SheIdon !"##"$% Columbia University, New York To a degree that may prove to be more far-reaching than I can demonstrate within the Iimits of the essay that foIIows, the theoreticaI understanding of rasa was shaped by its historicaI extension from the domain where it was nrst formuIated, that of djsyakavya Iiterature meant to be seen, that is, drama to the domain of sravyakavya Iiterature meant to be heard, that is, poetry recited and undoubtedIy read privateIy. There is nothing very originaI about positing such an extension (though the stages in the process have never been identined as weII as they might be), yet I beIieve its true consequences remain to be fuIIy assessed. I hope to show here that one of these pertains to the number and kinds of emotion that can count as rasas. Other cruciaI aspects of the inteIIectuaI history of rasa theory may be impIicated as weII, incIuding notions of its very ontoIogy and epistemoIogy: where it exists and how it comes to be known. My thoughts here are tentative, unIike the admira- tion and aection with which I oer them in honor of one of the great rasikas among Sanskrit schoIars of our time. I. Literature Seen and Heard Before we can reconstruct the history of the extension of aestheticaI anaIysis from the dramatic to the non-dramatic, we need to show that the Sanskrit tradition dierentiated between the two types of Iiterature, or better yet, that it drew an opposition indicating that anaIysis appIicabIe in the one domain might not be automaticaIIy appIicabIe in the other. WhiIe the specinc binary seen / heard is found as earIy as the Kavyadarsa (1.39), it is not without some conceptuaI dimcuIties. For one thing, the representation (abhinaya) that dennes djsyakavya itseIf comprises in some measure the verbaIization constitutive of sravyakavya, 1 softening any hard distinction between them. For another, when kavya is distinguished from sastra, as it very frequentIy is (thus Bhoja, for instance, decIares that Sanskrit discourse 1. In some measure, that is, one-quarter, since there are three other types of representation beside vacika, verbaI (nameIy, angika, physicaI; sattvika, psychophysicaI; aharika, costuming). But note that Natyasastra 1.11 speaks of drama itseIf as both djsya and sravya. From: In Aux abords de la clairire, ed. Caterina Guenzi and Sylvia dIntino. Paris: Brepols, 2012, pp. 189-207. Collections rudites de lEcole Pratique des Hautes Etudes. Sheldon Pollock 190 can be scripturaI, traditionaI, or mundane. Mundane discourse is sastra and kavya), 2 drama and Iiterature are no doubt both subsumed under the same term, and any distinction between them is bracketed. That said, not onIy were the two genres categoricaIIy dierentiated; they were often radicaIIy opposed, as we can see in the contest between them for primacy in the minds of Iiterary critics that became a running dispute in the tenth and eIeventh centuries. Bhoja merits quoting in fuII: It is dimcuIt to specify what preciseIy rasa is, since it is knowabIe onIy expe- rientiaIIy, and is not universaIIy accessibIe. When dispIayed by skiIIed actors in correctIy performed dramatic presentations, it can be determined by the audience; when properIy 3 decIaimed by great poets in their compositions, it can become accessibIe to the minds of the Iearned. However, [there is a dif- ference between these two modes of experience:| things are not so sweetIy savored when they are actuaIIy perceived as when they are cognized through the Ianguage of masters of Ianguage. To quote: A subject does not expand the heart so powerfuIIy when we see it portrayed as when it ashes forth from the words of great poets decIaimed with art. Therefore we prize poets far more than actors, and poetry more than dramatic representations 4 . As an anonymous verse puts it, The Ianguage of poetry and the representa- tions of drama are the two ways [of expressing rasa|. The former is superior in this by reason of the range of its narrative power (vastusaktimahimna) 5 . Abhinavagupta, by contrast, eIevated drama to the paradigmatic form of Iiterature, enIisting oIder schoIars in his cause: Other thinkers argue that the reIishing of rasa can occur in poetry no Iess than in drama, produced by the exceptionaI beauty of its Ianguage quaIities and rhetoricaI ngures. Our view, however, is as foIIows: First of aII, Iiterature is comprised chiey of the ten dramatic forms. For it is there that, thanks to the appropriate Ianguages, cuIturaI modes, intonations, costumes, and so on, the presence of rasa achieves pIenitude. In a Iiterary work Iike a courtIy epic, by contrast, we even have femaIe protagonists speaking in Sanskrit, one of many improprieties that nnd pIace in the narrative simpIy because it is not possibIe to do otherwise 6 however much it may not seem inappropriate, in view of 2. Srngaraprakasa, voI. I (&' )*+,-)+ .' )*+,-)+ (eds.), Srngaraprakasa of Bhojaraja, 2voI., New DeIhi, Indira Gandhi NationaI Centre for the Arts, 2007), p. 163-164. 3. I conjecture yathavat for yavad. 4. Srngaraprakasa, p. 2-3. 5. Cited by Srdhara (c. 1400) whiIe restating Bhoja`s view. See Kavyaprakasa (/' 0"123 (ed.), Kavyaprakasa [of Mammata|, solah tikaom sahit, 6 voI., DeIhi, Nag Prakashan, 1995-), voI. 1, p. 77. 6. PresumabIy because of the genre constraints of the courtIy epic (rather than the incapacity of the poet to become a pIaywright, so &' !' %234#-, Rasa-Bhava-Vicara, Bombay, Maharashtra Rajya Sahitya-Samskrti MandaI, 1973, p. 196). From Rasa Seen to Rasa Heard 191 the maxim that you Iike whatever you are given 7 . This is preciseIy the reason it has been argued, as noted earIier, that Among aII the varieties of Iiterary composition the best is drama in any of its ten mimetic forms. Other Iiterary works, from the courtIy epic to the isoIate verse, come into being by borrow- ing structures such as acts and scenes from the ten forms 8 . Whatever other questions may be at issue here, it shouId be cIear that by the beginning of the eIeventh century and no doubt far earIier, drama, or Iiterature seen, and poetry, or Iiterature heard, constituted two fundamentaIIy dierent and dierentiated forms of Iiterature, and indeed, that there aIready was a dispute about the extension of rasa anaIysis from the one sphere to the other. Thus when Bhatta Tota, Abhinavagupta`s teacher, asserts that there is in fact no such thing as non-dramatic Iiterature, he wouId seem to be responding to a new argument (one aIready contested by Abhinava himseIf) on the extensibiIity of rasa theory: Rasa exists onIy in drama, and in poetry onIy to the degree that it mimics drama. For as my teacher has argued, with respect to the eIements of the Iiterary text, rasa comes into being onIy when a state of awareness simuIat- ing visuaI perception (pratyaksakalpasamvedana-) comes into being. To quote his Kavyakautuka (Literary Investigations), So Iong as poetry does not approximate the character of a performance, there can be no possibiIity of savoring rasa 9 . II. Assimilating the Analytic If the distinction between visuaI-dramatic and auraI-poetic Iiterature was thus cIearIy estabIished from a reIativeIy earIy date, the Sanskrit tradition nowhere expIains how an aesthetic theory deveIoped for the former couId be appIied to the Iatter and indeed, why it shouId be. For the most part we are Ieft to reconstruct this deveIopment by inference. The nrst and, so far as I can see, the soIe expIicit decIaration on the subject comes from Rudrabhatta`s Srngaratilaka (databIe to somewhere in the period 950-1100): GeneraIIy speaking, the nature of rasa has been discussed by Bharata and others in reference to drama. I shaII examine it here, according to my own Iights, in reference to poetry 10 . We are justined I think in pushing this attempt at integration back to the time of Rudrata`s Kavyalankara, the source of so much of the Srngaratilaka: When Rudrata remarks that the greatest eort 7. tavativa hjdyam. My transIation is uncertain. 