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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Brian Michael Jenkins, Senior Advisor to the President of RAND Corporation,
and former Gore Commission member

Type: Interview

Date: April 1, 2004

Special Access Issues: None

Prepared by: Lisa Sullivan

Team: 7

Participants (non-Commission): Brian Jenkins

Participants (Commission): Lisa Sullivan, Gerald Dillingham, Bill Johnstone, John Raidt
-later joined by Kevin Shaeffer

Location: GSA Conference Room

Baseline Working Group and Gore Commission

[U] The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (Gore Commission)
convened after the TWA 800 incident. The FAA Baseline Working Group helped inform
the Gore Commission recommendations; but there was no formal relationship between
the two that Jenkins was aware of. The Commissioners had various backgrounds. Some
were family members of TWA victims, some were science-oriented; some were military.
They were looking at a lot of material. He recalls looking at the baseline papers. He
looked at the Pan Am 103 Commission reports as well. To him, it was a matter of
homework to review these previous products. Commissions often repeat the
recommendations of the Commissions before them. If something is repeatedly
recommended but not addressed, then there is an issue there. Why aren't we moving
forward on certain issues?

[U] With respect to the Gore Commission recommendation that the federal government
should view aviation security as a national security issue and fund it accordingly, Jenkins,
who was one of the chief proponents of this recommendation, outlined some his thinking.

[U] Providing for the common defense was the phrase pulled from the Constitution. An
attack on commercial aviation wasn't an attack on the passengers or the airline; it was an
attack on the Nation. Jenkins was not satisfied with the security performance of the
industry. He was looking for ways to engage the government to take a more active
posture.

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[U] Jenkins indicated that deployment of explosive detection technology cost a lot of
money. The industry was not going to put up the money. The Commission wanted to tap
into general funds to subsidize the deployment of the explosive detection equipment, and
that was the maj or intended purpose for the increased funding sought by the Commission.

[U] The Commissioners didn't want to federalize the screeners. Jenkins himself favored
creating a non-profit screening enterprise in order to take the screening function away
from the airlines. Under this plan, federal funds would go into a trust and the trust would
run the security. This would treat the issue as the national issue it was, but without the
cost of federalization. It was a way to move away from the system of patchwork security,
which had produced many egregious breaches of security.

[U] The Gore Commissioners wanted to raise the level of importance given to aviation
security, but they didn't want to "toss it entirely into the lap of the feds." They were
looking for a ratiorial approach to allocating security roles and to solving the funding
problem.

Transportation Security Today

[U] Jenkins thinks we are in a new environment. DRS is a big part of the picture. People
think about the threat differently. The problem today is that though there have been
significant changes since 9-11 (TTIC, etc.) Jenkins is still not sure we have changed the
fundamental mindset of how we define the threat.

[U] There are still futile debates as to whether to approach terrorism as crime or war.
Should law enforcement or military assets be used in response? The United States is
dealing with adversaries that operate in the gray area and putting terrorism in one
category or the other is beside the point. In Jenkins' view, the last thing to change will
be peoples' minds, and we haven't made that fundamental change yet. "That is cultural
revolution stuff," he said.

[U] According to Jenkins, "almost any damn fool can build a bomb and put it in a public
place." One can't seal off public places. Security measures should be focused on what
you can actually defend. Investing public resources must provide a "net security
benefit."

[U] Jenkins indicated that TSA doesn't really have an R&'D capability like the Defense
Department's DARPA. DRS has RSARPA, and TSA has its own R&D component that
may be combined with HSARP A in some fashion.

Aviation Security

[U] Jenkins reported that we have appropriately devoted a lot of attention to aviation
security because terrorists identified aviation as their theater of operations. If we look at
the percentage of terrorist attacks aimed at aviation targets, as a consequence of our
efforts to protect aviation we have reduced the number of incidents. It is a legitimate
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focus of attention (as demonstrated on 9-11) because the potential for destruction is
greater with aviation. You can't drive a train into skyscraper. In terms of lethality and
body count, aviation is more effective. That is statistically demonstrable.

[U] The worst instances of terrorism are massive car bombs and airline sabotage. These
have casualty rates in the hundreds, not the thousands. Airplane-as-weapon takes it to the
next level. Multiple, coordinated attacks are the only way a train attack scenario will
reach that level of severity. Strictly based on the sole criterion of potential fatalities,
aviation is by far the most important to protect.

