Neldon Jay F. Verzosa February 5, 2014 Comparative Analysis 1. San Diego v. Nombre et. al with - Caro v.

CA and Estate of Olave v. Reyes

Analysis: In the first case, San Diego v. Nombre, the issue is the capacity and power of an administrator to lease the properties of the decedent. The rule provides that the executor or administrator has the power of administering the estate of the deceased for purposes of liquidation and distribution. He may, therefore, exercise all acts of administration without special authority of the Court. For instance, he may lease the property without securing previously any permission from the court. And where the lease has formally been entered into, the court cannot, in the same proceeding, annul the same, to the prejudice of the lessee, over whose person it had no jurisdiction. The proper remedy would be a separate action by the administrator or the heirs to annul the lease. Also, it was discussed that although the duties of a judicial administrator and an agent are similar in some aspects, the provisions on agency, which is found in the Civil Code should not apply to a judicial administrator. Thus, certain circumstances in agency are not true in being a judicial administrator. In the second case, Caro v. Court of Appeals, it deals with an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust, which prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. Lastly, while the first case talks about capacity of an administrator and the second case is about trustees, the third case focuses on the claims of parties with emphasis on Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court which states that, "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.". The law is clear that where the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate court. 2. De Guzman v. De Guzman Carillo with - Kalaw v. IAC

Analysis: Both cases are about the proper application of Rule 85 of the Rules of Court on the Accountability of Executors and Administrators. In De Guzman v. De Guzman Carillo, it specifically discussed on Sections 1 and 7 of the said Rule. The issue is on the propriety of certain disbursements as administration expenses made by the administrator. In Kalaw v. IAC, the significant provision is Section 8 of the said Rule regarding the duty of an executor or administrator which is to render an account of his administration within one (1) year from the time of receiving letters testamentary or of administration, unless the court otherwise directs because of extensions of time for presenting claims against, or paying the debts of, the estate, or for disposing of the estate. 3. Uy Tioco v. Imperial et. al with - Rodriguez v. Ynza

Analysis: Both cases tackle on the claims for payment of attorney's fees for services rendered in the settlement of the estate of the deceased. In Uy Tioco v. Imperial, an Atty. cannot hold the estate directly liable for his fees. The liability for the payment rests on the executor or administrator, but if the fees paid are beneficial to the estate and reasonable, he is entitled to the reimbursement from the estate. On the other hand, in Rodriguez v. Ynza, a trustee or administrator who happens to be a lawyer, may engage the services of another lawyer for the benefit of the estate of the deceased. 4. First National Bank of New York v. Cheng Tan with PNB v. CA and Chua

Analysis: In First National Bank of New York v. Cheng Tan, the court argued that although the judgment has been reduced into a mere of right of action; still it does not argue against the proposition that it should be filed with the probate court for corresponding action. To the contrary, reduced, as it has been, to the condition of a mere right of action, it can well be likened to a promissory note. Like the latter, therefore, it should be submitted as a claim to the probate court where the settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor is pending. In PNB v. CA and Chua, it pertains

to the remedies available to a morgagee. The remedies are alternative in nature and resort to one remedy waives a morgagees right to resort to others. 5. Gaskell v. Tan Sit with Buan v. Laya

Analysis: A 'contingent claim' against an estate is one in which liability depends on some future event which may or may not occur, so that duty to pay may never become absolute. In Gaskell v. Tan Sit, under the ordinary contract of suretyship the surety has no claim whatever against his principal until he himself pays something by way of satisfaction upon the obligation which is secured. When he does this, there instantly arises in favor of the surety the right to compel the principal to exonerate the surety. But until the surety has contributed something to the payment of the debt, or has performed the secured obligation in whole or in part, he has no right of action against anybody no claim that could be reduced to judgment. But, although it is thus evident that this claim in favor of Gaskell & Co. against Dy Poco is a contingent claim, it by no means follows that said claim can now be allowed against Dy Poco's estate in administration; for a contingent claim is effected by a discharge in bankruptcy the same as an absolute claim, and that this claim has in fact been so barred is easily demonstrable, by reference to section 56 of the insolvency Law, which reads in part as follows: Any person liable as bail, surety, or guarantor, or otherwise, for the debtor, who . . . has not paid the whole of said debt, but is still liable for the same, or any party thereof, may, if the creditor shall fail or omit to prove such debt, prove the same in the name of the creditor. (Act No. 1956, sec. 56.) However in the case of Buan v. Laya, the validity of the contingent claim is apparent; as the driver of the bus belonging to the deceased spouses, Florencio P. Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, was found guilty of negligence, as a result of which Juan C. Laya died, the said deceased spousesthe employers of the drivercan be made responsible, as masters of a servant, for damages for the death of the petitioner's father. 6. Santos v. Manarang with Quisumbing v. Guison

Analysis: In Santos v. Manarang, the court ruled that the direction in the will for the executor to pay all just debts does not mean that he shall pay them without probate. There is nothing in the will to indicate that the testator intended that his estate should be administered in any other than the regular way under the statute, which requires "all demands against the estates of the deceased persons," "all such demands as may be exhibited," etc. The statute provides the very means for ascertaining whether the claims against the estate or just debt. In the first case, the claim was not presented at all to the committee on claims which had to pass upon it according to the old law, and this court held that the admission of the debt in the testator's will was not a sufficient reason for the court to allow the creditor's claim which had not been presented to said committee. While, in Quisumbing v. Guison, the admission of the existence of the debt in the inventory filed by the administrator was considered by the court, not as sufficient cause for not filing the appellees claim at all, but as one of the reasonable causes or reasons for his failure to file it within the time previously limited.