8. Abhinavabharati (%' %&+.1320""&516 (ed.), Natyasastra of Bharata, with the Abhinavabharati of Abhinavagupta, 4 th ed., Baroda, OrientaI Institute, 1992), p. 285. The citation is from Vmana, Kavyalankarasutra 1.3.3 (&' 4' 712552 (ed.), Kavyalankarasutra and Vrtti of Vamana, Varanasi, Braj B. Das, 89:;). 9. Abhinavabharati, p. 284. 10. Srngaratilaka 1.5: prayo natyam prati prokta bharatadyai rasasthitih / yathamati mayapy esa kavyam prati nigadyate // (&' !+.$1-# (ed.), Rudrata's [sic| rngaratilaka and Ruyyaka's Sahrdayalila, KieI, C. F. HaeseIer, 1886). Sheldon Pollock 192 must be made to invest kavya with rasa 11 he was sureIy referring to auraI- poetic Iiterature, since his work has nothing to say about drama. This wouId bring the date for the assimiIation of sravyakavya into the anaIytic of rasa to sometime in the middIe or Iatter haIf of the ninth century. This dating nts with what earIier works that touch on rasa have to teII us, a story that is weII known but bears restating. The Natyasastra, a composite text the core of which is probabIy not Iater than the fourth century, introduces the theory (in a confused and much edited form in the manuscripts now avaiIabIe) entireIy within the domain of dramaturgy. By contrast, the earIiest extant texts of Iiterary theory more narrowIy conceived, Bhmaha`s Kavyalankara (c. 650) and Dandin`s Kavyadarsa (Kavyalaksana, c. 700), are concerned excIusiveIy with auraI-poetic Iiterature, and whiIe both are aware of the dramaturgicaI theory they conceive of rasa excIusiveIy as one or another type of rhetoricaI ngure 12 . Their precise arguments concerning the tropes rasavat, preyah, and urjasvi are not easy to expIain in brief compass 13 . In the simpIest terms, these aII represent expressions of heightened feeIing: where a given emotion cIearIy manifests itseIf (rasavat); where a warmIy feIt compIiment is conveyed (preyah), where a character`s arrogance or vehemence is expressed (urjasvi). And whiIe not embodying the indirection (vakrata) that dennes other alankaras, these emotion-tropes nonetheIess remain speciaIized uses of Ianguage and hence are capabIe of being understood as ngures of speech. The expression of heightened emotion in the character, of course may indeed coincide with Bhatta LoIIata`s understanding of rasa, which constitutes the oIdest, or cIassicaI, view: that is, the view cIearIy impIicit in the Natyasastra, ascribed to Dandin himseIf and the other ancients by Abhinavagupta, 14 and preserved as Iate as Bhoja. Yet for both Bhmaha and Dandin the representation of emotion in auraI-poetic Iiterature is subordi- nate to and therefore subsumed under the dominant discourse on alankaras. Nowhere in this earIy work is rasa considered anything more than a trope; it certainIy does not yet, as it was soon to do, constitute the heart of Iiterariness. 11. Kavyalankara 12.2: tat kavyam [conj. for the unmetricaI tasmat tat| kartavyam yatnena mahiyasa rasair yuktam (Rudrabhatta had this v. in mind when he writes tasmad yatnena kartavyam kavyam rasanirantaram, Srngaratilaka 1.8) ()<&42!&2.2) *' #' .' !23.+%2& (eds.), Kavyalankara of Rudrata, with the Commentary of Namisadhu, Bombay, Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1928). Note Rudrata is stiII writing alankarasastra for makers of Iiterature rather than readers. 12. For the dates here see 6' 7&"33-&, A Question of Priority: Revisiting the Bhmaha- Dandin Debate, Journal of Indian Philosophy, in press. For the anaIysis of rasa as a trope in earIy alankarasastra, #' 0$$&-2= The Teleology of Poetics in Medieval Kashmir, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 2008. WhiIe Dandin regards dramaturgy as the object of a separate science (1.31) he is fuIIy aware of the doctrine of eight rasas: astarasayatta rasavatta smjta giram, Kavyadarsa 2.290 (2' 512%<& <' /12 (eds.), Kavyalaksana [= Kavyadarsa| of Dandin, with the Commentary of Ratnasrijana, Darbhanga, MithiIa Institute of Post-graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1957). 13. Bhmaha adds severaI more such ngures of aect (Kavyalankara 3.5-11) but Dandin`s three become canonicaI. 14. Abhinavabharati, p. 266. From Rasa Seen to Rasa Heard 193 Udbhata (. 800) marks the nnaI and, by his date, contradictory stage of this rhetoricaI anaIysis of aesthetic emotion. On the one hand, as we might expect from the nrst known commentator on the Natyasastra, Udbhata redennes the expressions of aect to approximate the fuII rasa typoIogy: rasavat, which for previous writers was simpIy heightened emotion, now and for the nrst time becomes the full realization of rasa with the compIete panopIy of aesthetic eIements (vibhavadi); 15 preyah (in the now oddIy overdetermined form preyasvat), 16 earIier an emotionaI compIiment, becomes the intimation of an emotion (or bhavakavya, as his commentator Pratihrendurja notes); urjasvi, formerIy pridefuI expression, becomes rasabhasa, or semblance of rasa, marked by sociaI impropriety. On the other hand, however, and despite this approximation to the dramaturgicaI modeI, Udbhata continues to categorize aII these as ngures of speech, on the same order as, say, the eIevated (udatta) ngure, where some richIy appointed object or the deed of a great being is intended as an indicative characteristic and not as an event in itseIf (4.8); 17 that is, he ranks them just as Bhmaha and Dandin had done, on the same IeveI as the expression of irony (paryayoktam) or the description of providentiaI heIp (samahita). By the end of the ninth century Pratihrendurja was confessing how markedIy the conceptuaI terrain had shifted from the time of Udbhata: Whether the rasas and the emotions, given that they are the source of the highest Iiterary beauty, are ornaments of Iiterature or its very Iife force wiII not be a subject for consideration here Iest it unduIy Iengthen the book 18 . Pratihrendurja`s confusion (and unfortunate reIuctance to dispIay it) was understandabIe, since onIy a few decades earIier, around the time of Rudrata, Anandavardhana in his Dhvanyaloka (c. 875) had fuIIy assimiIated rasa theory in the anaIysis of auraI-poetic Iiterature. AIthough according to Anandavardhana`s Iinguistics of Iiterary communication not aII Iiterature is concerned with the communication of rasa, when rasa is present it becomes the centraI organizing component of the work, to which aII other features must be subordinated (The nrst domain of action, for a good poet, is rasa) 19