[U] Jenkins added that the diminished passenger loads for commercial airliners post-91l1
was not a bad thing at all from a security perspective, because it allowed existing
resources to be applied to scrutinizing fewer individuals. He added that a pennanent
move of some travelers to high-speed rail would be a security plus.

[U] Jenkins stated that there are still unacceptable levels of vulnerability within aviation.
While we have deployed some EDT equipment, it is still not everywhere. They can't
make enough machines to meet the demand. Waivers have continued to be granted to the
deployment mandates. However, he is not one who believes that the EDT machines
alone are enough. There are various detection technologies, and because we can never
have sufficient confidence in a single solution, we need to deploy an array of
technologies. In addition, the heavy investment in "old" technology is inhibiting
deployment of new technology, "kind of like mail trucks," he said.

[U] But Jenkins believes there is a broader issue. In his view, the security measures in
place now are permanent features of the landscape. There is still a prevailing notion that
9-11 was an anomaly, and that someday we will go back to the way things used to be.
That is not his view. Terrorism is not going away; the implication is that security
measures have to be effective and efficient. In Jenkins' opinion, we have not paid
enough attention to efficiency because we are concentrating so hard on effectiveness.

[U] In Jenkins' view, efficiency can mean a number of things. For example, strengthened
port security can reduce cargo threat. We have to think strategically and set priorities.

[U] He compared the ability of supermarkets to expedite the check-out process to the
process of airport checkpoint screeners: The check-out process at supermarkets has
credit and debit card machines, mechanical conveyors, inventory controls, and bar codes
monitoring consumer preferences. We have extra lines for surges. At airports, we still
have gates and guards.

[U] Jenkins indicated that the federalized screener force has raised the level of
performance and we added machines. It doesn't stop there. We need to look at
engineering and airport layout issues. If we were to design an airport from scratch with
security in mind it would look different.

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Surface Transportation Security

[U] According to Jenkins, dropping the threat level down one level of magnitude from
aviation describes the situation with respect to surface transportation. An aviation
security model cannot be applied to a surface transportation security structure. Realities
of the system "architecture" such as the need for ready-access, the high volume of users,
and the cost involved make it impractical.

[U] There are 10-11 million people per day getting on heavy rail or light rail; another 16
million people per day are using buses. So applying an aviation security model is not
doable for surface transportation, according to Jenkins.

[U] Jenkins reported he was never a fan of increasing security of the lobbies of airports.
That is public space. The expended resources and people needed to secure it are
something of a waste, in his view. Jenkins thinks there is a net security gain by investing
in aviation security in being able to say they are not going to be able to hijack a plane and
fly it into a building. On the other hand, attempting to create secure perimeters around
public spaces in a routine fashion is a failure (unless it is a special occasion, such as the
upcoming Democratic National Convention in Boston, for instance).

Maritime Side

[U] Jenkins believes there are two maritime-related threats, both of which point to why
America needs a Homeland Security strategy:

1. Protection of vessels carrying large numbers of people such as cruise ships or

ferries (remember the example of the USS Cole)

2. The use of containers on a vessel as a means of clandestine delivery of a weapon

of mass destruction (especially in the nuclear realm).

[U] In Jenkins' view it makes a lot of sense to pay closer attention to this maritime
security problem, while recognizing that seaborne is but one of several possible delivery
modes for WMD, for example. He believes we should implement security where you can.
In the maritime arena, the security problem is amenable to being addressed with
technology built into systems: utilization of detection and scanner technology, smart
containers, etc. We have a chance in addressing this whereas certain things are security
nightmares.

FAA Rule-making

[U] Jenkins indicated that the FAA rule-making process was cumbersome before 9-11. It
was a rigid regulatory process. That was not the way to do security, certainly not the way
to take up a national security issue. These rules were negotiated. It was whether or not
stakeholders were in compliance with the security regulations, not whether or not they
were providing effective security.
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• [U] Under this process, we "redefined the threat as adetennined

inspectors. "
band of FAA

[U] The Gore Commission wanted to move away from compliance rules and toward
goals. The Commission was making recommendations in an era of smaller federal
government, more empowerment at the local level. Under these circumstances, people
(including some Commissioners) were "enamored" of the partnership/consortia process
in having stakeholders come up with security plans at airports on a case by case basis,
"that make sense." These plans would be better than the FAA dictating security for all
airports. "We wanted tailored suits not off the rack rules," Jenkins said.

CAPPS - profiling

~According to Jenkins, there was a narrow and a broader application of CAPPS.

