. It was not the
land reform which made the development of capitalism possible, but the
reverse: the development of capitalism enable the state apparatus to equalize
the strongest of the citizens. But by doing this the state accelerated the rise
of capitalism which faced it with new problems.
The land reform of 1861 was, then, the 19th century's Table of Ranks. It
initiated the process of annihilation of this category of citizens who were
relatively independent of the state and, besides - due to their economic
position ~ controlled the serfs themselves, replacing the state in its natural
tendency to control all the citizens. The gentry, which limited the state both
as to the depth of its control and as to the range of it, was a natural enemy
of the bureaucracy. The economic processes leading to capitalism by no
means were the "necessities" which forced the state to "adjust to the require-
ments of the new epoch" but simply a factor throwing the society of state
feudalism out of balance and allowing the state apparatus to fulfll its eternal
interests: to equalize the strongest of its citizens and to directly subordinate
the serfs to the state.
As we have seen, Marx was much closer to the proper understanding of the
process under consideration than his modern pupils. He was simply too great
a scholar to remain within the rigid schemata; even if they were of his own.
In fact, the schemata that Marxian historical materialism imposes do not fit
the history of Russia at all. That is why those who are lacking their master's
294
CHAPTER 18
penetrating abilities may only repeat his dead watchwords. And this happens
on such a large scale because the cognitively dead schemata of Marxian his-
torical materialism have turned out to be full of ideological spirit.
The Transition to State Capitalism
The reform of 1861 was a decisive link in the chain of acts leading to the
transformation of state-feudalism in Russia into state capitalism. It was the
state-owner who made the transition. The bourgeoisie was still too weak to do
this. Quite the reverse - the state's actions made it possible for the bourgeoisie
to become the real social power. This has nothing in common with the "jurid-
ical" grasp of the interformational changes. It was not the law which decided
about the transition, but the force of a mixed, economico-political nature, of
the class of rulers-owners. Only due to the productive and coercive forces
remaining at the disposal of the rulers-owners were the juridical acts able to
change the social relations. As a matter of fact they only sanctioned what was
enforced by the factual power of those who were able to violate the Marxian
mechanisms of the transition from one socio-economic formation to another.
And this was only an effect of the whole of Russia's history, starting from
the totalitarian anomaly in the 13th-16th centuries, which formed in it the
untypical. quasi Marxian social structure with a powerful group of people
who were keeping together what is in the Marxian-society always separated:
property and power.
It is the combination of the two sources of social force that were able to
transform the Russian state-feudalism into capitalism. And actually the same
was responsible for the fact that the Russian capitalism has turned out to be
- at once a state-capitalism.
STATE-CAPITALISM IN TSAR 1ST RUSSIA
The State as the Greatest Owner
The present book is not a history of Russia. It attempts only at the reinter-
pretation of what seems to be imposed in the Marxist historiography of
Russia by the out-of-date Marxian schemata. That is why I shall not describe
the development of capitalist economy in Russia trying, instead, to stress
what in it had nothing in common with economy. As for the latter, I shall
simply limit myself to quoting the opinion of the competent historian:
In the last years before it was engulfed by war and revolution, the Russian Empire
had reached a kvel of development which, though leaving it well behind the major
TSARIST RUSSIA 295
industrialized Western powers, was none the less appreciable. It would be quite mis-
leading to assume that the communists took over a wholly undeveloped and illiterate
country with a stagnant economy (A. Nove, An Economic History of the USSR, Penguin
Books,1975,p.ll).
From the technico-economical point of view Russia's industry was developed
quite well with a growth rate of about 5% per annum which was higher on
a per capita basis than England, Germany and even the United States. How-
ever, agriculture was marked with a much slower rate of increase, as little as
0.25% per annum. For a long time the growth in agriculture was even smaller,
because the latter figure includes the remarkable increase of production in
the last years before World War I. Therefore, one can conclude that from the
technico-economical point of view Russia's economy was strongly differen-
tiated: the modern and the quickly increasing industry was co-occurring with
an inefficient agriculture.
However, in spite of the prejudices of all the mechanicists of the world,
much more important than the indices of the amount of production, even
per capita, are the social conditions in which production is made. And Russia
was, in the second half of the 19th century, at such a level of social develop-
ment that - in spite of the prejudices of all the Marxists of the world -
much more important than the social conditions of production were the
social conditions that property was combining with power.
Under our hypothesis concerning the transition of Russia from state feu-
dalism to capitalism, one could expect that the state would become a power-
ful subject of the capitalist economy. This is because it was the capitalist
sector that became the dominant part of the economy, giving to the state
apparatus new, and much better, chances of subordination of the people. And
this was actually what had been taking place: the state was reaching more and
more new positions in the capitalist sector of Russia's economy. Table VI
illustrates the increase of the state's revenues from state enterprises:
Year
1877
1897
1908
1913
TABLE VI
The Profits from State Enterprises
(in millions of roubles)
51.4
484.8
1470.9
1964.0
a the approximate figure.
The Share of These Revenues in the
Entire State Income (in %)
8.7
34.2
Source: P. Lyashchenko, The Economic History of the USSR, vol. II, op. cit., p. 389.
296
CHAPTER 18
The trend is evident: the economic role of production in state enterprises was
significantly increasing. The state was using the capitalist mode of production
for improving its own economic position. And it succeeded. As witness the
historian who is by no means interested in underlining the facts testifying
to the increasing role of the tsarist state:
The role of the whole system of state economy in the national economy of Russia never
was so serious as in the nineties. State management in all the domains - state railways
and state enterprises, state orders for production, the developed system of state credits,
and also the customs - the industrial- and tax-policy, the monetary reform, etc. - all
this in the nineties accelerated the capitalist development of the national economy in
industry (ibid., p. 185).
The latter implies by no means that the position of the state in the field of
agriculture has been diminished. After the land reform of 1861 there occurred
deep changes in the structure of the productive relations in agriculture, with
one exception, however -- state property remained almost the same (see
Table VII):
TABLE Vll
The Type of Owner The Acreage of the Land (in min. desyat.)
The landlords
The state
1877
73
150.4
Source: Lyashchenko, op. cit., pp. 81, 186.
1887
65.3
1905
53.2
149.3
The state remained, then, the biggest owner of land, though it was farming in
the capitalist manner, mainly renting the land to peasants.
The economic power of the state was incessantly increasing: the budget
revenues amounted at the beginning of the sixties to 540 min. roubles. (rb),
while in 1914 to 5070 mIn. rb. Some idea about the latter sum may be given
by saying that all the capital credits in Russia's 790 private banks at that time
totalled 3305 mIn. rb. (ibid., p. 357).
In fact, the state remained the greatest owner in Russia. It was only the
type of its economic activity that had been changed. The state had associated
itself with the economic sub-system which in the sixties had won over the
feudal economy.
TSARIST RUSSIA 297
The State as the Controller of the Economy
The tsarist state had become, however, not only a subject of the capitalist
economy. Parallel to the growth of the economic role of the state, another
process was taking place - that of the subordination of the capitalist private
economy to the state. Not only had the economy been divided into the
"public" and private sectors, but also the latter turned out to be subordinated
to the former. Here is the list of the "interconnections between state and
capital" which may be found in a paper by authors who certainly would not
aim at the rejection of the first dogma of Leninism:
(1) The existence of the world's largest state sector in economy which included
numerous enterprises, even whole domains of the economy, and the great state banks;
(2) The enormous state orders for production including a large part of it and resulting
in a one-sided development of some domains on account of the fact that they attempted
to satisfy the needs of the state, not those expressed in market demand;
(3) The direct state activity in the organization of transport, great industrial enter-
prises, banks; the taking over of many firms, mainly those bankrupted or close to bank-
ruptcy, by the state;
(4) The lack of free activity by industrial capitalists resulting from the artificial
limitations which were the results of the application of the administrative methods or
the conferring of special privileges to a few firms;
(5) The system of state orders and requirements as a means of developing great firms;
(6) The large-scale financing of great enterprises and banks by the treasury and the
saving of them from bankruptcy;
(7) The anti-crisis activity of the state and the co-organization of large monopolistic
associations;
(8) The exchange of officials between the state apparatus and economic organizations
(V. I. Bobovkin, I. F. Gindin, and K. N. Tamovsky, The State-Monopolistic Capitalism
in Russia (in Russian), Istorija SSSP, 31959, pp. 830.
But ... , but this is the state the "developed western countries" have achieved
in quite recent times! That is it. The "underdeveloped tsarist Russia" turns
out to be ahead of the capitalist developments, having the advantage of some
several tens of years over the rest of the world. If one calculates the social
development in tons of cement per capita, then this certainly cannot be
accounted for at all. Therefore, it may easily happen, as it does, that smaller
technico-economical indices cover the tendency of the greatest importance,
the tendency for the combination of political power with economic power.
And the latter is a manifestation only of the much deeper trend towards the
joining of the disposal over the coercive forces with that over the productive
forces, that is, of the rise of a double class of rulers-owners.
298
CHAPTER 18
Let us add that this idea cannot be found in the quoted article whose
authors state in a Leninlike way that the main contradiction the tsarist
society underwent was that between the state representing the landlords and
the bourgeoisie. And since the state played an extremely important economic
role, it used its position to stop the bourgeoisie in its development. That is
why the bourgeois revolution was necessary, and so on as V. I. Lenin
claims.
Whose Interests Did the Russian State Represent at the Turn of the Century?
There is a very simple test for deciding whose class interests are represented
by a given state, which in the history of Marxism has been applied many
times. Here it is: (1) take the state apparatus of a given country and the two
great social categories of it, let us call them and 1; (2) fmd the situation
(let us call it the decisive one), where the decision of the state apparatus (or,
better, the series of decisions, that is, the state's policy) at the same time
favours the economic interests of one of those categories and makes obstacles
for those of the other category; (3) adopt the "zerohypothesis", that is
category 0, whose economic interests are represented by the state; (4) if it
turns out that in the decisive situation the state favours the interests of cate
gory I, then the zerohypothesis is falsified.
Let us add that the test in question does not allow for a positive conclu
sion in the case discussed. The reason is very simple: it might be that the state
has its own interests which are satisfied through the simultaneous realization
of the interests ()f category I.
Let us apply this test to our case. Category is, evidently, the landlords,
and the zerohypothesis says that "the class policy of the autocracy" was the
"policy of the support of the noble landowners" (Lyashchenko, vol. II, op.
cit., p. 177). Let us try to falsify this hypothesis taking the counter examples
from the same work in which it has been formulated.
The decisive situation 1. At the tum of the seventies of the last century,
many Russian industrial organizations asked the government for the increase
of customs duty for commodities they were producing among others for
foreign agricultural machines:
The import of those machines without any customs duty was in the interests of the
influential circles of landlords, but was contrary to the interests of the industrialists,
who demanded a customs duty on agricultural machines amounting to 90 kopeck per
pood I (ibid., p. 193).
TSARIST RUSSIA 299
It was, in fact, a decisive situation. The solution was the customs duty
amounting at first to 50 kopeck per pood which later on increased. The state
had chosen.
And this was not an accidental choice, since the average customs duty
increased over the next few years as follows: 1877 - 16.1%; 1884 - 18.7%;
1890 - 28.3%; 1891- 33%. The latter tariff was of an "almost prohibitive
nature" which was supposed "to protect finally the whole industry, of course,
at the sacrifice of the internal consumer" (ibid., p. 193). In fact: the new
tariff of 1891 increased the customs on the average up to a third of the value
of the imported commodities, and in many cases up to 100% and more. This
is what the author describes. He does not write, however, that under the
non-Marxist category of the "internal consumers" fell, first of all, the "ruling
class" of Russian society, viz. the landlords.
The decisive situation 2. The development of heavy industry in the nineties
required - as all the long-term investments of capital - a stable measure of
value accepted in international relations. The industrial circles had begun to
demand the exchangeability of the rouble into gold. Instead, the "unstable
paper-currency, undergoing devaluations, is conducive to the exports giving
to the exporter the sui generis premium following from the difference of the
rates of the currencies that were lower abroad than inside the country" (ibid.,
p. 197). Now, the export of grain was one of the main sources oflandlords'
incomes. That is why
the great landlords were ... interested in keeping the paper-currency, and opposed intro-
ducing the gold currency with all means available". And, in effect, the "introduction of
the gold currency corresponded exclusively to the interests of industrial capitalism, not
to those of the landlords (ibid., p. 197).
Nonetheless, the state introduced the gold currency despite the "stubborn
and systematic resistance of the class oflandowners" (ibid., p. 197).
The continuing of this test seems to be unnecessary. The conclusion is
clear: the "zero-hypothesis" is false.
It would be false to maintain the "one-hypothesis", as well. Do not turn
in this direction, comrade historians. For, if the tsarist state had represented
the interests of the bourgeoisie, then why did this bourgeoisie have to fight
against it? Why did the February Revolution have to be a bourgeois one?
It is much better, gentlemen, to do what you in fact do: instead of the
"zero-" or "one-hypothesis" adopt the "half-hypothesis" according to which
300
CHAPTER 18
the tsarist state represented the interests of the "propertied classes". Then,
if anybody asks for the facts, one may answer that it was such and such
(which was advantageous for the interests of the bourgeoisie), but if the
question of the interpretation of the facts is posed, one may answer that it
was, of course, the class of landlords which was referred to.
The Rise of the New Class of Rulers-Owners
The key lies in the facts which are even described in the works of Marxist histo-
rians, but with a little understanding. Here is a remark made by Lyashchenko:
The higher bureaucracy was connected with the most powerful representatives of the
Russian financial and industrial bourgeoisie. . .. This was not limited to the higher
bureaucracy but was spreading to the higher aristocracy, Grand Dukes and other mem-
bers of the emperor's family (ibid., p. 361).
This modest remark- to be just, enriched with numerous details - is of the
highest importance for somebody who understands that Russian feudalism
was, in fact, a state feudalism. The remark implies, on' the ground of the
generalized historical materialism presented in Part I of this book, that in
the new, capitalist conditions the social position of the new class of rulers-
owners is based on joining the political position with the economic one.
If it is assumed that the phenomenon of blending the bureaucracy and the
capitalists which is illustrated by the numerous data in works concerning
Russia's history is a symptom of the rise of the new double class of rulers-
owners, then things become much clearer. Such a class has, first of all, quite
peculiar interests the enlargement of its sphere of regulation with the aid
of both political and economic means. They are the interests neither of the
landlords, nor of the bourgeoisie. Both classes are of the Marxian type, that
is, they are single classes (see Chapter 10) interested in one, economic, type
of effect. However, the interests of the bourgeoisie were - until a particular
moment parallel to those of the new class of rulers-owners. It is the capi-
talist economy which enables the concentration of decisions much more than
a feudal one. The more the former developed, the better the conditions for
the subordination of the sphere of economy which the rulers themselves
created. That is why the tsarist state, being the institutional "superstructure"
over the new double class, alone supported the bourgeoisie and not the alleged
"ruling class", i.e., the landlords.
Let us repeat that the phenomenon of blending the state apparatus with
"capitalist circles" is well-known in the literature, and well confirmed. What
TSARIST RUSSIA 301
is lacking is the understanding of it. For to understand it properly, one is
forced to reject the basic assumptions of Marxian historical materialism. That
is why the phenomenon is noticed as an adventitious one: in the list made
by the Soviet authors quoted above it has been marked as the last point.
However, let us take it as the first one, and we shall see that it will explain
for us all the rest. That is, of course, on the grounds of generalized, not
Marxian, historical materialism.
Let us begin with the tendency marked in the list in question (see above
p. 297) as "(1) The existence of the world's largest state sector" is a natural
effect of the tendency of the state apparatus to strengthen its political posi-
tion by economic means. The class of rulers-owners supported the bourgeoisie
for a long time, as has been said. In this way a new social force was coming
which could replace the old gentry who were the most independent of all the
citizens. The state, facing the new situation, had to strengthen itself economi-
cally, achieving new positions in industry. And the best way of doing this was
to enlarge immediate economic activity, that is, to enlarge the state sector
more and more. The heritage of state feudalism made it possible to gain the
largest sphere of state capitalist economy in the world.
Let us go further: the state's orders were directed to some domains of pro-
duction only and w n ~ causing a one-sided development of them (see tendency
(2. One might even have predicted where the orders were directed: towards
those domains in which the bureaucrats making the appropriate decisions could
expect the highest profits for themselves. It is not surprising that it was so:
The state's orders always played a very great role in Russia. This ... was the unlimited
source of profit, and it was different personal connections which always underlay these
operations. The principles of economic rationality, or even common sense, very seldom
governed them; an enterprise was favoured because it had to be, and it acquired the
orders in spite of much higher offers .... This occurred especially sharply in the time
of ... building the great trans-Siberian railroad, which started in 1891. It entailed as
much as 375 min. rb., so that for every verst the treasury paid 70000 rb., while in
European Russia it had never cost more than 45 000 rb. And the building of the so-called
East-Chinese railway was even more expensive. This happened, because, when, e.g., the
trans-Siberian railroad was being built, the enterprise which delivered the rails obtained
2 rb. per pood, whereas other enterprises had offered the rails for 75 kopeck per pood
but their proposals had not been accepted. Also loans of many millions were given
without any guarantees or cover. ...
Big sums were spent for 'acquainting oneself with the matter', enterprises were
located in places that were quite inappropriate, cheaper technical devices were bought
which already at the moment of purchase turned out to be out-of-date (L. Bazylow, The
Internal Policy of Tsardom and Social Movements in Russia at the Beginning of the 20th
century, in Polish, Warsaw 1966. p. 53).
302
CHAPTER 18
Let us not ask ourselves from where we know this. Let us ask rather how
"this" has found us.
The author of the quoted passage is surprised as much as only a Marxist
could be when confronted with the phenomenon of power: "The intensive
support for the development of the home industry on the part of the govern-
ment was in itself a positive phenomenon; the methods applied were, how-
ever, fatal" (ibid., p. 52).
It is time to understand that as profit is the industrial form of surplus
value, so interest is the financial form of it, and so the bribe is the state form
of it. For a bribe is nothing but that part of the surplus value which is assigned
to the post in the hierarchy of power - if a person occupying the post makes
decisions upon which the possibility of a given economic action depends.
Let us go further along with the list under consideration. Tendency (3)
is simply an immediate consequence of (1). Phenomena (4) is not an "over-
growth of administrative measures" as it is conceptualized from the Marxian
standpoint (as well as from the point of view of common sense), but the
global effect of the purely rational actions undertaken by rulers. However,
the goal they aim at is not the economic efficiency of production but the
enlarging and the deepening of their control over people. And their adminis-
trative measures were simply the means of achieving this goal, not the satis-
faction of social needs or allowing capitalists to have a further increase in
profit. From the point of view of the latter goals, the measures applied by
the Russian state may seem to be "artificial" or an "excess of bureaucracy",
etc. The point is, however, that ascribing to rulers objectives of this kind
expresses rather their ideological prejudices than the actual aim of the power.
Private entrepreneurs in Russia understood this much better than the
Marxist theoreticians, and they undertook the appropriate counter-measures.
The most elementary was to have their own people in the state apparatus in
order to adapt themselves to decisions which the state was making. This is
what explains the phenomenon of the formation of organizations among
entrepreneurs:
It is not sufficiently known that for a long time Russian industrialists have been inclined
to organize themselves .... There were even many associations of the kind .... In such
organizations ... congresses were arranged, as a rule, yearly; in the breaks between
congress the 'councils of congresses' were in charge .... The old capitalists had a per-
manent council in Baku and had a permanent representative in the capital ... (Bazylow,
op. cit., pp. 61 (,2).
So, the entrepreneurs had created an organization and the latter, in order to
TSARIST RUSSIA 303
know what is going on within the more powerful organization, appointed an
"ambassador" to the state .... A subordinated system begins to reproduce
the internal structure of the dominating one.
Phenomena (5) and (6) reveal the tendency of the state to support the
development of great firms both by juridical and economic means. And it
succeeded: in "underdeveloped tsarist Russia" the concentration of produc-
tion was the strongest in the contemporary world. At a time when in the
"most advanced capitalist country" great American firms employed 33% of
workers and small and middle ones (up to 500 employees) gave work to 67%
of the manpower at large (Lyashchenko, vol. II, p. 288), in "underdeveloped
tsarist Russia" the details were as in Table VIII:
TABLE VIII
The Size of Firms The Number of Employees (in %)
1901 1910 1914
Small and middle 53.3 46.5 43.5
(up to 500 workers)
Great (over 500 workers) 46.7 53.5 56.5
Source: J. Ciepielewski, The Economic History of the Soviet Union (in Polish), Warsaw
1967, p. 46 (data for 1901 and 1910); P. A. Khromov, The Economic History of
Russia (in Russian), Moscow 1967, p. 301 (data for 1914).
Under our hypothesis the phenomenon can be explained rather easily: it is
much more difficult to control thousands of small producers than to enter
the councils of several great syndicates. The feudal economy is much more
"diffuse" than the capitalist one: that is why the class of rulers-owners had
opted for the latter. And the less "diffuse", that is, the more concentrated
is the production in the capitalist economy, the better for the interests of
that class. This process of the monopolization of production was very advan-
tageous for the tsarist state, that is why it supported this "natural" tendency
of the capitalist economy so much that at last it ceased to be the "natural"
one (see (5) and (6. The state was even defending monopolies from the
attacks of society. For instance, in 1908, 106 deputies of the Russian parlia-
ment signed a petition protesting against the activity of one of the biggest
syndicates ~ Prodamet (see below). The petition was considered by a special
commission composed mainly of the same state officials who, being the mem-
bers of its counciL were preparing the defence of the attacked enterprises.
304 CHAPTER 18
At the same time, in the United States, anti-trust legislation was being set
up ....
It is also a peculiar property of state capitalism in Russia that the tendency
to monopolize the banks was greater than the tendency to monopolize
production. Table IX gives some figures illustrating the phenomenon of the
concentration of banking capitals:
The Type of Bank according
to the Basic Liabilities
below 100
100-200
over 200
TABLE IX
I January 1900
The Total The Share
of Liabil. (in %)
821 71
336 29
I January 1914
The Total The Share
of Liabil. (in %)
772 17
646 14
3214 69
Source: I. F. Gindin and L. E. Shepielev, Banking Monopolies in Russia on the Eve of
the October Revolution (in Russian), Istorija SSSR 61960.
