In the Mayo clinic, doctors are referred to as "consultants" to emphasize the fact that anyone is expected to be called upon to discuss a patient. The bad kind of conflict is what we fear character assassination, angry words, gossip, and brush-offs. The good kind of conflict debate, challenging questions in search of the type of conflict.
In the Mayo clinic, doctors are referred to as "consultants" to emphasize the fact that anyone is expected to be called upon to discuss a patient. The bad kind of conflict is what we fear character assassination, angry words, gossip, and brush-offs. The good kind of conflict debate, challenging questions in search of the type of conflict.
Авторское право:
Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
Доступные форматы
Скачайте в формате PDF, TXT или читайте онлайн в Scribd
In the Mayo clinic, doctors are referred to as "consultants" to emphasize the fact that anyone is expected to be called upon to discuss a patient. The bad kind of conflict is what we fear character assassination, angry words, gossip, and brush-offs. The good kind of conflict debate, challenging questions in search of the type of conflict.
Авторское право:
Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
Доступные форматы
Скачайте в формате PDF, TXT или читайте онлайн в Scribd
A Guide for Managerd Leigh L. Thompson Kellogg School of Management Northwestern University I .. CHAPTER Leveraging to Create Opportunity "Each afternoon, in a tiny workroom on the 12th floor of the Mayo Clinic, the battle against cancer begins wiih an argument" (Roberts, 1999a, p. 148). The walls of rhe room are plastered with and data. A group of cancer and nurses debates how to diagnose, and ultimately treat, the patients. On one particular day, Dr. L . .ynn Hartmann, a medical oncologist. suggests 11 surgical procedure for a 65-year-old man with a possible kidney tumor. lfOH/ever, when she asks teammates John Edmonson and llarry Long for their opinionY, they challenge her in a direct, point- counterpoint debate. lVhereas this open debate might seem strange. it is precisely the vision that j(mnder William Worrall Mayo estabiLYhed when he j(rst opened the clinic in 1859. Mayo, an ambitious perfectionist and strong believer of the whole being greater than the sum of the parts, regularly preached, "No one is big enough to be independent of others." In the Mayo clinic, physicians are referred to as "consultants" to emphasize the fact thai anyone, at any time, is expected to be called upon to discuss a patient. The open debates are part of the team culture at lvtayo; consultants know thai their tions will be rigorously questioned by team members and that this kind of careful scrutiny will lead to more accurate diagnoses and more effective treatments 1999a). s we will see in this chapter, conflict is a lot like cholesterol: There's a good kind and a bad kind, Most people try to go on special diets so they can lower their bad cholesterol, hoping to avoid a heart attack, ln teams, the bad kind of conflict is what we fear character assassination, angry words, deniaL gossip, and brush-offs, The good type of conflict debate, challenging questions in search of the the type of conflict that characterizes high-perfor- mance teams such as the I\1ayo Clinic teams. This style of cont1ict is one that is often not present in teams. Indeed, most teams either actively avoid conflict and risk making "trips to Abilene" (as discussed in Chapter 6), or they engage in a type of conflict that is personal, rather than principled. Some team leaders, in fact, pride themselves on the fact that they never have conflict in their teams. \Ve think these leaders do their teams a great disservice< Our survey of executives and managers, presented in Chapter 1 of this book, revealed that team conflict is one of the top concerns of team management 1 Conflict 1 Survey of managers and executives in the Kellogg Leading High Impact Teams Program, 156 CHAPTER 7 Conflict in Teams: that is not properly managed may lead to hostility, performance deficits, and, in extreme cases. dissolution of the team. J\t1ost people regard conflict to be detrimental to cff\.:ctive teamwork and hdieve thal differences between team members should be immediately eliminated. Howevcc differences in interests< perceptions. information. and preferences cannot be avoidecL especially in teams that work together closely for extended periods of time. Moreover. conflict can he good for the team---when man- aged properly. The challenge for the leader is to transform conflict into opportunity. Conflict can have positive cons-::quences. such as enhancing creativity or fostering inte- grative solutions reflecting many points of view. This chapter hegins hy distinguishing among types of contlict and their relative and absolute levels within a team. \Vc the-n discuss the team dilemma, \vhich centers on the tension hct\vecn one's own and the team's interests. Next, we describe voting and majority rule and when they are appropriate to use in teams. F'inally. we discuss team negotiation and how to maximize mutual interests. TYPES OF CONFLICT As we noted ahovc, all conflict is not created equaL Many types of conflict can threaten teamwork. Before a manager launches into conflict management mode. it is important to accurately diagnose the type of conflict that plagues the team. According to khn ( 1995) there are three distinct types of conflict: relationship conflict, task conflict and process conflict (see Tahle T<YBLE 7-L Example of items used to assess/ of Connict Definition mea:-.ure this of conflict Relationship conflict Involves How often do people get angry while working in (also known as b<Jsed on personal nnd your !t.'am? emotional contlicL social issues ihat an: not How much relationship tension is there in your A-type conflict, or rdatcd to \vork team? affective conflict) Task conflict (also known as cognitive contlict or conflict} Involves about the work that is being done in a gruup Process conflict Centers on task strate_gy and of duties and TiJ what extent arc there differences of opinion in your team'? HO\v much conflict is there ahcmt the work you do in your team'! Hmv often do pcoptc in your team disagree about opinions regarding the work to be done? How frequently an; there conflicts about ideas in yuur tc<nn'!
