Primer on the Development Effectiveness of Civil Society Organizations

IBON Center

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IBON Primer on the Development Effectiveness of Civil Society Organizations

Copyright IBON International 2010 Some Rights Reserved.

IBON International holds the rights to this publication. The publication may be cited in parts as long as IBON is properly acknowledged as the source and IBON is furnished copies of the final work where the quotation or citation appears. IBON International is the international division of IBON Foundation, Inc. As an international NGO, IBON Foundation responds to international demand to provide support in research and education of peoples movements and grassroots empowerment and advocacy and links these to international initiatives and networks. IBON International initiates and implements international programs, develops and hosts international networks, initiates and participates in international advocacy campaigns, and established regional and country offices where necessary and appropriate.

IBON Center 114 Timog Avenue, Quezon City Philippines 1103 Tel: +632 9277060 to 62 local 202 Telefax: +632 9276981 Website: http://iboninternational.org This primer is written by Arnold Padilla and Antonio Tujan, Jr. with research and editorial assistance from Heather Richmond. Cover and layout by Darius Galang images from http://www.sidint.net and http://ipsnews.net ISBN 978-971-0483-57-0

Table of Contents
Preface Part I Civil Society Organizations as Developmental Actors
Who are civil society organizations? Why is social solidarity the defining characteristic of all CSOs? What is the social role of civil society? What defines legitimacy of CSOs? What do we mean by civil society organizations as development actors in their own right? What do we mean by CSOs as enablers of the poor and of the people?

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3 4 6 9

Part II Development Effectiveness of CSOs

What can be considered the key principles of CSO development effectiveness? What are some of the key elements of CSO development effectiveness?

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17 24

Part III Enabling Environment for CSO Development Effectiveness

What are some of the components for an enabling environment for CSOs? What is the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness?

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27 36

Endnotes Appendix Development Effectiveness in Development Cooperation Endnotes

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Preface

The purpose and process of development, especially the formulation of development policies and strategies, has long been an area of contention for civil society organizations (CSOs) and other development actors in the public and private sector. In more recent times, there has been increasing critical attention on the role and practices of aid and official development cooperation. The issues and concerns on quality of aid (as against increasing the quantity of aid) are now framed under the general heading of the aid effectiveness agenda a broad contentious theme encompassing the technocratic concerns of efficiency and anti-corruption as well as the far ranging concerns of overall development effectiveness of policies, strategies and programs in development cooperation. CSO engagement in the aid effectiveness agenda can be framed into three concerns: (a) the role of CSOs in aid effectiveness reform in the context of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA); (b) the efforts of CSOs to shift aid effectiveness reform toward a more thoroughgoing agenda of development effectiveness; and (c) the application of such development effectiveness reform on CSOs themselves as development actors in their own right. While the first concern mentioned above is not the subject of this primer, the annex includes some discussion of, the Paris Declaration, the AAA, and the principles of development effectiveness in development cooperation. Many donors and governments rightly point out that many CSOs, especially those from the North, are legitimate donors themselves, mobilizing billions of dollars in additional aid through various charities, as well as or in addition to acting as channels of up to forty percent (40%) of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for certain donors. While this means that the agenda of aid effectiveness may also apply to CSOs, it is important to bear in mind that they do not simply act as channels of ODA or vehicles for service delivery similar to, or in competition with governments as is assumed by many quarters. CSOs are development actors in their own right with a special focus on social solidarity and special concern for human rights, especially of the poor and marginalized. They are collectively concerned with ensuring delivery of services

and also with empowering the poor to claim their rights. In this context, CSOs are seriously concerned with ensuring effectiveness of the aid system not only from the limited concern of aid management and delivery but also with the full range of development effectiveness, including that of their own. It is thus absurd, from the viewpoint of CSOs - particularly those engaged in the aid effectiveness agenda -- to look at the Paris Declaration and aid effectiveness in the sense of aid management and delivery as fully applicable to civil society, even specifically to those CSOs involved principally in international delivery of services and development cooperation. Therefore, CSOs are increasingly critically concerned about developing and abiding by their own principles, indicators and mechanisms for development effectiveness.

Part I

Civil Society Organizations as Development Actors

Who are civil society organizations? There is no precise definition or category of civil society organizations which encompasses the full range of organizations that are established voluntarily by citizens seeking to promote their concerns, values or identities. While the notion of civil society as a specific sociological concept is often used as a starting point for defining these organizations, the Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness (AG)1 took a broader framework in its general definition that: civil society covers all non-market and non-state organizations and structures in which people organize to pursue shared objectives and ideals. As non-market institutions, CSOs do not operate principally for profit. They may engage in commercial operations and may charge fees for some goods and services that they provide but this is usually for the purpose of sustaining their operations and not for accumulating profit for its own sake. As non-state institutions, CSOs are generally autonomous from the state even though many CSOs often heavily depend on the government, collaborate closely with government agencies or even operate as extensions of the state. The most crucial feature of CSOs is their voluntary nature. CSOs are formed by the peoples assertion of their right to free association for the pursuit of common interests and goals. The broad category of non-government organizations (NGOs), which has now become associated with organizations of staffed offices and missions that are explicitly and uniquely developmental in character, is the most commonly known type of civil society organization. However, following the AGs definition, civil society also encompasses peoples organizations like farmers associations, labor unions, urban poor groups, womens groups, and so on. CSOs also include community-based organizations, research institutes, universities, faith-based organizations, alternative or not-for-profit media as well as other groups that do not necessarily engage in development work2. There are three general types of CSOs defined according to character and purpose: (1) cause-oriented CSOs pursue advocacies based on specific issues or a range of issues; (2) membership CSOs conduct activities based on a program of action determined by their membership; and (3) service-oriented CSOs deliver goods or

services for the general public or specific constituencies. These types of CSOs are not mutually exclusive. Many large CSOs pursue more than one or all of the above purposes. CSOs may also vary according to the form of organization. They can be simple associations, federations, networks or platforms, foundations, public interest offices and so on. These CSOs may have different governance models and orientations in the pursuit of their values and development objectives. CSOs also operate at different levels -- international, national, and local levels and in developed and developing countries alike. However, there are many differences in their role and legal status in different countries. Community-based CSOs can be placed in a key category because they may be considered the foundation of civil society. Community-based CSOs are the ones that organize and work directly at the grassroots level and are linked with many other CSOs operating at various levels and for varied purposes. Many CSOs do not fit neatly into common definitions or typologies. For instance, many CSOs are engaged in market-oriented activities such as operating a hospital or school which may generate income, but in reality are foundations and not organized to realize profit. Additionally, many CSOs engage in profit-making ventures for income generation purposes for use by the organization to sustain their activities. There are also cooperatives which are market organizations that derive profit for their members but strive for social solidarity that extends beyond their membership. Any analysis of the role of civil society in development must take into account its diverse and fast-evolving nature, and must therefore be based on a broad and inclusive definition3. Amidst this diversity and dynamism, CSO practitioners see themselves as sharing a common defining identity social solidarity with the people in society they serve or represent in the pursuit of development values and objectives. Why is social solidarity the defining characteristic of all CSOs? What is the social role of civil society? Citizens or people express their basic right to association to pursue shared objectives or ideals whether internal to its membership as a locus for social interaction, addressed to a specific constituency or to government and the society at large. Social solidarity is the basic framework which is common to all civil society organizations in the purpose of their being and their actions. CSOs act in social solidarity in many varied forms, from targeted programs to reduce smoking and improve the health of specific populations to trainings in entrepreneurial skills

to improve the livelihoods of others. This social role of civil society requires the identification of a normative framework or frameworks regarding the positive roles that CSOs are considered to play according to the Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness (AG). From literature and common usage on the role of civil society, the AG identified three such frameworks, namely:4 a. Promoting citizen participation The predominant normative framework from the literature is to approach the idea of civil society as the third leg of a three-legged stool, complementing the private sector and the state as pillars of any organized and well-functioning society. Civil society, from this perspective, is the social space in which citizens organize themselves on a voluntary basis to promote shared values and objectives. From this perspective, civil society is usually seen as essential to the proper functioning of a democratic society and to the growth of social capital. A related view is one that regards civil society as one of the ve pillars of democracy along with the executive, legislature, judiciary and independent media. This view provides a good governance perspective on the role of civil society. b. Ensuring effective delivery of development programs and operations People who work with development CSOs or NGOs on a day-to-day basis often have a different, more operational perspective. From this viewpoint, civil society consists of a constellation of CSOs actively engaged in development programs and operations. The value of each CSO depends on the particular values that it brings to the task and the effectiveness of its operations. From this perspective, civil society is not an abstract construct that is good or bad, but rather a collection of actors among which some discrimination is possible on the basis of their values and perceived effectiveness. The richness of and diversity in civil society provides opportunities for donors, governments and citizens, and other CSOs to identify partners with whom to engage in the pursuit of development objectives and for the public good. This view provides a more discerning and operational perspective on the role of civil society. c. The social empowerment of particular groups and the realization of human rights, social transformation and democratic development Yet another approach focuses on civil society from a human rights perspective, seeing civil society as a mechanism for the social empowerment of particular classes or groups within society such as the poor and dispossessed, women, ethnic groups and others.

Based on this perspective, CSOs are widely seen as expressions of the rights to peaceful assembly, free association and to free speech as enshrined in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They facilitate peoples claim to their political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights in a process of democratic development5. Furthermore, they contribute to the development of democratic institutions in society along with building social justice. An essential element of efforts by the poor and marginalized to claim their rights is their own political and social movement organizing. One of the central implications of using a human rights framework for assessing effectiveness is the need to take into account the links between social transformation and the efforts of engaged citizens. These three perspectives of promoting citizen participation, providing effective delivery of development programs and operations, and promoting the social empowerment of particular groups toward the realization of human rights and social transformation, as the AG noted, are different but complementary. While it is generally accepted that civil society is a central actor in development, there is less consensus regarding their political role: that which they actually play and that which they should play in society. There are those that would prefer to see CSOs silently dedicated to delivering social services, while others would like to see them dedicated to the work of pressure politics, leaving social services to the state. The majority of CSOs that currently exist are somewhere in between these two extremes -- representing a wide and diverse spectrum of shades6. Some also argue that all actions of CSOs should be understood as political tasks, to the extent that they work toward the common good or the construction of public goods, and contribute ways to widen and deepen democracy in society. From this perspective, representative democracy -- which confines peoples participation in governance to elections is not democratic enough. Real democracy is seen as a permanent process of construction involving continuous reform and the gradual renovation of society requiring the active engagement of the people. Therefore, the task of deepening democracy must be pursued integrally, insistently and intransigently, and democratic regimes must be evaluated on their ability to guarantee civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.7 What defines legitimacy of CSOs? Participants in the Brussels Consultation conducted by the AG suggested that the legitimacy of CSOs arises from the right of people to organize as enshrined in the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights and related Covenants. Other AG consultations articulated internal democratic legitimacy, based on an

appropriate role of the membership and sound internal governance, as the source of CSOs legitimacy. Other ways CSOs achieve legitimacy include: through their capacity to mobilize particular constituencies; through their public influence as credible sources of information; through broad recognition as significant or necessary actors in public debate on controversial issues; and so on.8 Some CSO platforms have chosen to develop a voluntary accreditation system as a means of establishing members legitimacy, often involving codes of conduct or practice to which members must adhere. However, the process of accreditation itself can sometimes become the subject of debate in terms of its legitimacy and inclusiveness.9 Ultimately, CSOs as an expression of the freedom of association confer legitimacy upon themselves. The legitimacy of CSOs is not bequeathed by any authority and is not subject to legislation or regulations for recognition and registration. In fact, in some cases such as in the Philippines during martial rule, CSOs have consciously defied registration under an authoritarian government. There is some basis for governments to be concerned about the abuse of the CSO status which is why systems of registration and legislation on CSOs are important. However, regulatory mechanisms are often inappropriately used by governments that betray their undemocratic character and are used by illegitimate CSOs to legitimize themselves. CSO legislation and registration are mechanisms to provide an enabling environment for CSOs and should not be used to regulate or restrict CSOs activities or be used to delegitimize other CSOs. CSO voluntary registration processes are also not requirements for legitimization, but are a democratic expression of such legitimacy. As such, they do not require state approval and recognition to exist. These mechanisms also contribute to an enabling environment both to inform government and the public of the existence of CSOs and the availability of their services and resources. Although CSOs speak or act on the basis of social solidarity in the performance of their different social roles, they are often questioned regarding their capacity to represent the people, as well as on their representativeness. Of course, CSOs are not meant to represent the public as a whole organically; else they would be elected officials themselves and would belong to the public sector. CSOs are considered voluntary in character, represent their constituencies in expressing their rights to speech, or taking upon various causes and concerns in the interest of the general public. They are private individuals or organizations involved in public causes or interests and are thus not part of the private sector.

