2

Is it a game? Albert Carr published an article to the Harvard Business Review in 1968 titled Is Business Bluffing Ethical? ! "he premise of #hich is to argue that business ethics differ significantl$ from the ethics of pri%ate life! "he ethics of pri%ate life considers bluffing and #ithholding facts immoral! Carr insists& ho#e%er& that game ethics encourages such beha%ior and is in'fact analogous to po(er! "his e)plorator$ paper #ill attempt to re%isit Carr*s paradigms and arguments #ith constructed philosophical arguments that counter the premises of his article! "he first premise to be challenged is the notion that business is merel$ a game! "he second premise to be challenged is the ethical frame#or(s& or the lac( of& #hich operate the mechanics of his cases and arguments! Although critics ha%e illustrated through utilitarianism and deontological arguments that deceit and bluffing are indeed immoral in business& ultimatel$ the fallac$ lies in the analog$! +ranted& Carr*s argument of the business'game analog$ offers businessmen and la$man ali(e a strong intuiti%e appeal! But the analog$ contains no merit #hen the traits of both a business and a collo,uial game are e)amined! "he purpose of a game is to #in! And #here there are #inners& there are losers! Business is not an acti%it$ #ith clear #inners and losers& regardless of their %anit$ point! "he good#ill of a compan$*s sta(eholders& including but not limited to- .uppliers& customers& and partners& is at great ris( in the business'game analog$! Corporations do indeed ha%e competitors #hich the$ appear to %ehementl$ defend against! As /ar$l 0oehn e)plains in his article for the Journal of Business Ethics: But their indi%idual sur%i%al re,uires that the$ tr$ to prosper b$ accustoming their customers to predictabl$ satisfactor$ ser%ice1s2 and products so that these customers #ill bu$ from them again 3pg! 14485! 6hile there are multiple t$pes of games #ith di%erse rules and norms& it should be noted that the$ are all ultimatel$ 7ero'sum games in #hich there are e)plicit beneficiaries and the rest& often times the ma8orit$& are the losers! /ar$l 0oehn proposes that instead of us'%ersus'them game& the acti%it$ should

9 be participator$ #ith a common mission! :or e)ample& #hen hi(ers become lost during their e)pedition& people often unite #ith one sole mission- "o find and retrie%e the hi(ers bac( to health and safet$! ;ne should not cast an analog$ of business and bluffing onto this scenario as it is a high'sta(e acti%it$ and doing so #ould endanger li%es! "he ne)t trait of a game is that losers con%entionall$ suffer conse,uences! Carr e)plains an e)ample of a manager d$ing his gra$ hair so as to appear $ounger and more %igorous to his colleagues"his #as a lie& $et #ithin the accepted rules of the business game& no moral culpabilit$ #as attaches to this 3pg! 95! Indeed& no moral culpabilit$ can be obser%ed from this scenario because the sta(es are minute! 6hen considering business decisions one must be a#are that man$ decisions do affect man$ people and can ha%e de%astating conse,uences! In a business'game analog$ there are #inners! A corporation that has successfull$ gained a large mar(et share through deceit and bluff are in%ariabl$ losers due to the e)ternalities caused b$ their decisions and beha%ior! E%er$ action has a reaction and e%er$ decision has conse,uences! "he difficult$ lies in the interpretation since conse,uences t$picall$ become obscured b$ diffusion< deemed e)ternalities b$ economists! Carr insidiousl$ assumes that po(er and business are ali(e! "here is an element of chance in both acti%ities! .imilarl$& beneficiaries of an acti%it$ is an organi7ation& team& or indi%idual that #ho pla$s #ith stead$ s(ill ! :urthermore& a po(er #ho ris(s& much less s,uanders& his and his famil$*s assets is more of an addict than a great pla$er! =nli(e po(er& business is hardl$ go%erned b$ a strict set of rules! And the rules that do e)ist ser%e as a guideline rather than regulate the action of the indi%iduals such as that of a game! >oreo%er& Carr encourages businesspeople to do #hat it ta(es to #in although there are no clear rules in business #hich can ha%e de%astating conse,uences! As such& bluffing in business #hile one cannot fathom all implicit conse,uences is of little help! Carr also alludes to an alarming practice b$ claiming that businesspeople do not ma(e up the la#& the$ merel$ abide b$ them! :irstl$& the la# of business and ethics associated #ith such are grand and %ar$ bet#een different so%ereign bodies and cultures and their respected 8urisdictions! It #ould be