The Gore Commission ended up going with the narrower application, which focused on
the bomb threat. Explosive detection was much more likely than hijackings, although
. lenkins reported that the Commission was clearly not satisfied with only explosives
detection as a consequence of selection.

~enkins reported that the Gore Commissioners were aware of the plot in Manila to

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bring down twelve airliners. Moreover, they had a developed device that would get past
the screening. These both revealed the system's vulnerability to bombings. However,
there was no indication the Manila plotters were suicidal. Previous Commission work on
Pan Am 103 had recommended that the U~S. deploy explosives detection equipment, but
it was discovered (via an OTA report) that the technology wasn't quite ready. The trial of
Ramsi Y ousef was concurrent with the Commission's deliberations. (Jenkins indicated he
is "agnostic" about the ultimate cause of the TWA 800 crash.)

~By the time of the Gore Commission, there was a clearly recognized need to
address the sabotage threat and the technology to detect explosives was available.
According to Jenkins, the Commission was desperate to get it deployed. That was the real
drive. Since it would take time because the CTX's were produced at a rate of 10 per
month, the Commission needed to come up with a security measure that would suffice in
the deployment phase of the CTX. Baggage-match was what they came up with to deal
with another Manila-style plot and other previous bomb attack methods.

CAPPS was seen as another sto a measure in addressin the bomb threat.

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• ~enkins reported that CAPPS was seen as an automated way to allow the selection
process to focus its resources. It was feasible - the idea of profiling had been around
awhile; we'd done it overseas; El Al was doing it. We knew it was time to deploy CTX
and we needed to target selectees to use the equipment on.

Civil Liberties and CAPPS

[U] The civil liberties issue was of great concern to the Commission, Jenkins said.
Therefore the Commission created a committee of civil lib ertari ans to advise it. If the
Commission could enlist them in the process, it was felt they would provide their
endorsement for the recommendations. The Commissioners were concerned about
selection and the consequences of selection, but weren't recommending that "invisible"
things be done as a consequence of selection. The Commission thought consequences of
selection should be visible to the passengers.

[U] Jenkins reported that there was a key compromise reached after philosophical debates
within the Commission concerning trade-offs between security and liberty. In addition,
they were worried about the security consequence of having a profile that over a period
of time people could pinpoint and "game". The Commission thought that they would be
unable to deter the determined adversary willing to carefully survey the system .

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PPBM (positive passenger bag match)

Congressional Oversight and Funding

[U] Jenkins reported that in costing out its recommendations, the Gore Commission
broke figures down by passenger. Rates fluctuated from 94 cents per passenger for added
security, to 1.45 per passenger, for instance. In terms of the actual funding provided for
the Commission's recommendations, the FY 1997 supplemental appropriations bill
provided $267 million. Then there was supposed to be a commitment to $500 million
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over the next five years, which would bring the overall dollar amount to $760 million.
However, Jenkins remembered that it was a tremendous uphill battle in Congress, even in
1996-97 and the promised 100 million dollars each year did not happen.

[U] Jenkins thought that Congress did not provide the additional funds because:

1) They didn't see the threat. The perception was not there. Jenkins had to testify
before Congress to defend the proposed funding. Members of Congress would
say, "When, Mr. Jenkins was the last hijacking in this country?" He often heard
Members say, "airline travel is still the safest mode of transportation"
(statistically). "This isn't the point," Jenkins told the Commission staff. A plane
crash impactsthe economy, security, and transportation.
2) They were looking at it as a cost benefit analysis issue, not a threat based issue.
The costs (to passengers, the airlines and the overall economy) were more
apparent than the benefits.
3) It was a time of diminishing federal budgets, so any proposed increases were even
harder to sustain.

General Aviation

[U] The Gore Commission did discuss the Murad and Bojinka matters, but as part of its
consideration of General Aviation security. However, the Commission didn't want to
recommend "500 things that wouldn't be implemented," and the ultimate determination
was that General Aviation recommendations wouldn't be acted upon.

The Appropriate Role of the Federal Government

[U] Jenkins stated that given the complexities and variation in surface transportation
systems (from the vast interconnected New York systems to rural bus companies), an
approach relying on best practices makes sense. We should identify such practices by
doing detailed case studies on previous terrorist attacks on surface transportation systems
(including the sarin attack in Tokyo, the IRA's attacks in London, and the Chechnyan
attacks in Moscow). The federal role should be to distill these lessons; support research
on appropriate technology; disseminate best practices information; provide threat
information; augment security in special cases; and assist in response and recovery. In
addition, the federal government should provide 4irect subsidies in certain cases, for
example by funding pilot tests of technology deployment (like in the case of sensors for
Washington Metro) or other security measures.

