Statement of the Rule The "Neypes Rule," otherwise known as the Fresh Period Rule, states that a party

litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order the "final order"! denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration" Domingo Neypes versus Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141 !4 "eptem#er 14, !$$ !

Purpose of the Rule

To standardi#e the appeal periods pro$ided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration" supra! The raison d%tre for the "fresh period rule" is to standardi#e the appeal period pro$ided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15&day appeal period should 'e counted" Thus, the 15&day period to appeal is no longer interrupted 'y the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration( litigants today need not concern themsel$es with counting the 'alance of the 15&day period to appeal since the 15&day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution" %udith &u versus 'on. Rosa "amson()atad, G.R. No. 1*$+*+, $+ Fe#. !$11!

The Rule Prior to Neypes

)efore the *upreme Court prmulgated +eypes, the rules mandate that the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupts the running of the period to appeal( and that an appeal should 'e taken within 15 days from the notice of ,udgment or final order appealed from" -hile the period to file an appeal is counted from the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the appellant does not ha$e the full fifteen 15! days" The appellant only has the remaining time of the 15&day appeal period to file the notice of appeal" Thus, some rules on appeals are. *ec" /0" 1)"2" 1304 5ppeals" 6 The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, ,udgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall 'e fifteen 15! days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, ,udgment, or decision appealed from" 2ro$ided, howe$er, that in ha'eas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall 'e 78! forty&eight hours from the notice of ,udgment appealed from" 9 9 9 *:C" /" 1Rule 714 2eriod of ordinary appeal" & The appeal shall 'e taken within fifteen 15! days from the notice of the ,udgment or final order appealed from" -here a record on appeal is re;uired, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty /<! days from the notice of ,udgment or final order" The period to appeal shall 'e interrupted 'y a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration" +o motion for e9tension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall 'e allowed" *:C" =" 1Rule 1334 -hen appeal to 'e taken" > 5n appeal must 'e taken within fifteen 15! days from promulgation of the ,udgment or from notice of the final order appealed from" This period for perfecting an appeal shall 'e suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order o$erruling the motion has 'een ser$ed upon the accused or his counsel at which time the 'alance of the period 'egins to run"

In What Cases Applicable

?@enceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 7< go$erning appeals from the Aunicipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts( Rule 73 on petitions for re$iew from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of 5ppeals( Rule 7/ on appeals from ;uasi&,udicial agencies/1 to the Court of 5ppeals and Rule 75 go$erning appeals 'y certiorari to the *upreme Court"/3 The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to 'e counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration whether full or partial! or any final order or resolution" Neypes, supra! B'$iously, the new 15&day period may 'e a$ailed of only if either motion is filed( otherwise, the decision 'ecomes final and e9ecutory after the lapse of the original appeal period pro$ided in Rule 71, *ection /" Neypes, supra! The fresh period of 15 days 'ecomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration" Cn this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is gi$en another opportunity to re$iew the case and, in the process, minimi#e andDor rectify any error of ,udgment" -hile we aim to resol$e cases with dispatch and to ha$e ,udgments of courts 'ecome final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deli$er ,ustice fairly" Neypes, supra!

Application in Criminal Cases

-hile +eypes in$ol$ed the period to appeal in ci$il cases, the Courts pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should e;ually apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under *ection = of Rule 133 of the Re$ised Rules of Criminal 2rocedure, for the following reasons. Eirst, )2 130, as amended, the su'stanti$e law on which the Rules of Court is 'ased, makes no distinction 'etween the periods to appeal in a ci$il case and in a criminal case" *ection /0 of )2 130 categorically states that "1t4he period for appeal

from final orders, resolutions, awards, ,udgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall 'e fifteen 15! days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, ,udgment, or decision appealed from"" ,#i le- non distinguit ne. nos distinguere de#emos. -hen the law makes no distinction, we this Court! also ought not to recogni#e any distinction" 1F *econd, the pro$isions of *ection / of Rule 71 of the 100F Rules of Ci$il 2rocedure and *ection = of Rule 133 of the Re$ised Rules of Criminal 2rocedure, though differently worded, mean e9actly the same" There is no su'stantial difference 'etween the two pro$isions insofar as legal results are concerned 6 the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration" Ct was this situation that +eypes addressed in ci$il cases" +o reason e9ists why this situation in criminal cases cannot 'e similarly addressed" Third, while the Court did not consider in +eypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under *ection =, Rule 133 of the Re$ised Rules of Criminal 2rocedure since it in$ol$ed a purely ci$il case, it did include Rule 73 of the 100F Rules of Ci$il 2rocedure on petitions for re$iew from the RTCs to the Court of 5ppeals C5!, and Rule 75 of the 100F Rules of Ci$il 2rocedure go$erning appeals 'y certiorari to this Court, 'oth of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as pro$ided 'y *ection / of Rule 133 of the Re$ised Rules of Criminal 2rocedure, thus. *:C" /" @ow appeal taken" > 9 9 9 9 '! The appeal to the Court of 5ppeals in cases decided 'y the Regional Trial Court in the e9ercise of its appellate ,urisdiction shall 'e 'y petition for re$iew under Rule 73" 9999 :9cept as pro$ided in the last paragraph of section 1/, Rule 137, all other appeals to the *upreme Court shall 'e 'y petition for re$iew on certiorari under Rule 75" Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the C5 in cases where the RTC e9ercised its appellate ,urisdiction! and to this Court in ci$il and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason e9ists why the periods to appeal from the RTC in the e9ercise of its original ,urisdiction! to the C5 in ci$il and criminal cases under *ection / of Rule 71 of the 100F Rules of Ci$il 2rocedure and *ection = of Rule 133 of the Re$ised Rules of Criminal 2rocedure should 'e treated differently" -ere we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in +eypes and make it applica'le only to the period to appeal in ci$il cases, we shall effecti$ely foster and encourage an a'surd situation where a litigant in a ci$il case will ha$e a 'etter right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case 6 a situation that gi$es undue fa$or to ci$il litigants and un,ustly discriminates against the accused&appellants" Ct suggests a dou'le standard of treatment when we fa$or a situation where property interests are at stake, as against a situation where li'erty stands to 'e pre,udiced" -e must emphatically re,ect this dou'le and une;ual standard for 'eing contrary to reason" B$er time, courts ha$e recogni#ed with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law 6 /uod est in.onveniens, aut .ontra rationem non permissum est in lege. 18 %udith &u versus 'on. Rosa "amson()atad, G.R. No. 1*$+*+, $+ Fe#. !$11 !