4 impressi%e to find an indi%idual that has not onl$ memori7ed but also abides b$ each rule! "his is in contrast #ith games #here the rules of the game are both fi)ed and e)plicit! :or e)ample& in business& especiall$ the pri%ate sector& businesspeople are encouraged to be d$namic and to al#a$s be curiousl$ see(ing out change that #ould impro%e an$ business function! "herefore& e%en if a rule e)isted to decei%e and bluff& there is no promise of it being present tomorro#! ?ence& one is not entitled to claim that business is a frigid and simple game in #hich the goal is to practice one'upsmanship through such tactics! @roponents of the business'game reasons that since the rules of the game are simpl$ the rules& reflection on the rightness of the business decision action does appear necessar$! Asserting that business has the characteristics of a game and e)hibits similar ethics holds little merit! /ar$l 0oen succinctl$ captures the fallac$ of business'game analog$- "his reasoning fails to persuade because the abo%e anal$sis has sho#n that business bears almost no resemblance to a game understood as a rule' constituted lo#'ris( pri%ate practice %oluntaril$ engaged in b$ parties of all of #hom (no# and #ho ha%e assented to the rules and #ho ris( onl$ #hat is theirs to ris( 3pg! 14925! Carr condones the message that if it is legal then it is moral! "his e)clusi%el$ ignores that #hat is legal can indeed be immoral and %ice'%ersa! Instead& this author implores businesspeople to understand the art of negotiation! "his paradigm transcends business'game analogies and e)plores mannerisms of consummating an *e%er$bod$ #ins* situation! "he purpose of #hich is to achie%e unanimous agreement and not a #orse off competitor or much #orse& a slightl$ #orse off societ$ as a #hole! @erhaps the most per%asi%e and blatant misconception appears to be the neglect of the continuum of ethical theories! ;ne can glean from Carr*s article& his preconcei%ed notion that people are and act in a rational manner! ?e ta(es this unsound assumption and e)amines it through one ethical frame#or(! In philosoph$ a #ide range of ethical theories e)ist! 6hat Carr is ad%ocating is contrasting and offensi%e to the proper moral foundation of Capitalism< rational egoism! Aational egoism& on the basis of trading purports that people relate to

B another& trading %alue for %alue in all endea%ors! .imilarl$& social contract theor$ holds that businesses o#e duties to societ$ as societ$ allo#s business to e)ist! It considers t#o factors- the changing social en%ironment and ambiguit$ of business ethics! 6ithout a formal code& or fi)ed guidelines& businesses are left to their o#n de%ices! ?o#e%er& under the social contract theor$& there are t#o guidelines businesspeople can adhere to- "he human factor& and the legal aspect! Carr e%o(ed the legal aspect but to the e)treme of self'interested egoism #ithout consideration of the human factors! +eorge Coe#enstein proclaimed that @eople are not ob8ecti%e information processors! ;ne of the most important nonob8ecti%e influences on information processing is self'interest& #hich poses $et another impediment to incorporating concerns for or about others in business decisions 3pg! 2215! Carr*s thoughts can be distinguished as a non'conse,uential ethical model- :ocusing on the concept of *dut$* rather than #hat is considered right and #rong! A sheer fallac$ to gloss o%er conse,uential ethical theories- Egoism& =tilitarianism& Altruism& and :eminism& amongst others! :or the sa(e of bre%it$& a thorough e)ploration of each theor$ #ill be a%oided! :or e)ample Derr$ 0ir(patric( in his paper critici7ing Carr illustrates- "o promote the happiness of the ma8orit$< more than one head of a large corporation has 8ustified co%er pa$ments to foreign go%ernment officials on the grounds that the pa$ments ultimatel$ support the 8obs and #ell'being of large number of Americans 3pg! B5! According to Carr& it #ould also be simpl$ pla$ing the game #hen a Corporation announces through public releases b$ cunning #ording that the$ #ill attempt to refrain from political lobb$ing! ?o#e%er& the$ neglect the fact that the$ ha%e a charit$ set up #hich supports a political candidate in order to impose a la# that #ould regulate their en%ironmental responsibilit$! "he$ are b$ Carr*s standards abiding b$ the rules! Albeit their actions conflict #ith conse,uential ethics! .hree%ardhan Cele stated in a conference at =ni%ersit$ of >ar$land on game theor$ that fairness or 8ustice are not numerical concepts! 3http-EE###!rhsmith!umd!eduEne#sEcan'game'theor$' help'decision'ma(ers5! It turns out the economic concept of game theor$ is %astl$ different than the business'game analog$ offered b$ Carr and the t#o should not be confused! +ame theor$ insists that