That said, rasa itseIf has an astonishingIy undertheorized, taken-for-granted. presence in Ananda`s treatise. He never actuaIIy teIIs us what it is or why it shouId in fact be centraI to the Iiterary work, and he never expIains how the 15. This is intimated in Kavyadarsa 2.279, but not fuIIy deveIoped. 16. Both iyasu and matup are used in the sense of atisaya, see Ratnasrjna on Kavyadarsa 2.237 (the printed text is corrupt, and is corrected in .' !"##"$%, Reader on Rasa: An Historical Sourcebook of Classical Indian Aesthetics, New York, CoIumbia University Press, forthcoming). 17. Kavyalankarajsara]samgraha 4.8 (0' &' 5-#234 (ed.), Kavyalankarajsara]samgraha of Udbhata, with the Commentary of Pratihahrenduraja, Bombay, Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1928). Bhmaha`s understanding of the ngure is nobiIity of character (3.11). 18. Kavyalankarajsara]samgraha 4.5. 19. Dhvanyaloka (!' .12.5&+ (ed.), Dhvanyaloka of Anandavardhana, with the Commentaries of Abhinavagupta and Ramasaraka, Varanasi, Chaukhambha, 1940), p. 364. For the Iarger question of the rise of a Iiterary teIeoIogy, see 0$$&-2, The Teleology of Poetics. Sheldon Pollock 194 reader becomes aware of it or experiences it. This can onIy be because Ananda had unquestioningIy accepted the cIassicaI view of rasa, as I suggested we caII it, with its presuppositions and particuIar anaIyticaI focus. The focus and presuppositions I can onIy touch on at the end of this essay; the important point to stress here is that the assimiIation of rasa theory into poetry was now an accompIished fact. III. Eight, Nine. Many Rasas The nrst consequence of the extension of rasa theory, from drama you see into poetry you hear, that occurred graduaIIy over the course of the ninth century is aIso one of the more specuIative. This concerns the nature of the rasas and specincaIIy their number. Lven the most supernciaI reading of the history of aesthetic theory wiII register how, after a certain point, a dispute arose over whether there may be additionaI aective states that can count as rasa; one of the few inteIIigent books on rasa is in fact devoted to this probIem, V. Raghavan`s The Number of Rasas. These states incIude, famousIy, santa, the tranquiI rasa, which was the earIiest object of controversy, and bhakti, devotion, one of the Iatest, with many other contestants for incIusion in between 20 . Indeed, from the moment dramatic rasa nrst became poetic rasa, thinkers began to question the numer- icaI Iimit that Bharata had pIaced upon the category. This starts with Rudrata, whom we have identined as one of the earIiest theorists of rasa in auraI-poetic Iiterature: Insofar as the teachers have identined certain emotions as rasas because they can be tasted (rasanad), the way sweetness, sourness, and the Iike can be tasted, other emotions such as despair shouId be rasas as weII, since they, too, can by aII means be tasted 21 . And the questioning reaches a high water mark in the work of Bhoja, whose masterpiece, the Srngaraprakasa, engages with the probIem in its opening pages: The conventionaI wisdom that rasa refers to the heroic, the fantastic, and the remaining [six categories| has come out of nowhere and is hardIy more than a superstition, Iike the beIief that a given banyan tree is haunted by a gobIin. It 20. Santarasa is mentioned nrst (outside passages in the Natyasastra added at a much Iater date than the core materiaIs) in Udbhata`s Kavyalankarajsara]samgraha 4.4 (aImost certainIy an interpoIated verse), but it is known to and accepted by Anandavardhana; bhaktirasa nrst in Bhagavatamuktaphala of Vopadeva (c. 1300), ()' 712552$12&662 (ed.), jBhagavata] muktaphala of Vopadeva, with the Commentary of Hemadri, CaIcutta, CaIcutta OrientaI Press, 1944), p. 164, where the co-author / commentator Hemdri, with refreshing candor, decIares, Abhinavagupta and Hemacandra are wrong to deny that bhakti is a rasa (though it is not cIear where in fact this supposed deniaI is made). Raghavan argues, with some justice, that The advent of Snta Rasa seems to have set the writers thinking on the sanctity or otherwise of the number eight or nine pertaining to the Rasa-s (,' &2412,23, The Number of Rasas, Madras, Adyar Library, 1975, p. 118). 21. Kavyalankara 12.4. The text is cited approvingIy by Pratihrendurja (and misinterpreted by him; contrast Namisdhu ad Ioc.) in Kavyalankarajsara]samgraha, p. 52- 53, and by Bhoja (Sjngaraprakasa, p. 633); and disapprovingIy by Dhanika on Dasarupaka (5' ,-3%252$12&62 (ed.), Dasarupaka of Dhanajaya, with the Commentary of Dhanika and the Subcommentary of Bhatta Njsimha, Madras, Adyar Library, 1969), p. 203-204. From Rasa Seen to Rasa Heard 195 has onIy been accepted because of the inteIIectuaI conformity typicaI of the worId, and our intention in this work is to put it to rest. If aII emotions are equaIIy rasas, concIudes Bhoja after citing Rudrata, it makes no sense to appIy the technicaI terms the erotic rasa, the heroic rasa and so on onIy to those eight stabIe emotions, desire and the rest, when they are fuIIy deveIoped. One may do it but that wouId then be onIy a termi- noIogicaI distinction 22 . Bhoja himseIf, accordingIy, adds such rasas as the vaingIorious (uddhata, based on a new stabIe emotion garva, pride), the nobIe (udatta or urjasvin, based on mati, sagacity), and the rasa of tenderness or motherIy Iove (preyah or vatsalya, based on sneha, attachment, the Iast being suppIemented by Iater thinkers with brotherIy Iove or friendship between equaIs, and aection for a superior, a king for exampIe), as weII as the rasas of autonomy, heteronomy, bIiss, and abatement 23 . StiII other thinkers heId that any of the thirty-three transitory feeIings couId become rasa, from torpor (alasya) to vindictiveness (amarsa) to resentment (asuya), and so on down the aIphabet. As one tenth-century writer puts it, There is no mentaI state (cittavjtti) that cannot achieve enhancement and become rasa 24 . Bhoja assumed that the Iimitation on the emotions that couId count as rasa originated in mere unfounded convention (the standard view of rasa comes out of nowhere, rasaprasiddhih siddha kuto 'pi). But we know that within the tradition, a distinction was earIy on drawn between what couId and couId not count as rasa. Bhatta LoIIata argued, as Abhinavagupta reports, that, aIthough rasas were potentiaIIy innnite in number, it was the opinion of experts that onIy those Iisted by Bharata were capabIe of portrayaI on the stage 25 . AIthough Abhinava agrees on the Iimited number of rasas (etavanta eva ca rasah) his haughty dismissaI here (This IittIe bit of arrogance on LoIIata`s part can be safeIy ignored) impIies that he himseIf feIt Bharata`s Iist was restrictive, not (as LoIIata seems to have thought) by schoIarIy conven- tion, but by the nature of things, though eIsewhere he tries to expIain the restriction otherwise: These are the rasas, and there are nine and nine onIy. It is either because these aIone subserve the four ends of man or provide sustained pIeasure that this restricted number has become traditionaI 26 . 