Philosophy Compass 6/1 (2011): 4453, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00370.

A Wolff in Kants Clothing: Christian Wolffs Inuence on Kants Accounts of Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Psychology
Corey W. Dyck*
University of Western Ontario

Abstract

In attempts to come to grips with Kants thought, the inuence of the philosophy of Christian Wolff (16791754) is often neglected. In this paper, I consider three topics related to Kants philosophy of mind, broadly construed, where Wolffs inuence is particularly visible, namely, consciousness, self-consciousness, and the doctrine of the soul or psychology. I argue that within this context we can better understand Kants particular arguments and positions, and gain a more accurate sense of which aspects of Kants accounts derive from the antecedent traditions and which constitute genuine philosophical innovations.

1. Introduction If Kants Critique of Pure Reason (CPR)1 amounts to a philosophical revolution, then the gime. Presented rst in a series of German textthought of Christian Wolff is the ancien re books published in the 1710s and 20s and then reworked and expanded in Latin in the 1730s, Wolffs system left few areas of philosophical interest untouched by its characteristic rigour. Wolffs organization of the topics of philosophy, his use of the mathematical method, and most importantly, his instrumental role in the establishment of a German philosophical lexicon, all provided a common point of departure from which his students could extend the scope of their masters system and his many critics could launch their attacks on particular doctrines. Wolffs thought enjoyed a position of unequalled authority in German academies through the rst half of the 18th-century, and even as his inuence waned in the second half, due at least in part to a change of tastes brought about by the inuence of English thinkers, it is notable that when one mentioned the school philosophy (die Schulphilosophie), it was to Wolffs thought that one referred. Despite Wolffs undoubted importance in preparing the ground in which Kants own philosophical reections took root, Kant scholars (especially in the English-language commentary) have not always thought it important to understand Kants views in light of their Wolfan context. There is some, but only some, justication for this in the fact that Kant styles himself a revolutionary thinker, and denies that his CPR has to do with particular books and systems (Axii), yet more often the exclusion of Wolff in particular has its basis in an unfortunate characterization of him, also promoted by Kant, as little more than Leibnizs disciple, whose views were so indistinguishable from those of his teacher that one referred to a Leibnizian-Wolfan philosophy.2 This stubborn caricature has, fortunately, been discredited,3 and a number of studies have highlighted how we can enhance our understanding of the innovative character and the details of the Critical philosophy through a consideration of the various ways in which Kant was inuenced
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by, and reacted to, his German predecessors and Wolff in particular (see for instance Kuehn, Friedman, Longuenesse and Watkins, as well as Anderson and Rosenkoetter). In what follows, I will focus on one area of Kants thought what might be termed his philosophy of mind and in particular his accounts of consciousness and self-consciousness, and the method and content of the investigation of the mind or soul (psychology). As has been made clear in a number of recent publications, especially Thiel (1996, 2001), Wunderlich (2005), Sturm and Wunderlich, and Dyck (2009), Wolffs inuence upon Kant is particularly evident on these topics, and our understanding of Kant is greatly improved by considering his claims in this context. 2. Consciousness That Wolffs philosophy is inappropriately characterized as a mere systematization of Leibnizs is especially evident with respect to the specic topic of consciousness. Beginning with Leibniz, the key discussions are those contained in 14 of the Principles of Nature and Grace and 4 of the Monadology,4 which proceed as follows:
it is good to distinguish between perception, which is the internal state of the monad representing external things, and apperception, which is consciousness, or the reective knowledge of this internal state, something not given to all souls, nor at all times to a given soul. (Philosophical Essays 208) The passing state which involves and represents a multitude in the unity or in the simple substance is nothing other than what one calls perception, which should be distinguished from apperception, or consciousness[...].(Philosophical Essays 214)

