REVIEW ARTICLE

Divine Foreknowledge and Freedom of the Will: Contemporary Work Revisits Calvinism
Owen Anderson
Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, Recent Work on Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will in Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford University Press 2002 (0-19-513336-6), pp. xvii + 638, Hb 46.99/$75 What Does God Know and When Does He Know It?, Millard J. Erickson, Zondervan 2003 (0-310-24769-1), pp. 268, Hb $24.99 A well-known problem in the philosophy of religion is the question of how a person can be free if God foreknows what they will do. Simply stated: if God infallibly knows what I will do in the future then in what sense am I free? In an article published in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will Linda Zagzebski looks at common attempts to solve this problem and the current literature critiquing and responding to these solutions. Millard Erickson, in his recent book What Does God Know and When Does He Know It?, offers a summary of these same views, but also looks at a view not considered by Zagzebski that he calls Calvinism. In Calvinism God does not simply foreknow but predetermines what will happen. The following paper will consider the problem as stated by Zagzebski and the common types of solutions she outlines in order to contrast these with Ericksons presentation of the Calvinist solution, and argue that the Calvinist position can solve the problem and avoid difculties inherent to other solutions. Zagzebski presents the problem as follows: A typical contemporary way of stating the argument that if God knows B infallibly [B stands for the proposition that tomorrow you
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1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

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will get out of bed exactly 7 minutes after your alarm goes off] then you do not get out of bed freely is the following: Yesterday God infallibly believed B. (Supposition of infallible foreknowledge). It is now necessary that yesterday God believed B. (Principle of Necessity of the Past). Necessarily, if yesterday God believed B, then B. (Denition of infallibility). So it is now necessary that B. (23, Transfer of Necessity Principle). If it is now necessary that B, then you cannot do otherwise than get out of bed tomorrow exactly seven minutes after you wake up. (Denition of necessary). Therefore, you cannot do otherwise than get out of bed tomorrow exactly seven minutes after you wake up. (45, modus ponens). If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not do it freely. (Principle of Alternative Possibilities). Therefore, when you get out of bed tomorrow, you will not do it freely (67, modus ponens). By parity of reasoning you can argue that no act any human person performs is done freely (p. 47).

Zagzebski believes that there is consensus that this argument, or something very close to it, is thought to pose a threat to the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human free will, and considers a number of attempts to reconcile the two. The rst deals with the difference between omniscience and infallibility. In theism God is essentially omniscient, but a solution to the problem might be sought in doubting this. For a being to be omniscient is for that being to know the truth value of every proposition. This does not entail infallibility in that an omniscient being is not mistaken in any of his beliefs, and he has a belief corresponding to every proposition, but he still might have made a mistake (p. 47). Such a being is omniscient even though he might not have been omniscient in the past or in other possible worlds. In contrast, if a being is essentially omniscient then he is not only omniscient as things actually are, but is also omniscient in every possible world. Essential omniscience does entail infallibility. One who doubts that God is essentially omniscient can doubt 1 and 3 and perhaps look for a solution by these means. Zagzebski further points out that believing that God is infallible does not require essential omniscience in that the latter is more than is needed for 1 and 3 (p. 48). God could be infallible with respect to the beliefs he has and yet not be omniscient. Having claried these concepts Zagzebski classies the traditional and contemporary responses to the argument. In the Boethian Solution the timelessness of God is used to solve the problem. If God does not exist in time then statements about what God
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believed yesterday do not apply. In the Ockhamist Solution there is backward counterfactual dependency which means that my action today makes true a specic counterfactual about Gods beliefs yesterday. Soft facts about the past are dependent on what a person does in the present. These solutions are similar in that they raise questions about Gods relationship to time, and they both afrm the Principle of Alternative Possibilities with respect to human free will. The desire is to retain that principle and alter the temporal parts of the problem that lead to contradictions between Gods knowledge and human freedom. However, the problem remains in that God predetermines what will happen in the temporal order of events because he is the creator and primary cause. The question is does God as creator, and primary cause, predetermine what will happen? If God predetermines what will happen then he has more than a simple foreknowledge of the temporal order of events. In the Molinist Solution questions about Gods timelessness are set aside in favour of a counterfactual approach to the future. Often called middle knowledge, this solution tries to explain how God knows the contingent future. Middle knowledge is the knowledge that stands