THE POLITICAL ELITE OF POST-INDEPENDENCE ARMENIA: CHARACTERISTICS AND PATTERNS OF FORMATION

YEREVAN 2014
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The political elite of post-independence Armenia: characteristics and patterns of formation. Yerevan: Edit Print, 2014; 15 p.

The present study was conducted with the support of the Academic Swiss Caucasus Net (ASCN). ASCN is a programme aimed at promoting the social sciences and humanities in the South Caucasus (primarily Georgia and Armenia). Its different activities foster the emergence of a new generation of talented scholars. Promising junior researchers receive support through research projects, capacity-building training and scholarships. The programme emphasizes the advancement of individuals who, thanks to their ASCN experience, become better integrated in international academic networks. The ASCN programme is coordinated and operated by the Interfaculty Institute for Central and Eastern Europe (IICEE) at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland). It was initiated and is supported by Gebert Rf Stiftung. The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent opinions of Gebert Rf Stiftung and the University of Fribourg.

This publication is not for sale

Academic Swiss Caucasus Net (ASCN) AREG Scientific Cultural Youth Association (AREG SCYA) NGO

ISBN 978-9939-52-775-8

CONTENTS
Foreword ............................................................................................ 4 Overview of the Research on Political Elites .................................... 6 Research methodology ......................................................................14 Chapter 1. Patterns of political elite formation in post-Soviet Armenia .............................................................................................17 Chapter 2 Characteristics of political elite: values and preferences........................................................................................51 Chapter 3Characteristics of future political elite ........................... 76 References ........................................................................................ 94 Appendices Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix

ATopic guide for interviews.............................. 97 B Charts ............................................................ 101 C Tables...........................................................134 D Graphs ........................................................... 1

FOREWORD
This book presents the results of a study of political elites in Armenia. This study was conducted by a research and analysis team from the AREG Scientific Cultural Youth Association utilizing the framework from The formation of political elites in post-Soviet Armenia project financed by The South Caucasus Academic Network (SCN) of Freiburg University. The study was conducted during the period 201112 in the territories of the Republic of Armenia (RA) and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). This study aimed to characterize the post-Soviet Armenian political elite and the patterns of its formation. To accomplish these goals, the following three sets of research objectives were identified: 1. Describe the main features of the process by which the political elite is formed and identify the political elites salient characteristics, including the composition of elite groups and the patterns of elite recruitment. 2. Identify and analyze the political preferences, values and behavioural characteristics and foreign policy positions of the political elites representatives. 3. Explore the characteristics of potential representatives of future political elites, including political culture, values and preferences, among other characteristics. This book consists of three main chapters, each devoted to the examination of one of the three objectives. In addition to the three main chapters, the book contains sections on literature review, research methodology as well as a list of the used sources and appendixes. This research project is unique in several ways. First, it summarizes the entire postindependence period for both the Republic of Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. This timespan enhances the comprehensiveness of the study and provides an opportunity to compare political elite formation models in two countries. Moreover, the utilization of qualitative research provided an opportunity to obtain data on the peculiarities of the political culture of the NKR. This study is the first, to our knowledge, to include the NKR because its non-recognized status precludes its inclusion in international and regional research initiatives of this kind. The second advantage of this study is its extensive empirical data. For nearly two years, both qualitative and quantitative research instruments were utilized to collect and analyze a comprehensive and extensive

dataset on Armenian political elites, the implementation of which would be impossible without the financial support of the funding organization. This project also reviews modern scientific surveys of political elites, concentrates on theories and methodologies recently developed in other post-Soviet countries and selects the most effective approaches and methods within the framework of such studies. However, this study only partly relies on the methodologies of previous research on political elites. One of the three major aspects of this study is its investigation of the potential representatives of future political elites, which was conducted by identifying and investigating the social groups that constitute the bases of recruitment of current political elites. This approach revealed the main features of the next generation of the political elites representatives. This study also employs an experimental application of social network analysis to identify and analyze influential groups and individuals within the political elite, such as members of parliament. This publication is the results of "Patterns of political elite formation of post Soviet Armenia" research project implemented by the team of AREG Scientific Cultural Youth Association NGO with following members:

Project Coordinator and Senior Research Analyst:

Hamazasp Danielyan, PhD - Political Science Assistants: Armen Grigoryan - Political Scientist; Hayk Khanumyan - International Relations Specialist Research Project Director: Adrine Babloyan, PhD - Sociology, AREG Scientific Cultural Youth Association NGO, Vice President Database Specialist: Bagrat Harutyunyan, PhD Sociology Research Fieldwork Coordinator: Tigran Harutyunyan - AREG Scientific Cultural Youth Association NGO, Board Member Overall Management and Control: Hovhannes Keshishian - AREG Scientific Cultural Youth Association NGO, President

OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH ON POLITICAL ELITES

This section briefly analyzes the scholarly literature on elites that addresses the evolution of this concept, the theoretical deliberation of the role of political elites in defining the nature of regimes and the transformation of perceptions of this role, as well as the characteristics of elites in various political systems. These topics were selected on the basis of their relevance to research on the Armenian political elite, and these concepts and theories guided the formulation of a theoretical framework for this study. This chapter contains three main sections representing different periods of research on political elites, including a review of recent scholarly publications on political elites in postSoviet countries. The chapter concludes with a brief overview of the alternative operationalizations of the political elite in the scholarly literature and defines the concept adopted in the framework of this study.

Classical Elite Theory

The first generation of scholars began researching elites nearly a century ago. The existence of small, organized groups of individuals who control political power was considered a fact of life by scholars including G. Mosca, V. Pareto and R. Michels (Michels, 2001; Mosca, 1939; Pareto, 1935). These three authors used different terms (ruling class, elites and oligarchy, respectively) to refer to elites, but they discussed various aspects of the same phenomenon. Mosca described the ruling class as well as systems of elite recruitment. He concluded that democracy, in the Aristotelian sense, cannot exist in reality because the existence of elites constitutes an aristocracy. Pareto discussed the aspects of an individuals personality that determine her social status. Following Machiavelli, Pareto identified two types of elite representatives based on these qualities,

lions and foxes, who interchangeably rule societies. Pareto also concluded that the existence of elites was inevitable in any society due to the substantial differences in individual qualities. Michels work analyzed political organizations, particularly leftist movements and parties; he formulated the iron rule of oligarchy, which elucidated the oligarchic tendencies of political organizations. Based on his analysis, Michels argued that even political organizations that pursue democratic goals inevitably become undemocratic: The democratic currents of history resemble successive waves. They break ever on the same shoal. They are ever renewed. This enduring spectacle is simultaneously encouraging and depressing. When democracies have gained a certain stage of development, they undergo a gradual transformation, adopting the aristocratic spirit, and in many cases also the aristocratic forms, against which at the outset they struggled so fiercely (Michels, 2001, p. 245). As illustrated above, these early scholars of elites not only agreed on (a) the inevitability of the existence of small, organized groups that rule a society but also concluded that (b) these groups are inconsistent with democratic ideals and structures. Such interpretations of elites and their effects on democratic systems reappear in academic literature beyond the expositions of Classical Elite Theory. For example, C. W. Mills located and described the elite of the post-Second World War United States in his seminal work, The Power Elite. Mills argued that a few hundred individuals held power by interchangeably occupying positions in various hierarchies, while the images of the public of classic democracy are still used as working justification of power in American society... [which] are not adequate even as an approximate model of how the American system of power works (Mills, 1956, p. 300).

Revision of the Role of Political Elites in Democratization

However, a number of other social scientists do not consider the existence of elites to be a challenge to democratic regimes. This disagreement is not related to the concept of a political elite itself but rather is related to a reconceptualization of democracy. Several works have played an important role in the reconciliation of the two concepts. One of the earliest of these scholars was J. Schumpeter, who defined democracy as the institutional arrangements of competing political elite representatives "who acquire power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for people's vote" (Schumpeter, 1943, p. 269). This minimalistic definition of democracy was substantially different from the approaches of earlier scholars who possessed more idealized understandings of the concept (e.g., Aristotelian democracy, classical democracy). The departure from this idealistic understanding of democracy was one of the most important contributions of R. Dahl. Dahl developed the concept of polyarchy to distinguish existing political regimes from the ideal democracy. According to Dahl, polyarchies contain representatives of small organized groups (political elites) who are constantly competing for the support of the citizenry. In Dahls polyarchic model, competition among elites and participation of the masses are the two core characteristics, and the pluralistic nature of the political elites in such systems is emphasized. Dahls other important contribution to understanding the character of political elites in polyarchies is the idea of a system of mutual security. The existence of this system guarantees smooth transitions of political power from representatives of the ruling political elite to representatives of the opposition political elite. Such a system of mutual security emerges in a country when the opposition political elite representatives are too powerful to be repressed by the ruling elite representatives. According to Dahl, such a system depends on the existence of narrow differences in interests and manageable conflicts

among competing groups as well as a certain level of trust among elites to guarantee transitions of political power without endangering the vital interests of these competing elites (Dahl, 1971, pp. 1537). Contemporaneous with Dahls work, another article analyzing historical transitions to democracy was published by D. Rustow (Rustow, 1970). Drawing on an empirical analysis of several historical and contemporary cases of democratization, Rustow emphasized the development of certain attitudes among politicians, including the willingness to compromise on certain rules of the game within competing parties during the early stages of democratization. After an initial, conscious agreement to adopt democratic rules is reached, politicians and citizens gradually become accustomed to and follow democratic rules. Rustow described the process (or habituation phase, in the authors words) that results in the establishment of a system of mutual security and emphasized the gradual nature of this process. However, according to Rustow, certain factors can accelerate the development of such system (Rustow, 1970, p. 361): Their trust will grow more quickly if, in the early decades of the new regime, a wide variety of political tendencies can participate in the conduct of affairs, either by joining various coalitions or by taking turns as government and opposition. J. Linz, a famous scholar of Latin American regimes, argued in his empirical research on democratic breakdowns in the region that both ruling and opposition elites play crucial roles in the process of breakdown. Linz focused on the idea of democratic loyalty, that is, elites commitment to democratic institutional norms and procedures while rejecting nondemocratic alternatives, including the inclusion of the armed forces in political disputes and crises (Linz, 1978, pp. 37 40). However, the transitions observed during the early years of the third wave of democratization induced many scholars to further examine the role of elites in these transitions. The 197080s were also quite fruitful in producing empirical research on political elites in both democratic and nondemocratic countries. Many prominent democracy scholars continued to explain the nature of political regimes in

reference to the dominance of particular values among elites. To a lesser degree, scholars also examined the behavioral patterns of political elites in different polities, among other factors. A whole body of literature was produced recognizing the special roles elites play in the various phases and scenarios of such transitions. Consequently, various models and theories were developed that concentrated on the analysis of the choices and actions of political elite representatives during democratic transitions. For example, two of the three most common modes of transition to democracy (top-down elite-led reforms and reforms resulting from pacts among competing elites) depend on the actions of elites. These modes of transition were often considered more effective, whereas the third mode, the breakdown of authoritarian regimes due to mass movements, was considered less effective in establishing democracies. T. Karl summarized this notion while commenting on Latin American regimes, To date, no stable political democracy has resulted from regimes transitions in which mass actors have gained control even momentarily over traditional ruling classes (Karl, 1990, p. 8). In some cases, political elites were considered the most important explanatory variable of both democratic transitions and the consolidation of democratic regimes in any polity (Diamond, 1999; Huntington, 1991; ODonnell & Schmitter, 1986). This elite-centered paradigm, while influential, was contested within the discipline. Theoretical debates among researchers over the factors that explain democratization continued and intensified during the 1990s and 2000s (Collier, 1999; Higley & Burton, 2006). Meanwhile, scholars investigated the processes triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union, particularly the establishment of new regimes and the nature and role of elites in these post-Soviet republics.

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Research on Post-Soviet Political Elites

The final years of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union initiated a wave of studies on political elites in communist and post communist countries. Research on elites in the Soviet Union had been conducted by Western scholars since the beginning of the Cold War period. However, these studies concentrated on describing and analyzing the nature of Soviet elites and rarely engaged the problem of elites roles in democratization (Klugman, 1989; Urban, 1989). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, research began to examine regime transformation and the role that elites play in that process in the post-Soviet republics. Elite-centered theories of democratic transition that were developed based on the transitions that occurred in other regions (e.g., Southern Europe and Latin America) were utilized to explain and predict regime transformations in post communist spaces. Research on the emerging political elites of this region comprised a significant fraction of the academic literature during the early 1990s (for example, Higley, Pakulski, & Wesolowski, 1998). This interest in studying elites increased not only among foreign scholars working predominantly on topics related to democratization but also among local academics, who were finally able to conduct their own research on elites, a taboo subject during the Soviet period (Gelman and Tarusina, 2000). The resulting body of literature on contemporary political elites produced by both local scholars and foreign academics can be categorized as follows: Research on a specific country or region concentrating on the analysis of elite representatives characteristics, background, and mechanisms of elite recruitment. Research on the values and attitudes of political elite representatives in a specific country and, rarely, in neighbouring countries (Steen, 1997). These studies are based mostly on qualitative interviews with elite representatives (Hollander, 1999; Miller & Hesli, 1997). Some of these studies also compared the

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values and attitudes dominant in the elites and general populations of the same country (Zimmerman, 2002). Comparative research involving many post-Soviet countries with the aim of testing and improving general theories of the role of elites in regime transformation. Such studies were often conducted by foreign scholars and resulted in the revision of not only the role of elites in democratization (Gill, 2000; McFaul, 2002) but also of general theories of democratic transition (Carothers, 2002, Gelman 2003). The different outcomes of post-Soviet transitions had a direct impact on research on elites. The direction of research on political elites in countries where democracy was consolidated gradually shifted and concentrated on topics that are common for comparative studies of elites in Western democracies (Haller, 2008). For example, excommunist countries that became EU members were incorporated into research projects such as the EurElite Project (for more on this project see Best & Edinger, 2005). The empirical research of political elites in nondemocratic post-Soviet countries (with a great emphasis on Russia) tends to focus on specific cases (Cummings, 2005; Ergun, 2010; Hork, 2010; Urban, 2010), leaving the elites of other countries unexplored. Very few scholarly works have touched upon the political elite of Armenia, among which the most notable is M. Margaryans Political elite and the problem of democratic transiton in Armenia (2006). The author did extensive reivew of existing scholarly literature on elites and particularly the role of elites in democratization and used this therotical framework for interpretation and explanation of developments in post soviet Armenia. However, no separate studies have been conducted on the political elites of post-Soviet Armenia with systematically collected empirical data. Therefore, we designed a research project based on similar studies conducted in other post-Soviet countries to understand the structure of the elite, the evolution of recruitment patterns and the social backgrounds of elite representatives, as well as the values, political orientations and attitudes toward democratic ideals and

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practices that predominate among the representatives of the political elite in Armenia.

Definition of the Political Elite

Within the framework of this study, the political elite was defined as a group of individuals holding strategic positions within a political system, which enables these individuals to influence political decision making directly and regularly. Following Higley and Burton, this definition enables us to clearly distinguish at the theoretical level members of the political elite from other actors that could exercise political influence (Higley & Burton, 2006); we adapt this definition to our study by limiting it to only those individuals who are associated with political institutions and are directly engaged in the political process, that is, individuals considered politicians. In the social sciences, there are several methods of locating political elites, including positional, reputational and decisional analysis (Hoffmann-Lange, 2006). The present research project adopts the first approach for two main reasons. First, this approach reflects our definition of the political elite and is preferable for studying elites at the national level. Second, information on political officials and public figures is more likely to be archived and accessible to researchers. The availability of information over the two and a half decades of the study period is important. The disadvantage of this approach is that it excludes politically powerful individuals who do not hold political positions or who are not publicly involved in politics. However, an initial screening of biographies indicates that individuals tend to institutionalize their influence by either running for public offices or being appointed to mid- and high-level political positions. This strategy is particularly observable among the wealthiest businessmen and, to a lesser degree, former high-ranking military officers and family members of influential politicians.

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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This research project employed both quantitative and qualitative methods to collect and analyze the data required to answer our research questions. The main components along with the research methods employed in each of these components are briefly described in Table 1. The initial research stage involved collecting and screening the official biographies of political elite representatives since 1990. Biographies were collected for most Armenian cabinet members and regional governors and all members of parliament. For the NKR, a scarcity of data limited the biographies to a majority of MPs and cabinet members, most of the regional governors and the mayors of the largest towns. The quantitative analysis of these biographical data served two main purposes. First, it enabled the characterization of typical members and groups of the political elite and revealed the main patterns of political elite formation. Second, it enabled the identification of seven different areas from which most political elite members are recruited (public servants, members of political parties, NGO activists, members of local governance bodies, student committee members, academics/artists/athletes, top business owners and CEOs) for subsequent study. Field research began with the development and implementation of in-depth interviews with past and current representatives of the political elite. The interview guide (Appendix A) consisted of five main sections: A general overview (gender, age, position, etc.); The life story of the respondent (childhood, family, education, social background and networks, etc.); Their entry into politics (career, political membership and dynamics, political orientations and initial motivations); Their views and value system (regime preferences, opinions on elites, main values, decision-making practices, etc.), and

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A mandatory test including nine incomplete sentences to be finished by respondents (results not presented in this study). The sample for the in-depth interviews was based on survey criteria for the political elite. An initial list of over 150 names of political elite representatives selected through the snowball technique was prepared. The final list of respondents included approximately 70 politicians who were targeted for appointments with the survey team. Overcoming apprehension and building rapport were among the most difficult phases of the survey. Social networks were utilized to improve collaboration and obtain appointments with political leaders. The data collection phase was implemented from April to August 2012. The interviews took an average of 70 min to administer. Generally, the respondents did not refuse to answer the entire questionnaire after approving a date for the interview. However, in several cases, the interviewers suspected biased or insincere answers from political leaders. Those cases were identified and described by the interviewers. The final narratives for analysis are based on the information gathered from 51 transcripts. The procedure was replicated in the NKR, and the analysis of those nine transcripts is presented as a separate subchapter. At the end of each interview, the interviewers evaluated the politicians level of sincerity on a five-point scale. Of the interviews, 20% were given scores of 3 or 2, and the remaining 80% received scores of 4 or 5. None of the interviews received the lowest score for sincerity. Based on this evaluation process, the level of sincerity was quite high. After completion of the in-depth interviews, a survey was designed and distributed to 691 representatives (500 from Armenia and 191 from the NKR) from the seven recruitment areas to examine the political culture of potential political elites. A representative sample was selected utilizing a multilevel approach that had been previously designed and tested. Field work was implemented from February to April 2012. The strategy included the following levels of activities:

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At the first levelproportional sampling was employed to obtain the required number of respondents in each of the seven sample segments based on available statistical data; At the second levelproportional quota sampling was performed to ensure representation of the marzes/regions of the RA and the NKR within each segment; At the third levelunits within each segment were selected based on the targeted sampling of units from lists (offices of political parties, addresses of NGOs, universities, etc.); At the fourth levelrespondents were selected through the random selection of floor, room and person in the buildings/offices selected at the third level. The questionnaire contained 56 questions divided into the following seven sections (see Appendix B in Armenian version): Social background and networks; Social and political activities; Attitudes toward democracy and trust in political institutions; Assessment of political developments; Political values and preferences; Social wellbeing and trust; Social-demographic characteristics. The final stage of the study utilized Social Network Analysis to identify and describe the most powerful representatives of the political elite within recent three convocations of the parliament of the RA (final section of Chapter 1).

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CHAPTER 1. THE PATTERNS OF POLITICAL ELITE FORMATION IN POST-SOVIET ARMENIA

This chapter describes the main characteristics of the political elite, reveals the changes and trends in these characteristics and compares political elites in the RA and the NKR. To achieve this goal, the official biographies of political elite members provided the only realistic option to systematically collect and analyze the required data. For the RA, elite representatives biographies (all MPs, all ministers and most regional governors or marzpets) were primarily collected through the official Web sites of the parliament and government. As a result, 1280 cases were identified and entered into the database. For the NKR, Web sites containing the biographies of officials from previous years do not exist, and the main sources of information were several publications containing biographies of the MPs and an encyclopaedia on Karabakh that contained detailed information about many individuals on our list. In total, the NKR database contained 262 cases. The difference in the number of cases is partially due to a lack of data about the NKR, especially for The 1990 Supreme Council (only 37 of 81 biographies were available for MPs). However, the more important reason is the differences in the number of MP seats (33 in the NKR and 131 in the RA) as well as less frequent changes in executive positions in the NKR. The obvious advantage of utilizing official biographies is that these documents usually contain information in a standardized format. For the same reason, it is possible to collect information about certain characteristics (gender, age, level of education, profession, years spent in the office, political affiliation, etc.), whereas other types of information (such as business affiliation, past political affiliations, reasons for leaving office) are much less frequently available in such documents.

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The findings of the analysis will be presented in thematic blocks and by comparing legislative/elected and executive/appointed positions in both the RA and the NKR.