In both of these passages, Leibniz distinguishes between perception and apperception: where perception is a complex representational state in a simple substance, apperception is the awareness of the complex state in us.5 Wolff adopts Leibnizs terminology, particularly in the Latin works, but where there are questions regarding, for instance, whether Leibniz simply identies apperception with consciousness (and reection),6 Wolff clearly distinguishes between them. For Wolff, consciousness is the more general term, including both the consciousness of external things and of ourselves, where (as we will see in the next section) apperceptio applies specically to the mind only insofar as it is conscious of its perceptions (Thiel 1996). Not only does Wolff depart from Leibniz in distinguishing between consciousness in general and apperception, but he also offers more details regarding the nature of consciousness and its differing degrees. Indeed, while Wolff can hardly be taken to provide a comprehensive theory of consciousness, it is a central theme for him beginning with his rst and most inuential metaphysical text, Rational Thoughts on God, the World, the Soul of Man, and All Things in General, or German Metaphysics (1720), which sets out from the claim that [w]e are conscious of ourselves and other things (German Metaphysics 1, 1; 7).7 Wolff understands consciousness in general to amount to differentiation [Unterscheiden], as he writes:
We nd, accordingly, that we are conscious of things when we distinguish them from one another.... I am conscious that I see the mirror not merely when I distinguish the various parts that I see in it from one another, but rather when I also represent to myself the distinction of the mirror from other things that I either see at the same time or saw shortly before. (German Metaphysics 729, 454)

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Wolffs example of the mirror is initially unhelpful, blurring as it does the distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness. Yet his point is simply that any consciousness of a thing will consist at the very least in the differentiation of it from other things from which it is distinct. Yet, as Wolff acknowledges, we can differentiate objects in a number of ways differentiation can be among objects, or parts of a single object and Wolff takes these to correspond to different degrees of consciousness. In explaining this, Wolff draws upon Leibniz once again, this time the early paper Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas. There, Leibniz recasts the Cartesian account of clear and distinct ideas on a continuum, dening clear, as opposed to obscure, concepts as those sufcient for the recognition of the thing represented, and distinct, as opposed to confused, concepts as those whose component marks can be enumerated and the thing represented distinguished from other things (Philosophical Essays 24). While, for Leibniz, this classication has to do mainly with certain epistemic capacities we have with regard to our representations, Wolff explicitly frames his account of consciousness in light of this classication, claiming that all conscious representation is clear in that clarity just consists in the noticing of the difference in the manifold [things], and distinctness originates from the clarity of the parts [of the manifold], that is, when we further differentiate parts within previously differentiated things (German Metaphysics 732, 457; cf. also Rational Psychology 20, 16). As we can see, Wolffs account of consciousness might draw inspiration from that of Leibniz but it is hardly reducible to it. Kant, like Wolff, falls short of offering a theory of consciousness, and when he does turn to the topic it is usually apperception, understood in the narrower (i.e., Wolfan) sense, that absorbs his attention. Yet, Kant does discuss consciousness generally, and the claims he makes about it indicate that his conception of consciousness is essentially Wolffian. For Kant, as for Wolff, consciousness is understood in terms of differentiation, and assigned a degree depending on the extent to which we differentiate our representations. For instance, in the Anthropology, we nd:
Consciousness of ones representations that sufces for the differentiation of one object from another is clarity. But that consciousness by means of which the composition of representations also becomes clear is called distinctness. (6; 7:1378)

As should be evident, Kant here links consciousness to the differentiation of objects, and then proceeds to offer much the same account of clarity and distinctness as Wolff had (one might also compare Kants account of clarity at 4:542). Even so, Kant sees t to modify the Wolfan model in certain, crucial respects. First, it is not differentiation that takes centre-stage in Kants account, but rather (the act of ) synthesis. This need not mean that Kant ultimately rejects the Wolfan emphasis on differentiation; rather, Kant is likely only pointing out that any differentiation of representations also requires that those representations are brought together for comparison (for this see Wunderlich 2005, 1445). As Kant writes, synthesis is the action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition (A77 B103 my emphasis).8 Second, where we saw that Wolff straightforwardly identies consciousness with clarity, Kant does not always go so far. So, in the following passage from the Logic, Kant would seem to follow Wolff rather closely:
If I am conscious of the representation, it is clear; if I am not conscious of it, obscure.[...] All clear representations, to which alone logical rules can be applied, can now be distinguished in regard to distinctness and indistinctness. If we are conscious of the whole manifold, but not of the manifold that is contained in it, then the representation is [clear but] indistinct. (9:334)