22. Srngaraprakasa, p. 2 and 633 (see aIso karika 11, p. 2); Sarasvatikanthabharana 5.23 (%' .2&02 (ed.), Sarasvatikanthabharanalankara of Bhoja, with the Commentaries of Ratnesvara and Jagaddhara, Bombay, Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1924). 23. Sarasvatikanthabharana, p. 627 (svatantrya, paravasya, ananda, prasama). These additions wiII not seem so odd when we consider that in 1859 an LngIish phiIosopher Iisted as emotions property, power, and knowIedge (4' 023)#-&, Lmotion, in )' %' >&--)1-+0 (ed.), Handbook of Psychology, I: History of Psychology, New York, WiIey, 2003, p. 157-175 (p. 158)). 24. The possibiIity that aII the transitory emotions can be rasas was nrst raised by Rudrata, Kavyalankara 12.3-4 ; the quotation in the text is from his commentator Namisdhu ad Ioc. 25. Abhinavabharati, p. 292, I. 22. 26. Abhinavabharati, p. 335, I. 8 (sustained insofar as sthayibhavas are enduring, unIike vyabhicaribhavas, or transitory emotions). See further beIow on the sthayitva of the sthayi. Abhinava reviews a range of opinion on why the transitory emotions are thirty-three in number, incIuding the view that the set is reaIIy an open one ; is meant mereIy for pedagogicaI purposes ; or is actuaIIy restrictive and driven by aesthetic concerns (Abhinavabharati, p. 373). Sheldon Pollock 196 For others, however, the Iimitation was made on the basis of the criteria that distinguish sravyakavya from djsyakavya. This is particuIarIy cIear from the treatment of santarasa, for which the argument of Dhanika (c. 975) is as forcefuI as any: Drama consists of representation, and by no means can we accept that in drama quiescence [sama, the stabIe emotion of santarasa| can function as a stabIe emotion. Quiescence signines cessation of aII activity and so cannot have any connection with representation 27 . To be sure, santarasa is a pecuIiar, even paradoxicaI, case emotionIess emotion and Dhanika`s judgment was not to go uncontested. But the impIication here, however faint, that the typoIogy of rasa was tied up with the typoIogy of Iiterature and the distinguishing features of each of Iiterature`s sub-species, points the way toward a fuIIer anaIysis. IV. The Science, and History, of Emotions It is not from the Indian tradition itseIf that we can derive this anaIysis the avaiIabIe data cannot, I beIieve, take us beyond where they have taken us so far but rather from research in cognitive science and studies in the science of the emotions. The point of adducing such perspectives is not to seek to penetrate to a scientinc core of the truth of emotion that exists entireIy outside of its history. As wiII become evident, emotions Iike Iife in generaI are historicaIIy contingent. But Iike Iife in generaI emotions have certain reaI and constant properties, and the point of turning to a science of emotions is to ask whether there may be anything more fundamentaI about the nature of emotions that can heIp us uncover the conceptuaI foundations of any given history, such as that of the traditionaI Indian, which presents a number of pecuIiar features. The history of emotion as embedded in the theory of rasa presents us not onIy with a conict over what is aIIowed to count as a dominant emotionaI register in Iiterature, but aIso with a very specinc Iist of what those regis- ters must be. RecaII for a moment the ceIebrated cataIogue of eight stabIe emotions in the Natyasastra: (sexuaI) desire, amusement, grief, anger, energy (or endurance), fear, revuIsion, and amazement. This Iist is puzzIing in various ways, but consider onIy the foIIowing two. Why shouId anger, which forms the basis of the vioIent rasa (raudra), gain entry onto the Iist but not hatred, sureIy an emotion as stabIe or primary as anger or any other in the group for Indians (as for Descartes and the moderns mentioned beIow)? 28 And why shouId sexuaI desire (rati), the basis of the erotic rasa (sjngara), be incIuded, 27. Dasarupaka, p. 202. That santarasa was perfectIy acceptabIe in non-dramatic Iiterature was a Iong-estabIished view, see ,' &2412,23, The Number of Rasas, p. 52-53 (Raghavan, engaging as he did with the tradition as if it were a Iiving one, was Iess interested in understanding the grounds for santa`s excIusion than in vindicating its incIusion, To grant it in Kvya and to deny it in Ntya is as cIumsy a compromise. p. 54). 28. Think onIy of SisupIa, who attained moksa not onIy despite hating Krishna (Bhagavatapurana 10.29.13), but because of it (Bhagavatapurana 10.74.46). Note that Nyya Iists hatred among the three dosas (raga, dvesa, and moha), and as one of the atmagunas, or properties of the seIf (see n. 33 beIow). From Rasa Seen to Rasa Heard 197 whiIe non-sexuaI aection (sneha), the basis of motherIy Iove (vatsalya), is excIuded? If we are to understand the criteria at work in this cIassincation, and what might account for Iater disagreement, we need to have some sense of what dennes an emotion as stabIe to begin with. UnfortunateIy, rasa texts themseIves rareIy oer any expIanation, and the thinkers who denne the concept do so other than psychoIogicaIIy or perceptu- aIIy. Dhanajaya (c. 975) seems to think in pureIy Iiterary terms: A stabIe emotion is one that is uninterrupted whether by conicting or non- conicting emotions. On the contrary, it subsumes other emotions, as the ocean subsumes rivers.. Despair and the other transitory emotions do not have that feature, and therefore cannot be stabIe emotions and cannot be savored. He impIies that stabIe emotions are stabIe because they cannot be interrupted, or expunged in a psychoIogicaI sense, but onIy says (as his commentator Dhanika onIy says) that they are not interrupted, or dispIaced in a Iiterary sense 29 . Abhinavagupta, for his part, conceives of the stabiIity of the stabIe emotions in what we might caII ethicaI terms, as we nnd in his discussion of inessentiaIity (apradhanata), the sixth of the seven impediments (vighnas) to aesthetic experience: No one`s awareness can come to rest upon something that is nonessentiaI (apradhana), since the moment that inessentiaI thing is cognized it hastens after something more essentiaI, and cannot come to rest in itseIf. The most essentiaI aesthetic components are those severaI forms of consciousness that pertain to the ends of man, that is, Iove, power, Iaw, and Iiberation. Thus, the stabIe emotion of desire pertains to Iove 30 as weII as to forms of power and Iaw that are necessariIy reIated to Iove; the stabIe emotion anger pertains to power among those given to anger, and can even eventuate in Iove or Iaw; the stabIe emotion energy can eventuate in any of the ends of man, Iaw and the rest; and Iast, quiescence, when it is the stabIe emotion and consisting IargeIy in dispas- sion brought about by true knowIedge, is the means of Iiberation. Hence, these stabIe emotions are the most essentiaI 31 . However eIegant Abhinava`s correIation of stabIe emotions with the ends of man, there is no evidence that it corresponds to anything in the conceptuaI structure of the Natyasastra or informed its cataIogue of stabIe emotions 32 . StabIe emotions are of course structuraIIy contrasted with transitory emotions 29. Dasarupaka 4.34, 36 (Dhanika`s comment here is fascinating, but does nothing to cIarify the stabiIity of the sthayin). 