I low often do memb<:rs of your team disagree nbout who should do what'! lfmv fn:quently do members of your team wsacrcc about the way to complete a team task? Hov much dis;.tgrecment about the delegation of tasks exists within your team'! /jased on: Jchn. K. l lJlJ5. "A Multimdhod Examination uf the l-knr:!'it;; and Detriments of Intragroup Con1lict." Adminismuive Si"ience Qtumeriv. 40, 256- .klm, K.A .. &: \iarmix. F.i\.. 2001. 'The Dynamic Nature of Conf!ici: A Lungi1udina! StuJy ot lntragroup ( 'onfiict anJ ( lmup PG!f<lfnl<!l1Cc."' \cadnnv o( Managemenr Jmmwf, 44(2L 2}8--251, Relationship rs defensive, and resentfuL Also known as A-type conflict; & it is rooted in anger, persona{ ego, and -tension.-Obviously, this is the type of conflict that mos_t team leaders and tea:rn members try to avoid, Sometimes, how- ever. they are noLsuccessfuL For several former managers at Qwest, the teleCommunications company that went undeccriminal for its accounting nractices_ say that matches among executives were not uncommon during CEO Joseph Nacchio's tenure with the companr At one in 2000, one execu- tive recalled, Nacchio flew into a rage, hurled a folder across the room, and ordered everyone at to return to their offices (Hudson. 2002). exoncssed via -open shouting matches. In fact, some people. and some teams, go to great to avoid any overt expression of con- flict For describes a case in which lower-level managers had identified a number of serious and in their company. told the middle managers, Once the middle managers wcre convinced that the sit- uation the lower managers was true, to release some of the bad news. but did so in measured doses. managed their communications carefully to -make certain were 'icovered'' if upper management became 'TI1e result was that apprised of the problems-rather, received a manage- ment COntinued to to ensure that it would the financial it needed from within the company. Lower-level managers became confused and because could not under- stand top management continued to Sl..J-pport the Their reaction was to reduce the -freouencv of their memos :and the of the alarm they expressed, prot>le.m over to rniddle managemen cmmi!ive co.ntlic!, rs also known as C-type conflict, it consists of argumentation about the merits of ideas. and projects. Task conflict is often effective in because it forces people to rethink problems and arrive at outcomes that everyone can live -,vith. This is having diver- gent views in a team is beneficia! for and For example. when a majority o_f members in a team is confronted the of minorities, the majority is forced to think abour the This though! process can instigate novel ideas & fvioreland Process conflict cemers on that tearn members have about how to approach a task and, who should do whaL Types As a general rule. conflict threatens team nrndBcti\itv. conflict benefits team 1995: Shah & Jehn, 1993), g_bout a is the most beneficial of conflict Relationship conflict interferes with the effort oeor>le members are with threats, rnt:reasrng build cohesion rather than work-in;; :tmrnosny mav inhibit into a task because to interpersonal 1994) and also CHAPTER 7 Differences to Create Opportunity distract team members from the task, causing them to work less effectively and pro- duce suboptimal products (Wilson, Butler, Cray, Hickson, & Mallory, I 986), ln contrast, task conflict can improve decision-making outcomes and team by increasing decision quality through incorporating devil's advocacy roles, con- structive criticism. and stimulation of discussion. Clear evidence for the advantages of task conflict over relationship conflict is found in observations of actual organizational work teams. According to Jehn (1997), who investigated everyday conflicts in six organizational work teams, relationship con- flict is detrimental to performance and satisfaction (t\VO major indices of team produc- tivity); furthermore, emotionality reduces team effectiveness. Groups that accept task conflict but not relationship conflict are the most effective. Thsk conflict is associated with higher decision-making quality, greater understanding, higher commitment, and more acceptance. In contrast. relationship conf1ict significantly reduces decision qual- ity, understanding; commitment. and acceptance. (For another illustration of the dele- terious effects of relationship conflict. see Box 7-L) Similarly, task conflict in teams composed of academics and practitioners is also conducive to productivity on a pro- ject, whereas relationship conflict is not (Amabile, Nasco, Mueller, Wojcik, Odomirok, Marsh, & Kramer, 2001 ), Task cont1ict is productive because when people are in conflict about ideas. they are forced to consider the ideas of others. For example, consider a debate between two managers concerning how to market a company's produce Although they have their own individual ideas, when they try to persuade the other by presenting a rationale for their approach, each is forced, on some level, to integrate the other's point of view< Of The Effects of Relationship Conflict Amason ( 1996) interviewed 48 agement teams in small and midsize food processing firms across the United States and five top-management teams in furni- ture manufacturing firms in the southeast- ern United States. Both CEOs and agers were asked about strategic decisions and team behavior. Questions to assess rela- tionship conflict included: How much anger was there among the group over this deci- sion? How much personal friction was there in the group during this discussion? How much were personality clashes between group members evident during the deci- sion? How much tension was there in the assess task conflict included: How many dis- agreements over different ideas ahout this decision were there? How many differences ahout the content of this decision did the group have to work through? How many differences of opinion were there within the group over this decision? The results were striking: The presence of task conflict was associated with higher decision-making quality, greater under- standing, higher commitment and more acceptance, In contrast, the presence of relationship conflict significantly reduced decision quality, understanding, commit- ment, and affective acceptance. ourse, it is possible to completely reject the other's arguments, but this is inappropri- te in a healthy working relationship, It would also represent relationship rather than ask conflict. Jchn and Mannix (20(Jl) investigated the evolution of conflict within teams over ime. Teams performing well were characterized by low but increasing levels of process onflict, moderate levels of task conflict, and low levels of relationship conllict, with a ise near project deadlines. These teams had similar value systems. high levels of trust nd respect, and norms that permitted open discussion< >roportional and Perceptual Conflict Pr(JjJtW!iona/ lCam members often have different ideas about the amount and type of conflict hat exists in their group, In any team, for example, there may be differing actuallevcls f relationship, task, and process conflicL And the relative levels of such conl1ict are a rucial aspect for team leaders to understand as it affects task performance (Jehn & :batman, 2000), Proportional conflict composition describes the relationship among he three types of conflict (task, relationship, and process) as the level of each type of ont1ict proportional to the other two and to the overall level of connie! within the ;roup, rather than as an ahsolute level or amount of any one type. Consider the follow- ag example offered by Jehn and Chatman (2000): A team that experiences a moderate .mount of constructive task conflict and no Other conflict (no