FurthernlOre, the banks subordinated the producers to themselves: as early
as at the beginning of this century the banks in Russia controlled 50% of the
capital in the metallurgic industry, 60% of the capital in the mining of coal,
80% in the electro technical industry, and later on the quotas were increased
(P. I. Kabanov and N. D. Kuznecov (eds.), op. cit., p. 220). And the banking
system became more and more subordinated, in turn, to the state itself. The
Russian banking system "differed a great deal in organizational respects from
those of Western capitalist countries" (Lyashchenko, vol. II, p. 354). "At the
head of the system" was the State Bank possessing the sole right to issue bank
notes:
As a result of the development of the state's credit operations, the State Bank, as the
central bank of issue and of credits, and the credit system ... dependent upon it had
a decisive influence on the financial life of the country and on great industry (ibid.,
p. 355).
In this way the state Bank, being the greatest with respect to the extent
of its deposits of the ten biggest banks of issue in the world,
could seriously influence the system through its credit, discount, foreign-currency and
economic policy, the policy of the balance of payments and of trade, the financing of
the exports of grain, etc. (Lyashchenko. vol. II, p. 355).
TSARIST RUSSIA 305
Let us compare this with the dreams of V. I. Lenin on the eve of taking over
power:
The great banks are this 'state apparatus' which is needed for us for the fulfilment of
socialism and which we are taking over in a ready form from capitalism. Our task con-
sists only in cutting off what causes the capitalist distortions of this grandiose apparatus,
in making it even greater, even more democratic, even more pandominating. The quan-
tity will pass into the quality (V. l. Lenin 'Will the Bolsheviks Keep the State Power?',
Works, vol. 26, the Polish edition, Warsaw 1956, p. 89).
Lenin was wrong: it had already passed. The quantity had already passed
into the quality when the greatest of the exploiters had become - due to
its political power - the supervisor of the rest of the exploiters. Russia was
on the direct road to socialism long before the Bolsheviks had adorned it with
red banners.
Phenomenon (7) was also a result of the actions undertaken by the state.
For the ruler-owner is much more interested in economic matters than the
ruler - possible economic losses are also his own. That is why the Russian
state began to intervene in the business cycle long before this had become
the custom in the allegedly "more developed" Western countries. Let us look
at this by taking the example of the sugar industry. In 1885 a crisis began:
production fell over three years to b ~ u t 18%. The fall would have been
bigger if the state had not intervened with donations for the great sugar
firms. And in 1887 the organization of sugar producers was set up which
established the amount of production for the home market and allotted orders
to particular producers. And. first of all, it mediated the relations with the
state. The latter, apart from the usual credit activity, gave also special high
premiums for the exports of sugar. As a result, export production was very
profitable even though the prices for the sugar were relatively low in the
foreign markets. The first result was an improvement in the internal situation:
the home market lost some of the "superfluous" amount of sugar products
reducing the danger of the crisis. The second result was the step toward the
blending of the state apparatus and the sugar industry. And the process
occurred in the whole capitalist economy of Russia. Everywhere state offi-
cials were penetrating the cells of economic life forming in this way the class
of those who made political decisions and then attempted to make also
economic ones - the class of rulers-owners which was transferring its political
goals to the domain of the capitalist economy.
As a result, tendency (8) noticed by the Soviet historians quoted above
seems to be the most important of all the phenomena presented in their
306 CHAPTER 18
penetrating study. To see this, however, one has to reject Marxian prejudices
and accept the stand of generalized historical materialism. That is why the
authors' own, quite orthodox, interpretation blames all that they found
out.
The Announcement of the Future: The Economic Inefficiency of the His-
torically Progressive Form of Society
If our hypothesis that in the second half of the 19th century the double class
of rulers-owners was forming in Russia is to be accepted, if, then, the pre-
socialist society was forming under the last tsars' regime, then this hypothesis
should allow for an explanation of some of the phenomena which could be
interpreted as the announcement of the coming socialist society. And it does.
Let us take such a typical phenomenon of all present socialist societies as
their economic inefficiency and try to fmd its augury in the last decades
of tsarist Russia. Of course, if it is to be of some relevance to us, then this
phenomenon must be explained as the result of the working of the same
factor that was responsible for Russia's coming towards socialism long before
the October Revolution.
It is the subordination of the economy to the state which results in eco-
nomic inefficiency. For the state officials, as rulers, are not interested in
maximizing any economic indices that would require high quality in the
commodities, or the satisfaction of possibly many needs of the consumers.
The industrial system is not for the ruler a system for making production
more effective but a new possibility for controlling the citizens. And the
banking system is nol for the ruler a service for production and trade but a
possibility for the control over the owners of the means of production and
of circulation. We have seen this in Lenin's admiration for the "grandiose
banking system". That is why economical problems are for the ruler only
opportunities to fulfIl his actual goal: to subordinate people to his will. It is
not surprising that this results in economically ineffective solutions to the
economic problems; for the ruler the latter are political problems alone (see
Part I D).
Hence one may conclude that the greater the influence of the class of
rulers in production, the lesser the economic efficiency of the latter. If so,
then one could expect two special phenomena:
(9) in a domain of production entirely dominated by the state, that is, in
the state sector of industry, economic efficiency is the lowest in the whole
economy;
TSAR 1ST RUSSIA 307
(IO) the economic efficiency of a producer is the lower the more it is
influenced by the state.
By economic efficiency is understood here the satisfaction of social needs.
And tsarist Russia became the exemplification of the rule - that power of
the state over economics results in economic inefficiency - long before this
had been revealed, in a much sharper form, by the systems calling themselves
socialist ones.
In order to confirm phenomenon (9), let us look at the war industry which
in Russia was entirely in the hands of the state. Here is the description by an
author who cannot be suspected of bias against the "social property of the
means of production":
The governmental factories of the war industry were subordinated to absolute bureau-
cratic control and to bureaucratic management. In production, all initiative was sup-
pressed. All the projects for improvements were rejected. Plans concerning production
and the setting up of the patterns of the armaments were kept beyond any limits which
resulted from the endless delays in different designing and ratifying stages (Lyashchenko,
vol. II, p. 581).
This resulted in the severe technical retardation of the Russian war indus-
try. More complicated, that is, more modem types of armaments were not
produced at all. This country with quite a modem and very-well developed
(private!) industry was not able to manage with the production of many
types of weapons that were at the time produced abroad. And so, plane
engines, anti-aircraft artillery, mine-throwers, even machine-guns were not
produced by the state industry. Also, the specialization of products the state
industry could manage was insufficient for the needs then of the tsarist army.
Not to mention the quality of them. Adopted rules of quality were fre-
quently not observed which resulted in the recurring phenomenon of the
lack of spare parts for the weapons used. And even elementary equipment
was produced in much too small an amount. The supplies of ordinary rifles
in 1914 amounted to 4 mIn. while already in the first year of war the demand
amounted to 8 mIn., and later on to 17.5 mIn. And with ammunition it was
even much worse. All this led to fatal outcomes for Russia at the beginning
of World War I (see the next chapter). What is, however, important at this
place, reduces to this: the tsarist state was even unable to produce materials
for the war. Which confirms tendency (9).
And here is the confirmation of trend (10). The greatest syndicate in
Russia was Prodamet, associating the bigger firms in the metallurgical industry.
Its statutes were validated by the government in 1902. In 1904, Prodamet
308
CHAPTER 18
controlled the sale of about 60% of the metallurgical output in the coun-
try; and in 1912, more than 90% of it. Also in the domain of production,
Prodamet had gained a monopolistic position, controlling 70-90% of the
production of various articles.
It was the state which had influenced such a quick development to a rather
great extent. At the very beginning of the 20th century the government
created a special committee for the regulation of sales and production in
the metallurgical industry. The committee set the conditions of production
for factories, and regulated donations, prices of commodities manufactured
in the industry under consideration, etc. The result was the elimination of
the competition between firms. Weaker firms came to be subordinated to
stronger firms, but to be stronger meant to have a greater influence within
the committee. In such conditions Prodamet was formed in 1902.
And later on, the support of the government was still a main factor in the
accelerating development of the syndicate. "The most effective instrument
of the support for industry was the high prices of the state orders" (Lyash-
chenko, vol. II, p. 322). The prices were set for three years which insured
the firms against the negative results of market fluctuations - but only those
firms that had gained state orders. E.g., some steelworks were producing for
state orders as much as 80% and more of their output. "In the form of high
prices, those firms were gaining enormous premiums" (ibid., p. 322). It is
obvious that this was making it much easier for Prodamet to compete with
independent firms not having such advantageous conditions. One thing is
characteristic: at last all the rivals of Prodamet turned out to be defeated,
with one exception, namely Putilov Factory, which possessed "special con-
ditions of production of their own" reSUlting from the "strict connexion with
the state orders" (ibid., p. 315).
Of course, there were protests against the existence and activity of such a
powerful syndicate. They were rejected in the same way as the interpellation
of the 106 deputies I mentioned above. However, the protests were gradually
changing character. It became an open secret that - as was formulated in
one of the memorials sent to the government - "Prodamet is a strong or-
ganization including personages with significant influence in governmental
circles" (quoted after Lyashchenko, vol. II, p. 323). And protests came to be
directed against the lowering quality of Prodamet's output or their not
keeping the terms of fulfilment of cooperative contracts, etc. What was
objected to more and more was not the existence of the syndicate but the
lowering level of its economic activity. In later times Prodamet gained such a
strong position that
TSARIST RUSSIA 309
it was the usual manoeuvre of Prodamet to take over all but the more advantageous
government and private orders without any possibility of their fulfilment. Not fulfilling
the orders and not keeping the terms had become a chronic phenomenon in Prodamet's
activity (ibid., p. 3 I 8).
Obviously, the strategy applied by Prodamet was purely rational - if it is
possible to gain high profits without much effort, then why increase the
effort? But this strategy was to be applied only in the conditions of the stable
state support for Prodamet guaranteed by "personages close to governmental
circles". That is why all the protests were fated to fail: "Prodamet had
already blended too strongly - legally and illegally - with the governmental
apparatus supporting its policy" (ibid., p. 323).
If, then, the same historian concludes that "the monopolistic capital had
subordinated to itself the whole economy, and the needs of the state eco-
nomy had to put first the ... profits of the bunch of monopolists" (ibid.,
p. 323), then it is hard to resist the impression that, knowing very much
about Prodamet, the author in fact understands rather little. What "state
economy" is referred to? There were two of them: the official one and the
true one. The true state economy consisted in the gradual subordination
of economic life to the hierarchy of power, and syndicates of the type of
Prodamet served as 'quite good instruments for this. In the conditions that
were being created in the former state-feudalist society, monopolist capital
could only act provided that it was supported by power. And the latter was
possible only on condition that it became more and more blended with the
state apparatus. In this way the new class of rulers-owners was forming itself,
that is, the class of people who influence both political and economical
decisions, who make the use of both the productive and the coercive forces
of society.
In this way the first lines in the picture of Russia's future have been
painted. Many of them are still unclear, but one has been distinguished quite
enough: the economic indolency of the state economy. Historical develop-
ment leads to the combination of power and property, and Russia was - due
to the whole of its history (see Chapters 16 and 17) - ahead of the process.
And Russia was also the first country which realized that historical develop-
ment brings economic regress.
The Tsarist State Represented, at the Turn of the Century, the Interests of
the Class of Rulers-Owners
Our Marxist question, 'which class interests has the tsarist state represented
310
CHAPTER 18
in the latest decades of its existence?' may now be answered. And the answer
is very short indeed: its own. More strictly: it was the interests of the class
of rulers-owners which was coming into being in the second half of the 19th
century as the result of the blending of the state apparatus and private capi-
tal. In the second half of the 19th century the new oprichnina was forming.
For, as we have seen in Chapter 16, the constitutive feature of the oprichnina
was not mass murders, but the combination of power and property. Now
the new power and the new type of property are combining again. And the
time for mass murders will itself come - on a scale Ivan N could not even
imagine.
The Announcement of the Collectivization: Stolypin's Reforms
The new class soon did its best to draw the new lines of the .picture of Russia's
future, this time in the open country.
As we remember from the preceding chapters, the usual mechanism in
Russia of the development through the class struggle was, starting from the
totalitarian anomaly, very strongly disturbed by the supra-class-struggle
between the category of rulers-owners and citizens-owners. The purpose was,
from the point of view of the state apparatus, to level down the citizens
distinguished by ownership of the land to the rank of regular citizens. But
not only this. Also, the state apparatus wanted to enlarge its control over
the masses of the peasantry. In the conditions of a feudal economy the state
was devoid. to a large extent, of the opportunity of actual control over the
serfs since they were subordinated to their landlords. In this way the majority
of the state's citizens were only juridical, not actual, citizens. These two
purposes were the basis of the constant struggle between the classes of rulers-
owners and citizens-owners at the time of the totalitarian anomaly, and of
the more or less hidden hostility between the state and the landlords later on
when the people's revolution at the beginning of 16th century turned Russia
out on the road of state feudalism.
The affranchisement reform of 1861 voided the landlords offeudal power
over the peasantry and the state gained some rights to treat the latter as
actual citizens. But it wished to do much too little. For a significant majority
of the peasant holdings were remaining in rural communities (obshchina)
which represented a given group of peasants in the face of the state. The
obshchina took the responsibility for the payment of taxes to the state, look-
ing after the poorest of its members, dividing periodically the whole of the
communal land among the people belonging to it, etc. In short, it played the
TSARIST RUSSIA 311
role of a self-governing community replacing the state organs in many func-
tions, even administrative ones, which they would wish to keep for themselves.
The capitalist development of Russia violated the force of the obshchina,
but nonetheless, in 1905, 77% of the peasantry still remained within rural
communities.
77% of the peasants (and the peasantry formed more than 80% of the
whole population of Russia) were still controlled in a rather limited man-
ner - at least from the point of view of the state, which was increasing in
power by making such great successes in the subordination of the industrial
sub-system to itself. Now the time was coming for the subordination of the
agricultural sub-system, for the liquidation of the rural community. The more
so, because the latter was an obstacle also for the capitalist development of
Russia's agriculture, which required a personal interest in the running of the
holding and a personal responsibility for it. The interests of the bourgeoisie
required the new reform of Russia's agriculture. And the interests of the new
class of rulers-owners were still parallel to those of the bourgeoisie.
The two purposes were inclining to the same end: to the smashing of
the rural community and to replacing it with a structure proper to the capi-
talist mode of agricultural production. This will make the further develop-
ment of capitalist industry possible - so profitable from the point of view
of the ruler-owner -- and will enable the state to subordinate particular
peasants, broken out of the rural community, to its own administration. A
peasant will cease to live in a social milieu impenetrable for the power. Let
him grow rich. At least he will be alone. Alone in the face of the state.
That is why Stolypin's reforms were nothing but the continuation of the
same line of development resulting from the growing process of the com-
bination of power and property and leading to the increase of the new double
class. The state had undertaken the gigantic task of adopting the agricultural
sub-system to the more advanced one, both economically and politically.
In virtue of the decree of 9 November 1906, every member of a rural
community gained the right to make an application for permission to have
the land he had been using as his property. Doing this he ceased to belong to
the obshchina. The latter ceased to be for him his local authority, his matters
came to be regulated by the true state authority represented by the com-
mission he had made his application to. And when he left the obshchina to
set up his own holding. then the said commission confined him to the state's
administrative care. A peasant, at first subservient to a lord and then to an
obshchina was becoming subservient to the state.
The realization of the decree began very soon:
312
CHAPTER 18
In 1906, 171 district commissions began work, and in the coming years their number
reached 462 .... District commissions were subordinated to the province .... The
leading instance was the Agricultural Committee composed of ... the representatives
of several ministeries with the chairman of the department of agriculture at its head"
(Bazylow, The Last Years a/the Russian Tsars, Warsaw, 1972, pp. 210-211).
According to the data usually given, until 1916 more than 2.5 mIn. peasants
left the rural communities; not all the applications were, however, able to be
settled by the authorities. The enterprise was on an enormous scale - in 1912
the number of land-surveyors reached 5 thousand; more than 3 mIn. peasants
emigrated in 1906-1916 from the European part of Russia to Siberia; and so
"the Stolypinean reform really shook the agrarian relations" in Russia (ibid.,
p.214).
The state not only administrated the process of the dissolution of the rural
communities, but also secured its fulfIlment fmancially. The State Peasant
Bank bought the land from the landlords and next sold it to the peasants on
very easy terms.
As a result of this reform, the process of the capitalisation of agriculture
was deepened; the amount of individual holdings increased by 20 per cent;
and the conditions of the rural poor were much worsened. This was what
Lenin had predicted when he gave to the second edition of his The Develop-
ment o/Capitalism in Russia of 1908 the following footnote:
It is self-evident that even more damage will be brought to the peasant poor by the
Stolypinean ... demolition of the rural community. This is the Russian 'enrichissez-
vous': Black-Hundred reactionaries - rich peasants! rob at large, but support the declin-
ing absolutism! (Works, vol. 3, the Polish edition, Warsaw 1954, p. 154, footnote).
In the first part of the footnote Lenin is perfectly right - every process of
capitalisation strengthens the rich and weakens the poor. But Lenin, as every
orthodox Marxist, fails to distinguish between the deep and the surface struc-
ture in the sphere of power. And that is why he does not understand the quite
analogical dependency occurring within the latter: the strong become stronger
and the weak become still weaker. He does not understand, then, that the
tsarist state "undertaking this improbably large enterprise" (Bazylow) proves
actually its social power and strengthens it. Lenin thinks that the tsarist state
is the Tsar and his clique, whereas the "tsarist absolutism" was then already
only a formal screen for the activity of the 20th century pomeshchikov.
There will come a time when the class of rulers-owners throws off the mask
and reveals its proper nature. But Lenin will still understand nothing, acting
along the line of the regularities which he will not even suspect to exist.
TSARIST RUSSIA 313
The main motif of Stolypin's legislation was the final destruction of the rural community
in Russia and the formation of the strong strata of the rich peasantry which could be
the support of the state power in the countryside. It was to be the capitalisation of the
peasant economy, authoritatively laid down and realized (R. Wojna, The Struggle for
Land in Russia in 1917, in Polish, Ossolineum 1977, pp. 21-22).
It was not basically the capitalisation of the economy; nonetheless this
remark of a penetrating historian is rather symptomatic. What was peculiar
for the "Russian road to capitalism in agriculture" was that a dominant role
was played in it by the state. And this requires so much naIvete as only an
orthodox Marxist may reveal when faced with the sphere of power, to say
that the process of smashing the rural community was determined by eco-
nomic reasons. On the part of which social class? (Since we, Marxists, know
that the notion of "economic reason", abstracting from the real class struc-
ture of a society, is a bad abstraction, nothing more .... ) The landlords? That
would be a joke. The bourgeoisie? No doubt: it was advantageous for them.
Bu t if the tsarist state was able to proceed on such a gigantic task in the name,
and on behalf of, the bourgeoisie, then shouldn't we call it a "bourgeois
state" rather? But, if so, then why did the same bourgeoisie turn out to fight
with the "bourgeois state" several years later on?
Marxist historians do not see that the capitalisation of Russian agriculture
was only one of the sides of the process under consideration and, what is
more, one subordinated to the other; and what they do not understand at all
is what was the role of the whole. The political side of the process consisted
in the fact that the strongest state apparatus of the world for the first time in
Russia's history was becoming successful in gaining control over all its citizens.
For the first time there were no landlords, or obshchinas, who would inter-
mediate the influence of the state upon the citizens. At last the state was, in
principle, able to reach all the citizens extending its cells over the whole
network of social practice; if, in fact, it was not, then this resulted only from
the fact that World War [interrupted the process in the middle.
The author cited defines obshchina in a very bright way, calling it a "sui
generis channel through which the authority's orders were reaching the
peasants" (Wojna, p. \9). However, having in mind Lenin's dogmas and
Marx's lack of understanding of the hidden nature of power, he does not see
the simplest thing: that the main motif of the reform was to cut off this
channel in order to stand face to face with the majority of citizens.
And it is, however, quite sufficient to analyse several sentences from the
speech Stolypin gave in the Duma, in order to defme the proper role of the
reform - provided that the analysis will be a really Marxist one:
314
CHAPTER 18
The government took a great responsibility upon itself by proclaiming the decree of
9 November 1906; the government has taken on not the poor and the alcoholics but
the strong .... Is it not clear that the chains of the rural community, the pressure of
family ownership, are for the 90-million population a bitter servitude? (quoted after
Bazylow, The Last Years of the Russian Tsars, Warsaw, 1972, p. 215).
There are, then, two reasons for the reform as shown by its promoter:
(a) to make the development of the "economically strong" possible;
(b) to release 90 million peasants from the "chains of the rural com-
munity".
Every Marxist would say that (a) is the ideological upturn of the actual
historical sense of the reform. For the latter, even provided that Stolypin
was personally convinced that such was the aim of the reform, reduces itself
to the following:
(a') to deepen the financial differentiation among the peasantry.
For only due to this concentration of property could production, etc., be
increased. (For only due to this- let us add this for our responsibility - will
the rural sub-system be gradually adjusting itself to the capitalist industrial
system where the dominant role is already being played by the class of rulers-
owners.)
No doubt this standard Marxist analysis is proper. It is very characteristic,
and very important, for Marxism to find out the mechanism of the ideological
upturning of actual class interests. However, why agree in advance with the
standard Marxist standpoint that this concerns economic classes, and their
economic interest alone? What does the orthodox Marxist have to say about
the goal indicated by Stolypin as (b)?
At most, exactly what our common-sense teaches us: that this is a slogan
and that's all. However, why could one not say about (a) that it is a slogan
and that's all? If it was worth turning one ideological mystification upside
down, let us try to do the same with the other.