[U] In issuing any security standards, care must be taken to make sure that they don't
become too rigid, but remain "flexible and sensible."

[U] Jenkins supports requiring guards (whether public or privately employed) at

designated critical infrastructure sites to meet higher federal standards for training and
identity verification (i.e. background checks).

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Human Factors

[U] Jenkins feels we do not pay enough attention to human factors in security system
performance. We couldn't pay such close attention at the governmental level to
checkpoint screening when a private company ran this. Now we can. We can and should
ask questions like: Do some people have a natural aptitude for this? We need a stable
labor force that he thinks we have now, and this should allow us to look for better results.
We should be able to learn more about screener performance and apply best practices.

MANPADS

~ Jenkins stated, "If a man pad brought down a plane tomorrow, I cannot say I'd be
surprised." The threat is real. However, he isn't ready to endorse a $10 billion program
to defend against this threat. He would want to deploy defenses on certain planes in
higher risk areas. It would be a security gain and also provide baseline data so we can
learn about the process. We could analyze the false alarrn rates.

~In terms of other things to be done, he favors efforts to "buy back" existing supplies
and to set manufacturing standards for new missiles which would render them less useful
as terrorist weapons (for example, a built-in disarmament system to render the weapon
harmless after a certain time period). Whatever is done must be done on an international

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basis because it is an international problem. -

Preparedness and Planning

[U] Jenkins believes that dealing with complacency in between significant events is a
significant problem for security. We should learn from the military. The army spends a
lot of time in between wars. They are constantly war-gaming. In addition, rigorous red
team testing with instaht rewards and penalties is a way to stay sharp. That is the only
way we keep soldiers ready to go to war: frequent exercises; national competitions, real
incentives.

[U] In Jenkins' opinion, in the transportation security arena, it is not a matter of

engineering. It is a dynamic threat. Therefore, our task is not to win the war. We have to
continually get better at this. (He added that the civil aviation security system had in fact
thought about suicide hijackings. It was around. It was irritating to Jenkins when he
heard people say that they don't think suicidal terrorism by hijacking was a potential
threat.)

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[U] Jenkins believes we need a national strategy for transportation security, and we must
allocate resources according to priorities.

Red Teams

[U] "Red teaming" is also important, according to Jenkins. FAA used them a lot under
Irish Flynn. He was a good guy and he fought hard, as a de-facto member of the Gore
Commission, to get this included in the report. Red teams were used to test the system
realistically. We wanted it that way. The inspection methodology used prior to that was
counter-productive in preparing the security personnel to face artificial threats. Jenkins
believes we have to test the system from the enemy's perspective, and bring a broad
spectrum of considerations to bear in constructing test scenarios.

[U] Jenkins reported that aI Qaeda certainly did this kind of planning, pointing to bin
Ladiri's 1996 tasking to have subordinates study the use of airplanes as weapons .

• [U] Jenkins does not know if !APR at TSA is functioning in this way. Public
attentiveness is a big part of this. People need to be aware of their surroundings. He did
report that there are two "Red Team" scenario units in DHS' strategy or R&D offices.·

[U] Jenkins feels that the red team should not be made up of insiders. Insiders think the
way they work in their institution. They think about the intelligence they read on a daily
basis. Outsiders are more likely to employ "outside the box" thinking.

NOTE: JENKINS WILL SEND THE RED TEAM BRIEFING TO THE COMMISSION

Operational Security and Public Disclosure

[U] Jenkins indicated that he is not disturbed by public revelations about security
problems, except. when operational security details are disclosed. In Jenkins' view the
bad guys are able to figure out system vulnerabilities, and it isn't necessarily a roadmap
that they need.

[U] In fact it is important, Jenkins believes, to successfully engage the pub1ic in the fight
against terrorism. Some people remember seeing the backpacks on the terrorists that
detonated bombs on the trains in Spain. That type of terrorist plan is less likely to succeed

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in London because the genera) public has been sensitized to the terrorist threat and
vulnerabilities in their Underground system. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) would
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have one bomb and submit 50 bomb threats. Britain has 5000 closed circuit TVs on the
rail system, and "first responders" (to threat reports) come fast. The result has been that
the British authorities can be confident they would be notified of a suspicious incident
within a few minutes, and they would be capable of quickly responding.

[U] Jenkins indicated that the type of infrastructure vulnerable to attack needs a readily
available means to communicate and rapid (and visible to the public) responses need to
be practiced. That way, people become a part of security for the infrastructure.

