The Phoenix programme

[back] Assassinations [back] Vietnam war

[CIA programme. The systematic killing and terrorising of civilians exposed in the y !ai massacre. Contin"es to exist and operate worldwide today #eg Ira$i and %alestinian civilians&' was seen in (icarag"a "nder the code)name *peration %egas"s' and in +l ,alvador with the +l o-ote massacre' and in Indonesia with the ,anta Cr"- assacre. And yo" can see the same hand at work with the man"fact"red ,erial killers' at least one of whom was part of %hoenix.]

See. Tort"re ,erial killers /"man ,acrifice Terror bombing

(a-i killing of civilians CIA (a-i connections y !ai massacre +l o-ote massacre ,anta Cr"- assacre

Articles
The 0eadly 1*peration %hoenix1 by Texe arrs [2334] 0ead ,pooks 0on5t !ie #And 0on5t 0eal 0r"gs +ither& by 6ri 0owbenko [7ook extract] The %hoenix %rogram' %rogram y !ai and the 8Tiger Cages9 excerpt from The %hoenix

[233:] 7ob ;errey' CIA <ar Crimes' And The (eed =or A <ar Crimes Trial by 0o"glas Valentine

Book
The %hoenix %rogram by 0o"glas Valentine

External
[233>] %reemptive anh"nting. The CIA?s (ew Assassination %rogram CIA and *peration %hoenix in Vietnam @ Information abo"t the CIA5s assassination program in Vietnam. CIA ,"pport of 0eath ,$"ads <illiam +. Colby on A"ly :B' :BC:' before ,enate ,"bcommittee testified that CIA5s *peration %hoenix had killed 2:'DEC Vietnamese citi-ens between Aan"ary :BFE and ay :BC:.

0oc"ments from the %hoenix %rogram Created by the CIA in ,aigon in :BFC' %hoenix was a program aimed at 1ne"trali-ing1@thro"gh assassination' kidnapping' and systematic tort"re@the civilian infrastr"ct"re that s"pported the Viet Cong ins"rgency in ,o"th Vietnam. The CIA destroyed its copies of these doc"ments' b"t the creator of %hoenix gave his personal copies to a"thor 0o"glas Valentine. They have never previo"sly been p"blished' online or in print %hoenix 0oc"ment. 1Internal ,ec"rity in ,o"th Vietnam ) %hoenix1 The latest in o"r collection of doc"ments from the CIA5s program of assassination' kidnapping' and tort"re in Vietnam

Quotes re Nicaragua [See. (icarag"a.]

The contras5 br"tality earned them a wide notoriety. They reg"larly destroyed health centers' schools' agric"lt"ral cooperatives' and comm"nity centers)symbols of the ,andinistas5 social programs in r"ral areas. %eople ca"ght in these assa"lts were often tort"red and killed in the most gr"esome ways. *ne example' reported by The G"ardian of !ondon' s"ffices. In the words of a s"rvivor of a raid in Ainotega province' which borders on /ond"ras. 1Hosa had her breasts c"t off. Then they c"t into her chest and took o"t her heart. The men had their arms broken' their testicles c"t off' and their eyes poked o"t they were killed by slitting their throats and p"lling the tong"e o"t thro"gh the slit.1 After many contra atrocity stories had been reported in the world press' it was disclosed in *ctober :BE4 that the CIA had prepared a man"al of instr"ction for its clients which' amongst other things' enco"raged the "se of violence against civilians. In the wake of the f"ror in Congress ca"sed by the expose' the ,tate 0epartment was obliged to p"blicly condemn the contras5 terrorist activities. Congressional intelligence committees were informed by the CIA' by present and former contra leaders' and by other witnesses that the contras indeed 1raped' tort"red and killed "narmed civilians' incl"ding children1 and that 1gro"ps of civilians' incl"ding women and children' were b"rned' dismembered' blinded and beheaded1. These were the same rebels whom Honald Heagan' with his strange mirror lang"age' called 1freedom fighters1 and the 1moral e$"al of o"r fo"nding fathers1. #The rebels in +l ,alvador' in the president5s st"died opinion' were 1m"rderers and terrorists1.& The CIA man"al' entitled %sychological *perations in G"errilla <arfare' gave advice on s"ch niceties as political assassination' blackmailing ordinary citi-ens' mob violence' kidnapping' and blowing "p p"blic b"ildings. 6pon entering a town' it said' 1establish a p"blic trib"nal1 where the g"errillas can 1shame' ridic"le and h"miliate1 ,andinistas and their sympathi-ers by 1sho"ting slogans and Ieers1. 1If ... it sho"ld be necessary ... to fire on a citi-en who was trying to leave the town'1 g"errillas sho"ld explain that 1he was an enemy of the people1 who wo"ld have alerted the ,andinistas who wo"ld then 1carry o"t acts of reprisals s"ch as rapes' pillage' destr"ction' capt"res' etc.1 [233>] (icarag"a :BE:):BB3 by <illiam 7l"m

Nicaragua 1981-1990
0estabili-ation in slow motion

excerpted from the book ;illing /ope by <illiam 7l"m JJJJJ <hen the American military forces left (icarag"a for the last time' in :B>>' they left behind a so"venir by which the (icarag"an people co"ld remember them. the (ational G"ard' placed "nder the direction of one Anastasio ,omo-a ... Three years later' ,omo-a took over the presidency and with the indispensable help of the (ational G"ard established a family dynasty which wo"ld r"le over (icarag"a' m"ch like a private estate' for the next 4> years. <hile the G"ardsmen' consistently maintained by the 6nited ,tates' passed their time on martial law' rape' tort"re' m"rder of the opposition' and massacres of peasants' as well as less violent p"rs"its s"ch as robbery' extortion' contraband' r"nning brothels and other government f"nctions' the ,omo-a clan laid claim to the lion5s share of (icarag"a5s land and b"sinesses. <hen Anastasio ,omo-a II was overthrown by the ,andinistas in A"ly :BCB' he fled into exile leaving behind a co"ntry in which two)thirds of the pop"lation earned less than K>33 a year. 6pon his arrival in iami' ,omo-a admitted to being worth K:33 million. A 6, intelligence report' however' placed it at KB33 million. It was fort"nate for the new (icarag"an leaders that they came to power while Aimmy Carter sat in the <hite /o"se. It gave them a year and a half of relative breathing space to take the first steps in their planned reconstr"ction of an impoverished society before the relentless hostility of the Heagan administration descended "pon themL which is not to say that Carter welcomed the ,andinista victory. In :BCE' with ,omo-a nearing collapse' Carter a"thori-ed covert CIA s"pport for the press and labor "nions in (icarag"a in an attempt to create a 1moderate1 alternative to the ,andinistas. Towards the same end' American diplomats were conferring with non)leftist (icarag"an opponents of ,omo-a. <ashington5s idea of 1moderate1' according to a gro"p of prominent (icarag"ans who walked o"t on the disc"ssions' was the incl"sion of ,omo-a5s political party in the f"t"re government and 1leaving practically intact the corr"pt str"ct"re of the somocista apparat"s1' incl"ding the (ational G"ard' albeit in some reorgani-ed form. Indeed' at this same time' the head of the 6, ,o"thern Command #!atin America&' !t. General 0ennis cA"liffe' was telling ,omo-a that' altho"gh he had to abdicate' the 6nited ,tates had 1no intention of permitting a settlement which wo"ld lead to the destr"ction of the (ational G"ard1. This was a notion remarkably insensitive to the deep loathing for the G"ard felt by the great maIority of the (icarag"an people. JJJJJ After the ,andinistas took power' Carter a"thori-ed the CIA to provide financial and other s"pport to their opponents. At the same time' <ashington press"red the ,andinistas to incl"de certain men in the new government. Altho"gh these tactics failed' the Carter administration did not ref"se to give aid to (icarag"a. Honald Heagan was later to point to this and ask. 1Can

anybody do"bt the generosity and good faith of the American peopleM1 <hat the president failed to explain was. a& Almost all of the aid had gone to non)governmental agencies and to the private sector' incl"ding the American Instit"te for =ree !abor 0evelopment' the long)time CIA front. b& The primary and expressed motivation for the aid was to strengthen the hands of the so)called moderate opposition and "nderc"t the infl"ence of socialist co"ntries in (icarag"a . c& All military aid was withheld despite repeated pleas from the (icarag"an government abo"t its need and right to s"ch help)the defeated (ational G"ardsmen and other ,"pporters of ,omo-a had not' after all' disappearedL they had regro"ped as the 1contras1 and maintained primacy in the leadership of this force from then on. In Aan"ary :BE:' Honald Heagan took office "nder a Hep"blican platform which asserted that it 1deplores the arxist ,andinista takeover of (icarag"a1. The president moved $"ickly to c"t off virt"ally all forms of assistance to the ,andinistas' the opening salvos of his war against their revol"tion. The American whale' yet again' felt threatened by a minnow in the Caribbean. Among the many meas"res "ndertaken. (icarag"a was excl"ded from 6, government programs which promote American investment and tradeL s"gar imports from (icarag"a were slashed by B3 percentL and' witho"t excessive s"btlety b"t with notable s"ccess' <ashington press"red the International onetary ="nd #I =&' the Inter)American 0evelopment 7ank #I07&' the <orld 7ank' and the +"ropean Common arket to withhold loans to (icarag"a. The director of the I07' r. ;evin *5,"llivan' later revealed that in :BE> the 6, had opposed a loan to aid (icarag"an fishermen on the gro"nds that the co"ntry did not have ade$"ate f"el for their boats. A week later' *5,"llivan pointed o"t' 1sabote"rs blew "p a maIor (icarag"an f"el depot in the port of Corinto1' an act described by an American intelligence so"rce as 5totally a CIA operation55. <ashington did' however' offer KD.: million in aid to private organi-ations and to the Homan Catholic Ch"rch in (icarag"a. This offer was reIected by the government beca"se' it said' 16nited ,tates congressional hearings revealed that the [aid] agreements have political motivations' designed to promote resistance and destabili-e the Hevol"tionary Government.55 As (icarag"a had already arrested members of several of the previo"s recipient organi-ations s"ch as the oravian Ch"rch and the ,"perior Co"ncil of %rivate +nterprise #C*,+%& for involvement in armed plots against the government. The Heagan administration was not deterred. Cardinal ig"el *bando and the Catholic Ch"rch in (icarag"a received h"ndreds of tho"sands of dollars in covert aid' from the CIA "ntil :BED' and then)after official 6, government aid was stopped by congressional oversight committees) from *liver (orth5s off)the)books operation in the <hite /o"se basement. *ne end to which *bando reportedly p"t the money was 1religio"s instr"ction1 to 1thwart the arxist)!eninist policies of the ,andinistas55.

As part of a concerted effort to deprive the (icarag"an economy of oil' several attacks on f"el depots were carried o"t. ContraNCIA operations emanating in /ond"ras also blew "p oil pipelines' mined the waters of oil)"nloading ports' and threatened to blow "p any approaching oil tankersL at least seven foreign ships were damaged by the mines' incl"ding a ,oviet tanker with five crewmen reported to be badly inI"red. (icarag"a5s ports were "nder siege. mortar shelling from high)speed motor la"nches' aerial bombing and rocket and machine)g"n attacks were designed to blockade (icarag"a5s exports as well as to starve the co"ntry of imports by frightening away foreign shipping. In *ctober :BE>' +sso anno"nced that its tankers wo"ld no longer carry cr"de oil to (icarag"a from exico' the co"ntry5s leading s"pplierL at this point (icarag"a had a :3)day s"pply of oil. Agric"lt"re was another prime target. Haids by contras ca"sed extensive damage to crops and demolished tobacco)drying barns' grain silos' irrigation proIects' farm ho"ses and machineryL roads' bridges and tr"cks were destroyed to prevent prod"ce from being movedL n"mero"s state farms and cooperatives were incapacitated and harvesting was prevented other farms still intact were abandoned beca"se of the danger. And in *ctober :BE2' the ,tandard =r"it Company anno"nced that it was s"spending all its banana operations in (icarag"a and the marketing of the fr"it in the 6nited ,tates. The American m"ltinational' after a cent"ry of enriching itself in the co"ntry' and in violation of a contract with the government which extended to :BED' left behind the "ncertainty of employment for some 4'333 workers and approximately six million cases of bananas to harvest with neither transport nor market.5 (icarag"a5s fishing ind"stry s"ffered not only from lack of f"el for its boats. The fishing fleet was decimated by mines and attacks' its trawlers idled for want of spare parts d"e to the 6, credit blockade. The co"ntry lost millions of dollars from red"ced shrimp exports.5 It was an American war against (icarag"a. The contras had their own vario"s motivations for wanting to topple the ,andinista government. They did not need to be instigated by the 6nited ,tates. 7"t before the 6, military arrived in /ond"ras in the tho"sands and set "p =ortress America' the contras were engaged almost excl"sively in hit)and)r"n forays across the border' small)scale raids on (icarag"an border patrols and farmers' attacks on patrol boats' and the likeL killing a few people here' b"rning a b"ilding down there'5 there was no f"t"re for the contras in a war s"ch as this against a m"ch larger force. Then the American big g"ns began to arrive in :BE2' along with the air power' the landing strips' the docks' the radar stations' the comm"nications centers' b"ilt "nder the cover of repeated Ioint 6,)/ond"ran military exercises' while tho"sands of contras were training in =lorida and California. 6, and 1/ond"ran1 reconnaissance planes' "s"ally piloted by Americans' began reg"lar overflights into (icarag"a to photograph bombing and sabotage targets' track ,andinista military mane"vers and e$"ipment' spot the planting of mines' eavesdrop on military comm"nications and map the terrain. +lectronic s"rveillance ships off the coast of (icarag"a partook in the b"gging of a nation. ,aid a former CIA analyst. 1*"r intelligence from (icarag"a is so good ... we can hear the toilets fl"sh in anag"a.1