Legislators in the RA and the NKR

Political Composition The single most important event in the transformation of postSoviet Armenia occurred just before the collapse of the Soviet Union. In May and June 1990 and December 1991, Supreme Council (SC) elections were held in both Soviet Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Okrug (NKAO). These single-member district elections were the first multiparty elections, and as a result, the representatives of the Communist Party were outnumbered. Initially, the two parliaments contained a substantial number of independent MPs (at least half in Soviet Armenia). These independent MPs represented two main groups. The first group included communists who had been in politics before the movement, and who sometimes were even elected as communists, but left the party during the transition from August 1990 to September 1991.1 For example, in the RA, 160 of 260 elected MPs were either members of the Communist Party or had recently been members, including at least 114 bureaucrats. However, by 1991, the communist faction consisted of only 25 MPs who remained faithful to the Party.2 The second group included individuals who began their political involvement by participating in the Karabakh movement. The representatives of this group eventually either joined political parties,
The Declaration of Independence was adopted by the SC of Soviet Armenia in August 1990. However, this document was not an actual declaration of independence but rather an expression of such an intention. Actual independence resulted from the Referendum for Independence, held on September 21, 1991. 2 This was not the only instance when a large proportion of MPs rapidly changed their political loyalties; this also occurred in 1997 and 2006.
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most frequently the ruling parties of the time, or gradually left the political arena. In 1995, only 28% of MPs were not members of political parties by the close of the SC term at the end of the summer. A fully majoritarian electoral system and a large number of seats (Chart 1.1) enabled members of newly established and minor parties to be represented in the SC or to create their own parties and MP coalitions after the election. As a result, the loosely organized factions and MP coalitions were not large enough to constitute a clear majority in parliament. To date, the SC is the most politically diverse legislative body, representing the largest number of parties and groups. At least 12 parties and factions were recorded in the SC, including all the traditional parties from the diaspora3 that were quickly re-established in the RA. This fragmentation enabled the Pan Armenian National Movement (PANM) to emerge as the dominant player in the SC in 1990 and to remain influential in the political landscape until 1998. Initially, the PANM was an umbrella organization uniting a variety of activists from the Karabakh movement and enjoying overwhelming public support. As a loose organization, the PANM produced a number of other parties, including the most prominent opposition parties of the period. A notable portion of representatives of the older generation of current elite was also affiliated with the PANM. At the first convocation of the NA elected in 1995, the PANM dominated the Republican block, which included a significant proportion of the independent MPs (40 of 117 coalition members) and a substantial number of representatives from minor parties (16). This structure contributed to the collapse of the block and the rapid loss of the majority in parliament by OctoberNovember of 1997. In both 1999 and 2006, the MPs elected from FPTP districts were instrumental in shifting the balance of political interests represented in parliament. These FPTP MPs, typically from entrepreneurial backgrounds, were
It should be noted that MPs from these parties themselves were not diasporan but rather citizens of soviet Armenia that quickly joined and often also quickly left these organizations, with the exception of ARFD.
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incorporated into the ruling parties in waves. For example, when the Rule of Law party, a partner holding 20 seats, decided to leave the coalition in May 2006, ten entrepreneur MPs also left their factions and created an entrepreneur group that later joined the other ruling parties (the RPA and the PAP). During the same week, nearly the same number of independent MPs, again mostly entrepreneurs, who were elected in FPTP districts joined the RPA and ensured the new coalitions control of parliament. The proportion of independent MPs varied between 6.7 and 11.5% over the next four convocations (NA1NA4). In the current parliament, elected in 2012, these MPs constitute only 2.2% of members and cannot influence the balance of political forces to the same extent as previous independents. In future parliaments, minor parties will likely be represented to a lesser degree. Additionally, changes to the formal election rules affected the mode of elections of such individuals. The growing number of party list seats in parliament (Chart 1.1) has encouraged both electoral blocks among minor parties as well as the involvement of prominent figures from such minor parties in the lists of larger parties that have higher probabilities of influencing the balance of power.4 The result of these trends was the consolidation of the party system, which can also be observed by examining the number of parliamentary factions. Where there once existed 12 factions in the SC, there were seven during the period 19959, eight during the period 19992003, seven during the period 20037, five during the period 200712 and six beginning in 2012. Furthermore, over the last decade, the diminishing size of the opposition coalition indicates the emergence of a single dominant party in the RA. For the first time since independence, a single party controls a sufficient number of seats to effectively pass legislation without seeking the support of other parties or independent MPs. Compared to the PANM of the early
4

For example, more than 10% of current RPA coalition members are representatives from eight minor parties elected through the RPA party list.

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1990s, the current RPA faction in parliament exhibits a much more stable structure by heavily relying on party list MPs who are replaced by other party members if they are disloyal to the party. Additionally, FPTP MPs are generally members of the party who are connected to the organization through various ties. The party politics of the NKR took a different path during the early years of independence. The initial composition of the SC was also dominated by independent MPs and was characterized by competition between supporters of the PANM and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsiutyun (ARFD). This legislative competition translated into competition with the executive branch, which was dominated by RANM supporters, whereas the legislative branch was dominated by ARFD supporters. By the spring of 1992, this competition sparked a conflict that resulted in the mysterious death of the speaker of the SC, an ARFD member. Intensified large-scale military action and increasing human and territorial losses diminished party competition and resulted in the establishment of the State Defence Committee in August 1992. Extraordinary powers were given to this body, and the activities of the SC were suspended. The committee was led by Robert Kocharyan, a young former Communist Party member turned nonpartisan, who was elected as the first president of the NKR after the war and later as president of the RA.5 The existence of an external threat and the primacy of national unity were the main arguments against the establishment of political parties in the NKR both during the war and after the cease-fire in 1994. Instead, the first decade of independence produced a political field dominated by nonpartisan war veterans. In addition to these veterans, recruitment for political positions took place among civil servants, members of the intelligentsia and, to a lesser degree, entrepreneurs (Table 1.2b). The nonpartisan MPs won more than one-half of the

During his long political career, R. Kocharyan publicly stated his negative attitude toward political parties a number of times and has never become a member of any party.

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legislative seats in all elections until 2005, when one-third of the seats were allocated to party list candidates. This negative view of political parties was also reflected in the formal rules; unlike many regulations copied from Armenian electoral law, the introduction of the party list system in the NKR took place ten years later than in the RA. Thus, party politics arrived in the NKR much later and in a less competitive form. Three major parties were represented in the legislative body. Two of these parties (the Democratic Party of Artsakh and the Free Motherland Party) have dominated the parliamentary coalitions, whereas the third party, the ARFD, has remained supportive of the executives policies, with the exception of the short period 20057. The two most recent convocations included the highest number of re-elected MPs to date; this indicates that elite recruitment has become less competitive and draws from a narrower circle. Compared to the 2005 elections, a smaller number of candidates, including independent candidates, registered for the 2010 elections; this decrease is another indication of this trend. In the NKR, the political opposition is represented by a few individual politicians both within and outside of the legislative body with no institutionalized party organization. Age and Education The generational composition of MPs in both the RA and the NKR (Chart 1.2) indicates that the largest influx of young political elite members (2340 years old) occurred during the first years of independence. MPs of this age constituted 40.2% of the SC in the RA and 63.1% of the SC in the NKR. Similar numbers in this age range were also recorded in 1995 parliamentary elections (RA, 39.8%; NKR, 51.4%). The same chart illustrates that the generational renewal of political elite decelerated. As a result, both the NKR and the RA now possess parliaments with larger proportions of MPs aged 51 years and older (RA, 48.9%; NKR, 35.7%). In the current convocation of the RA NA, the proportion of MPs aged 51+ years nearly doubled compared to

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the previous convocation (from 29.3 to 49.9%), and this increase came at the expense of middle-aged MPs (i.e., those aged 4150 years old decreased from 46.5 to 25.5% of the assembly). Overall, the modal age of elected MPs in the RA increased from 42 years during the SC to 45 years during NA1 and NA2 to 47 years during NA3 and NA4 and jumped to 53 years during NA5. In the NKR, the modal age of MPs increased from 41 years during the SC to 45 years during NA1 to 52 years during NA2, which is another indication that individuals of the same generation who entered politics during the Karabakh movement were recruited into NKR politics during the first decade. A re-election of MPs occurred during NA3 (modal age, 46 years) and NA4 (modal age, 42) and largely reflects the success of the Free Motherland Party in electing a younger generation of politicians with entrepreneurial and bureaucratic backgrounds to join the leadership of the current prime minister, Arayik Harutyunyan. An initial analysis of MPs education did not reveal any significant trends either within the RA or within the NKR. The distribution of the level of education was quite stable throughout the period of independence in both cases. The proportion of MPs in the RA without a university degree varied from 2.5 to 4%, whereas nearly one-quarter of all had achieved academic levels of Ph.D. candidate (kandidatskaya) or full Ph.D. Compared to the RA, the number of NKR MPs whose highest level of education was secondary school was greater than in the RA (on average, 14% compared to 1.6%). Consequently, the proportion of MPs with a university degree or higher was smaller in the NKR. We examined factors beyond general education levels to understand the influence of education on political careers. We attempted to determine the extent to which the proportion of MPs who received their first university degree after being recruited into the political elite had changed. We identified MPs who obtained their first higher education degree at a relatively older age (after 35), typically after achieving a certain level in their political career. The number of such MPs in the RA increased from four (1.5% of total)

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during the SC to eight (4.2%) in NA1, 22 (16.8%) in NA2, ten (7.6%) in NA3, 19 (14.5%) in NA4 and 17 (12.9%) in NA5. The same analysis for the NKR revealed that the number of such MPs is quite stable and varies from one to two MPs for each convocation. Further analysis of the education data revealed several other trends in professions and subject areas. Nearly half of MPs during the independence period received a university degree in either engineering or economics (Chart 1.3). The number of economist MPs increased over time, whereas the proportion of engineers gradually decreased. This pattern might be explained by the fact that two of the major higher education institutions in Soviet Armenia offer degree programs in these fields. The next two most common disciplines were law and history. MPs with law degrees became increasingly common and almost doubled in number compared to the SC. The remaining disciplines were grouped into three broader categories: social sciences, natural sciences and other. The latter group contains a wide variety of fields, including pedagogy, arts, athletics, veterinary science and agronomy. The number of MPs with education in these fields has doubled in the current parliament compared to the SC. In addition, the number of MPs with degrees in the social sciences has decreased significantly in the current convocation of the NA despite the establishment and popularization of many new universities and departments with social science programs (including political science, public administration and international relations) since the mid-1990s. In the NKR, the distribution of professions was more equally divided among engineers, economists, historians, natural scientists and pedagogues (on average, ranging between 12 and 19%). One notable trend is the increased representation of economists (10.8% in the SC, 21.4% in NA4) and historians (5.4% in the SC, 14.3% in NA4) at the expense of engineers (32.4% in the SC, 14.3% in NA4) and natural scientists (28.6% in the SC, 10.7% in NA4). Biographies also typically report the institution of higher education. An analysis of these institutions revealed that a stable pattern has been established; nearly four-fifths of MPs are graduates of Armenian higher education institutions (Chart 1.4). The proportion of

24

graduates from Private Universities6 began to increase at the end of the 1990s and is at its highest level in the current convocation (18.4% of MPs). The previously stable proportion (12.716.4%) of MPs during the previous five convocations who received their higher education at the state universities of other Soviet Republics and CIS countries, mostly from Russian universities, sharply decreased (5.1%) in the current convocation, whereas diplomas received from the private universities of CIS countries increased insignificantly (4.4%). Another minor trend observed in the current convocation was the increased number of MPs with degrees from Western universities (5.1% of MPs). One might initially assume that these changes are related to a generational change among the elite and the increased presence of younger MPs; however, cross-tabulations indicate that MPs with Western educations are equally represented across generational groups.7 In the NKR, the composition of higher education institutions is more stable. With the exception of the SC, in which 73% of MPs graduated from local universities and 16% from universities of the Soviet or CIS republics, at least 85% of MPs were graduates from local universities in all subsequent convocations. In the current convocation, this trend has become more pronounced; all MPs (96.4%) are graduates of local universities with the exception of one middleaged MP who graduated from Penza State University of Architecture and Construction in 1988. This similarity of educational background may be related to fewer opportunities to obtain higher education abroad. On the one hand, the NKR is increasingly isolated by its unrecognized status; by contrast, the NKR benefits from increased access to Armenian universities.

In the Armenian context, private universities are generally considered less competitive and of poorer quality compared to state universities, including universities based on intergovernmental agreements (the American University of Armenia, the Russian Armenian University and the French University of Armenia). 7 There are two MPs aged 2535 years old, three aged 3650 and two aged 5165.

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Occupational Backgrounds of MPs An analysis of the immediate backgrounds of MPs reveals that the RA SC was composed of the largest number of newcomer MPs (Table 1.2a). More than one-third of MPs were representatives of the intelligentsia, including academics, teachers, and journalists. The share of the intelligentsia continually decreased over the first decade and stabilized during the second decade. The other large group in the SC (42.5%) was composed of midlevel bureaucrats who generally had no prior national political experience during the SC. The number of these representatives significantly decreased in subsequent assemblies. In both groups, some members left politics after the second round of parliamentary elections (1995). Others transformed their political activities into their main vocation by launching political careers and reappearing in our database as elected or appointed officials. Table 1.2a displays the formation and consolidation of political classes in the RA. A growing proportion of professional politicians in parliament occupied both elected and appointed political positions (the share grew from 1.5% in the SC to 32.5% in the first convocation of the National Assembly, 39.5% in the second, 49.6% in the third, 51.9% in the fourth and 57.4% in the fifth). Similar trends are observable in the NKR (Table 1.2b); however, bureaucrats have been well represented in parliament (nearly half of the SC to at least one-quarter of NA4). This pattern might be explained by the less competitive nature of party politics in the NKR, which has enabled career civil servants to become MPs recruited into the political elite. The introduction of party list seats in 2005 and the increasing number of such seats explains the larger represenation of party list MPs (21.4% of seats) in the fourth convocation of the NA. The

26

NKR also produces a more limited representation of businessmen in parliament8 compared to the RA. This increasing influence of professional politicians in the RA parallels the proportion of entrepreneurs, which also grew beginning in the mid-1990s and included one-third of parliament during the period 20037. After this peak, the proportion of MPs recruited from these occupation decreased. However, this change does not imply that that the number of entrepreneur MPs decreased. For example, 6% of new MPs in the fifth convocation were entrepreneurs.9 This proportion is merely an indication that a substantial number of businessmen MPs were reelected and continued to secure seats in parliament. Although entrepreneurs were always represented in party lists, their proportion in parliament has increased substantially over the last decade. However, the proportion of businessmen elected from FPTP districts did not changed significantly. The main change in this regard is that such MPs gradually bacame members of ruling parties. For example only one non party member entrepreneur was elected in 2012 compared to at least 19 independent businessmen elected in 2003. Comparing the backgrounds of MPs who held political positions before elections reveals a few additional trends (Chart 1.5a). Increasingly, party list MPs are reelected more often than singledistrict MPs. In addition, the proportion of newly elected MPs who were engaged in party work as their main occupation increased slightly over the last two convocations. The increased ability of political parties, especially the dominant Republican Party of Armenia, to ensure the re-election of their candidates can only partially be attributed to changes in the formal rules, such as increasing party list
This observation may be a coincidence, but the highest proportion of businessmen elected to parliament occurred during similar time periods (20037 in the RA and 20005 in the NKR). 9 Despite formal limitations on the type of work in which MPs may engage, including entrepreneurship, in practice, MPs often continue to be directly engaged in their business activities and only formally delegate the management of their companies and assets while holding elected public office.
8

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seats in parliament. These trends strengthened during the fifth convocation with no additional changes in the proportions of party list and FPTP seats. We argue that the most important factors behind this change are (a) the consolidation of the political party system with a smaller number of contesting parties and (b) the more frequent reappearance of individuals on party lists and FPTP districts both in cases of parties with more seats (RPA, PAP) and smaller parties (ARFD, RoL). There are a few notable similarities and differences between the parliaments of the RA and the NKR in terms of MPs with backgrounds in political positions. In both the RA and the NKR, only 2030% of all FPTP members were reelected. Another similarity is the negligible proportion of MPs who built their political career at the national level after winning local elected positions (0.72.9%), which indicates that recruitment of the political elite rarely draws from the political preferences of local populations reflected in the official electoral results. In the NKR, particularly during the last two convocations, MPs with prior experience in the executive branch at both the national and regional levels (ministers and marzpets) have been common (Chart 1.5b). The NKR data also indicate the absence of MPs who were engaged only in party politics before the elections. Unlike in the RA, in the NKR, a party career is rarely an effective path to either a parliamentary seat or the political elite. Rather, political elites are drawn from among high-ranking civil servants with experience in governance and public administration. This dynamic may change with increasing numbers of party list seats in parliament.

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The Executive Branch

Ministers and regional governors (marzpets10) are core political positions appointed by the head of the executive branch.11 Despite certain changes in the formal procedures of appointment to these positions over the last two decades, in general, such appointments are in the domain of the president, who may either directly appoint or, at a minimum, approve appointments. Therefore, an analysis of the characteristics of these officials was conducted to uncover the recruitment principles of the political elite; the analysis not only reveals the leadership decisions of ruling parties but also reflects the preferences of the president. Cases were classified according to the years during which each of three presidents in both the RA and the NKR was in office, and characteristics were compared among periods,12 between the RA and the NKR and among MPs. Age and Education An age analysis of executive positions for both the RA and the NKR (Chart 1.6) revealed general patterns that are similar to the findings for MPs (Chart 1.2). First, and perhaps most important, is the consideration of the generational dynamics among elite representatives. During the early years of independence, a larger proportion of young officials were recruited (during the Levon Ter Petrosyan [LTP] term in the RA

Administrative unit of NKR is shrjan (region) and official name of the head is varchakazmi ghekavar However in the text a single term (marzpet) will be used both for RA and NKR to describe executive positions with similiar roles and responsibilities. 11 Whereas ministers are responsible for the design and implementation of executive policies in their respective sectors at the national level, marzpets ensure the implementation of such policies in the respective administrative regions (ten in Armenia and seven in the NKR). 12 Levon Ter Petrosyan (LTP 10/1991-01/1998), Robert Kocharyan (RK 01/199804/2008), Serge Sargsyan (SS 04/2008-present) in the RA; Robert Kocharyan (RK 1992, 12/1994-03/1997), Arkady Ghukasyan (AG 03/1997-09/2007), Bako Sahakyan (BS 09/2007-present).

10

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and during the Robert Kocharyan [RK] term in the NKR) compared to the subsequent decade (during the RK term in the RA and the AG term in the NKR). In addition, the proportion of older representatives (aged 51 years and above) has increased since independence in both the RA and the NKR. This trend is especially notable among marzpet appointments, in which presidents possess greater flexibility to determine the cadres of recruitment (marzpets require less specialized backgrounds). Additionally, during the last 56 years, the proportion of marzpet and minister appointments (during the Serge Sargsyan [SS] term in the RA and the BS term in the NKR) that are younger representatives (3140 years old) has increased in both countries. This change indicates the gradual renewal of the political elite. As a result, recruits who are currently middle-aged constitute the smallest proportion of appointments compared to postindependence (except ministers in the RA, age propotion of which remains stable). The following chart (Chart 1.7) presents the level of education of people appointed to executive branch positions. In both the RA and the NKR, cabinet appointments consistently tend to have completed academic degrees (PhD candidate or higher) compared to marzpets. This difference indicates that a higher level of specialization is important for the recruitment of ministers,13 whereas other factors are considered more important for marzpets. Both the smaller proportion of ministers with postgraduate degrees and the significantly higher proportion of positions filled by ministers with secondary education in the NKR suggest a notable difference in levels of education in the NKR and the RA. Similar differences were observed between MPs of in the NKR and the RA. A smaller proportion of elite members completed
Three Charts (from Chart 1.6 to Chart 1.8) present the age and education data. There is a single outstanding case in the NKR: one minister with primary education was appointed to a position in his 20s. This minister was Samvel Babayan, and his political career was possible due to his exceptional military success. He began his career as the leader of a voluntary detachment and became a military commander in the army during the Karabakh war. As the minister of defense, his control and authority over the NKR army made him the most influential individual in the NKR, especially during the second half of the 1990s.
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higher education in the NKR than in the RA, which may be explained by the composition of the society, which includes an overall smaller proportion of individuals with such degrees in the NKR.14 The types of university are described in Chart 1.8. In the RA, cabinet appointments more frequently received their degrees outside of Armenia (nearly one-third) compared with the NKR; this difference also holds for MPs in both the NKR and the RA. Most universities attended outside of Armenia were state universities in Russia and other CIS countries. The proportion of executive appointments who attended Western institutions is smaller than the proportion of current MPs with such education. Interestingly, in absolute terms, the number of people with Western education given executive appointments was highest during the first two years of independence. This trend reflected the LTP appointment of two diaspora candidates to ministerial positions. Both of these ministers vacated their positions relatively early, and the recruitment of professionals from the diaspora to high executive positions ended. During the RK period, the only minister with a Western education was also from the diaspora; however, unlike the ministers of LTP, he had built his career within the ministry of foreign affairs to which he was recutied during the LTP period. This minister served throughout both terms of the RK presidency and remained actively engaged in politics after leaving the ministerial position and currently serves as MP. Despite the rhetoric about the unity between Armenia and the diaspora and importance of utlizing diasporas human capacity intesified during the RK and SS periods (a special ministry for the diaspora was later established) it did not translate into recrutment of such cadres in important political positions. In general, the recruitment to political elite from the

For example, the proportion of teaching staff with academic degrees is smaller in higher education institutions in the NKR (30.2%) compared to the RA, 48.4% (state statistical services of the RA and the NKR, yearbook 2012 for the RA (http://www.armstat.am/file/doc/99471448.pdf, p. 126) and yearbook 200511 for the NKR (http://stat-nkr.am/files/yearbooks/2005_2011/6_krtut-mshak.pdf, p. 89).