There is no doubt that there are those that abuse the advantages of being a CSO. CSOs must be accountable to all as genuine organizations and not mere family enterprises or briefcase NGOs, if they are not market mechanisms, if they are not mere extensions of government, and if they truly act in the interest of the public and their constituencies and not for some interest to capture the state as in a political party or to amass profits. Nevertheless, every citizen has a right to organize a CSO, and multitudes do so including former government officials or relatives of current government officials acting as private citizens. Since CSOs seek to pursue public interest and concerns without officially representing the public through elections and similar processes, CSOs must address issues of representativeness by ensuring active mechanisms of accountability and interaction with its constituencies. Indeed, this is the real test of legitimacy of a CSO to be further discussed in a later section. But not a few government officials do not understand the character and role of civil society. When challenged by CSOs on policy issues, they respond by questioning the CSOs legitimacy and its right to speak in behalf of the public or its representation of the public. Hence the question of legitimacy and accountability is a pressing issue currently faced by CSOs especially when they engage governments and donors in dialogue. Instead, the issue of legitimacy in dialogue with government should refer to the question of representativeness or the distribution and combination of a group of CSOs acting as interlocutors for a certain public process or mechanism, or implementation of a certain program. Given the demands of democratic governance and the value of CSO diversity, the question of representativeness in policy dialogues is an important one for all stakeholders. Governments and donors may argue that a particular grouping of CSOs is unrepresentative and as a result may feel no obligation to listen to what they have to say. On the other hand, any CSO regardless of how representative it is, must have a voice in any policy matter. Judgment whether CSOs have appropriate representativity in a given dialogue is often a political act to avoid possible debate on contentious issues. In some cases, governments or donors seek to create a legitimate but artificial CSO platform to speak on behalf of all CSOs. This strategy can easily undermine the diversity of CSO voices particularly those excluded from such a platform. Fragmentation may be the confused judgment when the reality is diversity -- a feature of civil society that should be valued for enriching policy dialogue.10 Indeed, CSOs point out that only government can achieve comprehensive representation based on the legitimacy of electoral processes, whereas the defining CSO identity of social solidarity implies that any given CSO will almost necessarily

only represent certain segments of society, or speak only on specific themes or concerns.11 The critical question, therefore, is not so much ensuring the legitimacy and representativeness of CSOs, but the governments responsibility to create mechanisms for inclusive CSO participation, and for specific matters, to identify the appropriate mix or selection of CSOs that can ensure sufficient diversity and voice to engage in a particular dialogue, and its duty to provide the conditions, resources and multiple channels for maximizing citizen participation in governance.12 What do we mean by civil society organizations as development actors in their own right? What do we mean by CSOs as enablers of the poor and of the people? CSOs have long been recognized as important development actors either as donors or as watchdogs for the public good. However this dichotomy expressed in these two generally recognized preoccupations of CSOs prevent the understanding of the distinct role of civil society as development actors in their own right. The CSOs role emanates from their fundamental concern for social solidarity bringing CSOs into the role of enablers so that the poor are empowered to claim their rights; of mobilizers of resources for the delivery of services especially to the marginalized; and, of advocates for government to address the concerns of the excluded. As donors, developed country-based (or Northern) CSOs mobilize billions of dollars in voluntary contributions in cash and in kind for development purposes eminently for the poor and marginalized including those requiring urgent relief from calamities. The latest estimates of the OECD-DAC (the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) put the amount of such contributions at approximately USD14.7 billion in 2005, which is equal to about 14% of all Official Development Assistance (ODA) or 18% of ODA exclusive of debt cancellations. This amount is most likely underestimated by a considerable factor.13 More detailed data from the Hudson Institutes Index of Global Philanthropy shows that CSO contributions from the US alone amounted to USD26.2 billion in 2005, almost as much as official ODA from the US at USD27.6 billion.14 CSOs also act as channels or recipients of Official Development Assistance, receiving funds from official donors for use in their development programs or for redistribution to other CSOs. The share of donor funds to CSOs varies considerably from donor to donor. In 2004, flows to and through CSOs from the DACs top 15 CSO funders ranged between 6 to 34% of their bilateral ODA, totaling approximately USD4.6 billion. This amount, too, is underestimated.15

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However, being mobilizers of resources directly from citizens or being channels or subcontractors of official development funds does not solely define the importance of CSOs as development actors in their own right.16 Civil society plays a crucial role in the development process as innovative agents of change and social transformation. As peoples organizations they are well situated to understand the needs and claims of ordinary people and to build multiple relationships with communities, which are the agents and beneficiaries of development efforts. The developmental role of CSOs is expressed foremost in their concern for human rights, social justice and democracy. CSOs are cognizant of the reality of disempowerment and dispossession, and CSOs work to provide the conditions that enable the poor and the people in general to exercise and claim their democratic rights. CSOs have a common goal for every individual realizing her/his full potential through the full realization of her/his human rights. As such, CSOs also share a common goal of achieving democratic development in their countries where the people achieve equal rights and opportunities, and where the social structures that prevent such equality or further marginalization are dismantled. CSOs that have a strong human rights and democratic perspective strive to relieve this in defining the framework of their organization, their operations and way of working. This perspective determines how they define their role and responsibilities with respect to the poor and the people at large. They adopt a human rights approach in all their undertakings, internally within their own organizations and staff, and externally in dealing with others, especially with the marginalized communities and peoples with whom they relate. Thus, in the realm of development cooperation many CSOs often act as bridge builders between the public interest in social justice and change and the movements and initiatives of poor, excluded and discriminated communities and populations claiming their rights.17 Aside from playing their tasks as aid donors, channels, recipients and watchdogs, civil society plays other roles that donors and governments cannot perform. According to the synthesis report of the AG on regional consultations and related processes conducted in 2007, the range of roles that CSOs play as distinct development actors cover any mix of the following:18 a. Mobilizing grassroots communities, poor and marginalized peoples to claim their rights CSOs as development actors often give priority to mobilizing excluded communities,

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particularly poor and marginalized peoples, to claim the full range of their economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights. Where governments and donors often face distrust in such communities, CSOs foster community design and ownership of development approaches, initiatives and processes by affected populations. Case studies point to complex and changing CSO roles at different levels (local, national, international) in empowering people to develop their own assets and capacities. Many CSOs have developed capacities to be rooted in the community, to be able to read their specic social, economic, and political environment, and to adopt appropriate strategies that strengthen peoples organizations and mobilization to deal with the conditions that impinge on their reality. Box 1. CSOs and the election process in Democratic Republic of Congo
In 2007, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) went through a peaceful and transparent electoral process. Congolese churches, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and associations provided civic education that helped to mobilize the populace. Their efforts elicited a high level of participation, with over 25 million individuals registering to vote in the lead-up to the elections. CSOs trained 60,000 civic educators across the country to raise awareness of the stakes surrounding the election, democratic principles, and citizens electoral rights, as well as rules and regulations. Supportive tools such as community radio, posters, comics and theatre were also developed by local CSOs. A CSO Cadre de concertation de la socit civile pour lobservation des lections was put in place to observe the election process across the country. Source : Extracted from: Lefcacit de laide et la prise en charge dmocratique : le rle de la socit civile et les avances dmocratiques en Rpublique Dmocratique Congolaise. Case Study (2008). Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness: An Exploration of Experience and Good Practice, Reference Document, Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness

b. Monitoring government and donor policies and practices: holding national and multilateral development agencies to account through local knowledge, research, advocacy, and alternative policies CSOs play essential roles in democratic governance, creating and sustaining public spaces for peoples participation. Civil society is one of the key pillars of democratic practice, alongside the executive, legislature, judiciary and the media. The mix of social solidarity and values that characterize CSO actions give civil society a distinct role in the promotion of democratic governance and accountability in facilitating the engagement of people (citizens) seeking to promote the public interest. Several case studies have documented the capacity of CSOs to strengthen democratic accountability of governments and donors for policy and program decisions. The reference documents Exploration of Experience and Good Practice and the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book from the Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness (AG-CS) provide a number of examples in this respect.

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Box 2. MKSS Social Audits

Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) is a peasant and workers union in the Indian state of Rajasthan that has successfully demonstrated its ability to inuence and strengthen democratic governance and accountability through social audits. The social audits introduced by MKSS provide an innovative space for community members to audit government expenditures on public development funds. The social audit provides a system that empowers residents in verifying public records and identifying instances of fraud through information access and a MKSS sponsored public hearing. The public hearing enables residents to discuss the communitys opinions and ndings about public projects/programs with public ofcials. The social audits provide space to expose inefciency in the use of public funds, poor planning, and instances of corruption. The success of MKSS social audits in curbing corruption has inuenced the state government to institutionalize the process in each village. The formation of Indias Right to Information Act was also signicantly inuenced by MKSSs state-wide campaign demanding citizens right to information. Source: Adapted from Social Audits Tracking Expenditure with Communities: The Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) in India http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/cgg/unpan023752.pdf http://pgexchange.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=142&Itemid =136

CSOs have also monitored linkages between private sector actors and the aid system in their focus on corporate social responsibility. In playing this role, CSOs draw upon their capacities in knowledge creation, innovation, policy analysis and formulation. It is vital to protect and strengthen this CSO monitoring and advocacy role in many developing countries where democratic processes are often weak and fragile. CSOs are an independent source of information and perspective on the social needs and interests of marginalized or dispossessed peoples that must inuence government/donor policies if the latter are to be effective in reducing poverty and inequality. Some quarters argue that CSOs do not, and should not, create or displace the voices of poor and marginalized peoples. Rather, CSOs serve to identify, amplify and channel the voices of those excluded or seldom heard in society. An important dimension of CSO solidarity across borders is the strengthening of CSO advocacy roles for alternative policies in multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank or the World Trade Organization (WTO), whose current policies limit the realistic scope for policy proposals suggested by CSOs at the country level. c. Delivering services and innovative development programming Most development actors recognize and value the role of CSOs in service delivery, although there are concerns expressed that CSOs may create parallel and competing structures for service delivery at the community level. While some suggest that CSOs may be seen to address gaps in government service coverage, several examples during the Advisory Groups regional consultations, and in related literature, point out that CSO service delivery is often distinct from that of government (which has

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a recognized obligation to ensure universal access to basic services). CSOs not only address needs in excluded communities, but they can also link this service in particular communities to their roles in advocacy, mobilization, empowerment and democratic accountability. As CSOs develop relationships of trust with communities through the delivery of particular programs (whether government-initiated or not), they can further empower the communities to seek out a full range of services from their governments. CSOs can play a complementary role to that of government also by virtue of their exibility to experiment with new approaches. An example of this was evident in a case study in Mozambique, where a CSO had the space to experiment with innovation in school curriculum that was subsequently adopted by the government19. Box 3. Butokes Nutrition Program
Butoke is a grass roots CSO founded in 2004 to address problems of hunger and malnutrition in the Democratic Republic of Congos (DRC) Western Kasai province. From the start, Butoke combined a humanitarian approach to address immediate needs with a longer-term development approach, by providing food for work, managing a nutrition center, and introducing new seeds, basic tools and low-cost agricultural techniques, such as row planting and proper spacing to village associations. Beneciaries tended to be primarily widows and others whose nutritional status was the most precarious, but all village associations contain a mix of members. The approach has been successful in reaching large numbers of people at low cost, using a formula that can be replicated to scale as resources become available. Butokes programme has lled an institutional void in an area of the DRC in which the economy, the government and event the social ber of society itself had been devastated by years of war and bad governance. Butokes programmes have reached a large population. Starting work with 20 village associations on 19 hectares in 2004, Butoke by 2007 was reaching a population of about 120,000 people, whose nutritional levels are being improved through access to more abundant, more nutritious crops. In 2006, Butoke was supporting the school fees of 665 orphans (up from 278 in 2004), was treating approximately 6,500 cases per year in nutrition and primary health centres, and was rehabilitating approximately 200 severely malnourished children per year; it was providing counseling on responsible sexuality for approximately 5,000 people per year. The example of service and respect for human rights and dignity that inspire Butoke as basic values in its work provide hope and inspiration for the population, who can see in this a different way of doing things. Butoke is helping to break down the barriers to gender equality and working to change attitudes towards the handicapped and downtrodden, in a society that tends to blame orphans, widows, and the handicapped for their own misfortune as bewitched people to be isolated, shunned, and often dispossessed. Source: Extracted from Grassroots Development in Western Kasa, Case Study (2008) Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness: An Exploration of Experience and Good Practice, Reference Document, Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness

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d. Building coalitions and networks for greater civil society coordination and impact CSOs that share values and goals increasingly work together within a sector or program, or in issue-specic coalitions and networks, to coordinate and maximize their engagement with their constituencies, governments and bilateral and multilateral donors. Several case studies, including a cross-border West African network of womens organizations strengthening womens rights with government counterparts, point to the synergy created through informal CSO linkages and networking, drawing on the unique contributions and accompaniment of each partner to enrich and bring innovation to development processes at the local level. Box 4. National CSO Education Coalition
In Burkina Faso, CSOs were initially marginalized in the policy discussions that led to the formulation of the education sector plan in 2002 (despite rhetoric encouraging an increase in their involvement in the nal document). Teachers unions in particular were excluded because of the governments recognition of their opposition to aspects of the plan. Burkina Faso has since developed a national education CSO coalition, the Cadre de Concertation en Education de Base (CCEB), which is relatively cohesive and effective. CCEB is especially active at the regional level, which now is the location of much education decision-making. Its members work cooperatively and effectively to generate civil society voice on issues of gender, curricular reform and regional planning. CSO consultation at the national and regional levels in Burkina Faso is now routine, with CCEB playing a role in relating regional to national levels of decision making. Furthermore, a unique feature of the Burkina sector program has created a new space for CSO initiative, through the establishment of a CSO-government governed pooled fund for non-formal education projects. Source: Exacted from Education SWAPA in Africa: Lessons for CSOs, Karen Mundy & Megan Haggerty, University of Toronto, International Forum on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness, Gatineau, Quebec February 3-6, 2008 (http://www.cgce.ca/storage/research-papers/2008-02-EducationSWAPs-Africa-CSOs-Mundy.pdf).

e. Mobilizing and leveraging Northern nancial and human resources in North/ South CSO partnerships. Northern CSOs increasingly play an intermediation role between constituencies in Northern countries and CSOs and constituencies in developing countries. Northern CSO intermediation is said to involve a mix of ingredients: (1) resource transfers (from both ofcial donors and privately raised funds from both individuals and the private sector) when CSOs act as donors; (2) efforts to strengthen different capacities of Southern CSO counterparts (sometimes directly with communities); (3) facilitation of North/South policy dialogue, advocacy and citizen mobilization on issues of global economic and social justice; and (4) engaging Northern citizens in development education and actions.

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Box 5. CSOs and Education in Mozambique: Issues of Alignment and Complementarity

The case of CSOs in the Mozambique education sector-wide approach (SWAP) that is included in the Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness Case Book illustrates two aspects of alignment CSO alignment with government systems and priorities, and a Northern CSOs alignment in partnership with the priorities and systems of a Southern partner. This case involves a partnership between Progresso in Mozambique, and CODE, a Canadian NGO specialized in the promotion of quality primary education. Progresso and CODE have been working to increase the quality of education in the two Northern provinces of Mozambique for over 15 years. The activities included in their joint program strategy, Promotion of a Literate Environment in Mozambique (PLEM), includes the provision of reading and learning materials in Portuguese and local languages, skills development for primary teachers and adult literacy agents, and training of education ofcers on planning, in-service training and monitoring of teaching/learning. Progresso and CODE work in close cooperation with the Mozambican Ministry of Education and Culture at the national and provincial levels, and PLEM is aligned with the Government of Mozambiques rst and second Education Sector Strategic Plans. However, because the governments capacity and structure does not allow the exibility required to experiment with new education approaches, PLEM is funded through a bilateral agreement between CODE and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Progresso and CODE work with communities and government to design and implement interventions that build on the identied needs and the institutional priorities and capacities of the government. They do so in a way that is adapted to local needs and realities, drawing from their experience, knowledge base and skills in the education sector and in the region. The division of labour between Progresso and CODE is adapted to the comparative advantages of each partner. CODEs responsibility for the management of the contract with CIDA allows Progresso to focus on reporting and planning with its Mozambican partners, while Progresso is responsible for most activities in the eld. CODEs long-term commitment to education and support of Progressos education initiative, and its ability to secure funds through CIDAs different funding mechanisms, has allowed it to develop solid experience and to build up long-term relationships in Mozambique. Source: Extracted from Lessons of a CSO Project and the Education SWAP in Mozambique. Case Study (2007). Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness: An Exploration of Experience and Good Practice, Reference Document, Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness.

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Part II

Development Effectiveness of CSOs

The UN Declaration on the Right to Development defines development as a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting there from. Its ultimate aim is to ensure that people are able to meet their daily needs, lead lives of dignity, expand their capabilities, and reach their highest potential, especially those who are impoverished and marginalized, many of whom are women. This process requires the interventions of multiple actors in society governments, donors, the private sector and civil society. From the standpoint of CSOs, development effectiveness is about how well all development actors actions improve their impact on the lives of poor and marginalized populations. It is about improving their capacity to promote sustainable positive change that addresses both the root causes as well as the symptoms of poverty, inequality and injustice through the diversity and complementarities of different instruments, policies and actors. This perspective positions poor and marginalized populations as central actors and owners of development, challenging many of the current approaches of donors and governments.20 The principles and concerns of development effectiveness must be applied to all development actors including CSOs. However, as CSOs are development actors in their own right, the application of development effectiveness on CSOs varies slightly than when it is applied on governments and on the whole development process with the interaction of government agencies, external development partners and other CSOs. Indeed, if CSOs are distinct development actors in that they are expressions of social solidarity and have special concern for human rights, social justice and gender equality and sustainability, then all the more that they should abide by principles of development effectiveness. These should be translated actively and creatively in the framework, objectives, mechanisms, processes and intended results of their development interventions.

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What can be considered the key principles of CSO development effectiveness? Unlike the Paris Declaration, which is premised on aid governance and management of official development assistance, whose principles cannot be applied directly to CSOs as development actors, the principles of development effectiveness may be applied to governments, donors, development partners and CSOs as well. There may be specific variations in application depending on the development actor and its role in society and in development cooperation, but the principles remain essentially the same. CSO development effectiveness principles are applied to the specific role and character of CSOs who act in and for public interest, albeit as private voluntary representatives of the people, especially of the poor and marginalized. Similar to the role of the people in defining the basis and framework of governance and sovereignty exercised by government, the people, especially the poor, define the basis and framework of CSO legitimacy and constituency. These are values and principles that CSOs want to realize in the process of their daily work -- within their own organizations, in their interactions with other development actors, and in the social outcomes of their practice. Solidarity The foundation of CSO existence and purpose, solidarity is the principle behind CSO identification with the people, with those who are unable to claim their rights and entitlements, and with others who share similar goals. Thus, learning and sharing become principal features of the relationship between CSOs and their constituencies as well as among CSOs. The contractual elements of partnership only constitute the formal or legal aspect of an essentially deeper concern for the rights and development of one another. Solidarity is premised on shared values and mutual identification. Moreover, partnerships based on solidarity seek to balance out unequal conditions and compensate for the gaps in resources, capacity, and opportunities faced by partners. Box 6. Mobilization against imported toxic waste in Mozambique
When a secretary in Mozambique noticed a news article about the planned incineration of obsolete pesticides in a local cement kiln factory, she contacted Greenpeace who asked for her help in bringing toxic waste experts to Mozambique to examine the problem. The Joint Oxfam Advocacy Programme got involved by bringing in another expert from South Africa and organizing a meeting of

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local community leaders, organisations and individuals to discuss the project and hear how it might affect their lives. Following the rst meeting, a press conference was called and specic invitations sent to representatives of the Environment Ministry and the Danish government agency funding the incineration project. Neither came, but after the conference, those present decided to start a movement against the project. They had been kept in the dark, someone said, so the group should be called LIVANINGO shedding light in a local language. From there the movement grew quickly combining international networking with a strong commitment to working with local people. LIVANINGO organized public meetings and demonstrations near the factory and kept up the media campaign, especially through the small independent press. The group asked for a fresh and independent Environmental Impact Assessment. But neither the Mozambican nor Danish government were willing to listen. Thats when the campaign went international. LIVANINGO sent a representative to speak to the Danish Parliament with funding from Oxfam and support from other international allies in the US, Europe and South Africa. After that, the Mozambican government opened up the door a little and after two and a half years of campaigning, the government gave in and agreed to all of LIVANINGOs demands. The government eventually adopted a return-to-sender policy, shipping 900 tonnes of the chemicals to Germany and the Netherlands for safer disposal. Even after they took the decision, LIVANINGO was following the process to the nish to make sure the government did what they promised. Source: Extracted from CIVICUS PG Exchange, People Centered Advocacy Case Studies http://pgexchange.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=135&Itemid=125 For more information on this case study, see Lowe (2003), which is the sole source for this case summary.

Empowerment Human rights lie at the heart of CSOs as development actors. CSOs are expressions of citizens freedom of association and oftentimes act as enablers of the people especially of the poor and marginalized. As such, these enabling CSOs (as distinct from other CSOs which do not act as enablers although they are legitimate CSOs organized around specific social solidarity interest or concern) translate human rights and rights-based approaches to development into empowerment of the poor to claim their rights. There are many ways by which CSOs play their role as enablers for the empowerment of the poor and the people in general. This may include creating conditions and instruments or tools that the poor may use such as information and mechanisms for transparency. This may also be the development of certain skills. Box 7. MASIPAGs Farmer Empowerment
Magsasaka at Siyentipiko para sa Pag-unlad ng Agrikultura-MASIPAG (Farmer-Scientist Partnership for Agricultural Development) is a farmer-led network of peoples organizations,

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scientists and non government organizations that was established in the Philippines in 1986 with the aim to improve the quality of life of farmers through sustainable organic agricultural practices. Since its inception, MASIPAG has been at the forefront of development struggles in the Philippines pursuing, among other things, a holistic approach to development, community empowerment, and peoples control over agricultural biodiversity as a contribution in the overall effort of improving the quality of life of small farmers. An important and key factor in the success and outcomes of MASIPAG is that it is grounded in a farmer-led, bottom-up approach. In examining the empowering approach engaged by MASIPAG, the study from which this is drawn identied the following indicators for the bottom-up approach: -Involvement in seed selection and breeding; -Involvement in the organization and the community; -Approaches to training; and, -Social change at the individual and community level. This farmer-led approach strengthens empowerment through focusing on active participation, leadership, and knowledge of the farmers in seed breeding, organizational decision-making, research, and program planning, development, and evaluation. Additionally, MASIPAG utilizes the farmers expertise and knowledge in farmer-to-farmer diffusion through trainings, farm exchange visits, demonstration, and coaching to educate new members on not only the technological, but also the social aspects of their work. The study on MASIPAG has found that the sense of empowerment generated through the farmers involvement with the network has created a larger sense for civic involvement in which case a survey from the study revealed that many of the members further take on leadership roles within various local organizations. MASIPAG farmers gain a sense of empowerment through their decision-making capacities, recognized and respected knowledge and expertise, increased food security, freedom from debt, community involvement, and through exercising and protecting their rights. MASIPAG farmers benet from positive outcomes beyond those gained by sustainable organic agricultural practices. MASIPAG farmers gain social and economic empowerment, which naturally extends from the empowered individual to the empowered community where rights are recognized and lives are dignied. MASIPAG farm trainer and researcher, Perfecto Vicente remarks, Bottom up dignies the poorest and assures them of a socially just and equitable share of free life. Source: Extracted from CIVICUS PG Exchange, People Centered Advocacy Case Studies http://pgexchange.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=135&Itemid=125 For more information on this case study, see Lowe (2003), which is the sole source for this case summary.