[U] Jenkins believes the public will be increasingly involved in counter-terrorist

surveillance, and as long as it is voluntary, he believes this is fully legitimate. He said
new technology that is widely available should be used in imaginative ways to support
security infrastructure, such as web cam broadcast on the Internet. Stay at home moms
and "computer geeks" are underutilized and could provide be useful resources for
security.

Watch Lists

[U] Jenkins said the lists are a continuous problem in this country. They have varying
sizes, designs and purposes, and we are never able to get them properly matched up. It is
tough to get the necessary information from the lists to the end-users. The Gore
Commission intended to address this problem, but didn't include it in their
recommendations.

[U] Prior to 9-11, a person had to have been specifically associated with a threat to
aviation to he added to a list. The reality is "sharing information is an unnatural act" for
the intelligence community.

Local Law Enforcement

[U] Jenkins believes that, at present, we are significantly underutilizing local law
enforcement as a source of intelligence and other information on the terrorist threat.

[U] New York and a few other cities have a sophisticated system in place now to track
terrorists. Local law enforcement offices are more numerous (New York City alone has
1,000 counter-terrorism officers) ethnically and linguistically diverse than their federal
counterparts, and far more adept than the FBI in getting at local terrorist cells. This asset
needs to be harnessed. "We need to network them in a national system. But now that
power is lost when someone of great interest to law enforcement in New York gets on a
plane and goes to Las Vegas." Hi-tech corporations have figured out ways to respect
hierarchies while networking knowledge, and Jenkins indicated that the federal
government needed to learn to do this ..

[U] Better use of local assets is more imperative today, in Jenkins' view, because of the
dispersal of the threat (i.e. the localization of the enemy). We are dealing with a
dispersed, decentralized Jihad. They can operate under the radar. These are local plots.
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They communicate via Internet and only the mind set is shared. We aren't going to pick
that up on the national level. Local intelligence activity is more likely to.

[U] Jenkins pointed out that if you took just 2 percent of the 600,000 local law
enforcement officers, and trained them as a counter-terrorist force, you would have an
"MI 5" capability, but more dispersed.

National Strategy for Transportation Security

[U] For locally owned critical infrastructure, Jenkins supports setting security and
performance standards, and federal dissemination of "best practices." This would
represent a dispersal of capability and a recognition that the federal government does not
have to control all security from the top. Jenkins believes we have to "get smart fast"
about security, and believes that leveraging and mobilizing local resources (including law
enforcement) is one way of doing so, and also represents a more public-oriented
"populist" approach.

[U] Jenkins indicated that, in part because of Congressional mandates, DRS hasn't been
able to come up with a persuasive national homeland security strategy. Absent that, they
are vulnerable to having to respond to "the latest scare" and to having Congress impose
additional mandates in response. For example, at present Congress seems to want to cut
back on screening, FAMs, etc. and putting resources to respond to the Madrid attacks.

[U] Jenkins supports a layered defense with ever-changing "curtains of mystery."

Unpredictability drives terrorists crazy. They are willing to lose their life but they can't
abide the possibility of mission failure. So uncertainty is a great problem for them.
CAPPS is great because it creates mystery. It had great publicity but there was actually
no clearly defined profile of a hijacker to build into it. The uncertainty was effective.

[U] Jenkins indicated that removing TSA from DOT meant that security is now the sole
judge of the agency's performance, and that the security division no longer has to worry
. about the "efficiency" of its operations or what effect changes in security policy have on
the economy. This opens the possibility that there may be non-traditional means that can
be employed to address security concerns, such as making security a constant in the
design and construction of new infrastructure. "We need to think beyond gates and
guards to design a more resilient infrastructure."

[U] Jenkins stated that security and infrastructure are a constant tandem. The United
States has been investing in security for its infrastructure for 250 years. Interstates were
built to move troops and to evacuate cities; The Erie Canal was built because the United
States was subject to blockades. The National Guard was set up to protect a decaying
infrastructure. Now, more than ever, resiliency is the key. The country needs to decide
what the strategy will be: invest in newer bridges, or a high-speed rail with a security
incentive? Imaginative responses are needed for emerging threats.

[U] ".DHS needs a new mindset," Jenkins said.

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World Trade Center and Grand Central Station Briefings

[U] After the WTC bombing of 1993, Jenkins (as part of Kroll Associates) had done a
briefing for World Trade Center Management (which he is to provide to the Commission)
in which he laid out a number of "probable to improbable" threats (including airplane
crashes into the buildings) and stressed that each threat had to be addressed in some
fashion.