relationship or process onflict) will have a different experience than will members of another group with the arne amount of task conflict but also a high proportional level of relationship conflict, n the former group, members should experience less stress, less distraction, and less ,nger, which are frequent consequences ofrelationship conflict (Amason, 1996: Jehn, 994, I 995) as compared to members of the group containing more moderate levels of ask and relationship conflict Indeed, teams with a high proportion of task conflict xperience a higher level of team member commitment cohesiveness, individual per- ormance, group performance, and member satisfaction. In contrast, a high proportion Jf relationship conflict is negatively related to member commitment, cohesiveness, ndividual performance, group performance, and member satisfaction. Percepltuzf If proportional conflict refers to the relative amounts of task, relationship, and rroce,ss conflict within a team, perceptual conflict refers to the extent to which there is lgreement or lack thereof. in terms of whether team members perceive conflict. ,erceptual conflict composition is the degree to which each person in a team per- 'Cives levels of conflict differently compared to other team members (Jehn & :batman, 2000), Specifically, each members perceptions of conflict are compare to all rther group members' perceptions of the group, Jehn and Chatman (2000) the ollowing example:l\vo team members in an eight-person team perceive arguments in he group pertaining to the task while the other six members do not detect such con- lict. lbese two members have a larger 'perceptual conflict" composition score than hose members who believe that there is no task conflict, Importantly, disagreements ts to whether and how much conflict exists in a team negatively influence team effec- iveness. C!!AP!TR 7 ( \mflict in TCam'i: Leveraging to Creak Opportunity Transforming Relationship into Task Conflict T"he key. nf course. for the team leader is to learn how to transform relationship conllict into task conflict: OL ideally, design the team so that relationship conflict does not erupt and instc;ul only healthy task conflict exists. Usually. relationship conflict emerges \vhcn there is no other appropriate outlet for conflict. Cohesion and trust among team members allo\VS cognitive conflict to productively emerge. Indeed, friends arc better at applying cffcctiYc conflict management strategies to suit the task at hand than arc teams \)f strangers. \VIlO'iC conflict management approaches arc less sophisti- cated (Shah & Jc:hn. 1993). Some specific strategies follow. A.tJn',' (Ill t1 C1mmatt (,'(";/ (Ji. SlltuwJ The importance of a conmwn goal is summeJ up in quote by Steve Johs. who is associated with two high-profile Silicon Valley companies-Apple Computers and Pixar. Inc. It's okay to spend a lot of time arguing about which route to take to San Francisco when everyone wants to end up there. hut a lot of time gets \Vasted in such arguments if one person wants to go lO San Francisco and another secretly wants to go to San Diego'' (Eiscnh<JrdL Kahwajy. & Bourgeois. 1997. p. BO). Shared goals do not imply homogeneous thinking. but they do require everyone to share a vision. Steve Jobs is not alone in his thinking. Colin Scwcll-Ruttcr. a director of The Results Partnership. a consultanc:y that specializes in improving hoard-kvel communications. concludes that "[tJhe single most important source of problems within the boardroom is the lack of a shared vision. and shmcJ corporate goals .... All the major difficulties ultimately stem from that'' (Lynn, lY07, p. 31). The 1993 departure of Ernest Mario as chief executive of pharmaceutical firm Cilaxo (as it \Vas thc:n called) illustraws hmv contlicts can also mask the fact that teams never fundamcntaily agreed on what the cumpany is about. f\1ario was thought to have been preparing a takeover of American rival \Varner-Lamhcrt. even though the then- chairman. Sir Paul Girolami. believed that the company should stick with its strategy of investing for organic growth. The result \Vas a bitter conflict that culminated In Mario's departure with a payoff (it was only Dftcr Girnlami retired that Glaxo made its first takeover in decades when it hid for \Vclicomc ). ( 'rt'al<' a Pfacc/;w J;z,,J: and l)nh'(',,,J and Get It Out t!Itbe Open Most people. even seasoned managers and executives. feel uncomfortable about conflict much easier to C<:lpitalite on constructive conflict by creating a time and place for it to occur, rather than expecting it to naturally erupt. Furthermore. Uis- the potential for conflict he fore it erupts is a lot more effective than trying to deal with it after the fact. As an example of how companies create a forum for flicL sec Box 7-2. lla!ntlzq tfz J;J,Ik ( For many people. task conflict or open debate, docs not come naturally. They have lived their lives in rcpressed-conilict situations and have never had an opportunity to sec healthy conflict in action. H task conflict is not in team members repertoires, it will be impossible to cultivate conditions for it to thrive. One step is to provide members with training in task conflict Asking team mem- hers who have not hcen trained in task conflict to discuss their most sensitive issues is Creating a Forum for Conflict s Construction Corporation, which has ed on the renovation of Los Angeles Hall and the construction of a football urn in Nashville, deals with conflict in pen fashion. Prior to each projecL s construction teams hold a planning an in which team members openly :ss potential conflicts, These planning Jns are conducted by company who encourage the project owner, tects, contractors. and other p!ayers to out processes they plan to follow to 1e job done. During the session. partic- .s draft and sign a "win-win agree- ment,'' which includes a matrix that lays out what team members expect from one another. The first box in a matrix may detail the owner's responsibilities on the project, whereas the next box may look at the owner 1 s expectations of the construction manager, Teams then use this matrix to review their progress on the project. Bovis m-anagers agree that the process has not o:n:ly decreased the adversity that is so prevalent on construction sites, but the firm has also saved millions of dollars and has completed projects on time (Oldham, 1998), rot the best starting point, Instead, training should begin with topics in which the takes are low. Further. leaders and othet team members can serve as "coaches'' for me another (see Sidebar Edmondson, Bohmer, and Pisano (2000) refer to the bility of teams to discuss tough issues as ''psychological safety,'" A group that has a righ level of psycholo_gical safety has interpersonal trust and mutual respect among nembers. tvforeover, psychological safety leads to greater innovativeness, more open- Less, and comfort in raising difficult issues. In their book, Getting Disputes Resolved, Ury, Brett, and Goldberg ( 1988) 1bserved -managers in many different types of coal mines, and so 1n-discussing conflicts and in many cases, engaging in confiict.Ury et aL (1988) dis- ( 'l L\PTU\ thrt.'l' thcl.t pvnpk' ulk to ,lflt..' anr1thcr in such di-;putc situ:ninns. \\ hich luhck:d: ,md pn'LT L'onrlid is a Jut !ikL" ta:-:k nlct. !t i:o-, l)l)\ pcr:c.on;d, <HlJ (JCLl!r'-' \\hL'r\ ]lLOjlk <ltlt:mpt Tn !Clr!l ;lb(lllt tilt: ClthCT lC<ll1l m(mb...:rs lng l1l-'L'ds. Llcsir'--,_ or L'OtKc'rn:--. Tbc righh-l'asnl approach to conflic1 j:; hL':FiJ\ roL'Uscd 011 St<:ndard'i Oi f::irnC'i'. pl"t'CL'Lk!lL :llid isSUCc;, hna]IY_ the i!jl!l!'O:JCh \<_l nm!'iicl lhr...:-:lh. <l1L1c'ks t!lll'IWLICkL and the US<..' of rcmk or \tutus .-\s Jll l'\tunpk (lf tJ-L: dii'i',__'rL11L'c' hL'l\\'..