1.

[G.R. No. 143944. July 11, 2002.] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BASHER BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON, accused-appellant.

He left the small "maleta" containing sunglasses and brushes for fear that they would be confiscated by the security personnel. When requested, he voluntarily opened the big luggage, but refused to do the same to the Samsonite suitcase which he claimed was not his and had a secret combination lock. The security personnel forcibly opened the suitcase. The accused-appellant contends that the Samsonite suitcase containing the methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" was forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him. He also contends that People v. Marti is not applicable in this case because a vessel security personnel is deemed to perform the duties of a policeman. ISSUE/S: WON the confiscated drug is admissible as defense against the accused Ruling: The contentions of the accused-appellant devoid of merit. The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that protection is against transgression committed by the government or its agent. As held by this Court in the case of People v. Marti, "[i]n the absence of governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State." The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. In the case at bar, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security personnel. It was only after they found "shabu" inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply. There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any governmental function. In contrast, police officers are agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it is against them and other agents of the state that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 067542 is AFFIRMED.

Ponente: Puno, J. Nature: An appeal of the Decision of the RTC of Iligan City finding accused Bongcarawan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA 7659. December 27, 1999, Trial Court rendered judgment finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the offense and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Evidence of the Prosecution: At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock at the port of Iligan City when its security officer, received a complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. The members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they later found at the economy section. The suspect was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was informed of the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by two (2) security agents back to the economy section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the accused opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be "shabu," the security personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain. At about 6:00 a.m., Philippine Coast Guard arrived and took custody of the accused and the seized items the Samsonite suitcase, a brown bag and eight (8) small plastic packs of white crystalline substance. NBI Forensic Chemist confirmed the substance to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu," weighing 399.3266 grams. Version of the accused: On March 11, 1999, at about 10:00 p.m., he was in Quiapo, Manila where he met Alican "Alex" Macapudi, a neighbor who has a store in Marawi City. He was requested by Macapudi to bring a Samsonite suitcase containing sunglasses and watches to Iligan City, and to give it to Macapudi's brother at the Iligan port. He boarded the M/V Super Ferry 5 on the same night, carrying a big luggage full of clothes, a small luggage or "maleta" containing the sunglasses and brushes he bought from Manila, and the Samsonite suitcase of Macapudi. He stayed at cabin no. 106. At about 4:00 a.m. of March 13, 1999, as the vessel was about to dock at the Iligan port, he took his baggage and positioned himself at the economy section to be able to disembark ahead of the other passengers. Five (5) members of the vessel security force and a woman whom he recognized as his co-passenger at cabin no. 106 came and told him that he was suspected of stealing jewelry. He voluntarily went with the group back to cabin no. 106 where he was frisked. Subsequently, he was asked to get his baggage, so he went back to the economy section and took the big luggage and Macapudi's Samsonite suitcase.

2.

[G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO, accused-appellant. Ponente: Mendoza, J. Nature: An appeal from the decision, 1 dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of Section16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him accordingly to suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and of Section8 of the same law and sentencing him for such violation to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00. 2 Criminal Cases were filed against the accused-appellant for (1 Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357) possession and/or use 11.14 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) and (2 Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358) for having in his possession and under his custody and control 1,254 grams of Marijuana. Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution and the prosecution evidence established that: December 26, 1995- Sr. Rodolfo Insp. Aguilar (Narcotics Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City) applied for a warrant in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-appellant's room, and Badua saw that the shabuwas taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol. At about 10:30 p.m. of the same day, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant. The police operatives knocked on accused-appellant's door, but nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered the house. They served the warrant and started searching the house. They found 2.77 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and 850 grams of marijuana. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it. The police operative then took the accusedappellant and brought him to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized. DEFENSE - accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was corroborated by his motherin-law, Soledad Arcano. Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds: (1) The admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid; (2) the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from accused-appellant pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine and (3) the employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant. ISSUE/S: WON the search warrant was valid. RULING:

personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify its issuance. Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled. NOTE: In the Search Warrant, it stated that the things to be searched are: UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA. Yet, no drug paraphernalia was found. Existence of Probable Cause However, in Aday v. Superior Court, it stated that although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it was invalid as a whole. Yet SC held that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellant's house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not. Specificity of the Offense Charged Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425. In this case, the search warrant was captioned: "For Violation of P.D. No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.)." Although it is of different provisions, only one warrant was necessary to cover the violations under the various provisions of the said law. Particularity of the Place Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be searched with sufficient particularity. The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched. The address written on the warrant was merely: "Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City". Yet, it was proven as contended by the SOLGEN that the house raided by Aguilar's team is undeniably appellant's house and it was really appellant who was the target. The raiding team even first ascertained through their informant that appellant was inside his residence before they actually started their operation.

SECOND. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu but
not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground that the drug was seized within the "plain view" of the searching party.

Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence. For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police. The question is whether these requisites were complied with by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this case. In this case, the marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in

FIRST. Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that a search warrant shall
not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined

newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or manner these items were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in accordance with the "plain view doctrine," we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant.

the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support. ISSUE/S: WON petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President. WON the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause RULING: With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counteraffidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded. The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads: Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not

THIRD. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed by the searching
party in effecting the raid. Rule 126, Sec. 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. In contrast, polices claim that they had to use some force in order to gain entry cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to open the door despite the fact that the searching party knocked on the door several times. Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious movements of the people inside the house. These circumstances justified the searching party's forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the apprehension that the execution of their mission would be frustrated unless they do so. WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal drugs under 16 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordering the confiscation of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under 8 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. However, the confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court is AFFIRMED.

3.

[G.R. No. 82585, G.R. No. 82827, AND G.R. No. 83979 - November 14, 1988.]

MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOILI, and GODOFREDO L. MANZANAS, petitioners, vs. THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA AND PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents. Per Curiam: In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and

required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue. WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.

NBI Agent Samiano also presented certifications from petitioners that they have not authorized Maxicorp to perform the witnessed activities using petitioners' products. On 24 July 1997, Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the RTC's order. On 23 December 1998, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC's order denying Maxicorp's motion to quash the search warrants. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion on 29 November 1999. The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during the preliminary examination conclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the counterfeit products. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the sales receipt NBI Agent Samiano presented as evidence that he bought the products from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain "Joel Diaz." ISSUE/s: WON the Petition raises question of law (question of law and of fact) WON petitioners have legal personality to file the petition WON there is a probable cause to issue the SW. WON the SW are general warrants. RULING:

4.

[G.R. No. 140946. September 13, 2004.]

MICROSOFT CORPORATION and LOTUS DEVELOPMENT ORPORATION, petitioners, vs. MAXICORP, INC., respondent. Ponente: CARPIO, J p: Nature: Petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the Court of Appeals' Decision dated 23 December 1998 and its Resolution dated 29 November 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44777. The Court of Appeals reversed the Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Manila ("RTC"), denying respondent Maxicorp, Inc.'s ("Maxicorp") motion to quash the search warrant that the RTC issued against Maxicorp. Petitioners are the private complainants against Maxicorp for copyright infringement under Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 49 ("Section 29 of PD 49") and for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code ("RPC"). FACTS: 25 July 1996 NBI filed several applications for search warrants in the RTC against Maxicorp for alleged violation of Section 29 of PD 49 and Article 189 of the RPC. After conducting a preliminary examination of the applicant and his witnesses, Judge William M. Bayhon issued Search Warrants all dated 25 July 1996, against Maxicorp and thereafter conducted a search of Maxicorp's premises and seized property fitting the description stated in the search warrants. 2 September 1996 - Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there was no probable cause for their issuance and that the warrants are in the form of "general warrants." 22 January 1997 - The RTC denied Maxicorp's motion to quash and its motion for reconsideration. The RTC found probable cause to issue the search warrants after examining NBI Agent Samiano (the one who files application for SW), John Benedict Sacriz ("Sacriz"), and computer technician Felixberto Pante ("Pante"). The three testified on what they discovered during their respective visits to Maxicorp.

On Whether the Petition Raises Questions of Law N.B. The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is settled. A question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual. Of the three main issues raised in this petition the legal personality of the petitioners, the nature of the warrants issued and the presence of probable cause only the first two qualify as questions of law. The pivotal issue of whether there was probable cause to issue the search warrants is a question of fact. At first glance, this issue appears to involve a question of law since it does not concern itself with the truth or falsity of certain facts. Still, the resolution of this issue would require this Court to inquire into the probative value of the evidence presented before the RTC. For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. On Whether Petitioners have the Legal Personality to File this Petition Maxicorp argues that petitioners have no legal personality to file this petition since the proper party to do so in a criminal case is the Office of the Solicitor General as representative of the People of the Philippines. Maxicorp states the general rule but the exception governs this case. The court ruled in Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals that the petitioner-complainant in a petition for review under Rule 45 could argue its case before this Court in lieu of the Solicitor General if there is grave error committed by the lower court or lack of due process. This avoids a situation where a complainant who actively participated in the prosecution of a case would suddenly find itself powerless

to pursue a remedy due to circumstances beyond its control. The circumstances in Columbia Pictures Entertainment are sufficiently similar to the present case to warrant the application of this doctrine. On Whether there was Probable Cause to Issue the Search Warrants Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC based on the fact that the sales receipt was not in the name of NBI Agent Samiano. Petitioners point out that the Court of Appeals disregarded the overwhelming evidence that the RTC considered in determining the existence of probable cause. Maxicorp counters that the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the RTC. Maxicorp maintains that the entire preliminary examination that the RTC conducted was defective. The Court of Appeals based its reversal on two factual findings of the RTC. First, the fact that the sales receipt presented by NBI Agent Samiano as proof that he bought counterfeit goods from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain "Joel Diaz." Second, the fact that petitioners' other witness, John Benedict Sacriz, admitted that he did not buy counterfeit goods from Maxicorp. SC CA ERRED IN REVERSING RTCS FINDINGS. Probable cause means "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper." Thus, probable cause for a search warrant requires such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched. Theres something in here that I did not understand about the case WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the instant petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 December 1998 and its Resolution dated 29 November 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44777 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE except with respect to articles seized under paragraph (c) of Search Warrants Nos. 96451, 96-452, 96-453 and 96-454. All articles seized under paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, are ordered returned to Maxicorp, Inc. immediately.

