Robert Grainger Ker Thompson

From Wikipedia,

Contents

1 Biography 2 Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences in # $u%!ished &orks ' (otes ) *eferences + Externa! !inks

a!aya and "ietnam

Biography
,hompson &as the son of Canon W- .- ,hompson- /e &ent to ar!%orough Co!!ege and took an 0 at 1idney 1ussex Co!!ege, Cam%ridge- Whi!e at Cam%ridge he 2oined the 3ni4ersity 0ir 15uadron and !earnt to f!y-617 /e &as commissioned into the *oya! 0ir Force *eser4e in 18#+-6citation needed7 In 18#9 he 2oined the a!ayan Ci4i! 1er4ice as a cadet-617 0t the start of Wor!d War II ,homson 2oined the *0F, and &as ser4ing in acao &hen the :apanese attacked-617 /e escaped the :apanese and &ith a suitcase fu!! of money and a kno&!edge of Cantonese, he gam%!ed his &ay across China to Burma-617 /e &as a !iaison officer &ith the Chindit in the Burma Campaign, %eing a&arded the D1; and the -C- <the !atter an unusua! army decoration for an *0F officer=- 627 >ater in the campaign he f!e& /urricanes and &as promoted to the rank of 15uadron >eader in 18')-617 0t the &ar?s end he returned to the a!ayan ci4i! ser4ice, %ecoming assistant commissioner of !a%our in the state of $erak in 18'+- 0fter attending the :oint 1er4ices 1taff Co!!ege at >atimer and ho!ding the !oca! rank of >ieutenant@Co!one!, he &as mem%er of the staff of the British director of operations during the a!ayan Emergency/e &ou!d !ater say that much of &hat he had !earned a%out counter insurgency operations &as !earned &hi!e ser4ing under >ieutenant@.enera! 1ir /aro!d Briggs and his rep!acement .enera! 1ir .era!d ,emp!er-617 In 18)8, <after a!yan independence=, ,hompson %ecame permanent secretary for defence for ,un 0%du! *aAak <&ho !ater %ecame a!ayan prime minister=-617 In response to a re5uest from $resident (go Dinh Diem of 1outh "ietnam, ,unku 0%du! *ahman, the a!ayan prime minister sent a team to 1outh "ietnam to ad4ise Diem on ho& to counter his insurgency pro%!ems- ,hompson headed that team &hich so impressed Diem that he asked the British to second ,hompson to the go4ernment 1outh "ietnam as an ad4isor-617

In 1eptem%er 18+1 the British $rime inister /aro!d acmi!!an appointed him head of the ne&!y esta%!ished B*I0 <British 0d4isory ission= to 1outh "ietnam @ and %y extension Washington-6#7 ,hompson concei4ed of an initiati4e he ca!!ed the De!ta $!an %ut &hen he sa& the effects of the strategic ham!ets initiati4e, %egun in Fe%ruary 18+2 he %ecame an enthusiastic %acker, te!!ing $resident Bennedy in 18+# that he fe!t the &ar cou!d %e &on- 3nder ,hompson?s !eadership B*I0 put economic pressure on the 1outh "ietnamese go4ernment that ,hompson descri%ed as a Cstraight in4itation to a coupC-6'76)7 Bennedy &as recepti4e to ,hompson?s ideas %ut the 0merican mi!itary esta%!ishment &ere extreme!y re!uctant to imp!ement them- /is &arning not to %om% 4i!!ages &ent unheeded and his dismissa! of 0merican air supremacy &as ignored- C,he &ar 6&i!!7 %e &on %y %rains and on footC, he to!d Bennedy %ut competing interests in Washington and 1aigon acted to margina!ise ,hompson and u!timate!y his strategies had no rea! effect on the conf!ict- /e stepped do&n from B*I0 in 18+) and the organisation, depri4ed of the man &ho &as essentia!!y its raison d?etre, fo!ded up around himDespite his re!ati4e!y acrimonious criticism of 3nited 1tates po!icy in "ietnam, ,hompson returned to a post assisting the 0merican go4ernment in 18+8 &hen he %ecame a specia! ad4isor on CpacificationC to $resident (ixonIn !ater !ife ,hompson &rote extensi4e!y a%out the use of commandos and counter@ insurgency operations in 0symmetric &arfare-

Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences in Malaya an !ietnam

Certain princip!es of counter@insurgency &arfare are &e!! kno&n since the 18)Ds and 18+Ds- ,he &ide!y distri%uted and inf!uentia! &ork of 1ir *o%ert ,hompson offers se4era! such guide!ines- ,hompson?s under!ying assumption is that of a country minima!!y committed to the ru!e of !a& and %etter go4ernanceE!ements of ,hompson?s moderate approach are adapted here:6+7 1- The people are the "ey base to be secure an efen e rather than territory #on or enemy bo ies counte - Contrary to the focus of con4entiona! &arfare, territory gained, or casua!ty counts are not of o4erriding importance in counter@guerri!!a &arfare- ,he support of the popu!ation is the key 4aria%!e1ince many insurgents re!y on the popu!ation for recruits, food, she!ter, financing, and other materia!s, the counter@insurgent force must focus its efforts on pro4iding physica! and economic security for that popu!ation and defending it against insurgent attacks and propaganda2- There must be a clear political counter$%ision that can o%ersha o#& match or neutrali'e the guerrilla %ision- ,his can range from granting po!itica! autonomy, to economic de4e!opment measures in the affected region- ,he 4ision must %e an integrated approach, in4o!4ing po!itica!, socia! and economic and media inf!uence measures- 0 nationa!ist narrati4e for examp!e, might %e used in one situation, an ethnic autonomy approach in another- 0n aggressi4e media

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campaign must a!so %e mounted in support of the competing 4ision or the counter@insurgent regime &i!! appear &eak or incompetent(ractical action must be ta"en at the lo#er le%els to match the competiti%e political %ision) It may %e tempting for the counter@insurgent side to simp!y dec!are guerri!!as CterroristsC and pursue a harsh !i5uidation strategy- Brute force ho&e4er, may not %e successfu! in the !ong run- 0ction does not mean capitu!ation, %ut sincere steps such as remo4ing corrupt or ar%itrary officia!s, c!eaning up fraud, %ui!ding more infrastructure, co!!ecting taxes honest!y, or addressing other !egitimate grie4ances can do much to undermine the guerri!!as? appea!Economy of force- ,he counter@insurgent regime must not o4erreact to guerri!!a pro4ocations, since this may indeed %e &hat they seek to create a crisis in ci4i!ian mora!e- Indiscriminate use of firepo&er may on!y ser4e to a!ienate the key focus of counterinsurgency@ the %ase of the peop!e- $o!ice !e4e! actions shou!d guide the effort and take p!ace in a c!ear frame&ork of !ega!ity, e4en if under a 1tate of Emergency- Ci4i! !i%erties and other customs of peacetime may ha4e to %e suspended, %ut again, the counter@insurgent regime must exercise restraint, and c!ea4e to order!y procedures- In the counter@insurgency context, C%oots on the groundC are e4en more important than techno!ogica! pro&ess and massi4e firepo&er, a!though anti@guerri!!a forces shou!d take fu!! ad4antage of modern air, arti!!ery and e!ectronic &arfare assets-6E7 Big unit action may sometimes be necessary) If po!ice action is not sufficient to stop the guerri!!a fighters, mi!itary s&eeps may %e necessary- 1uch C%ig %atta!ionC operations may %e needed to %reak up significant guerri!!a concentrations and sp!it them into sma!! groups &here com%ined ci4ic@po!ice action can contro! them*ggressi%e mobility) o%i!ity and aggressi4e sma!! unit action is extreme!y important for the counter@insurgent regime- /ea4y formations must %e !ightened to aggressi4e!y !ocate, pursue and fix insurgent units- /udd!ing in static strongpoints simp!y concedes the fie!d to the insurgents- ,hey must %e kept on the run constant!y &ith aggressi4e patro!s, raids, am%ushes, s&eeps, cordons, road%!ocks, prisoner snatches, etcGroun le%el embe ing an integration) In tandem &ith mo%i!ity is the em%edding of hardcore counter@insurgent units or troops &ith !oca! security forces and ci4i!ian e!ements- ,he 31 arines in "ietnam a!so sa& some success &ith this method, under its C0$ <Com%ined 0ction $rogram= &here arines &ere teamed as %oth trainers and CstiffenersC of !oca! e!ements on the ground31 1pecia! Forces in "ietnam !ike the .reen Berets, a!so caused significant !oca! pro%!ems for their opponents %y their !eadership and integration &ith mo%i!e tri%a! and irregu!ar forces-697 ,he CI0?s 1pecia! 0cti4ities Di4ision created successfu! guerri!!a forces from the /mong tri%e during the &ar in "ietnam in the 18+Ds,687 from the (orthern 0!!iance against the ,a!i%an during the &ar in 0fghanistan in 2DD1,61D7 and from the Burdish $eshmerga against 0nsar a!@Is!am and the forces of 1addam /ussein during the &ar in Ira5 in 2DD#61176127 In Ira5, the 2DDE 31 CsurgeC strategy sa& the em%edding of regu!ar and specia! forces troops among Ira5i army units- ,hese hardcore groups &ere a!so incorporated into !oca! neigh%orhood outposts in a %id to faci!itate inte!!igence gathering, and to strengthen ground !e4e! support among the masses-6E7 Cultural sensiti%ity) Counter@insurgent forces re5uire fami!iarity &ith the !oca! cu!ture, mores and !anguage or they &i!! experience numerous difficu!ties-