eanwhile' American pilots were flying diverse kinds of combat missions against (icarag"an troops and carrying s"pplies to contras inside (icarag"an territory. ,everal were shot down and killed.5 ,ome flew in civilian clothes' after having been told that they wo"ld be disavowed by the %entagon if capt"red. ,ome contras told American congressmen that they were ordered to claim responsibility for a bombing raid organi-ed by the CIA and flown by Agency mercenaries. /ond"ran troops as well were trained by the 6, for bloody hit)and)r"n operations into (icarag"a ... and so it went ... as in +l ,alvador' the f"ll extent of American involvement in the fighting will never be known. The contras5 br"tality earned them a wide notoriety. They reg"larly destroyed health centers' schools' agric"lt"ral cooperatives' and comm"nity centers)symbols of the ,andinistas5 social programs in r"ral areas. %eople ca"ght in these assa"lts were often tort"red and killed in the most gr"esome ways. *ne example' reported by The G"ardian of !ondon' s"ffices. In the words of a s"rvivor of a raid in Ainotega province' which borders on /ond"ras. 1Hosa had her breasts c"t off. Then they c"t into her chest and took o"t her heart. The men had their arms broken' their testicles c"t off' and their eyes poked o"t They were killed by slitting their throats and p"lling the tong"e o"t thro"gh the slit.1 Americas <atch' the h"man)rights organi-ation' concl"ded that 1the contras systematically engage in violent ab"ses ... so prevalent that these may be said to be their principal means of waging war.1 In (ovember :BE4' the (icarag"an government anno"nced that since :BE: the contras had assassinated B:3 state officials and killed E'333 civilians. The analogy is inescapable. if (icarag"a had been Israel' and the contras the %!*' the ,andinistas wo"ld have long before made a lightning bombing raid on the bases in /ond"ras and wiped them o"t completely. The 6nited ,tates wo"ld have tacitly approved the action' the ,oviet 6nion wo"ld have condemned it b"t done nothing' the rest of the world wo"ld have raised their eyebrows' and that wo"ld have been the end of it. After many contra atrocity stories had been reported in the world press' it was disclosed in *ctober :BE4 that the CIA had prepared a man"al of instr"ction for its clients which' amongst other things' enco"raged the "se of violence against civilians. In the wake of the f"ror in Congress ca"sed by the expose' the ,tate 0epartment was obliged to p"blicly condemn the contras5 terrorist activities. Congressional intelligence committees were informed by the CIA' by present and former contra leaders' and by other witnesses that the contras indeed 1raped' tort"red and killed "narmed civilians' incl"ding children1 and that 1gro"ps of civilians' incl"ding women and children' were b"rned' dismembered' blinded and beheaded1. These were the same rebels whom Honald Heagan' with his strange mirror lang"age' called 1freedom fighters1 and the 1moral e$"al of o"r fo"nding fathers1. #The rebels in +l ,alvador' in the president5s st"died opinion' were 1m"rderers and terrorists1.& The CIA man"al' entitled %sychological *perations in G"errilla <arfare' gave advice on s"ch niceties as political assassination' blackmailing ordinary citi-ens' mob violence' kidnapping' and

blowing "p p"blic b"ildings. 6pon entering a town' it said' 1establish a p"blic trib"nal1 where the g"errillas can 1shame' ridic"le and h"miliate1 ,andinistas and their sympathi-ers by 1sho"ting slogans and Ieers1. 1If ... it sho"ld be necessary ... to fire on a citi-en who was trying to leave the town'1 g"errillas sho"ld explain that 1he was an enemy of the people1 who wo"ld have alerted the ,andinistas who wo"ld then 1carry o"t acts of reprisals s"ch as rapes' pillage' destr"ction' capt"res' etc.1 JJJJ In Aan"ary :BE>' the so)called Contadora gro"p' composed of exico' %anama' Colombia and Vene-"ela' began to meet periodically in an attempt to still the tro"bled waters of Central America. HeIecting at the o"tset the idea that the conflicts of the region co"ld or sho"ld be seen as part of an +ast)<est confrontation' they conferred with all the nations involved' incl"ding the 6nited ,tates. The complex and lengthy disc"ssions event"ally gave birth to a 2:)point treaty which dealt with the most contentio"s iss"es. civil war' foreign intervention' elections' and h"man rights. Then' m"ch to <ashington5s s"rprise' on C ,eptember :BE4 (icarag"a anno"nced its intention to sign the treaty. JJJJJ The American ambassador to Costa Hica likened (icarag"a "nder the ,andinistas to an 1infected piece of meat1 that attracts 1insects.1 %resident Heagan called the co"ntry a 1totalitarian d"ngeon1' and insisted that the people of (icarag"a were more oppressed than blacks in ,o"th Africa. embers of the ;issinger Commission on Central America indicated that (icarag"a "nder the ,andinistas was as bad or worse than (icarag"a "nder ,omo-a. /enry ;issinger believed it to be as bad as or worse than (a-i Germany. Heagan was in accord)he compared the plight of the contras to 7ritain5s stand against Germany in <orld <ar II. 1Central America'1 noted <ayne ,mith' former head of the 6, Interests ,ection in /avana' 1now exercises the same infl"ence on American foreign policy as the f"ll moon does on werewolves. ,o all)cons"ming' so "nrelenting' was the hatred' that ;issinger demanded that the American ambassador to (icarag"a be removed simply beca"se he reported that the ,andinista government was 1performing fairly well in s"ch areas as ed"cation1. And in the wake of the terrible devastation in (icarag"a wro"ght by /"rricane Aoan in *ctober :BEE' the Heagan administration ref"sed to send any aid nor to help private American organi-ations do so. ,o eager was the ,tate 0epartment to t"rn the ,andinistas into international pariahs' that it told the world' witho"t any evidence' that (icarag"a was exporting dr"gs' that it was anti ,emitic' that it was training 7ra-ilian g"errillas. <hen the CIA was pressed abo"t the alleged ,andinista dr"g connection' it backed down from the administration5s claim.

,ecretary of ,tate Alexander /aig referred to a photograph of bla-ing corpses and declared it an example of the 1atrocio"s genocidal actions that are being taken by the (icarag"an Government1 against the iskito Indians. <e then learned that the photo was from :BCE' ,omo-a5s time. JJJJJ 7y the time the war in (icarag"a began to slowly atrophy to a tentative concl"sion d"ring :BEE) EB' the Heagan administration5s obsession with the ,andinistas had inspired both the official and "nofficial s$"ads to embrace tactics s"ch as the following in order to maintain a steady flow of financing' weaponry and other aid to the contras. dealings with other middle)eastern and !atin American terrorists' fre$"ent dr"g sm"ggling in a variety of imaginative ways' money la"ndering' embe--lement of 6, government f"nds' perI"ry' obstr"ction of I"stice' b"rglary of the offices of American dissidents' covert propaganda to defeat domestic political foes' violation of the ne"trality act' illegal shredding of government doc"ments' plans to s"spend the Constit"tion in the event of widespread internal dissent against government policy ... and m"ch more' as revealed in the phenomenon known as IranNContra ... all of it to s"pport the band of rapists' tort"rers and killers known as the Contras This then' was the level of charm reached by anti)comm"nism after C3 years of refinement. The imperial sensibility of America5s leaders co"ld be compared favorably with that of 7ritain circa :B2D. 7"t it worked. *n 2D =ebr"ary :BB3' the ,andinistas were defeated in national elections by a coalition of political parties r"nning "nder the name (ational *pposition 6nion #6(*&. %resident George 7"sh called it 1a victory for democracy1... ,enator Hobert 0ole declared that 1The final o"tcome is a vindication of the Heagan policies.1... +lliott Abrams' former ,tate 0epartment official and IranNContra leading light' said 1<hen history is written the contras will be folk heroes.55 The opposing analysis of the election was that ten years of all)encompassing war had worn the (icarag"an people down. They were afraid that as long as the ,andinistas remained in power' the contras and the 6nited ,tates wo"ld never relent in their campaign to overthrow them. The people voted for peace. #As the people of the 0ominican Hep"blic had voted in :BFF for the 6,) s"pported candidate to forestall f"rther American military intervention.& 1<e can5t take any more war. All we have had is war' war' war' war'1 said ,am"el Heina' a driver for Aimmy Carter5s election monitoring team in A"igalpa. In some families 1one son has been drafted by the ,andinistas and another has Ioined the contras. The war has torn families apart.55 The 6, invasion and bombing of %anama I"st two months earlier' with all its death and destr"ction' co"ld only have intensified the commitment of hardcore ,andinistas to resist yan$"i imperialismo' b"t it co"ld not have failed to serve as a ca"tion to the large bloc of "ndecided voters.

The (icarag"ans were also voting' they hoped' for some relief from the grinding poverty that five years of a f"ll American economic embargo' as well as the war' had heaped "pon their heads. Commented %a"l Heichler' a 6, lawyer who represented the (icarag"an government in <ashington at the time. 1<hatever revol"tionary fervor the people once might have had was beaten o"t of them by the war and the impossibility of p"tting food in their children5s stomachs.55 ... =or ten years the people of (icarag"a had sho"ted [the] slogan)1/ere' no one gives "p.1 7"t in =ebr"ary :BB3' they did exactly that. #A"st as the people of Chile had chanted 1The people "nited will never be defeated1' before s"cc"mbing to American power.& The 6nited ,tates had more than war and embargo at its disposal to determine the winner of the election. The (ational +ndowment for 0emocracy spent more than K:: million dollars' directly and indirectly' on the election campaign in (icarag"a. This is comparable to a foreign government po"ring more than KC33 million dollars into an American election' and is in addition to several million dollars more allocated by Congress to 1s"pporting the electoral infrastr"ct"re' and the "nknown n"mber of millions the CIA passed aro"nd covertly. As a res"lt of a controversy in :BE4)when (+0 f"nds were "sed to aid a %anamanian presidential candidate backed by (oriega and the CIA)Congress enacted a law prohibiting the "se of (+0 f"nds 1to finance the campaigns of candidates for p"blic office.1 The ways to circ"mvent the letter andNor spirit of s"ch a prohibition were not diffic"lt to conceive. (+0 first allocated millions to help organi-e 6(*' b"ilding "p the parties and organi-ations that formed and s"pported the coalition. Then a variety of other organi-ations)civic' labor' media' women5s' etc.)r"n by 6(* activists received grants for all kinds of 1non partisan1 and 1pro)democracy1 programs' for voter ed"cation' voter registration' Iob skills' and so on. !arge grants made to 6(* itself were specified for items s"ch as office e$"ipment and vehicles. #Hep. ,ilvio Conte of assach"setts pointed o"t that the K:.> million re$"ested for vehicles wo"ld pay for renting 2'24: cars for a month at K23 per day.& 6(* was the only political party to receive 6, aid' even tho"gh eight other opposition parties fielded candidates. oney received by 6(* for any p"rpose of co"rse freed "p their own money for "se in the campaign and helped all of their candidates. oreover' the 6, contin"ed to f"nd the contras' some of whom campaigned for 6(* in r"ral areas. Afterwards' critics of the American policy in (icarag"a called it 1a bl"eprint1 for s"ccessf"l 6, intervention in the Third <orld. A %entagon analyst agreed. 1It5s going right into the textbooks.