What is rather suspicious as far as the second motif of the reform is
considered, is this sudden interest in the peasants' liberty on the part of the
state which revealed earlier rather greater interest in the development of
the Okhrana. It is not difficult on the grounds of generalized historical
materialism - to predict that after the "liberation of the chains of the rural
community", the state will not leave the peasant alone. After all it cannot
simply leave him full of freedom: it is necessary to include him under the
lowest officials (chinovniks), indirectly under upper ones, etc. until he will
become a full citizen subordinated to the hierarchy of power. In other words:
(b') to include 90 million people into the state's sphere of regulation.
TSARIST RUSSIA 315
This is true: neither (a' ) nor (b' ) were satisfied. The process assessed for
as long as 20 years by Stolypin himself was interrupted in the middle by the
war. One should not underestimate it, however. It was one of the proofs of
the power of the new class and the announcement of the future development
of the Russian countryside. This means nothing but that the latter will take
place under the sound of different slogans. Their historical sense will be the
same.
The Class Struggle and the Supra-Class-Struggle in Tsarist Russia
It is the basic historiosophic thesis of this book that the class struggle plays
the role of one of the two mechanisms of historical movement as long as the
process of combination of the disposal over at least the two material forces
of society does not occur. The latter is the result of the supra-class-struggle
among different classes of disposers of material means of different kinds
(see Part I C). Until the apogee of capitalism the supra-class-struggle has in
Western societies a historically accidental character. The necessities of capi-
talist reproduction bring it about that the state ceases to be the representative
of the interests of big business and even reduces the class struggle of workers
against the latter. Since that moment it is the supra-class-struggle between
the state and capital which becomes the leading force in modern history. This
is, as we remember (see Part I C), a rather peculiar struggle since it consists
in the gradual erosion of the economy, which gradually transforms capitalism
into the two-momentum totalitarian society.
Russia's historical road was a very peculiar one and has to be drawn as
early on as from the totalitarian anomaly of the 13th-16th centuries. The
latter caused the disturbances in the regular mechanism of the development
of feudalism through the class struggle. In Russia, since the middle of the
16th century, one upheaval, or even the peasant war, followed another,
leading to the strengthening of the powerful state-owner as the only result.
And, finally, the ability of the Russian serfs to resist has been crushed for
almost one hundred years. The growth of the intensity of the class struggle
in the countryside in the middle of 19th century was evoked by the change
of policy by the state-owner and the promises it made to the peasantry. This
was precisely what took the peasantry out of the threshold of dec1assation
which had lasted since Pugatchov's upheaval. However, this was without
special significance. For at that time the new stage of the supra-class-struggle
had begun. The state-owner finally defeated the landlords and at the same
time started to gradually corrode the growing capitalist economy. In this way
316 CHAPTER 18
the class of rulers-owners formed again in Russia, after a three hundred years'
break. At the beginning of the 20th century there was no oprichnina yet, but
only the pomeshchiki.
The latter employed unusual totalitarian opportunities opened up by the
capitalist economy. The capitalist economy by itself led to the replacement
of the free market by the domination over consumers' choices - and the
rulers-owners only saw to it that the domination was not limited to market
behaviour. The capitalist economy by itself led to the centralization of
production and circulation on a scale unknown to any previous form of
economy and the rulers-owners only saw to it that the centralization of
economic life was gradually becoming dependent upon the centralization of
power. The capitalist economy by itself led to periodical overproduction -
and the rulers employed the purely economic necessity of interventionism
to condition upon themselves those who still tried to act on purely economic
principles. And if they had such a handicap as the enormous power of the
state-owner at the initial stage of capitalism, then it is surprising that the
system transformed itself with increasing acceleration into state capitalism,
omitting both the free-competitive and the imperialist stages on the way.
If so, then the future of Russia depended only upon'what was going on
on the plane of relationships between the state and the bourgeoisie, that is,
on the state of the supra-class-struggle. In spite of the prejudices of Marxists
of all shades, the state of the class struggle at the turn of the century had
nothing in common with Russia's development. Russia's future depended
only on the tempo of gradual erosion of the capitalist economy, not on the
number of victims of the social revolutionaries' terror, of strikes led by the
Mensheviks, or of Bolshevik meetings concerned with party discipline. The
struggle of the working class against the capitalists was at the turn of the
century a quite secondary phenomenon of the rank, let us say, of the national
antagonisms within the tsar's empire, and may be entirely omitted in our
narration.
How is it known? Simply from the fact that if this is actually assumed
and nothing is said- until the rise of socialism - about the struggle of the
working class against the capitalists, then much may be understood, including
- if I am right .. the most important processes taking place in Russian society.
But if the reverse is done, if the supra-class-struggle is omitted and the whole
stress put on the class struggle, then .... However, why the "if"? For this is
always done nothing is said about the supra-class-struggle, but the class
struggle is the main point of interest of Marxist (Bolshevik or social-demo-
cratic) historians of Russia. As a result, either the most inhuman society in
TSAR 1ST RUSSIA 317
history is called the embodiment of the humanistic ideals of Marx, or the
most important historical process of this century is called an accidental by
the way. Such is the effect of the common acceptance of Marx's theoretical
faults.
At the Beginning of the 20th Century Russia Was the Only State Capitalist
Society in the World. It Was the Best Developed Capitalist Country
The conclusion of this chapter is the following: the first dogma of Leninism,
accepted also by social-democratic and bourgeois thought, is totally false.
Russia at the tum of the century was ahead of the whole world with respect
to the level of social development. For the latter, since the apogee of capital-
ism, is measured - according to generalized historical materialism - not
by the amount of production, neither by the quality of it, nor by the effi-
ciency of work, etc., in general, not by anything that Marxian historical
materialism could bring into the minds of its Bolshevik, social-democratic or
bourgeois followers, but it is measured by the development of the supra-class
struggle, that is, with results in the combination of power and property. And
from this point of view Russia has advanced over the rest of the world, taking
the advantage of many tens of years. That is why Russia was ahead of the line
of historical development leading, unfortunately, to totalitarian (or to fascist)
and then to socialist society.
All this is still far from being understood due to the common acceptance
of Marxian historiosophy, also by people who - as we have seen many times
- identify themselves as non-, or even anti-, Marxists. Marxist thought, both
in the social-democratic and the Bolshevik variants, was blamed by Marxian
historical materialism, which it wanted to be. Tsarist Russia was, and still is,
compared not with the (actual) socialism but with the (dream of a) Socialism.
And in fact: if we compare the abundance of goods, the level of alienation,
the conditions for self-realisation, or whatever, in Socialism, in tsarist Russia
and in the western countries as they were then, it becomes obvious that the
teleological trend looks as follows: Socialism, the western countries of the
beginning of the century, tsarist Russia. If as the point of arrival the ideal of
Socialism is taken, then the comparison between the tsarist Russian and the
western countries must lead to the view that the West was "developed" while
Russia was "backward". And the Marxian historical materialism gives intel-
lectual means for making this fruitful comparison.
There is no essential difference in the case of bourgeois thought. It
is Capitalism which replaces Socialism this time: that is, the rationalized
318 CHAPTER 18
capitalist system that bourgeois thought wanted, and wants, to have. And also
in the march towards Capitalism, tsarist Russia was at the end.
However, the thing is that both the marches - otherwise isomorphic -
were taking place, and still are, in the heads of the brave theoreticians of both
sides of the barricade of class struggle. The barricade was, and even is, actual,
but it stands on the side-track of history. And the reality of the mutual rum-
bling was, and still is, blaming the militants, making it impossible for them to
see the quite different development taking place on the main-track of history:
from capitalism - through state capitalism - to totalitarianism. And then to
socialism.
In this actual march tsarist Russia, due to the heritage of state feudalism,
was significantly in advance of the societies of the West. And those who did
not see this, those who were composing imaginary marches, were soon to
become wretched puppets in the hands of history.
NOTE
1 A pood is a unit of weight = 16.36 kg.
CHAPTER 19
THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION WAS A TOTALITARIAN
REVOLUTION
WORLD WAR I: THE PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION OF
TOT ALIT ARIANISM
The Point of Departure
Russia came to World War I as a country of developed state capitalism with a
more and more distinct class of rulers-owners. Natural economic processes
led, in the conditions of state feudalism, to the transformation of feudal
rulers-owners into capitalist ones; also to the constant increasing of the scale
of state intervention in economic life; and fmally, to the further institution-
alization of the bourgeoisie and the enlarging of its connections with the state
apparatus. The three processes we were observing in the preceding chapter
can be explained rather simply. The first by the fact that in the conditions of
capitalist society, particularly of the Russian type, with a delayed agriculture,
it is easier to make profits in the capitalist sector. The second by the tendency
to strengthen a position in the hierarchy of power by the increase of estate.
And the third trend is understandable as well because in the conditions when
the basic economic decisions within a private factory depend upon decisions
made within the state apparatus, the bribe becomes - together with interest
or ground rent - a form of surplus value. The more a capitalist wants to have
for himself, the less he wants to spend on bribes, the higher political position
he must possess - joining the apparatus of power himself, or attending
"coteries" (society, family, etc.) of people who belong to the apparatus.
The processes lead to the replacement of the two disjoint classes of oppres-
sors, rulers and capitalists, by a new structure, as suggested in Figure 19.
the class of disposers of productive forces
purely authoritarian
stratum
class of rulers-owners
the class of disposers of repressive forces
Fig. 19.
319
purely bourgeois
stratum
320
CHAPTER 19
The historical role of World War I for the social development of the tsar's
country consisted in the heightening of the supremacy of the ruler-owners
over the remaining two strata of the oppressive classes and in the significant
reduction of the purely bourgeois stratum transforming itself more and more
into the rulers-owners. Let us look at the trends in question.
The Economic Weakness of State Capitalism
Systems based on the fusion of power and property seem to be unimaginably
strong as long as they manifest their force against their powerless citizens.
They turn out to be extremely weak, however, when the hour of real trial
comes. Ivan the Fourth, so Sinister for his citizens, disgracefully lost the war
with Poland and the same turned out at the beginning of World War I.
In the first year of the war Russia lost her richest provinces - the Polish
ones - with about 20% of the industry (this and the following information
about the economic problems of the war are taken from P. Lyashchenko, The
Economic History of the U.S.S.R., Vol. II: Capitalism, Warsaw 1956, pp.
569-657). It was not an accident: the "terrible defeat of Spring 1915"
revealed the economic weakness of all the parts of the social organism where
the council of state was acting. Here are data concerning the productivity
of the armaments industry (being, as we remember from the last chapter,
entirely in the hands of the state).
The productive capacity in 1914 was 44 thousand rifles monthly, while
the front's demand in 1915 was 60, and in 1916 200 thousand rifles. Even
the worse were the munitions. During the peace Russia was producing 290
billions of units for rifles. The mobilization plans worked out by the bureau-
crats defined the norm of resources as 3,346 million units, while in July
1914 it turned out that the actual resource was only 2,446 million units.
What does an owner do when the demand exceeds the supply? He increases
production, of course. What does a ruler-owner do in the same situation? He
lowers the norm, of course. So they did, lowering it to 2,892 million units.
This was good in July 1914, before the war. Certainly, some bribers of
the Ministry of War saved their posts in this way still keeping the possibility
to join the power and the state form of surplus value. But the whole of the
actual resources were used during the first 3-4 months of the war and already
at the beginning of 1915 the shortage of rifle munition in relation to the rifles
possessed amounted to 2 billion units. And the shortage of rifles in that war
was about 11.1 million. Let us repeat that the production of rifle munition
before the war was 290 billion units yearly while during the war, in 1916, the
THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 321
front demand was 200 billion units monthly. And this was "only" the prob-
lem of the rifle munition. But "The worst, even most disastrous, was with
... artillery munition" (Lyashchenko, vol. 2, p. 621) - the norm amount
calculated by bureaucratic experts was exhausted during the first two weeks
of the war. This was the result of the following: despite the coming war,
No means of making a more intensive supply of the army possible have been undertaken.
On the contrary, the supply was organized in such a manner that particular parts of a
cartridge ... were produced in different factories and located in different artillery parks
in different parts of the country. Under the bad state of transportation this worsened the
situation even more (Lyashchenko, vol. 2, p. 621).
This was good during the peace - certainly many bribers of the bureaucracy
filled their pockets with the money of capitalists of "different factories in
different parts of the country" for such spreading of the global war produc-
tion. But after the outbreak of the war, Head Quarters communicated to the
Minister of War that for every three German artillery shots, the Russians were
able to answer with only one ...
The Cause of the Disaster: the Acceleration of the Socilll Development in
Russill
There is no need to continue this register to see that the most socially ad-
vanced (Le., the state) part of the industry of the most socially advanced
country in the world turned out to be technically and organizationally the
most backward. This is not surprising from the viewpoint of non-Marxian
historical materialism: the process of accumulating disposal over more and
more types of material forces in society implies the economic (and also
administrative and intellectual) ineffectiveness of society. It is only Marxian
historical materialism and the prejudices it is responsible for that incline us to
see something strange in claiming that tsarist Russia, in spheres dominated by
the double class of rulers-owners, was both the most historically advanced
and praxiologically the least effective society. In fact, Marx's historiosophic
vision is still present in modem thinking about history.
The State's Reaction: the Growth of Intervention in Economic Life
What can the state do when confronted not with papers but with life which
clearly shows its economic inefficiency? One thing only: to make recourse
to those domains of economy that are not yet corroded by statization.
322 CHAPTER 19
So it was done: the armaments production was transferred to the private
economy.
The large government orders for armaments resulted in the change of the
industrial type of production - already in 191687% of workers produced
for the front. The production of means of production increased twice and
more in comparison to 1913; light industry, instead, increased. The profits
of the capitalists were unimaginable. Here is an example. In eight steelworks
then under investigation which were working for the government, the profits
were as in Table X:
profits (in million roubles)
profits (in % of joint stock)
TABLE X
1913
23.2
25.8
1916
48.6
50.0
And in seven metal factories under contemporary investigation which were
working for the government the appropriate data are as in Table XI:
profits (in million roubles)
profits (in % of joint stock)
Source: Lyashchenko, vol. 2, p. 630.
TABLE XI
1913
2.6
13.5
1916
20.9
81.1
The necessity for transference of the main armament effort to private industry
resulted in golden rain not only for the capitalists but also for the bureaucrats
deciding in tens of committees where the state orders were to be directed.
Further results can be easily imagined. More and more new state institutions
for armament production, supplies to the front, cooperation, etc. came to
multiply and the old ones ramified. The class of rulers-owners increased in
numbers. But its significance increased as well. For the more a ruler "could"
do, due to his competences, the more expensive he was, and the more he had
to "have". To the usual motivation of the "nation's servants" - the enlarge-
ment of his control over the citizens - was added financial motivation; and
both worked in the same direction. That is why the competences particular
THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 323
committees (narads) ascribed to themselves increased even quicker than the
capitalists' profits did.
Four main committees were established composed of bureaucrats - in the
"prevailing number" - and of some "small number of especially invited"
representatives of industrial, trade and other organizations. Let us hear about
one of them, the so-called Special Committee for Defence:
The range of matters that were dealt with by the Special Committee for Defence was
extremely large and included precisely everything, all the problems connected to the
war, from concrete matters concerning orders and the army's equipment ... to the most
general state problems having only an indirect connexion with the war .. .
Since in the direction of the Committee ... the bureaucratic and military factors
were prevailing, all the decisions were worked out by special boards, and the Committee
only confirmed proposed solutions ....
In the organization of the Committee ... were included many preliminary, special,
executive and local (factories' etc.) boards. Besides there existed also particular boards
for ordering in America military equipment, records, allotment of currencies, ... etc.
(ibid., p. 597).
And this was only one of four main committees, whereas
Besides these main and highest governmental organs ... the state apparatus of the usual
ministeries multiplied itself more and more during the war in a number of special boards
regulating particular branches of industry (ibid., pp. 601/602).
In order to overcome the bureaucratization of the state armaments industry,
the state was forced to make recourse to private industry. But by doing
this so many new bureaucratic institutions were established that the in-
effectiveness soon came to threaten again. The war increased statization to
dimensions unknown before, even in this most socially developed (i.e. statized)
capitalist country. Hence, the country was soon to lose its capitalist character
altogether.
The Bourgeoisie's Reaction: Institutionalization
It was said in the preceding chapter that the internal structure of a domi-
nating system reflects itself in the internal structure of a subordinated one.
That is why the statization of capitalism in Russia resulted in the institu-
tionalization of industry and trade issuing from the capitalists themselves.
This leap of statization that took place during World War I had to lead to
deepening the process of institutionalization of the pure bourgeoisie.
And that was the case. Since the beginning of March 1915 the first chains
of the new "war" central state administration were created and at the end
324
CHAPTER 19
of May 1915 the project of the network of special social organizations
was advanced. They were called war-industrial committees. To the Central
War-Industrial Committee created on June 4, 1915, representatives of the
bourgeoisie and of the ministeries were included. Soon the number of local
war-industrial committees amounted to 200. Here are the tasks of these new
institutions:
War-industrial committees were to take up all the matters concerned with the trans-
ference of the industrial production for war needs and with mediating the realisation of
governmental orders that were passed to particular enterprisers .... the committees were
to take up mainly the heavy industry (L. Bazylov, The Overthrow of Tsarism (in Polish),
Warsaw 1977, p. 96).
Well, it was so after all that the state enlarged the central administration so
much in order to actually take up these matters - Yes, that is the point. And
there are two possibilities of explaining it.
It could be, as the historian cited says, that even the enlarged centralized
administration could not manage with the war effort. This is not surprising
to somebody who knows the effectiveness of any state's ,actions (acts aimed
at the subordination of citizens excluded). But there is also the other possi-
bility. Namely, the bourgeOisie was constantly bringing accusations against
too large governmental orders of foreign supplies, claiming it could satisfy
them better. This is not surprising: all bourgeois like to make as much money
as they can. This bourgeoisie, however, in the conditions of the statization
of social life, acquired an additional ability in itself: to appropriate profits,
it is necessary to cooperate with the state apparatus. Therefore, if so large
an amount of money, instead of being located in the Russian industry was
sent abroad, then this bourgeoisie knew perfectly what this means: simply
that the members of numerous committees deciding about the allocation of
state orders had their own profits from it. What was necessary, then, was to
take them away as much as possible. That implied the multiplication of
connections with them: which, in turn, implied that the best way would be to
establish a new network of joint organizations where the bourgeoisie's money
could meet the state's power making the exchange.
Which one of the two reasons was decisive, it is hard to say. Likely, both
of them played an equal part. The army was anxious about the ineffectiveness
of the enlarged state machinery; the bourgeoisie wanted to diminish foreign
orders. In sum, the idea of war-industrial committees was appreciated by the
government and private industry as well, and soon the whole of Russia was
covered with them.
THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 325
The war-industrial committees took care not only of the profits of the
bourgeoisie, but also undertook an integrative activity. After the outbreak
of the war the self-governmental organizations, the rural (zemstvas) and the
municipal (dumas), increased their activities, transforming themselves into
national hierarchies with central organizations at the head. Especially, the
Union of Zemstvas undertook an enormous amount in the field of front
supplies. And so, they bought clothes, footwear, medicines, arranged repair
shops, tailoring shops, etc. "This unlikely large activity" (Bazylov, ibid.,
p. 92) was conducted by the highly developed organization:
More and more new branches under the main committee residing in Moscow arose, and
the same in the region where the local activists were allowed to set up in case of need
committees even on the level lower than the district. . .. Not less than 8 thousand
different institutions were subordinated to the Union of Zemstvas alone; and several
hundreds of thousands of people were working in them. [All this led to 1 such a ramifica-
tion of the clerical bureaucracy it is a wonder that it was possible to keep any order
in this array. The Minsk Front Committee of the Union of Zemstva amounted, for
instance, to 17 divisions ... ; beside this separate sections were operating .... The same
committee gave work to SOO book-keepers (ibid., pp. 91, 94, 92).
Such was the organization that joint efforts with war-industrial committees
were held exchanging chiefs between authorities and after a time keeping a
common political platform.
When institutionalization starts there is no end to it. New institutions
attempted to coordinate a highly ramified co-operative movement amounting
to 38,100 co-operatives of different types (J. Ciepielewski, The Economic
History of the Soviet Union (in Polish), Warsaw 1977, p. 63). To do this, lots
of committees and boards were again established. War-industrial committees
also undertook attempts to establish the all-Russian peasant union. Prelimi-
nary work was aheady highly advanced when it turned out that first,however,
the Main Committee for Providing Food should be set up.
But what was the most surprising was the creation in this purely bureau-
cratic milieu of workers' groups. Such groups were attached to war-industrial
committees, and the all-Russian workers' assembly was planned, workers'
requirements (e.g. 8-hour working day, the protection of workers by special
labour stocks, etc.) were accepted by the bourgeoisie. The institutionalizing
bourgeoisie did not know the measure, neither organizational, nor the class.
For it was already not the same bourgeoisie that started its pursuit for
money in the middle of the 19th century, or earlier. The process of the
statization of the economy forced it to change the natural rules of economic
behaviour. There is no dollar without a good idea - the bourgeoisie in the
326 CHAPTER 19
West was learning; there is no rouble without good relations with the authori-
ties - that is what the bourgeoisie in Russia was taught. That is why the
process of the institutionalization of the bourgeoisie was a natural con-
sequence of the conditions of a highly bureaucratized Russian capitalism.
And as state structures in pursuit of the state form of surplus value were
intervening more and more in economic relations, so the bourgeoisie in the
pursuit of influences was incorporating itself more and more into organiza-
tional structures. The joint effect of both processes that took place since the
80's of the 19th century (see Chapter 18) - only being accelerated in war
conditions - was the following: the reduction of the purely authoritarian
stratum of the hierarchy of power and of the pure bourgeois stratum of the
old capitalists class to margins, to residuals of the state capitalism in the
newly arising (politically) totalitarian society.
For as a result of the war, acceleration of both processes - the statization
of the economy and the institutionalization of the bourgeoisie - one and the
same was done: the new double class of rulers-owners was rising, the ruling
class of the totalitarian society.
The Rise of the Double Class of Rulers-Owners
As long as the Marxian standpoint is accepted both the processes seem to
be incomprehenSible, and the Russia of 1915-1916 appears as a field of
unintelligible organizational activity of a mainly bureaucratic character, "too
often entirely fruitless", leading to a "monstrous network of all possible
committees, boards and divisions" (Bazylov, ibid., pp. 104,96).