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Even so, in the second edition of CPR Kant appears to depart from this identication in allowing for representations that are conscious, yet only obscure:
Clarity is not, as the logicians say, the consciousness of a representation; for a certain degree of consciousness, which, however, is not sufcient for memory, must be met with even in some obscure representations, because without any consciousness we would make no distinction in the combination of obscure representations; yet we are capable of doing this with the marks of some concepts (such as those of right and equity, or those of a musician who, when improvising, hits many notes at the same time). (B414n)9

Yet, if Kant loosens Wolffs tie between consciousness and clarity, he does so on what are, at bottom, Wolfan grounds since obscure representations are taken to be conscious only inasmuch as they do permit of differentiating among them. This leads Kant to redene clarity, as the passage continues, in terms of the consciousness of representations that is sufcient for being consciousness of the difference between it and others (B414n), that is, where we do not simply differentiate but are also aware of the way in which given representations differ. Kant will proceed to amend Wolffs account in other important ways, for instance, replacing the Wolfan term confusion with the less pejorative indistinctness and further allowing for distinct representations of the senses as well as the understanding (see for instance A44 B612, and for further detail Sturm and Wunderlich). Given what we have seen, however, these are best understood as modications of an essentially Wolfan position on consciousness rather than a radical departure. 3. Self-Consciousness For Wolff, self-consciousness, no less than consciousness, turns on differentiation, though in this case it is the self that is differentiated from other things or its own representations. As such, self-consciousness always presupposes an initial consciousness of some thing or representation from which the self can be distinguished. As Wolff explains in the German Metaphysics:
From this it becomes clear when we are conscious of ourselves, namely, when we notice the distinction between ourselves and other things of which we are conscious. This distinction is evident however as soon as we are aware of other things. Since supposing that we are conscious of something which we cognize through the senses, then we must notice the distinction between what we perceive in it, indeed, we must immediately distinguish the thing that we recognize thereby from the other things. Yet the representation of things is an action of the soul as much as differentiation is (which appears to be so even more clearly), and we recognize thereby the distinction of the soul from the things that it represents and that it distinguishes. (German Metaphysics 730, 4556; 46)

So, having differentiated among various things, we recognize that the self, the subject of the activity involved in differentiation, must be distinct from those things that it differentiates. Wolff claims that this follows from the principle of contradiction since the subject that acts must be different from that which it acts upon (cf. German Metaphysics 10, 6; 9 and 17, 10; 10). Consequently, it is only in differentiating those things from us that we can represent them as external to us (and to each other) in space (German Metaphysics 45, 234; 1415). In his later, Latin treatises on psychology, Wolff provides much the same account of self-consciousness, though things are complicated somewhat by the new role that the notion of apperception plays. Following Leibniz, Wolff contrasts perception with apperception, taking the former to be an act of the mind by means of which it represents
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objects to itself (Empirical Psychology 24, 17), and the latter to be an act of the mind whereby it is conscious of its perceptions (Empirical Psychology 25, 17). Apperception, then, is a kind of self-consciousness, though as the consciousness of a state of the self, it is distinct from that consciousness of the self explored in the earlier German text. Nonetheless, Wolff contends that apperception, no less than consciousness, provides an opportunity for self-consciousness since, when the soul is conscious of its states through the act of apperception, it is possible to differentiate between the subject and the objects of that activity (see Rational Psychology 12, 12; Wunderlich 2005, 2931). In general, then, we can see that for Wolff, self-consciousness is derivative upon consciousness it presupposes both consciousness of things or representations as well as a consciousness of the subjects activity (Thiel 1996: 219). Wolffs derivative conception of self-consciousness is certainly a long way from Kants well-known claim of an original apperception, yet as Thiel (2001) has noted there was (at least) one important development in the Wolfan conception over the intervening period. In his Philosophical Essay on the Immaterial Nature of the Human Soul rst published in 1741,10 Martin Knutzen (17131751), one of Kants teachers at the University of Ko nigsberg, makes clear that all consciousness makes possible a consciousness of the self, but further argues that the self of which we are conscious in this way must constitute a unity. Regarding the relation between consciousness and self-consciousness, Knutzen writes:
A renewed attentiveness will convince us with stirring clarity that we are conscious of ourselves at that moment when we differentiate ourselves from other things, and that when we recognize the difference of them from one another, only then do we notice a consciousness of other things in us. (Essay on the Immaterial Nature 2, 9; 77)