Quotes
Colby5s C.I.A. specialty' the 1%hoenix *peration1 in ,o"theast Asia' was known for its tort"re' political assassinations' mass m"rders #23'333 to 43'333 civilians&' tiger cages' rigged elections' and slanted intelligence. The fact that this person was approved for appointment as 0irector of the Central Intelligence Agency by a ,enate vote of E>):> indicates that the ,enate both agrees with' and rewards' an agent of theirs for these acts against mankind. It is no coincidence that the same ,enate t"rned down a vote' after 2D years of stalling and

debating' on an agreement that wo"ld o"tlaw genocide as late as arch' :BC4. A government that f"nds' promotes' recogni-es' and allows war criminals to direct their domestic affairs reveals a total disrespect for o"r lives. This monster and its vicio"s machinery will now t"rn "pon "s at home. The %hoenix program was an indiscriminate m"rder program in Asia' "tili-ing terror and the killing of innocent people. The /earst kidnapping is part of the %hoenix program inside the 6nited ,tates. I(,I0+ T/+ /+AH,T ;I0(A%%I(G ,o' I vol"nteered for this *peration %hoenix' which was a psychological operation. To make a long story short' it wo"ld make Charlie anson look like Abigail Van 7"ren. It was basically a psychological operation' and it was very well done. Americans have done it many times before and in essence we did it inadvertently in !ibya. The theory is yo" don5t kill the leader' yo" kill his children' or his family. 7asically' what yo" do is yo" destroy the chief5s family very ignominio"sly' and I mean ignominio"sly. I mean' Charlie anson wo"ld look like a 1sweetie1 compared to what this st"ff was. And so when the g"y comes back' he sees this mess )) yo" know his wife beheaded' and her infant child stripped o"t of her abdomen' and beheaded and bleeding on her body' h"ng from a rafter' shit all over the walls' those kind of things )) that5s how yo" do it. And when that happens' then these g"ys lose confidence in themselves' and the village loses confidence in them' b"t they5re not martyrs. ,o the whole operation loses its fighting will. And that5s basically 1The American <ay.1 [:BB> Interview with 0r. Alan !evin.] odern edicine and its ilitary !inks *n A"g"st 2D' :BC3' an article appeared in The (ew Oork Times hinting that the CIA' thro"gh %hoenix' was responsible for y !ai. The story line was advanced on *ctober :4' when defense attorneys for 0avid itchell @ a sergeant acc"sed and later cleared of machine)g"nning scores of Vietnamese in a drainage ditch in y !ai @ citing %hoenix as the CIA?s 8systematic program of assassination'9 named +van %arker as the CIA officer who 8signed doc"ments' certain blacklists'9 of Vietnamese to be assassinated in y !ai. <hen we spoke' %arker denied the charge. ......As in any large)scale %hoenix operation' two of Task =orce 7arker?s companies cordoned off the hamlet while a third one @ Calley?s @ moved in' clearing the way for ;oto"c and ,pecial 7ranch officers who were 8bro"ght to the field to identify VC from among the detained inhabitants.9 .....The CIA' via %hoenix' not only perpetrated the y !ai massacre b"t also concealed the crime. ....As Aeff ,tein said' 8The first thing yo" learn in the Army is not competence' yo" learn corr"ption. And yo" learn Pto get along' go along.?9 6nfort"nately not everyone learns to get along. *n ,eptember >' :BEE' Hobert T?,o"vas was apparently shot in the head by his girl friend' after an arg"ment over a bottle of vodka. The two were homeless' living o"t of a van they had parked "nder a bridge in %ittsb"rgh. T?,o"vas was a Vietnam veteran and a participant in the y !ai massacre. .....T?,o"vas?s attorney' George 0avis' traveled to 0a (ang in :BC3 to investigate the massacre and while there was assigned as an aide a Vietnamese colonel who said that the massacre was a %hoenix operation and that the p"rpose of %hoenix was 8to terrori-e the civilian pop"lation into s"bmission.9 0avis told me. 8<hen I told the people in the <ar 0epartment what I knew and that I wo"ld attempt to obtain all records on the program in order to defend my client' they agreed to drop the

charges.9 .....7art *sborn #whose agent net ,tein inherited& is more specific. 8I never knew in the co"rse of all those operations any detainee to live thro"gh his interrogation'9 *sborn testified before Congress in :BC:. 8They all died. There was never any reasonable establishment of the fact that any one of those individ"als was' in fact' cooperating with the VC' b"t they all died and the maIority were wither tort"red to death or things like thrown o"t of helicopters.9 [book extract] The y !ai assacre and The 8Tiger Cages9 by 0o"glas Valentine 7"t the American establishment and media denied it then' and contin"e to deny it "ntil today' beca"se %hoenix was a genocidal program )) and the CIA officials' members of the media who were complicit thro"gh their silence' and the red)blooded American boys who carried it o"t' are all war criminals. As ichael Hatner a lawyer at the Center for Constit"tional Hights told Co"nter%"nch. 1;errey sho"ld be tried as a war criminal. /is actions on the night of =ebr"ary 24)2D' :BFB when the seven man (avy ,eal "nit which he headed killed approximately twenty "narmed Vietnamese civilians' eighteen of whom were women and children was a war crime. !ike those who m"rdered at y !ai' he too sho"ld be bro"ght into the dock and tried for his crimes.1 ......A famo"s %hoenix operation' known as the y !ai assacre' was proceeding along smoothly' with a grand total of D34 Vietnamese women and children killed' when a soldier named /"gh Thompson in a helicopter g"nship saw what was happening. Hisking his life to preserve that 1social contract'1 Thomson landed his helicopter between the mass m"rderers and their victims' t"rned his machine g"ns on his fellow Americans' and bro"ght the carnage to a halt. .....It was the CIA that forced soldiers like ;errey into %hoenix operations' and the hidden hand of the CIA lingers over his war crime. ;errey even "ses the same rationale offered by CIA officer 0e,ilva. According to ;errey' 1the Viet Cong were a tho"sand per cent more r"thless than1 the ,eals or 6.,. Army. [233:] 7ob ;errey' CIA <ar Crimes' And The (eed =or A <ar Crimes Trial by 0o"glas Valentine %age F> #hardcover edition& 1(ow everyone knows abo"t the airborne interrogation@taking three people "p in a chopper' taking one g"y and saying. Talk'5 then throwing him o"t before he even gets the chance to open his mo"th. <ell' we wrapped det [detonator] cord aro"nd their necks and wired them to the detonator box. And basically what it did was blow their heads off. The interrogator wo"ld tell the translator' "s"ally a ,o"th Vietnamese intelligence officer' 5Ask him this.5 /e5d ask him' 5<ho gave yo" the g"nM5 And the g"y wo"ld start to answer' or maybe he wo"ldn5t@maybe he5d resist @b"t the general idea was to waste the first two. They planned the snatches that way. %ick "p this g"y beca"se we5re pretty s"re he5s VC cadre@these other two g"ys I"st r"n errands for him. *r maybe they5re nobodyL Tran' the farmer' and his brother (g"yen. 7"t bring in two. %"t them in a row. 7y the time yo" get to yo"r man' he5s talking so fast yo" got to pop the weasel I"st to sh"t him "p.1 After a moment5s silence he added' 1I g"ess yo" co"ld say that we wrote the book on terror.1 The %hoenix %rogram by 0o"glas Valentine %age ED As for the American role' according to "ldoon' 1yo" can5t have an American there all the time watching these things.1 1These things1 incl"ded. rape' gang rape' rape "sing eels' snakes' or hard

obIects' and rape followed by m"rderL electrical shock #1the 7ell Telephone /o"r1& rendered by at) taching wires to the genitals or other sensitive parts of the body' like the tong"eL 1the water treatment1L 1the airplane'1 in which a prisoner5s arms were tied behind the back and the rope looped over a hook on the ceiling' s"spending the prisoner in midair' after which he or she was beatenL beatings with r"bber hoses and whipsL and the "se of police dogs to ma"l prisoners. All this and more occ"rred in %ICs. The %hoenix %rogram The 6ltimate Cold <ar Apparatchik' Ted ,hackley was the notorio"s 0irector of 5*peration %hoenix5 in !aos and Viet (am' and th"s responsible for a sla"ghter which claimed the lives of over 43'333 Vietnamese civilians "nder the g"ise of ne"trali-ing comm"nist sympathi-ers. 0ead ,pooks 0on5t !ie #And 0on5t 0eal 0r"gs +ither& by C*(,%IHACO %!A(+T 10"ring the next several days' the state became very "pset at the 6. ,. military beca"se the 6,. military said I was involved in a military gro"p in Vietnam called %hoenix and that all members who were in %hoenix their military records were sealed and in !angley' VA. with the CIA.1 Aohnny Todd 7loodlines of the Ill"minati by =rit- ,pringmeier. Collins This is a program that was the CIA folks go behind the lines and assassinate civilian leaders Transcript of :2 ho"rs of radio interview of Chip Tat"m on Intelligence Heport. Ted G"ndersson interviewe :BBB. As 0o"glas Valentine writes in The Phoenix Program # orrow' :BB3&) concerning the CIA5s assassination' tort"re and terror program waged against the people of Vietnam ) the %hoenix teams consisted of ,+A!s working with 1CTs'1 described by one participant as 1a combination of AHV( deserters' VC t"rncoats' and bad motherf"cker criminals the ,o"th Vietnamese co"ldn5t deal with in prison' so they t"rned them over to "s.1 The spooks were only too happy to employ the services of these men' who 1ta"ght [their] ,+A! comrades the secrets of the psy war campaign.1 ,o depraved were these agency recr"its that some of them 1wo"ld act"ally devo"r their enemies5 vital organs.1 All in a day5s work for America5s premier intelligence agency. /enry ) %ortrait of an ;)6!THA AssassinM
From Library Journal

Designed to destroy the Vietcong infrastructure and ostensibly run by the South Vietnamese government, the Phoenix Program--in fact directed by the United States--developed a variety of counterinsurgency activities including, at its worst, torture and assassination. For Valentine ( The Hotel Tacloban , LJ 9/15/84), the program epitomizes all that was wrong with the Vietnam War; its evils are still present wherever there are "ideologues obsessed with security, who seek to impose their way of thinking on everyone else." Exhaustive detail and extensive use of interviews with and writings by Phoenix participants make up the book's principal strengths; the author's own analysis is weaker. This is a good complement to Dale Andrade's less emotional Ashes to Ashes (Lexington, 1990) and such participant accounts as Orrin M. DeForest and David Chanoff's Slow Burn (S. & S., 1990). - Kenneth W. Berger, Duke Univ. Lib., Durham, N.C. Copyright 1990 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

http.NNwww.thememoryhole.orgNphoenixN

CIA Support of Death Squads

by Ralph McGehee
Posted on RemarQ, 9 October 1999

The information below is from CIABASE files on Death Squads supported by the CIA. Also given below are details on at!h "ists prepared by the CIA to fa!ilitate the a!tions of Death Squads.
Angola hile #astern #!ro pe Georgia &ond!ras 'taly Panama %o!th A-rica /r!g!ay a Parag!ay Bolivia ol!mbia #ast $imor Germany 'ndonesia )atin Americ Brazil osta Ric a #gypt Greece 'ran Me*ico ambodia entral America "ominican Rep! blic #!rope &aiti 'srael +or,ay

!ba #l %alvad or G!atemal a 'ra( +icarag!a

Philippin P!erto Ric R!ssia es o $hailand $!r.ey

%o!th Ameri %yria ca /%%R 0ietnam

Death Squads: Miscellaneous CIA set up Ansesal and other networ#s of terror in El Salvador$ %uatemala &Ansegat' and pre(Sandinista )i!aragua &Anseni!'. The CIA !reated$ stru!tured and trained se!ret

poli!e in South *orea$ Iran$ Chile and +ruguay$ and elsewhere , organi-ations responsible for untold thousands of tortures$ disappearan!es$ and deaths. Spar#$ ./0123$ pp. 4(. 0135(1. Sponsorship by CIA of death squad a!tivity !overed in summary form. )otes that in 6aiti CIA admitted "t. %eneral 7aoul Cedras and other high(ran#ing offi!ials 8were on its payroll and are helping organi-e violent repression in 6aiti. "uis 9oreno$ an employee of State Department$ has bragged he helped Colombian army !reate a database of subversives$ terrorists and drug dealers.8 6is superior in overseeing I)S for Southeastern +.S.$ is %unther agner$ former )a-i soldier and a #ey member of now( defun!t :ffi!e of ;ubli! Safety &:;S'$ an AID pro<e!t whi!h helped train !ounterinsurgents and terrorism in do-ens of !ountries. agner wor#ed in =ietnam as part of :peration ;hoeni> and in )i!aragua where he helped train )ational %uard. Arti!le also details massa!res in Indonesia. 6aiti Information$ ./45/011.$ pp. 5$. CIA personnel requested transfers 01?@(A in protest of CIA offi!er )estor San!he-Bs wor#ing so !losely with death squads. 9arshall$ C.$ S!ott ;.D.$ and 6unter$ C. &012A'. The Iran(Contra Conne!tion$ p. 41. CIA. 011.. 9ary 9!%rory op(ed$ 8ClintonBs CIA Chan!e.8 E>!oriates CIA over Aldri!h Ames$ support for right(wing #illers in El Salvador$ )i!araguan Contras and 6aitiBs D7A;6 and Cedras. ashington ;ost$ 0@/0?/011.$ C0$4 Angola: Death Squads Angola$ 0122. Amnesty International reported that +)ITA$ ba!#ed by the +.S.$ engaged in e>tra(<udi!ial e>e!utions of high(ran#ing politi!al rivals and ill(treatment of prisoners. ashington ;ost$ 5/0./0121$ A4@ Bolivia: Death Squads Bolivia. Between :!tober 01??(?2 Amnesty International reported between 5$@@@ and 2$@@@ people #illed by death squads. Blum$ . &012?'. The CIA A Dorgotten 6istory$ p. 4?. Bolivia$ 0110. A group #nown as 8Bla!# 6and8 shot twelve people on 4. )ovember 0110. *illings were part of groupBs aim to eliminate 8undesirable8 elements from so!iety. =i!tims in!luded poli!e offi!ers$ prostitutes and homose>uals. ashington ;ost 00/43/0110$ A4 Bolivia: Watch List Bolivia$ 01A3. CIA hat!hed plot with interior ministry to harass progressive bishops$ and to arrest and e>pel foreign priests and nuns. CIA was parti!ularly helpful in supplying names of +.S. and other foreign missionaries. The )ation$ 3/44/01A?$ p. ?4.