When a commenting historian attempts to incorporate the co-operative
movement to war-industrial structures, saying "It is hard ... not to sigh
seeing then expressed the demand here also to multiply committees and
boards" (ibid., p. 103) then it may be seen that he attempts to understand
the phenomenon in categories inapplicable to it. For actually the point was to
multiply for multiplication'S sake!
Of course, this does not imply that "organizations spawn organizations".
If it so happens, then the only reason for this is that "organizers" get some-
thing from it: they may "have" more or "be able to do" more, or both.
One should not, however, ask them what they get from their organizational
activity, for they will answer that they get nothing except sufferings on the
altar of the motherland or such rubbish. It is only the people that is able to
experience high feelings on the mass scale. Disposers of all material means
are able at most to achieve high knowledge on this scale. It is also the old
THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 327
truthfulness of Marxism. And the whole sense of this book may be expressed
thus: this truth holds not only for direct producers and owners but also for
citizens and rulers; and particularly it holds for the people (direct producers-
citizens) and rulers-owners.
What, then, did the bourgeoisie get from the institutionalization? The
same that the state apparatus got from the statization of the economy -
money and power. The point is that for the bourgeoisie the second component
was becoming more and more self-sufficient, not instrumental; and the same
for the state apparatus, but from the converse. In this way both the processes
- that of statization from the top and that of institutionalization from the
bottom - were leading to the same result. Throughout the country a huge
organizational structure was rising, a state structure from above, a bourgeois
structure below. As the state apparatus was statizing the economic life, so
the bourgeoisie was becoming more and more organized. A unitary organiza-
tional structure was coming into being and more and more regions of social
practice were included in it. And, as with every structure of the kind, that
one was created and lasting because it gave the people what they aim most
at: money and power. The whole historical meaning of that structure in
European history consisted in the fact that it was giving both things at
once.
The Totalitarianization of Russian Society
It was not, however, such a novelty in Russian history. The counterpart
comes immediately to mind: the oprichnina. This is not a counterpart,
however: it is the same phenomenon consisting in the fusion of power and
property. The class of rulers-owners lost against the Russian people at the
beginning of the 17th century. But what remained was the state-owner
grouping a category of people who were disposing a large amount of produc-
tive forces of the Russian society only because they were disposing of the
repressive forces in it. It played a predominant role in Russian feudalism and
in transforming it into capitalism. In the conditions of capitalist economy
this heritage of state feudalism led to the enormous acceleration in forming
the class of rulers-owners. And the war statization of economy and the
institutionalization of the bourgeoisie completed the process: outside the
class of rulers-owners remained only purely authoritarian power and pure
bourgeoisie, both decreasing day by day.
There is only one significant different between the process under con-
sideration and oprichnina: the latter was unsuccessful.
328
CHAPTER 19
THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION: TOTALITARIANIZATION VIA
ELIMINATION OF PURELY AUTHORITARIAN POWER
The Position of the Tsar
The new social force was composed of the majority of the state apparatus
and of the institutionalized bourgeoisie. They were connected with each
other in multiple ways. The new social force in fact reigned over the country.
The tsar and his closest associates, the tsar's camarilla, became more and more
isolated from the usual power activity. People who every day made decisions
about what associations composed of factories spread over the whole Russia
were to be established, who took over the state's management of numerous
private factories, who effectively decided about the development or under-
development of great domains of economy allocating in some of them state
orders, etc., such people cannot think of themselves as really dependent upon
somebody who has nothing to do with all that. Of course, as long as they
kept official posts, they could not do anything openly anti. But if the formal
cloth of the system were to be adopted to the real state of the forces ....
The tsar lost the support even of such a weakened category of Russian
society as the landlords. The development of capitalism and the totalitarian
reforms of Stolypin (see Chapter 18 above) led to significant changes in the
agricultural method of production in Russia. From some Soviet researches
it follows that about 60% of landlords applied a capitalist method of produc-
tion, based on hired labour, about 20% of them applied the mixed system
and about 20% only the feudal method of production (see R. Wojna, The
Struggle for Land in Russia in 1917 (in Polish), Ossolineum, 1977, p. 27).
And so, the landlords became more and more capitalist allocating their capital
in the land and as such they had interests closer to capitalists than to the
traditional nobility. And the latter was the traditional basis for the purely
authoritarian power of the camarilla.
The camarilla were losing any social basis. Tsarism could be supported
from ideological motives - patriotism or nationalism, mental inertia, etc. -
but what were disappearing were the categories of people whose material
interests would somehow be dependent on the tsar's court. And those who
joined in their hands all the basic economic and organizational decisions,
who made all the remaining social categories more and more dependent on
themselves, those did not need the camarilla any more. It would have been
different if the tsar had used his position to become a modem ruler-owner
going in the flrst row of clerks capturing the economy. In that case he would
THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 329
have represented the new type of interests. But he could not, or he did not
want to, anyway - he became a superfluous anachronism. And also a useful
pretext for canalization of the increasing dissatisfaction of society.
The Social Disturbance as the Result of the Fusion of Power and Property
For in 1916 "The bureaucratic expansion of the incessant 'institutionaliza-
tion' reached not a zenith but - expressing this paradoxically - surely far
beyond the zenith" (Bazylov, ibid., p. 154).
However, if we remember the successes of the double class of rulers-
owners this trend is not paradoxical any more. On the contrary, it is quite
natural. As natural as are their consequences.
The more the economy was subordinated to the "state" or "social" in-
stitutions, the greater was the chaos. The efficiency of work decreased,
organizational troubles became sharper and sharper and soon the same
industry that at the beginning of the war managed to save Russia from the
threat of disaster began to brake its development.
In some domains the efficiency of work decreased in 1916 by 20% (e.g.,
in the mining of coal: see P. I. Kabanov, and N. D. Kuznetsov (eds.), The
History of the S.S.S.R, part 2, p. 415). The disorganization of the economy
inclined numerous capitalists to close their factories and the general number
of enterprises - despite the new ones created by the state - declined: in
1913, 13,485 of them were working; in 1915, 12,649 (the decline resulted
in part by the loss of the Polish lands); in 1916, 12,492; in 1917, 12,215
(Lyashchenko, vol. 2, p. 633). The state knew one means only to manage
with economic troubles .. more institutionalization of the economy. Here is a
description of the state activity as a remedy for crisis in the fuel industry:
Particularly harmful for the industry turned out, however, not so much the lack of fuel
in itself but the policy of its distribution. The establishment of the Special Committee
for Fuel and its policy of distribution among different categories of privileged ... and
of unprivileged ... consumers deepened the fuel crisis and led the country to a state of
acute shortage of fuel (ibid., p. 636).
And it was similar with everything else, since industry remained under state
management and "was taking everything out of the economic life of the
country - metal, fuel, financial means, workers" (ibid., p. 635).
The closer an industry was to the needs of the state, the further, then,
from the needs of the citizens, the better equipped it was in the economy
regulated by the state. The worst situation was, of course, in the food and
330
CHAPTER 19
light industries. And this, of course, was worsening the market supply which,
in turn, resulted in rising prices. Here is the global index of prices at the
beginning of a given year (1914 = 100); 1915 - 115; 1916 - 238; 1917-
702. In that period the price of food more than doubled (Lyashchenko,
vol. 2, pp. 647,649-650). The reaction of the state could be easily imagined:
a new office, the committee for the Struggle against Rising Prices, was
established:
It was the prime minister who was competent to confirm decisions of that office and he
was helped by some 'supervisors' possessing special powers: one of them was occupied
exclusively with sugar, another with skins, etc. Whole offices arose around it and in the
provinces it was aimed to create guberniyas and district committees for the struggle with
rising prices (Bazylov, The Overthrow of Tsarism, p. 154).
Of these institutions' ways of operating it is sufficient to say that the central
one polled the population in order to discover the causes of rising prices!
Russia was not only the fust totalitarian country in our civilization. It was
also the first country that was able to see the powerlessness of this system,
apparently as strong as iron.
Bureaucratic methods also affected the market directly. In April 1916
the central purchasing bureau of sugar forbade the selling of sugar in lumps
to private consumers. A historian comments on that as one of "numerous,
unreasonable and detailed prohibitions". But if they were numerous, enacted
by numerous committees of all kinds, then this requires a defmite answer:
which social category had the interest in "numerous, unreasonable and
detailed prohibitions"? Of course, only one: the people who were sitting in
the "monstrous network of all possible committees, boards and divisions",
that is, the class of rulers-owners. It consisted in making everyone dependent
on the network as far as possible. And the best way of doing this is to mani-
fest its presence and its power all the time. And the less it can be done
substantially, the more it can be acted upon formally. It is not substantial
absurdity which is deadly for the power, but absence that allows people to
act on their own responsibility and will. The prohibition of selling lump sugar
to private consumers, and numerous things of the same type, was only a
manifestation of the increasing appetites of a power which is able to control
economic life. It manifested to private producers the limits of their economic
autonomy (we are the people who tell you what you can sell, and to whom).
And it manifested the same to consumers (it is dependent on us that you can
buy; you can even have money but that is not everything - our permission is
indispensable at least to the same degree). The power has only one image.
THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 331
It is we ourselves who give it more faces, being later surprised that it shows
us the same face all the time! Then we call it "unreasonable".
The Peculiar Crisis
During 1916 Russian society underwent the effects of totalitarianism on a
large scale. At the end of 1916 a great crisis took place on the food market.
But it was a strange crisis, because it was a real one. To explain this let us
notice that, in 1913, grain production in Russia was 5.41 billion poods. In
the hunger year, 1916, it amounted to 4.43 billion poods, i.e. 82%. How did
such a decrease result in the hunger crisis in comparison to quite a good year,
1913?
What is more, in 1913, 648 million poods were exported; whereas, in 1916,
of 4.43 billion only 2.7 million poods were sent abroad. The difference
between the amount that remained in the country in 1913 and 1916 is,
then, much less: 4.762 billion and 4.403 billion poods (all the data after:
Lyashchenko, vol. 2, pp. 413, 639; J. Ciepielewski et al., World Economic
History till 1975, Warsaw 1977, p. 284). Such a difference is not so huge as
to lead from a well-off state to hunger!
But let us count further, the more so since the matter becomes ever more
mysterious. The population of the Russian Empire in 1913 was 170.9 million.
Assuming (counterfactually, but let us adopt it as it denies the hypothesis
I am aiming at) that in 1913-1916 the rate of natural growth was still 16.4
per 1000 inhabitants" we reach the number 179.4 million people for 1916.
Let us subtract, however, about 0.9 million killed up till the end of 1916.
We also have to subtract the number of inhabitants of the Polish lands that
Russia lost at the beginning of the war. From the expected number 179.4
million let us subtract 12.9 million obtaining 166.5 million people (as at the
end of 1916) that the tsarist Russia had to feed (data used in the calcula-
tions from Ciepielewski et aI., pp. 22, 23, 29). The fmal result is given in
Table XII:
Year
1913
1916 (the end)
TABLE XII
The population
170.9 min.
166.5 min.
The production of grain (poods)
4.762 mId.
4.513 mId.
332 CHAPTER 19
And so, in 1913 the amount the country had available to feed 1 inhabitant
was 27.864 poods of grain, while at the end of 19i6 the state (the purchase
of grain was then in the hands of the state centralized organs) had 27.268
poods of grain. The decrease would, then, be only 2.14%. And such a decrease
resulted at the end of 1916 in a "provisions disaster" (Lyashchenko, vol. 2,
p. 640), "economic crisis" (Ciepielewski et al., p. 89), "hunger" (Kabanov
and Kuznetsov (eds.), part 2, p. 417)!
The most interesting is, however, that the decline was, in fact, none. We
have evidently assumed in the previous calculations false assumptions about
the stability of the rate of natural growth during the war - in fact it was
much less. We have not subtracted all the inhabitants the National Committee
for Provisions lost from those it had to feed (e.g., those on the territory of
Lotva). Let us leave, however, the serious calculations to serious experts. It
is not a philosopher who is appointed to make them. If he must, that is only
since historians fIll their works with catastrophism. In more detailed works
whole pages are designed for presentation of the fact that before the war for
one household there was 1.3 of a man and in 1916, only 0.7; that 2.1 min.
horses had been mobilized; that the imports of agricultural machines declined
rapidly, etc. A reader overwhelmed with dozens of detailed facts of the same
kind somehow loses the most important one before his eyes: that despite
everything the amount of grain in 1916 was 82% of that of the rich year
1913. And a machine programmed in thinking is unable to calculate anything
but that for 1 inhabitant the amount of grain was iIi the hunger year 1916 the
same as in the rich 1913. That, in other words, objective (i.e. material, not
organizational) conditions of feeding had not changed during the war, or even
if they did, then much less than the number of mobilized horses shows.
However, what is the most surprising in this chaos was that the hunger was
real and terrible. No doubt as to that: numerous testimonies show the long
lines, standing all night, for bread, fuel, meat, and, of course, enormous
speculation. How was this possible?
Evidently, I am not able to answer such a detailed question. But the
"speculative historiosophy" built into this book (as it were from the expert's
point of view) allows me to advance some elements of such an explanation,
I suppose. They will be twofold - causal and functional.
As to the causes, the matter seems to be evident: the chaos and ineffec-
tiveness of the statized economy led to the rise in prices. There is no need to
repeat this, hence let us underline one new point: the chaotic organization
in transport. The decrease in production of locomotives, carriages, etc.,
together with a great increase in load, led to the attempt to reform transport.
THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 333
It consisted, of course, in creating a new bureaucratic institution, the Special
Committee for Transportation: this, however,
did not lead to an improvement but rather complicated matters by introducing some
privilege loads sent 'beyond the order' which often was ... used in speculative aims .
. . . Because of the lack of a general state plan a huge part of the load was transported
independently on the plan but for the bribe, instead loads that were really necessary
were lying on stations for months, being spoiled or stolen (Lyashchenko, vol. 2, p. 642).
As may be seen what was lacking was the general state of night watching for
goods not having a state priority of conveyance .... Troubles and chaos did
include priorities as well: in some months less than a half of the planned
number of carriages were sent to the front.
In short: the chaos and disarray were such as could only exist when state
activists begin to make economic decisions. It was the state that ruined
transportation as it did with other fields of economy.
The causal explanation does not say everything, one may suppose. Let us
consider several characteristic facts (Bazylov, pp. 157, 79).
A delegation of merchants of the Niznenovogrod guberniya asked the
prime minister to help them in buying grain. Already at the beginning of the
war, expectmg increasing business, they prepared a network of mills. Facing
troubles in train transporation they prepared 20 harbours on the Volga,
bought ships, found dockers etc. What was lacking was the grain itself. Their
organization was able to buy 10 mIn. poods but only 100 thousand poods
were they able to buy. The central authorities enacted the rule that the grain
could be bought only in far lying settlements, not on the railway stations,
and from there such huge amounts of grain could not be driven near the
Volga. As a result, there was a lack of grain in spite of the fully organized
private transportation, financial means, etc. It was at the end of October
1916 when in Petrograd the famine began.
Moscow needed 7.7 thousand carriages of meat a day. However,
there was nothing to drive it which had been anxiously said to the prime minister, and
the latter unsuccessfully was importuning the minister of communications for carriages.
And the minister answered quietly that neither live cattle nor meat can be brought
from Siberia or Mongolia, because the Trans-siberian Railroad brings more important
loads (Bazylov, p. 157).
And also those loads which are driven from Siberia do not have an easy
passage:
The grain from West Siberia rides then ... to Tchelabinsk in the Urals. In Tchelabinsk
it is unloaded from the carriages and is driven by horse transportation to Poletaevo
334 CHAPTER 19
station. ... In Poletaevo again to carriages and further in a westerly direction. ...
Poletaevo is a small station unprepared for such operations, not having enough empty
carriages that must be brought from the nearest station. It is ... Tchelabinsk. And so
from Tchelabinsk: carriages travel empty and the grain travels by horse transportation.
This can look like madness .... Meanwhile it was really so. The West of Siberia did
possess large resources of grain and the state bought here in 1914 much grain predicting
that after the war's breakthrough the price of grain would decline .... At the same
time it was forbidden for private persons to transport agricultural products further in a
westerly direction than Tchelabinsk. In 1915 it turned out that the price of grain did
not fall at all and in European Russia the harvest was unexpectedly high. There was no
need to buy grain in Siberia. They left that to private initiative - forgetting, however, to
annul the rule allowing grain to be brought from there only to the Urals. Hence it was
necessary to empty the carriages in Tchelabinsk. When the grain (transported by horses)
appeared in Poletaevo, however, the prohibition ceased to act and one could take it by
train ... anywhere one wanted (Bazylov, pp. 79-80).
All of these numerous facts can be explained by ineptitude or incompetence
- taken separately from each other. But if the ineptitude was so common
that it became a way in which the system worked? What percentage of
substantially senseless actions could be explained in such a way? 10%? 20%?
50%? At some point one should, however, ask in the Marxist way: whose
interests were served by such common ineptitude? Whose interests, then,
were hidden in the provisions chaos in Russia? Which social category took
advantage of it?
Not the masses, because they were suffering due to shortages. Not the
landlords or the capitalists as they were losing numerous opportunities to
make money. There remains only one, but the most powerful, social category
in Russia. In order to see why the famine in Russia resulting from chaos and
disorganization was advantageous for the rulers-owners, we have to look at
its acts on the purely political platform.
The Political Representation of the Class of Rulers-Owners
The two basic strata of the class of rulers-owners were related differently
towards the tsar's camarilla: the state bureaucrats were formally subordinated
to the tsar. That is why the weight of political representation of the rising
double class were to take "social bureaucrats" arising from the bourgeoisie.
The interests of the new class found its expression in the s o ~ l l e d progres-
sive block crossing the boundaries of some traditional political parties (e.g.
the left of the bourgeois party oktiabrists, nationalists and also many non-
party activists). Here is the program of the block:
THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 335
The program of the block began with the general statement that the country can be led
to victory only by power marked with force and inflexibility in action. Such qualities
can be possessed only by power based on the trust of society, only by that will one be
able to attract the citizens to active co-operation. The two fundamental conditions to be
met are that the state obtain the power and that the cooperation of society with the
state be real. Such a government must be established which would be able to undertake
- in cooperation with the legislative chambers - a definite program in a relatively short
time; decisive changes in the system of government are to occur, as the main property of
this system is the lack of trust to the social initiative (Bazylov, pp. 106-107; all italics
are mine - L.N.).
The historian interprets the program to the letter: as it is written that the aim
of the block was to avoid the catastrophe, then the point was to avoid the
catastrophe. Maybe such were the conscious aims set by the progressive
block. But why did it activize itself more the better the situation at the front
was?
Another easy explanation is that the struggle of the working class forced
the bourgeoisie to find remedial measures for itself: the weakening state was
losing control over the working class and ceased to guarantee the retention of
the system of class oppression of the bourgeoisie (or the landlords? - See the
last chapter). This explanation is entirely inadequate. The number of strikes
in the fIrst half of 1914 was seven times greater per month than in 1915 and
more than fIve times more workers were striking. And the relationship of
the number of political strikes and their participants is even worse for the
hypothesis under consideration: in an average month the number of political
strikes in the fIrst half of 1914 was 366 and in 1915 it was 17, and 151.2
compared with 12.9 thousand people (Kabanov, Kuznetsov (eds.), pp. 431,
372; S. Strumilin, Problems of the Economic History of Russia and the
S.S.S.R. (in RUSSian), Moscow 1966, p. 471). Why, then, did the progressive
block not arise when the class struggle was maximal but only when it rapidly
decreased? Why only in Autumn 1915 and not in Spring 1914?
Let us look at the program in the Marxist way, that is, posing on the
ground of interests what is posed in it upside down, and it will explain itself
- on the condition that the "ground of interests" must not be reduced to
economic interests, that "material" is not the same as "economic".
First of all, who is this "active citizen" manifesting "social initiative" but
endowed for this with the "lack of trust" in return? It is not, of course, a
peasant or a worker. It is not a pure capitalist busy with making money in
a town or in a village (as the modern landlord). It could be only one person:
an energetic organizer who under the slogan of the defence of the motherland
takes over and subordinates to the bureaucratic complex more and more new
336
CHAPTER 19
existing formal structures or multiples of original ones. The "lack of trust"
of the highest power in this citizen "full of initiative" is the "main feature"
of tsarism! The tsar would express confidence to the citizen, that is, to the
whole of society (characteristic: the rest of it can be omitted), if it is estab-
lished the government is representing his, the activist's, interests. And there
will be a strong and inflexible government when the concrete desiderata of
the block are met. Here they are (Bazylov, p. 107):
(a) to make "changes in the composition of local administration";
(b) to liquidate the "diarchy (military and civil) in matters not directly
connected with military operations";
(c) the "reasonable and consequent policy not allowing the conflicts
between dasses" .
Let us read them in the Marxist way:
(a') to send old tsarist state officials that did not learn to cooperate with
us for retirement and to replace them with our local activists;
(b') to separate military matters (under the tsar as the chief commander)
and civil ones; if military people will not disturb us, we shall manage in the
country;
(c') to establish new social divisions; we are ready to admit to power and
property everybody who will be cooperating with us helping to include
everything in the social life under the bureaucratic curtain; it may be a clerk,
bourgeois or worker; new criteria come to be essential - the criterion of pure
estate goes into the past.
The matter seems to be clear enough. Of the program of the progressive
block everything is seen: who is represented by it and who is the main obstade
for it. Something more is seen: the immense political (in the narrow sense)
naIvete of the new class. To ask the tsar to appoint a government directed
against himself! To count on the acceptance of the program destroying the
rest of the social forces upon which the camarilla was based! The class lacked
not only Lenin, but any great politicians at all. Its political development (in
the narrow sense) did not stand in any proportion to its position in the social
structure. That is why, it could not lead the February Revolution, but only
create the situation that led to it.
Was Nicholaus the Second Rational? The Case of Rasputin
The tsar was losing one position after another and the new class of rulers-
owners subordinated more and more of the substance of social life. It seems
THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 337
to be a convenient point of departure to explain the surprising policy the tsar
adopted in the last period before the revolution in February 1917.