Autonomy This refers to the autonomy or independence of CSOs from the state, from the market, from political parties, from private interests, and from external influence or control. This is an important feature and principle crucial for CSO legitimacy as a private voluntary actor but with the intention of working for and in behalf of public interest.

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As a general principle, CSO autonomy is self-expressed and presumed and thus all CSOs accord mutual respect to each other. Based on these principles of autonomy, independence and mutual respect, CSOs interact and cooperate in various ways and levels of networking including platforms and federations to pursue common interests. This also includes international networking and partnerships where the national dimension of autonomy and independence is also respected. Box 8. Platform on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Mali
The United Nations committee responsible for monitoring the International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) accepts alternative reports or parallel reports submitted by civil society. These reports are a way for civil society to be heard by the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and to publicise the status of economic, social, and cultural rights in a given country. The Platform on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Mali was organized in 2005 to support civil society in strengthening the rule of law and democracy by producing the alternative reports on rights in Mali. The Platform seeks to pressure public authorities to address economic, social, and cultural rights and to honour commitment to report to the international community on the implementation status of the ICESCR. In response to the Platforms alternative report on the status of economic, social and cultural rights in 2007, the Malian authorities asked the Platform to help produce the states own ofcial report. However, the Platform turned down the invitation, asserting its position as independent advocate. Source: Extracted from La Platforme des droits conomiques, sociaux et culturels au Mali. Case Study (2008). Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness: An Exploration of Experience and Good Practice, Reference Document, Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness.

Equality As CSOs interact and compete in their diversity, equality is a difficult principle to live up to and many problems often crop up among CSOs, both big and small, and at the international, national, sub-national and local levels. Equality among CSOs is premised on equality of rights, and not on the circumstances of CSOs. For CSOs to co-exist productively and constructively in pursuit of democratic development, the principle of pluralism that celebrates and promotes diversity is essential. For this principle to be actively implemented, mutual trust and respect is essential in CSO conduct among each other and among the people.

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Box 9. Aga Khan Rural Support Program (AKRSP) Gender Equality Programme (Islamabad, Pakistan)
As stated in its Gender Equality Strategy Report, the aim of AKRSP is to eradicate poverty through pro-poor development with an emphasis on bringing women into the mainstream and promoting gender equality. Gender equality and poverty reduction go hand-in-hand, and AKRSP recognizes the need to work on issues related to sustainable and inclusive human development which address womens empowerment and gender equality. The Board and Management of AKRSP recognize that in order to promote gender equality in their communities, the organization has to practice gender equality principles. Through a participatory approach which involved staff consultations and community forums, a gender equality strategy was devised envisaging an integrated and focused approach to reach out to the poorest, most vulnerable, and most marginalized. AKRSP further recognizes the interconnectedness of gender equality and equity to the principles of dignity and rights of all human beings, democratic culture, participation of people in their own development, professionalism, transparency, humility, and pluralism. In its Strategy, AKRSP addresses the integration of gender equality at the following levels: 1. Organizational level: AKRSP will ensure a more systematic integration of gender in all policies and activities with regular gender awareness sessions, capacity building of staff in gender, special management trainings for women to perform at senior levels, and a gender resource center as a space for dialogue. Also includes a reorganization of structure to support adequate presence of women in Board and senior management levels; 2. Programme and Operations: Gender perspectives will be integrated in AKRSPs sectors in the development of strategies, polices and programmes. Fostering of womens organization, inclusive sensitization, and capacity building in gender analysis/monitoring will be integrated in community programming, utilizing indicators such as participation of women in decision-making at household level, political empowerment, and womens mobility. Additionally, programme aspects need to be sensitive to class, age, ethnicity, culture, race, etc, as well as to gender; and, 3. External environment: AKRSP will initiate dialogue and partnerships with stakeholders to foster an enabling environment for increasing gender equality without causing conict. Source: Adapted from Aga Khan Rural Support Programmes Gender Equality Strategy paper (Feburary 2004)

Social justice and transformation Social justice and transformation are not simply strategic goals of development, but are also principles that define partnerships based on solidarity, and expressed in operations and actions. As a principle guiding CSO development effectiveness, social justice and transformation translate to policies, methods and ways of operating for CSOs that are distinctly inclusive, pro-poor, and opposed to practices, acts and attitudes that perpetuate marginalization and oppression of women and other marginalized sections in society.

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A CSO that is of the poor and that is an enabler of the poor has a transformative character and objective and is constantly seeking and building empowering democratic relationships both within itself and in society. Box 10. Unite Unions Approach to Social and Political Movement Unionism inside the Changing New Zealand Working Class
Unite Union was initially formed in the 1990s as a response to signicant cuts to and tightening of eligibility criteria for benets. In the early 2000s, Unite transitioned into an industrial organization representing the working poor and precarious workers. In their struggle to defend the rights and interests of the working class, Unites leadership adheres to the ideology of We are not building a narrow union, we are building a social movement. Unite organizes and provides services to the casual workforce (such as in the fastfood and hotel industries), which is often neglected by other unions that tend to believe they should not service precarious workers, yet however is most vulnerable to employment related injustices. As a struggle-based campaigning union, Unite recognizes the importance of providing services within and outside the workplace, but also the importance of organizing/re-unionizing the service sectors and campaigning particularly for the rights and fair treatment of precarious workers. Like other unions, Unite provides workplace services such as attending disciplinary meetings, ghting against unjustied dismissals and bullying, recovering lost wages due to underpayments, etc. Unite also provides empowering services of free education and access to appropriate nancial services. Moreover, Unite expresses solidarity with their members by adjusting their operations to meet the availability of those they represent, paying Unite organizers similar pay rates as their members, offering affordable membership rates, and by recognizing the transitional character of the casual workforce and the importance to offer lifelong benets and to help members as they move between jobs. Unite has demonstrated its capacity to ght against the social injustices faced by the working poor and achieve positive transformations. Unites discontented members working in the fastfood industry planned and organized the SuperSizeMyPay.com campaign demanding a raise in minimum wage, abolishment of youth rates, and secure hours. The campaign, described by Unite as a historic new deal, was able to secure the right of fastfood employees to belong to a union and win collective employment agreements with KFC, Pizza Hut, Starbucks, and McDonalds. Unite sees that the process of securing rights and winning agreements as part of changing the consciousness of members. Unite also keeps its members informed on negotiations, special events, and news reports through the circulation of Unite News and The Workers Charter. These publications not only foster solidarity among its members on their union struggles and victories, but also give space to communicate, educate, and connect to wider struggles against injustices of imperialism, war, immigration policies and environmental devastation. In this way, Unite advances social and political movement unionism for wider social transformation rather than narrow trade unionism that is focused exclusively on immediate benets for direct members. Source: Adapted from Unite Unions Approach to Social and Political Movement Unionism inside the Changing New Zealand Working Class, Jared Phillips and Daphna Whitmore found in Jobs and Justice: Globalization, Labor Rights and Workers Resistance, edited by Antionio A. Tujan Jr.

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Peoples sovereignty Sovereignty as a principle of development effectiveness also applies to CSOs which provide expression in peoples sovereignty i.e. that the foundation of sovereignty lies in the peoples participation, consent and sovereign action. Democratic development assumes participatory democratic development and economic democracy that ensures the fulfillment of the peoples economic rights among others as well as peoples stewardship over natural resources. Box 11. Dhulikhel Water Supply Project: An Example of Effective Community Water Management System in Nepal
Despite an abundant source of drinking water, the people of Kathmandu Valley, Nepal ironically often face scarcity of drinking water. To address the water crisis, ADB and other funding agencies have strongly advocated for water privatization in order to overcome poor government management practices of water supply operations. However, the private sectors failure to provide more efcient and affordable services, and often exacerbation of the situation by seeking prot maximization through raising tariffs regardless of the peoples capacity to pay, has resulted in the concept of community management of public utilities. Seeking a better water supply system to meet their increasing water demands, the local leaders of Dhulikhel Municipality approached the government authority to address the issue. On grounds of nancial capacity, the government rejected the project. The community took initiative to seek out donor agencies to support the project, eventually nding agreement of funding from Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) under certain conditions. These conditions upheld the peoples sovereignty in the management of their resource and in the operations of the project, including raising the operations and management fund, guaranteed community participation, handling of completed project by the community, and operations and management to be done independently by the community members through the Dhulikhel Drinking Water Users Committee. Throughout the project the community played an active and major role in all project cycle stages of conceptualization, planning, implementation, and monitoring. Upon completion of the project, the government ofcially handed over the new and the old water supply systems over to the committee for management. Through the Dhulikhel Drinking Water Users Committee, the local community has for the past 15 years successfully provided clean water to its consumers. Despite limitations in area of coverage, the project has overall been successful with its major strengths in high level of performance efciency, full recovery of operations and management costs, high collection rate of water tariff, low connection fee, small leakages, continuous operation of the system, and active participation of the community in managing the system. Financial transparency, autonomy, peoples awareness and participation in decision-making, and sound management are factors that have also contributed to the success and sustainability of the project. The Dhulikhel Water Supply project illustrates that community-managed systems are viable and sustainable alternatives to water privatization. Source: Adapted from Dhulikhel Water Supply Project: An Example of Effective Community Water Management Systems, Rabin Subedi and Anuj Sitoula of Water and Energy Users Federation (WAFED)Nepal, Water for the People: Peoples Water Resource Management Strategies.

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Social responsibility and accountability As private actors acting on behalf and in pursuit of public interest, CSOs are required to demonstrate accountability and social responsibility to a greater degree and in a different manner than the private sector or the government. The principle of accountability requires CSOs to pay special attention to its constituency that includes its membership and communities where it directly operates. Furthermore, accountability requires CSOs to be transparent and always ready to demonstrate facts and information required that relate to their work and operations. CSO accountability must address different levels: toward the CSOs own staff, its partners, the government, donors, and ultimately toward the community or constituency that it serves. What are some of the key elements of CSO development effectiveness? In order for CSOs to implement the foregoing principles as effective development actors and become themselves effective enablers and representatives of the poor and the people in general, a number of key elements or mechanisms for CSO development effectiveness are required: a. A code of conduct that embodies principles of CSO development effectiveness The principles discussed in the previous section constitute the set of principles that guide CSOs in their work and in their relationships. These can be presented as a code of conduct that CSOs can ascribe to voluntarily and internalize in their operations among the people, in their partnerships, in their networking and in their engagement with other institutions and sectors. Box 12. An NGO Code of Principles and Standards in Cambodia
In 2004, the Cooperation Committee for Cambodia established the Non-governmental organizations (NGO) Good Practice Project as a result of growing pressure from both within and outside the NGO sector for NGOs to be more accountable. A working group of representatives of the NGO community developed the Code of Ethical Principles and Minimum Standards for NGOs in Cambodia incorporating feedback from a wider audience of NGOs and other development stakeholders. This code aims to maintain and enhance standards of good organizational practice and to ensure public trust in the integrity of the individuals and organizations that make up the NGO sector, and the effectiveness of NGO programs. Nine ethical principles were established:

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partnership, independence, cooperation, transparency, accountability, non-political affiliation, non-discrimination, non-violence, respect for human rights and communities. The initiative is developing a system of self-certication and also provides opportunities for NGOs to come together to learn about best practices in accountability. Source: Extracted from Sothath (2008) and Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (2008).

b. An enabling environment for CSOs to exist and operate The effectiveness of CSOs in enabling the poor is very much influenced by the enabling environment in which they operate. Hence, equally important to the code of conduct are the enabling conditions that constitute an environment for CSOs to thrive. These conditions include social mechanisms for registration, government mechanisms and legislation, donor interventions as well as the CSOs own mechanisms and interactions. The role of donors, international organizations and institutions, of governments, are crucial in this regard. This is further discussed in Part III. c. A set of mechanisms for CSO accountability Established institutionalized mechanisms for CSO accountability are essential in order to assure recognition and legitimization of CSOs in society. Because CSOs face a web of responsibilities for accountability -- to institutional and private donors and governments, to their own staff and defined mission, to other organizations with which they may be working, and to their primary constituents -- this raises questions about which of these accountability relationships tend to predominate. Mechanisms for CSO accountability must ensure that CSOs do not favor their relationship to more powerful stakeholders (such as donors or governments) versus the primary constituency that they profess to represent and serve. Box 13. The INGO Accountability Charter
The INGO Accountability Charter is a voluntary charter signed by 17 international NGOs (INGOs). Among the Charters nine principles is transparency, whereby signatories commit to openness and honesty about their structures, mission, policies, and activities, and to communicating actively to stakeholders about themselves, by making information publicly available. Some of the practical implications of this principle include: reporting compliance with relevant governance, financial accounting, and reporting requirements in the countries in which they are based and operate, and annual reporting on activities, nancial performance, and sources of funds; audit compliance with relevant financial reporting and audit laws and practices; and