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diaspora was limited both in the RA and the NKR even in lower levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy. The first nondiaspora minister with a Western education was appointed during the SS period which is an indication of growing number of career beurocrates with western education. In addition to the absence of Western-educated political elites, we note that a relatively high proportion of individuals in the NKR were educated at private universities locally or in the CIS countries. Many of these degree recipients were older, which indicates that political elite members gained political influence without a university degree and later obtained diplomas from private institutions to legitimize their political standing and career growth. Political Composition The total number of ministers in the RA database appointed by the first president, LTP, was 76, whereas the second president, RK, appointed 71, and the current president, SS, has appointed 30. The differences reflect decreases in both the number of ministries (26 in mid-1995 and 18 currently) and the frequency of new appointments. Only 12 new marzpets were recruited by LTP.15 By comparison, RK recruited 21 individuals and SS had appointed only ten positions as of the fall of 2013. During the earlier years of independence, party affiliation was a less important factor for high-level political appointments. Over 90% of all ministers who served during the LTP period formally were not members of any political party; only half of marzpets declared a party affiliation, and only one-quarter of these were members of the ruling PANM. However, nearly half of the ministers and one-quarter of the marzpets were former members of the Communist Party who had

Administrative changes establishing these positions were made in mid-1995, nearly two years before the resignation of LTP.

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acquired managerial experience in either regional administration or specialized sectors. Technocratic appointments were still common during the first RK term, but party membership became a more frequent characteristic among ministers. During the ten years of RKs administration, 38% of all appointed ministers and 68% of all marzpets were party members. The party affiliation of newly appointed officials demonstrates that nearly half of the marzpets (42.9%) and one-fifth of ministers were from the RPA. Compared to LTP, RK did not rely on cadres with past working experience in similar positions of the executive branch (less than 10% of appointments). The emergence of several new parties that were well represented in parliament (RPA, ARFD, RoL and, subsequently, PAP) inevitably produced coalition governments, which were major sources of renewal for political elites at the executive level. The trend in party-based appointments intensified after SS took office and reached 80% of all newly appointed ministers and 70% of marzpets. These executive appointments included both individuals who had been loyal to the party for a long period and officials who became party members on the eve of an appointment. The SS recruitment policy also relied on long-serving, influential, nonpartisan and high-ranking officials from the RK period. At the beginning of the SS period, these officials were considered for technocratic appointments to positions that required special professional skills,16 but all of these officials became members of the RPA in two waves. In November 2009, the prime minister and two other ministers joined the party, and in December 2010, three additional nonpartisan ministers also enlisted.17 The overall political composition of the executive branch during the SS was more stable, and new
These officials were the prime minster and the ministers of finance, economic development and justice. 17 Interestingly, only one or two months before these decisions, most of these officials had publicly stated that they did not have intentions to become members of any party.
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appointments were triggered either by a changing coalition18 or changes within a coalitional party, particularly ROL. The combination of (a) a smaller number of new appointments, (b) longer tenures of executive positions and (c) higher rates of party membership, including the recruitment of appointed nonpartisan ministers into the RPA, is a strong indication of a recruitment model based on a closed circle of party members. The highest proportion of single-party members both in the cabinet (ten out of 18) and among marzpets (nine out of ten) in the current executive branch confirms what was observed in the legislative branch: the consolidation of the party system with a dominant party has reached its peak since the independence of the RA. Unlike RA, in the NKR, party affiliation had very limited influence on the appointments of the executive branch. During the RK administration, 90% of all executive positions were held by nonpartisan officials. This figure decreased slightly (nearly threequarters of executive appointments were nonpartisan) during the presidency of Arkady Ghukasyan, who was a party leader and introduced party list seats in the NKR. All three parliamentary parties were represented in the cabinet. However, this trend reversed after the election of the third president, Bako Sahakyan, a nonpartisan with a background in security services. Aside from the prime minister, Arayik Harutyunyan, who is the leader of the largest parliamentary party, none of the executive appointees selected during the BS administration have declared party affiliations. To understand the factors influencing elite recruitment in the NKR, we examined the background of executive officials. Chart 1.9a demonstrates that executive positions were initially given to political insiders; most frequently, these positions were given to civil servants, who were the main source of executive positions in the NKR (nearly two-thirds of appointments). One-quarter of the ministers were
18

In 2009, three ARFD ministers left the coalition and were followed in 2012 by four PAP ministers.

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promoted after serving as an MP. The most diversified elite in the executive branch was observed during the period of Arkady Ghukasyan, during whose term nearly one-quarter of ministerial positions were entrusted to people with no experience in public administration but who had entrepreneurial experience. This group was largely from the Free Motherland Party, which became the second largest party during the 2005 parliamentary session and later partnered with Arkady Gukasyans Democratic Party of Artsakh. With the election of Bako Sahakyan, recruitment preferences reversed: civil servants once again became the predominant source of political elites (seven of nine appointments). However, four of six newly appointed governors were long-serving police or security service officers with no prior political experience. Only one of the 15 (6.7%) executive appointments made by Bako Sahakyan was a public politician with prior electoral experience. In comparison, this figure was 38.9% during the RK and 31% during the AG administrations. In the context of a nonrecognized state, the increased presence of security officers and the replacement of public politicians may be explained by the existence of serious external risks, including the renewal of military actions by Azerbaijan. However, we consider this explanation primarily as a justification used by the president for these appointments. A weakly developed party system facilitates the appointment of nonpartisan individuals; BS, first and foremost, attempts to reward individual loyalty with important positions. Such individuals are bound to him by personal ties and are accountable to him because they had not previously built political careers. The background of individuals newly appointed to executive positions in Armenia also reveals the political elite recruitment preferences of the head of the executive branch at that time (Chart 1.9b). All three presidents relied on a system of insiders to enlist their teams. The largest group was drawn from former civil servants; they constituted from 40.8 to 53.3% of all newly appointed ministers and one-third of marzpets. After the introduction of a new system of regional administration in 1995, LTP entrusted more than half of marzpet positions to elected MPs, who often were from same region.

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The proportion of such appointments halved during the RK and SS administrations; other elected officials, including mayors, were also promoted to marzpet positions (RK and SS appointed 14.3 and 10%, respectively). Both RK and SS preferred to recruit officers to marzpet positions (19 and 20%, respectively). The cadre of recruits drawn from outside of the political system is from the intelligentsia and business sector. These two groups have been well represented in cabinets: LTP (29.9%), RK (18.3%) and SS (23.4%). Marzpets with such backgrounds were recruited mostly during the SS period (20%, or two individuals). This observation is not a notable trend, and it is difficult to assess whether SS has considered external sources of regional governance or whether these two appointments were motivated by other factors. Career Transitions From the NKR Political Elite to the RA Political Elite A former NKR president, RK, who was first selected as the prime minister of the RA and later was elected the president of Armenia, spurred popular discussion of the role of the Karabakh elite in the politics of the RA. To understand the extent to which this transition occurred and the effects on the composition of the political elite, we briefly document all cases of political elites shifting from the NKR to the RA and vice versa. It is easier to list individuals who were part of the political elite in the NKR and then became part of the Armenian elite. For example, former Prime Minister of the NKR Leonard Petrosyan moved to Yerevan to join the RK team. He became a minister in 1999 but was killed in the terrorist attack on the Armenian parliament that occurred on October 27, 1999. The current Minister of Defense, Seyran Ohanian, succeeded to this position after serving as the Minister of Defense in the NKR. The best example of shifting from one political elite to another is provided by the current Deputy Prime Minister of the NKR, Arthur Aghabekyan. After relocating to Yerevan, the former Minister of Internal Affairs in the NKR accepted the position of Deputy Minister of Defense of Armenia. He was then elected an MP of the RA. In 2012,

36

he returned to Karabakh and was appointed to the position of Deputy Prime Minister of Karabakh. Arthur Aghabekyan is the only representative of the NKR elite who has move into the RA elite and back into the political decision-makers of the NKR. After leaving office in the NKR, some representatives of the Karabakh elite continue their careers as Armenian diplomats. The former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Former President of the NKR, Arkadi Ghukasyan, is now a Special Mission Ambassador of Armenia, and Oleg Yesayan, the former Speaker of the NKR National Assembly, is the current Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Armenia in Russia. He previously held this position in Belarus. There are fewer cases of a representative of the Armenian elite becoming part of the NKR elite. The most vivid case is Tigran Kyureghyan, the MP of the Supreme Council of 19905, who then relocated to Karabakh. After accepting positions in LSG bodies, Kyureghyan became an MP in the National Assembly of the NKR during the period 20005. Compared to his colleagues, Kyuregyan was not appointed to high political positions, immediately transitioning from one political system to the other, but rather first relocated to the NKR and built a local career before being elected to national parliament. Gender The final section of this chapter is dedicated to a description of the political elites gender composition. Female representatives constitute a small portion of elites in both cases; however, certain characteristics and trends were notable both in the RA and the NKR. Overall, only 4.7% of all positions were held by females in the RA; a significant portion of these women (61.7%) were MPs elected by party lists. This pattern indicates that the representation of females within the political elite of the RA would be lower if not for formal rules

37

reserving at least 20% of party list seats for female representatives.19 However, this use of gender quotas is relatively new in the RA, which indicates that female politicians were frequently elected as MPs by the proportional system before the introduction of these quotas. Only 2.6% of all FPTP MPs were women, a figure that has ranged from 0 to 4.7% over time. A similar proportion of female politicians (2.8%) were also represented in the cabinet of the RA. Two female ministers were recruited to all cabinets of each of the three presidents. Only one female was ever appointed as a marzpet, constituting 2.1% of all such appointments. No major trends or differences in the age of recruitment between male and female political elite representatives were revealed. Unlike some male elites, none of the females were recruited into the political elite without a university degree; the most frequent degrees were earned in the social sciences (28.3% of females) and law (15%). Female elite representatives also exhibited less diverse paths to the political elite: more than half of female recruits were either part of the intelligentsia (36.7% compared to 17.6% of males) or civil servants (21.7%) before their political careers. Females are represented in the NKR twice as often (8.8% of all cases) as in the RA. The representation of females is significantly more balanced across various positions (26% of all females were party list MPs, 52% were FPTP MPs, and the remaining 22% were ministers), and females constitute 8.5% of ministers and 10.5% of MPs. Female representation has increased especially since BS took office as president; 16% of all newly recruited elite members are female, a significantly higher portion even without the introduction of quotas for female MPs. However, marzpet positions remain less attainable for females. The higher proportion of females with at least a university
Article 155.2 of the Electoral Code of the RA states that The number of persons of each sex shall not exceed 80% of any integer group of five candidates starting from the second number of the electoral list (26, 211, 216, and so on up to the end of the list) of a political party or alliance of political parties and of each party included in an alliance.
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degree was also observed in the NKR (91.5% compared to 80.2% among males). Another notable difference was that females received their education in local universities (91.5% compared to 83.1% among males). Female elites were drawn from less diverse professions: 52.2% of females earned degrees in pedagogy and/or linguistics, and 17.4% earned medical degrees. Female political elite members took similar paths to the political elite as their peers in the RA: 39.1% were appointed or elected to national political positions after years of civil service, whereas 21.7% were part of the intelligentsia (teachers, poets, etc.) before entering politics. Female political elite representatives frequently possessed electoral experience before their election or appointment to national political positions (69.6% compared to 56.3% of males), which indicates that females are less frequently appointed to such positions without political experience. Another indication of the importance of experience for female elites is that in the NKR, female representatives were entrusted to political positions at older ages (43.1% were recruited at age 51 or older compared to 19.9% of males). It is safe to conclude that despite their comparatively higher rates of representation in the NKR, only females with certain characteristics (university degrees earned during the early stages of their life, successful and long careers in civil service or other white collar employment) were likely to be recruited. One possible explanation for the higher rates of female representation in the more traditional NKR might be the relative scarcity of males in a postwar society, specifically when a high proportion of working-age males are recruited to the army in a society that has one of the worlds highest rates of soldiers per capita.

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Social network analysis as a tool for analyzing political elites

Introduction Naturally, not all individuals who hold formal positions are equally influential members of the elite. To identify and describe the dynamics within the elite, that is, among individuals and groups who wield the most influence and power, we turn to social network analysis. Based on graph theory and advanced computing capacities, network analysis methods have been employed in the hard sciences for several decades. Over the last decade, network analysis has been applied in many other academic disciplines as well as in other spheres. Social scientists have gradually adopted these methods to describe and analyze relationships among social actors both at the individual and institutional level. A number of social network analysis (SNA) software programs20 have been developed, enhancing the capacity of social scientists to both analyze and visualize network data. The core of this approach is the concept of a network (also referred as a graph or sociogram) that consists of nodes (actors) and ties or edges (relationships among those actors). The major difference and, in the context of this study, advantage of network data over conventional data are that the latter focuses on actors and attributes, whereas the former focuses on actors and their relations (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). Depending on the type of data, SNA can reveal various characteristics of a social community, including the type, direction and intensity of relationships among actors; the position of any given actor within a network; and the existence of various segments (clusters or components) in that network. SNA is considered a very
We utilized Gephi (https://gephi.org/), an open-source software for the visualization and analysis of networks graphs, in our research.
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effective tool for measuring the power relations among various actors. Therefore, the application of SNA to political elites enabled us (a) to look beyond the general characteristics of individuals who held political positions in Armenia and identify and describe the most influential individuals and groups among these elites and (b) to visualize and present relations, and changes in these relations, over time. In our approach, the network is composed of political decision makers (nodes) who were connected to each other in cases when (1) they were able to pass a formal decision and (2) they cooperated with each other for that purpose. The parliament and the laws passed by that parliament are the most feasible, and most likely the only, source of systematically collected data about formal political decisions that indicate the authors of these decisions. This approach limits the measurement of political influence of MPs to formally adopted decisions, whereas other aspects of influence are not captured in the network. Another limitation is the available data during this period; information about the authors of passed laws was available only for the RA21 and only beginning in 2003.22 As a result, we created networks that include all MPs who authored or coauthored bills that were passed by the parliament and became laws. Each tie represented a bill that was coauthored by two or more MPs, and the network represents all such cases. Consequently, ties in the network are measured or weighted by the number of times a given MP coauthored an adopted bill. This decision ensured an interval measurement of relations, which is considered the most advanced level of measurement allows us to discriminate among the relations reported in ways that allow us to validly state that, for

Note that in the parliament of the NKR, this approach probably would be less revealing of influential individuals and groups because the laws adopted by these institutions are imported from the RA; thus, very few cases exist in which NKR MPs actually author the bills themselves. 22 The author information of adopted laws can be found on the official webpage of the National Assembly.

21

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example, this tie is twice as strong as that tie (Hanneman and Riddle, Chapter 1, 2005). Ties within this network are unidirectional because coauthoring a bill is considered a symmetrical relation, that is, it is impossible to identify the direction of the tie.23 Bills proposed to parliament by the executive branch are not included24 in the network because it is impossible to identify who authored those bills within the government. The government is represented in the network only in exceptional cases when bills were coauthored with individual MPs. When the network represents the data of the full population of actors and their ties, it constitutes a full network. These networks are very effective for description and systemic analyses of a social structure because they anable to measure many concepts within the SNA. Each node in the network was assigned the following attributes: gender, party membership, faction membership, political status (opposition/ruling party member) and electoral status (FPTP/party list MP). Initially, three networks were constructed to represent each assembly of the parliament.25 The main analysis was conducted on these three networks. However, a representation and comparison of the data by convocations do not account for political changes, specifically the composition of the ruling coalition. For an MP, being a representative from the ruling party should greatly increase the ability to pass bills in parliament. To reflect major political developments, particularly changes in the ruling coalition, five separate networks were created to represent the data for each period with changes in the ruling coalition. Chart 2.1 displays all parliamentary parties since

Theoretically, it is possible to assign directions to ties in cases where it is clear who was the main coauthor of the bill or who exerted greater influence over its content, but this was not an option with our data. 24 Nearly 91% of all adopted bills during the third convocation, 83% during the fourth convocation and 89% during the fifth convocation were authored by the executive branch. http://parliament.am/parliament.php?id=parliament&lang=arm. 25 The third convocation (May 2003- May 2007), fourth convocation (May 2007May 2012) and current fifth convocation (May 2012-June 2013).

23

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2003 and indicates the changes in the composition of the ruling coalition (parties above the opposition/ruling coalition line). As a result, eight networks were generated and compared. Three of these networks represent the whole convocation (referred as Conv 3, 4, 5), and the additional five (Table 2.1) reflect periods of coalition change (referred as Coal 1, 2, 3, 4, 5). The most interesting findings from the SNA are presented in the following pages. These findings merely scratch the surface of the network data, which proved to be a very effective tool for elite research. The SNA has the potential to advance elite research, and experimentation with network data provides opportunities to innovate in this field.

Basic Characteristics of Networks Representing Entire Convocations

The size and density of a network is one its important parameters. In most cases, the size is described by the number of nodes and ties, the diameter or similar dimensions. Comparing these network features for MPs enables conclusions on the overall picture of the decisionmaking process in each of convocations to be drawn. Table 2.2 presents the basic characteristics of the networks. The number of nodes, ties and average degree demonstrates that the largest proportion of MPs directly participated in policy formulation during periods were MPs from ruling coalition parties. This finding indicates that belonging to a ruling coalition had tangible implications for the ability of MPs to formulate decisions in addition to affecting other privileges.26 In this context, it is interesting that only during the third convocation did the number of nodes exceed the number of MPs

Although voting on bills is also part of the decision-making process, in this context, we considered decision makers to be only those MPs who directly and proactively formulated public policies by drafting a bill and successfully passing it through parliament.

26

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from ruling coalition parties, that is, even oppositional MPs were able to pass at least one law (Graph 1). Some oppositional MPs were almost as effective in passing legislation as the most influential members of ruling parties27 (the size of a node reflects the number of passed laws). The smaller number of parties and MPs from ruling coalition parties during the fifth convocation (75 of 131 seats) suggests that a smaller number of MPs have been and will be able to effectively influence formal parliamentary decisions. Two other important factors, in addition to the size of the coalition, influence the size of the network: (a) the duration of a coalition and (b) electoral cycles. Naturally, in cases when a coalition was of short duration or conducted its legislative activities on the eve of national elections, a smaller number of laws (ties) were passed, and the number of decision makers (nodes) was reduced. The two networks characterized by these factors are Coal 2 and Coal 3. As expected, these networks also have the smallest diameters (3), which is the largest geodesic distance in the (connected) network. Such networks are considered compact. This figure is simply explained by the smaller number of laws (20 vs. eight, Table 2.1) and authors (27 vs. 13, Table 2.2); therefore, these two networks should not be compared to the larger networks representing whole convocation. Graph density, which illustrates the proportion of all possible ties that are actually present, is an important indicator of the level of interconnectedness in a network. The fifth convocation has the highest graph density, which once again reflects the consolidation of political power in the hands of a smaller group of MPs. The results presented in the next four columns confirm this conclusion. Modularity calculates the number of communities within a network according to the position of nodes. The number of such communities (in the context of our research, groupings within the elite) is higher during the fifth convocation (8). However, this finding is related not to a structural disintegration of the elite but rather reflects (a) the
27

See the next section on individual elite members for details.

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departure and/or isolation of MPs representing ex-coalitional parties or (b) a single nonpartisan MP who managed to pass a single law but was not part of the main network (largest connected components). A higher value of connected components (5), that is, the number groups that have no ties to other groups, confirms the isolation of certain MPs from the main network. Moreover, this isolation occurs across party lines, with two connected components representing members of a single party (PAP and ARFD ex-coalition members) and two individual majoritarian MPs (see Graph 2). Unlike the other convocations, even independent MPs elected through the FPTP system are unrepresented in the network, which indicates the diminishing opportunities of such MPs to directly design their policies.28 Instead, such MPs, who often are either wealthy businessmen or represent business interests, join a political party (often either the RPA or PAP) and promote their interests in the executive and legislative branches through party channels and personal relations rather than directly initiating and designing legislation. Consolidation across party lines is also reflected in the average clustering coefficient (highest during the fifth convocation, 0.955), which measures the average of the densities of the neighborhoods of all the actors, and in the average path length, which measures the proximity of nodes, which are connected components (the shortest paths occur during the fifth convocation, 1.653). The fourth convocation provides a transitional picture of this political power consolidation. As displayed in Chart 3, the number of MPs who authored legislation is significantly larger than during the fifth convocation, and in this regard, the fourth convocation resembles the third convocation. These MPs represent a larger number of political parties, which was also typical in the third convocation. Moreover, these MPs are integrated into a single connected component
28

A quick glance at the titles of laws initiated by these MPs indicates that most of these were related to economic and/or fiscal policies.

