1 Aglipay v.

Ruiz
Aglipay v. Ruiz In commemorating the 33 International Eucharistic Congress, postage stamps were to be printed, distributed and sold. Petitioner, the Supreme Hea of the Philippine Independent Church, raised the constitutional question on non-appropriation for religious purposes. Facts: 1. In May 1936, the Director of Posts (Juan Ruiz) announced in Manila dailies that he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the rd City of Manila of the 33 International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner (Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay) is the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church. He seeks to prohibit the respondent Juan Ruiz, the Director rd of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33 International Eucharistic Congress. Aglipay contends regarding the design of the stamp. He said: *I+n the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1.094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos. Aglipay adds that the said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Eucharistic congress, especially Section 23(3), Article VI which states that *N+o public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied or used, directly or indirectly for the use, benefit or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution or system of religion
rd

parish priest refused to do so. A replevin case was filed for the recovery of the image. The parish priest turned over the image but questioned the constitutionality of the resolutions passed by the Barangay Council. Facts: 1. The barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City adopted Resolution No. 5 which th called for the revival of the traditional socio-religious celebration every 5 day of April in honor of San Vicente Ferrer. The said resolution designated the members of the 9 committees who would take charge of the 1976 festivity. The tasks of the committee are to acquire the image of San Vicente Ferrer and to construct a waiting shed as the barangays project. The funds were to be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations. The barangay council likewise passed Resolution No. 6 which specified that the councilman (Tomas Cabatingan), the chairman of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that image would remain in his residence for 1 year and until the election of his successor as chairman of the next feast day. It was added that the image would be available to the Catholic priest during the celebration of the saints feast day. Funds were raised by means of solicitations and cash donations of barangay residents and those of the neighboring places of Valencia. With those funds, the waiting shed was constructed and the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired in Cebu City by the barangay council for Php 400.00. Image was temporarily placed in the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, the parish priest (Fr. Sergio Osmea) refused to return the image to the barangay council on the reason that it was the property of the church because church funds were used for its acquisition. Several days after the fiesta, the parish priest allegedly uttered defamatory remarks against the barangay captain (Manuel Veloso) in connection with the said image. Veloso, in turn, filed a charge for grave oral defamation. Because the image was never returned in accordance with Resolution No. 6, the council passed resolution no. 10 which authorized the hiring of a lawyer to file a replevin case against the parish priest for the recovery of the image. After the barangay council posted a cash bond of Php 800.00, the parish priest turned over the image to the council. In turn, the priest questioned the constitutionality of the resolutions.

2.

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3.

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Ruling: 1. 2. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration. Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instils into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. Garces v. Estenzo The Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City raised funds for the purchase of San Vicente Ferrers image and construction of the waiting shed. The image was temporarily sheltered inside the Catholic Church of the barangay. When requested to be turned over to them, the

5.

Ruling: 1. The contention of the petitioners is that the resolutions contravene the constitutional provisions that no law shall be made respecting or establishment of religion and that no public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion The