Bolivia$ 01A3. CIA provided government data on priests who progressive. Blum$ &012?'. The CIA A Dorgotten 6istory$ p. 431 Brazil: Watch List

Bra-il$ 01?4(?.. Institute of 7esear!h and So!ial Studies &I;ES' with assistan!e from +.S. sour!es published boo#lets and pamphlets and distributed hundreds of arti!les to newspapers. In 01?5 alone it distributed 024$0.. boo#s. It underwrote le!tures$ finan!ed studentsB trips to the +.S.$ sponsored leadership training programs for 4$?@@ businessmen$ students$ and wor#ers$ and subsidi-ed organi-ations of women$ students$ and wor#ers. In late 01?4 I;ES member Sie#man in Sao ;aulo organi-ed vigilante !ells to !ounter leftists. The vigilantes armed themselves$ made hand(grenades. I;ES hired retired military to e>ert influen!e on those in a!tive servi!e. Drom 01?4(?. I;ES$ by its own estimate$ spent between E4@@$@@@ and E5@@$@@@ on an intelligen!e net of retired military. The 8resear!h group8 of retired military !ir!ulated a !hart that identified !ommunist groups and leaders. Bla!#$ C.*. &01AA'. +nited States ;enetration of Bra-il$ p. 23 Brazil: Death Squads Bra-il$ !ir!a 01?3. Death squads formed to bolster Bra-ilBs national intelligen!e servi!e and !ounterinsurgen!y efforts. 9any death squad members were merely off(duty poli!e offi!ers. +.S. AID &and presumably the CIA' #new of and supported poli!e parti!ipation in death squad a!tivity. Counterspy 3/? 01A1$ p. 0@ Bra-il. Death squads began appear after 01?. !oup. "angguth$ A.C. &01A2'. 6idden Terrors$ p. 040 Bra-ilian and +ruguayan death squads !losely lin#ed and have shared training. CIA on at least two o!!asions !o(ordinated meetings between !ountriesB death squads. Counterspy 3/? 01A1$ p. 00 Bra-il$ torture. After CIA(ba!#ed !oup$ military used death squads and torture. Blum$ . &012?'. The CIA A Dorgotten 6istory$ p. 01@ Cambodia: Watch List Cambodia$ 01A@. Aided by CIA$ Cambodian se!ret poli!e fed bla!#lists of targeted =ietnamese to *hmer Serai and *hmer *ampu!hea *rom. 9ass #illings of =ietnamese. =alentine$ D. &011@'. The ;hoeni> ;rogram$ p. 542 Cambodia: Death Squads Cambodia$ 012@(1@. +.S. indire!t support for *hmer 7ouge , +.S. !omforting mass murderers. ashington ;ost$ 3/A/011@$ A0@ editorial Central America: Death Squads

Central Ameri!a$ !ir!a 01A1(2A. A!!ording to Ameri!as at!h$ !ivilian non !ombatant deaths attributable to government for!es in )i!aragua might rea!h 5@@$ most 9is#ito Indians in !omparison .@(3@$@@@ Salvadoran !iti-ens #illed by death squads and government for!es during same years$ along with similar number during last year of Somo-a and still higher numbers in %uatemala. Choms#y$ ). &0122'. The Culture of Terrorism$ p. 0@0 Central Ameri!a$ 0120(2A. Death toll under 7eagan in El Salvador passed 3@$@@@ and in %uatemala it may approa!h 0@@$@@@. In )i!aragua 00$@@@ !ivilians #illed by 01?2. Death toll in region 03@$@@@ or more. Choms#y$ ). &0122'. The Culture of Terrorism$ p. 41 Central Ameri!a. See debate !arried in 6arpers 8 hy Are e in Central Ameri!aF :n Dominoes$ Death Squads$ and Demo!ra!y. Can e "ive ith "atin 7evolutionF The Dilemmas of )ational Se!urity.8 6arpers$ ?/012.$ p53 Central Ameri!a$ 0124(2.. Admiral Bobby Inman$ former head of )SA$ had deep distaste for !overt operations. Inman !omplained that the CIA was hiring murderers to !ondu!t operations in Central Ameri!a and the 9iddle East , eventually Inman resigned. Toohey$ B.$ and ;inwill$ . &011@'. :ysterG the Story of the Australian Se!ret Intelligen!e Servi!e$ pp. 403(? Chile: Watch List Chile$ 01A@(A5. By late 01A0 the CIA in near daily !onta!t with military. The station !olle!ting the #ind of information that would be essential for a military di!tatorship after a !oupG lists of !ivilians to be arrested$ those to be prote!ted and government installations o!!upied at on!e. Atlanti!$ 04/0124$ p. 32 Chile$ 01A@(A5. CIA !ompiled lists of persons who would have to be arrested and a roster of !ivilian and government installations that would need prote!tion in !ase of military !oup against government. Corn$ D. &011.'. Blond %hostG Ted Sha!#ley and the CIABs Crusades$ p. 430 Chile$ 01A4(A5. Drew up lists those to be arrested immediately$ or prote!ted after a !oup by military. Sergeyev$ D.D. &0120'. Chile$ CIA Big Business$ p. 0?5 Chile late 01A0(A4. CIA adopted more a!tive stan!e re military penetration program in!luding effort to subsidi-e anti(government news pamphlet dire!ted at armed servi!es$ !ompilation arrest lists and its de!eption operation. CIA re!eived intelligen!e reports on !oup planning throughout Culy$ August and September A5. +.S. Congress$ Chur!h Committee 7eport. &01A?' v A$ p. 51 Chile. Chilean graduates of AID"D$ as well as CIA(!reated unions$ organi-ed CIA( finan!ed stri#es whi!h parti!ipated in AllendeBs overthrow. In 01A5 AID"D graduates provided DI)A$ ChileBs se!ret poli!e$ with thousands of names of fellow unionists who were subsequently imprisoned and tortured and e>e!uted. Counterspy ./0120$ p. 05

Chile. Blum$

. &012?'. The CIA A Dorgotten 6istory$ 4.@

Chile$ 01A5(A.. After 01A5 !oup$ +.S. Embassy intelligen!e types gave their files on the Chilean and foreign left to the <untaBs military intelligen!e servi!e &SI9'. )AC"A &maga-ine re "atin Ameri!a' 2/A.$ p. 42. Chile$ 01A5. The military prepared lists of nearly 4@$@@@ middle(level leaders of peopleBs organi-ations$ s!heduled to be assassinated from the morning of the !oup on. The list of some 5$@@@ high(level dire!tors to be arrested. "ists detailedG name$ address$ age$ profession$ marital status$ and !losest personal friends. It alleged +.S. military mission and the CIA involved in their preparation. 9oa 02?. Drom late Cune on plotters began to finali-e lists of e>tremists$ politi!al leaders$ 9ar>ist <ournalists$ agents of international !ommunism$ and any and all persons parti!ipating with any vigor in neighborhood$ !ommunal$ union$ or national organi-ation. The ;entagon had been as#ed to get the CIA to give the Chilean army lists of Chileans lin#ed to so!ialist !ountries. )ames sorted into two groupsG persons not publi!ly #nown but who important in leftist organi-ationsH and$ well(#nown people in important positions. 4@$@@@ in first group and 5$@@@ in se!ond. Se!ond group to be <ailed$ the first to be #illed. Sandford$ 7.7. &01A3'. The 9urder of Allende$ pp. 013(? CIA provided intelligen!e on 8subversives8 regularly !ompiled by CIA for use in su!h !ir!umstan!es. Blum$ . &012?'. The CIA A Dorgotten 6istory$ p. 01. Columbia: Watch List Colombia. "uis 9oreno$ an employee of State Department$ bragged he helped Colombian army !reate a database of subversives$ terrorists and drug dealers. 6aiti Information$ ./45/1.$ pp. 5$. Columbia: Death Squads Colombia. 9AS &9uerte A Se!uestradores'G 8Death to *idnappers$8 Colombian antiguerrilla death squad founded in De!ember 0120 by members of 9edellin !artel$ Cali !artel$ and Colombian military. S!ott$ ;. and 9arshall$ C. &0110'. Co!aine ;oliti!s$ p. 4?0. Colombia$ 0115(1.. Amnesty International !alled Colombia one of worst 8#illing fields.8 +.S. is an a!!ompli!e. illiam D. S!hult-$ human rights groupBs newly appointed E>e!utive Dire!tor for the +.S.$ told a news !onferen!e that using fight against drugs as a prete>t , Colombian government doesnBt reign in Iits for!esJ. About 4@$@@@ people #illed sin!e 012? in one of "atin Ameri!aBs most 8stable demo!ra!ies.8 only 4K politi!al #illings related to drug traffi!#ing and A@K by paramilitary or military. +.S. probably a !ollaborator and mu!h of +.S. aid for !ounternar!oti!s diverted to 8#illing fields.8 AI report said human meat is sold on bla!# mar#et and politi!ians gunned down along with !hildren$ homose>uals$ and drug addi!ts. +.S. support be!ause of ColombiaBs strategi! position. )o one is safe$ people #illed for body parts. ashington Times$ 5/0?/011.$ p. a03

Costa Rica: Watch List Costa 7i!a$ 0133. Ambassador oodward reported the government should be urged to maintain !loser surveillan!e over !ommunists and prose!ute them more vigorously$ and the government should be influen!ed to amend the !onstitution to limit the travel of !ommunists$ in!rease penalties for subversive a!tivities and ena!t proposed legislation eliminating !ommunists from union leadership. 9eanwhile +SIA a#a +SIS programs 8to !ontinue to !ondition the publi! to the !ommunist mena!e8 should be maintained. L 9aga-ine$ 00/0122$ p. 4@ Cuba: Watch List Cuba$ 0133(3A. Allen Dulles pressed Batista to establish with CIA help$ a bureau for the repression of !ommunist a!tivities. %rose$ ;. &011.'. %entleman SpyG the "ife of Allen Dulles$ p. .04 Cuba: Death Squads Cuba$ 013?(13 CIABs war against Cuba and CubaBs response. In 013?$ CIA established in Cuba the infamous Bureau for the 7epression of Communist A!tivities$ B7AC , se!ret poli!e that be!ame well #nown for torture and assassination of BatistaBs politi!al opponents. +n!lassified /011.(0113 0?(0A Dominican Republic: Watch List Domini!an 7epubli!$ 01?3. CIA !omposed list of 33 !ommunist ringleaders of pro<e!ted ta#eover of government. Cro-ier$ b. &0115'. Dree Agent$ p. 32 Dominican Republic: Death Squads Domini!an 7epubli!$ !over$ 01?3. 02 publi! safety program advisers$ ? of whom CIA. ;oli!e organi-ed "a Banda$ a death squad. "ernou>$ ;. &0124'. Cry of the ;eople$ p. 02A astern urope: Watch List East Europe$ +SS7$ 0134(15. 7adio Dree Europe resear!hers have hundreds of thousands of file !ards on prominent east blo! !iti-ens and a staff of 0?@ resear!hers. ashington ;ost$ ././0115$ p. A01 ast !imor: Death Squads East Timor$ 01A3(A?. 7ole of +.S. %overnment$ CIA/)SA$ and their Australian !ollaborators in East Timor is another e>ample of support for geno!ide whi!h <oins a long list of similar !ases. Carter and Dord administrations have been a!!ompli!es in the massa!re of anywhere between one(in(ten &Indonesian foreign minister 9o!htarBs latest figure' and one(in(two Timorese. Counterspy$ Spring 012@$ p. 01