In considering what this act consists in, Knutzen proceeds to list two conditions of the differentiation of representations that must be met with in the soul: the rst is that there must be a plurality of representations to be distinguished and the second is that the soul, as the subject of these representations, must be a unity. The rst is obvious since the differentiation of representations presupposes, at the very least, representations to be distinguished (Essay on the Immaterial Nature 2, 13). Concerning the unity of the subject, Knutzen reasons that the representations that are to be differentiated must be found in a single subject since otherwise the cognition of their differentiation could never occur. Moreover, the thinking subject must be that by which these representations are brought to consciousness, that is, the acts involved in differentiation must be executed by a single subject (Essay on the Immaterial Nature 3, 1819).11 Considered with respect to these, and other, previous theories of apperception and self-consciousness, Kants undoubted innovation is his distinction between empirical and transcendental apperception. Kant introduces this distinction in the following passage from the rst edition of the CPR:
Now this original and transcendental condition is nothing other than the transcendental apperception. The consciousness of oneself in accordance with the determinations of our state in internal perception is merely empirical, forever variable; it can provide no standing or abiding self in this stream of inner appearances, and is customarily called inner sense or empirical apperception. (A107)

While this distinction is clearly original to Kant, a Wolfan inuence can be discerned in the account of empirical apperception in particular. Kant follows Wolff in taking this empirical consciousness to involve the consciousness of a given mental state, as is indicated by his identication of it with inner sense (see also 7:135n). In addition, Kant maintains the close connection established by Wolff between the empirical consciousness
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of ourselves and the consciousness of external objects, claiming in the Refutation of Idealism that a consciousness of the persistence of an external thing is presupposed by our empirical consciousness of ourselves as determined in time (cf. B274279). By contrast, there is hardly any precedent for what Kant dubs transcendental apperception,12 even outside of the Wolfan tradition. As Kant explains it, transcendental apperception amounts to the consciousness of the thoroughgoing identity of ourselves with regard to all representations that can ever belong to our cognition (A116). The identity of the self thus disclosed in transcendental apperception serves as a condition of possible experience inasmuch as the cognition of objects can only come about through the necessary relation to this single identical subject. Without getting into the details, Kant claims that the identity, or unity, of the thinking subject to which all our representations belong, makes necessary a combination of the manifold of representations in accordance with rules such that the relation of that manifold to an object can come about.13 What is, in any case, signicant is that the general claim of the priority of the identity of the subject disclosed in transcendental self-consciousness to the minds synthesis of its representations contrasts starkly with the Wolfan claim that self-consciousness is derived from, or only made possible by, our consciousness of other things or representations. Yet, even if the notion of such an original consciousness of the thinking subject is advanced against the Wolfan account, it should be clear that it develops a line of thought present in Wolff and already developed to some extent by Knutzen. Moreover, even if transcendental apperception is pure in the sense that the identical subject of which we are conscious cannot be thought of as such through empirical data (A107), Kant stresses that this consciousness of ourselves depends on empirically-given representations to serve as the material of thought (B423; cf. Thiel 2001, 475) and so, to that extent at least, still conforms to the broader contours of the Wolfan account. 