Case Digests on Freedom of Religion by Mark Justin Mooc

2 Gonzales v. Archbishop of Manila

contention is devoid of merit. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly nor abridge religious liberty nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of a waiting shed is entirely a secular matter. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. 2. Gonzales v. Archbishop of Manila Fonacier v. CA Petitioner wanted to collect income from certain properties located in Calle Rosario, District of Binondo. He contended that as having been assigned by the property owner as chaplain, he had the right to do so. Facts: 1. Petitioner (Angel Gonzales) wanted to collect the income from certain properties situated in Calle Rosario, District of Binondo. He was assigned by the property owner (Petronila de Guzman) for the maintenance of a collative chaplaincy founded by her. The ownership dates back to June 20, 1901. Petitioner contends that as the chaplain, incumbent and beneficiary of the said chaplaincy, he had the right, by virtue of a title in perpetuity, from June 20, 1901, to receive and retain all the income and revenues of the said property. The property mentioned had been producing and yielding not less than Php 650/month. Thus, from June 20, 1901 to the time the action was instituted, the property in question is a sum of Php 12,500.00. Respondents are the Archbishop of Manila (Msgr. Harty) and the administrator of funds of the Sagrada Mitra (Thomas Hartigan). Going back to history, by virtue of the provisions contained in the will executed by Donya Petronila de Guzman on March 3, 1816, a collative chaplaincy was founded in this archdiocese. It entailed a certain obligation of a spiritual character and possessed a capital of Php 1,700. It was also provided that the first executor of the estate of the testatrix should act as administrator of the property subject to the chaplaincy during the minority of Esteban de Guzman, the first chaplain appointed for the foundation. Angel Gonzales, a descent of Petronila, was appointed chaplain on August 21, 1901. The Consejo Supremo de Obispos of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente approved the designation of bishops to respective bishoprics. However, Monsignor Fonacier questioned some assignments. Having been removed by the Asemblea Magna of the church and upon selection of successor to him, Fonacier refused to turn over the funds, documents and properties. Moreover, as the Asemblea was electing its Supreme Bishop, Fonacier was doing the same. Facts: 1. On September 2, 1945, the Consejo Supremo de Obispos (Supreme Council of Bishops) of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI) convened and approved the designation of bishops to their respective bishoprics. Here began the conflict which culminated in the division. Monsignor Alejandro Remollino was assigned as bishop of the diocese of Cavite. Upon learning that the latter notified the priests of his bishopric regarding his assignment, Monsignor Fonacier wrote him a letter dated September 18, 1945 enjoining him from assuming the duties of his office and from taking possession of the diocese of Cavite until he (Fonacier) had approved the appointment made by the Supreme Council. On December 1, Bishop Manuel Aguilar filed charges against Monsignor Fonacier as Supreme Bishop which were submitted to a meeting of the Supreme Council of Bishops held on January 21 of the following year and same charges were submitted to the Asemblea Magna or Asemblea General of the church held the following day. This body approved the forced resignation of petitioner and elected Bishop Bacaya as Supreme Bishop to succeed Fonacier. Fonacier, when informed of his removal, refused to turn over all the funds, documents and other properties of the church to his successor. On September 1, 1946, the Asemblea convened and elected Monsignor Isabelo de los Reyes Jr., as Supreme Bishop. Meanwhile, on the same date, Monsignor Fonacier and some of his followers met at the Manila Hotel and elected Monsignor Juan Jamias as their Supreme Bishop. provided. To refute this assertion, it suffices to say that the provisions of the said will set forth that the first testamentary executor of the estate of the testatrix should act as the administrator of the property during the minority of the first chaplain appointed in that document. This provision must be understood to be mandatory, except as otherwise provided by the canonical laws and as, pursuant therewith, the chief ecclesiastical authority may order for, after the latter had accepted the foundation of the chaplaincy, the administration of its property appertains to the authorities established by the Church, pursuant to the latters own laws, and this rule has been observed since 1863. The defendants in this case were absolved.

2.

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3. 4.

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Ruling: 1. Our attention has been invited to the fact that the property affected by the chaplaincy should have been administered by the chaplains and not by the administrators of the Sagrada Mitra inasmuch as clause 11 of the foundress will so 4.

Case Digests on Freedom of Religion by Mark Justin Mooc

3 American Bible Society v. City of Manila

Ruling: 1. The claim that the ouster in question was legal and valid because petitioner, as Supreme Bishop, could act alone pursuant to the constitution of the church wherein it is provided that the Supreme Bishop is the supreme head of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente and as such shall have full powers to impose the penalties of dismissal, confinement in the seminary, suspension, fine, transfer, etc. which, without contravening the penal laws of the constituted government, can be imposed upon the bishops, and that said power can be exercised even without the intervention of the Supreme Council, cannot be entertained in the light of the very provisions of the constitution of the church, it appearing that the alleged power of the Supreme Bishop under the constitution is not all-embracing but limited and, in any event, the final action shall be taken by the Supreme Council. We have already stated that while the civil courts will ordinarily leave ecclesiastical matters to church authorities, they may however intervene when it is shown, as in this case, that they have acted outside the scope of their authority or in a manner contrary to their organic law and rules. American Bible Society v. City of Manila The acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila required the payment of a particular amount from petitioner. Respondent claims that petitioners Philippine agency had distributed and sold bibles and/or gospel portions throughout the country; thus, conducting business of general merchandise. Facts: 1. Petitioners Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions throughout the country and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. On May 29, 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed petitioner that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November 1945 without providing itself with necessary Mayors permit and municipal license in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and further required petitioner to secure the corresponding permit and license fees, together th nd with compromise covering the period from 4 quarter of 1945 to 2 quarter of 1953, within 3 days. Sum of said fees amounted to Php 5,821.45. enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. It may be true that in the case at bar, the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that petitioner was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said merchandise for profit. To have the City Ordinance in question applied would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. Gerona v. Secretary of Education The Secretary of Education released a department order directing all pupils and teachers regarding what they should do during the flag ceremony. Petitioners are members of the Jehovahs Witnesses who sought that they be exempted from performing the acts contemplated by the said department order. Facts: 1. Republic Act No. 1265 took effect on June 11, 1955. The Secretary of Education, acting upon Section 2 of said Act authorizing and directing him to issue or cause to issue rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony, issued Department Order No. 8 on July 21 of the same year. Pertinent portions of the said department order include the directive that pupils and teachers or students and faculty who are in school and its premises shall assemble in formation facing the flag. And, said assembly shall sing the Philippine National Anthem with everyone standing at attention and execute a salute. Moreover, immediately following the singing of the Anthem, the assembly shall recite in unison the patriotic pledge (in English or vernacular version). Petitioners who are members of the Jehovahs Witnesses wrote to the Secretary of Education allowing their children to remain silent and stand at attention with their arms and hands down and straight at the sides and that they be exempted from executing the formal salute, singing of the National Anthem and the reciting of the patriotic pledge. Said petition was denied by the Secretary. Petitioners religious beliefs, which served as bases for this action, state that: *t+hou shalt not make unto thee any graven image or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them. They consider that the flag is an image within this command.