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and are thus similar to the third convocation in terms of interconnectedness. These connections represent cooperation on bill authorship, often across party lines. With the exception of relatively more interconnectedness among ARFD MPs (displayed in orange), no significant clustering occurs along party lines. A final important similarity with the third convocation is the existence of a substantial number of independent MPs. However, compared to the third convocation, these independent MPs are not grouped together but rather are diffused within the network and cooperate with all representatives of the ruling coalition. The most important difference between the third and fourth convocations is the extent of representation of opposition party MPs in the network. Unlike the third convocation, which included a meaningful involvement of opposition party MPs, such MPs became marginalized during the fourth convocation. This trend continued and intensified during the fifth convocation. As a result, the political elite has evolved from a diverse and consensual group, where oppositional and coalitional party MPs as well as independents cooperated to produce formal decisions, to an exclusive and closed group representing a dominant party (and its minor ally party) that limits policy formulation even among partners from previous coalitions.

Identification of the Most Influential Elite Representatives

SNA not only presents the overall characteristics of a network but also enables the identification of the most influential or powerful nodes within a network. Indeed, SNA contributes to the advanced analysis of power relations. Hanneman and Riddle (2005) summarize the role of SNA in research on power as follows: Network thinking has contributed a number of important insights about social power. Perhaps most importantly, the network approach emphasizes that power is inherently relational. An individual does not have power in the abstract, they have power because they can dominate others.

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Because power is a consequence of patterns of relations, the amount of power in social structures can vary. Power arises from occupying advantageous positions in networks of relations... Three basic sources of advantage are high degree, high closeness, and high betweenness. In simple structures (such as the star, circle, or line), these advantages tend to covary. These three criteria are the basis of our approach to identifying the most powerful elites in parliament. After a brief explanation of these three concepts, the findings are presented and discussed, concentrating on the qualities possessed by the 1012 most influential MPs. The results for the entire network are presented in separate tables (Table 2.3 represents the third convocation, 2.4 the fourth and 2.5 the fifth). The degree is the primary criterion for identifying the most powerful MPs; other criteria produce similar standings, that is, MPs with higher degrees also tend to have to have better results when employing weighted degree, closeness and betweenness measures. The degree of a node represents its connections with other nodes. In our network, this is the number of MPs with whom a particular MP coauthored a law. Because ties in our network are weighted, it is also possible to produce a weighted degree, that is, to measure not only the number of laws but also how many times each MP coauthored laws with other MPs. Closeness measures the proximity of a node to other nodes. MPs who are able to reach other actors via shorter paths or who are more reachable by other actors on these shorter paths occupy favored positions. This structural advantage reflects a second dimension of power. Betweenness is another measure of the position of a node within a network. Betweenness indicates how often an MP serves as an exclusive bridge between two other MPs, which reflects an increased capacity to mediate between MPs and thus reflects that MPs power. Table 2.3 indicates that the most powerful MPs of the third convocation were quite diverse. This diversity is related to both political and party preferences. MPs from all parliamentary parties and the two independent MPs are included in this most powerful group. Of the 11 most powerful MPs, four represent the parliamentary

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opposition. The FPTP MPs included three of these 11. Gender is unequally represented among the most powerful MPs; only one female is included in this elite group. The results of the fourth convocation indicate a significant shift: opposition MPs constituted a much smaller portion of parliament and were largely absent from the list of MPs who were able to pass a law. Moreover, with one exception, even independent MPs were not on the top of the list. That exception was Victor Dallaqyan, who managed to be one of the top five most influential MPs during the third convocation despite the fact that he was a member of the opposition bloc; however, during the fourth convocation, he saw his power wane even after he split with the oppositional parties to represent himself as an independent MP. Instead, only MPs from ruling parties were represented in the top positions in the list of the most powerful MPs in the fourth convocation. The frequency of appearance in the list was roughly proportionate to the number of representatives of each ruling party in parliament (RPA as dominant, PAP as the main partner and ROL and ARFD as minor partners in the coalition). MPs representing these factions were not always elected through a proportional electoral system, and the representation of FPTP and party list MPs was comparable to previous convocations. The main distinction was that influential FPTP MPs, who are often reelected from the same districts, were already party members. There was also a transition in terms of gender between the third and fourth convocations, with female MPs increasing in numbers and growing in influence. When filtered based on a weighted scale of frequency of passed laws, several other MPs29 would rise to the top of the list of most influential MPs. All these MPs were elected by a proportional system, and they represented each of the four ruling parties; at least three were part of a smaller team that concentrated on shaping public policy
29

Hegine Bisharyan, Ara Babloyan, Ara Nranyan, David Harutyunyan, bold in the

list.

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in a specialized field (economy, justice, healthcare) without significant involvement from other MPs (resulting in a lower number of degrees, i.e., a lower number of coauthor MPs). This finding indicates that as the ruling parties consolidated in parliament, a certain type of division of labor occurred within parties. In addition to influential MPs who held formal positions (such as faction leader) and who frequently authored laws with a large number of MPs in a wide variety of fields, a group of party MPs was established that specialized in regulating certain fields. Professional expertise and background were important factors that enabled MPs to assume such roles in parliament. Data for the current fifth convocation covers only a period of one and half years, and the composition and structure of the network might change by the end of the term. However, based on these data, certain trends can be observed that are briefly discussed below. One of the new trends is a greater number of coauthors; as many as 21 MPs have been involved in coauthoring a single amendment. Notably, those MPs who also hold positions in parliament30 (such as deputy speaker, faction leader, head of committee) tend to appear in these groups more frequently and tend, in particular, to cooperate with one another. These developments might indicate the fusion of real political influence with formal positions and the establishment of an acknowledged hierarchy within the ruling party and/or an increased motivation by a larger number of MPs to demonstrate a certain type of parliamentary performance by joining various bill initiatives, even when the possibility of influencing a policy outcome is small. Another (but not new) trend is the increased influence of party list MPs compared to FPTP MPs, despite having the same proportion of seats during the fourth and fifth convocations. This is a continuation of a larger trend that began in 2003 that is described above. Another continuing trend is the increased representation of females in the
30

Galust Sahakyan, Eduard Sharmazanov, Hermine Nagdalyan, Ara Babloyan, David Harutyunyan.

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network of decision makers; this figure rose from 6.3% during the third convocation to 19% during the fifth convocation. Thus, although the increased representation of females in parliament was achieved by adopting formal rules (quotas), this finding indicates that it in fact has translated into greater participation of women in decision making and policy formulation. The most obvious and probably the most important trend is party consolidation and the establishment of a single dominant party in the political system, which is indicated by the percentage of MPs in the network who are affiliated with the largest faction in parliament. In the most recent three convocations, the RPA was the leading faction, but its percentage rose from 27.9% during the third convocation to 46.8% during the fourth convocation and to 66.7% of the MPs in parliament during the fifth convocation (excluding coalition partners from the R O L). These general results from the social network analysis, including identification of the most influential elite members within the parliament, reinforce findings from statistical analyses, and they deepen and refine our understanding of the elite composition in RA.

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CHAPTER 2: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POLITICAL ELITE: VALUES AND PREFERENCES

After Armenian independence, new political elites emerged; some elites left the ranks over time, some elites were forced out, and new figures have joined the group of political elites. Drawing from Samuel Huntingtons argument that the system of beliefs and actions of the elite are the most direct and significant variables explaining democratic transitions,31 we attempt to reveal political elite representatives values, beliefs, political orientations and preferences. The selection of individuals for in-depth interviews was based on the criteria that defined political elites in this study. Respondents were selected using the snowball method. The final list of respondents included more than 50 political figures targeted to participate in the interviews. The most difficult task of this procedure was overcoming representatives unwillingness to participate. Social networks were leveraged to overcome difficulties in making final arrangements and obtaining consent to participate. Interviewers selected for this study were skilled in clarifying information and deepening responses. They were also specially trained to overcome potential problems arising from delicate questions addressed to politicians. The in-depth interviews were conducted from April to August 2012. The main difficulties encountered during fieldwork were gaining the approval of potential respondents and scheduling the meetings for the interviews, especially given that this fieldwork coincided with elections in Armenia. The average interview lasted 70 min. Importantly, in most cases, the representatives did not decline after initially agreeing to participate. However, interviewers noted a lack of

Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press (1991), 3638.

31

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sincerity or bias in some responses. These specific cases were identified and interpreted by the interviewer. At the end of each interview, interviewers evaluated the level of the respondents sincerity on a five-point scale. Twenty percent of the interviews were given grades in the range of 23, and the rest received grades of 45. Therefore, the interviewers perceived that a high level of sincerity was exhibited. After obtaining the consent of each respondent, the interviews were recorded, and the interviewers took notes. Interviewers produced literal transcripts without making any changes or reformulations immediately after each interview. In cases of specific opinions or observations, interviewers added their notes in the notes section of the questionnaire. The tests that were administered and completed by the respondents were also transcribed and coded. Respondents are presented according to political party affiliation to preserve their anonymity. Additionally, the main distinction in approaches was made between two groups: the governing coalition and the oppositional political parties. It is noteworthy that three of 51 respondents were previous prime ministers, two of whom served during the first presidential administration, and the other served during the second administration. The list also includes approximately 30 deputies, ten ministers and three deputy ministers from the administrations of all three Armenian presidents. Three respondents were leading presidential candidates in 1991, 1996 and 2013. Sixteen respondents, or one-third of the sample, were women. The youngest respondent was 30 years old, and the eldest was 70 years old. Fifteen respondents were 3040 years old, 11 respondents were 4150 years old, 15 respondents were 5160 years old, and ten respondents were 61 years old or above. Twenty-one respondents were members of the Armenian Republican Party, which is the ruling party in Armenia. Seven respondents represented the Heritage party, three were from Prosperous, Armenia, three were from the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, three were from the Armenian National Congress, three represented the NGO sector, and the others were from other

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nonparliamentary political parties. Except for the Republican Party, the remaining parties are oppositional.

Life Story
The first section of questions concerned the life story of the elite representative. The aim of these questions was to discover their place of birth, family social status and parents professions. Twenty-nine respondents were born in Yerevan, seven were born in other Armenian cities and towns, nine were born in villages, and the other five were born in other countries. Therefore, more than 70% of the respondents were born in a city, nearly 20% were born in villages, and 10% were from abroad. Approximately 55% of the Republican Party representatives were born in Yerevan. The parents of most respondents were employed in higher education institutions and schools. The rest were employed in construction, industry and state administration. Most of the respondents parents were employed; only four respondents reported that only one parent (in particular, their mother) was not working and was engaged in housekeeping. Most respondents described the socioeconomic situation of their families as normal or good, whereas only two respondents considered their situation to be bad or difficult. The respondents own answers indicate that, during the transition phase in Armenia, the individuals who became part of the new elite came from families that would be considered middle class. Respondents were asked about their childhood role models who played major roles in the formation of their personality and value system. Almost all respondents described their parents as authorities who influenced their lives and shaped their values. Respondents also mentioned elder family members, especially grandparents. They recounted the stories their grandparents had told about the Armenian Genocide, which was cited as a major influence on the development of their personality and values as well as a factor in their decision to become politicians. All three members of the Armenian Revolutionary

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Federation party reported that joining this particular party was closely connected to hearing stories about the Armenian Genocide as a child. A small group of respondents indicated the absence of role models during their childhoods by emphasizing that they were quite active and this shaped their future. Four respondents claimed to not have thought about entering politics during their youth and that their presence in politics was determined by chance. Respondents often mentioned famous political and historical figures as authorities in their lives. The following names were most commonly mentioned: former prime ministers Vazgen Sargsyan and Andranik Margaryan, King Tigran the Great, King Pap, Garegin Nghdeh, Margaret Thatcher and Winston Churchill. One respondent mentioned the president of the RA, Serj Sargsyan, and two respondents mentioned former President Levon Ter-Petrosyan. One respondent reported that his youth was very active and he was always creating different initiatives. During these years, Samantha Smith was a role model for him. Respondents generally referred to historical figures, which may reflect the absence of political authorities in Armenia. Fifty respondents had completed higher education (seven respondents also had postgraduate education), and one respondent had received a high school education. Three respondents received their higher education abroad, and the rest were educated in Yerevan. Nearly 10% of respondents obtained their educations partly in Armenia and partly abroad, most frequently in Russia. Sixty percent of respondents received their degrees in the humanities and social sciences; many of these degrees were received in jurisprudence, which represented one-third of the humanities and social sciences degrees. The remaining 40% of respondents studied the natural and technical sciences. Respondents stated that their professional education played a substantial role in their political activity. Even those who obtained degrees in the natural and technical sciences held this opinion. One respondent with a technical education reported that his life vision was shaped in the university and that his profession taught him a realistic approach to politics. Another respondent, who graduated from the

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Polytechnic Institute named for K. Marx, reported that he would not have become a politician without the knowledge from his field, which he uses in his daily activities. One of the primary activists in the movement that began in 1988, who was later a prime minister, stated that the Soviet Union did not limit the development of the natural sciences and that many of the free-thinking people who proposed liberal ideas during the Soviet period were scientists. He gave physicist Andrey Sakharov and mathematician Alexander Shavarev as examples. Respondents also answered questions about their hobbies and their preferences in leisure activities. The most common response was reading. Other favorite pastimes included various types of sports. A few respondents enjoyed the theater or played musical instruments. One respondent noted that he liked to frequent the casino. Heritage Party representatives reported that they enjoyed spending time in their social networks and participated in political activism for human rights and ethnic and environmental movements. During the interviews, we attempted to determine how respondents met their spouses, the meaning they attributed to family and how family affected their involvement in politics. Four of the respondents were not married. One-third of respondents reported meeting their spouse at a university; the next most frequent response was the workplace. Respondents often characterized the family as the cell of a society, indicated that they valued family and stated that the family is the environment in which a person lives and receives spiritual sustenance. One respondent called his family his guardian angel as well as his castle and refuge. Family was widely characterized as a persons home, a place where one can express oneself, an important place for a persons tranquility and the place where ones homeland begins. Only one respondent claimed that a social life is more important than the family.

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Entering Politics
The next set of questions explored the motives, situations and circumstances that contributed to the decision to enter the political field. Nearly the half of the respondents over the age of 40 identified a single key moment in their political awakening. The Karabakh movement, which began in February 1988, encouraged a generation of citizens to engage in politics and build political careers, many of which have endured. The movement also greatly shaped these politicians life visions, value systems and political behavior. A similar persistent effect of early political activism related to the Karabakh movement was observed by anthropologists studying mass political behavior in postSoviet Armenia (Abrahamian & Shagoyan, 2012). One respondent claimed to have realized that he must become involved in politics in 1987 but that the Karabakh movement forced him to do so. He was a member of The Yerevan City Council during the period 19992003 and later became a deputy in the National Assembly; in 2012, he once again became a deputy in the National Assembly. Another respondent noted that he entered politics during the Karabakh movement and that the political party environment played a role in his becoming a politician. Respondents frequently reported that entering politics was closely connected to becoming a member of a particular party. Some members of the Heritage Party noted that their political activity was linked to being involved in that partys different structures. One respondent had first cooperated with the party, joined the party list and become a deputy in the National Assembly, only afterward considering a career in politics. Of the 21 representatives from The Armenian Republican Party, eight noted that their entry into politics was connected to joining this particular party. Republican Party representatives also often reported that they were handpicked by party leaders to carry out specific political functions. Andranik Margaryan, a former prime minister, was most frequently cited as mobilizing and motivating new members of

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the party that would become the ruling party of post-Soviet Armenia. To summarize, participation in the Karabakh movement and party membership were identified as the two most frequent paths of political elite formation. Whereas the former path was common among the older generation of elites, people who entered into politics more recently considered party membership to be the defining moment in their political path. The third, but less common, path into the political elite was taken by nonpartisan individuals who were elected by constituencies or appointed to positions because of their personal or professional skills. However, most of these individuals faced the dilemma, after a certain point in their political careers, of whether to join one of the dominant parties or to leave politics. Interestingly, a number of interviewees claimed that often, the decision to join a political party was conditioned upon their ability to exert maximum influence and not their ideological orientations or specific policy preferences. We also asked the respondents to identify the factors that helped them enter the political elite as well as to indicate which qualities and skills a person should possess to succeed in Armenian political life. Nearly one-quarter of the respondents said that education is important for elite membership, and another quarter cited advantageous family and social relationships. More frequently, families were considered important to creating quality and competitive education and to developing a stable system of values. One respondent noted that his family played a major role in the formation of his personality and that the main role belongs to the family when growing up as a true Armenian, whereas the family has little influence over his current political activities. Only one respondent noted that his familys influence on his political activity was negative. When asked whether they would like their children or grandchildren to be engaged in politics, most replied that their children were free to choose for themselves and that they would not object to a decision to become involved in politics. One respondent reported that he would like for his children to be involved in politics because he considers politics to be the art of arts. Only four respondents reported that they would not

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like their children to be engaged in political activity without providing much elaboration on the question. It is noteworthy that these respondents were members of the ruling political party. We also attempted to determine what the respondents consider to be their role in politics upon entering this field and which objectives they pursued at the beginnings of their careers. Respondents mostly indicated quite general objectives: to raise questions that were important for the progress of the society and to effect change in the country. One respondent recalled that he entered politics to build the motherland that he dreamed of. Another respondent said that she attempts to demonstrate to her former colleagues, journalists, by example that not all politicians suffer from the deficiencies that she observed during her journalistic career and that it is possible to be a different kind of politician. Another respondent described his role as demonstrating the possibility of honesty in politics and raising important national issues. Respondents frequently indicated that their goals have not changed since their initial entry into politics. One respondent stated that he wanted to demonstrate that democratic governance could be implemented in Armenia and that this goal had not changed over time. Independence and Nagorno-Karabakh were issues of great importance for the respondents. The Heritage Party representative stated that his sole purpose in politics was to build a state with 42,000 km2 of territory (referring to the joint area of the Republic of Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic), which is our motherland territory that will serve the needs of all Armenians of the world. A primary goal of this study was to reveal the main components and features of the political elites value system. Therefore, elites were asked about two topics: Which universal values and principles they identify with as politicians; Which behaviors are acceptable or unacceptable in the political arena. Respondents most often selected freedom and justice as well as democracy as the universal principles they identified with as

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politicians. They also cited family, the motherland and responsibility toward the family and motherland as core values. One group of respondents cited Tseghakron (nationalistic) ideology. Another respondent stated that the most important principle for a human being was to serve the nation in which he was born and that a man cannot be a good person or espouse universal values if he fails to uphold these values. Certain patterns were revealed by prioritizing values and preferences. Nationalistic rhetoric was dominant among interviewees who represented the ruling political party as well as many nonliberal opposition members who place greater emphasis on national security and economic prosperity than other goals. Commonly employed terms in this group included Motherland, nation, order, morality and security, compared to terms such as statehood, democracy, rule of law and freedom, which were used more often by other opposition members. Respondents most frequently expressed that the use of all possible means to achieve a goal or to enter into politics, the betrayal of principles and disregarding the public interest were unacceptable. One respondent considered political romanticism to be unacceptable. Truthfulness, prioritizing the public interest, intelligence and the ability to persuade the public were most often considered desirable. The availability of a political team and the possession of a political conscience were also considered important. Respondents stressed the importance of fairness and honesty. One respondent stated that he would never accept meanness or the use of manipulative technologies in politics. Another respondent noted that of the universal values, morality is primary and patriotism follows and that knowledge is a precondition to enter the political arena. The next question asked elite representatives whether they consider themselves followers of any religion. The vast majority of respondents, approximately 80%, identified as followers of the Armenian Apostolic Church. These respondents traced their membership to receiving sacraments, which was most often their baptism in childhood. The others identified as Christian in a general sense but expressed disappointment in the Armenian Apostolic Church

59

for various reasons and did not consider themselves to be members. One respondent noted his belief in God but did not follow a religion. Another respondent replied that he did not consider himself a Christian but that Christian morals guide his behavior. Only one respondent identified as an atheist.