between necessary truths and Gods knowledge of his own will. The content of middle knowledge has to do with counterfactuals of freedom. Assuming that there are true counterfactuals corresponding to every possible free action, God combines his knowledge of these counterfactuals with what he wills to do and this produces his knowledge of the actual future. The Molinist believes this preserves the Principle of Alternative Possibilities and the infallibility of God. However, the problem remains because it seems that God predetermines what will happen by creating persons who he knows will do certain actions in specic circumstances. Once again, the question appears to be more than simple foreknowledge, and involves whether God predestines in creating. The Frankfurtian Solution questions the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Frankfurt sought to bring libertarian freedom into question by driving a wedge between responsibility and alternative possibilities. He did this by showing that the important issue in a free act is doing what one wants, rather than having alternative possibilities. Since doing what one wants is consistent with the foreknowledge of God there is no problem for human freedom. Most objections to the Frankfurtian Solution seek to defend libertarian freedom and reject determinism. There is more to explore on this issue of whether the Principle of Alternative Possibilities is true. The nal solution considered by Zagzebski that is relevant for this study is the Open God Solution. This solution seeks to solve the problem by challenging the Classical Theistic view of God. It does this by asserting that God does not know the contingent future, especially
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the future related to free human actions. In the Open God Solution Gods knowledge is infallible but growing. God simply does not know what a free person will do until they actually do it. This position often assumes that the Principle of Alternative Possibilities is true, and then argues from there to a nature of God that is consistent with that principle. Yet Open Theism still believes that God is the creator, and so the problem returns to Gods predestination: if God is the creator and primary cause has he predestined what will happen? Each of these solutions has, in one way or another, attempted to dene foreknowledge in a way that makes it compatible with freedom (libertarian freedom except for the Frankfurt Solution). A recent book that looks specically at the question of divine foreknowledge is Millard Ericksons What Does God Know and When Does He Know It? The larger goal of this book is to explore the difference between Classical Theism and Open Theism, but central to this debate is the problem of evil. Open theism claims that it can solve the problem of evil by limiting the foreknowledge of God. Erickson believes that there are three ways that Classical Theism has addressed the problem. The rst is simple foreknowledge, where God sees the future. This usually involves God being outside of time and seeing all points in time simultaneously. The second is middle knowledge. This view asserts that not only does God know what will be, but all the other possibilities in other possible worlds. The third view is Calvinism. This asserts that God knows what will happen because he determined what would happen. Erickson denes freedom in the following way: a person is free if he/she was able to do otherwise than what he/she actually did (p. 165). This is the libertarian denition of freedom. The rst two views of divine foreknowledge are often coupled with libertarian freedom where a person is able to do otherwise. Calvinism denies that people can do otherwise, but asserts that they are free because they can do what they want. The view that asserts both determinism and freedom is called compatibilism. It is called compatibilism because it asserts that determinism and freedom are compatible. Divine foreknowledge and free will are only in conict if the libertarian denition is assumed. Each of the solutions considered by Zagzebski, except the Frankfurt Solution, assumes the libertarian definition of freedom. If freedom is understood as doing what one wants, and God knows ahead of time what a person will want, then freedom and divine foreknowledge can co-exist without any logical problem. God can predetermine and people are free because they can do what they want. However, there are four obvious criticisms that the Calvinist position must address: rst, the claim that I am not free if I could not have wanted otherwise; second, if God predetermined evil then he is responsible for the moral evil that is done; third, to be free I must be
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able to choose the kind of being am I; and nally the claim that I cannot choose what I want but rather I am forced to want what I want by God. The following will show how the Calvinist can address these criticisms, and then end by asserting that Calvinism offers a solution to the problem raised by Zagzebski by doubting #7 in her argument, and by asserting that while each person is predetermined by God it is also true that each person does what he/she wants. Very often those thinking about the problem of divine foreknowledge and free will consider rather trivial instances such as getting out of bed. But what is of crucial importance in the theistic context is saving faith. In theism, a persons failure to have saving faith results in separation from God for eternity. Calvinism asserts that God foreknows who will have saving faith by determining who will have saving faith. What Calvinism must explain is how humans can be responsible for having or failing to have saving faith if God predetermines this. The question of responsibly is behind each of