__';,;.'!l inkrv-..h- ttlld pu\\cr-hac;L'd :tpproachvs in k<ll1b. '-onsidcr d L_':llll in\\ hich tlwr..: h:-t-.. h.:cn <l sninuc:;. lonf!-Standing conflict concnning thL' Jut uri._' of lhL' to tc;ml !lll'nllxrs. Sumc as,ign- HL'llts arc Llc:lrly r(:ganJ<..d llll)rL' cl11r:IL'!i\c ;lnd L'<lrc'LT-..:nh<clllCing than others. Iln\\l:YC'L r,lr the h.__' ,,Ut.>.xs...:ful. Jl! as:-,i)!l11llCn1s llllbl ht. CO\lTCd hy the team. On<..' or lilt..' I ;JJT)'. tl lllt.'cting h\ stat "I arn ll\ll at :ill wit!l how the <hSi!lnmcnh for tlw prnjr:ct :HL' handled. l <Hl1 ha\'ing to do 1 he IL'<t"t p:lrt o( tht..' pro.j.:..__t :md it i-; a lot tlf \\'ork. I want to he c\cuscd from tJ-ut p:lrl uf the pl'l)jcct in thL futurL."Thn_'(' difkrcnl kdllli11Clllhns might l'C'-'pond in tht.. ft)l!n\Yillf. on \\hich appro:1ch the: l<ll-\c to the conflict at hand: J. fllkf!'.\{.\-hii\'({/ I'CSjil!i/'.'''.- [<II r.\. l'\L' -;'--'I1'-.Cd i)lcllllii:-, .!'-.. \JI gr_':ll (\\fh.'<..'rll tll .\Oll. \\-'c'd ;JIIiik( tniL"<ir mur,: ,Jbuut Ynur ()\\11 nn rln:, :uJd \\h:ll \our :lrL'.! will he lwnc"l in 111:11! :nn rut :m\ can di:Hlo;,___ J\ lnr JHm_ hut I think that 1t is illljllli'- Luntin! w,__- :lll h;nl- :1 di<UlCc lP umknJ:111d )](,\\ llih; ot'll\ the' W\lrk- !,l<ld ,lllll <t:,signm<..'lll' ;111 !Ill.' prlljcct dllhi' !1'1inl. 1 1-\i,c:!Jr,-hmcd '!J'\'k:. l_;nn, \ilU :1\!H''--'d n cn\'--'r th:l1 (1( tlh.' \Yh.:n \\c fJl''-.1 \()llk \ltllhl' dwJknr:v i'<Hir \;:; r" ;lf!'l. ,-\,<; J l]]:ltTU ni' i':JCI_1jy)j._:n:: tllilt l h:l\L' ;me-mail frum \ uu tgi'L'L' lo d,J th:11 (1:1ri (lf t11v \\Orl. '\\ !':1r :1s I :Hl1 CPl1 ,c:nl,:d. thi:- :,; ;, m,\lkr Dl ,H\d \\1Jdt pcnpk ha\l: h d11./ <Jill \Urc ih:il ,1ur 'UpL-r\isor \\ouU <Jllk '-'<lllc.:Ju,ion :1'- l \\Ol!ld iJ '-<!\\ tiK e-mail! ;1111 tu' tl'.._';llm,:nL VH :II! h;l\<,_' inlp(>rLtLl t\1 do \t_) mcctthL proj,cl ;nnt!rcd of' kning t\l w:ilk 11!1 <trOUild t!w, i:-'-lh __- :md l d\li!.l!lnnh. tint di"-cuo.:-:illi! unrc;tli:-:tic dlld "-L']f- i-.;n )c'cJ<th r-. :1 us..: (li \,HI. k:llli ti: l_. \\...: c;impl:-, f{lll(l\\ principk ,1f r;lllk 111 nur kdill. i'ul th:d \\<Hdd h: h:H.l !.1lr _'nu. J ;nn iL:,Jlh \(l nmlinu,, uur prun::-'-.. hul Thl: pu\\ tc;un mvmb'-'r ;n thi:-. t..''\:m:plv i:-., thing :-.cv'--r;ll t(xhniquL") dc"iglh.d to thrc;ltcn ;md intimidall' Fir-;L thcr"L' arc numnt)US unflattering charadcr ;JtLH:Ks l.a!TV ]:-, LlbL!cd <t'> "out u( lint.:" "dcnwncling ... a prinw--dunnct." and "Ull!Till i-..\i(,_ :n1d c;clfi'-h." fhi" conlmvnt Ci.illLiin'- :-.Onll' thin]\- gui"L'd tilrc<Jh: lr l.arr\ doc" !Wl :-:hut up. !hi:-, tl':un nwmh.._r intl'!lds to pull r<l!lk. Tllt.' lc;nn member, l'tlCUsing tlll the p<lsl. '-;ei\S_ vvl. cannot hi!\"' this discus".ion."The b:hL'd k:l!n munb'-r Sl<lk'i tlut !hnc mel\' ll<Jl he nHltll for llHJ\L'l11CllL hut slk !.., Oi'Cn to undn:-:t:mding. !n \\<ly. till: rcspdll'-,L' models thL dou- hk-lonp qyk of { l')/'7;! L \lo'-'( jll'oph.:. \\hen faced \\-ith s.._'nsi- li\'--' :HH.l i..;:-;ucs. f'ind il Ln c;t:-.,!'---r to hunch intu ri_:::hh- or argu- ilh.'!lh. l any nr f!O'\Lr- ha--;cd L'<lll he connTkd into ,-ul intcrv>h-h:lscd r(_>Thl!l"\..' \\ithtlUl fnr,_in_ team 11ll'nlhcrs tn c;q.litulatc to (!thcr-.;_ rEAM DILEMMA: GROUP VERSUS INDIVIDUAL In most teams, members have both cooperative and competitive motives (Deutsc 1973). Team members share a common objective when they work this is a cooperative aspect Yet in many teams. individual members have an incentive to fu ther their own interests.1Cam efforts are often subverted when individual agendas le::' to competition between members. and members hecome preoccupied with what othe are getting. relative to what they themselves are getting. Sometimes the way teams a1 set up can lead to these kinds of conflict. For example. when individuals arc compel sated according to team rather than individual performance. contlict may arise to tl detriment of the team if members' skills. abilities, or effort vary to a significant degre In many team situations. members face a choice between furthering lev interests or their own personal interests. For example, consider project teams con posed of various members within a company Each employee may be, at any time, member of four or more project teams. Consequently, the team members have oth1 projects vying for their attention and have an incentive to work on pet projects. letti1 the rest of the team carry them on the other project. However_ if everyone does th each project suffers. The choice between individual and group interests is a tea dilemma. The hallmark features of a team dilemma arc when members a: interdependent with regard to resources, and each person has an incentive ro free rir on the group's efforts. The resources may be tangible outcomes. such as salaries. offi space. or equipment. or intangible outcomes. such as information. services. or soci support (Foa & Foa, 1975). Team members in this case must choose between the team and Consider the following team dilemmas: A group of MBA students is working on a class project that counts for 50 percent of thci1 grade. Some take a higher course load than o1hcrs: some are taking the course some are second-year students who already have jobs. How should the work be divided'? Companies with significant R&D activities frequently usc functional teams, However, when the R&D is spread across different parb of the organization. members may want to retain control of the projccl in their own division. rather than co!lahorating:_ with others across divisions, \Vhich might add substantial value. In large law firms. partners act a:-. their O\Yll profit centers and. thus, have little incentive l provide knowledge to attorneys outside their group. Yet doing so improves the viability of the firm in a competitive marketplace. Team dilemmas pit individual incentives against group incentives in such a way th a poorer outcome for the organization is likely if each member acts in a way. The dilemma lies in the fact that memhers cannot simultaneously choose to coo erate and avoid exploitation by other members. Below. we expand upon th effectively tip the balance in favor of team interest (versus individual interest: see al n1hle 7-2). Strategies to Enhance Cooperation and J\1inimize Competition In Chapter 2, we offered some specific strategies 1() reduce free riding. Here -;; add to the list. CHAPTLR 7 Conflict in '!Cams: 1 "''""'" Diffcrcnc'--'S to Cr'-';Jtc Opfklrtun!ty 1ABLE Tipping Points on the Team Diicmma These more likely tn interest lmlividw1lly reward (C.5!, meritucr<tCil''i} Lxisrcncc of a hierarchy Re<.:tmrcc' scarcity Stress cmJ unccrulinty SIH>rt-tcrm relationships Productivity wa!s Swtus di!'fcn:nccs f(\am ld<'lllily These factors mnrc likely to collcftive interest (Jroup-!cvcl reward -;tructure" Salient Ct)DJ!llun identity Sh;m.::d threat friendships Long-krm rclarionships I-larmnny :'-latus 165 The .;,;tronger a team\ identity. the less sharply members distinguish between their self-interest and that of the f!TOUfJ (Dmvcs, van de Kragt. & OrhciL 1990). "Il1ere arc sc\eral \VHys to increase team identity such as linking individual outcomes (i.e., com- tu team outcomes (i.e., performance). HowevcL don't think that the price of building team identity is outside of your budget For leader-.; like David Kelley, founder and former CEO nf IDEO. and Steve Johs. formLT CEO of Apple. Inc .. T-shirts for each temn member me the Recognition of individual efforts can also he effec- tive< Sometimes. emphasizing team idenlity as being an integral part of a larger team t.'fforL such as that of a plant. division. nr firm. is effective. particularly \Vhen a con- scious challenge is presented in \vhich the team can either succeed or for exam- ple. heating the competition to market \Vith a nc\V producL If the team has an identity or reputation of its own. that can also make memhns vvant to uphold their end of the \vork. Certain things detract from team the important of which is whether members expect to \\:ork together in the future. If the cooperative cfforl is short-lived. indi\idua!s have kss incentive to invest in the team. HclKL\ another v...ay of enhancing team identity is to extend the length of time people expect to work as a team. \1orcovcL menthcrs who believe that other members \vill leave' cooperate less than those \vho expect the team to remain intact (iVlanni_x & Loewenstein. 