30. I read kama- (for kamah or [KA| kame). The editors of the Natyasastra and the corresponding passage in the Kavyanusasana mispunctuate the passage as a whoIe. 31. Abhinavabharati, p. 275-276. 32. The correIation was however aIready known to Pratihrendurja (on Kavyalankarajsara] samgraha 4.3-4). There is additionaIIy both a gender and a social inection to the stabIe emotions, from the time of the Natyasastra itseIf, that I can onIy register here: for exampIe, onIy women and adhamaprakjti, or persons of the Iowest sociaI order, feeI fear ; uttamaprakjti, persons of the highest sociaI order, onIy feign being afraid, for exampIe in the face of a Sheldon Pollock 198 (vyabhicari- or samcari-bhavas) but the dennition of the Iatter brings us no cIoser to understanding the stabiIity of the former. (In fact, they compIicate what preciseIy a bhava is, incIuding as they do such physicaI states as iIIness, dying, torpor, numbness, sIeeping, waking, and exhaustion.) The idea of an emotion Iist of the sort we nnd in Bharata is rare in systematic thought outside the discourse of rasa itseIf. To be sure, Nyya and Smkhya cataIogue emotions, as does Buddhism, of which Abhinava oers a brief, characteristicaIIy irreverent review when noting the schoIarIy discom- fort with the Iist of thirty-three transitory emotions: Some schoIars wonder how anyone couId possibIy cataIogue aII the various states of mind (cittavjtti). And they ask with respect to their enumeration how any given number couId capture this totaIity, whether the nine quaIities of the seIf Iogicized by Iogicians, the eight properties of the inteIIect num- bered by the numeroIogists of Smkhya, or the four types of apprehension (error and the Iike), or the duaIity mind and mentaI activities broadcast by Buddhists 33 . But in fact, the phiIosophicaI systems show IittIe reaI concern with the emotions, making no attempt to justify their Iists or indeed to more narrowIy distinguish among the various items 34 . This reIative unconcern seems especiaIIy odd in Iight of the interest in preciseIy this question shown by Western thinkers. We have been oered Iists constructed on the basis of what are no doubt radicaIIy diering physioIogies, epistemoIogies, and moraIities, and for radicaIIy dierent purposes by everyone from AristotIe (a very Iong one in the Rhetoric, incIuding anger, miIdness, Iove, enmity, fear, conndence, shame/shameIessness, benevoIence, pity, indignation, envy, emuIation, contempt) to Descartes (who in his Iast work, Passions de l'me, 1649, cataIogues the passions primitives as wonder, Iove, hate, desire, joy, transgression they may have made against a guru (Natyasastra, p. 347 ; Abhinavabharati, p. 325). 33. Abhinavabharati, p. 373. NormaIIy Nyya speaks of eight gunas (among the twenty-four) that pertain to the atma: buddhi, sukha, duhkha, iccha, dvesa, prayatna, dharma, adharma, presumabIy Abhinava here adds samskara. The Smkhyas` eight are dharma, adharma, jana, ajana, vairagya, avairagya, aisvarya, anaisvarya, and the four types of apprehension, viparyaya, asakti, tusti, and siddhi (see aIso &' !' %234#-, Rasa-Bhava-Vicara, Maharashtra Rajya Sahitya-Samskrti MandaI, Bombay, 1973, p. 438). 34. Buddhist Abhidharma, which provides Iists in profusion, may be an exception but it is concerned more with ethicaI dispositions than with what contemporary psychoIogy wouId identify as emotion (see 4' )&-6><., Asian Perspective: Indian Theories of Mind, in !' ?-#2?" et al. (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 89-114 (p. 100)). NonetheIess, the Iists of klesas, asravas, kasayas, anusayas, and other mentaI states merit attention for an inteIIectuaI history of rasa of the sort they have not received. Indeed, there is no comprehensive account of emotion in IndoIogicaI Iiterature, or even an adequate historicaI psychoIogy dierentiating the functions of manas, buddhi, antahkarana, citta, hjdaya (where rasa is often said to exist), and so on. From Rasa Seen to Rasa Heard 199 sadness) and Spinoza (who in his Ethics reduces a[ectus to pIeasure, pain, and desire, identifying the Iast as the very core) 35 . One of the striking if conspicuous things about these Western Iists is their variabiIity. Not onIy does the scientinc capacity for precision in describing the human meet something of its Iimit in demarking the subtIe gradations of the emotions, but emotions change over time. We have more and more evidence of the fact that new emotions emerge, and oId emotions disappear, sIowIy no doubt but assuredIy. In Western Lurope, meIanchoIy is a phenomenon of the post-Reformation era, boredom of the eighteenth century, and (perhaps not unreIatedIy), romantic Iove of the nineteenth. We know that emotions may fade to the point of vanishing (for exampIe, the sense of honor in contem- porary Iife; consider aIso the historicaI uctuations in the nature of maIe grief), and may be variabIy distributed across cuItures or across historicaI epochs (for exampIe, shame and guiIt) 36 . Then again, there do seem to be striking continuities. In cIassicaI Chinese thought, for exampIe, the cataIogue of emotions seems very famiIiar. The Book of Rituals Iist the qing as joy and anger, sorrow and fear, Iove, aversion and desire; whiIe traditionaI Chinese medicaI theory and therapy Iist the seven qiqing liuyu or emotionaI states/ aects as joy, anger, anxiety, thought, grief, fear, and fright 37 . There exists to date no historiography of Indian emotion, Iet aIone one that might have some bearing on Bharata`s Iist or the notion of stabiIity, though I think one couId be written. It can certainIy be argued that, for exampIe, bhakti, or devotion to a personaI god, is a new aective state nrst discernibIe in Iate-epic India (though it attains cuIture-wide, and expIosive, inuence onIy a miIIennium or more Iater) 38 . No Iess interesting if more specuIative is the history of karuna (which becomes the rasa karuna) 39 . The term is sometimes 35. Ethica III. cupiditas est ipsa hominis essentia (/' ,23 ,#"5-3 /' !' 