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accuracy of information adherence to generally accepted standards of technical accuracy and honesty in presenting and interpreting data and research. Another of the Charters principles is that of good governance, under which signatories commit to: a governance mechanism that includes structures for supervision and evaluation of the chief executive, and overseeing program and budget matters; written procedures defining the appointment, responsibilities and terms of members of the governing body, and regular general meetings to appoint and replace its members; and listening to stakeholders suggestions on how to improve the INGOs work, and encouraging input from people whose interests may be directly affected. The charter also contains principles on ethical fundraising, professional management, nondiscrimination, effective programs, responsible advocacy, independence, and respect for universal principles grounded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A suggestion that emerged as part of the AG-CS consultation process was that this charter could be expanded to address the increasing presence of large INGOs based in developing countries. Source: Extracted from No author (2005), Tomlinson and AG-CS (2008). More information on the Charter is available at: http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/

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Part III

Enabling Environment for CSO Development Effectiveness

The enabling conditions for CSO development effectiveness are multi-dimensional and include conditions that relate to the general character and state of governance in a country. This complex set of conditions include the following: (a) mechanisms to ensure the promotion and protection of the rights to expression, peaceful assembly and association, and access to information; (b) CSO-specific policies such as CSO protection and promotion through legislation and regulations including charitable status provisions; (c) regulations and norms to promote CSO transparency and accountability to their constituencies; (d) the general legal and judicial system and related mechanisms through which CSOs or their constituencies can seek legal recourse; (e) the degree to which multi-stakeholder dialogue is encouraged and practiced; and (f) measures to promote philanthropy and corporate social responsibility.21 However, there are minimum standards for an enabling environment for CSOs to conduct their affairs as development actors in their own right. Based on these minimum standards, more elaborate or sophisticated measures of support through CSO networking or through government-sponsored programs and mechanisms to promote pluralism and support CSO development work may be established. What are some of the components for an enabling environment for CSOs? In general these enabling conditions may be grouped under: recognition through voluntary registration; legislation; access and participation; financial regulation; government support mechanisms; CSO partnerships; CSO networking; and donor support. a. Voluntary registration for recognition An essential element for an enabling environment for CSOs is social recognition in order for them to perform their functions as interlocutors of government in policy formulation, implementation, evaluation, and so on. Registration is one mechanism to establish formal recognition in order to assure requirements of CSO legitimacy that a CSO is indeed an organization that exists and operates and is non-profit. One of the challenges in this regard is ensuring that the registration process is open

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and not exclusionary in order to draw in voluntarily a wide and diverse range of civil society organizations, including small community-based formations, and not just big, professional organizations. Steps have to be taken in order that the registration process is pro-poor, inclusive, and affirmative to marginalized sectors; which means that the process should have only minimum requisites in order that it does not become too tedious as to exclude or restrict any legitimate organization from signing up. CSO-managed voluntary registration mechanisms should be favored over government registration mechanisms. In the Philippines, for example, government requires all CSOs to register only with the barangay (the organic local government unit). But this is not sufficient to accord them with privileges of participation in more elaborate government projects which require more restrictive and costly forms of registration. Box 14. Accountability Through Accreditation The International Planned Parenthood Federations Approach
The International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), a global network of autonomous member associations, is one of the rst INGOs to implement a process of accreditation. The accreditation system helps to ensure that IPPFs mission, vision, and values are shared by all associations, and that agreed principles, policies and standards are respected and implemented consistently across the Federation, regardless of the national context in which they are working. IPPFs accreditation tool is used to assess and review the work of all its member associations. It embraces their diversity while ensuring that they uphold essential international standards and observe best practice. Importantly, this guarantee of excellence is consistent across the globe. Accreditation offers a guarantee to external partners that the association adheres to internationally recognized transparent governance, management, nancial and monitoring systems, making them partners who come with a guarantee that they adhere to the same principles as those highlighted in the Paris Declaration, from a civil society perspective. With ve years of experience, IPPF has emerged as a leader within civil society for accountability through accreditation, receiving visits and requests for information from Transparency International, the International HIV/AIDS Alliance and the Emergency Capacity Building Consortium of NGOs Project. An interesting aspect of the IPPF case is that for CSOs that do not at rst meet the standards, the organization will support and assist them to address areas needing to be strengthened. Source: Extracted from Accountability through Accreditation: The International Planned Parenthood Federations Approach to Partnership with Independent Partners. Case Book Study (2008).

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b. CSO legislation An enabling legal and judicial system is one that can function with efficiency, is impartial, and to which all members of society have access. The legal and judicial system is often used by CSOs to pursue human rights contained in international law and further enshrined in domestic policy. Other enabling means for the promotion and protection of rights include bodies such as human rights commissions and ombudsmans offices.22 CSO legislation is necessary in order to assure the rights of citizens to association; protect CSOs against threats and abuses; and prevent and address undue restrictions from local or national government. There are concerns raised that policy and legislation governing CSOs may be a double-edged sword in that while it may help secure basic rights for CSOs to exist and operate, these may also limit the independence of CSOs especially where governments and CSOs are in opposing sides of the table. At best, legislation governing CSOs should complement CSOs own regulations and norms for transparency and accountability. And in the event that the legislation itself is restrictive, CSOs and their constituencies may challenge this either by questioning the constitutionality of such legislation and/or seeking legal recourse before international law and covenants where the national government is a party to. Box 15. Registration and Regulation of Charities and Societies in Ethiopia
Civil society organizations have become important contributors to Ethiopias political and economic revitalization. Major achievements of NGOs can be seen in the areas of health, food security, human rights, and poverty alleviation, just to name a few. Most recently, during the 2005 elections, NGOs supported voter education, and monitored and observed the election process. In February 2009, the Government adopted the Proclamation to Provide for the Registration and Regulation of Charities and Societies (CSP), Ethiopias rst comprehensive law governing the registration and regulation of NGOs. The law is one of the most controversial NGO laws in the world. CSP Article 68 requires all charities and societies to register. It further requires foreign organizations to obtain a letter of recommendation from the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. CSP Article 69 allows the Agency to deny registration if, inter alia, (1) the proposed charity or society is likely to be used for unlawful purposes or for purposes prejudicial to public peace, welfare or good order in Ethiopia; or (2) the name of the charity or society is in the opinion of the Agency contrary to public morality or illegal. CSP Article 14j-n restricts participation in activities that include the advancement of human and democratic rights, the promotion of equality of nations and nationalities and peoples and that of

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gender and religion, the promotion of the rights of disabled and childrens rights, the promotion of conict resolution or reconciliation and the promotion of the efciency of the justice and law enforcement services to Ethiopian Charities and Societies The restriction on NGOs that receive more than 10% of funding from foreign sources from participating in essentially all human rights and advocacy activities may effectively silence civil society in Ethiopia by starving NGOs of resources, and thus essentially extinguishing their right to expression. These restrictions may force the closures of many organizations, especially human rights organizations. This is of particular concern in Ethiopia where local sources of nancing are very limited and NGOs are thus dependent on foreign funding. Alternately, NGOs may abandon disfavored missions or activities if they cannot raise funds locally to sustain them. Based on: Ferguson (2008, p. 31).

c. Access and participation Assumed in a democratic system, and enshrined in CSO legislation if it exists, CSOs interlocution role means that they can also represent themselves as citizens in hearings and policy discussions called by parliament and other government bodies; or in deliberations regarding planning, evaluation and other aspects of work of government committees or projects. CSOs, however, have greater recognition because they do not merely act as individuals representing individual citizen views and interests but instead act as groups of citizens representing broader views of groups of citizens or of the whole public. An enabling environment for CSOs exists where structures and processes for multistakeholder dialogue between and among CSOs, government, and other sectors are assured as a structural feature of governance. Special attention is likely to be required for CSOs working in situations of conflict or in especially difficult circumstances where there may be particular need of protection and where CSOs may often be the only vehicles available for delivering certain types of services, or are engaged in peace building and reconstruction processes. 23 Box 16. Laws and Regulations on the Political Activities of NGOs
As a general rule, there are no specic provisions regarding political activities of NGOs in the civil codes. Countries including France, Belgium, Holland, Finland, Italy, Spain, Germany, Switzerland, and Denmark place no restraints upon the public policy activities of NGOs. In fact, some civil law countries actively encourage NGOs political activities. In Belgium, for example, there is an explicit right entitled droit de critique (right to criticize) which permits associations to use all legal means to defend interests and ideas of organizational objectives. Political parties in Germany set up foundations specically for the purpose of channeling resources into partisan activities. And in Switzerland, associations mobilize and represent citizens in the political decision-making process.

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Against the background of this permissive approach, restrictions are sometimes imposed through the tax or administrative law to limit the scope of political activities, especially where the NGO is pursuing public benet or tax-privileged purposes. In Germany, for example, tax-privileged purposes do not include political activities. Tax-exempted organizations may not act as direct supporters of political parties; they are not allowed to support or campaign for political parties or their political representatives. In France, while nothing in the codied law prevents a public benet organization (public utility association or public utility foundation) from engaging in political activities, a decision of the Conseil dEtat claries that organizations with a primarily political purpose, such as engaging primarily in political advocacy, cannot be recognized as public benet organizations. In EU Member States, the regulatory framework for NGOs and political activities is similarly permissive, with restrictions typically linked either to direct nancing of political parties, or applicable only to those NGOs receiving state support. Poland presents perhaps the most permissive framework: Polish law explicitly gives associations the right to engage in almost any political activity, even participation in electoral campaigns (through special elective committees). In Slovakia, associations are similarly free to engage in a range of political activities, including endorsing candidates, lobbying, and even contributing to political campaigns; foundations, however, are restricted from nancing political parties. In the Czech Republic, while associations cannot be founded for political purposes, they can lobby, endorse candidates, provide information and advocate; foundations, as in Slovakia, cannot provide nancial support to political parties but can lobby, endorse candidates, provide information, and advocate. In Hungary, NGOs are free to lobby, nominate or endorse candidates, and provide information and nancial support to political parties. Restrictions arise only for public benet organizations (that is, those NGOs with public benet status and preferential tax benets), which are prohibited from engaging in direct political activity, such as nominating candidates for national elections or funding political parties. Thus, in the European civil-law context, legislation generally recognizes NGOs as key participants in framing and debating issues of public policy, and like individuals, they have the right to speak freely on all matters of public signicance, including existing or proposed legislation, and state policy and actions. Likewise, NGOs generally have the right to criticize or endorse state ofcials and candidates for political ofce. They also usually have the right to carry out public policy activities, such as education, research, advocacy, and the publication of position papers. In some cases, however, NGOs (or at least certain categories of NGOs, such as foundations or public benet organizations) are prohibited from engaging in party political activities, such as nominating candidates for ofce, campaigning, or funding parties or political candidates. As compared to common-law countries, therefore, civil law countries take a more permissive approach, restricting NGOs from engaging in only a narrowly dened range of political activities. Source: Extracted from Indias National Policy on the Voluntary Sector. Case Study (2008). For a copy of the policy, see www.planningcommission.gov.in/data/ngo/npvol07.pdf.

d. Financial regulations Since CSOs are not private individuals or private profit organizations, there is also need for regulations regarding finance and property. These include policies and rules on CSO banking transactions, receipt of funds from abroad, receipt of donations, ownership of property, tax exemption and charitable status provisions, and so on.