1Y93).Thereforc. presen!ng in membership can also be important. "Jl,d.l' Plo?qe,J To the extent that team members make p!cdf!:cS. cooperation is greatly enhanced (Chen. 1096). Pledges or social contracts come in all shapes forms. the most com- mon being the business handshake._ nr the "implt. statement "You hHve my: word." Social contracts arc sometimes exp!icil rYou can count on n1e'") and implicit (such as a wink. a nod. or a handshake). Social contracts capitali7c on a basic psychological need for cornmitmcnt and con-;istency. The power of pledges cannot he underestimated. In many insLJnces, team members who make specific pkd!!-CS nr com- mitments to their team vvill act in th<ll hl'ncfit the group. even at the expense of self-interest For numv of the teams \"-'e \vork v.:ith. we usc team contract::-.. A learn con- tract is a document that Lam members collcctivclv write at the uutsct nf their task \.Vork. rhc purpose of the team contract is tn ( l) -.'larif:;-' the kam \goa! and missiun and (2) dcterrninc hmv the k<lnl (:an hest \-Vnrk together tu achieve their g.nals. Example of a Team Contract !SSION STATEMENT ur mission is to be a high-performing am hy: Focusing on learning as much as possible Participating fully Sharing our collective experiences Leveraging the diversity of our team Challenging one another's thinking Being innovative Having fun GUIDING PRINCIPLES/CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS " Share team leadership (self-governing) Rotate role of scribe 1$ Begin and end on time * Attempt to minimize weekend work Debrief at the end of each work group sessiOn "' I 00% attendance and active participation There should be a clear understanding among all team members that this is a "liv- ing" document_ meaning that it is subject to change and feedback from others_ There sho11ld also be a clear understanding that this is indeed a "contract" for which members will hold themselves and other members accountable throughout the duration of team- work_ In short, teams who develop a team contract put themselves on the line_ Ideally, team contract should be about one page long_ (For an example of a team contract that was prepared by a team of consultants at the outset of an eight-week-long intensive learning project, see Box 7-3_) RILS AND PITti\LLS OF DEMOCRACY In some teams. the choice facing members does not center upon a choice between the team and self-interest Rather. members must agree on some course of action. This is particularly true when the decisions facing the team are complex. Consider, for exam- ple, team members who disagree about their weekly meeting time. This cannot be resolved by each member simply deciding the time that is best for him/beL Effective cont1ic1 resolution requires coordination and consensus among members. Voting is one method for reducing connicL in which members agree to adopt the choice preferred by the majority. Voting is commonly used in organizational hiring) promotion, and decisions. Team members who vote among alternatives acknowledge that conflict exists, but agree to accept the outcome of the vote. The key issue becomes how to develop and utilize a suitable voting scheme. Voting Rules There <J_re several kinds of voting rules, and different rules are used in different sit- uations. The objective of voting rules can be to find the alternative that the greatest number of team members nrefeL the alternative the fewest members object to, or the ClL\FlTR lh:tt i11d\[!11i!L''- \\\_'!1 ll!l'l11 nr \\'ilhin 1!1,- L'
dcci<..inn (in hcc-,\U"'--' \ n\ !/,,,,,,, Rn/,- !L:c<:u::c.: an Js:-:Lil' \( \ l67 ind\ciih.> ,1r climin:ttcd \ndi -id :1"' n:c1 ;[<_'rs nuy no1 em \\ :'"" ''L: c]J\i);_';_' ;t, i"'\( s,m1t.' i\ ruk. ::;d "ti!i ,lJ!L'l"' nn <t t' Dw: nut vklt1 ,t '--k' l'--Jnn hn;J!l\-. ru k- p< ornnL un:-tr:inHJU" n;k :w k;m\\ di-,l'n--:s ;'(-c,1d!c.; in lc\'1 OUh'clllJCS th;ill dl\' 1.. :tm\ inhihirs th'---' di'-C'.l\l'i\' nt \\ ilh t:_roup:: !h;n U"'-' mainriti ruL JlL \Lnn>c & B:u'-'rm;nL \in which 1 lk oHJ,__'r (JU(\_nmo.:s fur I he k<nn :t:' -, ,:nni 1 ict m:liUL:L'lllCll! the ;Jbii- and U1L lil'lli(\ ('fhompc.:(Jil cl ,;L ilJS>;j, ,lPYl'l'l1h'rll"- h<C;l.liC'C l1 When a decision :reached in these circumstances goes against what most memben believe 'is right, if can lead to poor outcomes. Drawbacks to Voting Arro1' Paradox Consider the situation described in Box 7-4.1be ptoduct development team mem, bers are victims of the Arrow in Which the winners of majority rule electiom change as a functioa of the order in which alternatives are proposed. In fact, any sys- tem of weighted voting (such as when members three points to thelr first choice two to their se-cond, and one to their third) the same prohlem. Theorem The unstable voting outcomes of the product development team illustrate the impossibility theorem (Arrow. !963). which states that the derivation of team preference from individual preference is indeterminate. Simply put, there is no method of ing group members' preferences that guarantees that group preference has been maxi" mized_when groups have three or more members and there are -three or more options. The context of voting often involves people explaining the reasons for their pref erences. Sometimes they persuade others with their arguments; other times, the in their arguments become illuminated. Therefore. aside from the mathematical com plexities_ -involved in voting rules, serves an important functi_on. The itself can lead to buy-in. if not downright consensus, by the time the vote is through. Stratt.:qc AfanlimLat/on Strategic ma-nipulation further compounds the problem of indeterminacy of team choice (Chechile, 1984; Ordeshook. 1986; Plott. 1976: Plott & Levine, 1 978). Consider n situation in which members do not vote for their first choice because by voting for \V1Hm Voting Goes Awry ;uppose a three-person product nent team (Raines, Warner, and Lassiter) is hoosing among designs A. B. or C Each nanager's preference ordering is depicted )elow. J\s a way of resolving the conflict, Narner suggests voting between designs A md H In that vote, A wins over B. \Varner hen proposes a vote between A and C. In hat vote, C wins. Warner then declares lesign C the consensus .... assiter agrees to. _However, Raines pro- loses a new vote. but this time starting with contest between B and C. B wins this vote. eliminating C. Between A and B, A heats B. so Raines happily declares A the winner, L.assiter complains the whole vot- ing process was fraudulent hut cannot explain why. DESIGN MANAGER A Raine<; Warner Lw;sitt:r 2 3 DESIGN OESIGN B C 3 -Vote.- ?\umb;::;r\ reprc:s<:nl nmkunkred choicn CHAPTFR 7 169 another dl\)\ce. som"-' ()thcr. option i"> -,urc to This is an example ul strategic rnanipulatinn people' do not vote in acund with their true preferences. Furthcrmnn.:. mc.'Inhcr:, m<lY manipulate the order in \\ hich alternatives arc \oted OIL because when the ;lltcrnatin:s are voted ,,n in pair:,, those \'Okd on later are more likely to \Vin (Mny.lYX2). Coalitions Coalitions dre anl)ther way tJf asserting po\vcr in a group. r\ is a group nf twn or nwn.:: rnembcrs \:vho jnin tn)!Clhn tn Jffcct the outcome df a decision involving at lea:-.t thn..