the four objections considered below. The rst objection is that the person without saving faith did not have the option of wanting to be in the other group. The Calvinist can respond that the person need only get what they want for there to be responsibility. If at any point a person wants to believe in God then he/she can believe in God. In other words, want precedes ability: a person has the ability if he/she wants to. The libertarian may claim that a person does not have the ability to do otherwise and therefore doing what he/she wants is of little value in terms of freedom. But this assumes that ability is more basic than want which is not true. For every time the libertarian can say, you cannot do otherwise the Calvinist can respond with you can do otherwise if you want to do otherwise; nothing is stopping you except that you do not want to do otherwise. The second objection is that in reality it is Gods fault that a person did not have saving faith and therefore God is responsible for this evil. This can be solved by distinguishing between primary and secondary causes. God creates the secondary cause of a human being with beliefs, desires, and a will. It is the person that does not want to believe in God, it is not God who does not want to believe in God. Nor can the person say, I would want to believe in God if only God wasnt forcing me to not believe in Him. If at some point an unbeliever wants to believe then he can believe. There is no outward coercion that keeps a person from believing when he/she wants to. Wanting to be in the other group is sufcient for being in the other group. God determines what the person will do without Himself being the one who does it. This proves that God is not responsible for evil but does not offer an explanation for why God permitted evil.
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The third objection is that to be free a person must be able to choose what kind of being they are, whether they are rational or non-rational, yet in the Calvinist view he/she never had this option. The person who does not believe in God and suffers undesirable consequences because of his/her lack of saving faith might say that he/she wishes he/she had the option of being non-rational. Why did God make me a rational being? This question is self-defeating in that it asks, give me a reason for why I am a rational being, or give me a reason for why I need reasons. Perhaps the person will say, I wish I could reject belief in God and not suffer any consequences. But if the consequences are ontologically necessary, for instance, the result of rejecting God is not having a relationship with God, then they cannot be avoided. This cannot be said to be Gods fault. A nal objection is that while each person gets what he or she wants he/she is forced to want this. To answer this objection the Calvinist distinguishes between ontology and personhood. God creates persons as rational beings with beliefs and wants, and it is part of being a person to have wants. There is a certain sense in which I nd myself wanting particular things, perhaps because of my past choices, perhaps because of other reasons. And I may nd myself either wanting or not wanting to believe in God. However, what is important is that I can question this want and decide to want otherwise. Here Calvinism offers a corrective to the libertarian denition of free will. It is too simple to dene freedom as having other options because other options are irrelevant if one does not want them. What is important is doing what one wants to do without hindrance. And in the crucial area of belief in God the will is free in that nothing hinders a person from believing. Not only is there no hindrance, but if a person nds himself or herself in a condition they do not want to be in with respect to belief, they can change their positions simply by changing their belief. It is nonsensical to say, I want to believe in God but I cant because He wont let me. The Calvinist position preserves this deep kind of freedom, and a strong view of foreknowledge where God not only foreknows but also predetermines what will happen. In conclusion, the specic solutions considered by Zagzebski can be summarized by the three kinds of solutions offered by Erickson. Specifically, those that assume the libertarian view of freedom can be said to either solve the problem by locating God outside of time, through middle knowledge, or the Open View of God. The common attempts to solve the apparent problem between divine foreknowledge and free will share the libertarian denition of freedom which undermines their ability to solve the problem. However, in his recent book Erickson reminds his audience of the Calvinist position which has the ability to explain how God both predetermines and humans have free will. The Calvinist has answers to the objections that arise from the intuition that
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alternative possibilities are necessary for freedom. The Calvinist solution asserts not only that God foreknows whether a person will believe in him or not, but predetermines this. However, this predetermination does not take away responsibility or freedom. As the creator and primary cause God determines what will come about. This is a much stronger claim than the solutions Zagzebski considered were willing to make. However, while God is the creator, no person is kept from doing what he wants. At the end of the day no one will be able to look back and say, I wanted to believe in God but I wasnt allowed, or I didnt want to believe in God but I was forced to do so. There is freedom of the will with respect to belief in God. Owen Anderson teaches philosophy, religious studies, and history at Arizona State University.

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