3' #23) (eds.), Benedicti de Spinoza opera quotquot reperta sunt, 2 voI., The Haag, Martinus Nijho, 1882), p. 172. Compare Bhoja`s dennition of sjngara, or passion: sarvatmasampadudayatisayaikahetuh (the soIe cause of the appearance and added potency of the entire range [of emotions| of the seIf), Srngaraprakasa, p. 2 (for Bhoja`s exegesis of the karika, see p. 375). 36. The bibIiography on the history of emotions in the West and the history of attempts to cataIogue them is vast, and I am a very inexpert guide. For generaI trends see !' .5-2&3., History of Lmotions: Issues of Change and Impact, in 0' #-*+. et al. (eds.), Handbook of Emotions, 3 rd ed., New York, GuiIford Press, 2008, p. 17-31 ; 4' 023)#-&, Lmotion; 4' 7&<3 )' %<-3?#-= @Introduction: A New RoIe for Lmotions in LpistemoIogy, in 4' 7&<3 et al. (eds.), Epistemology and Emotions, AIdershot, Ashgate, 2008, p. 1-31. !' 2&+A.= The Hour of our Death, New York, Vintage Books, 1982, presents evidence of maIe grief in the MiddIe Ages that wouId have been famiIiar to medievaI Indians (judging from a work Iike the Uttararamacarita) but aIien to our contemporaries. Lnnui, or French boredom, may be somewhat Iater than the LngIish variety. 37. 1' -+>&+34 (ed.), Love and Emotions in Traditional Chinese Literature, Leiden, BriII, 2004, p. 1, 13, 23 ; Benjamin LIman (personaI communication). 38. I am unaware, however, that anyone has actuaIIy made this argument. Note that devotion was an emotion for Darwin (discussed beIow), with its own distinct historicaIity. See aIso )' 4&"..= Defending the Humanities with CharIes Darwin`s The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872), Critical Inquiry 37 (2010), p. 34-59 (p. 49). 39. The two forms were nrst distinguished by Sr Sankuka (Abhinavabharati, p. 311). Sheldon Pollock 200 transIated in Luropean Ianguages as pity or compassion, but what emotion is it reaIIy pointing toward? Two quite dissimiIar ones, I beIieve, for two dierent emotionaI communities 40 . In the Uttararamacarita, for exampIe, the paradigmatic text of karunarasa (eko rasah karuna eva, says Bhavabhti, 3.48, meaning of course the singIe rasa in his drama), Rma does not feeI pity for St because he beIieves she has been wronged or wants to reIieve her suering; the emotion is not primariIy outward-directed sadness at aII. On the contrary, the pity wouId seem rather to be Rma`s sadness for himseIf, for the coIIapse of everything he suered for, above aII his kingship, and for the Ioss of the sons required to heIp him repay the debt to his ancestors (6.28 [8|). Lven if such a formuIation may be thought too reductive, the cIassicaI theory can hardIy be said to concern itseIf with compassion according to the dictionary dennition: pity for the suerings or misfortunes of others, tout court. For the feeIing of karuna to become the rasa karuna the person Iost must be, as Bharata says expIicitIy and repeatedIy, an istajana, someone beIoved to the subject; it is an emotion in which one`s seIf remains centraI. The karuna rasa that arises when someone grieves for a person not reIated (bandhu) to him, as Abhinava states, is [a semblance of karuna and hence is| itseIf comic 41 . We think of karuna more broadIy as we do onIy because the earIy Buddhists appropriated and transvaIued the concept as they appro- priated and transvaIued so much of the dominant episteme. One might even say the Buddhists redenned the very concept bandhu so as to comprise the whoIe worId, thereby turning karuna into the active, bIind, aImost irrationaI compassion so exuberantIy iIIustrated in the jataka taIes. As Dr. Johnson put it, Pity is not naturaI to man. Pity is acquired and improved by the cuItiva- tion of reason. We may have uneasy sensations from seeing a creature in distress, without pity: for we have not pity unIess we wish to reIieve them 42 . To see a creature in distress and to strive to do everything, even at the cost of one own Iife, to reIieve that suering was, once upon a time, something new in India. It was the Buddhists who invented compassion and this is decidedIy not the karuna of aesthetic discourse 43 . Indeed, it is aIso by no 40. See /' !#20!-&, The History of Lmotions, History and Theory 49 (2010), p. 237-265 (p. 252) for a brief dennition, and 7' 1' &".-3*-+3, Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages, Ithaca, NY, CorneII University Press, 2006, for a fuII exposition. 41. See Natyasastra 6.62 and Abhinavabharati, p. 290 (note that the vibhavas for karuna are: a vioIation of dharma ; Ioss of one`s weaIth, and death of one`s kin, 6.78 with Abhinava). Abhinava dismisses Sr Sankuka`s idea that karuna has anything to do with daya, compassion (p. 311). 42. /' 7".*-##, Johnson's Table Talk: a Selection of His Main Topics and Opinions Taken from Boswell's Life' and Arranged by W.A. L. Bettany, London, BIackie & Son, 1904 (p. 20). Hume (in The Treatise of Human Nature) oers a strikingIy dierent, and uncharacteristicaIIy Christianized, view of pity. 43. A fuIIer argument wouId need to make sense of the history and nature of the idea of the dayavira, the hero of compassion, nrst discussed in Dhvanyaloka (p. 394) in reIation to santarasa (in fact, Abhinava and others cIaim dayavira is onIy another name for santa; see ,' &2412,23, The Number of Rasas, p. 85), but nrst exhibited in Nagananda, Hara`s Buddhist drama. Note that the Natyasastra speaks onIy of the dharmavira (6.79). From Rasa Seen to Rasa Heard 201 means cIear that what the viewer was supposed to feeI is compassion, rather than something cIoser to misery 44 . Pity therefore has a history in India, as no doubt many other emotions do in many other pIaces, and this history sureIy has a bearing on the aective aesthetics of Bharata. But there is something eIse more directIy pertinent to this aesthetics that the science of emotions has to teII us. V. Seeing is Believing However vastIy documented, or at Ieast documentabIe, the historicity of emotions may be, the diversity reveaIed by this history has not stopped contemporary psychoIogy from trying to deveIop a set of the basic universaI emotions; on the contrary, the overIaps have encouraged the eort. There have been Iists gaIore and more recentIy Iists of Iists, incIuding one that reports Iists of three emotions (fear, Iove, and rage, Watson in 1930), four (expectancy, fear, rage, and panic, Panksepp in 1982; or fear, anger, depres- sion, and satisfaction, Kemper in 1987), nve (happiness, sadness, anxiety, anger, and disgust, OatIey in 1987), six (anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, and surprise, Lkman in 1982), nine (fear, anger, distress, disgust, interest, shame, joy, surprise, and contempt, Tompkins in 1962-1963), ten (anger, contempt, disgust, distress, fear, guiIt, interest, joy, shame, and surprise, Izard in 1971) 45 . This state of aairs has naturaIIy Ied some to doubt the very attempt to reduce so compIex a mass of phenomena to a set of eIementary particIes (there are over 300 words in the LngIish Ianguage that refer to emotions), 46 confronting