cuador: Watch List E!uador$ 01?4. Subversive !ontrol wat!h list. ith agent from So!ial Christian party CIA will form five squads !omposed of five men for investigative wor# on subversive !ontrol wat!h list. Agee$ ;. &01A3'. Inside the CompanyG CIA Diary$ pp. 4.@$ 4.A E!uador$ 01?5. The CIA maintained what was !alled the lyn> list$ a#a the subversive !ontrol wat!h list. This a file that might have 3@ to 3@@ names. ;eople on the list were supposed to be the most important left(wing a!tivists whose arrest we might effe!t through the lo!al government. ould in!lude pla!e and date of birth$ wifeBs name$ where they wor#ed$ and biologi!al data on the whole family$ in!luding s!hools the !hildren attended$ et!. In E!uador the CIA paid teams to !olle!t and maintain this type information. Agee$ &0120'. hite ;aper hitewash$ p. 33 g"pt: Watch List Egypt$ ;a#istan$ 0115. ./0?/0115 4 teams from CIA and DBI to ;eshawar to !he!# information given them by Egyptian intelligen!e servi!es. Egyptians reported terrorist groups based in ;eshawar belong to 8Arab Afghans8 with ties to fundamentalist 9uslims in +.S. CIA spe!ialists met with offi!ers of 9u#habarat Al(Amat who had list of 5@@ Egyptians believed to be hard inner !ore of Cihad led by 9ohammed Sahw#y Islambuli. )ames of various terrorists. :n request by CIA and others$ 0@@ e>pulsions on ./0@. Intelligen!e )ewsletter$ ./41/0115$ pp. 0$3 l Salvador: Watch List El Salvador$ 012@(21. :n T= DBAubuisson$ using military intelligen!e files$ denoun!ed tea!hers$ labor leaders$ union organi-ers and politi!ians. ithin days their mutilated bodies found. ashington had identified most leaders of death squads as members Salvadoran se!urity for!es with ties to DBAubuisson. ashington ;ost op(ed by Douglas Darah$ 4/45/0114$ p. C. El Salvador$ 0124(2.. Signifi!ant politi!al violen!e asso!iated with Salvadoran se!urity servi!es in!luding )ational poli!e$ )ational %uard$ and Treasury ;oli!e. +.S. %overnment agen!ies maintained offi!ial relationships with Salvadoran se!urity establishment appearing to a!quies!e in these a!tivities. )o eviden!e +.S. personnel parti!ipated in for!ible interrogations. +.S. Did pass 8ta!ti!al8 information to alert servi!es of a!tion by insurgent for!es. Information on persons passed only in highly unusual !ases. Senate Intelligen!e Committee$ :!tober 3$ 012.$ pp. 00(05 l Salvador: Death Squads El Salvador$ 01?0(A1. =igilante organi-ation !alled Demo!rati! )ational :rgani-ation &:rden' !reated early 01?@s to further !ontrol !ountryside. Created in 01?0 but abolished in 01A1. But qui!#ly regained and even surpassed former vi!ious role. Today its members form the !ore of !ivil defense !orps. hite$ 7.A. &012.'. The 9orass$ p. 055

El Salvador$ 01?0(2.. During the *ennedy administration$ agents of the +.S. government set up two se!urity organi-ations that #illed thousands of peasants and suspe!ted leftists over the ne>t 03 years. %uided by Ameri!ans$ these organi-ations into the paramilitary units that were the death squadsG in 012. the CIA$ in violation +.S. law$ !ontinued to provide training$ support$ and intelligen!e to se!urity for!es involved in death squads. :ver the years the CIA and +.S. military organi-ed :rden$ the rural paramilitary and intelligen!e net designed to use terror. 9ano Blan!o grew out of :rden$ whi!h a +.S. ambassador !alled the 8birth of the death squadsH8 !on!eived and organi-ed Ansesal$ the elite presidential intelligen!e servi!e that gathered files on Salvadoran dissidents and gave that information to the death squadsH re!ruited %eneral 9edrano$ the founder of :rden and Ansesal as a CIA agentH supplied Ansesal$ the se!urity for!es$ and the %eneral Staff with ele!troni!$ photographi!$ and personal surveillan!e of individuals who later assassinated by death squadsH and$ trained se!urity for!es in the use of investigative te!hniques$ weapons$ e>plosives$ and interrogation with 8instru!tion in methods of physi!al and psy!hologi!al torture.8 The ;rogressive$ 3/012.$ pp. 4@(41 El Salvador$ 01?5. +.S. government sent 0@ spe!ial for!es personnel to El Salvador to help %eneral Cose Alberto 9edrano set up :rgani-a!ion Demo!rati!a )a!ionalist &:rden'((first paramilitary death squad in that !ountry. These green berets assisted in organi-ation and indo!trination of rural 8!ivi!8 squads whi!h gathered intelligen!e and !arried out politi!al assassinations in !oordination with Salvadoran military. )ow there is !ompelling eviden!e to show that for over 5@ years$ members of +.S. military and CIA have helped organi-e$ train$ and fund death squad a!tivity in El Salvador. Covert A!tion Information Bulletin &Muarterly'$ Summer 011@$ p. 30 El Salvador$ 01?5. )ational Demo!rati! :rgani-ation &:rden' formed as pro( government organi-ation with assistan!e from CIA$ +.S. military advisers$ AIDBs poli!e training program. :rden supervised by Salvadoran national se!urity agen!y$ intelligen!e organi-ation of military. CIA !hose 8right hand man$8 Cose 9edrano$ to dire!t :rden. :rden served as base for death squad operations and san!tioned in 01A@(A1 all 8above ground8 unions. Barry$ T.$ and ;reus!h$ D. &012?'. AID"D in Central Ameri!a$ p. 55 El Salvador$ 01?3(23. Dor a report of CIA supporting death squad a!tivities in El Salvador see 8Spar#$8 ./0123$ pp. 4(. El Salvador$ 01??. Developed death squads with help of green berets. Campaign used vigilantes to employ terror. "ater !alled !ivil defense !orps. hite$ 7.A. &012.'. The 9orass$ pp. 0@0(5 El Salvador$ 01?2. AID"D !reates Salvadoran Communal +nion &+CS' whi!h emphasi-ed self help for rural farmers and not peasant organi-ing. Initially$ +CS had support military government. By 01A5 +CS seen as too progressive and AID"D offi!ially e>pelled. +.S. funding +CS !ontinued through training programs and private foundations. +CS !harged with ties to :rden$ organi-ation whi!h !arried out death squad a!tivity. ith failing pro(government union efforts$ AID"D !alled ba!# to !ontrol +CS in 01A1. Barry$ T.$ and ;reus!h$ D. &012?'. AID"D in Central Ameri!a$ p. 5.

El Salvador$ 01A?(23. Attended !onferen!es of orld Anti(Communist "eagueG 7oberto DBAubuisson$ El Salvador. Dormer ma<or in military intelligen!eH !harged with being responsible for !oordinating nationBs rightist death squads. Established Arena politi!al party with assistan!e of +.S. new right leaders. Anderson$ C. ".. and Anderson$ S. &012?'. Inside the "eague El Salvador$ 01A1(2.. 6ouse Intelligen!e Committee investigation of +.S. intelligen!e !onne!tions with death squad a!tivities !on!luded +.S. intelligen!e agen!ies 8have not !ondu!ted any of their a!tivities in su!h a way as to dire!tly en!ourage or support death squad a!ts.8 6ouse Intelligen!e Committee$ annual report$ 0/4/0123$ pp. 0?(01 El Salvador$ 01A1(22. Death squads re!ruited under !over of boy s!outs. Boys operated as a death squad #nown as 7egalados Armed Dor!es &DA7'. They murdered union offi!ials$ student leaders and tea!hers a!!used of being guerrilla sympathi-ers. 6erman Torres$ a death squad member$ learned that the s!outs part of nationwide net based on the paramilitary organi-ation #nown as :rden and !oordinated from the main military intelligen!e unit #nown as Ansesal run by DBAubuisson. After !oup of 01A1$ :rden and Ansesal offi!ially disbanded. In 0124$ when Arena won !ontrol of the !onstituent assembly$ the top legislative body was turned into a !enter for death squads. Another death squad !alled the se!ret anti(!ommunist army &ESA'. Bush and )orth in 04/00/0125 were sent to ma#e it !lear +.S. would not tolerate death squads. ;ere"inares boasted he #illed Ar!hbishop 7omero on 5/4./012@. Catholi! Chur!hBs human rights offi!e reports 0110 death squad and government #illings in first half of 0122 double the number of 012A. 9other Cones$ 0/0121$ pp. 0@(0? El Salvador$ 012@(2.. Colonel 7oberto Santivane-$ former !hief of the Salvadoran ArmyBs spe!ial military intelligen!e unit$ testified before +.S. Senators and Congressmen. 6e !harged that 7oberto DBAubuisson was the prin!ipal organi-er of the death squads$ along with Colonel )i!olas Carran-a$ the head of the !ountryBs Treasury ;oli!e. 6e said Carran-a also serves as a paid CIA informer. :ther reports said Carran-a re!eived E1@$@@@ a year for providing intelligen!e to the CIA. ashington ;ost$ ./0/012. El Salvador$ 012@(2.. Dormer +.S. Ambassador to El Salvador$ 7obert hite$ said the 7eagan administration !overed up information that Salvadoran rightist 7oberto DBAubuisson ordered the #illing of Ar!hbishop 7omero. ashington ;ost$ 4/5/012.$ 4/A/012. El Salvador$ 012@. Dormer +.S. Ambassador 7obert hite$ said DBAubuisson presided over a lottery to sele!t whi!h Salvadoran military offi!er would assassinate Ar!hbishop 7omero$ gunned down on 5/4./012@. hite said the +.S. Embassy re!eived an eyewitness a!!ount of the 5/44 meeting that plotted 7omeroBs murder. ashington ;ost from Asso!iated ;ress$ 5/012. El Salvador$ 0120(25. Colonel Carran-a$ leader of SalvadorBs infamous Treasury ;oli!e$ oversaw the government reign of terror in whi!h 2@@ people were #illed ea!h month.

Carran-a re!eived E1@$@@@ a year from the CIA from 01A1(2. 7eportedly living in *entu!#y. The )ation$ ?/3/0122$ p. A2@ El Salvador$ 0120(2.. 6ouse Intelligen!e Committee !on!luded 8CIA did not dire!tly en!ourage or support death squad #illings.8 7eport added that 8some intelligen!e relationships with individuals !onne!ted with death squads8 may have given the impression that the CIA !ondoned$ be!ause it was aware of$ some death squad #illings. ashington ;ost$ 0/0./0123$ A4@ El Salvador$ 0120(2.. Senate Intelligen!e Committee reported several Salvadoran se!urity and military offi!ials have engaged in death squads a!ts. "arge numbers of low( level personnel also involved. Death squads have originated from the Treasury ;oli!e and the )ational %uard and poli!e. ashington ;ost$ 0@/04/012. El Salvador$ 0120(2.. The CIA and military advisers have helped organi-e$ trained$ finan!ed and advised Salvadoran army and intelligen!e units engaged in death squad a!tivities and torture. Information from two well(informed sour!es in Salvadoran government. Christian S!ien!e 9onitor$ 3/2/012.$ p. 0 El Salvador$ 0120(22. Dis!ussion of the use of death squads in El Salvador &)o indi!ation of dire!t CIA parti!ipation'. The )ation$ 3/2/0121$ p. ?43 El Salvador$ 012?. Despite e>tensive government labor !lamp down &in!luding )ational %uard raid of hospital wor#ers stri#e'$ Irving Brown$ #nown CIA and head AD"(CI:Bs Department of International Affairs$ issues report !laiming 8a shift away from violent repression and an improvement in human rights.8 Statement in!redible in light of death squad atta!#s on unionists. Barry$ T.$ and ;reus!h$ D. &012?'. AID"D in Central Ameri!a$ p. 53 El Salvador$ 012A. Central Ameri!an death squads reported operating in the "os Angeles area. )AC"A &maga-ine re "atin Ameri!a'$ ?/012A$ pp. .(3 El Salvador$ 0122. Ameri!as at!h in September said the military #illed 34 !ivilians in first ? months$ !ompared with A4 in all of 012A. In 0122 the Salvadoran rebels have stepped up the war. ashington ;ost$ 00/4?/0122$ A0N02 El Salvador. AID publi! safety advisors !reated the national poli!e intelligen!e ar!hive and helped organi-e Ansesal$ an elite presidential intelligen!e servi!e. Dossiers these agen!ies !olle!ted on anti(government a!tivity$ !ompiled with CIA surveillan!e reports$ provided targets for death squads. 9any of 3@$@@@ Salvadorans #illed in 0120(23 Attributable to death squad a!tivity. )ational 7eporter$ inter 012?$ p. 01 El Salvador. Covert A!tion Information Bulletin &Muarterly' 04G0.(03H04G3(05. El Salvador. 9edrano 8the father of the death squads$ the !hief assassin of them all$8 a!!ording to Cose ). Duarte. :n 45 9ar!h 0123$ 9edrano was assassinated. 9edrano in 012. admitted he had wor#ed for the CIA in 01?@(?1. The ;rogressive$ ?/0123$ p. 00