[U] Since active defenses, like mounting missile batteries on the buildings, were out of
the question, the team at Kroll set out to devise mitigation strategies for that scenario and
others like it. People streaming out of the building in 1993 had faces black from smoke.
It took six hours to get out of the building. Floor marshals were needed and drills for
evacuations needed to be practiced. Ventilation and proper lighting needed to be
installed. These measures were implemented and 25,000 people got out of the buildings
on 9-11. Jenkins believes that if the mitigation measures had not been put in place, it is
likely more lives would have been lost.

[U] Around January 2001, Jenkins lead an all-agency exercise in NYC with the OEM
(Office of Emergency Management). They devised a response to a hypothetical large
incident in Grand Central Station. The exercise led to a crisis management review of all
the involved agencies. Transportation systems as part of a larger system must keep.
moving. The exercise revealed that it took about seven layers of management to make
and implement a decision to shut down a train. That was not good. Many changes were
made to the entire system of response. On 9-11, in the stations immediately beneath the
Trade Center, everyone got out. There were tens of thousands of people down there, and
once again, Jenkins believes that proper planning helped save lives. While no one can
plan for every conceivable contingency but practice drills go a long way.

Planes as Weapons

[SSI] With respect to the civil aviation security system's awareness of the possibility of
airplanes being used as weapons, Jenkins reported: "There were dots. There was
reporting on the issue. It was within the bloodstream of the intelligence community."
The historical precedent:

[U] Jenkins recounted that in 1972, a Southern Airways hijacking occurred, which was
the longest one in the history of the United States. The pilot was shot. It went back and
forth from Cuba, That is the first time a threat was made to crash that plane into a facility.
It went on for three days. After that, universal passenger screening was implemented.

[U]Jn 1989, Jenkins wrote in a paper on aviation security ofa "nightmare crash into a
city or facility." Also, planes-as-weapons was a frequent topic of discussion in Israel. In

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1994 came the plan of the Algerian hijackers to crash a plane into the Eiffel Tower. It
was broadcast to the intelligence community. The Bojinka plot occurred in 1995.

[U] Jenkins continued that around 1996, bin Ladin had Atif do feasibility studies on the
planes-as-weapons concept. And in a July 1996 appearance before a Senate committee,
Jenkins testified, "terrorist attacks from the air are not inconceivable."

~ With respect to an Israeli expert on terrorist-use of aviation who discounted the

threat of aircraft as weapons before 9-11 in a briefing to aviation security personnel,
Jenkins indicated that at that time, the issue was the nature of suicide attacks. They were
occurring in Lebanon, and some in Israel, and then the embassy bombings in 1998. The
suicide profile was always some, ''whacked out" young, impressionable person, not likely
to be highly educated. The profile also indicated that the person was not likely to work in
a group. The other conclusion the aviation security community came to was that suicide
attacks did not "travel well." If you sent someone willing. to explode him or herself far
away from home to Paris to detonate, who knows what might happen to corrupt the plan?
This was the conventional wisdom that led many experts in the field to determine suicide
hijackings were unlikely.

¢ At that point, it was inconceivable that a well-educated group of suicide hijackers

assigned to a mission in another country for months of preparation time would happen .
...1

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I(the Israeli expert) was absolutely right at the time," Jenkins said .

[U] Jenkins reported that consideration of aircraft as weapons came up at a number of

conferences, for instance the July 2001 Genoa G-B Summit. He further indicated that the
notion of sealing off air space during major events goes "way back to the 19705,"

[UJ Jenkins indicated that at Rand, they used to track al1 novels about terrorism;
especially nuclear terrorism, to look at the language used by authors. If a phrase or the
design of a weapon were lifted directly from such a book, they would be more inclined to
regard the threat received as most likely a hoax.

(U] Jenkins reported an instance in which the Israeli government shot down a commercial
Libyan aircraft. It was on the assumption that it was a commandeered plane. This was in
the 1980s. It was on the Israeli agenda. They were willing to shoot it down. (NOTE:
JENKINS WILL ALSO SEND INFORMATION ON THIS TO THE COMMISSION.]

9/11 Attacks

[U] Jenkins doesn't know if the success of the 9/11 attacks was the result of "someone
screwing up." However, in his view, this was really a matter involving systemic issues,
especially intelligence-sharing. He recognizes that such an accounting is perhaps
"tougher" to convince people about, and may not be satisfying to all concerned.

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