In the historical literature it is emphasized, as something most surprising,
how politically blind the tsar was- in that he could not see any signs of the
coming disaster and, as he suffocated, did everything to speed up his own
decline. He did not look for any chances of a compromise with the progres-
sive block which was increasing in power, not attempting to fmd "new men"
the Duma could accept, but pressing it to accept his own candidates. And
there were many of them - the tsar in the last period changed one prime
minister after another. All of them belonged, however, to his camarilla. In
spite of what today's historians describe as the insignificant requirements of
the progressive block, the tsar did not make any concessions, even in the
situation which tested the lack of his self-preserving instinct. Why?
One of the current explanations is that the tsar was a weak man under-
going the influences of his wife and the latter was guided by Rasputin. He was
to be a person that supported the tsar in inflexibility, steering his personal
policy, and prompting the ambitions of the "absolute monarch".
The famous facts showing Rasputin's influence upon the tsar cannot be
denied. The point is, however, why did the tsar accept it? Why did a politician
who was not outstanding but nevertheless good enough to choose Witte or
Stolypin as implementers of state policy rapidly begin to be influenced by
a common rogue? Why, instead of outstanding collaborators, did he fmd
himself in the society of a dark, almost illiterate peasant from Siberia?
Let us notice that the political influence of Rasputin came in the first
months of 1916 (Bazylov, p. 244). And at that time the situation was clear
enough: the bureaucratic complex already dominated over the Empire. The
tsar had numerous reasons to be afraid of the requirements of the new class.
They were not so innocent as today's historians seem to suppose - we saw
that above. Maybe it was not accidental that the tsar nominated himself the
chief commander and came to Mohylev to be closer to his army. It was the
last force he could rely upon- after all it turned out later on that he was out
in his reckoning.
The tsar did not have to understand the social mechanisms behind what
he saw. It is sufficient that he saw the increasing political emptiness around
him. It is sufficient that only out-of-date politicians at the very top of the
hierarchy of power were submitted to him and that the circle narrowed more
and more. It is sufficient that he understood that he was not able to fmd an
energetic governor of the province - who would save the monarchy - simply
because he did not exist. For everybody belonged to some "committee",
338 CHAPTER 19
cooperated with a board, made great business deals, in short, was involved in
the network of relationships of which he himself, the tsar of All-Russia, was
entirely eliminated.
One must not assume too much of the tsar in explaining his increasing
political isolation and his reactions. At the moment when he understood that
no compromise was able to resist the increase of enemy power aU around, he
could only replace Goremykin with Stiirmer and the latter with Trepow,
because aU the new politicians would be even worse, opening aU the doors to
the pressure of the committees and eliminating aU that his reign was based
upon.
One may guess that he applied the "roundabout of reactionaries" not
because he was influenced by the illiterate man of Siberia, but on the con-
trary - being forced to a hopeless internal policy he attempted to fmd a
rationalization for it. And not being able to fmd arguments supporting it,
he looked for the opinion of the "saintly old man". The more the latter
demonstrated his contempt for human knowledge and political experience,
the better. For actually knowledge and experience told the tsar that the
remedies he was forced to make were useless. And from looking for irrational
justifications to being influenced by the "Friend's" advice is not too great a
distance. The irrational motive supported only the working of the rational
one: choosing bad alternatives rather than worse.
Whoever would have been in the place of Nicolaus the Second would have
done approximately the same. This place, the place of the purely authori-
tarian sovereign, was lost in the face of the increasing forces of totalitarianism.
At most, with another tsar, Rasputin's place would have been empty. But
that is without any Significance for the processes occurring in the Russia of
those days.
Who Took Advantage oj the Hunger in the Rich Country?
Here is the image of the situation at the end of 1916. For the process of
totalitarianization had already led - thanks to the war acceleration - to the
entire isolation of the purely authoritarian layer of the state apparatus: that
layer which did not understand that in modern times power must be based
on property not only on the okhrana. It happened, however, that the new
double class had an undecided and short-sighted political representation. A
better one would make the order with tsarism at once employing the actual
state of forces. An average member of that class was prepared for this: at aU
the meetings and conventions, there were plenty of voices testifying about
THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 339
the need for action and expectation for decisive steps. Here it is said that
tsarism does not give the guarantee for victory, somewhere else the govern-
ment is called the government of "favourites, jugglers and clowns", sharp
criticisms are directed against "dark forces" around the tsar, and so on. None
of this, however, transforms itself into any clear and uniform program of
political action. And the readiness to action is, fmally, only one thing an
average member of it can offer - the rest must be done by the political repre-
sentation of it. This one was below any criticism. Instead of new ideology was
an eclectic mixture of liberal and "state-building" ideas (both components
fully comprehensible if one remembers the two components of the double
class), instead of the program - mischievous criticisms against the government
and servile expressions towards the tsar, instead of actions - there was
begging for compromise. On the level of the material base the alloy of the
state apparatus and of the bourgeoisie was excellent, on the level of ideology
and politics (in the narrow sense) the eclectic mixture was unable to act
significantly.
And the tsar had to be dismissed as the okhrana and - rather nominally -
the army was under his command. Who was, then, able to overthrown him?
Of course, only the masses. And these were - as we remember from the
figures concerning strikes - rather sleepy at that time. One should awaken
them, then. For this, two means are the best: the whip and hunger. The first
was, however, in the hands of those whom the masses were to be directed
against. What remained was the latter.
How to evoke hunger in a country full of grain, however? Fortunately,
one need not evoke it at all. It was quite sufficient to admit it. The chaos and
disarray following the subordination of the economy to the new double-lords
was increasing day by day, and led - on the strength of purely causal connec-
tions - to the critical situation. And next, next it was sufficient not to
counter-act it energetically enough to have provisions troubles transformed
into hunger.
I am stressing once more what has really been said here. It is not said that
the hunger was consciously evoked by the double class: it was the effect of
its inefficiency that is implied by the fusion of power and property
everywhen and everywhere. But the hunger was not counteracted by it
efficiently enough, because it was advantageous for its interests.
The Revolution Itself
Of course, the strongest hunger was there where the biggest resources of food
340 CHAPTER 19
were gathered - in Petrograd. The wave of strikes grew in October and next
in January and February, February 14, a great strike took place of 90 thou-
sand Petrograd workers. But Duma with the "block-progressive" majority
was still itself - debates were going as nothing occurred. And in the second
legislative chamber - where the block also had strong support - the session
began with servile expressions directed to the tsar and the "urrah!" directed
there as well, and went phut.
Fortunately, somebody invented the idea to introduce ration-cards for
bread. On February 17, began the strike in the biggest factory of Petrograd
with strong requirements. Facing the lack of any answer the strike movement
spread all over the town factories. On February 25, the tsar personally
ordered the shooting of manifestants after three times warning. On the next
day the first people were killed and next, the army joined the manifestants
and together pursued the police, closed the prisons, burned the cmnmissariates
of the okhrana. The attempts to resist were weak and anaemic - even higher
military officers did not want to defend the All-Russian Tsar. Nobody sup-
ported the tsar's regime. The activity of the bureaucratic complex was effec-
tive. And everything stood the gaff on the tsar.
This could be claimed to be a masterpiece of political work: at first the
bureaucratic complex corroded the economy leading it to ruin; afterwards
the results of its own activity devolved on the tsar shining at the alleged top
of the hierarchy of power; the people's indignation increased, tsarism was
overthrown and new rulers-owners reached the highest nominal positions in
the state corresponding to the actual position of the class in life. However,
to be sure nobody planned this in such a way. The new class lacked any
serious political representation - those louts could not plan what was neces-
sary only because they actually turned out to be louts. They were full of
indisposition to take power even when it turned out that nobody supported
the tsar and the army joined the people in the streets. And still attempted
to establish the system of regency, etc. At last they decided to seize power
but did it without faith. The full name of the first semi-governmental insti-
tution appointed by the Duma testifies this best: "The committee of the
members of the State Duma for returning order to the capital and organizing
contacts with personalities and institutions".
Something of the timidity of this quasi-governmental institution remained
in the name of the first government: "The Provisional Government". It
does not make sense to suspect that the name shows a respect for the will
of the nation who would later defme their real representation in an elec-
tion. This name only showed the indisposition and the meanness of the
THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 341
quasi-politicians hidden by it. That is why it turned out to be self-fulfilling and
the government was, in fact, provisional.
What was the February Revolution?
What then, was the February Revolution? It was only the liquidation of the
purely authoritarian layer of the apparatus of power. It did not have any
greater social significance being only a dot above the i. The letter itself was
writing the social development under state capitalism during some tens of
years. It is strange - less as for the social process of this kind - that the
countries of the West arrive at that level of development only today. But
let us remember about the totalitarian anomaly shaking Russia for almost
three centuries, and about two centuries of state feudalism later on. This
historical heritage caused the state in the conditions of state capitalism to
force centralization, and institutionalization changed itself into an accelerator.
And pushed Russia rapidly through capitalism; the Western countries pass
and pass for centuries.
CHAPTER 20
TOT ALITARIAN SOCIETY IN RUSSIA: MARCH-OCTOBER
1917
The Two Interpretations of the Period February-October
The two basic interpretations of the period February-October 1917 have
been in conflict for generations. According to the bolshevik interpretation
the Provisional Government expressed the interests of the bourgeoisie,
including the petty one - in this way the share of the socialist parties in its
working can be "explained". According to the social-democratic interpre-
tation it was a transitory period when, however, the socialist parties were
playing more and more of a significant role in making the policy of the
partial changes that after a longer time inevitably would lead to .ocialism,
if the brutal bolshevik breakthrough would not disturb that. The thesis of
this chapter is that both interpretations are entirely false.
The Class of Rulers-Owners Fights with the Pure Bourgeoisie
How would the class of rulers-owners behave after seizing all the posts within
the hierarchy of power? Of course, to strengthen themselves. That is, to
complete the process of the fusion of property and power, which implies
the elimination of the pure bourgeoisie independent of the state structures.
And, in fact, the struggle of the state with the bourgeoisie is one of the
fundamental tendencies one may observe in the period February-October.
Of course, such a thesis cannot meet a strong resistance on the part of
all those who believed in Lenin's view about the bourgeois nature of the
Provisional Government so old that they certainly forgot whether they
tested it on historical materials at all. The best way will be, then, to falsify
Lenin's thesis by using the material they expose in their writings. They -
today's Marxist historians of the socialist countries - surely do not look
for data falsifying any of Lenin's theses. It would be hard to charge them
in the way favoured most by all demagogues of the world: that they disturb
facts to the idea assumed in advance.
Let us look, then, in what way this "Provisional Government, bourgeois
of its very nature" (Lyashchenko, vol. 2, p. 660) solved its problems.
One of the bases of the economic policy of the Provisional Government
342
MARCH-OCTOBER 1917
343
was monopolizing the sale of commodities and establishing the rigid price
for them. And so the state monopoly was introduced not only for food com-
modities (see below) but also for coal, oil, wood, metal goods, textures, skins,
sugar, tobacco and others. (The information is taken from Lyashchenko,
vol. 2, but the author does not give it at one place: the commodities under
the state monopoly are mentioned in different places and in different con-
texts). And, in general, the "principles of the ... (state -L. N.) monopoly
were intended to include other important commodities and organs of
the country's supply" (ibid., p. 667). Well, it is a rather .strange policy as
for a government "bourgeois of its very nature". Its result was that every
commodity included in the state monopoly disappeared from the market.
Examples may be found in the same work. Here is a typical one: "After
establishing the monopoly for fuel, the supply of the industry in fuel did
not improve" (ibid., p. 667). The explanation is contained in the following
statement: "The great bourgeoisie sabotaged all the actions that were disad-
vantageous for it" (ibid., p. 667). A reader who knows the Leninist doctrine
of the bourgeois nature of the Provisional Government must be surprised:
is it possible that the state monopoly for fuel is disadvantagous for the
bourgeoisie? And even more: for the great one? Let us check this once more
looking for a more detailed explanation. Here it is:
In reality the cause of the disastrous state of supply of the industry in metals, pit-coal,
rock-oil was not in the diminishing production but in the sabotage on the part of the
industrial capitalists who were hiding the resources, did not want to sell their production
at the official prices, were demanding the increase of prices, etc. (ibid., p. 673).
And all this concerned not one single commodity for a single period of time,
but the great and increasing number of commodities for all time. How is it
possible that capitalists hide commodities from their own, capitalist, state?
A mistake is, however, excluded. All this is there really said. And also
the following: "The monopoly and the stable prices of industrial commodities
met the impetuous opposition on the part of the capitalists, who also did
not want to sell their commodities but were keeping them in repositories"
(ibid., p. 670). And many other statements of the kind. Let us say things in
plain words: the statements concern the anti-bourgeois economic policy of
the ... "bourgeois government". This is revealed, sometimes unintentionally,
by the work of Soviet authors:
the main cause of their (texture products' - L. N.) disappearance was deliberate storing
of the cotton and textiles by banks, monopolies and trade firs in their repositories;
344
CHAPTER 20
in this way they intended to reach higher prices that was to be a peculiar protest against
regulation by the state relations in the textile industry (A. Frayman (ed.), The Year
1917 in Petrograd (the Polish translation from the Russian), Warsaw 1977, p. 365,
my italics -" L. N .).
Weil, it is a rather typical way of behaviour as for capitalists. What is not only
un typical but even most surprising is the described way of behaviour of
the alleged "capitalist government" (Frayman (ed.), ibid., p. 95). It is not, let
us notice, so that somewhen and somewhere the government made a conflict
with such and such enterpriser or a group of them. Facts of the type can be
explained by the usual arguments - that state to "a measure" represents also
the "general interests" of society at large, that "temporal" conflicts with
some parts of the bourgeoisie and their state are "admissible" etc. In this case
these quibbles are useless- we have to do both with particular facts and with
tendencies overwhelming the whole economy. And it was only the weakness
of the Provisional Government resulting in the internal chaos that restrained
it from introducing the general state monopoly for everything. And for ever.
When one reads numerous statements of the kind as quoted above in
Soviet writings, a particular tone may be noted. For their authors generally
- usually at the beginning and at the end - accused the Provisional Govern-
ment of being a bourgeois one. In the middle, however, they look at it not
without a special interest and, one might say, not without the cheers of a
benevolent supporter. And a benevolent supporter applauds when his team
is attacking: "It is an understandable thing that the supply of the popUlation
in products ... could not have been arranged on strong bases without the
state monopoly and stable prices on all the products" (Lyashchenko, vol. 2,
p. 670); but he also censures when the team breaks down the attack: "An
attempt to introduce the skin monopoly by the Provisional Government
failed and they dared even to think of the regulation of the distribution
of ready products" (Frayman (ed.), p. 367). It looks like the "supporters"
feel very well what was done truly and if they have something against, then
they declare something different. Namely, that the interrevolutionary state
was too weak in its attacks against big business. But they have this against
"theirs" not against the "bourgeois" state. It is senseless to say something
against the bourgeois state that took from the capitalists only the distribution
of the skins leaving them the distribution of the boots. It is sensible to have
this against the yes, it is - socialist state. Of course, such a state includes
the disposal over the economy to the attributes of the power and the control
over a raw material without controlling the appropriate product is, in fact,
incomplete and, as such, blameworthy.
MARCH-OCTOBER 1917 345
In fact, it was the state that joined disposal over the repressive and pro-
ductive forces and did everything to complete the fusion. Nothing simpler
than to multiply the facts for supporting the thesis.
The state doubled the income-tax from the possessing classes, increased
the tax of the growth of income of industrial and trade enterprises, intro-
duced the single tribute from the possessing classes. The Soviet historians
are commenting: "The financial oligarchy of Russia revealed then its real
face ... At the head of the campaign against the new acts stood the group
of the biggest imperialist sharks - the banks' monopolies" (Frayman (ed.),
p. 373). And, in fact, the further course of events revealed that the "sharks"
irritated the "bourgeois" government terribly. They already had strong
trumps in their hands - the serious liabilities of the- till recent times -
richest state apparatus of the world. The huge costs of the war (the war
with Japan cost Russia 2.2 mIn. roubles a day; whereas World War I in 1917
cost 55.6 mIn. a day cf. G. Shygalin, War Economics in World War 1.
1914-1918 (in Russian), Moscow 1961, p. 301) forced the state to borrow
a lot of money: September 1917 the sum of loans was 42.5 mId. rb. including
7.68 mId. abroad netto. This is why, "sharks" were able to take revenge
against the state, paralysing its actions directed against them. And so, in
order to finance the grain monopoly, the Provisional Government raised a
loan in private banks for 1.5 mId. rb. After a time, the consortium lowered
the quota to 400 mIn. and afterwards paid nothing as before. The govern-
ment made the concessions and the consortium again promised to pay but
only 275 mIn. rb. Till the end of its existence the Provisional Government
did not obtain a single kopeck of the promised money, however.
After four months of pressure of this kind the Provisional Government
was forced to weaken its tax acts directed against the bourgeOisie. In October
it diminished the tax maximum of 90% to 50%, passed the payment of the
single tribute of the bourgeoisie to the end of 1918, etc.
In the writings by Soviet historians a loud laugh begins to sound in this
place. And it should not. The authors should check with great gravity whether
they did everything in order to test Lenin's thesis that "The policy of the
Provisional Government in the domain of industry decided in favour of the
bourgeoisie" (Lyashchenko, vol. 2, p. 672). Or, rather, whether they did
anything. Saying about one of the two sides leading an economic war that
it expresses the interests of the other - only because it turns out to be too
weak to execute its decisions directed against the other side - is not worth
any serious discussion. Such is actually the Bolshevik interpretation of the
period February-October.
346
CHAPTER 20
The "Diarchy". Why the Double Qass of Rulers-Owners Had to Fight against
the Citizens
The social-democratic interpretation of the period in question is no better.
Why would the class of rulers-owners yield privilege to a grey citizen before
a gold one? To be sure, all the (politically) totalitarian systems attack at
first the citizens-owners as the strongest of all citizens. In that case one could
also expect that at first the (pure) bourgeoisie will be attacked and later on
the ordinary citizens.
This, however, was impossible. The class of rulers-owners had to pay very
heavily for the indisposition of their leaders. At that time when they were
sitting in Taurid Palace unable to form a new government and seize power
without hiding themselves for the three hundred years of the Romanovs
tradition, the masses began to organize themselves. In the same Taurid
Palace the Soviet of Worker and Soldier Delegates was set up, and soon
numerous local soviets started to operate. The system of factual diarchy
was beginning. Formally, however, the central soviet dominated by the
socialist parties' activists passed the power to the government keeping only
a controlling function in its hands. It was guiding itself by the doctrine that
Russia is too underdeveloped to bring socialist revolution forward and that
it is the bourgeoisie that is the only leading force of the historical events
in the Russia of those days.
But the masses are not the makers of doctrine and they were demanding
a lot: an 8-hour labour day, the increase of payments, the stopping of chaos
by the people's control, etc. The local soviets in the first period after the
February Revolution gained some range of the actual power.
In spite of the amicability of the socialist leaders, who saw the world in
Marxian categories, some danger appeared for the alleged "bourgeoisie".
The continuation of the diarchy, of the existence of a double institutional
structure of power, threatened that in the masses people will awake that will
execute their rights, not looking for the stand of their alleged leaders, being
more connected with their Marxian sacred writings than with reality. As H.
Arendt puts it, the system of local soviets was the result of the people's (and
not only the working class's) initiative looking for a proper form of satisfac-
tion of its will outside any political parties.
That is why the class of rulers-owners had to do its best to suppress the
system of soviets even if its main task, to entirely seize control over the private
economy, was not yet completed. That is why, from the very beginning the
double class fought both against the bourgeoisie and the people.
MARCH-OCTOBER 1917
347
Tfte Class of Rulers-owners Fought with the Town People
The double class of ruler-owners has two measures for suppressing the
people's activity: repression and hunger. The first was inapplicable in the
then external (war!) and internal (democratic atmosphere of the revolution)
situation. What remained was the second.
After the excellent harvest of 1916 the objective possibilities of feeding
the population were even better in the Spring 1917 than in the Spring of
1916. The effectiveness of the agricultural production increased as is shown
in Table XIII:
Rye
Wheat
TABLE III
An Average Harvest in five years before
the World War I (in poods of desyatina)
53.9
62.3
Source: Lyashchenko, vol. 2, p. 669.
The grain surpluses in 1917 were significant:
Harvest 1916
60.1
71.7
In Siberia the remnants of the harvests of previous years were assessed at least at 145-
150 min. poods. The North Caucasus had huge grain surpluses, about 105 min. poods;
the Cuban region alone could sate the two capitals with grain and also the starving
guberniyas. In the Ukhraine the grain surpluses reached about 300 min. poods.
In general the grain surpluses in the guberniyas producing the grain were assessed in
1917 at more than 600 min. poods, whereas the demand for the grain in the guberniyas
with insufficient harvest ... was about 180 min. poods (Lyashchenko, vol. 2, p. 669).
Let us remember this appraisement by the Soviet historian, for hunger will
become a constant element of the social situation of this country also when
it exchanges democratic banners for red ones. In the name of the latter our
historian reprimands the inter-revolutionary state:
However, those surpluses were amassed in the granaries of the kulaks, merchants, specu-
lators, landlords expecting a rise in prices and refusing to sell at the official prices. And
the government did not want to apply resolute measures to the landlords, merchants and
kulaks. (Lyashchenko, vol. 2, pp. 669-70).
What does a government do which wants to feed its citizens and the
country's granaries are full of grain while the prices are too low for the
348
CHAPTER 20
possessors of it. This is the question A. Ulam poses in the situation ten years
later. And his answer is: every school-boy knows the proper remedy - to
raise the price of grain for its possessors. I do not see any reason why this
answer, proper to Stalin's government, could not be' applied to that of Lvov
or Kerenski.
What does a government do which wants to keep its citizens in poverty
in order to make impossible any social activity in the diarchic structure
of power competing with it itself? Firstly, it avoids raising the price of
grain, so keeping the grain resources in the granaries. Secondly, it takes
the whole grain trade over in order to exclude any spontaneous outflow of
the grain from the rich countryside to the starving towns.