Self-Perception of the Political Elite

Respondents were also asked to describe the current Armenian political elite. The current elite was generally described in negative terms, especially by the members of opposition parties, who often distanced themselves from or did not consider themselves to be part of the elite. The current political elite was generally described in negative terms. The representatives of the ruling party stated that the elite had experienced some recent, positive changes and presented examples of such positive developments, whereas representatives of oppositional parties relied on predominantly negative descriptions of the elite. For instance, one oppositional party representative stated, there is no elite in Armenia because the main prerequisite for being elite is having principles, but nowadays, the ruling class does not have any. A representative of the ruling party claimed that to be a part of the elite, one needs to be consistent, determined, knowledgable and intelligent. Many respondents not only assigned negative characteristics to their colleagues, especially to the representatives of competing parties, but also depicted politics itself as an immoral, zerosum game with far-reaching consequences both for elite members and society in general. Of the 21 ruling party representatives, eight stated that political fights are becoming more and more civilized and referred to the National Assembly elections held on May 6, 2012 and other examples to support their argument. Interestingly, there were also a few interviewees who were disappointed in that same election and referred to it as an example of the ruling classs offenses. The oppositional party representative who stated that there is no elite in Armenia because the main prerequisite for having an elite is to

60

have principles and that politicians today do not possess any principles also stated that economic oligarchy dominates, and the level of the elite is irrelevant and does not represent the development level of the whole society. Elite representatives were also asked to identify the groups that exist within the Armenian elite and their place within it. Once again, respondents often noted that an elite with certain qualifications does not exist in Armenia. One group of respondents distinguished between progovernment and opposition groups as well as political party membership to group elite representatives. One respondent identified three groups: the first addresses serious politics, the second includes the business elite, and the third group includes opportunists. Another respondent also identified three groups: representatives who passed through the Soviet school, activists who traced their origins to independence and became the locomotive of the national movement and active young people sharing postindependence aspirations who received the patronage of the first two groups. One respondent identified two groups: elites who understand national issues and elites who do not. Still another elite representative described three layers: the first layer acquires financial resources and does not care about Armenia as a whole, the next layer does not have the resources but is not prepared to engage in political fights, and the third layer consists of those who are willing to sacrifice their interests in a struggle. The respondents did not describe a homogenous Armenian political elite but rather a structure with different layers, groups and even subgroups. The responses indicated the absence of a unified elite structure and, in fact, suggested the absence of general agreement on underlying values, national priorities and political principles. We also asked elite representatives to identify the factors that helped them become part of the political elite as well as to note the qualities and skills that a person should possess to remain in Armenian political life. As expected, education was an important factor in joining the political elite. Family and relationships were also important factors. Many respondents also reported negative factors. One respondent noted that it is necessary to be impolite and to betray to become a

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member of the elite: adulation, applying any means to ones purpose, mediocrity and the special skill of initiating intrigues are negative features that can play a crucial role in advancing a political career. The respondents identified three important factors that influence integration into the political elite: being a part of a political organization, professing an ideology and possessing financial or other means of control. One respondent noted the need to be consistent, determined, knowledgeable and intelligent to become a part of the elite. Other factors highlighted included working hard, desiring to effect change and possessing social skills. One representative of a oppositional party said that to represent the ruling elite, one needs to be greedy, unscrupulous and dishonest. In contrast, a representative of the ruling party stated that one must possess deep ideological views and values. We also asked the respondents to describe the nature of political struggle in Armenia as well as to note which measures employed in this struggle are justified in their view. Eight respondents of the 21 ruling party representatives stated that political disputes have become increasingly civilized; these representatives referred to the National Assembly elections on May 6, 2012 as evidence of this pattern. Another representative of the ruling party said that an atmosphere of tolerance is important for political competition but that no such condition exists in Armenia. Most respondents were inclined to compromise, but the political environment does not always allow parties to be more constructive. Representatives from the opposition political parties gave negative evaluations of political competition in Armenia. They indicated that competition is unfair and violates the principle of equal opportunity and that, therefore, society cannot form a government, and political struggle is just an imitation of government. Another respondent claimed that no political struggle takes place because opposition parties are not given equal opportunities. The respondents were also questioned about the form of governance they consider to be the most successful and that can serve as an example for the Republic of Armenia. Most respondents cited

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France, England, the United States, Germany and the Scandinavian countries as the most effective forms of government. One ruling party representative noted the importance of matching each countrys political system to its needs; for the examples of the successful management systems of England and the United States, their effectiveness was stated only in terms of a particular country. Respondents considered Western democratic political systems of governance to be exemplary, but some of them stated that their actual implementation in Armenia is not realistic for a variety of reasons. The representatives of the political elite were asked about the extent to which they were devoted to democratic values and democratic governance. At least at the level of rhetoric, almost all interviewees expressed positive views of democracy, and a majority declared it the best alternative for Armenias future. Another unsurprising pattern was observed in the responses to elite assessments of the existing system. Representatives from the ruling party held more positive opinions and often considered Armenia to be a fully democratic country, or at least to be steadily moving toward that state. In contrast, most interviewees from the opposition decried the current regime as unlawful, corrupt and autocratic and indicated that it should be altered even at the price of serious sacrifices. Nonetheless, representatives from this group did not indicate intentions to change the whole system but rather to enforce the existing, formal rules of the game that are ignored by the ruling elite. Very few interviewees considered the implementation of core democratic components such as the rule of law, accountability, free and fair elections and the protection of human rights to be their first political priority. Representatives of the ruling parties also stressed the importance of democracy, but they often said that democracy must not contradict security issues or produce anarchy. One respondent claimed to support democratic values to the extent they do not endanger national security. The limitations of the democratic process are very often justified by security issues. The restriction of citizens freedoms also often occurs under the guise of national security.

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We also attempted to determine how political elites would act if they faced a situation in which they would have to choose between displaying loyalty to the party and protecting the interests of citizens. One group of respondents said that they would remain loyal to political power. The other group believed that situations of apparent contradictions between the interests of public and political power must be avoided. One ruling party respondent said that the partys interests could not differ from the public interest; he added that he could never imagine that the interests of the whole society might deviate from the ruling partys interests. Ruling party representatives tended to regard their own political interests and the interests of the people as the same. Another group of respondents argued that only the public interest should guide politicians. We also attempted to determine whether these elites were ready to compromise with political opponents. The ruling party respondents were unwilling to compromise on national security or state interests. Some expressed willingness to compromise on issues that do not risk national and state interests. One ruling party member considered compromise to reflect weakness. Some ruling party respondents considered compromise to be risky. Oppositional party representatives considered compromise to be an opportunity to stimulate the development of the country. The majority is always ready to make compromises, whereas others consider political compromises to be necessary conditions to reach agreements in political activities. Although the willingness to compromise was expressed often, it was conditional. The political system grants the ruling party control over all state institutions so the ruling party has no incentive to compromise with other parties; the ruling party is able to impose its will. We also investigated opinions on the problems that elites consider to be most important for Armenia and that require urgent solutions. Most respondents indicated that one of the most important issues facing the country is the poor socioeconomic situation. One respondent stated, The first and most important issue, of course, is the social and economic situation. Other respondents singled out the

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Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the improvement of Armenian-Turkish relations and social justice among critical issues. Many respondents also consider immigration to be a real threat to the country, requiring a quick solution. One representative stated that immigration, corruption, social polarization, false elections, non-developed democratic systems and injustice in all spheres are the priority issues. Respondents stressed the importance of democratic values but did not consider democratization to be a priority for Armenia. Respondents also provided descriptions of their ideal Armenia. Elites emphasized the desire for an exceptionally free and democratic country. They imagine an Armenia where Armenians from the diaspora and emigrants would wish to live. One participant noted that his ideal Armenia is a homeland where citizens have rights and opportunities to obtain competitive and high-quality education and where safety and security are dominant. One representative dreams of an Armenian homeland that is founded on human rights and ensures the welfare of its citizens. Representatives also stressed the importance of freedom of expression, the primacy of law, equal opportunities and social, political and economic justice. Respondents noted the primary importance of socioeconomic problems, whereas the quality of democracy was not a high priority. Socioeconomic issues were salient to both governmental and oppositional group representatives. Respondents did provide clear answers to questions regarding their political careers and the future. Uncertainty of the future is very common in transitioning societies. It is clear that, in this sense, Armenia is characterized by political instability. The in-depth interviews with the representatives of the Armenian political elite produced multifaceted, unique qualitative information. The interviews reveal the main characteristics and necessary background factors of elite formation in postindependence Armenia. They also reveal ideological perceptions and values, ideological and political priorities and attitudes toward issues of public concern. We conclude that Armenias current political elite is increasingly disunited; as defined by Higley and Burton (2006), the elite lacks structural integration and basic value consensus, and high levels of

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distrust toward various groups exist within the political elite, especially between representatives of ruling and opposition parties. Disunited political elites are characteristic of unstable regimes such as illiberal democracies and authoritarian regimes; this factor may be useful in understanding the recent increasing instability in the Armenian political system. Because of this growing disunity, competition among various elite groups is considered a zero-sum game. The fragmented structure of the elite and their distrustful attitudes toward other members negatively affect the establishment of Dahls system of mutual security, an important prerequisite for institutionalizing democratic rules of the game in any polity and transitioning power from one group to another through competitive elections. In this context, prospects for power sharing among elites, let alone transitioning political power to competitors, appear to be limited over the short term in Armenia.

Female Representatives of the Political Elite

During the in-depth interviews with female representatives of political elites, emphasis was placed on revealing their political preferences; the peculiarities of starting their political careers; their values and principles; and their approaches to the political elite, to the political struggle in Armenia and to their vision of the countrys overall development. Before proceeding, we reflect on the political elites female representatives approaches to the family. This introduction is particularly relevant in the context of the public discussion of the incompatibility of a certain level of female political engagement and the effective realization of their role in the family. First, all surveyed female politicians, without reservations, appreciated the role of family in their lives; the vast majority of representatives did not believe that family had ever hindered their political activities. Moreover, there are several measures according to which the family (and family members) substantially contributes to active political involvement. In this regard,

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the following opinions are quite interesting: My family has always supported me; my husband never objected that I am into politics (female representative of the ruling party); My family, thank God, has always been on my side in the difficult political decision-making. If my family, especially my husband, were not on my side, did not approach with support and understanding, it would be very difficult for me to effectively reinvent politics (female representative of the PA Party of the National Assembly); I gave birth to my fourth child when I was engaged in very active political initiatives, and if my family did not support me at that time, I could not have combined family and motherhood, the birth of my little miracle with my political activities (a female representative of the political opposition). The other half of surveyed female participants did not have a family or husband due to various circumstances (some resulting from divorce or death). This fact supports the relevance of the above discussion. It is evident that the tradeoff between family and political activity is relevant to the family situations of our women politicians. It is notable that the vast majority of male participants are married. Unlike the men, the women politicians seldom noted historical, state, public or cultural figures as influences in their political activities. One respondent cited Margaret Thatcher as an authoritative figure. Another young MP respondent was particularly impressed by Churchills political activities, and a former minister cited the great Armenian poet Silva Kaputikyan as a spiritual mother. Other references were made, but it is clear that women are more reserved than men in this regard. This phenomenon can be explained by a unique kind of self-preservation instinct; most of the women do not talk about their idols, perhaps because they suspect it would make them vulnerable. A number of features are outlined in the context of analyzing the motives, factors and issues regarding female political elites entrance into politics or engagement with professional political activities. In this context, it is particularly important to understand the arenas from which women transfer into politics and to track their political career mobility. The respondents revealed three separate

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arenas from which women enter into politics. First, they are recruited from the public sector or, according to a classic definition, the civil society sector. In other words, their political socialization began from engagement in public activities during which they raised many issues of public concern and implemented many targeted projects for the protection of vulnerable groups. Most women who shifted from civil society into politics primarily were engaged in human rights issues and social problems, which have received a great deal of political attention. This transition can be considered customary. The second arena from which women transferred into the political elite is public administration or civil service. As a rule, it is easier to be noticed on this platform. This track is considered advantageous for a political career as, at least, a slow but steady path toward the political elite. In this sense, one of the young female deputies made an interesting comment: ...as if it were normal, Ive always been engaged into processes, I have not been sitting in the distance to get an official proposal one day; I always say that it was some kind of evolution and it is not easy to say at what particular stage that decision was reached. This approach indicates that the transition from this platform into active politics is smooth and natural. Finally, the third arena is from within a political party. This case should not be understood as a platform for entering active politics but rather as a platform for replenishing the ranks of the political elite. Although active political activity as a member of a political party is considered one of the most effective ways to supplement the political elite, the long-term membership and activities as a party member did not result in membership in National Assembly or the government for the vast majority of our women. Approximately half of the respondents received invitations to join a political party or election lists just two or three months, and in some cases up to six months, before the elections. This pattern can be explained by the existing formal rules mandating the political participation and representation of women in general, and, in particular, the participation of women in proportional lists according to a certain proportion: The participation of each sex in the electoral lists of The National Assembly proportional

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party, alliance of parties and each party involved in the alliance should not exceed 80 percent32 starting from the 2nd number to any whole number in each five (26, 211, 216, and so on, until the end of the list). Several interesting conclusions can be made by drawing parallels between female and male political elite representatives entrances into politics. Whereas men mostly transition into politics from the business sphere and through political party channels, women transition through civil society, state administration and political parties. This comparison illustrates the social order that has formed the countrys political landscape. Clearly, the main motivations of men who shifted from the business sector into politics are to serve the interests not only of the public but mostly of their own businesses. The motivations of women entering politics are very similar to the motivations of men. Most women did not imagine themselves actively engaged in politics or decision-making. The women politicians have found it difficult to specify the moments that were essential to accessing the political area. The human values and principles that women in particular noted were the importance of fairness, honesty, humanity, tolerance and peaceful coexistence. Women politicians are extremely sensitive to these principles and values. The female representatives assessments of the Armenian political elite were rather pessimistic. One opposition deputy described the elite as a very indescribable, versatile and multi-layered phenomenon. Another representative of the oppositional party gave the following formulation: As our elites have already been closely identified with so many truly unrelated ideas, unfortunately for me, it is a kind of concept that has become unacceptable and abominable. One Republican deputy noted, our political elite is fuzzy because the expression elite has been taken in a slightly different direction, and I think it still has to go through the several stages of development.
32

RA Electoral Code, Article 8.2.

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Such assessments are reflected in the womens observations of the political elite groups/levels. As a rule, female representatives experienced difficulties with clearly and correctly identifying the elite strata and the historical and political background of its formation. In some very uncertain cases, the so-called detached context approaches were presented. One former member of the National Assembly said, There are both intelligent politicians and just businessmen. One ruling party representative gave the following answer: There is one layer that knows what the policy is and why it is there, but there is a layer that appears random; this layer is exerting great efforts to stay among the political elite; unfortunately, there is also a layer that is not compatible with the concept of the elite in any way but, unfortunately, there is no hope that they will change. Female respondents described political struggle in Armenia as very tense, life or death, unhealthy and contaminated by black PR strategies. Considering these phenomena unacceptable, female respondents find that this situation contributes neither to the development of a civil struggle nor to the strengthening of competition principles. There are no obvious differences in female responses regarding issues that require urgent solution. They basically noted the same issues that dominate the mens responses. Female respondents expressed strongly divergent opinions in response to the question of which form of governance is most successful and is exemplary for the Republic of Armenia. The most common responses were the governments of France, Germany, England, Sweden and the United States. Those who cited France emphasized the semipresidential administration, which also operates in Armenia (the amended version of the RA Constitution adopted in 2005 by a nationwide referendum was modeled on the French example). For Germany and England, the particular emphasis was on parliamentarianism traditions. The United States was cited as a country with rich democratic traditions and a stable political system. For Sweden, the female representatives emphasized the highly effective operational model of the social state. While considering these specific

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forms of governance as the most successful, the women did not consider them exemplary for Armenia. The respondents expressed interesting approaches. In particular, one of the former ministers said, Germany is very acceptable, but they are Germans, thinking that the law is superior, what the law says the citizen should be subjected to. We do not have such thinking, unfortunately. One opposition deputy, consistent with the previous logic, stated, There are no ways that can be exemplary for Armenia. In general, each country should have its management model and form the basis for it considering the mentality of its people, its customs and traditions, the region it is in and the surrounding neighbors, and so on. On the one hand, similarities in terms of political preferences, values, principles, evaluations of issues and Armenias future were observed between women and men; by contrast, unique paths into active politics, incorporation into the political elite and the platforms from which people transition into politics exist for women. Whereas men mostly enter the political elite from business and political party channels, women enter from civil society, civil service and political party platforms. An additional important conclusion relates to the purposefulness of female representatives. Most participants were clearly aware of their plans in politics, were ready to take on the responsibility and were willing make tough political decisions.

Findings from Interviews with Representatives of the NKR Political Elite

Nine in-depth interviews were conducted with representatives of the political elite from Nagorno-Karabakh. Two participants are deputies of the National Assembly. Six respondents are former deputies, three of whom held previous positions as community leaders. One respondent was a candidate during the NKR presidential elections and a previous deputy minister. Five participants were born in Stepanakert, three were born in villages of NKR, and one was born in the RA. Three participants were

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born into families of teachers; the parents of the other respondents are highly qualified professionals such as construction workers, farmers and veterinarians. Four respondents had higher pedagogical education, one respondent had a higher medical education, and three respondents had university education. Three respondents received degrees in the social sciences, and six received degrees in the natural sciences or related fields. Three respondents had worked in their previous profession for a long time; two respondents had worked up to a year, and the rest had not been employed in their profession at all. No respondents reported dreaming of becoming a politician during childhood or adolescence. However, some respondents, by the force of tradition, had been members of the Komsomol, the Communist Partys youth organization. Eight of the nine respondents indicated that the Karabakh movement and the collapse of the USSR stimulated their interest in politics and their active engagement in it. Some of the interviewees named the intellectuals of the time as their teenage authority figures, other respondents noted their families and relatives, and one respondent could not indicate any authority figure. For some respondents, Armenian writers had made an impact on their political views. Eight of the nine respondents entered into the political arena during the mid-1980s as the Karabakh movement was developing. Some respondents were members of different student groups concerned with discussions of political issues, but the process of becoming politicians on an institutional level started with the Karabakh movement. Only one respondent was actively involved in politics during the 2000s and transferred from the public sector. Four respondents did not consider themselves politicians. However, all respondents held political positions in legislative and local government bodies either at the time of the interview or previously. Six respondents indicated that family, acquaintances and friendly relations had not played a substantial role in their political career, whereas three others noted the important role of family. One respondent indicated that friendship and kinship ties are important.

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Among universal principles, respondents most often selected human rights, humanism and sincerity. Most representatives stated that they remained loyal to the principles and goals they had at the beginning of their political career. The issues needing urgent solutions among NKR respondents were the establishment of justice and democracy, the rebirth of hope, resettlement policies, the rehabilitation of the economy and the encouragement of real political competition. Almost all respondents believe that the NKR president and his social environment have the greatest impact on the decision-making process. One respondent attributed the greatest role in this process to the RA authorities. It is notable that three of the nine respondents considered themselves left nationalists, one was left-orientated, one was in the center, and four held liberal ideologies. Most respondents did not name a specific governmental model. One respondent mentioned the parliamentary governance model, one respondent mentioned the presidential model, and another one mentioned the semipresidentialsemiparliamentary governance model. Respondents often noted that it is possible to have effective governance regardless of the model. Most respondents considered themselves to be individuals dedicated to and driven by democratic values. One respondent supports conservatism and traditional values. Three respondents believe that democratic values are acceptable to the extent that they contribute to national and social development. The vast majority of respondents emphasized the importance of remaining loyal to the public in their political practice rather than their commitment to the political forces with which they are affiliated. The arguments in this regard value the national interest above everything else and emphasize the need to side with citizens. Two respondents considered compromising to achieve primary goals to be impossible. One respondent supported compromises if national interests demand it. The other respondents would be willing to sit around the negotiating table and solve key problems in a

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civilized way. However, respondents were more willing to compromise on internal issues than on external issues. Respondents described an ideal model of the Nagorno-Karabakh republic as a democratic, internationally recognized state with a large population, a stable future and stable perspectives. Most respondents were willing to continue their current political activities for the next six months, the next year and the next five years. Some were considering being more proactive in their political endeavors. Most respondents considered themselves to be happy. Respondents who were happy stated that their happiness derives from the opportunity to participate in the Karabakh movement and their contribution to the establishment of the republic of NagornoKarabakh. The Karabakh movement at all stages of its development has had the greatest impact on the formation of the NKR political elite. The political elite in the NKR can be called situational because it was formed under the influence of a specific situation. All respondents stated that they had had no intention of entering into politics, and most respondents had entered the political arena due to the ongoing processes resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union. In particular, the rise of nationalism has provided motives and ideas that encourage people to occupy a more active role in society. During the Soviet regime, respondents likely would have pursued professional activities; however, the creation of a national state through the independence of Armenia (including the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) opened the political arena. The Armenian intellectuals of the time have had a great influence on the ideological formation of these political elites. Universal values and a commitment to human rights are close to the heart of these elite representatives because the Karabakh movement began as a struggle for human and social rights and has a clear ideological definition. These values are strongly imprinted on the participants of the Karabakh movement.

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The notion of situational elites is supported by the fact that one part of the elite does not foresee their ongoing active involvement in politics, stating a preference to be engaged in professional activities.

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CHAPTER 3. CHARACTERISTICS OF FUTURE POLITICAL ELITES

Reviewing the biographical data of all cabinet members and MPs elected to parliament since Armenias independence revealed seven different segments (public servants, members of political parties, NGO activists, members of local governance bodies, student council members, academics/artists/athletes, top business owners and CEOs) from which most political elites are being recruited. To study the political culture of potential political elites, a survey was conducted among 691 respondents from these seven segments. The results of the survey were analyzed and grouped into the following four sections: General profile of potential political elite members; Political culture (at three levels, as conceptualized by G. Almond and G. B. Powell); Attitudes toward democracy, and General values (as conceptualized by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel). The questionnaire included questions regarding age, gender, level of education and income that could help to explain the variation in responses.