6 oneFs #ell'being depends on both $our decisions as #ell as those made around $ou! It is about correctl$ predicting and understanding ho# and #hat decisions competitors ma(e and respond to $our (e$ mo%es! /r! "homas .chelling& a recipient of Gobel @ri7e in 2HHB in Economics& further e)pands on the idea at the =ni%ersit$ of >ar$land conference- Arri%ing at a common understanding of the benefits and dangers that accrue to each pla$er in the game is crucial to ma(ing the most beneficial mo%es! "hat is #hat allo#s pla$ers to deli%er a belie%able threat& or come to a #in'#in solution! It is including both ethical frame#or(s& statistics& and decision ma(ing and stri%es for the ne)t best alternati%e action #ithin a gi%en conte)t and considering normati%e ethics and conse,uences! It is a comple) tool but re#arding due to the man$ %ariables at sta(e! In fact& information as$mmetr$ has been a heated topic in economics and beha%ior economics for some time no#! In order to ma(e good decision one must create a s$nthesis for decision ma(ing! In the conclusion of this paper& a simple $et effecti%e guideline and ,uestions can be set forth in order to e)pand deliberation to consideration #ithout resorting to bluffing or concealment of information! "here are as follo#s :irstl$& is the decision and subse,uent ethical protocols compatible #ith the la#? Conduct scenario planning to e%aluate the short term and long term impact of the decision on societ$ and the organi7ation as #ell as all sta(eholders! 6ho #ill be affected b$ the decision and to #hat degree? E%aluate the effects and conse,uences of alternati%e decisions! 6hat are the norms& shared %alues& and ideals of the decision ma(ers? /o the$ possess the abilit$ to ob8ecti%el$ e%aluate their decision ma(ing or is their 8udgment clouded b$ politics and sub8ecti%e desires? Be a#are of the obligations that arise from organi7ational relationships!

Aeference-

Can game theor$ help decision ma(ers? 32H125! University of Maryland, Robert H. Smith School of Business. Aetrie%ed fromhttp-EE###!rhsmith!umd!eduEne#sEcan'game'theor$'help'decision'ma(ers 0oehn& /! 3199I5! Business and game pla$ing- the false analog$! Journal of Business Ethics, !, "# $, %%&. Aetrie%ed from http-EE###2!o#en!%anderbilt!eduEmi(e!shorEcoursesEgame'theor$EdocsElectureH1EEthics!pdf Coe#enstein& +! 3n!d!5! Beha%ioral decision theor$ and business ethics- s(e#ed trade'offs bet#een self and other! Aetrie%ed from http-EE###!cmu!eduEdietrichEsdsEdocsEloe#ensteinEBeh/ecBusEthics!pdf 0ir(patric(& D! 32HH25! A criti,ue of Is business bluffing ethical? ! 'e(artment of )nternational Business * mar+etin, -alifornia State .olytechnic University, .omona. Aetrie%ed from http-EE###!csupomona!eduEJ8(ir(patric(E@apersECritBluff!pdf