Several days after the new double class seized power, the new All-State
Provisions Committee was set up. In two weeks the act of the state monopoly
of grain was enacted. Its basic rule said that all the grain must undergo the
state's record and all the grain transactions can be done only with the media-
tion of the state's provisions organs. Every possessor of grain was obliged to
give all information to the organs, based on which a definite amount of the
grain was left to him and all the rest he was obliged to hand over to the
provisions organs at the defined prices and in definite terms. Of course, the
"prices were established much below the market level" (ibid, p. 668). In this
way the possessors of the grain were strong enough and did not surrender to
the decisions of the ramified provisions apparatus (for -- of course - "intro-
ducing the state monopoly implied the rise of a dense network of local organs:
plenipotentiaries, inspectors, instructors, even agitators" (ibid., p. 668)), and
the grain remained in private granaries. Instead, the state was strong enough
to realise its own decisions, the grain remained in the state granaries.
This situation may seem awful. But this is only on the assumption that
a democratic government takes care of its citizens, that is, on the purely
idealist assumption which makes social processes dependent upon the con-
sciousness of the leaders, not upon the interests they represent. If we see,
however, in these people of truly democratic convictions the representatives
of the huge, ramified and ever-increasing bureaucratic machine; if we under-
stand that the system of the soviets, especially local ones, was a real danger
for this machine; if we understand that the people were dependent not on
those who listened to their democratic (and later on Socialist) slogans but
on the masses of clerks controlling more and more of social life - then we
reach the conviction that there is nothing surprising in hunger in a country
full of grain. For it testifies to the fact that democratic ideals, as all ideals,
are weaker than totalitarian interests.
MARCH-OCTOBER 1917
349
The provlSlons policy was directed against the townspeople, that is,
against the workers: already in April 1917, in order to buy bread with ration-
cards in the morning, people in Petrograd had to wait in queues the preceding
evening. It was disadvantageous also for the bourgeoisie, not allowing it
to make money. And also, for obvious reasons, it was harmful for landlords
and the peasantry.
Whom was it serving? The one social category alone - the double class
of rulers-owners which applied hunger in order to subordinate the masses
to the state apparatus: masses tired with looking for the means of subsistence
- fuel, clothes, boots, etc. - were unable to display such social initiative
as to become a real threat - in the soviets - for the bureaucratic machinery
of the rulers-owners.
Remarks on Social-Democratic Illusions
Of course, such a thesis must meet strong resistance on the part of all the
supporters of the social-democratic tradition that look today at the stretch
of eight months between February and October as at the lost heaven. So
many times one can hear a sigh: if those Bolsheviks had only given the
socialists a chance . . . ' But had they done so, the result would have been
approximately the same - history does not depend especially on the clothes
in which its real shape is dressed.
Nonetheless, let us consider the alternative interpretations of the period
in question, at least in respect of the intentions hidden in these illusions.
And so, the first counter-argument: in the case of provisions troubles
the state always takes provision for the country in its hands. No doubt.
The point is, however, why? In order to solve the problems or in order to
take one step further in making the citizens dependent on itself! For the
provisions troubles are for the state the same as newly discovered resources
of raw materials for the capitalists. Why do we all agree that when the
capitalists find new oil, they arrange the exploitation to increase their own
income, but when there occurs a hunger in society, then the state establishes
a new institutional structure and, in the strained atmosphere, uses "extra-
ordinary means" in order to lighten the load of the citizens? Undoubtedly,
sometimes it is so. But it is easy to define when it is so. Namely, if there
is a group of citizens which is powerful enough to take the state illusion
away that it is able to increase its sphere of regulation in the conditions of
hunger. England, with its imports of food, had much worse conditions of
feeding than Russia during World War I. In spite of this the state paid the
350 CHAPTER 20
producers of the food special subsidies, keeping the so-called guaranteed
prices in order both that the consumer could buy food for low prices and
that the producers would be interested in selling it. It is not so that such is
the way of behaviour of the good, democratic state. Such is the way of
behaviour of the state that is not left to itself being, instead, dependent upon
the class of great owners. The state which is a great owner itself, and wants
to be even the greater for the exclusive one, behaves in such a manner as the
Russian state directed between February and October by sincere democrats.
It was not the difference in the political convictions of the leaders of England
and Russia which decided the differences in policy, but the real, material
difference of the social positions of the state civil servants.
Another counter-argument recalls the impossibilities. One of the most
often quoted is the impossibility of transportation. Maybe the disorganization
of transport was responsible for the hunger situation in the country?
First of all, not in the country, but in the towns. And the gradation
of the famine was really a simple one: the greater the significance a town
possessed, the greater the hunger its inhabitants had to suffer. At the top
was, of course, Petrograd. Let us look, then, at the "argument from trans-
portation" taking Petrograd as an example.
Before the revolution the capital ate 37.6 mIn. poods of grain a year
which required about 95 carriages of supplies a day (calculated on the basis
of data given by Lyashchenko, vol. 2, p. 670). In 1916 the traffic of carriages
in all the Russian trackage was 91.5 thousands of carriages a day (ibid.,
p. 641). In order to get food to Petrograd it was sufficient to use 0.1 % of
the resources the Russian railways had at their disposal. And for the supply
of food to the country the waterways could also be used - as we remember,
the organization of merchants alone arranged transportation through the
Volga of 10 million po ods - if they were allowed to act. Instead of making
more and more new far-reaching bureaucratic organizations, the state could
have simply left the supply of food to private production and trade: in that
case, success would be sure. But the state - independently of the intentions
of the people at the top and their rationalizations - had no interest in such
a success. The material interest of the class of rulers-owners consisted in
keeping the masses far away from the soviet institutions in order to subor-
dinate them to the official state bureaucracy. And the best way for this
was the simplest: let the people be hungry both physically and socially;
let them be busy with running for everything - bread, coal, oil, clothes,
... The hungry masses could not display such a quantum of social initiative
as to become a real threat to the centralized civil servant hierarchy.
MARCH-OCTOBER 1917
351
The Class of Rulers-Owners Fights with the Rural People
Which is the optimum strategy for the double class already engaged in the
struggle with both classes of the town sub-society, that is, with the bour-
geoisie and the town people? Of course, temporarily to maintain relations
in the countryside. And such was the fundamental policy of the interre-
volutionary state in agriculture: to keep the supremacy of the landlords
over the peasantry; every other solution would imply disturbances in the
countryside.
That is why the Provisional Government shifted the land reform, applying
the most typical diplomatic arguments that were in the Bolshevik press
defmed as subterfuges. And rightly. The Government was able to edit the
law of the punishment for taking the landlords' lands over already on March
9 (here and following, the old style is used until February 1918). But it
was only on 21 April that the net of committees (of course!) was ready to
be set up, preparing materials for the future reform that was planned by
the future National Assembly, as for which it was known that the election
would be held, but nobody knew when ...
In the meanwhile any changes in the social relations in the countryside
were strictly forbidden. And not only spontaneous acts of peasants, seizing
the landlord's land, but also official acts of peasant organizations aiming at
support of the changes in the status quo, were annulled by the state. Even
the control of the agricultural committees over the payments for hire con-
tracts was forbidden (R. Wojna, ibid., pp. 159ff., 134ff.).
The policy of the state was clear in spite of all the declarations: to secure
the private property in agriculture. And nothing may be more convincing
as to the real nature of that policy than sending the army against peasant
attempts to seize the landlords' estates (see Table XIV).
The Period in 1917
March-June
july-August
September.()ctober
Source: Wojna, p. 226.
TABLE XIV
The number of cases of the use of the army
17
39
105
352
CHAPTER 20
And in Autumn of 1917 the minister of internal affairs stated in his letter to
the minister of war that the situation in the countryside required the setting
up of special squads of the cavalry in the key points of all the guberniyas to
suppress agrarian movements (ibid., p. 216). The war with the nation was
ready a long time before Stalin. Let us not believe that such a war was neces-
sary for the future National Assembly to solve the problem of the land in
a proper form ... No, it was not a society of the people.
It was not a society of the people, nor of the possessing classes. Both
interpretations, social-democratic and bolshevik, entirely fail. For they
both assume the same alternative of Marxian origin: either the Provisional
Government expressed the people's interests or the interests of the bour-
geoisie. But this mood of thinking is based on old-style reasoning, not seeing
that in Russia at the beginning of this century the question "how much has
one and where from?" lost its significance in favour of the question: "how
much can one and why?".
The Class of Rulers-Owners Enlarges Its Social Basis
Nothing, however, shows so distinctly the inadequacy of the Marxian ap-
proach to Russian society as the domain of politics in the proper sense of
the term. If the February Revolution was a bourgeois one as bolsheviks
and social-democrats commonly state, then one would expect that the
bourgeoisie ~ aiming at reaching a political position appropriate to the
economic one ~ . . will make deep changes in the apparatus of power. Mean-
while, all the institutions ~ with some quite unimportant exceptions - were
kept without any changes. And this is actually what should be expected on
the basis of our hypothesis: that it was the double class of rulers-owners
who profited from the Revolution, in the name of which the masses shook
out the out-of-date top echelon of the system.
The point was, as has already been said, for the apparatus to include the
spontaneously created system of the soviets. By the policy of poverty the
double class weakened the masses and deprived them of their initiative. It
was the first half of the task. The second one can be easily imagined. As
the system of soviets had been cut off, the masses, the worker and peasant
activists sitting in the soviets, were to be included in the overwhelming
bureaucratic structure. Of course, this concerned Menshevik and Social
Revolutionaries ~ the influence of the Bolsheviks in the soviets was insignifi-
cant in the Spring of 1917.
Including soviet activists in the bureaucratic structures soon led to the
MARCH-OCTOBER 1917 353
share in the Provisional Government itself not to mention all the middle posts
for middle - but decisive - masses of activists. The cells of the enormously
ramified bureaucratic network absorbed activists of the socialist parties.
Coming to the ready, already formed for tens of years, a typical activist
could do only one thing: adapt himself. A Social Revolutionary fighting for
many years for the idea of the socialization of agriculture, and coming into
the established bureaucratic apparatus, could only adopt the policy clearly
directed against the peasant poor or brake the party's stand and lose the
post. Usually he was choosing something that seemed to him a third solution
- the belief in the governmental declarations recalling the decisions of the
future National Assembly. It was, however, the first solution plus self-illusion.
Not only the system of soviets had been incorporated factually to the
super-structure of rulers-owners, but also all the institutions that arose spon-
taneously, especially in the countryside. After February numerous citizens'
committees started to work there: people's, public security's, revolutionary's,
etc. etc. All of them had, however, the two properties extremely dangerous
from the standpoint of the double class: they were independent of it and
possessed the authentic support of the masses. They called people's assem-
blies, fulfilled their decisions, setting up citizens' militia, etc.: that is, they
represented some range of actual power. They had to be annihilated, then.
The first step was their unification. Already on March 19, the Government
set up the unitary hierarchical network of peasant committees. As the lowest
level, in fact, people elected by the peasantry gathered, as the higher they
were, the less they had in common with this social category; on the level of
the guberniya, a decisive impact was made on the war-industrial committees,
and zemstvas. The next step consisted in the subordination of the whole
hierarchy of organs ruling the countryside to the central authorities. In the
law of April I, the guberniya commissar was defined as the "only bearer
of the power of government in the guberniya"; and in a district, the district
commissar. A district commissar is nominated by the central government
from the persons nominated by the guberniya commissar or the district
committee. The former may also nominate deputies of the district commissar
and call on the central authorities to dismiss him.
The bureaucratic system was absorbing the autonomous institutional
structure of the countryside as it did with the system of the soviets (though
by different means). And when it turned out that the lowest chains of
this administration, elected by the peasants themselves, were not sub-
ordinated to the agricultural policy of the government, the central author-
ities began to arrest their members. In this way, coercion complemented
354
CHAPTER 20
the bureaucratic measure to include all that was a result of the people's
social initiative.
The Totalitarian System in Socialist Colours
The bureaucratisation of the apparatus of socialist parties had to change
their social program. It is seen most clearly in the example of the agricultural
program of the Social Revolutionaries. They defend the idea of the socialisa-
tion of land: the land belongs to nobody and the right to use it gives the
work on it alone; especially, the land cannot be "nationalised", i.e., statised
- in the hands of the state the natural resources can remain; the spontaneous
struggle of the peasantry against the landlords is right, and seizing the land
without any formal basis should be supported as well.
Such a program is a rather bad basis for the party whose cadres join
the state apparatus. It is not surprising that it had been re-interpreted. W.
Tchernov, the leader of the SR's states spoke already on May 21 as the Minister
of Agriculture: "Before, it was the slogan of the fight against landlords that
joined us. At present this watchword is changed by the new principle - that
of the active and creative order". That is why the nearest task of the party is
"intensive organizational activity", of course, in the framework of govern-
mental organs -- "starting from the agricultural committees, rural, district,
guberniyas up to the central, Main Agricultural Committee" (quoted after
Wojna, p. 66-7).
The change of the program was a necessary result of the bureaucratization
of the party. The idea of the struggle with the landlord is not a good platform
for cooperation with "paper comrades" of the offices belonging to the
hierarchy, whose interest requires the neutralization of the countryside.
Much better is the "principle of active and creative order", the more so
if it is to be embodied in life, not in the actual social life but within the
bureaucratic world. Those who could not adopt it came to the Left of the
SR's.
In this way the Socialist ideology was so reinterpreted as to make totali-
tarian activity possible - the control over both the political and economic
practice of society. It is not socialist activity - the production of conscious-
ness is still entirely free. But anyway it is a march in this direction. And the
Socialist ideology is not an obstacle to it.
There was no social force in Russia in 1917 that was able to change
the basic organizational principle of the new society - that of the fusion
of power and property. This does not imply that the people who in 1917
MARCH-OCTOBER 1917
355
were occupying those positions were not to be eliminated. The stability of
the social structure is something different from the durability of people
mling it. The change of the personal composition of the ruling class does
not imply the change of the social system - if the social relationships are
preserved. The latter depends, in turn, on the level of social development
defined by the manner of union of material means and human interests.
By no means does it depend upon the subjective intentions or views or
ideologies of the acting people themselves. Every Marxist should understand
this. That is why every Marxist should understand that the October Revolu-
tion did not possess in the history of Russia any greater significance than
the change of one king for another in the history of any kingdom.
CHAPTER 21
THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION WAS NOT A SOCIAL
REVOLUTION AT ALL. IT WAS INSTEAD THE RESULT
OF ANTI-TOT ALIT ARIAN PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS
The Point of Departure: The Clouds of Ideology
In a more handbooklike treatment than that aimed at by the present author,
this chapter, devoted to the October Revolution, could be entirely omitted.
More powerful forces than Bolshevism brought about socialism. If one wanted
to fmd the crucial point leading to socialism, then it would rather be the
February Revolution. It, or rather the social process of which it was the
ending, enabled Russia to come back to Ivan the Sinister's path. This time
Russia came onto this path effectively and even surpassed the perspectives
shown several centuries previously by the oprichnina: the modem oprichniki
seized not only offices and factories but also the mass media.
The role of the October Revolution in the historical process is, however,
exactly none in spite of the myths spread both by the Bolsheviks and the
anti-Bolsheviks. It enabled the march to go on in the same direction under
other ideological banners. And that is all. For a Marxist who rejects Marx's
faults, the October Revolution does not exist - for him there is no signif-
icance in the changes of the colour of the banners if the march goes on
in the same direction and by the same rank and me.
If I would like to give some place to the October Revolution in this work,
it is only because there is, I think, no historical event that is so defonned and
mystified in modern consciousness. And not only in the socialist countries.
When sovietologists accuse the Bolsheviks of being guilty of all the things
that happened in m9dern Russia's history, they are no less prisoners of the
official ideology than the communists themselves. The ideology is not so
coarse and naive as it seems to common-sense in both parts of the world.
The ideology tells us something different from what it declares. The surface
level of that ideology, the declaration that with the October Revolution
the heavenly era begins in the Earth, is not of any importance for socialism
and its lords. What matters is what is hidden in it: the idea that with the
October Revolution the new socio-econornic formation begins; and it is
not so important whether it is good, or bad. The October Revolution begins
the new socio-economic formation; next after capitalism; it is a turning
point in history - that is what is ideologically really important. That is why
356
THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION 357
a sovietologist who begins humanitarian regrets from the date of October
25, 1917 is not less a representative of the official ideology than no matter
what speaker insisting on the happiness the Party opened for humanity with
that date.
One may overturn this ideological distortion of all the proportions of
historical development in one way only. Not by saying "bad" in the places
the official ideology says "good", but proving theoretically that there is
nothing to talk about.
The Essence of the Controversy: The Provisional Government - the
Bolsheviks
The actual program of the Provisional Government was so close to that
of the Bolsheviks that even V. I. Lenin, nolens volens, had to admit it. The
state monopolies, the all-country planning (much more advanced than the
Bolsheviks' attempts by the second half of the twenties), nationalisation
of many branches of industry, the strict control over private firms, the
obligation of work, etc. - all this was proposed by the Bolsheviks as well.
And Lenin admitted it in one of his papers.
What did the difference consist in? In one thing only: the Bolsheviks
were more cautious. The Provisional Government attempted to fight both
the bourgeoisie and the people. And being drawn - in spite of the primitive
intention - into war with the peasant poor, it had to open the third social
front. And in the struggle on the four fronts it had to decline (there was also
the real war front).
The Bolsheviks understood, instead, that they are not able to seize power
other than through the counter-action of the masses resulting from the
activity of the bureaucratic complex. They saw that they can only go after
the people's wave - and on the eve of it capture power at the right moment.
How can we explain that difference? I think that it results simply from the
disproportion of forces between the Bolsheviks and the bureaucratic complex.
The latter was a great social power. The former were - in Spring 1917 -
a small party whose only trump card could be a wise strategy based on the
contradictions resulting from the activity of the bureaucratic structure.
The Actual Greatness of V. 1. Lenin
The strategy of a political party must be invented by somebody. And some-
body must incline the party members to adopt it and to apply it. The latter
358
CHAPTER 21
is much more difficult, especially when the natural tendency to come
to power pushes the party in another direction. And so it was with the
R.S.D.L.P .(B.).
After the February Revolution the party underwent the same pressure to
come into the hierarchy of power as other socialist parties. The pressure
of the grey party activists was so strong that fragments of Lenin's papers
from Switzerland expressing distrust in the Provisional Government were
censored in the official party newspaper Pravda. There were also very strong
tendencies to reunion with the Mensheviks - it was a means of joining
the bureaucratic complex with a much stronger partner. And the fusion
was almost done: at the All-Russian conference of the party's activists,
Stalin, who opposed the fusion, got only a 4-votes majority (out of 120
delegates). The position of Stalin himself is expressed iti his formula in the
report of the conference: "to wait until the Provisional Government loses
its forces, for realising the revolutionary program it must discredit itself'
(quoted after Frayman, ibid., p. 156).
As can be seen, Djugashvili exposed the matter openly: the Provisional
Government fulfills the same program we would like to do; but if it fails,
maybe we shall be able to reach more (posts) than if we would support it
at present.
The greatness of Lenin consisted in the fact that he concealed the political
coarseness of Stalin in a masterly way: inventing the whole political doctrine
about the "overgrowth of the bourgeois revolution in the socialist one"
and fmding support for it in the system of social forces resulting from the
struggle between the bureaucratic complex and the Russian people.
The greatness of Lenin consisted also in the fact that he was able to stop
the party's aspirations to join the Mensheviks and to achieve the bureaucratic
structures. It was not so simple. The day after Lenin's return from emigra-
tion, the common meeting of both parts of the R.S.D.L.P. was called. In
spite of Lenin's objections the Bolshevik activists decided to take part in
it. Then Lenin went with them. With a great deal of trouble the party's leader
ruptured the session - only 30 Bolshevik delegates, out of 50, got out of the
re-union meeting. And later on events showed that he was right to count
on the people's resistance against the Provisional Government.
Only an outstanding leader is able to stem a party that pushes to have
a share in power - even if he is right that the struggle will bring greater power
than the alliance. For whether he is right depends, among other things, on
whether the party believes in advance that he is.
THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION 359
The Clouds of Ideology: the Historical Sense of the Doctrine of the Two
Russian Revolutions - Bourgeois and Socialist
The theoretical kernel of Lenin's program was the doctrine of the two re-
volutions - bourgeois and socialist - and of the possible transition from
the former to the latter. The basic means was to count on the masses who
would overthrow the Provisional Government in the same manner as they
had overthrown tsarism:
the 'task of the day', at this moment must be: Workers, you have performed miracles
of proletarian heroism, the heroism of the people, in the civil war against tsarism. You
must perform miracles of organization, organization of the proletariat and of the whole
people, to prepare the way for your victory in the second stage of the revolution (V. I.
Lenin, 'Letters from Afar', in: Selected Works, vol. 2, Progress Publishers, Moscow
1970, p. 39; from the word "Workers" the original has uninterrupted italics; the bold
is mine).
"This" moment is the period after the Provisional Government was established
(the text quoted was written on March 7, 1917). It was, then, the program of
the struggle for power - for the Bolsheviks. At the point of departure of
that program lay the interpretation of the February Revolution as a bourgeois
one. Without that it would have lost any meaning. That is why the doctrine
of the two revolutions was accepted by the executors of the program and
is still supported by their descendants. The latter need it no less: it allows
them to believe that whatever happened later on, the starting point of the
system was the actual will of the masses. And the starting point of the so-
cial system is the basic matter for ideological rationalizations: if the system
arose out of the revolutionary spirit of the masses, then later on it could
at most deviate from the proper developmental line. A deviation from the
norm can, however, always be explained - e.g., by the economic backward-
ness and the necessity of drastic steps to improve upon it. And one may also
easily believe that it is possible to come back to the proper line of develop-
ment after the deviating causes cease to exist, due to the conscious activity
of the Party.
In a word, that doctrine of the two Russian revolutions, seemingly only
a historical one, turns out to be the first chain in the developed and ramified
system of ideological rationalization reaching the period of the "cult of
personality" and the fortunate "renovation". Without it those rationalizations
are senseless. That is why it keeps so strong till today. Similarly, the doctrine
itself is senseless without the "theory" that the tsarist Russia was a backward
360
CHAPTER 21
country. That is why Marxist historians believe it without any attempts to
test it.