-c parties (Kumnrit:l & Parks. llJLJ4). Cdaliiinn.;;, in\o]ve hoth conperntion and competition: Members of cooperate with one another in compclition against l)tbcr co;llitions hut compete within the coalitiun regarding the al!oc'<ltion of re-..varcb the CO<tlitilln ohtains. Power i-; intimately involvt:'d in both the formation of coalitions ;wd the :dlocJtion ,)f resources among ll1l'tnhcrs. In some C<l'ICS, members of an organizational co;d!tion might b .... relatively cqu;ll in power (e.g .. ;ill may he of the sarne rank): howcn::c in other cases, !here might be extn:mc difrcn:n .... e"> in po\vcr (e.g .. a kam of senior ;lnd _iunior hires}. Although member-.; of a cooperate in joining rcc;oun:es .. a karn might rally tugcthcr in an to 12:1in d grea!Cr budget). they need to ;:dlocatc lhc resource:-. they <litain arnnng: thcm:-,ciVL'S (e.p. .. indi\;idual tl'am mcmtk'rs may think tht.'Y deserve a higher percentage of the budget). Power imhalancc amon)l coalitidn members Cdn lend to a numhcr of detrimental consequences. including mnrc ddecting coalitions {Mannix. l99J). fewer intcgratiu: (\lannix.l993: \kAlister, Bazerman.& Fader, !9X6Lg:reatcr likelihood of bargaining impasse (Ivfanni.x. llJ9J). nnd more ....-ompctitin. beh;wior (,\lcClintock. \kssick. Kuhlman & ( llJ7:1). TEAM 1\'EGOTII\TIONS Some situations call for tL'iim mcmhcrs to discuo;;s i'co'illt.'S and huild consensus for example. \v!lcn a team of prpfcssional-:: must divide responsibilities among thcmsd>iC'> t1r members of a dep;!rlmcnt must a!locak funds. in btHh cases, member..., mu'il arrivt: at a mutu<llly satisfactory outcnllll' ;dthnugh each may ha\'l __' different inleresh. This inYolvcs negotiation. Negotiation occurs vvhen interdependent p:1rlics !TJ<lk:.:- mutua! decisions rcg;ndin: the al!ocJtion of scan:c n:sourccs (H;izcrman eta!.. llJSX). ;'\;egollali\m is neccs<>ary when no one em dict::1te a solution. Furthermore. leam !11L'mher..., must agrL'C for any decision to he hinding. Failure t;J reach consensus cu1 he cns!ly for the team if. for it C<lllnot move fnr"v:1rd because it f'<lils to JT<Kh :lg_recnlcnt. if opportunities are missed due to protracll'd negotiation"-, if of incrc'asc over time (e.g .. if lawyers ur rnu:-.t he paidL (if if the rights to decision making <!rc losr anU must instead he sent to a higher level. An exarnplc of ;t lost opportunity due to occurred nt :1 promincnt -;t;Jtc uni\'crsity. A department h;ld been gnmted spe- cial fund\ to crca!t' a bad!y nt.'c'ded additional winE?- of:! nc\V building. l :nfortunatcly. department memhers could nn1 agree on hmv to allocatc tfll: ncv.: spacL, among thcm- sdvcc;_ the of f1nal Because. nc, phns were for!hcominp_, he university withdrew the funding. This is an example of a iose .. Jose outcome Thompson & Hrebec, 1996). When group members fail to reach consensus, it can he ;ostly for everyone. In retrospect, the members of the department would have all been 1appier had the new wing been built. but at the time, they were absorbed in paralyzing ;ont1ict with one another. What are some strategies that teams can use to avoid lose-lose outcomes and move oward mutual agreement'! Most conflict situations contain the potential for joint gain. Jr integrative outcomes, although these may be obvious only after the fact. ]be follow- ng strategies are aimed at uncovering the win-win potential existing in most conflicts. fhe BATNA Principle TCam consensus is only feasible if it represents an improvement over each rnem- Jer's best alternative to a negotiated agreement, or BKI'NA (Fisher & l!ry, 1981), If nembers have better options outside the team {such as with another team or different :ompany). then group dissolution is inevitable. rnms, for consensus to he viable, the mtcome must be at least as attractive as each person's best available outside option. (nowing the BATNAs of the parties involved greatly enhances the ability to achieve :onsensus. \void the Fixed-Pie Fallacy rhe fixcdpie fallacy is the tendency of people in conflict to assume that their interests tre completely opposed to those of others. 1be fixed-pie mentality can be extremely letrimental in negotiations (Thompson & Hastie, 1990), Although most negotiations :ontain potential for mutually beneficia! agreements, the belief that the pie is fixed and he drive to grab the biggest slice is so pervasive that most people fail to recognize )pportunities for win-win agreements.. For example, Thompson and Hrebec (1996) found that about 50 percent of people 'ail to realize when they have interests that are completely compatible with others, and tbout 20 percent fail to reach optimal agreements even when their interests are com- rletely compatible. A key reason for such breakdowns is that people fail to exchange nformation about their interests, making it unlikely that faulty judgments will be chal- enged and corrected (Thompson. 1991), Furthermore. when people are provided with nformation about others' interests, they often overlook areas of common interest Thompson & DeHarpport, J 994; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). 3uild Trust and Share Information Rapport between memhers of the team makes mutually beneficial agreement nore likely (Moore, Kurtzbcrg, Thompson, & Morris, 1999). Rapport is usually esrab- ished when people find points of similarity. Surprisingly, it does not take much to find omething in common with another person. For example, in one investigation rhompson, & Morris, 1999), students from two highly competitive rival MBA pro- ~ r m s negotiated with one another via electronic maiL The bargaining zone was small md reputations "vere at stake. All buyer-seller pairs had exactly eight days to reach .orne kind of settlement. Some of the negotiators were randomly selected to have a 'get acquainted'' phone call with their opponent immediately before dow-n to he business of negotiation. Others just immediately commenced negotiations. The esults were dramatic: The impasse rate was cut in ha!f vvhen negotiators spent a CHAPTER 7 Conflict in TCams: Leveraging Differences to Create Opportunity few minutes on the phone with the other person--a strong testament to the power of rapport in building trust in negotiations. Furthermore. those who had the phone call \vere convinced that their opponent had heen especially selected for them on the hasis of similarity. \vhen in actual effect. the opponent \Vas chosen at random. fhese results ma:y suggest that the better two persons kno\v one another, the "lronger their rapport should be and, consequently. the better they should he at finding common ground. However. this is not ahvays the case. In face when friends negotiate, they often do worse than complete strangers (Fry. Firestone. & \Villiams. 1983; lbompson & DcHarpporL 1 99K). Frit:nds arc often uncomfortable negotiating with each otheL and so may make premature concessions: as a result. they may overlook opportunities for expanding the pie in their hurry to reach a deaL Friends may also pre- sume they know each other's interests, \Vhen this may not he the case. However, it can he av.ik\vard trying to explain your views to someone who knows you. Strangers, by contra:;;t do not need a pretense to clarify their point of view. n1e key t k e ~ w y mes- sage goes hack to our earlier point: it is imponant to create a forum for task conflict. Understand Underlying Interests Integrative negotiation often requires that team members have information about each other's preferences (Pruitt & Lewis. 