December 14, 1995- S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search warrant before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. December 15, 1995 The SW was issued against Mr. Hussain was issued not at the place stated in the SW but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent (to) Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4) Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their personal belongings, papers and effects, such as wallets, watches, etc and cash, which were never mentioned in the warrant. However, the money was returned to the respondents upon their request. Included allegedly are one piece of dynamite stick; two pieces of plastic explosives C-4 type and one (1) fragmentation grenade. But without the items described in the search warrant are: (a) three (3) Ingram machine pistols; (b) four (4) gmm pistol; (c) blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted chemical ingredients for explosives; and (f) assorted magazine assg and ammunitions. December 19, 1995 - three days after the warrant was served, a return was made without mentioning the personal belongings, papers and effects including cash belonging to the private respondents. There was no showing that lawful occupants were made to witness the search. January 22, 1996 - private respondents upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged and submitted their "Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search Warrant and to Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible). Furthermore, the search was not accomplished in the presence of the lawful occupants of the place (herein private respondents) or any member of the family, said occupants being handcuffed and immobilized in the living room at the time. The search was thus done in violation of the law. Also, The articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as required by the warrant itself; "(i)n fact the return was done after 3 days or 77 hours from service, in violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court." ISSUES/S: WON the search was valid. (NO) RULING: The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the Quezon City RTC for the search warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched and the things to be seized. But unfortunately, the place they (police officer who searched the place) had in mind the first of four (4) separate apartment units (No. 1) at the rear of "Abigail Variety Store" was not what the Judge who issued the warrant himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described in the search warrant. The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers' own faulty depiction of the premises to be searched. For in their application and in the affidavit thereto appended, they wrote down a description of the place to be searched, which is exactly what the Judge reproduced in the search warrant: " premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207, Area-F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan." And the scope of the search was made more particular and more restrictive by the Judge's admonition in the warrant that the search be "limited only to the premises herein described."

5.

[G.R. No. 126379. June 26, 1998.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial Prosecutor FAUSTINO T. CHIONG,petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD SAGED, MUJAHID KHAN, MOHAMMAD ASLAM and MEHMOOD ALI, respondents. Nature: In behalf of the People, the Solicitor General has perfected the appeal at bar under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the Decision promulgated on September 11, 1996 of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals. 1 Said judgment dismissed the People's petition for certiorari to invalidate (i) the Order of Judge Caesar A. Casanova of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996, 2 as well as (ii) that dated May 28, 1996 denying the People's motion for reconsideration. 3 Those orders were handed down in Criminal Case No. 43-M-96, a case of illegal possession of explosives, after the accused had been arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. Facts: PLACE SEARCHED IS DIFFERENT FROM THE PLACE MENTIONED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT.

SOLGENs argument: The assumption is sanctioned by Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff , AFP, allegedly the effect that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant relevant, and he may, in case of any ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched, look the affidavit in the official court file. Burgos case was merely typographical error therefore, it inapplicable.

to is to is

necessarily brought into operation the concomitant provision that "(a)ny evidence obtained in violation . . . (inter alia of the search-and-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals of September 11, 1996 which dismissed the People's petition for certiorari seeking nullification of the Orders of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996 and May 28, 1996 in Criminal Case No. 43-M-96 is, for the reasons set out in the foregoing opinion, hereby AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to costs.

The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an "obvious typographical error" involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as in Burgos, but the search of a place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant. In Burgos, the inconsistency calling for clarification was immediately perceptible on the face of the warrants in question. In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched although not that specified in the warrant is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant.The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, providing that: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the things to be seized." The contentions have just been stated again and again. Point is, it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on probable cause, personally determined by the judge after examination under oath, or affirmation of the complainant. and the witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly describe the place to be searched, 15 the manifest intention being that the search be confined strictly to the place so described. There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional requirement that a search warrant particularly describe the place to be searched; and that infringement

6.

[G.R. No. 149878. July 1, 2003.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TIU WON CHUA a.k.a. "Timothy Tiu" and QUI YALING y CHUA a.k.a. "Sun Tee Sy y Chua", accused-appellant. SYNOPSIS: Appellants were convicted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA No. 7659. On appeal, they assailed the legality of the search warrant and the search and arrest conducted pursuant thereto, and the correctness of the judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court held that even if the search warrant used by the police did not contain the correct name of appellants Tiu Won or the name of Qui Yaling, that defect did not invalidate it because the place to be searched was described properly and the test buy operation conducted before obtaining the search warrant showed that they have personal knowledge of the identity of the persons and the place to be searched. The search conducted on the car parked away from the building, however, was illegal because it was not part of the place described to be searched and it was not incidental to a lawful arrest. Nature: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, convicting appellants Tiu Won Chua a.k.a. Timothy Tiu (Tiu Won) and Qui Paling y Chua a.k.a. Sun Tee Sy y Chua (Qui Yaling) for violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Facts: October 3, 1998 Accused were caught having in possession of: (1) A sealed plastic bag containing two three four point five (234.5) grams of white crystalline substance, (2) Four (4) separate sealed plastic bags containing six point two two four three (6.2243) grams of white crystalline substance, (3) Sixteen (16) separate sealed plastic bags containing twenty point three six seven three (20.3673) grams of white crystalline substance; or a total of 261.0916 grams and (4) An improvised tooter with traces of crystalline substance. A.K.A. SHABU October 6, 1998 Police conducted a test-buy operation and they were able to buy P2,000.00 worth of substance from appellants. When tested, it was found out that its positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. However, they did not immediately arrest the suspects but . applied for a warrant to search Unit 4-B of HCL Building, 1025 Masangkay St., Binondo, Manila. Their application to search the unit supposedly owned by "Timothy Tiu" was granted by Judge Ramon Makasiar of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila on October 9.