General Profile
Respondents of the survey were distributed as follows: one-third of respondents were civil servants; 23.4% were LSG body members; 22.5% were academics, athletes or artists; 9.6% were party members; 6% were NGO members; 3.5% were owners of large businesses and CEOs; and 2% were student council members. Of the respondents, 53.8% were female. Respondents aged 28 or younger constituted 26.3%, and another 60% of respondents ranged from 29 to 49 years old. Respondents aged 55 or above constituted

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only 1% of the sample. In total, 65% graduated from secondary school after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Of the respondents, 73.7 had completed some level of higher education, and another 15.2% had an academic degree (PhD candidate or higher), whereas only 1%, all of whom were representatives of political parties and LSG bodies, had only graduated from secondary school. Of the respondents, 99% reported knowledge of Russian, and 61.9% reported knowledge of English. Other popular languages included German (11%), French (10.9%) and Turkish (2.2%). One-quarter of respondents from Armenia were born in Yerevan, 18.2% in other Armenian towns, 15.5% in villages and 5.8% outside of Armenia (mostly Georgia, Azerbaijan and Russia). Of the respondents, 51.7% reported that their parents were white-collar workers during the Soviet period, 20.6% of parents were blue-collar workers, 7.4% of parents were farmers, and 5% of parents were middle- and highranking officials. When asked to rank the social conditions of their families at that time, 30.6% considered their families to be fully provided for, 62% had most of their needs provided, and 1.2% considered their family to be needy. Of the respondents, 81.2% were living in nuclear families with five or fewer members. Regarding income, 31.5% identified themselves as the main breadwinner of their family, 46.2% identified themselves as one of the breadwinners, and 22.6% reported that their contribution to family income was not considerable. Male respondents were more often reported to be the breadwinner (51.4 vs. 14.5% of females). Of the respondents, 34% reported lower per capita monthly spending (one hundred ten $) than the official minimum consumer price index and were close to or below the official poverty line. This figure is roughly proportional to the poverty rates at the national level. The largest portion of respondents, 43.6%, reported income in the range 110220$ monthly spending per capita, whereas only 3.3% reported monthly spending over four hundred forty $/month. The proportion of lower levels of per capita spending was more frequent in the NKR (38.9% with less than 110$ and 55.3% spending 110220$ per month) than in the RA (35.9% spending less than 110$ and 43.7% spending

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110220$ per month). Only 0.5% of respondents from the NKR reported more than 330$ per capita spending per month compared to 9.4% of RA. The following groups reported less than 220$ in monthly spending per capita: 86.9% of civil servants, 90.3% of party members, 86.4% of NGO members and 93.2% of LSG members. Interestingly, the highest per capita spending (above 440 $) was reported by student council members (38.5%) and business community members (17.4%). We were also interested to learn how often representatives of these segments travel outside of Armenia and to what destinations. Respondents from Armenia were significantly more mobile than in the NKR. Of the respondents, 43.4% in Armenia and 57.1% in the NKR reported that they had not traveled outside of Armenia during the last five years, and another 13.4% in the RA and 28.8% in the NKR had traveled only once. Another 27 and 12.5% from the RA and the NKR, respectively, had left the country between two and five times. The remaining 14.3% of respondents from Armenia and 1.6% from the NKR had traveled abroad more than five times. Of the respondents from Armenia who traveled abroad, 75.3% had visited Russia and other CIS countries, whereas only 17.7% reported visits to North America or Europe. The proportion was much more unbalanced among respondents from the NKR, where 94.8% of visitors had traveled to Russia and other CIS countries, and only 3.1% had visited the United States or European countries. Despite this general proximity to Russia and other CIS countries, Armenians prefer EU integration (26% RA, 2.1% NKR) over integration with Russia and CIS countries (22.5% RA, 6.3% NKR) or a regional/Caucasian organization (0.8% RA, 0% NKR). The difference in responses for the RA and the NKR may be explained by considering the NKRs very limited interaction with the outside world due to its unrecognized status as well as additional options (integration with RA) designed for NKR respondents (Chart 3.2). More than two-thirds of those who preferred EU integration graduated from secondary school after the collapse of the Soviet Union, whereas 58.4% of those who preferred integration with Russia and CIS countries graduated before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Half of the NGO members and more than one-third of the business sector

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representatives favored EU integration, whereas LGB representatives preferred (23.6%) integration with Russia and CIS countries. Of the respondents, 94.4% reported being followers of the Armenian Apostolic Church, another 1.3% identified with other Christian denominations, and 3.5% considered themselves to be atheists/agnostics. Additionally, 48.4% thought that religion always helped them to make important decisions in their everyday life, 43.6% thought that religion helped them only in some cases, and 8% reported that religion was never helpful in making important decisions in everyday life. Moreover, when asked about membership in various organizations, only 1.3% indicated that they were active members of churches or religious organizations, and another 4.5% identified themselves as passive members of such organizations. However, the Church was considered the second and third most trustworthy institution in the RA and the NKR, respectively. In general, active membership in various social organizations, such as labor unions, sports and cultural clubs, consumer rights or environmental protection groups and professional organizations, was below 10%, with the exception of political parties (42.2% of responses identified active members of political parties). Among the groups most frequently identified as active members were party members (93.9%), student council members (30.8%), LSG representatives (17.3%), civil servants (18.2%) and NGO members (12.2%). Another 3% of party members, 18.5% of LSG representatives, 10.4% of civil servants and 19.5% of NGO members identified themselves as not very active members of political parties. Only 5.2% of respondents considered themselves to be uninterested in politics, most frequently athletes, artists and academics, whereas 97% of party members, 84.6% of student council members, 78.1% NGO members, 79.6% of local governance representatives and 76.6% of civil servants were very or mostly interested in politics. This high level of interest in politics was also confirmed by participation rates in recent elections. A full 94.2% of respondents confirmed that they had participated in recent presidential elections, 90.1% had participated in parliamentary

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elections, and 86.8% had participated in elections of local selfgovernance bodies (more details on electoral participation are presented in the next section).

Political culture
G. Almond (2010) identified three main levels of studying political culture: system, process and policy. In the following section, we attempt to describe the main characteristics of political culture of potential political elite members by adopting this approach. The system level of political culture involves the general orientation toward the political system and includes components such as national pride, identification with the system and the legitimacy of the political system. In terms of national identification and pride (Chart 3.1), the most dominant characteristic is ethnic identity (46 and 47% in the NKR and the RA, respectively), and identification with the political system is second (26 and 30% in the NKR and the RA, respectively). The third most common identity is religion, chosen from among many options. However, religious self-identification is almost twice as strong in the NKR (16%) as in the RA, 9%, which may be related to the fact that Armenians in the NKR had the recent experience of coexisting with a non-Christian population within a Muslim-dominated society. The other notable difference is that there are three times as many individuals who consider themselves first of all to be citizens of the world in the RA, 7% compared with the NKR (2%). Another measure of the support for the political system can be considered opinions on the future of the RA and the NKR (Chart 3.2). A total of 50.4% of respondents in the RA and 58.1% in the NKR preferred their respective republics to be fully independent rather than integrated with the EU, a Russian/CIS block or a regional block. Contrary to the widespread notion that the population of the NKR is willing to be part of Armenia, only one-third of respondents indicated such a preference.

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Potential political elite members were also asked about their preferences for the current political regime versus the Soviet political regime. A majority of potential future political elite members in both societies expressed a strong preference for the current political regime (Chart 3.3). The difference between the RA and the NKR may be explained by (1) the predominance of younger respondents in the latter group and (2) a preference for the current status/situation over being an autonomous region within Soviet Azerbaijan. By dividing respondents into two main age groups representing those who graduated from school during the Soviet Union (preindependence political socialization) and those who graduated after (postindependence political socialization), we found a significant relationship for the support of current political regime among those with postindependence political socialization (two out of three supported the current political regime). The difference in the older generation was less significant (53% support the current political regime vs. 46% who support the Soviet political regime). The process level represents (a) expectations of the citizens and their role in political processes as well as (b) attitudes toward different institutions of the political system. The vast majority of potential political elite members in both societies were very interested or quite interested in politics (70% in NKR and 83% in RA). There was a much stronger interest toward foreign politics in the NKR (30%) than in the RA, 18%, whereas the latter were more interested in national (27%) and local level politics (20%) compared to 19 and 10% in the NKR, respectively. Regional political developments are of interest to 12% of NKR future political elite members and 18% of those from the RA. As expected, the most common type of political participation is voting; however, in both societies, the voting turnout of future political elite members was much higher than the average rates. A total of 93% of respondents voted during the most recent presidential elections in NKR, and 95% voted in Armenia, with 84 and 93% in parliamentary elections and 79 and 90% in local governance bodies, respectively. Those who did not participate in all three types of elections most frequently (3.26.3%)

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explained this behavior with objective reasons (e.g., absence from the country), whereas another 1% considered elections not to be free and fair. Interestingly, unlike local governance (1.6%) and parliamentary elections (1%), none of the respondents identified the absence of worthy candidates as a reason for not participating in presidential elections. Despite this interest in politics, almost half of the respondents (47.3%) indicated that they were not planning to become involved in politics directly. Frequent explanations for this decision included not being interested in political activities (24.8%), the ability to reach ones goals without getting involved in politics (11%) and not believing that ones involvement would change anything (10.5%). Female respondents were more often reluctant to become involved in politics (62.4%) than male respondents (37.6%), and the proportion of undecided respondents was similar (62% female compared to 38% male). As could be expected from these data, male respondents more often (55.1%) reported willingness to become involved in politics than females (44.9%). At the same time, of those respondents who considered themselves already involved in politics, 70.1% were male, whereas 29.9% were female. This finding indicates that politics continues to be largely dominated by men; however, in the future, the proportion of women may be increased, as indicated by the proportion of those women who indicated a willingness to become involved in politics. We also examined the age differences of the respondents. A total of 80.1% of respondents who decided to get into politics were 38 years old or younger (post-Soviet socialization). Representatives of the same generation constituted 57.2% of those who did not plan to be involved in politics and 74.4% of those who had not yet decided on that matter. The distribution of responses among the segments with regard to planning to become involved in politics is shown in Table 3.1. A total of 25% of those who planned to become involved in politics identified the executive branch as the area of their involvement, whereas 21.5% indicated party politics, 12.5% indicated local governance, and 9.6% indicated the legislative branch. The largest group (31.4%) of those

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who planned to become involved in politics were not sure which branch of politics they would pursue. Regardless of this strong interest in politics and active electoral participation, most future political elite members had very limited experience in engaging in other conventional types of political participation, and a very small portion of those had directly organized this kind of action (Table 3.2.1). Boycotts and strikes had not been experienced by most potential political elite members in either the RA or the NKR, and more than half of potential political elite members think that they will never be engaged in such types of actions. A striking difference observed among respondents from the NKR who organized or participated in peaceful demonstrations may be explained by the Karabakh movement of the late-1980s. However, this movement should be considered a distant and unique experience that is not part of political practices (unlike in the RA); in recent decades, few demonstrations have been organized in the NKR. Almost all of these demonstrations were related to external issues and did not make demands related to internal issues. However, there are significant differences among the recruitment segments, where NGO activists and political party members are the most actively engaged segments, and public servants and members of local governance bodies are the most passive segments (Table 3.2.2). Most future political elite members can be characterized as subjects, who are aware of and interested in politics but limit their public political participation to voting and, unlike the small minority of participants, refrain from making demands and actively engaging in promoting these demands through the support of political forces. The second dimension of describing political culture at the process level is related to the measurement of the trust in social and political institutions. The general characteristics of the level of trust in political and social institutions observed among future political elite members in the present study showed some differences compared to findings from a survey among the entire population of Armenia conducted by

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the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) in 2011.33 In general, in the present study, potential political elite representatives exhibited a higher level of trust in political institutions compared to the general population and a lower level of trust in social institutions, such as the healthcare system, the educational system and banks (Chart 3.4.4). There were also similarities with regard to the level of trust among the general population and potential elite representatives. For example, the army was the most trusted institution among the respondents of our survey. The level of trust among respondents from the NKR (51% fully trust the army, whereas another 33% somewhat trust the army) was higher than in the RA (42% fully trust, and 32% somewhat trust). The level of trust in the army was slightly lower among the general population (34% fully trust, and 32% somewhat trust), and the army was the second most trusted institution, with the Church being the most trusted among the population (46% fully trust, and 32% somewhat trust the Church). Among the representatives of political elite members in the RA, the Church is the second most trusted institution (38% fully trust, and 29% somewhat trust), whereas in the NKR, the Church is only the third most trusted institution (24% fully trust, and 25% somewhat trust), following the president of the NKR (30% fully trust, and 34% somewhat trust). Respondents from the RA trust the president to a lesser degree (27% fully trust, and 26% somewhat trust), in contrast to the much lower level of trust among the general population (11% fully trust, and 25% somewhat trust). The fourth most trusted institution among the NKR political elite representatives is the police, where more than twice the number of respondents fully trusted the police (21%) compared with political elite representatives in the RA, 9%, whose trust level was similar to the low level among the general population of the RA (Chart 3.4.1 contains detailed information on the level of trust in these four institutions). When comparing the four most trusted institutions among potential political elite representatives of the RA and the NKR and the general
33

http://crrc.ge/oda/.

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population of the RA, only two institutions (the army and the Church) had high levels of trust from all three groups. When comparing the levels of trust in the legislative, executive and judicial branches and local self-government (Chart 3.4.2), the latter was the most fully trusted institution both among potential political elite representatives of the RA and the general population (20 and 11%, respectively), whereas in the NKR, local self-government was trusted half as much (6%) as executive government and parliament (13 and 12%, respectively). The levels of trust both among potential political elite representatives of the RA (8 and 7%, respectively) and the general population (7 and 6%, respectively) toward these two institutions were lower than in the NKR. Despite the low level of trust, courts were trusted twice as much by the population of the RA, 7% as by potential elite representatives of the RA and the NKR (3%). Another difference was the higher level of mistrust toward governance bodies among the general population compared to potential elite representatives: in case of LSG, 21% of the general population of the RA compared to 15% of the potential elite representatives in the RA and 10% in the NKR reported full mistrust; 28% of the population of the RA compared to 19% of the potential elite representatives in the RA and 11% in the NKR mistrusted executive, 30% of the population of the RA compared to 22% of the potential elite representatives in the RA and 8% in the NKR mistrusted legislative body. The courts are the least fully trusted institution in this group among representatives of the potential political elite in the RA and the NKR (3%), whereas the level of full trust among the general population of the RA in the courts is more than twice as high (7%). The levels of trust in political institutions that are crucial for a competitive democratic society, including media, NGOs and ombudsmen, were quite low among both groups and comparable to the low level of trust recorded among the general population of the RA (Chart 3.4.3). The most significant difference regarding these institutions was the higher level of trust in the ombudsmen of the RA (13% among the general population and 10% among potential elite

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representatives of the RA reported full trust) compared to ombudsmen of the NKR (only 3% fully trusted), with 17% expressing full distrust in both groups of the RA compared to 25% expressing full distrust in the NKR. Taking into account the fact that in the RA and the NKR, the institutions were created almost simultaneously (2004 in the RA, 2005 in the NKR) and that the NKR Law on Human Rights Defender was copied almost exactly from that of the RA, we infer that the difference in trust is based on the personalities and performance of the ombudsmen. We also asked our respondents about their trust in political parties and the electoral system. The percentage of respondents who trust the electoral system is the same in the RA and the NKR (10%); however, in the RA, 27% of respondents fully distrust the electoral system, compared to 15% in the NKR. Political parties are slightly more often trusted (7% in the RA, 4% in the NKR) and distrusted (27% in the RA and 19% in the NKR) in the RA than in the NKR. Unfortunately, there were no questions in the CRRC (2011) survey on the level of trust in political parties or the electoral system to be compared with our findings. We also investigated the extent to which the level of trust in institutions differs among representatives of those institutions versus the general population. For this purpose, we measured the level of trust among three segments representing these institutions, namely, representatives of NGOs, political parties and local self-governance bodies (Chart 3.4.5). As might be expected, experiences working in any of these institutions at least doubled the level of trust in that institution. The most significant difference was observed among representatives of LSG bodies, 39% of whom fully trusted that institution. The respondents were asked indicate their level of trust in the EU and the UN (Chart 3.4.6). In this case, the most significant difference was among representatives of the potential elite of the NKR, their counterparts from the RA and the general population of the RA. The latter two groups had comparable levels of trust and distrust toward both the EU and the UN, whereas respondents of the NKR distrusted

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these institutions twice as much. This finding again shows a difference in attitudes toward external political institutions in the RA and the NKR. This difference may be explained by both the limited interaction with those institutions in the NKR as well as the frustration resulting from the lack of attention from the outside world, including a reluctance to recognize and engage with the NKR. At the policy level, political culture indicates the main policy expectations from the government, which includes both the general understanding of governments role and areas of involvement as well as formulations of particular policy goals. To measure policy preferences, respondents were asked to rate on a ten-point scale three questions about income equality, type of ownership and the governments responsibility in the sphere of social security. These three questions were taken from a six-question set in the World Value Survey.34 The details of findings on these six questions, along with a comparison of World Value Survey data collected in Armenia in 1995,35 as well as two questions from the Caucasus Barometer of 2012 conducted by the CRRC36 in 2012 are discussed below (for the results of separate questions, see Chart 3.5.1 to 3.5.6). Based on the aggregated data, six main groups of policy preferences were identified. Representatives of the group labeled leftist gave leftist answers to all three questions, those who were left leaning gave leftist answers to two out of three questions, neutrals selected the middle point in at least two cases, the situational group representatives gave at least one rightist answer and one leftist answer, right leaning respondents chose two rightleaning answers out of the three questions, and rightist respondents indicated right-leaning preferences for all three questions. Chart 3.6 suggests that socialistic aspirations are still predominant among future
WVS questionnaire available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/survey_1995 35 Dataset available at http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSData.jsp 36 http://www.crrc.am/research-and-surveys/caucasusbarometer/documentation
34

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political elite members both in the NKR and the RA; however, these aspirations were more strongly expressed in the RA (34% leftists and 20% left leaning) than in the NKR (18% leftist and 21% left leaning). Another interesting finding was that in both groups, a significant portion (approximately 30%) did not have consistent preferences on public policy issues. With regard to recruitment segments, leftist preferences were the most frequent among civil servants (35%) and LSG members (28.1%). Rightist preferences were the most frequent among civil servants (37%) and political party members (25.9%). The latter finding may partially explain why leftist preferences are not translated into voting preferences in either the RA or the NKR and why not a single leftist party has been elected to either parliament since 1999. The only exception was the ARFD, which is predominantly viewed as a nationalistic party, with its socialistic ideology often forgotten. Among the representatives of the younger generation of respondents (post-Soviet socialization), leftist aspirations are weaker (26.1%) compared to those with Soviet socialization (36%). At the same time, situational policy preferences were rarer among the latter group (26.8% among the Soviet socialization group vs. 31.6% among the postSoviet socialization group). Another interesting difference was found when comparing policy preferences between genders. Female respondents more often reported right and right-leaning preferences (55.6 and 59% in RA and NKR), whereas most male respondents favored leftist responses (55.7%). Respondents were also asked about their opinions on the general direction of internal policies (Chart 3.7). The largest group both in the RA and the NKR (38.4 and 50.3%, respectively) considered that internal policies were mostly moving in the right direction. The second largest group of respondents (36.8 and 37.2%, respectively) believed that policies were not being changed. However, in the RA, respondents more frequently answered that internal policies were mostly (12.4% compared to 6.3% in the NKR) or surely moving in the wrong direction (8.1% compared to 2.1%, respectively). When answers were separated among the recruitment segments, student council

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members stood out as the most satisfied with developments regarding internal policies, with 23.1% assured that those policies were moving in the right direction and 38.5% believing that the policies were mostly moving in the right direction. Artists (46.2%), party members (28.8%) and NGO representatives (22.5%) considered that the policies were mostly or surely moving in the wrong direction, whereas the majority (56.5%) of business owners considered that the policies were not being changed.