1975; 'I1Knnpson, ] 091 ). Most people neither provide nor seck the information nect:ssary to reach such agreements. The most impor- tant question a team mcrnbcr can ask of another is: VVhm arc JiOUr imercsrs in rhis situ- ation! (Thompson.1991). Share Information The distinction het\vecn this strategy nnd building trust and providing information has to do with bilateral versus unilateral strategies. ln the earlier strategy. it was assumed that teammates were mutually engaged in a process of information exchange. However. if that strategy fails, then we encourage some degree of unilateral (i.e., one- sid.;d) information sharing. It would seem that teammates should always reveal their interests to fellow team members. Hov/CVCL they may hesitate to do so if they feel this will place them in a strategically disadvantageous position. Consider a team negotiat- the allocation of scarce resources (research money, secretarial assistance, and travel support) among its memhers. One member may feel that, of these scarce resources, research support is most important although secretarial and travel support are also valuable. This person may reason that a mutually beneficial agreement is possible hy '"trading" secretarial support for research support. However_ he may hesitate to reveal his priorities. fearing that other members will demand large concessions on the secre- tarial and travel support issues in exchange for conceding research support "There are of revealing information: it huilds trust, convinces others of your ,;,,nrilv in achieving the priorities you do reveaL encourages others to incorporate your priorities in their proposals. and leads to faster agreements. Make Multiple Proposals Simultaneously in some cases, team memhers are frustrated when their attempts to provide and seck information are not effective. This happens most commonly in the face of high distrust and less than arnica hie relations. n1e strategy of multiple offers can he effec- ti\'e even \Vith the most uncooperative of team members. The strategy involves pre- senting the other team members with at least two (and preferably more) proposals of equal value to yourselt The other team members are asked to indicate which of the proposals they prefer, This should reveal information about how the other members value trade-offs between different issues. There are psychological benefits as welL When people believe they have more choices, they are more inclined to cooperate. Avoid Sequential Discussion of Issues There is a pervasive tendency for teams to discuss issues sequentially. This usually stems from the belief that making progress on some issues will grease the wheels of cooperation for more di'fficult ones. However, sequential discussion inhibits joint dis- cussion of sets of issues, reducing the likelihood that team members will identify poten- tially beneficial trade-offs between issues (Mannix et aL, 1989; Thompson et aL, 1988: Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993)_ Just as we saw in the Arrow paradox, it may not be possible to find the best outcome if trade-offs are only considered pairwise. Team meinbers who discuss issues simuitaneously eXchange more information and have greater insight into other members' interests (Weingart et aL, 1993). Teams fol lowing sequential agendas under majority rule are less likely to reach integrative agreements. This may stem from the fact that coalitions often form, preventing infor- mation e:<change and discussion of members' underlying interests, Construct Contingency Contracts and Leverage Differences Team members differ in their forecasts about what they think will happen in the future. These different expectations may make team negotiation diffieulL For example, one member wants to protect against disaster stemming from a potentially bad invest- ment: another may worry about how to spend the vast riches that are sure to follow. Each may have difficulty taking the other's position seriously, because each has very different expectations about what the consequences (and the value) of a decision may be, However, such differences in beliefs can actually improve the possibility of integra- tive agreements. This is possible through the formation of contingency contracts. Consider the case of a cross-functional team in which a sales manager is more optimistic than the manu- facturing manager about product sales. A contingent contract can be constructed, establishing that manufacturing will produce more products, but if sales fail to meet an agreed-upon level, the sales department will cover all manufacturing costs. In other situations, team members may agree on the probability of future events, but feel differently about taking risks. For example, two colleagues may undertake a collaborative project, such as writing a noveL for which they both agree that the ability of success is only moderate. The colleague with an established career can afford to be risk seeking; the struggling young novelist may be risk averse. The two may talize on their different risk-taking profiles with a contingent contract. The more risk- averse colleague- receives the entire advance on the book: the risk -seeking colleague receives the majority of royalties after publication of the noveL People may value the same event quite differently depending on when it occurs. If one party is more impatient than the other. mechanisms for -sharing the consequences over time- may be devised< Two partners in a Joint venture might allocate the iniiiai profits to the partner who has- high costs for time, whereas the partner who can wait will achieve greater profits over a longer, delayed period. !L\l'! f-R ( un difrcr.__'nCt.'S oftl'n L'!lLiib contingency contrach. in \Vhid h'" rc,; ht'h bas.._,d upon di!len .. 'nl po-.;sihk out com.::--. For contingency cu tlKy shuu!d to L'Y<duatc and kaYt.' no roum for ambig:uity Ldi\111. ( onditions mc;tsurcment <:;hould he spelled out in ac Se-arch for Postsetdement Settlen1ents f\:,ml ll1L'IllbLr-.: Ilia\ dLcidc tll rvnegotiatc after reaching a mutually tknh:nt_ It m;!\ sc(m or ..:ountcrpruducti\ c 10 resumer 11!1CC dll illTCpt:tl_;]c ap:n .. 'cllk'lli ha-.: hl'L'll reached. but the :-;tratq:._\: of posrsct tkm..:Tlts em be renurkably dft.cti\-L' in impn)\ing. the quality of ncgoti mcnts In thL' posbl'tt!cmcnt settlement. team members ag:rc \J1htr \Yith the goal of finding another that all members prefer \ll{ dlrn.'n! llllc. ThL' current sdtkml'nt hc'-omes the new 'l'he postsct fkmvnt is t.'!Tecti\'C (-l\:Ci.ill'-e it team members to reveal 1 L'lll'CS \YilhCJU! fear of the_\ e<m safely revert to their prL'Vious <I the poshL'ltkm\..'ll( S<:..'tt!cmcni discussion doc" not prove fruitful. If bet It !'nund_ parti ... Gill h..: more confi<..knt !ht_'Y ha\c reached <1 truly integrative lr n'l bl'tkr :1f._:rccmcm is ruund. lhe team IncmhL'r\ may he mnrc confid1 current ugn_'L'!llL'llt i;, r'-';J!]\' ;1 \\in-win nutcmnc, :\orms of .Justice lcam Jncmht.'l"S incnnrlict \\house objccti\l.' appearing arguments arc tiYc tiDn tho')'-' whu usc 'iubjL'CliYL' arguments. Jio\Yt:VcL there are mar o!<nc<cl!\L' ;Jrgumcnh. C'unsider the fu!kming: f:'quiiy ( \lr ;.;\HJI rihutilm- hasn.l lli-.;t rihut ((_lfl l prc:--.cribc" t h:tt IW!lL' shr1uld h'-' ru '--ontrilllnion,; { ,\d;J!w,, l. $ Equality tor blind jusliLcJ that :tll tc<lm 1ncmhd" ._!Jou!d suffer or ( \ks-,ick. l !JI.J_-:1. ). \'ced 1 or\\ L'li':1rt -hii\L'd _iustiCL') t h<ll bend sh1n!ld he pn1ponional t l1L'L"<-.i" ( Dunsch. I lr;':) ), cff.._(ti'>cnc'S'> 1,)j ;my gi\'L:ll principle will lx enhanced to 1 he cxtc c;impk. L'kar.justili,thk. popuLJL rind general. 