4. Psychology Properly determining the scope of Wolffs inuence on Kant in their respective treatments of psychology is rather difcult given the prevailing misconception of the nature of Wolffs rational psychology in particular. In the German Metaphysics, Wolff distinguishes between two kinds of investigation of the soul. The rst is an investigation that is aimed not at determining what the soul essentially is, but simply at cataloguing what we perceive of [the soul] in everyday experience (German Metaphysics 191, 106). The focus on everyday experience is key inasmuch as it limits the investigation to that which anyone can know who attends to himself (German Metaphysics 191, 1067) without recourse to experimental investigation. Wolff distinguishes this from another way of investigating the soul that does consider what it is essentially, though because this is not available to experience we will have to bring it out through inferences (German Metaphysics 193, 108; 22). Wolff would later distinguish more formally between an empirical and a rational psychology, where empirical psychology concerns what actually occurs in the soul (Empirical Psychology 1, 1) and along these lines, attempts to clarify and classify what is available to inner experience.14 Rational psychology, by contrast, considers more broadly what is possible through the soul and spirits in general (Rational Psychology 1, 1), and thus covers the nature and essence of human souls, as well as those of animals, and even offers hypotheses about the correct system for explaining the commerce between mind and body, and demonstrations of the souls immortality.15 This Wolfan distinction between empirical and rational psychology is often brought up in the relevant secondary literature. Yet what is far less frequently noted is that Wolff
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did not consider these two sciences to be completely distinct disciplines but in fact took pains to emphasize the ways in which they were interdependent. For Wolff, the observations catalogued in the course of empirical psychology serve as principles for the inferences of rational psychology, and the resulting ndings on the part of rational psychology serve to guide our empirical observation in search of conrmation. Thus, Wolff writes, that which everyone can experience of themselves will serve as a principle for deriving something else that not everyone can immediately see for themselves (German Metaphysics 191, 107; 22), and that which is known of the soul from experience is the touchstone of that which is taught here of its nature and essence (cf. German Metaphysics 727, 453; 46). Far from constituting distinct disciplines, then, empirical and rational psychology amount to complementary parts of a single science, working together in the same way in which observation and theory co-operate in astronomy (Empirical Psychology 5, 34).16 As a result, Wolfan rational psychology can hardly be identied as a rationalist psychology, at least insofar as the latter is taken to intend a science of the soul that proceeds completely independently of experience; indeed, at least in its reliance upon experience to conrm its theories and use of inference to explain empirically observed mental phenomena, it bears comparison to the investigative model of contemporary cognitive science (especially as characterized in Brook). Kant famously addresses the pretensions of rational psychology in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason chapter of the CPR.17 There, Kant charges that the soul, which the rational psychologist had taken as an object of inner experience, amounts in the end to nothing more than the I think which is obviously not an experience, but rather the form of apperception, on which every experience depends (A354). Kant thus accuses the rational psychologist of a rather egregious mistake in confusing a merely formal representation with something given in experience which could constitute the object of synthetic cognition. Yet, as Kant explains, the rational psychologist is led into such an unlikely error by transcendental illusion,18 in accordance with which the (I of the) I think naturally and unavoidably seems to be given empirically, thereby giving rise to the temptation to take the unity in the synthesis of thoughts for a perceived unity in the subject of these thoughts (A402 my emphasis). It is precisely insofar as the soul holds out the illusory appearance of being given in inner intuition that Kant thinks it serves as the transcendental ground for inferring falsely (A341 