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In many cases, the official registration of CSOs is a function of financial regulation similar to that stipulated in many domestic policies on corporations and associations. What this means is that CSOs must be registered as a corporation or association in a number of countries to participate in different financial transactions. This may be disabling among many community-based organizations especially marginalized groups of indigenous peoples, peasants, labor, and others who are challenged to comply with the complexities of financial regulation but are unable to, either due to cultural constraints or due to economic and sociological reasons. For instance, an indigenous group may be unable to open a bank account because its members cannot comply with the requirement of showing proofs of identity, residence or property. Weaknesses in many existing legislation and social regulations sometimes result in ill-advised arrangements such as registration of property and finances to the private ownership of the CSO leader. A truly enabling environment with regard to financial regulation should make these financial services more accessible to local organizations and make them truly propoor and inclusive. e. Government support mechanisms As societies become more developed and affluent, various government programs to support CSOs must be put in place. These mechanisms and programs may cover the full range from providing assistance in establishing CSOs, supporting CSO activities, to providing direct funding support for CSO programs, especially at the community level. It may also include government measures to promote philanthropy and corporate social responsibility. These mechanisms and programs should be inclusive and directed primarily toward local communities and poor organizations. This means reforming current policies and structures that politicize government support programs -- excluding or discriminating against CSOs that challenge government policies and practices. Box 17. Indias National Policy on the Voluntary Sector
In 2007 the Government of India, responded to calls to recognize CSOs as development actors in their own right and approved a National Policy on the Voluntary Sector. This policy was developed over a three-year period through a participatory process with representatives from various levels of government and civil society. It has provided much-needed legitimacy and voice to the voluntary sector, while ensuring autonomy and independence of voluntary organizations and CSOs. In order to expand the reach and impact of the policy, state governments have been asked to prepare similar policies and state and central ministries dealing with the voluntary sector have been requested to take appropriate steps towards the national policys implementation.

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CSOs recognize that while the passing of the legislation is an important milestone in the recognition of their roles, monitoring of implementation is required to assure its effectiveness. To that end, the Voluntary Action Network of India has organized state consultations of CSOs to disseminate the policys message and mobilize civil society efforts to impress upon respective state governments the need for similar policies. Source: Extracted from Indias National Policy on the Voluntary Sector. Case Study (2008). For a copy of the policy, see www.planningcommission.gov.in/data/ngo/npvol07.pdf.

f. CSO partnerships International solidarity and cooperation are constructive when they respect and are premised on the autonomous process and effort of people for democratic development providing support toward an enabling environment for the people and the poor and marginalized in particular, to exercise their citizenship. An external development partner helps provide an enabling environment for both governments and CSOs, who in turn, ought to provide an enabling environment for the poor to claim their rights and drive the process of democratic development. CSO partnerships should be properly anchored in a country policy. A partnership with a trade union for example, should be able to locate that union within the whole trade union and working class movement in a specific country as well as the whole civil society movement and democratization movement in that country; identify the main challenges regarding decent work, labor rights and human rights in general; and, address general and particular needs of that trade union in support of its overall goals. Furthermore, CSO partnerships must assiduously embody the principles of CSO development effectiveness, especially in the management of grants and co-financed programs. Unfortunately the reality is often far from ideal. International solidarity even among CSOs often reflects unequal relations between North and South akin to patron-client relationships, and not unlike traditional donor-recipient country relationships. To a large degree this is influenced by donor operational policies that trickle down to Northern CSOs who are channels of donor funding. The aggressive promotion of the internationalization and homogenization of international CSOs needs to be questioned in relation to the objectives and principles of development cooperation for the promotion of independent democratic development of societies in the South. Are they glossing over national borders in the name of globalization and in effect disempowering or creating barriers for effective involvement in national processes? Or, conversely, are they creating unfair advantages over domestic CSOs? Are they promoting internationalization

34

or commonly shared values and identity to the detriment of creating an enabling environment for CSOs in national processes? On the other hand, the nationalization of large and extensive international NGOs also needs to be questioned in relation to the impact that the nationalized chapters have on autonomous national processes for democratic development. Do they create imbalances among domestic CSOs or do they create unnatural inequities among national players that do not reflect the true levels of development and linkages in national CSO evolution? In the end, to what extent should external intervention properly contribute to the enabling environment and not actually distort or become unconstructive intervention in independent national processes in a country? 24 Box 18. CCICs Code of Ethics and Partnership Principles
In the early 1990s, members of Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC) developed a membership-wide Code of Ethics. Ratied and adopted in 1995, the Code of Ethics delineates the minimum ethical standards that the organizations members must observe in the areas of governance, organizational integrity, management/human resources, nancial management, and communications for the purpose of raising funds. It is based on a philosophy of self-certication and peer accountability and supported by a broader ethics program. In 2004, CCIC added a set of principles and standards regarding North-South partnerships to the code. While the topic of partnerships had been discussed for many years it was the new political climate following September 11th that pushed them to develop the principles, as new security legislation seemed to threaten many of traditional CCIC partnerships. The principles, developed over a two-year period through a process that included Southern CSO participation, address many issues, including unequal North-South power relations. One of the principles states that Partnerships should embody equity. Acknowledging that inequalities often exist as a result of power dynamics, especially in funding relations, partners should strive for equitable partnerships. Another principle stresses that Partnerships should be vehicles for long-term accompaniment that support the right of peoples to determine and carry out activities that further their own development options, through their CSOs (CCIC 2008a, pg. 11). CCIC supports its membership in implementing the code and principles through workshops on ethical practice and publication of supporting documentation on such issues as managing conict of interest, and fundraising. Extracted from: CCIC (2008a) and http://www.ccic.ca/e/002/ethics.shtml

g. CSO national and local networking CSO national networks and platforms provide an enabling environment for CSOs, particularly where issues of legitimacy and representativeness come to the fore. Membership to and affiliation with platforms and networks provide the credibility and profile that may be needed by particular CSO members in accessing resources

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and information, engaging with donors, governments and other stakeholders, and so on by providing an umbrella by which individual and small community-based organizations and associations may be recognized and cooperate. Furthermore, CSOs working in especially difficult circumstances may benefit from the profile of being identified with such platforms besides other services networks may provide. In the same manner, local and sub-national networking and partnerships among CSOs strengthen civil society efforts for democratic development by arriving at a clear and focused country policy, i.e. identifying areas where development intervention is most needed. CSO networking and cooperation facilitates resource sharing, capacity development, organizing and mobilizing for advocacy and action, which are vitally important in sustaining the work of achieving democratic development. Tensions, however, may arise due to competition and the tendency towards various forms of sectarianism among CSOs. More work is needed in arriving at recommendations to address this common problem in national and local networking, but there is a long history of successful cooperation among CSOs, especially in urgent and tactical issues and concerns. h. Donor support mechanisms Civil society organizations in the North can provide enabling support in three complementary ways and areas: 1) Provide direct enabling support for CSOs from the South that are positioned for meaningful contribution to democratic development of their country at national or sub-national level through CSO development cooperation and sustained partnerships where desirable; 2) Contribute to indirect enabling support to CSOs and to democratic development efforts of the country internationally and in their base countries through solidarity actions that enhance the enabling environment for CSOs as regards specific issues or in general; 3) Advocate and strengthen their own peoples and governments capacity and efforts to provide development cooperation, official development assistance and diplomatic support that specifically enhance democratic development of the country. CSO partners from developed countries as well as international organizations must be aware of the dangers of falling into the practice of paternalism no matter how well intentioned. CSO partnerships should adjust to the needs and circumstances of

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the inherently weaker partner from the South and the East, and reduce demands that partnership places on them. This occurs mostly in the area of fiduciary requirements which are often influenced or dictated by donors of Northern CSOs. Similar to the principle of alignment in aid effectiveness, CSO partnerships must pay attention to strengthening the partner from the South, avoid burdening the partner with unnecessary requirements of project management, and align to partner fiduciary and organizational processes and mechanisms which they can assist to strengthen.25 What is the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness? 26 Given the important roles of CSOs in contributing to development progress and the realization of human rights, all stakeholders donors, developing country governments, CSO and communities have a stake in assuring that CSOs realize their full potential. In recent global consultations and meetings, CSOs have acknowledged their obligation to take forward and lead a process to improve their own effectiveness as development actors. At the end of June 2008, more than 70 civil society delegates, representing a rich diversity and large constituency of CSOs (including individual CSOs [7], international CSOs [14], national [27] and regional [14] platforms, and thematic networks [10]), from both developed and developing countries, assembled in Paris to take up the challenges of CSO effectiveness in development. The Exploratory Meeting on CSO Effectiveness, held in Paris on 29-30 June 2008, was the first major event of a process that was initiated in February 2008 during the International Forum on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness in Gatineau/Ottawa. During informal talks, CSO leaders resolved to start an independent global process toward agreeing on a CSO-suitable effectiveness framework. The overall objectives of the meeting were, firstly, to reflect upon prior discussions on CSO effectiveness and, secondly, to set the course for the CSO effectiveness process up to December 2010 (the suggested deadline by which concrete results should be produced). Box 19. Key messages in the Exploratory Meeting on the effectiveness of CSOs
1. CSOs conrmed that they need their own independent process towards agreeing on a CSOsuitable effectiveness framework. 2. Not only do CSOs want to establish principles for themselves, they also want to come up with a vision on development effectiveness that is relevant to all development stakeholders (including governments and ofcial donors). 3. The prospective effectiveness framework to be developed by CSOs must take into account the many diverse roles CSOs play in development. Therefore, their effectiveness should be

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measured, not by the effectiveness of their aid relationships, but by the impact that their actions have on the poor and marginalized (development effectiveness, not aid effectiveness). 4. The process needs to be inclusive, open and transparent. It should take the form of an Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness that is accessible to all CSOs. 5. National and regional platforms and thematic networks should take the lead in triggering processes on CSO effectiveness on their levels to inform the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness (principle of subsidiarity). 6. It must be acknowledged that there is already a lot of work on effectiveness carried out within civil society. Therefore, rather than imposing a global accountability mechanism, this process should aim at facilitating the establishment of such mechanisms at national, regional and thematic levels and provide learning opportunities and a platform to identify the common elements of CSO effectiveness. 7. Through the Open Forum, CSOs also want to dene their contribution and position for negotiations on effectiveness with ofcial donors and governments in the run-up to the planned Beijing High-Level Forum in 2011. Extracted from: CCIC (2008a) and http://www.ccic.ca/e/002/ethics.shtml

This exploratory meeting on CSO Effectiveness agreed to launch a two-year global Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness, from January 2009 to December 2011. The key directions for the Open Forum include the following: 1. The Open Forum will elaborate CSO effectiveness principles focusing on their diverse roles as development actors, not solely as aid actors. CSOs are first and foremost highly diverse expressions of social solidarity for the active engagement of people in their own development efforts. Their development and advocacy work comes out from the grassroots experience, analysis and open dialogue in community-based processes. As such, CSO effectiveness cannot be reduced to a donor/recipient aid paradigm. Through the Open Forum, CSOs will build consensus on a commonly accepted framework to help measure their effectiveness, based on their development visions, approaches, relationships and impact of actions. The focus will be the enrichment of CSO development roles in support of people claiming their rights, in promotion of womens rights, in contributions to fulfilling livelihoods, sustainable environments and the democratic determination of development priorities. The goals of development effectiveness and sustainable impacts should be the overarching concern of all development actors donors, country governments, CSOs and communities. 2. The building of consensus in the Open Forum during the next two years is complex, requiring a global process that is constructed from country and regional activities, involving many different development actors. It is a CSO-led process that is multi-stakeholder in character. The Paris Declaration has been a voluntary inter-governmental process spread over a decade for consensus among donors and