October 12 after several attempts, they were finally able to implement the SW. Failing to get the cooperation of the barangay officials, they requested the presence of the building coordinator, Noel Olarte, and his wife, Joji, who acted as witnesses. DEFENSE: They presented appellants Tiu Won and Qui Yaling. They denied that Timothy Tiu and Tiu Won Chua are one and the same person. They presented papers and documents to prove that appellant is Tiu Won Chua and not Timothy Tiu, as stated in the search warrant. Tiu Won also claimed that he does not live in the apartment subject of the search warrant, alleging that he is married to a certain Emily Tan and is a resident of No. 864 Alvarado St., Binondo, Manila. Nonetheless, he admitted that his co-appellant, Qui Yaling, is his mistress with whom he has two children. Qui Yaling admitted being the occupant of the apartment, but alleged that she only occupied one room, while two other persons, a certain Lim and a certain Uy, occupied the other rooms. Both appellants denied that they were engaged in the sale or possession of shabu. They asserted that they are in the jewelry business and that at the time the search and arrest were made, the third person, whom the prosecution identified as a housemaid, was actually a certain Chin, who was there to look at some of the pieces of jewelry sold by Tiu Won. They also denied that a gun was found in the possession of Tiu Won. They contended that the search warrant issued in the name of Timothy Tiu, did not include appellant Qui Yaling and because of this defect, the search conducted and consequently, the arrest, are illegal. Being fruits of an illegal search, the evidence presented cannot serve as basis for their conviction. ISSUE/S: WON the search and arrest was valid although the person being arrested was not the one being stiplulated in the warrant. RULING: SC disagreed. There are only four requisites for a valid warrant, i.e,: (1) it must be issued upon "probable cause"; (2) probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; and (4) the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, a mistake in the name of the person to be searched does not invalidate the warrant, especially since in this case, the authorities had personal knowledge of the drug-related activities of the accused. In fact, a "John Doe" warrant satisfies the requirements so long as it contains a descriptio personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused. We have also held that a mistake in the identification of the owner of the place does not invalidate the warrant provided the place to be searched is properly described. However, SC affirmed the illegality of the search conducted on the car, on the ground that it was not part of the description of the place to be searched mentioned in the warrant. It is mandatory that for the search to be valid, it must be directed at the place particularly described in the warrant. Moreover, the search of the car was not incidental to a lawful arrest. To be valid, such warrantless search must be limited to that point within the reach or control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of escaping. In this case, appellants were arrested inside the apartment, whereas the car was parked a few meters away from the building. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of RTC Br. 27, Manila as to the penalty of appellant Tiu Won is affirmed, while that of appellant Qui Yaling is modified. Tiu Won Chua is sentenced to a penalty of

reclusion perpetua, and a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) in accordance with Section 16 and Section 20 (1st paragraph) of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. Qui Yaling y Chua is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of prision correccional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

7. [G.R. No. 149462. March 31, 2004.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. PRISCILLA DEL NORTE, appellant.
Nature: An appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 28, finding appellant Priscilla del Norte guilty of the crime of illegal possession of drugs. Facts: August 1, 1997 In Caloocan City, Manila, the accused-appellant and a Jane Doe were conspiring together and mutually helping each other were in possession of MARIJUANA weighing 6748.37 gms. knowing the same to be a prohibited drug under the provisions of the above-entitled law (INFORMATION FILED BY THE PROSECUTOR). Same date-- The police was tasked to serve a search warrant against a certain Ising Gutierrez Diwa residing at No. 275 North Service Road corner Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 6425 and was ordered to "forthwith seize and take possession of an undetermined quantity of shabu and marijuana leaves." They found a bundle of marijuana wrapped in Manila paper under the bed and inside the room. They asked appellant who owned the marijuana. She cried and said she had no means of livelihood. Appellant was brought to the police headquarters for further investigation. DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED: Accused assailed the validity of the SW against her. She contended that she lived at 376 Dama de Noche, Barangay Baesa, Caloocan City, 13 and that on August 1, 1997, she was merely visiting a friend, Marlyn, who lived at 275 North Service Road corner Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. She went to Marlyn's house to borrow money. Marlyn was out and she waited. While appellant was seated near the door, several people introduced themselves as policemen, made her sign a white paper and entered the house. She heard them say "we already got Ising," and was surprised why they suddenly arrested her. She saw Ising, her sister, at a house two steps away from the house where she was arrested. Despite her claim that she was not Ising, the policemen brought her to the police station. ISSUES/S: WON the SW was valid. WON accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. NO. RULING: SC reversed TCs decision. The Constitution requires search warrants to particularly describe not only the place to be searched, but also the persons to be arrested. We have ruled in rare instances that mistakes in the name of the person subject of the search warrant do not invalidate the warrant, provided the place to be searched is properly described. (Cited People vs Tiu Won Chua) The case at bar is different. The authorities did not have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the search. They did not conduct surveillance before obtaining the warrant. It was only