Attitudes Toward Democracy

Surveys measuring attitudes toward democracy have been implemented in virtually all parts of the world during last two decades, including in some of the post-Soviet countries. In the framework of the survey conducted among future political elite members, a separate section was designed to measure support for the democratic regime, preferences for alternatives to democracy and additional questions that would clarify perceptions on what constitutes democratic values and ideals. Several of these questions were taken from above-mentioned surveys (World Value Survey and Caucasus Barometer) conducted in Armenia to be able to compare these attitudes between potential elite representatives and the general population. However, most of the questions in this section are not comparable with the above-mentioned surveys because they were specifically designed for this project or were taken from thematic surveys that were not conducted in Armenia. When directly asked about the importance of living in a democratic country, respondents in the RA expressed stronger sentiments (77% indicated that it is very important for them) than in the NKR (58%). At the same time, both groups consider their respective political regimes to be on approximately the same level of democracy (RA Mean 4.30, NKR Mean 4.46). Thus, the gap between democratic aspirations and reality is substantially larger in the RA than in the NKR (Table 3.3). An analysis by segment demonstrated that NGO

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activists, artists and student council members value living in a democratic country the most (mean: 9.56, 9.54 and 9.54, respectively), and representatives of these segments gave the lowest ratings for the current level of democracy (mean: 3.61 and 3.92 for activists and artists, respectively), whereas student council members gave the highest ratings for the current level of democracy (6.23). This contrast may be explained by the fact that student councils were dominated by the representatives of ruling political parties and were reluctant to criticize either the regime or the authorities. To measure the level of support for democracy, another question was asked regarding preferred alternatives to the democratic regime in the RA and the NKR. A strong majority, 80% in the NKR and 82% in the RA, indicated that there were no better alternatives to democracy. Those who indicated that there might be better alternatives for the RA and the NKR were asked to specify their preferences. The most preferred alternatives were the rule of a strong leader (7% in the NKR and 10% in the RA) and the rule of the best educated experts (10% in the NKR and 2% in the RA). Remaining alternatives (including a one-party system, rule by military officers, rule by clerics and a Soviet regime) were considered alternatives to democracy only by 11.5% of respondents in each group (Chart 3.8). Despite the low levels of trust in political institutions that are critical for the existence of any democratic regime (details of the level of trust were presented in previous section), less than 10% of potential future political elite members considered the elimination of those institutions and limitations on civil liberties to be acceptable. A strong majority (at least 60%) considered these kinds of undemocratic developments to be completely unacceptable. The least supported developments in the RA were bans on political parties (6.9%); the dissolution of parliament and unrestricted rule of the president (5.5%); bans on NGOs and the limitation of media freedom (2.6%); and the announcement of martial law for an unspecified time period with the limitation of political freedoms (0.8%). In contrast to this, in the NKR, respondents more often would tolerate a ban on NGOs and a limitation of media freedom (6.6%) and bans on political parties (6%) compared

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to the announcement of martial law for an unspecified time period with the limitation of political freedoms and the dissolution of parliament and unrestricted rule of the president (both 2.2%). This overwhelming support for democratic values and institutions decreased to some extent when additional questions were asked to verify the intensity of preferences for democracy. When asked to choose between the two options, 38% in the NKR and 39% in the RA prefer to be governed by good and experienced individuals regardless of the outcomes of elections, whereas only slightly more than 60% in each group believes that authorities should be established as a result of free and fair elections. Another set of questions was asked to identify the proportion of respondents who (1) believe that government should be viewed as an employee and held accountable by the people, (2) believe that people should participate in protests against the government to demonstrate that the people are in charge, and (3) believe that elections are important to defining the future of the country (for details, see Chart 3.9.1 to Chart 3.9.3). Interestingly, two-thirds of respondents representing potential political elites and the general population provided answers that indicate a political culture with democratic values and principles. However, support was slightly higher among the representatives of the potential political elite of the RA compared to elites in the NKR and the general population of the RA. At the same time, a higher percentage of respondents from the NKR considered elections important because they define the future of the country (69.8%) when compared with their colleagues from the RA, 62.2%. One possible explanation for this variation might be the notion that elections conducted in the NKR are not only important for choosing officials but also for securing the legitimacy of the regime in the external world. Despite this support for democracy, the picture changes dramatically when democratic goals are compared to economic and social achievements and security issues. When asked to prioritize the goals for the development of the country, economic development was the first choice in both the NKR (68%) and the RA, 62%, followed by national security (NKR 28%, RA, 26%) and restoring order in the

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country (NKR 4%, RA, 7%). Freedom of speech and public influence over important government decisions were secondary priorities for 8 and 7%, respectively, in the NKR and 14 and 13%, respectively, in the RA. These findings reflect the dominance of survival values over selfexpression values, which are very briefly presented in the next section.

Values
Inglehart and Welzel developed a new theory of modernization according to which the modernization process consists of two main transitions: industrialization and postindustrialization. These transitions produce substantial cultural changes in many countries, as observed through an analysis of the World Value Survey data. Based on these data, the authors concluded that industrialization replaces traditional values with secular rational values (rationalization of authority), whereas postindustrialization replaces survival values with selfexpression values (emancipation from authority). Although the authors acknowledge that socioeconomic development is not a deterministic process and cultural change is not irreversible or linear, they argue that cultural change is a major factor in emergence and survival of democracies (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 58, Pp. 4647). To provide a better picture of the value systems among potential elite representatives, an attempt was made to determine the composition of different worldviews based on five variables utilized by the authors to measure the first group of values (traditional vs. secular rational values) and three of five variables to measure the second group of values (survival vs. self-expression values). Based on these aggregated data, five groups were identified for the first set of values and three groups for the second set of values. Charts 3.10 and 3.11 reflect the proportion of values in both groups (RA and NKR). An analysis based on gender, generation and level of education revealed insignificant differences, indicating that a similar proportion of values was represented across the respondents. The

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most notable difference was related to the respondents with selfexpression values: 75% of representatives from this group had undergone post-Soviet socialization. Some peculiarities were recorded among the elite recruitment segments, where representatives of political parties, NGO members and student council members had a higher frequency of rational secular values, whereas athletes, civil servants and business owners more frequently adhered to traditional values. The composition of traditional versus rational legal values was similar among future political elites in the NKR and the RA, whereas for survival versus self-expression values, significant differences were observed. In the NKR, survival values were much more common (84%) than in the RA, 75%, whereas self-expression values were almost nonexistent (less than 1%) compared to 3% in the RA. This distribution of values among political elites and the established mechanisms of recruitment from certain groups makes it highly unlikely that in a short term prespective a critical number of individuals who are both capable of and willing to produce genuine democratic changes in the political system will be incorporated into the political elite.

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REFERENCES
Abrahamian, L., & Shagoyan, G. (2012). From carnival civil society toward a real civil society: Democracy trends in Post-Soviet Armenia. Anthropology & Archeology of Eurasia, 50, 1150. Almond, G. et al. (2010). Comparative Politics Today. A World View, (9th ed). New York: Pearson Longman. Best, H., & Edinger, M. (2005). Converging representative elites in Europe? An introduction to the EurElite Project. Czechoslovak Sociological Review, 41 (3), 499510. Carothers, T. (2002). The end of transition paradigm. Journal of Democracy, 13 (1), 521. doi: 10.1353/jod.2002.0003. Collier, R. B. (1999). Paths toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America. New York: Cambridge University Press. Cummings, S. (2005). Kazakhstan. Power and the Elite. New York, NY: I.B.Tauris. Dahl, R. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Diamond, L. (1999). Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Ergun, A. (2010). Post-Soviet Political transformation in Azerbaijan: Political elite, civil society and the trials of democratization), Uluslararas likiler, 7(26), 6785. Gelman, V. (2003). Post-Soviet transitions and democratization: Towards theory-building. Democratization, 10 (2), 87104. doi: 10.1080/714000120. Gelman, V., & Tarusina, I. (2000). Studies of political elites in Russia: Issues and alternatives. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 33, 311329. doi: 10.1016/S0967-067X(00)00009-X. Gill, G. (2000). The Dynamics of Democratization Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process. New York, NY: St. Martins Press. Haller, M. (2008). European integration as an elite process: The failure of a dream. New York, NY: Routledge. Hanneman, R. A., & Riddle, M. (2005). Introduction to Social Network Methods. Riverside, CA: University of California Riverside. Retrieved from http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/. Higley, J., Pakulski, J., & Wesolowski, W. (Eds.). (1998). Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe. London: McMillan Press.

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Higley, J., & Burton, M. G. (2006). The Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Hoffmann-Lange, U. (2006). Methodological Developments in Elite Research. Paper for presentation at the 20th IPSA World Congress, Fukuoka Retrieved from: http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/view/5308. Hollander, P. (1999). Political will and personal belief: The decline and fall of Soviet communism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Hork, S. (2010). Changes in the political elite in Post-Soviet Turkmenistan. China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 8(3), 2746. Huntington, S. (1991). The third Wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Karl, T . (1990). Dilemmas of democratization in Latin America. Comparative Politics, 23 (1), 121. doi: 10.2307/422302. Klugman, J. (1989). The new Soviet Elite: How they think and what they want. New York, NY: Praeger. Linz, J. (1978). Crisis, breakdown, and reequilibrium. In J. Linz & A. Stepan (Eds.). The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Margaryan, M. (2006). Political Elite and Problems of Democratic Transition in the Republic of Armenia. Yerevan: Petakan tsarayutyun hratarakchutyun. McFaul, M. (2002). The fourth wave of democracy and dictatorship. Noncooperative transitions in the postcommunist world. World Politics, 54, 212244. doi: 10.1353/wp.2002.0004. Michels, R. (2001). Political Parties. A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (Repr). Kitchener, ON: Batoche Books. Miller, A., & Hesli, V. L. (1997). Conceptions of democracy among mass and elite in Post-Soviet societies. British Journal of Political Science, 27(2), 157 190. doi: 10.1017/S0007123497000100. Mills, C. . (1956). The Power Elite. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Mosca, G. (1939). The Ruling Class. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. ODonnell, G., & Schmitter, P. (1986). Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Vol. 4. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Pareto, V. (1935). The mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology. (Repr.). New York, NY: Dover.

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Rustow, A. (1970). Transitions to democracy: Toward a dynamic model. Comparative Politics, 2(3), 337363. doi: 10.2307/421307. Schumpeter, J. (1943). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London, UK: George Allen and Unwin. Steen, A. (1997). Between past and Future: Elites, Democracy and the State in Post-Communist Countries. A Comparison of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. Urban, M. (1989). An algebra of Soviet power: Elite circulation in the Belorussian Republic. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Urban, M. (2010). Cultures of Power in Post-Communist Russia: An Analysis of Elite Political Discourse. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Zimmerman, W. (2002). The Russian people and foreign policy: Russian elite and mass perspectives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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APPENDIX A. TOPIC GUIDE OF INTERVIEWS

General questions: 1. The code of the interview _______ 2. The code of the assistant ______________ 3. The date (dd/mm) ___________________________ 4. The place_________________________________________ 5. Duration /ex.` 65 minutes/`_____________ 6. Respondent`s name and surname __________________ 7. Respondent`s position___________________________________________ 8. Respondent`s sex 1. male 2 female 9. Respondent`s birth date_________________ 10. Respondent`s education 1. Secondary 2. Vocational 3. Bachelor 4. Graduate 5. Postgraduate 11. Respondent`s profession according to his/her__________________ Life story Please let`s talk a little bit about your life 1. Where and when were you born? What kind of family do you have /Interviewer. Nuclear/large family, children, the condition of the house, social status/. Who were you your parents: profession, education? 2. What kind of important memory do you have about your childhood, which were conditional for your political activity and principles, Who were role models for you at that time. Who had roles in the formation of you identity and value system. /Inetrviewer. Family, friendship, school, other eucation centers, organizations, parties, other/ 3. What is you first profession and where did you study? How did you decided to chose that profession. Did you work according that profession? If not, then why? If yes, the how long, where? How much are important your profession and work experience for your today`s

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4.

5. 6.

work. What is your hobby, if they have changed during the time, how do you spend your free time during the evening, holidays and vacations. With whom and how do you spend your leisure Who are your friends, how do you chose them, do you have friends at your work, who also are your friends. How did you meet your wife/husband, his/her family which factors were conditional to marry him/her. Tell us about your children, what kind of school did they go, their hobbies and aim. Generally what does it mean family for you and how it is related to your political career?

Entry into politics Now let`s talk about your political career 1. When and how did you recognize the need to enter into politics? /Interviewer. Ask about concrete historical events, leaders and persons impact/ Please describe your story in politics in which parties, organizations did you participated, how have you held as a politician. Which events do you consider crucial in your career. 2. What kind of role did your family, parents have in your career? Who from your family helps you in your political activities? Would you like your children and grandchildren enter into politics? 3. How did you see your role and what kind of aims did you pursue in politics? How have they been changed during the years and why? 4. As a politician what kind of universal and political principles/functions do you seclude for you? What do you consider acceptable and not acceptable for entering into politics? The value system and motivations of political elite 1. How would you describe political elite in Armenia? Who are the representatives of elite? 2. What kind of clasters/groups can you seclude inside our political elite and where is your position there? How well integrated do you feel among them? 3. What kind of factors would you seclude that would help to become part of elite? /Interviewer. Family, connection, origin, education, friends/. Which skills/qualities a person should have in order to consist in modern Armenian political life. According to this which

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qualities do you consider important for you personally? How would you describe political struggle in Armenia? What kind of tools are used? /Which one do you think is justified? 5. When reaching your goals you encounter problems how persistently do you struggle? What would disappoint you? While reaching the goal when is it allowed to ignore others interest, when is it allowed to take advantage of others weakness. 6. In your opinion today what are the problems that require primary solutions in Armenia? Who are engaged in political decision making process? Who have more impact on decision making: the leadership of the country, local/regional elite, voters, active citizens, business elite: /Interviewer: pay attention to: local, regional, national, legislative, executive and judicial decision making election results. 7. Which political ideology do you adhere? In your political view do you consider yourself rightist, leftist, centrist? /Interviewer: pay attention to: political orientation membership in political groups political stereotypes and attitudes political values and norms forms of political behavior 8. Which political regimes do you consider the most successful and which are exemplary for Armenia. 9. How much are you devoted to democratic values and whether do you consider them acceptable for Armenia. Interviewer: pay attention to: only a small group can govern the country and make decisions everybody should participate freedom of speech 10. In your opinion what is more important while making political decisions: professional knowledge or political calculation/expediency 11. What would you do if in your practice a situation would be created when you would have to choose to be loyal to citizens/community or to your political party. 12. Are you ready for compromises with your political opponents? Why? Are there dangers related to that? 4.

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13. Generally what do you think how much our society is conflicting/compromiser? 14. According to you what is ideal Armenia? What kind of political system should it have? How can Armenia achieve to that? 15. How do you see your future? Can you accurately predict your future in 6 month, 1 year, 5 years? 16. Generally how much happy and secure do you feel as a person, as a citizen, as a politician? Why? At the end evaluate the honesty of the respondent. 1 2 3 4 5 totally not honest totally honest

100

APPENDIX B. CHARTS

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

115

116

117

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122

123

124

125

126

127

128

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Chart 3.9.1 Government like a parent vs like an employee

Government is like an employee; the people should be the bosses who control the government.

People are like children; the government should take care of them like a parent.

37.9%

32.1%

18.5%

62.1%

67.9%

69.5%

RA

NKR

CRRC'2012

Chart 3.9.2 People should vs should not participate in protest actions

People should participate in protest actions against the government, as this shows the government that the people are in charge People should not participate in protest actions against the government, as it threatens stability in our country.

31.1%

20.2% 37.9%

68.9%

65.6% 62.1%

RA

NKR

CRRC'2012

131

132

Chart 3.10 Distribution of traditional vs. rational secular values

Rational secular 6%

Traditional 17%

Mostly rational secular 27% Mostly traditional 47% Neutral 3%

Chart 3.11 Distribution of survival vs. self-expression values

Self-expression 2%

Transitional 20%

Survival 78%

133

Table 1. Research components and methods Research questions Methodology/ Data

Quantitative analysis of biographies of political elite members. Analysis of legal institutional framework recruiting politicians. In-depth interviews with political elite representatives. In depth interviews with political elite representatives.

Research component

The patterns of political elite What is the structure of political elite in Armenia and formation in post soviet how it has evolved during last two and half decades? Armenia and NKR What are the main characteristics of typical members and groups of the political elite? How consolidated and diversified is the political elite in post soviet Armenia? The values, preferences and What are the motivations of individuals for pursuing self perception of political political career? elite representatives in post What are the predominant beliefs and values, soviet Armenia including: regime preferences, opinions on the role of political elites,

APPENDIX C. TABLES

134
personal and political priorities in the decision-making processes, external political orientations. What are the main characteristics of political culture among various groups from which typically political elite members are being recruited? How future political elite members view democracy and how their views differ from the older generation and general population? What are the predominant values of potential political elite?

Political culture of representatives of potential political elite

Representative survey among individuals from the segments that most often produce political elite members (public servants, members of political parties, NGO activists, members of local governance bodies, student committee members, academics/artists/athletes, top business owners and CEOs).

Table 1.1 The level of education of MPs in RA and NKR

Incomplete SCRA NA1RA NA2RA NA3RA NA4RA NA5RA Total SCNKR NA1NKR NA2NKR NA3NKR NA4NKR Total 0.70% 1.00% 1.30% 0.70% 1.30% 0.70% 1.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.80% 0.00% 0.60%

Primary 1.50% 3.10% 0.70% 1.40% 1.30% 0.70% 1.50% 10.80% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.40%

Secondary 1.10% 1.00% 2.00% 2.10% 2.50% 1.50% 1.60% 16.20% 14.30% 8.80% 16.70% 14.30% 14.10%

Higher (BA/MA) 67.80% 73.00% 69.10% 72.30% 68.20% 74.30% 70.40% 54.10% 62.90% 70.60% 61.10% 71.40% 63.50%

PhD candidate 23.00% 18.40% 17.80% 14.90% 21.70% 18.40% 19.50% 18.90% 20.00% 20.60% 16.70% 10.70% 17.60%

PhD and higher 5.90% 3.60% 9.20% 8.50% 5.10% 4.40% 6.00% 0.00% 2.90% 0.00% 2.80% 3.60% 1.80%

Table 1.2a Occupation of MPs of RA before being elected

SC Intelligentsia Businessman Bureaucrat/Civil Servant Party boss/activist Officer/War Veteran Party list MP FPTP MP Minister/Marzpet Mayor/City Council Member Other N of Cases
35.70% 4.90% 42.50% 0.00% 4.50% 0.00% 0.80% 0.40% 0.40% 10.90% 266

NA1
17.30% 15.70% 26.70% 1.00% 2.00% 0.00% 29.30% 0.00% 2.10% 5.80% 191

NA2
16.40% 25.00% 11.80% 2.00% 2.00% 7.20% 25.00% 0.70% 4.60% 5.30% 152

NA3
9.40% 34.50% 3.60% 0.70% 1.40% 16.50% 28.80% 2.10% 1.40% 1.40% 139

NA4
10.90% 17.90% 14.70% 3.20% 3.80% 20.50% 25.60% 2.50% 0.00% 0.60% 156

NA5
11.80% 5.90% 16.90% 5.10% 7.30% 33.80% 15.40% 0.00% 3.00% 0.70% 136

135

Table 1.2b Occupation of MPs of NKR before being elected

SC Intelligentsia Businessman Bureaucrat/Civil Servant Party boss/activist War Veteran Officer in Police/Army Party list MP FPTP MP Minister/Marzpet Mayor/City Council Member Other
16.20% 5.40% 48.60% 0.00% 24.30% 5.40% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%

NA1
22.90% 11.40% 31.40% 0.00% 8.60% 2.90% 0.00% 20.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.90%

NA2
8.80% 17.60% 35.30% 0.00% 5.90% 2.90% 0.00% 20.60% 2.90% 2.90% 2.90%

NA3
2.80% 11.10% 25.00% 2.80% 8.30% 5.60% 0.00% 33.30% 8.30% 2.80% 0.00%

NA4
3.60% 10.70% 28.60% 0.00% 3.60% 0.00% 21.40% 28.60% 3.60% 0.00% 0.00%

Table 2.1. Description of networks reflecting changes in the coalition

Network name

Covering period

Composition of coalition
RPA/ARFD/ROL RPA/ARFD/ULP RPA/PAP/ARFD RPA/PAP/ARFD/ROL RPA/PAP/ROL RPA/ROL

N of laws adopted

N of MPs in ruling coalition/ in the network

71/75 57/27 104/13 112/70 96/86 75/42

Conv3

Coal1 Coal2 Coal3

05.2003-06.2006 06.2006-05.2007 05.2007-03.2008 03.2008-04.2009 05.2009-05.2012 05.2012-06.2013

183 20 8 54 114 36

Conv4

Coal4 Coal5

Conv5

136

Table 2.2 Basic Characteristics of Networks

Nodes

Ties

Av. Degree

Graph Density

Modularity (communities)

Connected Components

137

Conv3 Conv4 Conv5 Coal1 Coal2 Coal3 Coal4 Coal5

79 109 42 75 27 13 70 86

465 1111 242 450 61 24 366 756

11.8 20.4 11.5 12 4.5 3.7 10.5 17.6

Av. Weighted Diameter Degree 50 4 42.8 4 18.2 4 50.8 4 5.2 3 8.5 3 16.1 5 32.6 4 0.151 0.186 0.281 0.162 0.174 0.308 0.152 0.207 7 5 8 5 6 3 7 5 2 2 5 1 4 2 2 1

Avg Clustering Avg. Path Lenth Coefficient 0.764 2.187 0.695 1.98 0.955 1.653 0.759 2.168 0.882 1.923 0.918 1.579 0.774 2.493 0.777 2.015

Table 2.3 Distribution of power within 3rd convocation of NA

Ruling/Opposition Faction Degree Weighted Degree Closeness Centrality Betweenness Centrality Eccentricity

Name

Gender PartyList/FPTP Party

138
Ruling Ruling Ruling Opposition Ruling Ruling Opposition Ruling Opposition Opposition Opposition Opposition Opposition Opposition

Samvel Balasanyan Viktor Dallakyan Galust Sahakyan Levon Mkrtchyan Hranush Hakobyan Grigor Gonjeyan Vahan Hovhannisyan Rudik Hovsepyan Vostanik Maroukhyan Shavarsh Kocharyan Vardan Mkrtchyan Rafik Petrosyan Gagik Melikyan Sukias Avetisyan Edmund Tsaturyan Hovhannes Margaryan Heghine Bisharyan Mkhrtich Minasyan Vladimir Badalyan Mushegh Movsisyan Armen Danielyan Mekhak Mkhitaryan Hrant Khachatryan Hrayr Karapetyan Hermine Nagdalyan Hakob Hakobyan Samvel Nikoyan Mkrtich Mkrtchyan Ararat Malkhasyan Albert Bazeyan Ruben Hayrapetyan Harutyun Pambukyan Samvel Aleksanyan Hamlet Tamazyan Gagik Tsarukyan Levon Sargsyan Mnatsakan Petrosyan Armen Rustamyan Vahram Baghdasaryan Aram Sargsyan Tatul Manaseryan Sergey Isreayelyan Grigor Harutyunyan Arshak Sadoyan