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developing country governments. Similarly, the large numbers and diversity of CSOs, their geographic reach and their multiple roles in development, will require a careful process of dialogue at country, regional and global levels, iteratively building understanding and global consensus on principles, guidance, and good practices on implementing these principles for improved civil society effectiveness. A detailed work plan for this process will be developed in next several months. 3. The Open Forum will be an inclusive and multi-stakeholder process, which is managed and led by CSOs. As distinct development actors in their own right, CSOs require the space to debate the issues affecting their own effectiveness. CSO effectiveness is not only shaped by the many challenges emerging from their own practices, but also by challenges posed by the environment in which they operate, which is often determined by donor and recipient country governments. As also proposed by the Synthesis and Findings of the Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness, the Open Forum process will be structured as a shared multistakeholder agenda. Over the two years, the Open Forum will be managed and facilitated by a globally representative 25-member CSO Global Facilitation Group, which will work closely with a supporting CSO platform, and will coordinate and engage with appropriate donor and government bodies. 4. The Open Forum, over a two year period, will reach consensus on key principles affecting CSO development effectiveness, along with guidance on how to apply these principles and highlight good practices for context-relevant mechanisms to hold CSOs accountable to these principles. The Open Forum will build upon existing understanding of the principles for aid and development effectiveness, including the work of the Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness. In developing a framework for CSO development effectiveness, the Forum will take account of the lessons from many existing civil society mechanisms, codes and tools, including more than 23 country and global codes documented for the Exploratory Meeting. But the Open Forum will not be proposing a new global mechanism or impose a single international code of conduct. Rather than propose a new global mechanism, the Open Forum will be a learning space for CSOs to agree on a framework of key principles and related guidelines that should direct efforts to assess and improve their effectiveness in development operations, including international civil society partnerships. 5. The Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness will be a key CSO contribution toward a truly multi-stakeholder and tripartite Seoul Agreement on Development Effectiveness in 2011, with CSOs equally at the negotiating table along with other development partners. The Accra Agenda for Action recognizes the need for inclusive processes for making development progress, based on gender equality, human rights and environmental sustainability. The Open Forum will be an inclusive process, whose outcomes will deepen the development effectiveness

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of CSOs, in ways that will implicate and be relevant to all development partners. The Open Forum presents a real opportunity for CSOs, donors, governments to undertake a more ambitious level of dialogue, one which could initiate negotiations, with equal participation among the three stakeholders groups, for a joint Declaration on Development Effectiveness at the 2011 Seoul High Level Forum IV. The voluntary and multi-stakeholder character of the Open Forum is premised on the recognition that CSOs themselves must come together to address their own development effectiveness. This can not only be achieved in dialogue with communities and different CSOs, but also with donors and governments, who have responsibilities and policies that directly affect the enabling environment for achieving CSO effectiveness. CSOs in turn can enrich the implementation of donor and government approaches to improving their own aid and development effectiveness. Box 20. Major objectives of the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness
From January 2009 to December 2010, the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness will undertake to: 1. Develop an inclusive, participatory and representative process, owned by CSOs around the world, with regional equality of representation, and taking into account issues of gender equality; 2. Increase awareness within CSOs around the world regarding their effectiveness as development actors and innovative agents of change and social transformation; 3. Increase understanding and reach consensus on the principles guiding the effectiveness of CSOs as development actors; and 4. Develop guidance related to the implementation of such principles, which will facilitate adaptation to country, regional or sectoral conditions; and generate political dialogue with donors and governments to address the needs for enabling environments for CSO effectiveness, based on the recognition of the distinct roles and voice of CSOs as development actors in their own right. Source: Exploratory meeting on the effectiveness of civil society organizations: meeting report, Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness, Organized under the auspices of the preliminary Global Facilitation Group, Paris, Maison de lEurope, 29-30 June 2008

Box 21. Expected outcomes of the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness
The Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness will result in: 1. The creation of an open process, whose credibility and accountability will be based on its inclusiveness and transparency. It will reach out through country-based, sectoral/

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thematic, regional and global processes, enabling CSOs to contribute to and identify with an iterative consensus on CSO development effectiveness. 2. The development of a vision on development effectiveness through national and international policy dialogue, taking account of the centrality of the concepts of human rights, gender equality, environmental sustainability, and the capacity of development actors to lead the changes they seek, as the foundation for situating CSO effectiveness, as well as the effectiveness of donors and governments. 3. An agreement on common principles regarding CSO development effectiveness as development actors, through dialogue and learning. Shared principles will be applied differently by a diversity of CSOs in very different regional or sectoral contexts. 4. An agreement on guidelines on how to apply these principles and documentation of good practices for context-relevant mechanisms appropriate to each country and/or region. 5. Establish a CSO foundation for a negotiated and equitable process for a tripartite (CSO, government, donor) agreement on advancing development effectiveness at the 4th High Level Forum in Seoul in December 2011. Such negotiations would be based on the recognition and support for CSOs as distinct development actors in their own right, and a shared interest in strengthening an enabling environment for development effectiveness. Source: Exploratory meeting on the effectiveness of civil society organizations: meeting report, Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness, Organized under the auspices of the preliminary Global Facilitation Group, Paris, Maison de lEurope, 29-30 June 2008

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Endnotes

1 The AG is a multi-stakeholder group composed of representatives each from official donors (Canada, France, Norway), recipient country governments (Nicaragua, Rwanda, Zambia), CSOs from the North (ActionAid International, Canadian Council for International Cooperation, CONCORD) and CSOs from the South (Afrodad, Reality of Aid, Third World Network). It has a very diverse mandate, including issues relevant to the effectiveness of CSOs as development actors. It was established in 2007 to facilitate an explicit civil society and aid effectiveness track for the September 2008 Accra High Level Forum which reviewed the implementation of the Paris Declaration. 2 Civil society and aid effectiveness, Concept paper (final), Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness, 17 September 2007 3 The role of civil society in EUs development policy, Reflection document, undated 4 The following is an extract from Civil society and aid effectiveness, Concept paper (final), Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness, 17 September 2007 5 Consultations on civil society and aid effectiveness: a synthesis of issues, analysis and proposals, A background paper for the Advisory Groups International Forum on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness, Ottawa, 3-6 February 2008 6 Civil society organizations that work for development... and also for democracy, Rubn Fernndez, Reality Check, Aug 2008 7 ibid. 8 Civil society and aid effectiveness, A synthesis of Advisory Group regional consultations and related processes, January December 2007 9 Advisory Group 2008, op.cit.. 10 Advisory Group 2007, op. cit. 11 Advisory Group 2008, op. cit.. 12 Ibid. 13 These are country estimates made by donors in their report to the DAC, which are often educated guesses (e.g. Canada) and for some countries are not even reported to the DAC (e.g. France, Norway, Spain and the US). Furthermore, reporting is for private voluntary organizations rather than the full range of CSOs. 14 The Index of Global Philanthropy, 2007; p. 14. The figure of USD26.2 billion provided here

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is the sum of the amounts shown for Private and Voluntary Organizations (16.2), Universities and Colleges (4.6) and Religious Organizations (5.4). It excludes contributions from Corporations (5.1) Foundations (2.2) and Individual Remittances (61.7). For present purposes, Foundations are considered to be part of private giving, and thus not part of civil society. 15 Compiled from DAC statistical data Table 1, line items 015, 076, 077 and 421. These figures under-represent DAC members flows to CSOs as direct funding to local CSOs is often not included, nor are flows through other institutions such as multilaterals. In addition, some donors, such as the US, do not report their flows to and through CSOs. 16 Advisory Group 2007, op. cit. 17 Advisory Group 2008, op. cit.. 18 The following is an extract from Advisory Group 2008, 19 Lessons of a CSO Project and the Education SWAP in Mozambique. Case Study (2007), Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness: An Exploration of Experience and Good Practice, Reference Document, Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness, August 2008. 20 Development Cooperation: Not Just Aid, Better Aid Policy Paper, Available from http:// www.betteraid.org/images/Documents/dev%20coop%20not%20aid_english.pdf 21 Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations, Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness, August 2008. 22 Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness: An Exploration of Experience and Good Practice, Reference Document, Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness, August 2008. 23 Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations, Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness, August 2008. 24 Ibid. 25 CSO Development Partnership: Principles and Challenges, Antonio Tujan Jr., Forum Syd Policy Paper Chapter 8, 2008. 26 Exploratory meeting on the effectiveness of civil society organizations: meeting report, Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness, Organized under the auspices of the preliminary Global Facilitation Group, Paris, Maison de lEurope, 29-30 June 2008.

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Annex

Development Effectiveness in Development Cooperation 1

On the surface, CSO development effectiveness principles could seem to fit with those expressed in the Paris Declaration ownership, alignment, harmonization, mutual accountability. However, the implementation of the Paris Declaration is largely carried out by donors and a few officials in the central governments of the poorest countries. Current donor practices in harmonization and alignment, with aid conditionality, will limit the achievement of real local ownership. The goals for civil society, by contrast, are more closely aligned with the principles of democratic culture which requires respect and encouragement of pluralities of views, policy and development alternatives. Democratic culture in the South would be limited if constrained artificially by donor/ government strategies for harmonization of all external and local development CSO actors. Donor and CSO approaches to effective development cooperation may sometimes be in tension. But it is a tension that, CSOs will argue, is at the heart of democratic practice, upon which the sustainability of results from donor development interventions depends.2
What is the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness? The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD), which was agreed to in March 2005, establishes global commitments for more effective, scaled up aid to be met by 2010 by countries with development partners. The PD outlines ve principles which should shape aid delivery: OWNERSHIP: Developing countries will exercise effective leadership over their development policies and strategies, and will coordinate development actions; ALIGNMENT: Donor countries will base their overall support on developing countries national development strategies, institutions, and procedures; HARMONIZATION: Donor countries will work together so that their actions are more harmonized, transparent, and collectively effective; MANAGING FOR RESULTS: All countries will manage resources and improve decision-making for results; and, MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY: Donor and developing countries pledge that they will be mutually accountable for development results. Signatories include 35 donor countries and agencies, 26 multilateral agencies and 56 countries that receive aid. The PD species indicators, timetables and targets for actions by governments and has an

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evolving agenda for implementation and monitoring of progress. Source: The Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD-DAC), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

CSOs are aware, now more than ever, of the need to address concerns of accountability and to improve their own effectiveness as development actors. There are numerous policies at local and national levels that CSOs have developed and set in place as well as internal systems of improving individual CSO effectiveness. But what is missing is a global framework that CSOs all over the world could share as a guiding and facilitating tool for their respective efforts. 3 The absence of such a framework was highlighted during the consultations in the run-up to the Accra High-Level Forum. In several of these consultations, many of them sponsored by the Advisory Group previously mentioned, CSOs were asked to explore the question of the applicability of the principles of the Paris Declaration to their own effectiveness as development actors. During the said consultations, CSOs clarified that they welcome the intention of the signatories to the Paris Declaration to improve the management and technical dimensions of their effectiveness, but do not consider the Paris Declaration applicable to them. As mentioned above, CSOs are development actors in their own right. They are not only donors but actually play multiple roles in development, i.e. as watchdogs, service providers, mobilizers of citizens, research institutions, and others.

What is the Accra Agenda for Action? In 2008, developing and donor countries, emerging economies, UN and multilateral institutions, global funds and civil society organizations participated in the discussions leading up to the Third High Level Forum (HLF3) on Aid Effectiveness, hosted by the Government of Ghana and organised by OECD and the World Bank, in Accra. The outcome of the HLF3 was the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) which has three major thrusts: To strengthen country ownership over development, the AAA commits donors to broad country-level policy dialogue on development, strengthen the capacity of developing country partners to manage development; and use country systems. It also commits them to work more closely with parliaments and local authorities, civil society organisations, research institutes, media, and the private sector. To build more effective partnerships, the AAA reafrms donors pledge to increase aid while reducing aid fragmentation. It also promises to work with all development actors including CSOs, and to pay particular attention to countries in fragile situations and those that receive insufcient aid. Donors also pledged to elaborate individual plans to further untie their aid. In order to achieve better development results, the AAA promises to improve accountability and trans-

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parency through better information management and alignment with country information systems. It opens up to parliamentary oversight, regular disclosure of aid information and mutual assessment reviews by 2010 in all countries. It also aims to strengthen existing international accountability mechanisms. To increase the predictability of aid, donors commit to providing full and timely information on aid commitments and actual disbursements, and strive to provide three- to ve-year expenditure plan. Source: The Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD-DAC), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.