2.

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Ruling: 1. Article III, Section 1(7) of the Constitution guarantees the freedom of religious profession and worship. It has reference to ones views of his relations to His Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence to His being and character, and obedience to His Will. The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and

Ruling:

Case Digests on Freedom of Religion by Mark Justin Mooc

4 Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Cebu

1. The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by ones imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however, strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercises of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The Government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it. The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic, of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony. The flag salute, particularly the recital of the pledge of loyalty is no more a religious ceremony. The determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to its followers; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects or followers. The Court finds nothing objectionable even from the point of view of religious belief. The school child or student is simply made to say that he loves the Philippines because it is the land of his birth and the home of his people. He is not even made to pledge allegiance to the flag or to the Republic for which it stands. So even if the Court assumes for a moment that the flag were in image, connoting religious and veneration instead of a mere symbol of the State and of national unity, the religious scruples of petitioners against bowing to and venerating an image are not interfered with or otherwise jeopardized. In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State through the Secretary of Education was not imposing a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It was merely enforcing a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike. The state was merely carrying out the duty imposed upon it by the Constitution. The children of Jehovah witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the flag ceremony for they have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, an exemption to the requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great majority. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and nondiscriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Cebu For refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, petitioners were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu. Facts: 1. Petitioners were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1264 and by Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the DECS making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. There were a total of 68 students who were expelled from various public schools in Cebu. According to petitioners, while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in external acts or behaviour that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceeding. Since they do not engage in disruptive behaviour, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

2.

2. 3.

3.

4.

Ruling: 1. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or of being expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free speech and the free exercise of religious profession and worship. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The Court is not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovahs Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a small portion of the school population will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes. After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from public schools where they may learn and be trained. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this Court had feared in Gerona case. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs,

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Case Digests on Freedom of Religion by Mark Justin Mooc

5 German v. Barangan
will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities. While the highest regard must be afforded their right to the free exercise of their religion, this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, the Court does not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right and duty to prevent. German v. Barangan Petitioners gathered and marched down J.P. Laurel Street and eventually hear mass at St. Jude Chapel, which is within the Malacaang security area. Respondents prevented them from doing so. Facts: 1. 2. Petitioners in this case wanted to hear Mass inside St. Jude Chapel located at J.P. Laurel Street and well within the Malacaang security area. On October 2, 1984, 5:00 pm, 50 individuals composed of businessmen, students and office employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street and, wearing the yellow shirts, they marched down said street with raised clenched fists and shouts of antigovernment invectives. They were barred however by respondent (Major Isabelo Lariosa) upon orders of his superior and co-respondent General Santiago Barangan from proceeding any further. According to respondents, they were disallowed to enter the chapel because same was found within the security area. They were unable to convince respondents that their (the petitioners) intention was to hear mass. Thus, they decided to leave. However, they were allegedly warned by Lariosa that any similar attempt to enter the church in the future would likewise be prevented. 3. security checks. The reasonableness of this restriction is readily perceived and appreciated if it is considered that the same is designed to protect the lives of the President and his family, as well as other government officials, diplomats and foreign guests transacting business with Malacaang. The need to secure the safety of heads of state and other government officials cannot be overemphasized. As announced in Cantwell v. Connecticut, *t+he constitutional inhibition on legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the amendment embraces two concepts freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute; but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. In the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner which they had attempted to translate the same into action. People v. Zosa Zosa and Lagman sought that they be exempted from military enlistment, having reached the age of 20 years. Facts: 1. Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Zosa reached the age of twenty years and were thus required to register in the military service between April 1 and 7 of the said year. This compulsory military enlistment is in consonance with section 60 of CA 1 (National Defense Law). Zosa claimed that he was fatherless and a mother and a brother of 8 years old to support, while Lagman also had a father to support, had no military learnings and does not wish to kill or be killed.

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Ruling: 1. As declared in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, *w+ithout violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests and even against his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense.