0mericans experienced this in "ietnam and during the 31 in4asion of Ira5i and occupation, &here shortages of 0ra%ic speaking interpreters and trans!ators hindered %oth ci4i! and mi!itary operations-61#7 8- +ystematic intelligence effort) E4ery effort must %e made to gather and organiAe usefu! inte!!igence- 0 systematic process must %e set up to do so, from casua! 5uestioning of ci4i!ians to structured interrogations of prisoners- Creati4e measures must a!so %e used, inc!uding the use of dou%!e agents, or e4en %ogus C!i%erationC or sympathiAer groups that he!p re4ea! insurgent personne! or operations1D- Metho ical clear an hol ) 0n Cink spotC c!ear and ho!d strategy must %e used %y the counter@insurgent regime, di4iding the conf!ict area into sectors, and assigning priorities %et&een them- Contro! must expand out&ard !ike an ink spot on paper, systematica!!y neutra!iAing and e!iminating the insurgents in one sector of the grid, %efore proceeding to the next- It may %e necessary to pursue ho!ding or defensi4e actions e!se&here, &hi!e priority areas are c!eared and he!d11- Careful eployment of mass popular forces an special units) ass forces inc!ude 4i!!age se!f@defense groups and citiAen mi!itias organiAed for community defense and can %e usefu! in pro4iding ci4ic mo%i!iAation and !oca! security1pecia!ist units can %e used profita%!y, inc!uding commando s5uads, !ong range reconnaissance and Chunter@ki!!erC patro!s, defectors &ho can track or persuade their former co!!eagues !ike the Bit Carson units in "ietnam, and parami!itary sty!e groups12- The limits of foreign assistance must be clearly efine an carefully use ) 1uch aid shou!d %e !imited either %y time, or as to materia! and technica!, and personne! support, or %oth- Whi!e outside aid or e4en troops can %e he!pfu!, !ack of c!ear !imits, in terms of either a rea!istic p!an for 4ictory or exit strategy, may find the foreign he!per Ctaking o4erC the !oca! &ar, and %eing sucked into a !engthy commitment, thus pro4iding the guerri!!as &ith 4a!ua%!e propaganda opportunities as the to!! of dead foreigners mounts- 1uch a scenario occurred &ith the 31 in "ietnam, &ith the 0merican effort creating dependence in 1outh "ietnam, and &ar &eariness and protests %ack home- /ea4y@handed foreign interference may a!so fai! to operate effecti4e!y &ithin the !oca! cu!tura! context, setting up conditions for fai!ure1#- Time) 0 key factor in guerri!!a strategy is a dra&n@out, protracted conf!ict that &ears do&n the &i!! of the opposing counter@insurgent forces- Democracies are especia!!y 4u!nera%!e to the factor of time- ,he counter@insurgent force must a!!o& enough time to get the 2o% done- Impatient demands for 4ictory centered around short@term e!ectora! cyc!es p!ay into the hands of the guerri!!as, though it is e5ua!!y important to recogniAe &hen a cause is !ost and the guerri!!as ha4e &on-

(ublishe #or"s
This list is incomplete Judgement on Major General O C Wingate, DSO, &ritten on %eha!f of the Chindits ;!d Comrades 0ssociation in co!!a%oration &ith Brigadier $- W- ead <>idde!! /art Centre for i!itary 0rchi4es= Defeating Communist Insurgency !"periences in Malaya and #ietnam $Study in International Security%, Chatto F Windus, 18++, I1B( D@ED11@11##@G-