when they implemented the warrant that they coordinated with the barangay officials. One of the barangay officials informed SPO3 De Leon that Ising Gutierrez Diwa and Priscilla Del Norte are one and the same person, but said barangay official was not presented in court. The authorities based their knowledge on pure hearsay. The prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution's witnesses failed to establish appellant's ownership of the house where the prohibited drugs were discovered. Except for their bare testimonies, no other proof was presented. In all criminal cases, it is appellant's constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. In the case at bar, SC held that the prosecution's evidence treads on shaky ground and said that it detested drug addiction in society. However, SC also has the duty to protect appellant where the evidence presented show "insufficient factual nexus" of her participation in the commission of the offense charged. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City is reversed. Appellant is acquitted based on reasonable doubt.

Facts of Umils Case: 1 February 1988 - military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Bian, Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols. ISSUES/S: WON Rolando Dural was lawfully arrested. RULING: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes. Durals arrest was not based on mere suspicion that hes a member of CPP/NPA but on PROBABLE CAUSE supported by facts. His arrest falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrest without warrant: (1) that the person to be arrested has just committed an offense, and (2) that the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the offense. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of popularity or palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be right.

8. [G.R. No. 81567. October 3, 1991.] CONSOLIDATED CASES IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners, vs. FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.
Per Curiam; Note: There are other cases before this one. But not part of the assigned readings. Nature: Petitions seeking reconsideration of the courts decision promulgated on 9 July 1990. Petitioners in their motion for reconsideration assailed the validity of the questioned arrests made without warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests violated the constitutional rights of the persons arrested. In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention of petitioners was illegal or not, the Court before rendering the decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests without warrant were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance with law, it would follow that the detention resulting from such arrests is also in accordance with law. As a general rule, no person shall be arrested without warrant though there can be exceptions as expressly authorized by law as found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. SEC. 5.Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b)When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED. This denial is FINAL.

precinct where the investigator asked for their names, and subsequently to Station B where they were ordered to stand up and be photographed with Nuevas, who Din first met in jail. Inside the room where they had their fingerprints taken, he saw marijuana placed on top of the table. This version was however corroborated by his co-accused Inocencio. ALL THREE (3) were found guilty if the charged crim. 4 July 2003 - Nuevas filed a manifestation and motion to withdraw appeal 25 August 2003 In a Resolution, the court granted Nuevas's withdrawal of appeal and considered the case closed and terminated as to him. 22 September 2004 In a Resolution, the case was transferred to the CA. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, finding the 2 guilty of the charges. So, this petition. The accused were claiming that were rights were violated and that the TC erred in finding them guilty just based on the testimonies of the arresting officers. ISSUE/S: WON the warrantless searches and seizures are valid. RULING: Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" and any evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The constitutional proscription, however, is not absolute but admits of exceptions, namely: 1.Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence); 2.Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search; 3.Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; 4.Consented warrantless search; 5.Customs search; 6.Stop and Frisk; and 7.Exigent and emergency circumstances.

9. [G.R. No. 170233. February 22, 2007.] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JESUS NUEVAS y GARCIA, REYNALDO DIN y GONZAGA, and FERNANDO INOCENCIO y ABADEOS, appellants.
Accused were charged before RTC of Olongapo City, Branch 75 with illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. Facts: September 27, 1997 Some police officers (Fami and Cabling) conducted a stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking along Perimeter Street, Barangay Pag-asa, Olongapo City. They had received information that a certain male person, more or less 5'4" in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana dried leaves. While stationed thereat, they saw a male person who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag, later identified as Nuevas, alight from a motor vehicle. They accosted Nuevas and informed him that they are police officers. Fami asked Nuevas where he was going. Nuevas answered arrogantly but afterwards, calmed down. Nuevas and Fami conversed in the Waray dialect. Nuevas informed him that there were other stuff in the possession of a certain Vangie, an associate, and two other male persons. Later on, Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when opened, contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. Shortly, in his bid to escape charges, Nuevas disclosed where the two (2) other male persons would make the delivery of marijuana weighing more or less five (5) kilos. Fami and Cabling (police officers), together with Nuevas, then proceeded to Purok 12, Old Cabalan, Olongapo City, which according to Nuevas was where his two (2) companions, Din and Inocencio, could be located. From there, they saw and approached two (2) persons along the National Highway, introducing themselves as police officers. Din was carrying a light blue plastic bag. When asked, Din disclosed that the bag belonged to Nuevas. Fami then took the bag and upon inspection found inside it "marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein." After confiscating the items, the police officers brought Nuevas, Din and Inocencio to the police office at Purok III for proper documentation. Accuseds Version (Nuevas): 27 September 1997 morning, he was walking along Perimeter Street, on his way home from the Barangay Hall, when Fami called him. Nuevas approached Fami, who was then in front of his house, and asked why Fami had called him. Fami poked his gun at Nuevas and asked him to go inside the room where Fami handcuffed Nuevas's hands, got Nuevas's wallet, took out P1,500.00 and put it in his (Fami's) wallet. Fami then confronted Nuevas with shabu use but the latter denied the charge. Before leaving the house with Nuevas, Fami brought out a plastic bag and told Nuevas to carry it. Subsequently, they boarded a red owner type jeep and proceeded to Station B where Nuevas was put in jail. Nuevas further stated that he did not know Din or Inocencio. Accuseds Version (Din): 27 September 1997 10oclock morning, Inocencio was visiting him, then suddenly 2 men entered the house looking for a woman. The two (2) introduced themselves as police officers. Then, Din and Inocencio were immediately handcuffed. They were not informed of the reason for their arrest and were told that the reason will be explained to them in court. Next, they were brought to the Cabalan