El Salvador. Administration sour!es said at height of rightist death squad a!tivity$ 7eagan administration depended on !ommanders of right wing death squads. The +.S. shared some intelligen!e with them. +.S. intelligen!e offi!ers developed !lose ties to !hief death squad suspe!ts while death squads #illed several hundred a month and totaling tens of thousands. ashington ;ost$ 0@/?/0122$ A 51 and .5 El Salvador. Arti!le !ontrasting results of Senate Committee 012. news a!!ounts of offi!ial !ooperation between CIA and Salvadoran se!urity offi!ers said to be involved in death squad a!tivities. Dirst ;rin!iples$ 04/012.$ pp. 4(. El Salvador. CIA supplied surveillan!e information to se!urity agen!ies for death squads. Blum$ . &012?'. The CIA A Dorgotten 6istory$ pp. 540$ 54A El Salvador. Dalange mysterious death squad !omprising both a!tive and retired members se!urity for!es. Condu!ts death squad a!tivities. Covert A!tion Information Bulletin &Muarterly'$ ./0120$ p. 0. El Salvador. Dormation of :rganisation Demo!rati!a )a!ionalista :rden Dormed in 01?2 by 9edrano. Dor!es between 3@$@@@ and 0@@$@@@. Drom 01?2(A1$ :rden offi!ial bran!h of government. Dirst <unta attempted to abolish$ but group reorgani-ed as )ational Demo!rati! Dront. E>ample of :rden death squad a!ts. Covert A!tion Information Bulletin &Muarterly'$ ./0120$ p. 0. El Salvador. See Di!#ey arti!le re slaughter in El Salvador in )ew 7epubli!$ 04/05/0125$ entitled 8The Truth Behind the Death Squads.8 fn Di!#ey$ C. &0123'. ith the Contras$ p. 42? El Salvador. The CIA and +.S. Armed for!es !on!eived and organi-ed :rden$ the rural paramilitary and spy net designed to use terror against government opponents. Con!eived and organi-ed Ansesal$ the presidential intelligen!e servi!e that gathered dossiers on dissidents whi!h then passed on to death squads. *ept #ey se!urity offi!ers with #nown lin#s to death squads on the CIA payroll. Instru!ted Salvadoran intelligen!e operatives 8in methods of physi!al and psy!hologi!al torture.8 Briarpat!h$ 2/012. p. 5@ from the 3/012. ;rogressive El Salvador. +%B &+nion %uerrilla Blan!a' &white warriors union'. 6eaded by DBAubuisson$ who trained at International ;oli!e A!ademy. DBAubuisson !laims !lose ties CIA. Dormer ambassador hite !alled DBAubuisson a 8psy!hopathi! #iller.8 Covert A!tion Information Bulletin &Muarterly'$ ./0120$ p. 0. El Salvador$ 01A1(22. See 8Confessions of an Assassin$8 arti!le. 6erman Torres Corte- is the assassin who was interviewed and tells of death squad operations in El Salvador. 9other Cones$ 0/0121$ p. 0@ El Salvador$ 0125. =i!e ;resident Bush delivered an ultimatum to Salvadoran military to stop death squad murders. 9other Cones$ 2/012?$ p. ?.

El Salvador$ 012A. Assassins$ !ertainly sponsored by and probably members of Salvadoran se!urity for!es$ murder 6erbert Ernesto Anaya$ head of Salvadoran !ivil rights !ommission and last survivor of !ommissionBs eight founders. ;rior harassment of Anaya soli!ited neither protest nor prote!tion from Duarte or +.S. administration. Contrary to popular opinion$ death squad a!tivity has not waned. 8Sele!tive #illings of !ommunity leaders$ labor organi-ers$ human rights wor#ers$ rural a!tivists and others have repla!ed wholesale massa!res8 sin!e signing of Arias plan. "os Angeles organi-ation 8El 7es!ate8 has !ompiled !hronology of human rights abuses. The )ation$ 00/0./012A$ p. 3.? El Salvador. CIA too# more than two years 012@(25 begin seriously analy-ing papers !aptured from DBAubuisson. ICC 4.4. ;apers said reveal death squad supporters$ atro!ities. 9arshall$ C.$ S!ott ;.D.$ and 6unter$ C. &012A'. The Iran(Contra Conne!tion$ p. 44 El Salvador$ 0122. Death squad a!tivity surged in El Salvador in 0122 after a period of relative de!line. Amnesty International report 8El SalvadorG Death Squads( A %overnment Strategy$8 noted in )AC"A &maga-ine re "atin Ameri!a' 5/0121$ p. 00 El Salvador$ 0121. Although human rights monitors !onsistently lin# death squad a!ts to the Salvadoran government$ many +.S. media report on death squads as if they an independent or un!ontrollable for!e. E>tra$ Summer$ 0121$ p. 42 El Salvador$ 0121 9ember of Salvadoran army said first brigade intelligen!e unit army troops routinely #ill and torture suspe!ted leftists. Dirst brigade day(to(day army operations !arried out with #nowledge of +.S. military advisers. CIA routinely pays e>penses for intelligen!e operations in the brigades. +.S. has about 33 advisers in Salvador. ashington ;ost$ 0@/4A/0121$ A0$4? El Salvador$ !ir!a 0124(2.. 7i!ardo Castro$ a 53 year old Salvadoran army offi!er$ a est ;oint graduate$ said he wor#ed for the CIA and served as translator for a +.S. offi!ial who advised the military on torture te!hniques and overseas assassinations. Castro personally led death squad operations. The ;rogressive$ 5/012?$ pp. 4?(5@ El Salvador$ domesti!$ 012?(2A. Arti!le 8The Death Squads 6it 6ome.8 Dor de!ades they terrori-ed !ivilians in El Salvador$ now they are terrori-ing !ivilians in the +.S. The DBI shared intelligen!e about Salvadoran a!tivists in the +.S. with SalvadorBs notorious se!urity servi!es. The ;rogressive$ 0@/012A$ pp. 03(01 El Salvador. :ffi!e of ;ubli! Safety graduate Colonel 7oberto 9auri!io Staben was$ a!!ording to <ournalist Charles Di!#ey 8responsible for patrolling , if not !ontributing to , the famous death squad dumping ground at El ;ayton a few miles from its headquarters.8 also$ Alberto 9edrano$ founder of El SalvadorBs !ounterinsurgen!y for!e :rden$ was an operations graduate. Dinally$ Cose Castillo$ who was trained in 01?1 at the +.S. International ;oli!e S!hool$ later be!ame head of )ational %uardBs se!tion of spe!ial investigations whi!h helped organi-e the death squads. The )ation$ ?/A/012?$ p. A15

El Salvador. Dormer death squad member Coya 9artine- admitted death squad operations !arried out with #nowledge and approval 4 +.S. military advisers. "A ee#ly$ 0/43/011@ El Salvador. DCI report to 6ouse Intelligen!e Committee re CIA !onne!tions with death squads. )ational se!urity ar!hives listing. El Salvador. DBIBs !onta!ts with the Salvadoran )ational %uard. Information in Senate Intelligen!e Committee 7eport$ A/0121$ pp. 0@.(3 El Salvador. Dormer San Dran!is!o poli!e offi!er a!!used of illegal spying said he wor#ed for CIA and will e>pose CIABs support of death squads if he prose!uted. Tom %erard said he began wor#ing for CIA in 0124 and quit in 0123 be!ause he !ould not tolerate what he saw. 6e and 7oy Bullo!# are suspe!ted of gathering information from poli!e and government files on thousands of individuals and groups. Information probably ended up with BBnai BBrith and AD". CIA refused to !onfirm %erardBs !laim. %erard said there is proof CIA dire!tly involved in training and support of torture and death squads in El Salvador$ 6onduras$ and %uatemala during mid 012@s. ;roof in his brief!ase San Dran!is!o poli!e sei-ed. %erard said several photos sei-ed by poli!e show CIA agents attending interrogations$ or posing with death squad members. ashington Times$ ./42/0115$ A ? El Salvador$ 01?5(1@. In 01?5 +.S. sent 0@ Spe!ial Dor!es to help %eneral 9adrano set up :rgani-a!ion Demo!rati!a )a!ionalista &:rden'$ a death squad. Eviden!e this sort a!tivity going on for 5@ years. 9artine-$ a soldier in Dirst infantry brigadeBs department 4$ admitted death squad a!ts. Said he wor#ed with two +.S. Advisers. Castro$ another soldier$ tal#s about death squads and +.S. !onta!ts. 7ene 6urtado$ former agent with Treasury ;oli!e$ gives his story. Covert A!tion Information Bulletin &Muarterly' Summer 011@$ pp. 30(35 El Salvador$ 01A5(21. El SalvadorBs ruling party$ Arena$ !losed off fifth floor of )ational Assembly building to serve as 6M for national networ# of death squads following ArenaBs 4@ 9ar!h 0122 ele!toral vi!tory. 6ernan Torres Corte-$ a former Arena se!urity guard and death squad member$ said he was trained and re!ruited by Dr. Antonio 7egalado under orders of 7oberto DBAbuisson intelligen!e servi!e$ Ansesal$ in 01A5. :ffi!ial networ# was bro#en up in 012. following =i!e ;resident BushBs visit$ but was reinstated in 0122. Intelligen!e )ewsletter$ 0/02/0110$ p. 3 El Salvador$ 01A1(1@. A detailed dis!ussion of SalvadorBs death squads. S!hwar-$ B. &0110'. Ameri!an Counterinsurgen!y Do!trine and El Salvador$ pp. .0(5 El Salvador$ 012@(2.. E>patriate Salvadorans in +.S. have provided funds for politi!al violen!e and have been dire!tly involved in assisting and dire!ting their operations. Senate Intelligen!e Committee$ :!tober 3$ 012.$ p. 03

El Salvador$ 012@(2.. )umerous Salvadoran offi!ials involved in death squad a!tivities , most done by se!urity servi!es , espe!ially the Treasury ;oli!e and )ational %uard. Some military death squad a!tivity. Senate Intelligen!e Committee$ :!tober 3$ 012.$ 03 El Salvador$ 012@(21. DBAubuisson #ept +.S. on its guard. 6undreds of released de!lassified do!uments re relationship. ashington ;ost$ 0/./011.$ A0$05 El Salvador$ 012@(21. De!lassified do!uments re 54 !ases investigated by +nited )ations appointed Truth Commission on El Salvador reveal +.S. offi!ials were fully aware of Salvadoran military and politi!al leadersB !ompli!ity in !rimes ranging from massa!re of more than A@@ peasants at El 9o-ote in 0120 to murder of ? Cesuit priests in 0121$ and thousands of atro!ities in between. "ies of our Time 5/011.$ pp. ?(1 El Salvador$ 012@(21. ;resident 7eagan and =i!e ;resident Bush instituted poli!es re fighting !ommunists rather than human rights !on!erns. Drom 00/012@ through 0/0110 a large number of assassinations , 00/4A$ 3 respe!ted politi!iansH 04/.$ rape and murder of 5 Ameri!an nuns and a lay wor#ersH 4 Ameri!an land reform advisers on 0/./0120. Ar!hbishop 7omero #illed 5/012@. There !lear eviden!e DBAubuissonBs involvement but 7eagan administration ignored. :n T=$ DBAubuisson$ using military intelligen!e files$ denoun!ed tea!hers$ labor leaders$ union organi-ers and politi!ians. ithin days their mutilated bodies found. ashington had identified most leaders of death squads as members Salvadoran se!urity for!es with ties to DBAubuisson. ith +.S. outrage at bloodshed$ +.S.$ via Bush$ advised government slaughter must stop. Arti!le dis!usses torture te!hniques used by se!urity for!es. ashington ;ost op(ed by Douglas Darah$ 4/45/0114$ C. El Salvador$ 012@(1@. C:" )i!olas Carran-a$ head of Treasury ;oli!e$ on CIA payroll. 9inni!#$ . &0114'. Spies and ;rovo!ateurs$ p. 54 El Salvador$ 012@(1@. State panel found that mista#es by +.S. diplomats$ parti!ularly in probing 0120 massa!re of !ivilians at El 9o-ote$ under!ut poli!y during SalvadorBs !ivil war. Dindings in ?A(page study ordered by Se!retary of State Christopher. Sen. "eahy said report 8glosses over...the lies$ half(truths and evasions that we !ame to e>pe!t from the State Department during that period.8 Sen. Dodd said 8report is sloppy$ anemi! and basi!ally a whitewash...8 ashington Times$ A/0?/0115$ A04 and ashington ;ost$ A/0?/0115$ A0? El Salvador$ 012@(10. Truth Commission report says 01 of 4A Salvadoran offi!ers impli!ated in ? Cesuit murders were graduates of +.S. ArmyBs S!hool of Ameri!as in Dort Benning$ %a. Almost three quarters of Salvadoran offi!ers a!!used in A other massa!res were trained at Dort Benning. It !alled s!hool for di!tators. Sin!e .? it has trained more than 3?$@@@ "atin soldiers. %raduates in!lude some of regionBs most despi!able military strongmen. )ow$ when +.S. wants to build demo!ra!y$ s!hool an obsta!le. )ewswee# investigation turned up hundreds of less than honorable grads. At least ? ;eruvian offi!ers lin#ed to a military death squad that #illed 1 students and a professor were graduates. Dour of five senior 6onduran offi!ers a!!used in Ameri!as at!h report of organi-ing a death squad$ Battalion 50?$ were trained there. A !oalition !harged 4.?