One thing is, however, striking in the quoted watchword for the party:
what does the word "organization" do there? Why could the workers fight
heroically with tsarism and that be good, but with the Provisional Govern-
ment they were to fight "organizationally"? For in this word the secret of
the October Revolution is hidden.
The Historical Sense of the Watchword: "All Power to the Soviets!"
The reason why the bureaucratic complex was forced to make its anti-people
policy at once was the existence of the system of the Soviets. And that
was the institution lenin based his counter-strategy upon: the Soviets are
to be an independent "state apparatus" existing on the side and against the
official one. In order to see what the watchword "All power to the Soviets!"
(let us omit for the sake of simplicity the historical variations of it in 1917)
meant for grey Bolshevik activists, let us look at their actions.
One of the Mensheviks so characterised the activity of the Bolsheviks
during the February Revolution:
In those days the people were busy with a quite different type of work than the
Mensheviks who were engaged in political discussions. They were tending a technology
of the movement, were agitating for an uncompromising fight with tsarism, were organiz-
ing agitation and an illegal press (quoted after H. land, The Tactic of the Bolsheviks
in the Period of the Peaceful Development of the Revolution, 27 February - 4 July
(in Polish), Lodz. 1962, p. 21 l.
It was the policy of the party which was strengthened after the February
Revolution. On March 19, the front-rank party's newspaper gave the charac-
teristically authentic interpretation of the party statutes:
Paragraph 1 of the statutes requires that the party organization arise not by entertaining
particular persons to a local committee. but by unification of the existing and arising
small cells, so that a local organization is to represent not particular persons but the
entirety of the smaller organizational units. One should organize party cells in all enter-
prises, in all workshops (quoted after ibid., p. 21; italics are mine).
Any commentary is superfluous as the intention of such a party of the new
type is quite clearly revealed: to become the kernel of the new totalitarian
state grouping together not people but organizations. For every organization
controls some of its members' interests, and control over it enables control
of the appropriate type of interests.
THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION 361
First of all, the main subject of the attack were the Soviets. As long as
the socialist parties were controlling them, the Bolsheviks subordinated every
other thing they could: factory committees, trade unions and all the organiza-
tions available.
Mter February a lot of committees were set up in factories by the workers
themselves which regulated interfactorial matters, established an 8-hour
labour day, attempted to regulate wages, to intervene in production matters,
to arrange provisions, etc. The Bolsheviks attempted to control this spon-
taneous movement by sanctioning its most radical tendencies and making it
dependent on activists of their own. The Leninist conception of the workers'
control was the following: such control should be (1) universal in the scale
of a given enterprise, i.e., including all the matters concerning its productive
and fmancial activity; (2) common in the scale of the whole country, i.e.,
including all the enterprises, (3) enabled by not only workers but also political
parties' activists. Of course, the more universal and the more common a
control becomes, the less of the workers and the more of the party it be-
comes. Workers were simply unable, as they were educated in 1917, to
control the fmances of a great factory - the party's specialists had to help it,
becoming more and more indispensable. The demand of workers' control
was aimed at taking the (economic) property out of the hands of the capital-
ists and in the way it was fulftlled it aimed at replacing the workers' control
by the party. As a result, the program in question was thought to take over
the (economic) property, making the party organization a controller of the
economic life of the country.
It was not wishful thinking. The Bolsheviks were surprisingly active in
subordinating factory committees to the control of the party. Supporting
that spontaneous trend of the committees - which was especially distinctive
in comparison to the unclear and indecisive politics of the socialist parties
resulting from their share in the bureaucratic complex that aimed at the
liquidation of the movement - the Bolsheviks sanctioned its most radical
tendencies above the effective possibilities of control. And doing this, the
party was becoming a manager, next a participant, and fmal1y the only
subject of the workers' control. In this way the Bolsheviks inclined factory
committees to adopt their program of action according to which they control-
led not only the production and fmancial activity of an enterprise but also
decided about accepting and dismissing all the workers and clerks, including
the directors. Unfortunately, it was not the control of the state-capitalist
by the people. It was the control of the state-capitalist by the new, arising
state.
362
CHAPTER 21
Another type of organization which R.S.D.L.P.(B.) aimed to subordinate
was the trade-union. According to their conception, unions were to be
organized not according to the criterion of profession, but to that of the
branch of industry which implied that all the labourers of a given factory
belonged to one trade-union. A modem Marxist historian explains this option
as follows: the traditional "association of workers according to the criteria
of the profession diffuses the forces of the working class and makes its
organization more difficult" (Zand, p. 26). Maybe the question is, however,
for whom? Not for the workers themselves as different professional groups
can to some extent have different interests. But this is not important for a
"party of the new type" which prefers to have workers unified as much as
possible.
The Bolsheviks established new trade-unions, on principles of their own,
and also made a lot of effort to capture the old unions. In June 1917 at the
All-Russian Conference of Trade-Unions this party, which had not long
before been insignificant, had the strongest representation - twice as much
as the Mensheviks and triple the Social Revolutionaries. Such was the price of
posts achieved by the socialist parties within the bureaucratic complex
following an anti-people policy. For workers fighting against the Provisional
Government the Bolsheviks were becoming the only political alternative.
And, in general, all the existing organizations were the field of constant
penetration: cultural associations, educational clubs, associations of
compatriots, etc. It was in full accordance with the resolution of the e.K.
R.S.D.L.P.(B.) that the watchword became "organizing, organizing and once
more organizing of the proletariat: in every factory, in every district, in every
quarter of the town" (quoted after Frayman (ed.), p. 172).
The conscious goal of the "grey organizers" was probably the following:
it is easier to lead the masses to a struggle against the bourgeoisie and its
government if they are organized. And this is given in the works of Marxist
historians today as the ... explanation of the social process of "all-organizing"
that included all the regions of social practice of the poorer strata of the
Russian town population. Modem Marxism explains in the Marxist way
only what is strange allowing itself to mystify idealistically its own tradition.
Meanwhile, independently of the understanding of the "organizers" them-
selves, the process under consideration had a historical meaning of its own:
it was arising, and growing, the state within the state. Or, more exactly, it
was arising, and growing, the totalitarian state within the totalitarian state.
For new cells of the mega-organization were equipped not only in the physical
force (see below) but also in the economic one - they were arising mainly
THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION 363
in industry, ensuring the possibility of making economic decisions by them-
selves. In this way they were acquiring not only the factual possibility to make
public decisions but also to control the economy, that is, not only to become
rulers but also owners in a higher and higher degree. The sub-totalitarian
state was subordinating to itself more and more new spheres of social practice,
eliminating in this way the old ones.
Now, the demand to fight to seize the Soviets becomes more and more
comprehensible. The Soviets possessed a significant range of the factual
power. Theoretically - according to the self-limitations imposed by the
socialist parties ~ they were organs controlling the state. In practice, they
took a large extent of power over, especially at the local level. It was to the
advantage of the Soviets to force the Provisional Government to introduce
the 8-hour labour d a y ~ the local Soviets introduced it on the responsibility
of their own, and the Government had in the end to sanction the objective
state of affairs. The Soviets organized also provisions, fought against specula-
tion, helped people particularly needing help. They were, then, organs of
power, of the second power, stemming not from the fusion of force and
property but from the resistance against such fusion.
The Soviets were the first since Bolotnikov's times to be evidently of the
people on such a scale. They were, however, only results of the February
Revolution. They did not lead to it: it led to them. The February Revolution
occurred not because the people were growing in power and at last made
the final revolutionary step, but because the bureaucratic complex was
growing and was unable to make such a step by itself. The Soviets were the
price the bureaucratic complex paid for the indecisiveness and inefficiency
of its political representation. That is why the Soviets were rather weak and
the political parties, at first the socialist parties and next the Bolshevik
party, did not have special troubles with seizing them. The first, the people's,
character of the Soviets ended rather soon and later on they became a terrain
of the sharp interparty struggle. Or, rather, a terrain of the struggle of the
socialist parties - belonging to the bureaucratic complex - with the new
totalitarian state growing from the outside. "As long as the Soviets do not take
power, we shall not take it. And the Soviets should be pushed to power by
the vivid force" (V. I. Lenin, 'All-town Petrograd Conference R.S.D.L.P.(B.)',
April 14-22, in: Works, vol. 24, (the Polish edition), Warsaw 1952, p. 134).
In these two sentences the full flavour of Lenin's political thOUght is con-
tained; he understood that only the mass movement may give power to the
increasing sub-state; and he understood as well that the sub-state must be
first, before the masses - otherwise the people will establish the power in
364
CHAPTER 21
their own name. That is why the 7th (April) conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.)
challenged: "It is necessary to work comprehensively inside the Soviets
of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, to increase their number, to strengthen
them, to concentrate in their interior the proletarian, internationalist groups
of our party" (quoted after B. M. Morozov, The Party and the Soviets in the
October Revolution (in Russian), Moscow 1977, p. 4S;italics are mine).
It was not a command, it was- to a large extent - a description of what
had already taken place. The Bolsheviks seized more and more Soviets. Those
they were controlling distinguished themselves with the range of the per-
formed power and -- keeping their own armed forces. For example, the
"Krasnoyar Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was acting as a state
organ of power" (Morozov, p. 46) -- it demolished the governmental organs
in the town and in the whole gubemiya, established the constant squads of
Red Guards as its organ, edited the laws and punished transgressors for
disobedience.
The process in question, called in the official historiography a Bolsheviza-
tion of the Soviets, was proceeding fairly quickly. By July 1917 the Bolshevik
faction in the Petrograd Soviet increased ten times (to 400 deputies), and in
many other towns the Bolsheviks then controlled the Of 402 Soviets
at the 2nd All-Russian Congress of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies on October 25, the Bolshevik platform was represented by 255 of
them, and of 649 deputies there were 390 Bolsheviks (The Encyclopaedia of
the October Revolution (in Polish), Warsaw 1977, p. 45). At that time the
Bolshevik Red Guard counted in the whole country about 200 thousands of
armed people. In Petrograd alone the squads amounted to about 20 thousand
people and the Military Organization of the C.K. R.S.D.L.P.(B.) already
in September gave regular military courses in 79 factories of Petro grad (ibid.,
p. 122). The new sub-state had armed forces of its own. In fact, it was a
totalitarian state joining together disposal over the productive and the repres-
sive forces.
The historical sense of the watchword "All power to the Soviets!" is
clear, I think to support the masses and on the eve of their struggle against
the totalitarian order to organize a new one inside it.
The Historical Sense of the Watchword: "The Land to the Peasants!"
Since the Social Revolutionaries sanctioned the policy of the Provisional
Government to neutralize the countryside, R.S.D.L.P.(B.) was the only
political force in Russia supporting the peasants' spontaneous taking of the
lords' land. And the process was increasing (see Table XV).
Amount of peasants'
disturbances
General
% of slaughters
THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION
TABLE XV
The months of 1917
III IV-V VI VII VIII IX
208 847
25.5 6.3
1255
2.6
1365
3.2
916
6.1
1189
15.5
Source: Wojna, ibid., p. 87ff.
36S
X
1820
27.2
Direct influence of the R.S.D.L.P.{B.) in the countryside was not too signif-
icant. Much more important was the fact that, in contrast to the obscure
policy of the S.R.P., its policy clearly and decisively supported the spon-
taneous movement of the peasants, and the Bolsheviks impaired the authority
of the bureaucratic complex the Social Revolutionaries were attaining in the
countryside (possessing, e.g., the post of the Ministry of Agriculture).
The most important sense of the watchword "Peace to the people!"
was, however, more hidden. The IS-million strong army was a peasant one.
And there was no more important reason for a peasant-soldier to leave the
army than his will to be at home when the land will be divided for him and
his family. The "Peace to the people!" without "The land to the peasants!"
would only be a pacifist slogan.
The Historical Sense o/the Watchword: "Peace to the People!"
The meaning of the third Bolshevik watchword lies on the surface: in fact,
the new substate was aiming to disarm the bureaucratic complex. The effec-
tiveness of the Bolshevik action in that field was surprising.
From March 24 to June 11 alone, almost 900 thousand copies of the
Bolshevik newspapers were sent to the front (Zand, ibid., pp. 228-9). Before
October 1917, 15 Bolshevik newspapers were printed for soldiers and sailors;
a single impression of eleven of them was 140 thousand copies (P. A. Golub,
The Bolsheviks and the Army in Three Revolutions (in Russian), Moscow
1977, p. 218). The anti-war activity of the Bolsheviks in the front was
extremely vivid: agitation, meetings, the actions of fraternization with
German soldiers, etc. Lenin's papers about fraternization were printed as
leaflets in Russian and in German in 200 thousand copies and spread in the
front. In Riga on 21 June, 40 anti-war meetings were called, and on 28 June,
12 (Golub, pp. 152--154).
366
CHAPTER 21
Accordingly the anarchy in the army was increasing. As the telegram of
the commander of one of the Russian armies put it.
Subordination and discipline do not exist any more. Explaining and persuasion became
senseless; the soldiers answer with threats, it happens that they murder those who try
to encourage them to fight. Some squads, not waiting for the enemy's attack, leave the
front. It happens that they discuss for hours about the command to march to help the
fighting squads (quoted after, L. Gyurko, Lenin ~ October (Polish translation from
the Hungarian), Warsaw 1967. p. 207).
It is not surprising that in October 80% of the soldiers in the Petrograd gar-
rison supported the Bolsheviks (Golub, p. 230). It was the only political
party that told the soldiers: "Not only voting (of officers by soldiers -
L.N.) is appreciated, but every step of an officer and general should be
controlled by especially elected representatives of the soldiers" (V. I. Lenin,
'The Political Parties in Russia and the Tasks of the Proletariat', Works,
vol. 24, ibid., p. 85).
The Interpretations of Lenin's Program
There are two main types of interpretation of Lenin's political program. The
official one maintains that it recognized - thanks to the creative development
of Marxism - the actual structure of Russian society and proposed the proper
means to establish Socialism in the country. Another interpretation claims
the first one to be an ideological l u f f ~ either with respect to the imma-
turity of the Russian working class to set Socialism (social democrats) or with
respect to the lack of any laws of history (bourgeois line). They concede
to Lenin, however, a splendid sense of timing that enabled the Bolsheviks
to make a successful plot. The program of the class struggle, from the one
side; and the program of the plot, from the other.
The first alternative is hard to accept. If Lenin's program was directed
against the bourgeoisie, the Bolsheviks would only help the bureaucratic
complex to subordinate them. And it was not so. Presumably the hidden
sense of it was different from the declared one. This alternative, though
clearly apologetic, can at least be discussed. The interpretation of the October
Revolution in terms of the plot is simply funny. The plot of tens of activists
would decide the destiny of the great society for tens of years! It is not
surprising that the bourgeois thought with its peculiar lack of any ability
to do historiosophic thinking recalls such an idea. But the fact that it is
principally the same as social democratic thought cannot be explained in
THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION 367
terms of the intellectual matter. The stereotype of the "tartarian version
of Marxism" present in social democratic attempts to explain the appearance
of socialism in Russia expresses something more than the feeling so popular
in the West of the "civilizational superiority": it expresses the aversion
to understanding what the socialist parties in fact did in Russia between
February and October. The Bolsheviks were entirely right - it was the real
treason of the Russian people.
The Bolsheviks could win only because they were doing quite different
things than their ideology told them to do. Lenin's program, in other words,
turned out to be successful just because its historical sense was different than
the declared one. The hidden layer of the program was Marxist - recalling
the mass processes - but not Marxian - since it neglected the class struggle
in the Marxian sense. The hidden sense of Lenin's program was a stake on
the people's struggle against the bureaucratic complex. It was not the workers-
peasant union as Lenin formulated it, but the struggle of the people, both
workers, peasants, and soldiers, against the activity of the class of rulers-
owners. It was the stake for the gpontaneous tendency to regulate from below
production which is weighted with bureaucratic control from above. And for
the spontaneous pressure to seize the land. Those actions that Bolshevism
was strengthening were at the same time undergoing its more and more
rigid control. Lenin's program was the stake to organizationally capture
the social processes arising from the people's protest against the action of
the bureaucratic complex.
Considering that inside the totalitarian state the sub-totalitarian one was
forming, the good intentions of the Bolsheviks were without any social
significance; similarly, those of the left-social revolutionaries inside the
former bureaucratic complex. The less importance they had, the greater the
meaning ascribed to them. The greater was the share of historical idealism in
the party's ideology.
The Sign of the Future: Historical Idealism in the Bolshevik Doctrine
Already during the October events Trotsky gave the peculiar characteristics
of the "socialist power" that was to be from then on repeated by all socialist
leaders including Stalin, Mao, Brezhnev: the Bolsheviks aim to create the
"power that would have no other goals outside the satisfaction of the needs
of soldiers, workers and peasants" (quoted after J. Reed, Ten Days that
Shook the World (polish translation), Warsaw 1973, p. 112).
When Trotsky said this to the surprised world R.S.D.L.P.(B.) counted
368 CHAPTER 21
350 thousand people in 348 districts 334 towns, 24 gubemiyal etc. organiza-
tions (The Encyclopaedia of the October Revolution, ibid., p. 394) disposing
200 thousand Red Guards, controlling the majority of the Soviets, factory
committees, trade-unions, not to mention educational clubs or unions of
compatriots. And such an army of people controlling the main arteries of the
country is to be a choir of angels singing to the melody of the "Communist
Manifesto"! It is not to have any interests of its own, thinking only of the
satisfaction of the interests of those who do not have what it has: neither
property, nor power. One must be blind theoretically above possibility to
state this seriously. Or to feel the interest of its own in it.
Can a grown man be satisfied with what people think of themselves, not confronting
this with what they do? Is a Marxist allowed not to distinguish wishes and declarations
from the objective reality? No, he is not (V. I. Lenin, 'Louisblancianism', Works, vol. 24,
ibid., p. 18).
And a real Marxist, that is one who understands the inevitable limitedness of
his own declarations, is not allowed to believe in the "wishes and declara-
tions" of his party either.
It is, however, an idealist illusion that the faith in the myth of inevitable
laws of history and in Marxist ideals inclined the Bolsheviks to gain power.
They pressed forward motivated by purely material interests - the same
which led the oprichniki, the bureaucrats of the era of state capitalism,
the same which decided the treason of the interest of the people by the
activists of socialist parties, the interests of the fusion of economic and
political regulation, of property and power. Historical idealism was only an
ideological mystification clumsily added to the Marxian historical materialism.
If the Bolshevik leaders did not understand this, they were only a naive
means in the hands of history. If they did, they were something much worse.
Why Actually on October 25?
Unfortunately, the latter possibility is not entirely excluded. Lenin's strategy
was too masterly to assume in advance that there occurred simply a coin-
cidence between his vision, mystified in the Marxian way, of social reality
and the reality itself. The more so that there is an independent source of
such a prejudice -- the date of the armed upheaval.
The date October 25 is a very strange one: for actually on that day the
2nd All-Russian Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was to have
been opened and it was known in advance that the Bolsheviks would dominate
THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION 369
it (see above). In that situation the most plausible tactic for the Bolsheviks
seems to be evident - to let the Bolshevik majority of the deputies vote the
resolution "all power to the Soviets" avoiding disturbances and a sharp
antagonism within their own ranks (even among the leaders there were some
opposing Lenin's plan to seize power before the Congress); and the socialist
deputies would leave the Congress, as they did, hearing about the use of
coercion. Why, then, such a decision?
In order to answer this, one has to identify the interest the new, arising
class of rulers-owners would have in such a decision.
The interest of the purely authoritarian power, that is, based on the
monopoly of coercion alone, and not on property, requires support on the
part of the citizens, for they possess some source of material force indepen-
dent of the state. Namely, a section of the citizens (the owners) are highly
independent themselves and secure the rest (the direct producers) against too
much oppression on the part of the state. The purely authoritarian ruler
takes care of the support of his citizens, because they possess an independence
in the field of economics. A ruler-{)wner is in a quite different position:
the citizens in the pure totalitarian society have lost the sources of main-
tenance independent of power. And he must not exert himself for their
support, though it does not disturb him. Instead a ruler-owner-priest must
avoid the support of the people. He himself is by himself the only source of
his distinguished position. If he allows them to support himself that would
mean that they allow themselves to support him and he would be dependent
on their support! And even such an idea is dangerous for the ruler-owner-
priest as it limits him, one who monopolizes all the material means of forming
social life in his hands. That is why he will not only not exert himself for the
support of his citizens, but will even manifest his contempt for them: even
your support is not needed for me, you are only subjects of my actions that
legitimize themselves.
Lenin's decision to use force before the opening of the 2nd Congress of
Soviets with the Bolshevik majority was the first such manifestation of the
contempt for the Soviets, and through them, for the Russian people. Is there
such a party which having the easy possibility of taking power legally decides
to use coercion risking an internal split, external reputation, a growth in the
number of opponents, unnecessary corpses on both sides? Yes, there is such
a party: it is one who aims not only to politically control people, but also
economically and spiritually.
It is doubtful whether such a motivation may be ascribed to a typical
Bolshevik activist: the goals of his daily organizational work were presumably
370
CHAPTER 21
not so clear for him. It might be, however, that such a motivation can be
ascribed to Lenin and the group of leaders around him. They could feel
that the party which constitutes the kernel of the new class of rulers-owners
whose ambition is also to seize the means of the production of consciousness,
that is, to monopolize all material means, that such a party cannot ask the
people for legitimacy for itself.
What Was the October Revolution?
The spiritual subordination of Russian society was then a distant dream.
Dissentient newspapers were still working; the Russian intelligentsia was
still far from Marxism; the majority of society was still under the influence
of the Orthodox Church. Then, in October 1917, the party took over
power and property from the hands of the bureaucratic complex. And it
itself was a mega-organization able to constitute a new complex of the
type fulfilling the same functions as its predecessor. In the place of the old
rulers-owners, originating from the traditional state bureaucracy or the
bourgeoisie, came the new ones, originating from workers and peasants.
But it was not their origin, but their social functions which were important.