The courts below (TC and CA) anchor appellants' conviction on the ground that the searches and seizure conducted in the instant case based on a tip from an informant fall under one of the exceptions as Nuevas, Din and Inocencio all allegedly voluntarily surrendered the plastic bags containing marijuana to the police officers. SC differs. FIRST. SC holds that the searches and seizures conducted do not fall under the first exception, warrantless searches incidental to lawful arrests. A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed as in this case where the search preceded the arrest. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the persons to be arrested had committed an offense. The searches conducted on the plastic bag then cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest. Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." SECOND. The searches be neither be justified under the plain view doctrine. An object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized Records show that the dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags that Nuevas and Din were carrying and were not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers. In Nuevas's case, the dried marijuana leaves found inside the plastic bag were wrapped inside a blue cloth. In Din's case, the marijuana found upon inspection of the plastic bag was "packed in newspaper and wrapped therein." It cannot be therefore said the items were in plain view which could have justified mere seizure of the articles without further search. Indeed, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. However, it must be seen that the consent to the search was voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent was unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. The consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.

However, during the cross-examination, the police officers gave inconsistent and dissimilar testimonies. regarding the manner by which they got hold of the bag containing the marijuana. This already raises serious doubts on the voluntariness of Din's submission of the plastic bag. Jurisprudence requires that in case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The prosecution failed to prove that Din waived his right to unreasonable search/seizure. The Court has repeatedly declared that the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution. Same is true with Inocencio, the court likewise find that he was wrongly convicted of the crime charged. Taking a look at an object, more so in this case peeping into a bag while held by another, is not the same as taking possession thereof. To behold is not to hold. Indeed, the act attributed to Inocencio is insufficient to establish illegal possession of the drugs or even conspiracy to illegally possess the same. The prosecution failed to show by convincing proof that Inocencio knew of the contents of the bag and that he conspired with Din to possess the illegal items. Inocencio was firm and unshakeable in his testimony that he had no part in any delivery of marijuana dried leaves. WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 4 April 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 75, in Criminal Cases No. 458-97 and No. 459-97 is reversed and modified. Appellants Reynaldo Din y Gonzaga and Fernando Inocencio y Abadeos are hereby ACQUITTED. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause the immediate release of appellants from confinement, unless they are being held for some other lawful cause, and to report to this Court compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

10. [G.R. No. 127755. April 14, 1999.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PASCUAL,accused-appellant.

JOSELITO

DEL

ROSARIO

SYNOPSIS: Accused Joselito Del Rosario was found guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and he was sentenced to suffer the death penalty and to pay damages to the heirs of the victim. Del Rosario alleged that he was just hired by Virgilio Santos to drive him to a cockpit. He was not aware of the plan of Santos and his two companions to rob and kill the victim. He was not able to seek assistance because Santos threatened to shoot him if he did. He also failed to inform the police authorities about the incident because the culprits has threatened him and his family. He claimed exemption from criminal liability as he allegedly acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force. The conviction of Del Rosario must be set aside and his claim for exemption sustained. He was then unarmed and unable to protect himself when he was prevented at gunpoint from leaving the crime scene during the commission of the robbery and killing. He was also forced to help the culprits escape after the commission of the crime. Further, Del Rosario's failure to disclose what he knew about the incident to the authorities does not affect his credibility. The natural hesitance of most people to get

involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. Given his quite limited means, Del Rosario understandably did not want to get involved in the case so he chose to keep his silence. Besides, he was threatened with physical harm should he squeal. Nature: Review of the court a quo finding accused Joselito del Rosario y Pascual guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, and to pay the heirs of victim Virginia Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez alias "Jun," Virgilio Santos alias "Boy Santos" and John Doe alias "Dodong" were charged with the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide. While accused Joselito del Rosario pleaded not guilty, Virgilio "Boy" Santos and John Doe alias "Dodong" remained at large. Ernesto "Jun" Marquez was killed in a police encounter. Only Joselito del Rosario was tried. Facts (according to eye-witness Paul Vincent Alonzo): 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening, Alonzo saw the accused del Rosario driving his tricycle. At that point, Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman grappling for possession of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one of the two men armed with a gun started chasing a man who was trying to help the woman, while the other snatcher kicked the woman sending her to the ground. Soon after, the armed man returned and while the woman was still on the ground he shot her on the head. The bag taken by the man was brought to the tricycle of accused del Rosario where someone inside received the bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver while his companion entered the sidecar. When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase and was able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He also recognized the driver, after which he went to the nearest police headquarters and reported the incident. Accuseds version (Del Rosario): 5:30PM accused was hired by a Boy Santos (co-accused) for P120. Their original agreement was that he would drive him to a cockpit at the Blas Edward Coliseum. 7 However despite their earlier arrangement Boy Santos directed him to proceed to the market place to fetch "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya. He (del Rosario) acceded. 8 Marquez and Bisaya boarded in front of the parking lot of Merced Drugstore at the public market. 9 Subsequently, he was asked to proceed and stop at the corner of Burgos and General Luna Sts. where Bisaya alighted on the pretext of buying a cigarette. The latter then accosted the victim Virginia Bernas and grappled with her for the possession of her bag. Jun Marquez alighted from the tricycle to help "Dodong" Bisaya. 10 Accused del Rosario tried to leave and seek help but "Boy Santos" who stayed inside the tricycle prevented him from leaving and threatened in fact to shoot him. Meanwhile, "Dodong" Bisaya succeeded in taking the victim's bag, but before boarding the tricycle "Jun" Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on the head while she was lying prone on the ground. After the shooting, "Dodong" Bisaya boarded the sidecar of the tricycle while "Jun" Marquez rode behind del Rosario and ordered him to start the engine and drive towards Dicarma. While inside his tricycle, del Rosario overheard his passengers saying that they would throw the bag at Zulueta St. where there were cogon grasses. Upon arriving at Dicarma, the three (3) men alighted and warned del Rosario not to inform the police authorities about the incident otherwise he and his family would be harmed. Del Rosario then went home. Because of the threat, however, he did not report the matter to the owner of the tricycle nor to the barangay captain and the police ISSUE/S:

WON there was lawful warrantless arrest within the meaning of Sec. 5, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court. WON del Rosarios rights were constitutional rights were violated. RULING: The conviction of Del Rosario must be set aside and his claim for exemption from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 5, Revised Penal Code as he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force must be sustained. He was then unarmed and unable to protect himself when he was prevented at gunpoint by his co-accused from leaving the crime scene during the perpetration of the robbery and killing, and was only forced to help them escape after the commission of the crime. (Other aspects of the case are related to CRIMINAL LAW conspiracy and exempting circumstance AND TO NOT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW). Well, in relation to Constitutional law, Del Rosario contended that there was violation of his right to remain silent, right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and right to be informed of these rights as enshrined and guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. After the police found out that it was Del Rosario who was involved in the case, he was summoned and was invited for an interview. The investigator took the statement of the accused on May 14,1996, and was only subscribed on May 22,1996. All the while, he was detained in the police station as ordered by the Fiscal. His statements were only signed on May 16, 1996. Del Rosario underwent a custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is well-settled that it encompasses any question initiated by law enforcers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 41 This concept of custodial investigation has been broadened by RA 7438 42 to include "the practice of issuing an 'invitation' to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed." As stipulated in Section 2 of the RA 7438, it is the duty of a public officer of employee to inform persons who are arrested, detained or investigated of rights to remain silent, have a counsel, etc. and other constitutional rights. However, Del Rosario was deprived of these rights during the custodial investigation. He also asserted that his arrest was unlawful having no warrant therefor The arrest of del Rosario does not comply with the requirements under (Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court) since, as earlier mentioned, the arrest came a day after the consummation of the crime and not immediately thereafter. As such, the crime had not been "just committed'' at the time the accused was arrested. Likewise, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense since they were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became aware of his identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation. It was pretty clear that a transgression of the law has occurred. Unfortunately, an innocent person lost her life and property in the process. Someone therefore must be held accountable, but it will not be accused Joselito del Rosario; we must acquit him. Like victim Virginia Bernas, he too was a hapless

victim who was forcibly used by other persons with nefarious designs to perpetrate a dastardly act. Del Rosario's defense of "irresistible force" has been substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. On the other hand, conspiracy between him and his co-accused was not proved beyond a whimper of a doubt by the prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of any complicity in the crime charged. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City convicting accused JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the accused is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His immediate RELEASE from confinement is ordered unless held for some other lawful cause. In this regard, the Director of Prisons is directed to report to the Court his compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

Petitioners contentions: (1) that his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule; (2) that he is a confidential agent authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms; and (3) that the penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution. "Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or private person.[29] Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run - an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene. HOT PURSUIT Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest. Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such irregularities and defects. Now, with regards to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search warrant, the admissibility in evidence of which, SC upholds. The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid,[44] are as follows: 1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court[45] and by prevailing jurisprudence[46], 2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are:[47] (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

11. [G.R. No. 121917. July 31, 1996.] ROBIN CARIO PADILLA, accused-appellant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee.
Facts: October 26, 1992 The petitioner was allegedly involved in a hit-and-run incident. He was chased by the police officers for such. It is to be noted that the petitioner (accused-appellant) was during this time wearing a short leather jacket, that was why, the police officers noticed him possessing a pistol. It was also discovered that the accused-appellant also possessed other high-powered firearms with live ammunitions yet, there was no proof to show that he has the permit to do so. The firearms which were confiscated are as follows: (1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions; (2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazine with ammunitions; (3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions; and (4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver. December 3, 1992 Padilla was charged before the RTC of Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under P.D. 1866. RTC ordered his arrest but his request for bail was granted. RTC decision: April 25, 1994 GUILTY and will be convicted and sentenced with an "indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years ofreclusion perpetua, as maximum". April 28, 1994 Filed a petition to appeal before the CA. December 2, 1994 SOLGEN filed a motion to cancel petitioners bail bond. Then, the court ordered his bail bond to be cancelled. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Angeles City, is directed to issue the Order of Arrest of accused-appellant and thereafter his transmittal to the National Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police where the said accused-appellant shall remain under confinement pending resolution of his appeal, should he appeal to the Supreme Court. August 9, 1995 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of arrest) and same was denied by CA on its September 20, 1995 Resolution.