Colombian offi!ers with human rights violationsH 0@3 were s!hool alumni. 6onored graduates in!lude %eneral Suare-$ a brutal di!tator of BoliviaH %eneral Calle<as O!alle<as$ !hief of %uatemalan intelligen!e in late 01A@s and early 012@s$ when thousands politi!al opponents were assassinatedH and 6onduran %eneral %ar!ia$ a !orrupt personH and$ 6ernande-$ armed for!es !hief of Colombia suspe!ted of aiding Colombian drug traffi!#ers. )ewswee#$ 2/1/0115$ pp. 5?(A El Salvador$ 012@(14. 8Se!ret of the S#eletonsG +n!overing Ameri!aBs 6idden 7ole in El Salvador.8 ;athologists un!overed 52 small s#eletons in El 9o-ote. In 0120 soldiers of AC7E$ immediate rea!tion infantry battalion !reated by +.S.$ herded !hildren into basement and blew up building. +.S. offi!ials denied any massa!re had ta#en pla!e and #ept on denying for years. About 2@@ residents #illed. Armed servi!e leaders said they !ondu!ted war on part of 7eagan and Bush administrations with bi(partisan support Congress sin!e 012.H re!eived daily assistan!e from State Department$ D:D and CIA. Truth Commission investigating via +.S. %overnment interagen!y !ommittee. State and CIA not !ooperating with !ommission. CIA not giving one do!ument on formation of death squads$ prepared in 0125 for !ongressional intelligen!e !ommittees. *idnap(for( profit ring against Salvadoran business !ommunity. ith +.S. En!ouragement$ Salvadoran government arrested several members of ring. :ne was a death squad assassin$ 7udolfo Isidro "ope- Sibrian$ who impli!ated in deaths of 4 Ameri!an labor advisers. ashington ;ost$ 00/03/0114$ C0$4 El Salvador$ 012@(15. 00/3/0115 release of thousands pages of intelligen!e reports shows every +.S. diplomat$ military offi!er$ and intelligen!e operative who wor#ed with El SalvadorBs military and politi!al leaders in 012@s #new most of those involved in organi-ing death squads. State Department offi!ials lied to Congress. Intelligen!e reports detailed pre!ise information on murder$ #idnapping$ and !oup plots$ and death squad funding$ involving people li#e =; Dran!is!o 9erino and !urrent Arena !andidate Armando Calderon Sol. At least ?5$@@@ Salvadoran !ivilians , equivalent of 5 million Ameri!ans were #illed , most by government supported by +.S. The )ation$ 00/41/0115$ p. ?.3 El Salvador$ 012@(15. Appro>imately 3@(page arti!le on the massa!res at El 9o-ote. Arti!le by 9ar# Danner. )ew Oor#er$ 04/?/0115 El Salvador$ 012@(15. Arti!le by Cared Toller$ 8Death Squads ;ast$ ;resent N Duture.8 dis!usses re!ent !ases of D9") members being murdered by resurgent death squads. :nly left is !alling for full implementation of +) Truth CommissionBs re!ommendations , purging armed for!es$ full investigation into death squads$ et!. Truth Commission had re!ommended +.S. ma#e it files available. +.S. 6ad refused to turn over 0125 DBI report on death squads organi-ation in 9iami. Salvadoran government is the death squads. 9ember of a death squad now imprisoned and see#ing amnesty$ "ope- Sibrian$ e>plained parti!ipation of Arena luminaries in #idnappings$ bombings and atta!#s on )ational +niversity. 6e impli!ated the mayor of San Salvador in various a!ts. "in# between phone servi!e$ Antel$ and national intelligen!e poli!e. Antel re!ords !alls of left and passes them to poli!e. &The se!ret anti(!ommunist Army$ a former death squad$

were regulars of now(disbanded Treasury ;oli!e'. +p!oming ele!tions may have generated in!rease in death squad a!tivity. L maga-ine$ 0/011.$ pp. 0.(3 El Salvador$ 012@(15. Colman 9!Carthy !omments of +)Bs Truth Commission report and the 7eagan(Abrams 8fabulous a!hievement.8 ashington ;ost$ ./?/0115$ D44 El Salvador$ 012@(15. "etter to editor by Thomas Buergenthal of law s!hool at %eorge ashington +.$ who was a member of the Truth Commission for El Salvador. 6e denies news story that there was a !hapter in the report that dealt with the stru!ture and finan!es of the groups was withheld. 6e bemoans the ability of the !ommission to thoroughly investigate all aspe!ts. ashington ;ost$ 00/5@/0115$ A4. El Salvador$ 012@(15. 7eport of +)Bs Truth Commission re enormous !rime of a government that #illed upwards of A@$@@@ !ivilians between 012@(14. 7eport refutes offi!ial statements made by 7eagan and Bush administrations , when offi!ials denied leaders of Salvadoran armed for!es were using e>e!ution$ rape and torture to sustain their power , reports says they were. e need a truth report on our own government per 7ep. 9oa#ley. Truth report adds growing body eviden!e +.S. %overnment offi!ials may have parti!ipated in perpetuation of atro!ities in El Salvador. In 01?@s$ CIA advisers helped !reate a nationwide informant net. In 0120$ team of military advisers led by Brig. %en. Drederi!# oener sent to determine 8rightist terrorism and institutional violen!e.8 Salvadorans generally dismissed notion that terror was a bad idea. :ne of Colonels$ :s!ar Edgardo Casanova =e<ar$ was one !overing up rape and murder of four !hur!hwomen. oener re!ommended +.S. pro!eed and give E5@@(.@@ million aid. +.S. offi!ials !laimed !hur!hwomen had run a roadblo!# and there was no massa!re at El 9o-ote. )eil "ivingstone$ a !onsultant who wor#ed with :liver )orth at )SC !on!luded$ 8death squads are an e>tremely effe!tive tool$ however odious$ in !ombating terrorism and revolutionary !hallenges.8 op(ed by Cefferson 9orley$ an :utloo# editor. ashington ;ost$ 5/42/0115$ C0$3 El Salvador$ 012@(15. SalvadorBs ruling party moved to de!lare amnesty for those named in +nited )ations.(sponsored Truth Commission. Investigators said 23K of !omplaints laid to government death squads. Dis!usses DBAubuissonBs impli!ation in Ar!hbishop 7omeroBs assassination. ashington ;ost 5/0A/0115 a43 El Salvador$ 012@. Ten former death squad members were ordered #illed in Santiago de 9aria on 4A De!ember 012@ by 6e!tor Antonio 7egalado$ who felt they #new too mu!h. Intelligen!e )ewsletter$ 0@/./0122$ p. ? El Salvador$ 0120(2.. There are two versions of first page of a CIA report$ 8El SalvadorG Dealing ith Death Squads$8 0/4@/012.. CIA released first version in 012A$ among !ongressional debate over aid to El Salvador. Se!ond version$ whi!h !ontradi!ts first$ de!lassified by CIA in 00/0115. As re!ently as 0@/0114$ CIA !ontinued to release !ensored version in response to D:IA requests. 7eda!ted version implies death squad problem over!ome , non !ensored version show this is not true. )ew Oor# Times$ 04/0A/0115$ A01

El Salvador$ 0120(21. Salvadoran atro!ity posed agoni-ing !hoi!e for +.S. C:" 7ene ;on!e$ !hief of staff of SalvadorBs armed for!es$ has been a!!used of ordering murder of si> Cesuit priests$ their house#eeper and her daughter at Central Ameri!an +niversity. )ewly available +.S. do!uments show +.S. #nowingly and repeatedly aligned themselves with unsavory !hara!ters during 012@s while defending them to +.S. ;ubli!. Diplomati! !ables found among more than 0@$@@@ re!ently de!lassified State$ ;entagon and CIA do!uments$ reveal e>tent +.S. poli!y ma#ers !hose to overloo# ;on!eBs brutality. +.S. offi!ials long labeled ;on!e a right(wing e>tremist tied to death squads. But do!uments ma#e !lear +.S. played down unsavory side of ;on!e. Details from !orresponden!e between Ambassador al#er and Ba#er. In 0@/0125$ CIA prepared a 8briefing paper on right(wing terrorism in El Salvador8 that des!ribed ;on!e as a supporter of death squads. Impa!t BushBs visit in 012. to push for human rights was minimal. By A/0121$ CIA reported that ;on!e 8espouses moderate politi!al views.8 ;on!e refused repeated requests to pursue those responsible for deaths of Cesuits. ashington ;ost$ ./3/011.$ A05 El Salvador$ 0120(1@. %overnment operation at El 9o-ote !onsisted of Army$ )ational %uard and the Treasury ;oli!e in operation res!ue. By early 0114$ +.S. spent more than . billion in !ivil war lasting 04 years and that left A3$@@@ dead. )ew Oor#er$ 04/?/0115$ p. 35 El Salvador$ 0120(1@. In 0120 over 0@$@@@ politi!al murders !ommitted by Salvadoran military and its death squads. In 011@ there were 0@2 su!h murders. S!hwar-$ B. &0110'. Ameri!an Counterinsurgen!y Do!trine and El Salvador$ p. 45 El Salvador$ 0120(14. Arti!le 8Death(Squad 7efugees$8 dis!usses !ase of Cesar =ielman Coya 9artine-$ e>tradited by Bush to El Salvador to fa!e murder !harges for being part of a death squad that he !laims operated with #nowledge of defense minister ;on!e and other top offi!ials. D:IA do!uments show +.S. helping prepare e>tradition request for Salvadoran government. Truth CommissionBs report vindi!ates Coya. Te>as :bserver &maga-ine'$ 5/4?/0115$ pp. 1(0@ El Salvador$ 0120(14. Some +.S. spe!ial operations soldiers in El Salvador during !ivil war want ;entagon to admit they more than advisers. They say they also fought. Army memo given )ewswee# says$ 8most personnel serving in an advisory !apa!ity were dire!tly engaged in hostile a!tion.8 )ewswee#$ ./3/0115 El Salvador$ 0120(14. Truth Commission report impli!ates top Salvadoran offi!ials in ordering or !overing up murders of four +.S. !hur!hwomen and si> Cesuit priestsH and Salvadoran troops massa!red many hundreds at El 9o-ote. Dour Dut!h <ournalists #illed 5/0A/0124 were deliberately ambushed by Salvadoran army. Denials by then top +.S. government offi!ials now e>posed. +.S. government supported war with E? billion. The )ation$ ./04/0115$ p. .A3 El Salvador$ 0120(15. 04 years of tortured truth on El Salvador , +.S. de!larations under!ut by +nited )ations. Commission report. Dor 04 years$ opponents of +.S. poli!y in Central Ameri!a a!!used 7eagan and Bush administrations of ignoring widespread

human rights abuses by the Salvadoran government and of systemati!ally de!eiving or even lying to Congress and people about the nature of an ally that would re!eive E? billion in e!onomi! and military aid. A three(man +nited )ations.(sponsored Truth Commission released a long(awaited report on 04 years of murder$ torture and disappearan!e in El SalvadorBs !ivil war. Commission e>amined 44$@@@ !omplaints of atro!ities and attributed 23 per!ent of a representative group of them to Salvadoran se!urity for!es or right(wing death squads. It blamed remainder on guerrilla Darabundo 9arti )ational "iberation front &D9")'. In 9ay 012@$ for instan!e$ when Carter was still ;resident$ se!urity for!es sei-ed do!uments impli!ating rightist leader DBAubuisson in the murder of Ar!hbishop :s!ar 7omero. In Dall of 0120$ Army Brig. %en. Dred oerner supervised preparation of a <oint +.S.(Salvadoran internal military 87eport of the El Salvador 9ilitary Strategy Assistan!e Team$8 whi!h noted that 8the &Salvadoran' armed for!es are relu!tant to implement vigorous !orre!tive a!tions for abuses in the use of for!e.8 :ne reason so many people found it hard to believe +.S. offi!ials !ould not have #nown more about rights abuses and a!ted more aggressively to !urb them is that the +.S. was deeply involved in running the war$ from intelligen!e gathering to strategy planning to training of everyone from offi!ers to foot soldiers. By 0124$ +.S.. military advisers were assigned to ea!h of the si> Salvadoran brigades$ as well as ea!h of 0@ smaller deta!hments. The +.S. put tens of millions of dollars into developing the ultra( modern national intelligen!e dire!torate to !oordinate intelligen!e gathering and dissemination. +.S. military and CIA offi!ials parti!ipated in almost every important meeting. 9ost brigades had a +.S. intelligen!e offi!er assigned to them$ as well as a +.S. liaison offi!er. +.S. advisers regularly doled out small amounts of money$ usually less than E0$@@@ at a time$ for intelligen!e wor#. The +.S. was not informed of arrests or !aptures +nless they spe!ifi!ally as#ed. 8They never as#ed unless there was a spe!ifi! request be!ause someone in ashington was getting telegrams.8 El 9o-ote$ the report said$ was wor# of +.S.(trained Atla!atl battalion$ part of a days(long sear!h(and(destroy sweep #nown as 8:peration 7es!ue.8 In fa!t$ the report said$ the soldiers massa!red more than 3@@ people in si> villages. In El 9o-ote$ where the identified vi!tims e>!eeded 4@@$ 8the men were tortured and e>e!uted$ then women were e>e!uted and finally$ the !hildren8 ashington ;ost$ 5/40/0115 El Salvador$ 0120(15. A dis!ussion of the mediaBs treatment of the El 9o-ote massa!res and the +.S. mediaBs treatment of that story. "ies of our Time$ ?/0115$ pp. 5(. El Salvador$ 0120(15. Thomas Enders$ former Assistant Se!retary of State for Inter( Ameri!an Affairs from 0120(25$ writes op(ed defending +.S. offi!ialsB testimony re massa!re at El 9o-ote as now !onfirmed by +)Bs Truth Commission report. ashington ;ost$ op(ed 5/41/0115$ A01 El Salvador$ 0120(15. +nited )ations. Commission on Truth to release report on !rimes !ommitted against !ivilians in SalvadorBs 04(year !ivil war. Defense 9inister ;on!e already resigned. ashington ;ost :utloo#$ 5/0./0115$ C0$4 El Salvador$ 0120(1.. Armando Calderon Sol !onsidered shoo(in to win ;residen!y in impending ele!tions. Calderon began his politi!al !areer as a member of a seven(man$ neo(fas!ist group under DBAubuissonBs guidan!e that supported death squad operations.