The Paris Declaration does not reflect these diverse roles. Rather, it frames effectiveness narrowly as effective aid relationships. Applying the Paris Declaration to CSOs would therefore imply reducing them to mere donors and service providers. In addition, CSOs point out that not only do they play multiple roles, but are also diverse by nature. The core principles of the Paris Declaration include harmonization and alignment with government priorities. These principles are not reconcilable with a civil society that regards diversity and autonomy as beneficial, rather than detrimental to development.4 Civil society rejects the challenge to adopt the Paris Declaration not because it is inherently opposed to efforts at improving aid effectiveness but because it thinks that such a challenge is wrongly framed in relation to development effectiveness and the role of CSOs.5 A much more important reason is that CSOs find the aid effectiveness agenda and the Paris Declaration limited and not truly reflective of development goals because it is too technicist. This may be acceptable to governments as they are concerned with governance and official development cooperation, but CSOs are critical that this development cooperation must be premised on the principles of development effectiveness. Even more so with CSO development activities which are premised on social solidarity and voluntary action by citizens. Acknowledging the important issues and challenges regarding their own effectiveness, a number of CSOs present at the International Forum on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness (Ottawa, 3-6 February 2008), resolved to launch a North/ South process to agree, by December 2010, on a global framework of principles and mechanisms suitable to guide CSOs in their efforts to improve effectiveness. CSOs preparing for the Accra High Level Forum III in September 2008 raised the call for development effectiveness as the more thorough-going alternative to the Paris Declaration by framing aid effectiveness around the strategic development goals of human rights, social justice and sustainability and the building of an equitable international aid architecture to support genuine partnerships of solidarity in international development cooperation. While the concepts and principles of development effectiveness need to be fleshed out towards the High Level Forum IV to be held in Seoul in 2011, CSOs meeting in Paris in June 2008 agreed that

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development effectiveness is the appropriate framework to define CSO effectiveness as this deepens the interpretation of aid effectiveness along the lines of CSO social solidarity. Development Effectiveness in Development Cooperation Development effectiveness is a concept and a framework for aid effectiveness that is still in the process of understanding and contestation between different actors and parties. CSOs raised it on the road to Accra as a challenge to the Paris Declaration and to the narrow technicist aid effectiveness that the latter represents while a number of donors and institutions, notably the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), have already defined and used it in the past. Development effectiveness is itself a broad concept and issue. But applied to development cooperation as a framework of principles, goals and mechanisms, this needs to be further fleshed out, developed and agreed upon. This is now the challenge that everyone seeks to address as the development community prepares for the next High Level Forum IV in Seoul, where presumably a new agreement or declaration will be hammered out to replace the Paris Declaration that expires in 2010. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), development effectiveness refers to the extent to which an institution or intervention has brought about targeted change in a country or the life of an individual beneficiary and is influenced by various factors beginning with the quality of project design and ending with the relevance and sustainability of desired results. 6 CSOs, in challenging the Paris Declaration, provide a more specific definition of development effectiveness, to wit: Promoting sustainable change that addresses the causes as well as the symptoms of poverty and marginalization i.e. reduces poverty and builds capacity within communities, civil society and governments to address their own development priorities.7 Thus, while aid effectiveness, as outlined in the Paris Declaration, is about technical issues in aid management and delivery, development effectiveness is more about the impact of aid on the poor and marginalized communities. 8 Key principles and elements for development effectiveness in development cooperation While valid, aid effectiveness and the Paris Declaration are limited to aid management and delivery and are thus shallow when considered in the framework of development impacts. The Paris Declaration and its aid effectiveness agenda has also been depoliticized, avoiding the implications of the strategic goals of human

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rights, gender equality and other aspects of social justice and sustainability which are necessarily political. Furthermore, the Paris Declaration does not squarely address the fundamental issues in development cooperation that challenge relations in aid partnerships and the international aid architecture. As such, it loses its effectiveness on the ground and in the long term. Rather than the narrow framework of aid management by the executive branches of government, bringing the discussion in the broader context of societal development goals and processes of countries ensures a more rooted and comprehensive approach to the effectiveness agenda in the form of development effectiveness. a. Beyond ownership - sovereignty, autonomy, and equality Ownership as a principle of the Paris Declaration is appropriate for the narrow framework of aid management. It is a derivative application of a number of principles and methods in management such as leadership in the aid partnership and responsibility in the development policy, program or process. Countries have criticized this technicist interpretation and have instead emphasized the issue of sovereignty. CSOs have also criticized this limited interpretation and have proposed the concept of democratic or broad country ownership which has since been adopted in the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA). Nevertheless, the Paris Declaration principle of ownership is not appropriate when applied to the whole development process and goals. In fact, the application of the notion of ownership can even be contrary to the development goal for instance, when it simply means to own a policy conditionality proposed by a donor. It does not reflect the principles that assure independence, autonomous development and sovereignty of a country on the one hand, and equality in development cooperation on the other. Autonomy in policy-making and development planning is a common feature of developed countries, particularly during their early industrialization phase. More recent development success stories such as that of China and Cuba have also been achieved under conditions of independent development. Developing countries need the policy space to determine national goals, priorities and intervene in the economy accordingly. But this autonomy is severely constrained by donors and other external actors that condition their aid on laissez faire principles that favor large commercial interests and the already wealthy countries. In countries where governments complain about the lack of ownership, the issue is not just the lack of independence but also the lack of equality in development cooperation as practiced by development partners through conditionalities, tied aid and so on. Indeed, equality is a principle in development cooperation that comes in

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combination with autonomy and respect for sovereignty. It no longer matters which comes first when a country is denied the opportunity for autonomous development because of imposed conditionalities. If in the first place development cooperation is skewed, then the main responsibility lies with the stronger development partner to allow for the autonomous development of the weaker partner. b. Much more than managing for development results - partnership for empowerment, sustainability, justice and transformation The strategic goals of development -- human rights, social justice especially gender justice and sustainability -- should define the kind of results development cooperation should achieve. Besides data that can clearly show how the poor are able to claim which rights and how equality is achieved for women and other marginalized sectors and communities, concern should also be placed on assessing progress in removing structures of injustice that perpetuate marginalization and violations of human rights. Similarly, results should ascertain the extent of utilization and conservation of natural resources, and how structures that erode social and environmental sustainability are removed. Achieving such results goes beyond reforming management for aid effectiveness. It requires reshaping development cooperation partnerships among stakeholders such that those partnerships become characterized and promotion of: Empowerment Promotion of human rights and transformative justice means that development cooperation should be guided by human rights in terms of objectives, methods and results. It should promote rights-based approaches to development not only in the objectives of programs and projects but also in the methods of operationalizing multi-stakeholder partnerships that actively include the participation of the poor and their communities. A rights-based approach translates to empowerment of the poor and the people in general as the objective of aid programs and projects, and requires the empowered participation of the poor and people in their implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Sustainability Development outcomes that are not sustainable in the long-run or benefit some people at the expense of others or future generations should not be the results aimed for by development cooperation. Development actors must consider the full environmental and social costs and consequences of their programs and projects, especially since impoverished and marginalized communities in poor countries suffer the worst impacts of ecological degradation, climate change and resource

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depletion. The health of the people, communities and the environment should be central to development partnerships. Ecological sustainability should count for more than financial sustainability in development cooperation. Social justice and transformation Development partnerships and cooperation efforts must be in support not only at the micro level where a small group of the poor are able to claim their rights, but more importantly providing support for people to participate in the societal processes of democratic development as well. Beyond this, CSOs representing the poor must also be able to effectively participate in national processes. Transformative and socially just partnerships are not just about the focus for social justice in results, but also about the nature of the partnerships that are built. This has a bearing on the common values that the partnership promotes, the goals adopted, and the kind of programs implemented to achieve those goals that the partnership seeks. c. More than harmonization and alignment- solidarity and mutuality In the context of the management of official development assistance, it is crucial that development partners harmonize under the leadership of the country, especially under the direction of government entities responsible for different aspects of governance of the development process and provision of services. Alignment to country systems is even more essential in the respect of country sovereignty. Beyond aid management and delivery, development partners have a responsibility that is not merely harmonization and alignment to country leadership and systems. In its support for the countrys development process to achieve its development goals, a development partner has the responsibility of solidarity and mutuality to the country. Solidarity as a principle should govern and guide international development cooperation. Beyond equality, solidarity implies identification with a countrys development goals, and commitment of support for their achievement. Mutuality implies shared values and circumstances that have a different application when partners are unequal or face unequal circumstances. In this sense mutuality reinforces solidarity. Unfortunately current attitudes and practices of donors in relation to country systems are bereft of solidarity and are thus inherently unequal in their expectations, assumptions and applications. The persistence of conditionalities, the prevalence of parallel Project Implementation Units (PIUs) and the widespread non-use of country systems are all evidence of this.

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d. More than mutual accountability- social responsibility and accountability While the Paris Declaration focuses on mutual accountability of donor and country, the clarification that a country is not just the executive branch of government raises serious questions about domestic accountability or social accountability of a developing country government which indeed is more fundamental than the contractual accountability of a government to a donor agency. Furthermore, in the context of democratic development of the country, what is more important than mutual accountability is the responsibility of international cooperation to the country and its people in respecting its independent and endogenous process of democratic development. In the context of a countrys development, accountability has to be reconfigured from the simplistic framework of mutual accountability in the aid partnership between the executive and its development partner agency. Accountability becomes first and foremost social accountability of the government, and of the development partner to the people of the country, in particular to the impoverished and marginalized populations. Furthermore, a development partner must be held accountable for its commitments and actions through international mechanisms within the framework of an equitable multilateral aid architecture. These mechanisms must properly address issues beyond contractual obligations to the executive branch of the government of, say, an aggrieved country, but more so its obligations to the people who are affected by the programs or projects and its terms. Additional elements and mechanisms for development effectiveness in development cooperation In order that these principles mentioned above are able to effectively guide development cooperation, a new multilateral aid architecture should be established. Such an architecture must be principally framed on multilateralism through a new agency or institution that has the capacity to promote equitable development cooperation, implement international programs and mechanisms, guide bilateral and multilateral partnerships, and provide mechanisms for dispute settlement. This new multilateral mechanism can also include aspects of development finance and trade concerns currently under the aegis of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and others. Much has already been articulated on the need for the radical transformation of these multilateral institutions. Essentially, these institutions have track records of being undemocratic, lacking in transparency, and heavily favoring Northern and

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corporate agendas in underdeveloped countries. Programs and policies implemented by and through these institutions have resulted in increasing levels of poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation and so on. The issue of development policy coherence of donor countries and multilateral institutions is another important issue and element for development effectiveness. Reforms to the aid architecture must seek legitimacy by engaging all development actors and ensuring coherence across global structures and policies. Reformed structures should be grounded in international human rights covenants and achieve a vision of international development cooperation that goes beyond aid delivery processes to focus on development effectiveness and the principles of solidarity and partnership. 9

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Endnotes

1 This annex discusses the principles of development effectiveness for development actors governments, donors and civil society organizations involved in international development cooperation. 2 Determinants of civil society effectiveness: a CCIC discussion paper, Executive Summary, November 2006. 3 Background information and rationale for the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness- the new international initiative, Available at http://www.bond.org.uk/pages/csoeffectiveness-international-work.html 4 Exploratory meeting on the effectiveness of civil society organizations, Meeting report, organized under the auspices of the preliminary Global Facilitation Group, Paris, Maison de lEurope, 29-30 June 2008. 5 Civil society and development effectiveness: North/South challenges, Brian Tomlinson, Canadian Council for International Cooperation, Civil society and development effectiveness: another view, Reality Check, August 2008. 6 Development effectiveness: review of evaluative evidence, United Nations Development Programme, November 2001. 7 NGO effectiveness framework, Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), June 2004. 8 Issues and principles for the exploratory meeting on the effectiveness of civil society organizations, Conny Lenneburg, World Vision Australia, Civil society and development effectiveness: another view, Reality Check, August 2008. 9 Development Cooperation: Not Just Aid, Better Aid Coordinating Group policy paper, November 2009.

The primer on the Development Effectiveness of Civil Society Organizations reviews the on-going movement driven by civil society organizations (CSO) to raise concern on the issues of the aid effectiveness agenda, and their effort to push the reform toward a more comprehensive, rights-based approach of development effectiveness. It argues that CSOs are development actors in their own right, having a special concern for human rights, social justice, gender equality and sustainability, and are seriously concerned with ensuring effectiveness of the aid system not only from the limited concern of aid management and delivery but also with the full range of development effectiveness, including that of their own. It presents the determination of CSOs to challenge the ill-suited Paris Declaration principles and the need for CSOs to develop and abide by their own principles and mechanisms of development effectiveness principles. The primer outlines a set of principles based on a common framework of social solidarity and identifies conditions for an enabling environment to capacitate CSOs in conducting their affairs as development actors in their own right.

ISBN 978-971-0483-57-0