B399) on the part of the rational psychologist. On this basis, Kant disputes the particular metaphysical claims made about the soul by the rational psychologist, arguing that they cannot be taken to be informative about the souls nature insofar as the idea of the soul can have no other grounding than the I think. This criticism has an important consequence for Kants own rational psychology, however, as it leads him to radically revise the ambitions of any such investigation into the soul. Given that the merely formal I think now constitutes the sole text of rational psychology (A342 B401), it follows that rational psychology can only proceed entirely independently of experience. This hardly redounds to the benet of rational psychology, however, since without any available empirical content it is left to turn in a constant circle, applying concepts in their transcendental signication to that formal unity through which those very concepts are possible in the rst place (A346 B404). Even so, Kants new pure rational psychology provides an important negative service as a bulwark against those who would deny outright, for instance, the possibility of the souls survival of the death of the body and continuing personality,19 even as it makes whatever condence we might have in these claims a matter of hope rather than knowledge (cf. A3834). Yet, in spite of these signicant differences from Wolff regarding the proper use of rational psychology, it will be noted that Kant continues to hold the Wolfan line on the reliance
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of rational psychology upon experience. Where Wolfan rational psychology had grounded its claim to advance our cognition of the soul on the presumption that we had available observations of the soul to ground its inferences, Kant now claims that it is precisely because we lack any intuition that the pretensions on the part of the rational psychologist to offer any such cognition must be strictly limited. In this way, we see that Kants rational psychology is no more essentially rationalistic than Wolff s as the purity of the rational investigation of the soul is only the consequence of the absence of any empirical content. 5. Conclusion In the foregoing, I hope to have shown that some of the more challenging philosophical claims and arguments found in Kants treatments relating to the mind can be greatly illuminated by considering them in light of Wolffs discussions. While thinkers like Wolff and Knutzen, not to mention Alexander Baumgarten, Christian August Crusius and Johann Nicolaus Tetens, are hardly paid-up members of that elite group of philosophers that includes Kant and Leibniz, they do provide an essential context for Kants writings (which are, after all, directed to a German audience), and to ignore them is only to add to the many existing opportunities for misunderstanding Kant. Acknowledgement I am greatly indebted to Falk Wunderlich and Larry Jorgensen for their detailed comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I also gratefully acknowledge the Board of Editors of the Journal of the History of Philosophy for their award of a Kristeller-Popkin Travel Fellowship to support a visit to the Johannes Gutenberg-Universita t Mainz where much of the research for this article was conducted. Short Biography Corey W. Dyck specializes in the history of German philosophy, with an emphasis on the 18th century and Kant in particular. His recent research has focused on issues in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind in the period from Wolff to Kant, and he is currently at work on a manuscript that considers Kants criticisms of rational psychology in the rst Critique in light of the Wolfan tradition. In addition, he has completed a translation, along with Daniel O. Dahlstrom, of Moses Mendelssohns Morning Hours: Lectures on Gods Existence (forthcoming with Springer). He received his BA in Philosophy and English Literature from the University of British Columbia, his MA in Philosophy from the Catholic University of Leuven (Belgium), and his PhD from Boston College in 2006. Since 2007 he has been an Assistant Professor at the University of Western Ontario, and has previously taught at Boston College and the University of B.C. (Okanagan). Notes
* Correspondence: Philosophy Department, University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada N6A 3K7. Email: cdyck5@uwo.ca.
1