'lo he more specific. <I fail nrg:umcnl th:il ha" the fdl!o\\'ing. l'lnr<tctL:ristics is more !ikcly ln \\-'in the tt:mn members cmd nthn rclc\dllt actor\ (\fcssick.ll)tJ3): * _\'implicit_)'.' k;ml member:- should h\_: 10 dlliculalc the proccdmc easily. n 1!1\_' L"iLinl"L'" uf mi-..unddSt<llldini!. ;md makes it c:1sicr tn l'\<Jluatc how nccuratd cillrl' i" impkm'-ntc:d ( 'larity: Thv aii(IL'dtiun proccdun: should hv ckc1L if noL conrliu may enq>t em i illcrprL'1 :1! lUll. Tile PJU'-'L'dttr'- -.;lwui,J be Ulllsi:-.lcntl.\' applied dCnhs in' \irn...:. ;tnd <Jludlilll''" * ('on.':>tnsus: 'lL':Im 111\..'lllbl'f'> :.hould ilgru.' ()J1 rh,: !lldhr1d t!l. ai](JCati(m. me iiill'rn;di/\_- dtcl'ti\c Slll'i;d _juqiL'C pmccdmc:'. ..;uch norm'> ad as gui( ,k'ci,ion in kame;. lkcdll'< thl'C.C rwrm'> \)ften ,,m!i\c l'Ltrrcnttcammer l\ll:lilhns :nlloclrinakd with proc'-'durL'', the k:1111 fuund u-.dul i No matter how objective a fairness rule may appear. fairness is not an absolute con- struct And peo!'le's uses of fairness are for the most part self-enhancing, We do not wish to evaluate here what is really fair, but rather to stress the importance of arriving at an outcome that is perceived as fair by everyone concerned. Reputations for fairness can be extremely important in business and employment relationships and often set the background against which a negotiation takes place. Generally speaking, people with a reputation for fairness will be trusted more than those who are viewed differently. We are not saying that being "fair" or "not fair" is the right or moral thing to do in every circumstance; simply that a reputation for fairness can be beneficial in many negotiating contexts. Moreover, an expectation of fairness as a splitting rule is the emphasis in virtually every business publica- tion, textbook, and so on, for competitive behavioL HAT TO DO WHEN CONFLICT ESCALATES? Sometimes an organization will set up teams within the organizational structure to compete with one another. The idea is to create a healthy competition to spur motiva- tion. However, this can lead to escalating conflict and destructive outcomes that need special interventions. Conflict often escalates because people believe that coercion is effective in reduc- ing the resolve of others. Paradoxically, most people believe that when others use coer- cion on them, it increases their resolve (Rothbart & Hallmark, 1988). The unfortunate consequence is that this perception encourages mutually aggressive behavior. (For an example of this in a military setting, see Sidebar 7-2.) What can be done to reduce the likelihood of strikes and get parties back to the bargaining table once a strike has begun? -nre likelihood of protracted conflict is intimately linked to the beliefB each holds about what they regard to be a fair settlement (Thompson & Loewenstein, People in conflict have different ideas about what is fair, and the most difficult conflicts are ones in which the parties' ideas of fairness are highly discrepant In fact, the length of costly strikes can be directly predicted by the discrepancy between what the parties involved regard to be a fair outcome: the greater the discrepancy, the longer the (II \PTIR 7 175 strike: :md hoth pi!rlit.'" ultim;ut!y PHh, to cnnnicL it crilicJl tn U!Hkr- <.:t;md bm-Y to partie-; to nWYC' :l\t.i;ry from pcrct..'ptinns df fair tu mort" rt:ilsorublc Olk">. fhe J.iroh!cm ], tlwt most pl:dplc thLmsch'cs 1n be uniquely immune to and hcncvoknt in tht:ir O\Yll moli\ilt!on-: (f--,Inn:l! & \Veinc:c !l)lJ6): thc:v regard hias to he something that afflich the other party in conflict. \1ost people:; iuvol\cd in re;l!ly difficult cnnflicts huld the folimdng pnccptinn-.;; ( l-J they ;we them other-;: (2) the.' othe-r \it'\'; is l11dtiv;\lcd {and, hence. unfair): and (1) there is only tmc correct Lmd fair) w:1y to Yicw the sittwtion. This tril- ogy of beliefs is a recipe for di-;aslcL unk'..;:., '-iOlTli..'lhing em he dnnt.' to moYc away from one (and lwpcfully more) of \'iL'\.s. \fost people me not th:ll !heir O\\ n perception\ of arc ca!ly biased. For cx<lmpk. \"tin .\vcnnat.'t ( l{Y:'-J.) :l:.,kcd tl'am hi complete scv- t.:Ll.l quL:stionnairt'S. These look t.ithcr 45 or 90 minutts. Tlh ..' qucslionnaircc-> were con- <.,tructcd '>O th<JL for CtlL'h durnt!nJL .;;ornL' p<lrticipanls six questionnaires. where a'-' othns completed only thrct.. \Vhcn ;1sked tu al!ocltc monetary rewards. pm- ticipants cmphasi;cd tht' th:1t f:Jvort.'d them in the <Jllocation procedure (those \Vbn wnrkLd longer cmpha'-.i/cd time: questionnaire completion \Vas cmpha- si;cd by those who worked on rnore I1 is not surprising, thcrL that mcrnhcrs who contribute less prefer to di\idc rc'Sdllrccs L'quall:-..-, \Vht.TC<t" those who contribute more pr<:..'kr the cquit!: ruk ( Al!i\on & Messick, 1090), In cont<:1ining members htlYing different pmver nr status lev- els. tho:-.e with low want equality. \\'hcrC<lS those with high power desire L'quit)- (Komorita & ChcrtkofL l97J: Sha\v. l iJN! ). As a \vay of dealing \\ith how to minimize egocentric perceptions of cnnflict. it j<.; prob<lhly most useful to first indicate which strategies Sl'Cm like would vYork_ hut usually don't. \Vc are not say that these strategie-s me doomed to f11ilure. but rather that they hme been \Tied and h;we not been shm\n to work. M luht in sirnulakd (yet rcaliqic) conflict situations. It would seem that prnviding both with veridical inlorm:ltion pertaining to !he' conflict {:;tntistic\ on thl' lalwr compdi-- tih? etc.) would he hclrfuL at the very lcac,t i.lS a reality check; how- t\'c'L this hac, not sho\Vll to he helpful. That is, when rnarwgcmcnt labor arc pro- \idcd \\-ilh additionaL unhia\cd information concerning disputl"..;, this has the eff::ct of further entrenching both more firmly in lhtir own po\itinn'> {Thompson & f_ocwcnstcin, l99:2).To thi-; hack fire t.>ffcct. it important to recall our di::.- cus'1ion of the confirmution hiac;. Partie::; intc'fJ!lTl informtllion in a \\ay thai is mo:-;t favor,-lhlc to own position. Thus. they put their own on the f;_Jcts in il WilY that them more cnnfidencc in their J-ll!:->ition. lt may Sr,_';_'m that \Yarning disputant-; about the cxbtL'ncl; of hi;ls may he effective in reducing conflict ;md. nt the \\.'ry le<1sL getting partie" tu perform :1 check of their d\'\/11 positions and hclicfs supp()rting those 11o<..,itinn:.;. J Io\\-C\TL thi" dncs litllc to assu;_tgc biased perceptions ( Rc1 hcock. Ltn:wL:nskin. hsaeharoff. (._\:. C;tmcrcr, Jf.)l)) ). >\pp;ir;_'nlly. people rcg;lrd hi<J<.: ;ts something that dfflicb tlll: other guy"- -not thcm- '1C!h'',, For similar rL'<lSOI1'< t;lking the othn person\ point nr vic'\\- j..,; guh:r<JI!y not cHeclin:' in reducing hi a" ;md conflict. SLJ much ror \Yhat dnc-s !!(if work. \\--'hat dot'S \\-ork tn l"L'dl!cc Cf2:UL'L'IHriL pcrccptil)lb of fairncs-:".) The key is lu gel parties to change tht.'ir 0\\D perceptions ;1hou1 wh<Jt is fair. p;1nics to adin:l;. think ahNJt thl' in their mu1 po-;ilion L'<lll he effective in reducing the length of costly strikes (Babcock et aL 1995), Furthermore, inviting a respected, neutral outsider to mediate can be cflective (see Sidebar 7-3), NCLUSIONS Conflict in teams Js unavoidable, However, it does not have to result in decreased pro- ductivity, Managed effectively, conflict can be key to leveraging differences of interest to arrive at creative solutions. However, many people intuitively respond to conflict in a defensive fashion, and this emotional type of conflict can threaten productivity. To the greatest extent possible, team members should depersonalize conflict. We have presented a variety of ways to achieve this. \Ve have also cautioned against using majority rule, splitting the difference, and strict agendas, which might stifle the oppor- tunity for team win-win gains.
Randomised Controlled Trial Using A Theory-Based M-Health Intervention To Improve Physical Activity and Sleep Health in Adults The Synergy Study Protocol