<Extracts of this %ook &as distri%uted %y the Ca!cutta chief of po!ice to Benga!i po!ice men in Decem%er 18ED during the naxa!ite insurgency in Ca!cutta=-61'7 Defeating communist insurgency e"periences from Malaya and #ietnam, 18++ C0merica fights the &rong &arC, The Spectator, 12 0ugust 18++ &oyal 'lying Corps $'amous &egts( S%, > Cooper, 18+9, I1B( D@9)D)2@D1D@G C15uaring the ErrorC in 'oreign )ffairs 0pri! 18+9- <0n issue &ith ' artic!es on "ietnam the other three authors &ere %y *oger /i!sman, Chester >- Cooper and /ami!ton Fish 0rmstrong=*o !"it 'rom #ietnam, Da4id cBay company, Inc-, (e& Hork, 18+8, I1B( D@ ED11@1'8'@D Inter4ie&ed %y Frank *eyno!ds on 0BC@," 1E Decem%er 18+8 &e+olutionary ,ar in ,orld strategy, -./01-.2. First Edition <3-B-=, >ondon: artin 1ecker F War%urg, 18ED, I1B( D@'#+)@2D)1@+61)7 3eace Is *ot )t 4and, (e& Hork: Da4id cBay, >ondon: Chatto and Windus, 18E', I1B( D@ED11@2D)E@+ C*ear Bases and 1anctuariesC in 5essons of #ietnam, editors ,hompson, W1cott and Dona!dson D- FriAAe!!, $u% ,ay!or F Francis, Incorporated, 18EE War in 3eace )n )nalysis of Warfare Since -./0, <consu!tant editor= 1891, ;ctopus $u%!ishing >imited, >ondon, I1B( D@9)+1#@#'1@9 Ma6e for the 4ills, an auto%iography, >ondon, $en F 1&ord BooksI>eo Cooper, 1898, I1B( D@9)D)2@E+1@8

,otes
12#')+J :ump up to: a b c d e f g h i j k ,imes staff 1882-ump up . C,he citation ga4e, as part exp!anation for the a&ard to an *0F man of an 0rmy meda!, the fact that Wing Commander ,hompson &as ?a!&ays to the fore &ith his tommy@gun?-C <,imes staff 1882= -ump up . Busch 2DD#, pp-#+K++ -ump up . Busch 2DD#, p- 1+' -ump up . Berg 2DDE, p- 8' -ump up . *o%ert ,hompson <18++=- Defeating Communist Insurgency The 5essons of Malaya and #ietnam, Chatto F Windus, I1B( D@ED11@11##@G J :ump up to: a b etA, 1te4en <Decem%er 2DD+=- C>earning from Ira5: Counterinsurgency in 0merican 1trategyC- 31 0rmy 1trategic 1tudies Institute monograph- *etrie4ed :une 1, 2DDE-ump up . ichae! >ee >anning and Danie! Craig, CInside the "C and ("0C, and CInside the >**$?sC -ump up . Shooting at the Moon The Story of )merica7s Clandestine War in 5aos, 1teerforth $ress, 188+ I1B( 8E9@1@99#+'2@#+@) -ump up . 8ush at War, Bo% Wood&ard, 1imon and 1chuster, 2DD2 -ump up . Operation 4otel California The Clandestine War inside Ira9, ike ,ucker, Char!es Faddis, 2DD9, ,he >yons $ress I1B( 8E9@1@)8821@#++@9 -ump up . 3lan of )ttac6L Bo% Wood&ard, 1imon F 1chuster, 2DD' I1B( 8E9@D@E'#2@))'E@8 -ump up . >earning from Ira5, op- cit-ump up . Calcutta -.:0 1 -.;-( )u coeur des cr<ations et des r<+oltes du si=cle- Editions 0utrement, $aris, 188E-ump up . 5iam7s &e+ie,s > &e+olutionary War In World Strategy -./01 -.2., .oodreads, 2E Fe%ruary 2D12

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References

Busch, $eter <2DD#=, )ll the ,ay ,ith J'?@ 8ritain, the AS, and the #ietnam War, ;xford 3ni4ersity $ress, I1B( D@18@82)+#8@G Berg, anfred <2DDE=, Berg, anfredL Etges, 0ndreas, eds-, John '( ?ennedy and the BThousand DaysB ne, perspecti+es on the foreign and domestic policies of the ?ennedy administration, 1'' of 0merican studies, Winter, I1B( #@92)#@)#D#@+ ,imes staff <2D ay 1882=, C;%ituary: 1ir *o%ert ,hompsonC, The Times