Retroactive Effect

The determinati$e issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could retroacti$ely apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 17 *eptem'er 3<<5 when +eypes was promulgated" That ;uestion may 'e answered with the guidance of the general rule that procedural laws may 'e gi$en retroacti$e effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there 'eing no $ested rights in the rules of procedure" 1F 5mendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remo$e $ested rights, 'ut only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already e9isting"18 "ps. De los "antos reaffirms these principles and categorically warrants that Neypes 'ears the ;uested retroacti$e effect, to wit. 2rocedural law refers to the ad,ecti$e law which prescri'es rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may 'e a'le to administer ,ustice" 2rocedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroacti$e law, or the general rule against the retroacti$e operation of statues G they may 'e gi$en retroacti$e effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not $iolate any right of a person who may feel that he is ad$ersely affected, insomuch as there are no $ested rights in rules of procedure" The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescri'es a fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal may 'e made in the e$ent that the motion for reconsideration is denied 'y the lower court" Eollowing the rule on retroacti$ity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should 'e applied to pending actions, such as the present case" 5lso, to deny herein petitioners the 'enefit of the "fresh period rule" will amount to in,ustice, if not a'surdity, since the su',ect notice of ,udgment and final order were issued two years later or in the year 3<<<, as compared to the notice of ,udgment and final order in Neypes which were issued in 1008" Ct will 'e incongruous and illogical that parties recei$ing notices of ,udgment and final orders issued in the year 1008 will en,oy the 'enefit of the "fresh period rule" while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in the instant case, will not" 10 +ota'ly, the su',ect incidents in "ps. De los "antos occurred in 5ugust 3<<<, at the same month as the rele$ant incidents at 'ar" There is no reason to adopt herein a rule that is di$ergent from that in "ps. De los "antos" Fil(0state Properties, 1n.. versus 'on. 2arietta 'omena %. 3alen.ia, G.R. No. 1*4+4!, ! %une !$$5 !

Not Inconsistent With Rules of Court

This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 71, *ection / of the Rules which states that the appeal shall 'e taken within 15 days from notice of ,udgment or final order appealed from" The use of the dis,uncti$e word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another" Ct should, as a rule, 'e construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies"// @ence, the use of "or" in the a'o$e pro$ision supposes that the notice of appeal may 'e filed within 15 days from the notice of ,udgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to refer to the Huly 1, 1008 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration" Neypes, supra!

Neypes Rule Not Applied

2etitioner was charged with and found guilty of per,ury" @e was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 7 months and 1 day to 1 year, a period which is considered as a correctional penalty" Inder 5rticle 0 of the Re$ised 2enal Code, light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor one to thirty days of imprisonment! or a fine not e9ceeding two hundred pesos 23<<!, or 'oth are imposa'le" Thus, per,ury is not a light felony or offense contemplated 'y Rule 13<, *ec" =" Ct was therefore mandatory for petitioner to 'e present at the promulgation of the ,udgment" To recall, despite notice, petitioner was a'sent when the ATCC promulgated its ,udgment on 35 5ugust 3<<0" 2ursuant to Rule 13<, *ec" =, it is only when the accused is con$icted of a light offense that a promulgation may 'e pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representati$e" Cn case the accused failed to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation despite notice, and the failure to appear was without ,ustifia'le cause, the accused shall lose all the remedies a$aila'le in the Rules against the ,udgment" Bne such remedy was the Aotion for Reconsideration of the ,udgment of the ATCC filed 'y petitioner on 38 5ugust 3<<0" 5'sent a motion for lea$e to a$ail of the remedies against the ,udgment, the ATCC should not ha$e entertained petitioners Aotion for Reconsideration" Thus, petitioner had only 15 days from 35 5ugust 3<<0 or until 0 *eptem'er 3<<0 to file his Aotion for 2ro'ation" The ATCC thus committed gra$e a'use of discretion when it entertained the motion instead of immediately denying it" 999 2etitioner, howe$er, did not file a motion for lea$e to a$ail himself of the remedies prior to filing his Aotion for Reconsideration" The hearing on the motion for lea$e would ha$e 'een the proper opportunity for the parties to allege and contest whate$er cause pre$ented petitioner from appearing on 35 5ugust 3<<0, and whether that cause was indeed ,ustifia'le" Cf granted, petitioner would ha$e 'een allowed to a$ail himself of other remedies under the Rules of Court, including a motion for reconsideration" 999 5s a final point, while we held in &u v. "amson()atad that the rule in Neypes is also applica'le to criminal cases regarding appeals from con$ictions in criminal cases under Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, ne$ertheless, the doctrine is not applica'le to this case, considering that petitioners Aotion for 2ro'ation was filed out of time" Anselmo de 6eon Cuyo versus People of the Phils., G.R. No. 1+!174 8.to#er 1!, !$11!