Male Male Male Male Female Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Female Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Female Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male

FPTP FPTP Party List Party List FPTP Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List FPTP Party List FPTP Party List Party List Party List FPTP FPTP FPTP FPTP FPTP Party List Party List Party List FPTP Party List FPTP Party List Party List FPTP FPTP FPTP FPTP FPTP FPTP Party List Party List FPTP Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List

RoL Independent RPA ARFD Independent ULP ARFD ARFD ARFD NDP ADP RPA RPA RPA ADP RoL RoL RPA RPA Independent Independent RoL CRU ARFD RPA Independent - RPA 2006 RPA RPA RPA Republic Independent - RPA 2006 Independent - RPA 2006 Independent Independent Independent Independent - RPA 2006 ULP ARFD Independent Republic Independent Independent ADP NDCP

Ruling Opposition Ruling Ruling Ruling Opposition Ruling Ruling Ruling Opposition Opposition Ruling Ruling Ruling Opposition Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Opposition Ruling Ruling Opposition Ruling Ruling

RoL Justice RPA ARFD RPA ULP ARFD ARFD ARFD Justice Justice People's MP RPA RPA Justice RoL RoL People's MP People's MP Justice RPA RoL Justice ARFD RPA People's MP RPA RPA RPA Justice None None None People's MP None People's MP ULP ARFD People's MP Justice Justice Justice Justice Justice

36 34 32 28 23 21 21 21 20 20 20 19 19 19 18 18 17 17 16 16 15 14 14 14 14 14 13 13 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 10

211 129 208 210 99 106 103 129 83 88 88 61 32 41 38 97 90 103 85 35 62 93 20 76 33 150 68 36 39 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 55 76 56 10 10 10 10 10

1.526315789 1.657894737 1.592105263 1.631578947 1.815789474 1.881578947 1.842105263 1.907894737 1.75 2.026315789 2.026315789 1.828947368 1.842105263 1.868421053 1.881578947 1.802631579 1.921052632 1.960526316 1.973684211 1.894736842 1.868421053 2.263157895 2.144736842 1.960526316 1.921052632 2.184210526 1.894736842 2.052631579 2.065789474 2.184210526 2.184210526 2.184210526 2.184210526 2.184210526 2.184210526 2.184210526 2.381578947 2.026315789 2.184210526 2.381578947 2.381578947 2.381578947 2.381578947 2.381578947

567.1568177 405.9684361 353.8141855 229.8846627 91.2262217 180.266281 114.3674535 73.83275698 84.03445362 45.4080604 45.4080604 147.6790342 78.29306194 76.98455661 162.1577859 93.5424973 24.42878767 42.45239741 32.50347985 82.15482395 119.0099317 19.23966849 42.16924644 40.40791709 56.54569712 0 47.29227343 14.07409394 13.36487359 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29.85306638 4.453044572 0 0 0 0 0 0

2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4

Opposition Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Opposition Opposition Ruling Ruling Opposition Ruling Ruling Ruling Opposition Opposition Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Opposition Ruling Opposition Opposition Ruling Ruling None RPA ARFD RPA RPA RPA RoL RoL ARFD ULP RPA ULP None RPA RoL None 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 10 10 40 5 5 5 17 12 10 28 9 8 8 12 1 1 2.578947368 2.578947368 2.565789474 2.407894737 2.407894737 2.407894737 2.394736842 2.407894737 2.407894737 2.763157895 3.105263158 2.763157895 2.526315789 2.263157895 0 0

Stepan Zakaryan Volodya Badalyan Alvard Petrosyan Razmik Martirosyan Lernik Aleksanyan Ararat Mkrtchyan Ashot Aghababyan Artak Arakelyan Mikayel Vardanyan Samvel Sahakyan Aghasi Arshakyan Aleksan Karapetyan Vardges Matevosyan Ashot Arsenyan Manvel Nazaryan Arthur Baghdasayan Hrant Grigoryan Karen Karapetyan Gurgen Arsenyan FPTP FPTP Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List FPTP Party List Party List Party List Party List FPTP Party List Party List FPTP Independent RPA ARFD RPA RPA RPA RoL RoL Independent ULP RPA ULP Independent RPA RoL Independent 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.365884116 0 0 0 0 0 0 62.94595127 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 0 0

Male Male Female Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male

Party List FPTP Party List Party List Party List Party List FPTP Party List Party List FPTP Party List Party List Party List Party List FPTP Party List FPTP FPTP Party List

ADP Independent ARFD RPA RPA RPA RPA RoL Independent Independent NU NU RPA RPA Independent RoL Independent Independent ULP

Justice None ARFD RPA RPA RPA RPA RoL ARFD None NU NU RPA RPA People's MP RoL RPA People's MP ULP

10 9 9 9 8 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 5

10 21 54 25 22 26 14 38 7 7 7 7 18 18 18 14 18 24 26

2.381578947 2.105263158 2.184210526 2.105263158 2.671052632 2.421052632 2.434210526 2.065789474 2.144736842 2.144736842 2.144736842 2.131578947 2.697368421 2.697368421 2.697368421 2.078947368 2.171052632 2.342105263 2.394736842

0 47.91391664 0 2.969104929 25.0459707 0.142857143 0 1.882299073 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.796019835 0 0 10.96436896

4 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 4

139

Manuk Gasparyan Armen Mkhitaryan Gegham Manukyan Vazgen Karakhanyan Hamlet Harutyunyan Armen Ashotyan Mher Shahgeldyan Samvel Shahgaldyan Ashot Apoyan Hripsime Avetisyan Tigran Torosyan Arthur Petrosyan Aramayis Grigoryan Vazgen Khachikyan Gagik Mkheyan Khachatur Suqkiasyan

Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Female Male Male Male Male Male Male

Table 2.4 Distribution of power within 4rd convocation of NA

Name Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling

Gender

PartyList/FPTP Party

Ruling/Opposition Faction

Degree

Weighted Degree

Closeness Centrality

Betweenness Centrality

Eccentricity

140

Galust Sahakyan Arman Sahakyan Hakob Hakobyan Aram Safaryan Naira Zohrabyan Vardan Bostanjyan Viktor Dallakyan Arevik Petrosyan Samvel Sargsyan Arsen Avagyan Melik Manukyan Martun Grigoryan Karo Karapetyan Gohar Enokyan Hovhannes Margaryan Versand Hakobyan Avet Adonts Heghine Bisharyan Ruben Harutyunyan Martin Sargsyan Hayk Sanosyan Ara Babloyan Robert Tovmasyan Karen Avagyan Ernest Soghomonyan Mkrtich Minasyan Vardan Ayvazyan Ara Nranyan Hermine Naghdalyan Hrant Grigoryan Nahapet Gevorgyan Rustam Gasparyan Tigran Stepanyan Harutyun Gharaghyozyan Armen Petrosyan Vahe Hakobyan Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling

Male Male Male Male Female Male Male Female Male Male Male Male Male Female Male Male Male Female Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Female Male Male Male Male Male Male Male

Party List Party List FPTP Party List Party List Party List FPTP Party List FPTP Party List FPTP FPTP FPTP Party List Party List FPTP Party List Party List FPTP Party List Party List Party List FPTP Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List FPTP FPTP FPTP FPTP FPTP FPTP FPTP

RPA RPA RPA PAP PAP PAP Indep. PAP RPA PAP PAP PAP PAP PAP RoL PAP PAP RoL RPA RPA Indep. RPA PAP RPA SDHP RPA RPA ARFD RPA RPA RPA PAP PAP Indep. RPA RPA

RPA RPA RPA PAP PAP PAP None PAP RPA PAP PAP PAP PAP PAP RoL PAP PAP RoL RPA RPA RPA RPA PAP RPA PAP RPA RPA ARFD RPA RPA RPA PAP PAP PAP RPA RPA

63 51 50 47 47 45 43 42 41 40 37 37 37 36 35 35 34 33 33 33 32 31 31 30 30 29 29 28 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27

281 61 110 137 126 215 63 76 49 57 42 42 42 58 115 36 38 121 49 46 33 115 31 70 35 97 43 107 62 27 27 27 27 27 27 27

1.411215 1.5607477 1.5794393 1.5794393 1.5981308 1.588785 1.6635514 1.6448598 1.6261682 1.6915888 1.7196262 1.7196262 1.7196262 1.7009346 1.728972 1.7757009 1.7383178 1.7009346 1.7757009 1.7570093 1.8037383 1.7102804 1.8130841 1.7943925 1.8130841 1.7383178 1.7850467 1.7570093 1.8317757 1.8691589 1.8691589 1.8691589 1.8691589 1.8691589 1.8691589 1.8691589

730.39891 282.7574889 420.2040613 154.7199631 197.084073 248.4518274 148.2428207 123.1177461 79.67641832 63.24651573 36.36568533 36.36568533 36.36568533 75.89820385 319.8850124 91.94364727 106.0429562 261.9170687 58.39548914 79.62251269 63.4948247 108.7368104 33.99241824 140.5210893 12.21972087 90.81082074 65.44735264 131.9357019 83.05216079 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

141

Armen Abrahamyan Armen Melikyan Hrant Madatyan Rafik Grigoryan Artsvik Minasyan Samvel Nikoyan David Harutyunyan Sukias Avetisyan Karen Vardanyan Vahan Hovhannisyan Gagik Melikyan Arayik Hovhannisyan Gagik Minasyan Vazgen Karakhanyan Hovik Abrahamyan Artyush Shahbazyan Hrayr Karapetyan Mikael Manukyan Anahit Bakhshyan Misha Stepanyan Hovhannes Sahakyan Ashot Arsenyan Aleksandr Sahakyan Karen Chshmarityan Rafik Petrosyan Karine Achemyan Aleksan Petrosyan Armen Rustamyan Bagrat Sargsyan Stepan Aslanyan Eduard Sharmazanov Khachik Manukyan Ashot Tonoyan Lilit Galstyan Mkhitar Mnatsakanyan Armen Martirosyan Ruzanna Arakelyan Karen Karapetyan GOVERNEMENT Styopa Safaryan Artsruni Aghajanyan Khachik Harutyunyan

Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Female Male Male Male Male Male Male Female Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Female Male Male Female Male N/A Male Male Male

Party List Party List FPTP Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List FPTP Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List FPTP Party List FPTP Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List FPTP FPTP FPTP Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List N/A Party List Party List Party List

Indep. PAP PAP RPA ARFD RPA RPA RPA Indep. ARFD RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA ARFD ARFD ARFD HP Indep. RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA ARFD ARFD RoL RPA RPA PAP ARFD Indep. HP ARFD RPA N/A HP RoL RoL

Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Opposition Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Opposition Ruling Ruling N/A Opposition Ruling Ruling

PAP PAP PAP RPA ARFD RPA RPA RPA ARFD ARFD RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA ARFD ARFD ARFD HP RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA ARFD ARFD RoL RPA RPA PAP ARFD PAP HP ARFD RPA N/A HP RoL RoL

27 27 27 26 25 25 24 23 23 22 22 21 20 20 20 19 19 19 18 18 17 17 17 17 16 16 16 15 15 15 15 15 15 14 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 11

27 27 27 49 84 53 123 39 38 68 34 55 62 49 32 68 51 37 59 23 96 19 19 19 96 47 17 48 45 29 23 15 15 89 39 37 36 29 28 21 15 21

1.8691589 1.8691589 1.8691589 1.7850467 1.8317757 1.7943925 1.8878505 1.8130841 1.8224299 1.8317757 1.8504673 1.8691589 1.8411215 1.8598131 1.9158879 1.8878505 1.8878505 1.9065421 1.9158879 1.9719626 1.8691589 2 2 2.0280374 1.9719626 1.953271 1.9252336 2.1028037 1.9719626 1.9906542 1.9439252 2.046729 2.046729 2.1214953 2.0373832 2.0560748 2.0747664 1.9906542 1.9719626 2.0654206 2.0747664 2.2429907

0 0 0 53.38184063 68.56748039 42.79415772 71.67376436 94.85207346 77.42185624 46.09649182 67.02988521 35.35668454 28.75593192 64.45333165 29.84216184 25.41145499 35.07906553 56.59830147 24.46167931 60.44849029 55.84842415 10.32017297 10.32017297 7.851224109 30.80949208 86.63837669 44.47529771 26.25482395 14.02311848 19.26029332 34.48858747 0 0 11.5040814 3.295903309 7.066721887 3.664435314 26.48543858 12.00727196 3.671428571 17.36749527 12.71471372

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 4

Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Opposition Ruling

142

Volodya Badalyan Areg Ghukasyan Armen Ashotyan Samvel Balasanyan Artak Davtyan Hranush Hakobyan Arshak Mkhitaryan Ashot Apoyan Mikayel Vardanyan Arthur Aghabekyan Larisa Alaverdyan Lyova Khachatryan Ashot Aghababyan Mkhitar Varagyan Ishkhan Khachatryan Tachat Vardapetyan Gagik Gevorgyan Myasnik Malkhasyan Ara Simonyan Vahagn Makhsudyan Levon Sargsyan Ruben Sadoyan Armen Mkhitaryan Grigor Margaryan Koryun Nahapetyan Gagik Tsarukyan Khachik Petrosyan Ruben Gevorgyan Artak Zaqaryan Tigran Torosyan Artashes Avoyan Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling

Male Male Male Male Male Female Male Male Male Male Female Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male

Party List Party List FPTP FPTP Party List Party List Party List Party List FPTP Party List Party List FPTP FPTP Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List FPTP Party List FPTP FPTP Party List FPTP FPTP FPTP Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List

Indep. RPA RPA PAP RPA RPA PAP Indep. Indep. ARFD Indep. Indep. RPA Indep. RoL Indep. ARFD RPA NU PAP RPA RPA RPA Indep. RPA PAP RoL PAP RPA RPA RoL

RPA RPA RPA PAP RPA RPA PAP ARFD None ARFD HP None RPA None RoL RPA ARFD RPA None PAP RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA PAP RoL PAP RPA RPA RoL

11 11 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 8 7 6 6 6 6 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 1

21 11 28 12 35 15 9 9 9 24 18 8 8 12 10 6 6 6 12 8 4 4 4 4 9 3 3 6 4 2 1

2.0186916 2.1308411 2.0280374 2.2336449 2.046729 2.1588785 2.2616822 2.2616822 2.2616822 2.1869159 2.0654206 2.1308411 2.1214953 2.2336449 2.4392523 2.364486 2.364486 2.5420561 2.3738318 2.5794393 2.3831776 2.364486 2.3271028 2.1682243 2.3738318 2.5794393 2.411215 2.6261682 2.9345794 0 2.7196262

6.108518592 0 5.720796302 2.627809874 33.35489733 7.770801076 0 0 0 0 3.709161611 0 0.525 0 2.611552599 0 0 0.366666667 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0

Table 2.5 Distribution of power within 5th convocation of NA

Gender List/FPTP Party Ruling/Opposition Faction Degree Eccentricity

Name

143
RoL RPA None RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA

Sahakyan Galust Hovhannisyan Arpine Babloyan Ara Arzumanyan Aleksandr Khachatryan Ishkan Manukyan Abraham Minasyan Gagik Minasyan Mkrtich Nahapetyan Koryun Poghosyan Karine Vardapetyan Tachat Naghdalyan Hermine Sharmazanov Eduard Mnatsakanyan Mnatsakan Muradyan Ruzanna Avagyan Karen Badeyan Manvel Davtyan Artak Zakaryan Artak Karapetyan Naira Hovhannisyan Arayik Margaryan Hovhannes Babayan Armen Hovhannisyan Vahan Minasyan Artsvik Rustamyan Armen Aghvan Vardanyan Harutyunyan David GOVERNMENT Bisharyan Heghine Ayvazyan Vardan Marukyan Edmon Grigoryan Manvel Saroyan Sedrak Farmanyan Samvel Hakobyan Hakob Achemyan Karine

male female male male male male male male male female male female male male female male male male male female male male male male male male male male GOV. female male male male male male male female

Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List FPTP FPTP Party List Party List Party List FPTP Party List Party List FPTP Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List Party List GOV. Party List Party List FPTP Party List FPTP FPTP FPTP Party List

RPA RPA RPA FDP RoL Indep. RPA RPA RPA RPA Indep. RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA MIAK RPA RoL ARFD ARFD ARFD ARFD ARFD RPA GOV. RoL RPA Indep. Indep. Indep. RPA RPA RPA

Ruling Ruling Ruling Opposition Ruling PAP Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Opposition Opposition Opposition Opposition Opposition Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Indep. Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling Ruling

RPA RPA RPA HP RoL PAP RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA RPA RoL Inde. ARFD ARFD ARFD ARFD RPA

25 21 21 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2

Weighted Degree 57 55 23 20 20 20 20 21 20 20 20 50 50 50 50 20 20 20 20 20 20 11 16 12 16 12 16 9 10 10 6 1 4 4 4 2 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 0 1 1 1 0 3

Closeness Centrality 1.137931034 1.379310345 1.379310345 1.413793103 1.413793103 1.413793103 1.413793103 1.413793103 1.413793103 1.413793103 1.413793103 1.413793103 1.413793103 1.413793103 1.413793103 1.413793103 1.413793103 1.413793103 1.413793103 1.413793103 1.413793103 1.896551724 1 1 1 1 1 2.310344828 2.793103448 2.793103448 2.793103448 0 1 1 1 0 2.068965517

Betweenness Centrality 188 13.5 13.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 78 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

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Grigoryan Hayk Babukhanyan Hayk Gevorgyan Arthur Babayan Vahan Vardanyan Elinar

male male male male female

FPTP Party List FPTP Party List Party List

RPA CLU RPA PAP PAP

Ruling Ruling Ruling PAP PAP

RPA RPA RPA PAP PAP

2 2 2 1 1

4 2 2 1 1

2.068965517 2.068965517 2.068965517 1 1

0 0 0 0 0

3 3 3 1 1

Table 3.1 Do you plan to get involved in politics?

Yes Civil Servants Political party members NGO members LSG members Student Council members Business owners Academics Athletes Artists 25.20% 15.20% 22.00% 14.20% 53.80% 17.40% 16.80% 8.30% 15.40%

No 43.50% 4.50% 51.20% 49.40% 15.40% 60.90% 67.20% 83.30% 69.20%

Undecided 19.60% 6.10% 19.50% 24.70% 7.70% 21.70% 13.00% 0.00% 7.70%

Already involved 11.70% 74.20% 7.30% 11.70% 23.10% 0.00% 3.10% 8.30% 7.70%

Table 3.2.1 Types of political participations (in percents)

Signed a petition Organized it Participated in it RA Did not participate in such action, but may participate in future Did not participate and would never participate in such action Organized it Participated in it NKR Did not participate in such action, but may participate in future Did not participate and would never participate in such action 4 23 35 38 2 10 54 34

Boycott 1 11 26 62 0 7 41 52

Peaceful Demonstration 2 29 29 40 6 68 18 8

Strikes 0 3 35 62 0 3 42 55

Other protest actions 1 10 34 55 0 5 50 44

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Table 3.2.2 Types of political culture among potential political elite represenatives seprated by segments.

Segments Civil Servants Politcal Party members NGO represenatives LSG represenatvies Student Council members Businness owners Academics Athletes Artisits

Proactive (5/5)
3.40%

Active (4/5)
10.20% 14.30% 2.00%

Participants (3/5)
3.10% 32.20% 17.10%

Follower (2/5)
3.90% 10.20% 14.30% 13.10% 42.90% 14.00% 28.60%

Passive (1/5)
13.20% 28.80% 31.40% 18.20% 28.60% 25.00% 24.60% 20.00% 14.30%

Subject (0/5)
79.80% 15.30% 22.90% 66.70% 28.60% 75.00% 50.00% 80.00% 28.60%

0.90%

2.60%

7.90% 28.60%

Table 3.3. Frequencies for support of democracy and perception on the nature of the existing regime

QG1. To what extent it is important for you to live in a democratic country? (1-not important at all, 10- very important) RA Valid Missing Mean Valid Missing Mean
500 0 9.29 191 0 8.8

QG2. To what extent you consider RA/NKR to be democratic? (1-not democratic at all, 10fully democracy)
498 2 4.3 191 0 4.46

NKR

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APPENDIX D. GRAPHS
Graph 1. The political composition of network for the third convocation (MPs from ruling parties in red, opposition in blue, independent and oppositional MPs joint to ruling parties in green)

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Graph 2. Party composition of the fifth convocation: (MPs from RPA in red, ARFD in green, PAP in purple. RoL yellow)

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Graph 3. Party composition of elite in the fourth convocation (each color represents separate party, nodes in blu are independent MPs, nodes in black are MPs from oppositional parties)

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THE POLITICAL ELITE OF POST-INDEPENDENCE ARMENIA: CHARACTERISTICS AND PATTERNS OF FORMATION

AREG SCIENTIFIC CULTURAL YOUTH ASSOCIATION NGO Kievyan str. 12/10, 0028 Yerevan, Republic of Armenia Tel./fax: +374 10 270873 www.ngoareg.am email: aregngo@gmail.com

Publication: Ofset. Size: 60x84 1/16 Paper: Ofset. Publication size: 1000 examples

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