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d)"plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.[48] 3. search of a moving vehicle.[49] Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity.[50] 4. consented warrantless search, and 5.customs search. In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that the authorities stumbled upon petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. Anent his second defense, petitioner contends that he could not be convicted of violating P.D. 1866 because he is an appointed civilian agent authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms and ammunition as evidenced by a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt duly issued by PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang, the deputy commander of Task Force Aguila, Lianga, Surigao del Sur. The contention lacks merit. The petitioner failed to produce and present said Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt. Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court "in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context" and adds that respondent court should have applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution. The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of appellant's commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones.[86] Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. And until its repeal, respondent court cannot be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner. Consequently, the penalty for the offense of simple illegal possession of firearm is the medium period of the complex penalty in said Section 1, that is, 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years. "This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance with the rules therefor and not merely imposable as a general prescription under the law, shall be the maximum of the range of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum thereof shall be taken, as aforesaid, from any period of the penalty next lower in degree, which is, prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period,

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner's conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner's indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to ten (10) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum.

12. [G.R. No. 136292. January 15, 2002.] RUDY CABALLES y TAIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
SYNOPSIS: The Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna convicted petitioner Rudy Caballes of the crime of theft for stealing aluminum cable conductors worth P55,244.45 belonging to the National Power Corporation. Accordingly, it sentenced petitioner to a prison term and ordered him to indemnify private complainant. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction but deleted the award of damages and modified the penalty imposed. Hence, this appeal by certiorari. Petitioner questioned the validity of the warrantless search and seizure made by the police officers, and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue thereof. The searches without warrant of moving vehicles is allowed provided such searches are made at borders or 'constructive borders', like checkpoints. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon. The Court held that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause'' as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant. In addition, the police authorities did not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle, which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in this case. Furthermore, it cannot be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's vehicle were in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid. It was clear from the records that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because they were placed in sacks and covered by kakawati leaves. The police officers even have to ask petitioner what was loaded in his vehicle. Moreover, it was not established by clear and positive proof that the petitioner consented to the search or intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable search. Thus, the articles seized from petitioner could not be used as evidence against him. For lack of evidence to establish his guilt, the Court acquitted petitioner of the crime charged. Nature: Appeal by Certiorari from the decision of CA dated September 15, 1998 which affirmed the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, finding herein petitioner, Rudy Caballes y Taio, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft, and the resolution dated November 9, 1998 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

13. [G.R. No. 136860. January 20, 2003.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN and ROSITA NUNGA y VALENCIA, accused.
SYNOPSIS This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City finding appellant and her co-accused guilty of violating Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. For their conviction, each was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. The appellant argued that her arrest was unlawful and capitalized on the absence of a warrant for her arrest. She contended that at the time she was apprehended by the police officers, she was not committing any offense but was merely riding a tricycle. She also impugned the search made on her belongings as illegal as it was not done without a valid warrant or under circumstances when warrantless search is permissible. Consequently, she claimed that the evidence obtained therein were inadmissible against her. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the appellant. According to the Court, the general rule is that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in the Constitution. However, the constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures. The warrantless search in this case is not bereft of a probable cause. It was also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing a criminal offense, transporting prohibited drugs. Against the credible positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant's defense of denial and alibi could not stand.

enforcement, to the detriment of society. Thus, the strip search in the ladies' room was justified under the circumstances. The search conducted on appellant resulted in the discovery and recovery of three packages containing shabu. Such warrantless search and seizure was legal. Armed with the knowledge that appellant was committing a crime, the airport security personnel and police authorities were duty-bound to arrest her. Her subsequent arrest without a warrant was justified, since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person flagrante delicto.

14.

[G.R. No. 148825. December 27, 2002.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. SUSAN CANTON, appellant. SYNOPSIS: Appellant was charge with violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425). At the trial, the prosecution established that at the time of the commission of the crime, appellant was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), being a departing passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. When she passed through metal detector booth, a beeping sound was emitted. Consequently, the frisker on duty frisked and searched appellant. The frisker felt something bulging at appellant's abdominal area so she was brought to a comfort room for a thorough physical examination. It was discovered that appellant was carrying packages containing shabu. After due proceedings, the trial court found her guilty as charged. Hence, this appeal. In affirming the conviction of appellant, the Supreme Court ruled that the search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235. This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and seizures. In the said provision, passengers are subject to search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit the action of the airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and sending her home, and thereby depriving them of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to further search without warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law