Ruling: 1. Even assuming that petitioners claim to the free exercise of religion is genuine and valid, still respondents reaction to the said incident may not be characterized as violative of the freedom of religious worship. Since 1972, when mobs of demonstrators crashed through the palace gates and scaled its perimeter fence, the use by the public of J.P. Laurel Street and the streets approaching it have been restricted. While travel to and from the affected thoroughfares has not been absolutely prohibited, passers-by have been subjected to courteous, unobtrusive

Case Digests on Freedom of Religion by Mark Justin Mooc

6 Pamil v. Teleron
Pamil v. Teleron Fr. Gonzaga won the mayoralty race in Alburquerque, Bohol. Petitioner however raised that Gonzaga, being an ecclesiastic, is barred from being elected or appointed. Facts: 1. Father Margarito Gonzaga was elected to the position of municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol in 1971. However, petitioner who happened to be an aspirant for the office, filed a suit for quo warranto based on a provision of the Administrative Code, which provides that: *i+n no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality. The suit however did not prosper under the sala of respondent judge stating that the statutory ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. 2. 1. Benjamin Victoriano was a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo and was employed by Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. since 1958. He was a member of the Workers Union, whose collective bargaining agreement with the company provided that *m+embership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees. Republic Act 3350 was enacted on June 18, 1961. It introduced amendment to Section 4[4(a)] of RA 875. Said section of RA 875 did not preclude the employer from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees. However, due to the amendment introduced by RA 3350, such agreement (between employer and labor organization) shall not cover members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization. Being a member of a religious sect which prohibits affiliation of its members with any labor organization, Victoriano tendered his resignation to the Union in 1962. However, no action was taken by the Union; thus, petitioner reiterated his resignation 12 years later. The Union, on the other end, wrote a formal letter to the Company asking for the separation of Victoriano from service as he was resigning from the Union as a member. The management in turn notified Victoriano and his counsel that unless they (Victoriano) could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss him from service.

3.

2.

Ruling: 1. The Revised Administrative Code was enacted in 1917. In the 1935 Constitution, as it was the Charter being referred to that time, it was explicitly declared that *n+o religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. The principle of the paramount character of the fundamental law thus comes into play. The challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as it declares ineligible ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, is, on its face, inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To exclude them is to impose a religious test. However, the vote is indecisive. While five members (grant petition for there is no constitutional infirmity against the prohibition) of the Court constituted a minority, the vote of the remaining seven (those which affirmed decision as the challenged provision is no longer operative) does not suffice to render the challenged provision (Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code) ineffective. Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union Victoriano tendered his resignation for being a member of Iglesia ni Cristo, after the enactment of RA 3350 which directed that the agreement between employer and labor organization is not binding to members of religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members to any such organization. In order to remain with the Company, according to the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the employee should likewise be a member of the Union. Facts: 4.

2.

Ruling: 1. The purpose of RA 3350 was to insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination against those members of religious sects which prohibit their members from joining labor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right to work, the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they can maintain their own life and the life of their dependents. Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of religion. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. The constitutional provision prohibiting the establishment of religion only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, this forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship, but also assures the free exercise of ones chosen form of religion within the limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clause of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to

3.

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Case Digests on Freedom of Religion by Mark Justin Mooc

7 Iglesia ni Cristo v. Gironella

profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions or to discriminate invidiously between religions is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. But, if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the States secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the State can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. A religious test required for the exercise of a right needs a right to be exercised. Iglesia ni Cristo v. Gironella Respondents opinion in a case provoked Ramos to charge him of ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a member of the bench. Facts: 1. Mr. Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr., on behalf of the INC, charged respondent Judge due to his opinion in the course of acquitting the defendants-accused of Triple Rape. In his opinion, Gironella said that, *i+t cannot, therefore, be discarded that the filing of the charge was resorted to as a gimmick of showing the community of La Paz, Abra in particular and to the public in general that the Iglesia ni Cristo unhesitatingly helps its member of his/her problem. Respondent, in so doing, was charged with ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a member of the bench.

4.

2.

Ruling: 1. The use of the word gimmick could offend the sensibilities of the members of the Iglesia ni Cristo. It is not inaccurate to state that as understood in the popular sense, it is not exactly complimentary. It may indicate lack of sincerity. It is a ploy or device to persuade others to take a course of action, which without it may not be acceptable. It is to be expected that a religious sect accused of having to resort to a gimmick to gain coverts would certainly be far from pleased. Freedom of religion implies respect for every creed. No one, much less a public official, is privileged to characterize the actuation of its adherents in a derogatory sense. It should not be lost sight to either that the attendance at a trial of many members of a religious sect finds support in the Constitution.

2.

Case Digests on Freedom of Religion by Mark Justin Mooc