us as it does again with the tension between a quest for scientinc order and the messiness of Iife in history. The Indian materiaIs do not heIp us resoIve that tension, and it is not my intention anyway in adducing them to try to do so the usuaI, and usuaIIy useIess, maneuver of attempting to upstage Western science by a wiser Lastern pre-science. What I do aim to achieve by pIacing the Indian data in the context of a cognitive approach to emotion I repeat myseIf here Iest I be misunderstood is to determine whether the contemporary method for identifying basic emotions might suggest anything pertinent about the Indian inteIIectuaI history of rasa as it moved from the seen to the heard. Perhaps the most weII-known of the Iists of emotions is the set of six noted above that was deveIoped by PauI Lkman (since revised by the rather 44. See Gadamer`s discussion of Greek leos in AristotIe, for which he beIieves the correct German transIation is not Mitleid but Jammer (in Truth and Method, New York, Continuum, 1996, p. 130), though others demur (see 0' !"1#-3?= Furcht und MitIeid? Lin Nachwort, Hermes 84 (1956), p. 49-74). (I thank Andrew OIIett for reminding me of the Gadamer passage.) 45. The Iist of Iists is adapted from Ortony and Turner, cited in &' $' ."#"0"3, Back to Basics: On the Very Idea of Basic Lmotions, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 32 (2002), p. 115-144 (p. 123), pIus &' #-6., How Did Fear Become a Scientinc Object and What Kind of Object Is It ?, Representations 110 (2010), p. 66-104 (p. 68). 46. 4' 7&<3 )' %<-3?#-= @Introduction, p. 7. Sheldon Pollock 202 aIarming addition of seven) 47 . What has been most inuentiaI in Lkman`s work is his insistence that distinctive signaIs, more particuIarIy, faciaI conngurations, are fundamentaI to the dennition of basic emotion. It does not matter to my argument whether or not such data are presented in the attempt to prove the existence of transcuIturaIIy constant, indeed neuroIo- gicaIIy based, universaI emotions. What does matter is that these signaIs and conngurations, for much contemporary research, are considered key to determining what is basic about basic emotions, however many there may be, since other emotionaI traits and moods do not manifest themseIves in this way. In a word, whiIe there may very weII be debate about the meaning and heuristic vaIue of physicaI expression in the science of the emotions, there is no debate that some emotions are indeed physicaIIy expressed and some are not. As Lkman`s acknowIedges, his theory and in fact the heart of his method were deepIy inuenced by CharIes Darwin`s The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872). The aim of this cIassic work was to corroborate the theory of evoIution by demonstrating how the expression of emotions was constant across species 48 . It is Iess any particuIar Iist of basic emotions that interests me here Darwin actuaIIy oers no nxed set, though he does speak of chief emotions and discusses amusement, fear, suering, rage, indigna- tion (moderate anger), astonishment, disgust, and contempt or disdain 49 than the method by which emotions are to be investigated. CentraI for Darwin in making his case was visible expression, in particuIar faciaI expression, which he presented with photographic and other iIIustrations. There are some emotions that are basic; they are identined with those that dispIay more or Iess nxed, more or Iess automatic. manifestations 50 . The emotions that are basic are the emotions that you can see. There are other emotions that you cannot see. They certainIy exist, and powerfuIIy so, but they cannot be considered basic because they eIicit no action on the subject`s part. Darwin considers these in a section of Emotions caIIed Contrast between the emotions which cause and do not cause expres- sive movements. The nrst he addresses is motherIy Iove: No emotion is stronger than maternaI Iove, Darwin expIains, but a mother may feeI deepest Iove for her heIpIess infant, and yet not show it by any outward sign. And with this he contrasts sexuaI Iove: The Iove between the opposite sexes is wideIy dierent from maternaI Iove. for this Iove is not inactive Iike that of a mother for her infant. SimiIarIy, hatred (Iike suspicion, envy, or jeaIousy) does not Iead to action and is not shown by any outward sign. Hatred is enacted by rage, which however is pIainIy exhibited. Neither painters nor 47. !' -%023= Basic Lmotions, in 5' )2#4#-+.1 0' !"*-& (eds.), Handbook of Cognition and Emotion, Chichester, WiIey, 1999, p. 45-60 (p. 55). 48. See )' 4&"..= Defending the Humanities. 49. $' )2&*+3, The Expression of the Emotions, p. 361-364. 50. &' $' ."#"0"3, Back to Basics, p. 116. From Rasa Seen to Rasa Heard 203 poets are abIe to portray such emotions as hatred and maternaI Iove except by association with their accessories 51 . It shouId be noted that whiIe Darwin may have emphasized in his account of the visibIe what the then-revoIutionary technoIogy of photography permitted him to capture and reproduce, nameIy faciaI expression (a narrow assessment in which, rather curiousIy, he has been foIIowed by contemporary schoIars such as Lkman), 52 he was actuaIIy interested in the totaI physicaIity of the emotions. He thus speaks generaIIy of the physicaI movement of an emotion, or movement of expression: Terror causes the body to trembIe. The skin becomes paIe, sweat breaks out, and the hair bristIes. The breathing is hurried. The heart beats quickIy, wiIdIy, and vioIentIy; When Iovers meet, we know that their hearts beat quickIy, their breathing is hurried, and their faces ush; for this Iove is not inactive Iike that of a mother for her infant 53 . In this history of the science of emotion we can nnd, I suggest, some cIues to heIp us understand the inteIIectuaI history of aesthetics in India. The Indian data show that it was originaIIy in the context of drama, djsyakavya or Iiterature-that-is-seen, that the distinctive Iist of stabIe emotions and their associated rasas was conceptuaIized. The foundationaI Iogic of dramatic (and dramaturgicaI) emotion comprises onIy emotion that can be physicaIIy represented, not of course just in faciaI expression but in the whoIe host of vocaI and physicaI reactions and cues (anubhavas), in physicaIIy observabIe movement, that the Natyasastra is at pains to teach the actors who were its principaI readership 54 . (This context of identincation wiII prompt us to rethink the physicaIity of utsaha, the basic emotion of the heroic rasa: it is Iess fortitude as a moraI virtue than something Iike embodied determination.) 55
51. C. )2&*+3! The Expression of the Emotions, p. 78-79, see aIso 215 (and )' 4&"..= Defending the Humanities, p. 50-51). Note that Lkman regards hatred and parentaI Iove as emotionaI pIots (Basic Lmotions, p. 55), more enduring than emotions, which (in contrast to the Indian sthayibhavas) he thinks of as short-Iived (p. 50). 52. See !' -%023 *' ,' >&+-.-3, Unmasking the Face. A Guide to Recognizing Emotions from Facial Clues, LngIewood CIis, N, Prentice HaII, 1975. DeveIoped from this work is a FaciaI Action Coding System used by cognitive scientists, see )' 4&"..= Defending the Humanities, p. 41. 53. $' )2&*+3, The Expression of the Emotions, p. 77-79. 54. For exampIe, The erotic is to be represented by reactions