And the latter were defined by the joint disposal over both the productive
and repressive forces of society. That is why they continued, and had to
continue, the same process. And their social strangeness against "higher
strata", and also the clouds of the Marxian ideology darkening their actual
role for themselves, allowed them even to accelerate the process in the same
direction.
For history was developing thanks to the Bolsheviks in the same direction
as before them: in the direction of the fmal fusion of property and power
in the same hands; that is why the hands wrote that they do not have any-
thing of their own, that everything is 0 f the people.
The October Revolution did not lead from capitalism to Socialism because
in the initial moment Russia was not a capitalist, but a totalitarian society.
The October Revolution did not lead from the totalitarian society to a
socialist one, since the rulers-owners could not join spiritual domination
with property and power for some years more - it was the lasting social
process that after October made some preliminary steps only.
The October Revolution led from a totalitarian society to a totalitarian
society - it was only a change of the personnel within the same social struc-
ture. And the society was developing in the same direction - to the most
class-ridden society in history. At the same time the October Revolution
THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION 371
was possible only on the eve of the people's struggle against totalitarianism.
That struggle of the people was used by the new candidates to the posts of
rulers-owners. Their intentions, and their type of ideology, did not possess
greater significance - what mattered was the type of social relations they
came in.
What, then, was the October Revolution? It was the result of the anti-
totalitarian movement of the people used by the new repertoire of rulers-
owners to continue the totalitarian SOciety. It was, then, the same social
process that in Kronstadt, in 1921, led to the revolt of the workers and
sailors against the Bolsheviks themselves. Berlin in 1953, Poznan in 1956,
Budapest in 1956, Gdansk in 1970 and Poland in 1980 - here are some
of the following links in the series. The October Revolution, read from the
standpoint of its social content, was the first anti-totalitarian revolution in
the Eastern countries. Read from the standpoint of its result, it was simply
a change of personnel, like the majority of anti-socialist revolutions in the
history of the socialist countries. The October Revolution was a first counter-
revolution. The real issue of socialism in the Eastern world was - if we decide
to use the event-symbol - the February Revolution.
These theses are not peculiar. What is peculiar is rather that for such a
long time modem history is seen not from the point of view of the disposal
over the material forces of society but from the ideological point of view;
and social systems are not defmed in terms of class interests but in terms of
slogans ("socialist", "communist", etc.) which are used to conceal their true,
material nature.
CHAPTER 22
CONCLUSION: THE MYTH OF THE COMMUNISTS
And so, they won. Who won in Russia? The current answer to this question
is evident: the communists! And already in this hasty, so seemingly evident,
answer to the question who won and who rules in socialist countries the
fundamental falsity is contained.
Who are they, the communists? Some people with a common political
faith. The thesis that an ideological community subordinated to itself a great
society is from the materialist point of view an essential falsity confusing the
material grounds of class domination and the ideological cover which it
declares. The claim that communists rule socialist societies is, from the stand-
point of non-Marxian historical materialism, the same essential falsity as the
claim, from the standpoint of Marxian historical materialism, that capitalism
was introduced by the protestants. Just as one cannot think?f the bourgeoisie
on the assumptions with which it thinks of itself, so one cannot conceive of
the triple class ruling in socialism.
For the general conclusion of this book is that in Russia the double class
of rulers-owners won (that at some point accepted the communist ideology
instead of the mixture of liberalism and socialism its previous garniture
adopted); and that after a time they also seized the means of production of
consciousness becoming in that way the triple class of rulers-owners-priests.
They are the disposers of the means of coercion, of the means of production
and of the means of indoctrination. And it has, indeed, not great significance
that they are at the same time communists. This influences only the kind of
slogans they use to hide the true nature of their rule.
The nature of the socialist way of domination of man over man requires
a separate analysis which I am unable to make in this book. What I would
like to stress to the utmost is that this social system is the most class-ridden
society of all known in history. And that it develops everything in the same
way as the previous formations - thanks to the class struggle. Let me try
to explain this a little despite the fact that the ideas require a new book
to elaborate them and can be expressed here only in a rough and vague
manner.
The socialist society is a class system based on the antagonism of the two
triple classes ~ rulers-owners-priests (Le., three-lords) and the people. It is
372
THE MYTH OF THE COMMUNISTS 373
the system where the cumulation of class divisions reaches its apogee - the
three oppressive classes, hitherto separated from each other and forced to
compete, join together in the one class of three-lords.
The social power of the three-lords is incomparable with that of any class
of owners achieved in the past. Even their economic power is much greater
than any class of capitalists or feudals. The old owners made economic
decisions on the scale of an enterprise - the class of three-lords makes them
on the scale of the whole national economy using centralized planning. And
besides that they administratively form the consumption, decide who can
work for his maintenance and who cannot, make decisions concerning promo-
tions, access to rare goods and services, ... what class of capitalists had such
enormous economic power over society? And besides, it is state power, such
that is able to fulfil the dreams of all rulers - to separate making decisions
from the responsibility for them; the latter weighs down the administrative
apparatus that especially in that goal is separated from the party's aims. And
besides it is a real church- with its spiritual masters, its dogmatists and
heretics, and - above all - with such possibilities of forming the minds which
no church had anywhere. No church anywhere had the monopoly of the
press, radio, tv, film, youth and child organizations, education, even sports .
. . . And those people disposing such a material power that was never pos-
sessed by any minority of any society tell us that they do not have any
material interests of their own, that they actually only serve all who have
been deprived of such things.
In spite of such a disproportion of forces between the class of three-lords
and the class of people, socialism also develops due to, and through, the class
struggle. But the disproportion leads to a long silence from the people, to a
long period of submissiveness.
For the class of three-lords there is only one condition of balance - to
smash all the autonomous social relations among people making impossible
any kind of common action, independent of that class. The class of people
is to be atomized and unable to take spontaneous action - only on that
condition will a system of such enormous injustice be able to survive. And the
class triply ruling socialist society has good means to do that.
The means of repression, so largely applied at the beginning of socialism
and in its mature stage as well, are mainly means of desocialisation. The
coercion is not blind. not at all. It is applied always against those people
who grow above the average level and become centres of autonomous social
relations: political and social activists, intellectuals of a higher rank, great
artists. All the outstanding people were eliminated, and made unable to form
374
CHAPTER 22
autonomous social groups, even societal or discussive ones. The terror was a
means of equalizing people in the face of the three-lords.
The means of production are also means of desocialization. A small prop-
erty - of a piece of land, for instance - disturbs the class of three-lords not
because of the ideology of it, but because of the fact that it gives to some
people a means of maintenance independent of the state machinery. That
is why collectivization must come in socialism - all the reasons given by the
official ideology only cover the hidden state of affairs. They do not deter-
mine the actions of the three-lords, but the actions require an ideological
rationalization. Industrialization is also a powerful means of making people
isolated. Factories in socialism do not so much produce as link peoples in
anonymous working teams - so numerous and so organized to eliminate
the possibility of the recovery of autonomous social relations which had been
smashed in a given milieu by setting up the given factory. That is why fac-
tories are set uP. in social milieux particularly independent of the system of
three-domination; from this arise those "senseless" locations of great steel-
works far from both coal and iron but just in the middle of the traditional
rural milieux. The factories are to be great; small ones could recover auton-
omous relationships among the workers; from this arises this "surprising"
trend to build great enterprises without any economic reasons for doing so.
Economic reasons are not in socialism - except the late stage of it (see below)
- any subject of special interest on the part of the three-lords; the economy
must increase the material power of the three-ruling class, but it is not maxi-
mized. Factories are here not means of production, but basically means of
desocialisation of the class of people. They produce, but first of all they
produce new factories that will be doing the same: annihilating the interrela-
tions among people and bringing an individual to an anonymous working
team where he becomes a single cog in the great machine; from this arises the
economically suicidal priority of the production of means of production over
that of means of consumption.
At last, the means of production of consciousness are means of desocial-
ization as well. They are not to convince anybody of anything - if they
attempted to do so, they would be eVidently counter-efficient. Meanwhile,
they have a monopoly of "torpid talk", possibly far from any peoples' emo-
tions and possibly clearly false, to make forming the common conviction in
the people's class impossible. In other words, the primary aim of the means of
production of consciousness is to kill any authentic class consciousness on
the part of the people.
Thanks to the joint application of the terror, industrialization and total
THE MYTH OF THE COMMUNISTS 375
boredom, the class of three-lords attains the same object: it includes all the
people in barracked squads of serfs; the squads are constantly sterilized of
all recovering social connections among people themselves; it creates a new
social hierarchy among citizens privileging submissiveness - the more sub-
missive a person is (e.g., the louder the system of oppression, exploitation
and indoctrination is called "socialism"), the higher post in the moloch
hierarchy he or she occupies. In such conditions no abilities to resist are
possible. The class struggle is possible, if the suppression is painful enough,
but not too much, if the autonomous social relations enabling people to act
commonly still exist. Pure socialism kills them and kills the society in the
people. And the name "socialism" mystifies this ideologically.
The Soviet Union of the 30's reached such a pattern of the purely socialist,
Le., anti-social, society. Even the family interrelationships were disappearing
and the hero of Soviet youth, full of subconscious fear, became Pavlik
Morozov who denounced his father to the secret police. Everything that
could allow an at least elementary social connection had been eliminated in
this most lonely crowd in history that lived then on the territory of the
Soviet Union. And in the conditions of mass state terror, state planning and
state propaganda leading to their anti-social action, the ability of the society
to resist was nil. The only thing the Russian people could do was to believe
in socialism. For such a faith was a condition for survival. We believe on the
mass scale in what justifies our interests. And the simplest interest of every
one of us is to save life and liberty. There is no mysticism of the "Russian
soul", then, in the fact that Russian mothers kept the portrait of Stalin
among the family sanctities, even if their sons languished in concentration
camps; it was the proof for them that they have the right to live - for the
mothers believe in socialism. Doubts as to socialism can appear only if the
socialist fonn of domination of man over man grows less severe, and the
dominated retrieve human dignity.
Socialism does not grow less severe from the good will of the three-lords
but from the same reason all movement in history takes place - from the
struggle of the most oppressed.
The system of terror was based on keeping in concentration camps the
multimillion mass of people. The camps were so cruel in order that people
outside them, having their "liberty", would remain in constant, paralysing
fear. The camps were not for the 10% of the constant inhabitants of "Gulag",
but for all the rest who were afraid to come in (Wat). In that sub-society of
the most oppressed, unexpected processes were taking place. The hopeless-
ness after many years created quite new conditions of social life - the severity
376 CHAPTER 22
of them in a way lowered the threshold of fear in comparison to the "free"
part of the Russian society and the atomization of the camp society began
to cease. Gradually autonomous interpersonal relations in camps recovered:
solidarity, readiness to help, readiness to resist at last. In the Soviet camps
at the end of the 40's a new citizen society began to form - which had
actually been so efficiently destroyed outside them. Acts without parallel
in the Soviet penal system multiplied desertions, killing informers, strikes.
Finally, armed upheavals took place. At the beginning the authorities managed
them without any special technical troubles (e.g., the marching column of
prisoners of V orkuta who captured their camp and went to liberate others
in the surroundings were shot by military planes), but soon it turns out that
the problem is not of a technical but of a social nature. Upheavals multiply
and one camp after another begins to pass the same stages: passive resistance,
liquidation of informers, strikes .... It was this sector of socialist society
which had to press back the fear in the rest of it. The armed upheavals of
the most oppressed stratum of the Soviet people showed that the class strug-
gle becomes easier if the terror goes too far.
The system had to be changed, if its Gulag foundations were not to be
destroyed. The change was called, as always, quite improperly but in an
ideologically efficient way the '"retreat of'Stalinism' ". In fact, it was the
step forward from socialism on, the step done by those who first, at the
bottom of the social hierarchy regained human dignity, enabling them to
fight against oppression. They were people who saved the class of three-lords
before the suicidal self-terror, for the mechanisms of submissiveness it under-
went the class of people transferred themselves into it itself (the shark was
devouring its own head as Solzenitsyn put it). It was not the 20th Congress
which saved the inhabitants of Gulag but their readiness to fight which saved
the class of three-lords before it itself. And the 20th Congress only sanctioned
this deceitful "taking the initiative over".
The liquidation of the inefficient system of camps and the consequences
of the liberation of the class of three-lords from the self-devouring terror
changed the regularities of the working of the system. Since that time the
cyclic development began.
The starting point of a cycle is the releasing of control over some regions
of social practice. The class of people gains some concessions and the class
of three-lords gains social quietitude in return. However, the triply ruling class
is only seemingly an iron. centralized organization with a hierarchic structure.
The decisive role is played in it not by the top, but by those instances that
are directed immediately to capture the class of people. All the rest is the
THE MYTH OF THE COMMUNISTS 377
ideologically-organizational superstructure. Therefore, the acts of the grey
activists aimed to enlarge their private spheres of control from the spon-
taneous movement, not directed by anybody, to subordinate social life more
and more. That movement tramples the decisions of the highest institutions
and political programs leading to the gradual recovery of the position of the
ruling class as a whole. The process of total control is itself uncontrollable.
Spontaneously the bureaucratic machinery recovers paralysing human initia-
tive, readiness, and finally the possibility to act socially. And the natural
consequence of it is a worsening economy. Another consequence is, in turn,
the resistance of the masses. After the system ceased the mass terror, the
masses are able to resist and this occurs every time the spontaneous pressure
of the system passes the threshold of their patience. Disturbances occur, the
system is forced to concessions and the whole process begins anew. The
retreat to the phase of submissiveness ("Stalinism") is impossible - it turned
out to be inefficient and also the class of three-lords has no interest in new
Moscow trials.
This threshold of the patience of the people goes up, however, in succes-
sive cycles- the people's class more and more easily and efficiently fights for
the liberation of new regions of social practice from the domination of the
three-lords. And the latter are forced to make more and more concessions in
the successive cycles.
In this way the decline of socialism is taking place - if we leave aside the
illusion that socialism is something of the future, the illusion that constantly
confuses the leftist ideal and anti-leftist reality. For socialism achieved its
apogee in the period of the annihilation of social bonds ("Stalinism"), and
from then on there occurs the evolutionary process of decline. In the succes-
sive cycles more and more regions of social practice will become liberated hy
the resistance of the masses and the political opposition in socialist countries
will give them more and more adequate ideological representation - such is
the historical role of the so-called democratic opposition in socialist countries.
In spite of the false self-consciousness of some parts of it, the democratic
opposition does not fight for the realisation of the ideals of the Great French
Revolution in the East but for the fulfilment of a quite new type of society.
Or, more properly, it helps the masses to produce evolutionarily such a
society by making them conscious of what they are in fact doing.
One thing only can be said abou t the new fonn of society in advance: that
it will be a truly classless society - without political, economic or spiritual
classes, that is, without a monopoly of the disposal over any material means
which society creates. The way to achieve a classless society leads through
378 CHAPTER 22
the most class-ridden form of society which is deceitfully called socialism.
This system of the three-rule is a historical necessity, as historically necessary
as is its fall and the rise of the new social formation: at any rate, in the East,
in societies which are ahead of the historical process in the post-Marxian
epoch.
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INDEX OF AUTHORS CITED
Aleksandrow, N. 139
Bazylow, L. 276,301, 302, 312,314,
324-327, 3 3 ~ 3 3 3 3 3 7
Bobovkin, V. l. 297
Buczkowski, P. 62, 186
Bukharin, N. 177
Ciepielewski, J. 303, 325, 331
Davies, H. C. 35
Dziewulski, J. 76
Engels, F. 13, 18, 31. 33, 34, 46,47,
127,129,137,170,171,285
Estay,J.A.121
Frayman, A. 344,345,362
Galbraith, J. K. 224,229.231
Galileo 3-6
Gindin, l. F. 297,304
Golub, P. A. 365,366
Grekov, B. 289
Gyurk6, L. 366
Hicks, J. R. 13
Kabanov, P. l. 289,292,304,329,332,
335
Kalecki, M. 68, 69, 77, 91. 123, 124,
126
Kautsky, K. 20-22,30,31,35,64
Khromov, P. A. 303
Khrushchev, N. S. xix
Klawiter, A. 186
Koranyi, K. 257,258,277
Kosik, K. 28
Kowalik, T. 77
383
Kozyr-Kowalski, S. 31, 139
Kula, W. 100
Kulisher, J. 95
Kuznecov, N. D. 289, 292, 304, 329,
332, 335
Kuzncts, S. 119, 120
Labriola, A. 139
Ladosz, J. 139
Landau, H. 25
Lange, O. 29
Lasalle, F. 139
Lenin, V. l. 20,31,131,137-139,243,
245, 264, 289, 298, 305, 306,312,
313, 336, 342, 345,357-359,363,
365-369
Lowmianski, H. 246
Luxemburg, R. 65-70,76,77,89,98,
103, 109-111, 119,123, 126,213,
215,220,222
Lyashchenko, P. I. 258, 259, 274,275,
286, 287, 295-304, 307, 308,320--
322,329-333,342-350
Mantcuffel, T. 248
Markovic, M. 28
Marx, K. passim
Morozov, B. M. 364
Nove, A. 295
Nowak, L. 9,46,106,124,166,186
Nowakowa, l. 7
Ochmimski, J. 246,264,274,289,290
Polyanski, F. 288
Reed, J. 367
Robbins,L. 13
384 INDEX
Robinson, J. 45
Shepielev, L. E. 304
Sheptulin, A. 30. 139
Shygalin, G. 345
Stalin, J. W. xix. 11,30, \28-131, 243,
244,352,358,367,375
Strumilin, S. 335
Tarnovsky, K. N. 297
Tiendriakov, l. xix
Tocqueville, A. de 167, 168
Ularn, A. B. xx, 348
Wojcik, Z. 261,262,268
Wojna, R. 313,328,351,354,365
Wolski, J. 73, 74
Zand,H. 360,362,365
THEORY AND DECISION LIBRARY
An International Series in the Philosophy and Methodology
of the Social and Behavioral Sciences
Editors:
Gerald Eberlein, University of Technology, Munich
Werner Leinfellner, University of Nebraska
1. Giinther Menges (ed.), Information, Inference, and Decision. 1974, viii + 195 pp.
2. Anatol Rapoport (ed.), Game Theory as a Theory of Conflict Resolution. 1974,
v + 283 pp.
3.Mario Bunge (ed.), The Methodological Unity of Science. 1973, viii + 264 pp.
4.Colin Cherry (ed.), Pragmatic Aspects of Human Communication. 1974, ix + 178 pp.
5.Friedrich Rapp (ed.), Contributions to a Philosophy of Technology. Studies in the
Structure of Thinking in the Technological Sciences. 1974, xv + 228 pp.
6. Werner Leinfellner and Eckehart Kohler (eds.), Developments in the Methodology of
Social Science. 1974, x + 430 pp.
7.Jacob Marschak, Economic Information, Decision and Prediction. Selected Essays.
1974, three volumes, xviii + 389 pp.; xii + 362 pp.; x + 399 pp.
8.Carl-Axel S. Stael von Holstein (ed.), The Concept of Probability in Psychological
Experiments. 1974, xi + 153 pp.
9.Heinz J. Skala,Non-Archimedean Utility Theory. 1975, xii + 138 pp.
10.Karin D. Knorr, Hermann Strasser, and Hans Georg Zilian (eds.), Determinants and
Controls of Scientific Developments. 1975, ix + 460 pp.
1 1. Dirk Wendt and Charles Vlek (eds.), Utility, Probability, and Human Decision
Making. Selected Proceedings of an Interdisciplinary Research Conference, Rome,
3-6 September, 1973. 1975, viii + 418 pp.
12. John C. Harsanyi, EsSllys on Ethics, Social Behaviour, and Scientific Explonation.
1976, xvi + 262 pp.
13.Gerhard Schwtidiauer (ed.), Equilibrium and Disequilibrium in Economic Theory.
Proceedings of a Conference Organized by the Institute for Advanced Studies,
Vienna, Austria, July 3-5,1974. 1978, 1+ 736 pp.
14. V. V. Kolbin, Stochastic Programming. 1977, xii + 195 pp.
15.R. Mattessich, Instrumental Reasoning and Systems Methodology. 1978, xxii +
396 pp.
16.H. Jungermann and G. de Zeeuw (eds.), Decision Making and Change in Human
Affairs. 1977, xv + 526 pp.
18.A. Rapoport, W. E. Stein, and G. J. Burkheimer, Response Models for Detection of
Change. 1978, vii + 200 pp.
19.H. J. Johnson, J. J. Leach, and R. G. Miihlmann (eds.), Revolutions, Systems, and
Theories; Essays in Political Philosophy. 1978, x + 198 pp.
20.Stephen Gale and Gunnar Olsson (eds.), Philosophy in Geography. 1979, xxii +
470 pp.
21. Maurice Allais and Ole Hagen (eds.), Expected Utility Hypothesesand the Allais
Paradox: Contemporrlry DiscUlsiom of Decisions Under Uncertainty With AUais'
Rejoinder. 1979, vii + 714 pp.
22. Teddy Seidenfeld, Philosophical Problems of Statistical Inference: Learning from
R. A. Fisher. 1979, xiv + 246 pp.
23.L. Lewin and E. Vedung (eds.), Politics as Rational Action. 1980, xii + 274 pp.
24. J. Kozielecki, hychological Decision Theory. 1982, xvi + 403 pp.
25.1.1. Mitroff and R. O. Mason. Creating a Dialectical Social Science: Concepts,
Methods, and Models. 1981, ix + 189 pp.
26. V. A. Lefebvre, Algebra of Conscience: A Comparative Analysis of Western and
Soviet Ethical Systems. 1982, xxvii + 194 pp.
27. L. Nowak, Property and Power: Towards a Non-Marxian Historical Materialism.
1983, xxvii + 384 pp.
28.J. C. Harsanyi,Papers in Game Theory. 1982, xii + 258 pp.
29. B. Walentynowicz (ed.), Polish Contributions to the Science of Science. 1982, xii +
291 pp.
30.A. Camacho, Societies and Social Decision Functions. A Model with Focus on the
Information Problem. 1982, xv + 144 pp.
31.P. C. Fishburn, The Foundations of Expected Utility. 1982, xii + 176 pp.
32.G. Feichtinger and P. Kall (eds.), Operations Research in Progress. 1982, ix +
520 pp.