Citations from the CPR refer to the pagination in the rst A edition and, when applicable, to the second, B edition. All other citations to Kants works refer to the volume and page number in Kant (1900ff). Translations are from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant.
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2

As one commentator has remarked: One gathers that Wolff had a second-rate mind, and it is a matter for regret that he came to interposed, as a distorting glass or a mufing pillow, between the two great geniuses of German philosophy [i.e., Leibniz and Kant] (Bennett, 6). It is in any case important to separate an assessment of Wolffs philosophical merits from an account of his inuence, and while I might disagree with Bennett on the former, I only consider the latter here. 3 See for instance Beck and Corr. 4 It should be noted here that Leibnizs Monadology and Principles of Nature and Grace were only published in 1720, the same year as the rst edition of Wolffs German Metaphysics, and that the New Essays on Human Understanding, an important source for Leibnizs account of consciousness, was not published during Wolffs lifetime. 5 For recent discussions of Leibnizs theory of consciousness, see Simmons and Jorgensen. 6 There is some discussion as to whether Leibniz, particularly in Principles of Nature and Grace 4, identies all consciousness with apperception or merely self-consciousness (i.e., inner-directed perception) with apperception. For a defence of the former claim see McRae, and for the latter see Rescher. 7 All translations from the German and Latin works of Wolff are my own, though the reader should note that portions of the German Metaphysics are translated in Watkins (2009): 753. References are to section numbers followed by page number and, when available, the page in Watkins (2009). 8 As Wunderlich notes (2005, 145n541), one might also compare Kants claims that all dissolution or analysis of representations presupposes synthesis (see, for instance, B130). 9 See also A1034. 10 The Latin edition, entitled Commentatio philosophica de humanae mentis individua natura sive immaterialitate, was published in 1741, but a German translation undertaken by a student (with Knutzens approval) entitled Philosophische Abhandlung von der immateriellen Natur der Seele followed in 1744. I have provided my own translations from the German text, though a few selections are also translated in Watkins (2009): 7583. References are to the section number and page number in the German translation, followed by the page in Watkins (2009) when available. 11 Additional detail on Knutzen in this context can be found in Thiel (2001) and Wunderlich (2001). 12 Though Thiel (1996) points out, J.B Merian can also be taken to anticipate some features of Kants account. 13 This is, quite briey, the conclusion of the line of argument Kant presents at A104110. 14 One might consult Sturm for more details on Wolfan empirical psychology (and particularly its non-experimental character and distinction from anthropology). 15 For more detail on the specic topics in Wolffs psychology, see Blackwell. 16 See Richards and Dyck (2009) for more on the interdependence of empirical and rational psychology. 17 For more detail on Kants relation to Wolff on the method of empirical psychology, see Sturm, and Sturm and Wunderlich. 18 For a detailed exposition of Kants doctrine of transcendental illusion, see the study by Grier. 19 For more on this topic in particular, see Dyck (2010).

Works Cited
Anderson, R. Lanier. The Wolfan Paradigm and its Discontents: Kants Containment Denition of Analyticity in r Geschichte der Philosophie 87 (2005): 2274. Historical Context. Archiv fu Beck, Lewis W. Early German Philosophy. Cambridge MA: Belknap, 1969. Bennett, Jonathan. Kants Dialectic. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1974. Blackwell, Richard J. Christian Wolffs Doctrine of the Soul. Journal of the History of Ideas 22 (1961): 33954. Brook, Andrew. Kants View of the Mind and Consciousness of the Self. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. E. Zalta. Stanford, CA: The Metaphysics Research Lab, 2008. Sept. 30 2010 <http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/win2008/entries/kant-mind/>. Corr, Charles. Christian Wolff and Leibniz. Journal of the History of Ideas 36 (1975): 24162. Dyck, Corey W. The Divorce of Reason and Experience: Kants Paralogisms of Pure Reason in Context. Journal of the History of Philosophy 47.2 (2009): 24975. . The Aeneas Argument: Personality and Immortality in Kants Third Paralogism. Kant Yearbook 2 (2010): 95122. Friedman, Michael. Kant and the Exact Sciences. Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 1992. Grier, Michelle. Kants Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001. Jorgensen, Larry M. The Principle of Continuity and Leibnizs Theory of Consciousness. Journal of the History of Philosophy 47.2 (2009): 22348. Kant, Immanuel. Gesammelte Schriften. Ed. Ko niglich Preussische (later German) Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1900ff. . Lectures on Logic. Ed. and trans. J. Michael Young. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992. . Critique of Pure Reason. Ed. and trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. . Anthropology, History, and Education. Ed. and trans. G. Zo ller and R. Louden. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007.
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