such as the skiIIfuI pIay of the eyes, movements of the eyebrows and sideIong gIances, and gentIe and pIeasing bodiIy motions and verbaI utterances (Natyasastra, p. 293). R. A. Shweder et al. have aIso recognized the paraIIeI between Bharata`s Iist of basic emotions and that of contemporary psychoIogy, but they adduce it basicaIIy to questions any simpIe equation There is no neatIy bounded set of universaI faciaI expressions (&' 2' .1*-)-& et al.= The CuIturaI PsychoIogy of the Lmotions; Ancient and Renewed, in 0' #-*+. et al. (eds.) Handbook of Emotions, 3 rd ed., New York, GuiIford Press, 2008, p. 409-427 (p. 412)); R. Scheckner, by contrast, sought to correIate photographs of faciaI expression with the sthayibhavas to posit a universaI pattern (&' .$1-$%3-&= Performance Theory, New York, RoutIedge, 1988). 55. Bharata`s own description of the physicaI representation of virarasa is obscure enough (By boIdness, heroism, steadfastness, energy, audacity, and magnincence, and by statements Iaden with doubIe meanings, is the heroic rasa properIy represented, Natyasastra 6.68) that Sheldon Pollock 204 With the extension of rasa theory to sravyakavya, Iiterature-that-is-heard a conceptuaI innovation that occurred nearIy haIf a miIIennium after the core ideas of the Natyasastra were formuIated this Iogic was weakened or even Iost. In the eyes of the subsequent tradition, beginning with Rudrata (and to the despair, instinctive and not cIearIy reasoned, of the custodians of dramaturgicaI theory such as Dhanika, who rejects Rudrata out of hand), the Iist came to appear arbitrary or even senseIess. AccordingIy, among those thinkers Iike Bhoja for whom poetic representation took precedence over dramatic representation, there seemed to be no reason because in fact there was no Ionger any reason not to incIude additionaI emotions and rasas, such as vatsalya, motherIy Iove. VI. Summary and Conclusions The number of the aesthetic emotions, and the very idea of what kinds of emotions couId become aesthetic, were transformed when the concept of rasa was extended from Iiterature seen to Iiterature heard. The originaI pragmatic ground of what couId count as rasa emotion that can be made perceptibIe through acting was no Ionger understood and in any case was no Ionger required for Iiterature where everything occurred in the mind`s eye vastusaktimahimna, by the power of narrativity. The visibiIity of emotion does not of course exhaust the signincance of the sthayibhava Iist; it can be anaIyzed in many other ways, such as Abhinavagupta`s moraI map, once these emotions came to be Iinked with the ends of man. But visibiIity, in service of a theory not of psychoIogy but rather of performativity, was the feature that informed the Iist in the nrst pIace. The number and kind of emotions that couId become rasa was not the onIy conceptuaI transformation that accompanied this anaIyticaI integration of drama and poetry. Another key probIem, though somewhat more obscureIy tied up with it than the questions deaIt with here, concerns rasasraya, or the Iocus where rasa was beIieved to reside. It makes perfectIy good sense that earIy writers thought of rasa, at Ieast in their anaIysis of performance, as being Iocated in the nrst instance in the character they couId see (the onIy dispute among them was whether rasa arose in the character or was inferred or manifested in him), whereas Iater theorists of auraI-poetic Iiterature, for whom the character was no Ionger visibIe but rather heard, wouId naturaIIy Iocate rasa in the reader. The former position was certainIy that of Bharata schoIars eventuaIIy confessed compIete confusion. Thus Bhnudatta (c. 1500): The reactions (anubhava), one might argue, have to be physicaI properties. if they are to give us some sense of rasa, which is itseIf imperceptibIe, but steadfastness (dhairya) and energy (utsaha) [seen as both sthayibhava and anubhava| are not such properties. True enough, but by the word steadfast was meant the absence of physicaI movement, and by energy, things Iike tears and horripiIation. Or we couId repIy that the physicaI reactions are of four sorts, and mentaI reactions have been incIuded among them. Awareness of that mentaI reaction is what makes cIear the particuIar rasa being reacted to. It makes no dierence whether that awareness is mentaI or perceptibIe. See Rasatarangini 3.25 (.' !"##"$% (ed.), Rasatarangini of Bhnudatta, in The Bouquet of Rasa and the River of Rasa, New York, New York University Press, 2009). From Rasa Seen to Rasa Heard 205 and aII writers before c. 900, when Bhatta Nyaka tried to make phiIosophicaI sense of this naturaI reIocation, and redirected the focaI point of the rasa anaIytic away from the oId formaIism and toward a new reception theory, or hermeneutics, of aesthetics 56 . The dimcuIty with this expIanation, however, is that in the transitionaI period some thinkers concentrating on djsyakavya such as Dhanika and Abhinavagupta foIIow Bhatta Nyaka, whereas some who prioritize sravyakavya such as Bhoja return to the cIassicaI view. However this particuIar dimcuIty may be resoIved, another set of questions, this time of an epistemoIogicaI sort, was tied up with the shifting ontoIogy of rasa as it moved from the seen to the heard. The most chaIIenging and important case concerns the notion of (abhi)vyakti. For Anandavardhana, who put the term in the Iiterary-criticaI vocabuIary, this was pureIy a Iinguistic phenomenon, a sabdavjtti, the verbaI manifestation of the Iatent meanings of a text, of which rasa is the most important. But this expIana- tion for how rasa in the text was communicated became uninteIIigibIe when Bhatta Nyaka reIocated rasa in the reader, as thinkers writing in his wake Iike Dhanika cIearIy show 57 . AccordingIy, Iater alankarikas, at Ieast from the time of Mammata if not Abhinavagupta (or perhaps Bhatta Nyaka himseIf), and by a process aImost compIeteIy unregistered in western schoIarship and in the Indian tradition itseIf, transformed (abhi)vyakti into a psychoIogicaI phenomenon, a cittavjtti, the reveIation to the viewer/reader of his own basic emotion 58 . It remains uncIear whether the soIutions to these key questions are aII part of the extension of rasa theory from drama to the wider worId of Iiterature. What I hope to have at Ieast demonstrated, however, is that much of the inteI- IectuaI history of this theory, India`s greatest contribution to worId aesthetics, remains to be written 59 . References Primary Sources &' 4' 712552 Bed.C= Kavyalankarasutra and Vrtti of Vamana, Varanasi, Braj B. 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