Calderon has all worst elements of DBAbuisson without any redeeming qualities. hen DBAbuisson running death squads out of his offi!e$ Calderon was his private se!retary and a loyal soldier in a terrorist !ell , Salvadoran )ational 9ovement &9)S'. In 0120$ DBAbuisson unified 9)S into Arena party. ashington ;ost$ :utloo#$ ./0A/011.$ C0$5 El Salvador$ 0120. Detailed arti!le on 8The Truth of El 9o-ote$8 by 9ar# Danner. )ew Oor#er$ 04/?/0115$ pages 30 and ending on page 0@5 El Salvador$ 0120. S#eletons verify #illing of Salvadoran !hildren of El 9o-ote$ El Salvador. ashington Times$ 0@/40/0114$ A1 and ashington ;ost$ 0@/44/0114$ A02 El Salvador$ 0124(2.. Signifi!ant politi!al violen!e asso!iated with Salvadoran se!urity servi!es in!luding )ational poli!e$ )ational %uard$ and Treasury ;oli!e. +.S. government agen!ies maintained offi!ial relationships with Salvadoran se!urity establishment appearing to a!quies!e in these a!tivities. )o eviden!e +.S. personnel parti!ipated in for!ible interrogations. +.S. did pass 8ta!ti!al8 information to alert servi!es of a!tion by insurgent for!es. Information on persons passed only in highly unusual !ases. Senate Intelligen!e Committee$ :!tober 3$ 012.$ pp. 00(05. El Salvador$ 0124(2.. 87e!ent ;oliti!al =iolen!e in El Salvador$8 7eport of Senate Intelligen!e Committee. Committee found ample eviden!e that +.S. poli!y was to oppose politi!al violen!e. +.S. government a!!orded high priority to gathering intelligen!e on politi!al violen!e. ;resident Bush and his demar!he in 0125. ;2. +.S. government 7elationship with 7obert DBAubuisson , bio on him. +.S. %overnment !onta!t with him limited. 7oberto Santivane-$ dire!tor of Ansesal 01A2(A1. 6e !laimed he himself had engaged in death squad a!tivity and had a relationship with +.S. through CIA and that C:" Carran-a had ties to CIA. Colonel )i!olas Carran-a had e>tensive ties to Arena and )ational Con!iliation &;C)' parties. 6e involved in various a!tivities of interest to +.S. in various positions. Senate Intelligen!e Committee$ :!tober 3$ 012.$ pp. 0(00 El Salvador$ 0125(1@. Dormer Salvadoran army intelligen!e agent who applied for politi!al asylum in +.S. !onvi!ted in !ourt of entering !ountry illegally. Coya(9artine-Bs request for politi!al asylum still pending. ashington ;ost$ 1/01/011@$ A3 El Salvador$ 0123. In 4/0123$ CIA reported that behind ArenaBs legitimate e>terior lies a terrorist networ# led by DBAubuisson using both a!tive(duty and retired military personnel...8 main death squad was 8the Se!ret Anti(!ommunist Army$8 des!ribed by CIA as the paramilitary organi-ation of Arena , from the )ational ;oli!e and other se!urity organi-ations. These were funded dire!tly from ashington. Death squads be!ame more a!tive as 011.$ ele!tion approa!hed. Columbia$ possibly leading terrorist state in "atin Ameri!a$ has be!ome leading re!ipient of +.S. military aid. Sin!e 012?$ more than 4@$@@@ people have been #illed for politi!al reasons$ most by Colombian authorities. 9ore than 0$3@@ leaders$ members and supporters of the "abor ;arty &+;' have been assassinated sin!e party established in 0123. ;rete>t for terror operations is war against guerrillas and nar!otraffi!#ers. Dormer a partial truth$ latter a myth !on!o!ted to repla!e the 8!ommunist threat.8 or#s hand(in(hand with drug lords$

organi-ed !rime$ and landlords. )ational ;oli!e too# over as leading offi!ial #illers while +.S. aid shifted to them. Targets in!lude !ommunity leaders$ human rights and health wor#ers$ union a!tivists$ students$ members of religious youth organi-ations$ and young people in shanty towns. Sale of human organs. Case of %uatemala. Shift of 01?4$ under *ennedy administration from hemispheri! defense to 8internal se!urityG8 war against the internal enemy. Do!trines e>pounded in !ounterinsurgen!y manuals. Internal enemy e>tends to labor organi-ations$ popular movements$ indigenous organi-ations$ opposition politi!al parties$ peasant movements$ intelle!tual se!tors$ religious !urrents$ youth and student groups$ neighborhood organi-ations$ et!. Drom 012. through 0114$ ?$2.. Colombian soldiers trained under +.S. International 9ilitary Edu!ation and Training ;rogram &9ET'. L 9aga-ine$ 3/011.$ 0. pages El Salvador$ 012?(2A. See arti!le 8Death Squad +pdate$ Investigating ".A.Bs Salvadoran Conne!tion.8 "os Angeles ee#ly$ 2/A/012A El Salvador$ 012?(21. Coya 9artine-$ former death squad member$ who said two +.S. advisers atta!hed to his unit and gave funds of 13@@ month. Arti!le names other Salvadoran death squad members. +n!lassified$ A/011@ El Salvador$ 012?. In 012?$ Salvadoran authorities$ with help of DBI$ !ra!#ed a #idnap( for(hire ring in whi!h death squads posing as leftist rebels #idnapped some of nationBs wealthiest businessmen. S!hwar-$ B. &0110'. Ameri!an Counterinsurgen!y Do!trine and El Salvador$ p. 42 El Salvador$ 012A(21. Cesuit labeled ardent !ommunist two years before by Salvadoran$ +.S. offi!ials. 7eligious )ews Servi!e$ 3/1/011@$ p. 0 El Salvador$ 012A(21. Salvadoran woman defe!ting to +.S. said she wor#ed for death squad and provided information on si> people who #illed. 6er !laims ba!# up those of her supervisor$ Cesar Coya 9artine-$ who lin#ed death squad a!ts to +.S. funding. Boston %lobe$ 5/0?/011@$ in Dirst ;rin!iples$ ./011@$ p. 0@ El Salvador$ 0122(21. Coya 9artine-$ former member intelligen!e department 0st army Brigade of SalvadorBs army. Said +.S. advisers funded their a!tivity$ but unaware of death squad. ashington ;ost$ 00/01/0121$ D4 El Salvador$ 0122. Amnesty International report of 4? :!tober 0122 noted 8bla!# list8 are supplied to Salvadoran media by Salvadoran intelligen!e servi!es. During first si> months of 0122$ number of murders by death squads tripled over same period of previous year. 9ost prominent vi!tim was Cudge Corge Alberto Serrano ;anameno who was shot in 9ay 0122. In!rease refle!ts rise to power of 01?? !lass from national military s!hool. Class members in!lude Colonel 7ene Emilio ;on!e$ new !hief of staff of armed for!es as well as dire!tor of Treasury ;oli!e. They !ommand five of !ountryBs si> brigades$ five of seven military deta!hments$ three se!urity for!es as well as intelligen!e$ personnel and operations posts in high !ommand. Intelligen!e )ewsletter$ 00/0?/0122$ pp. 3$?

El Salvador$ 0121(10. A!!ording to !onfidential Salvadoran military sour!es$ de!ision to murder si> Cesuit priests was made at a 03 )ovember 0121 meeting of senior !ommanders &C:' at the Salvadoran military s!hool. Those allegedly present wereG Colonel Benavides$ C: of the s!hoolH %eneral Cuan 7afael Bustillo$ then C: of Salvadoran Air Dor!e , in 0110 assigned to embassy in IsraelH %eneral Emilio ;on!e$ then !hief of staff , in 0110 minister of defenseH and Colonel Elena Duentes$ C: of 0st brigade. Initiative for murders !ame from Colonel Bustillo. Dor a listing of dire!t and !ir!umstantial eviden!e supporting allegation$ see statement of 7ep. Coe 9oa#ley$ Tas# Dor!e on El Salvador$ 00/02/0110 El Salvador$ 0121. CIA offi!er visited bodies of dead priests. :ffi!er was senior liaison with &D)I' the national intelligen!e dire!torate. +.S. probably #new Salvadoran military behind assassinations but did not say anything for seven wee#s. State Department panel did not review a!tions of CIA or D:D. ashington ;ost$ A/02/0115$ C0$. El Salvador$ 0121. Congressman !riti!i-ed a 00/ 012A report in whi!h "atin Ameri!an and +.S. military leaders a!!used 7ev. Igna!io Ella!uria and several other theologians of supporting ob<e!tives of !ommunist revolution. Dather Ella!uria$ 7e!tor of Cesuit university in San Salvador$ was murdered on 00/0?/ 0121. 7eligious )ews Servi!e$ 3/00/011@$ p. 0 El Salvador$ 0121. Coya 9artine- and Cesuit murders. 9artine- says his unit whi!h played ma<or role in 04/0121 murder of Cesuit priests had +.S. government advisors. I)S trying to deport 9artine-. +n!lassified$ 1/011@$ p. ? El Salvador$ 0121. Salvadoran Ar!hbishop 7ivera a!!used +.S. offi!ials of sub<e!ting a witness to the slaying of ? Cesuit intelle!tuals to brainwashing and psy!hologi!al torment. ashington ;ost$ 04/00/0121$ A45$4. El Salvador$ 0121. +.S. military adviser Benavides told DBI$ later re!anted$ that Salvadoran army !hief of staff and others #new of plan to #ill si> Cesuit priests. ashington ;ost$ 0@/41/011@$ A0A$40 El Salvador$ 011@. Amnesty International reported a signifi!ant surge in number of #illings by army(supported death squads this year. .3 people #illed between Canuary and August this year$ !ompared with .@ reported in 0121. ashington ;ost$ 0@/4./011@$ A0. El Salvador$ 011@. Cesar =ielman Coya(9artine-$ former member Salvadoran Dirst brigade death squad$ senten!ed to ? months in <ail for illegally reentering +.S. ? years after he deported. ashington ;ost$ 04/2/011@$ A44 El Salvador$ 0110. Salvadoran minister of defense and other top generals attended 0121 meeting where de!ision was made to murder si> Cesuit priests$ a!!ording to !onfidential sour!es. Allegation was made by an attorney wor#ing for 7ep. 9oa#ley &D(9A'$ whose tas# for!e released a si> page statement dire!tly lin#ing Salvadoran high !ommand to slayings. ashington Times$ 00/02/0110$ A4

El Salvador$ 0110. Summary e>e!utions !ontinued in El Salvador despite the presen!e of :nusal$ the +) observer mission monitoring human rights violations. In a 0110 report$ :nusal noted government made few attempts to investigate slayings. 7eport also a!!used D9") for re!ruiting fifteen(year(olds. ashington Times$ 04/5/0110$ A2 El Salvador$ 0114. Cesar =ielman Coya 9artine-$ former Salvadoran death squad member$ to be deported. ashington ;ost editorial$ 0@/45/0114$ A4@ El Salvador$ 0115. 7ight(wing death squads undermining fragile pea!e per +) !hief in !ampaign for 9ar!h 011. ele!tions. ashington Times$ 00/43/0115$ A03 El Salvador$ Central Ameri!a$ 0120(0115. Salvadoran death squads set up as a !onsequen!e of *ennedy administration de!isions. *illers were Treasury ;oli!e and the military who were trained in intelligen!e and torture by +.S. +.S. personnel staffed military and intelligen!e apparatus. %enerals sele!ted and trained by +.S. were most notorious #illers. 012. DBI report on death squads never released. Dor savage e>pose of S!hool of Ameri!asB #illers$ see Dather 7oy BourgeoisBs S!hool of the Ameri!as at!h$ Bo> 555@$ Columbus %a. 501@5H &A@?' ?24(35?1. The )ation$ 04/4A/0115$ p. A10 El Salvador$ 0121(011@. Coya 9artine- testified role played by +.S. offi!ials in death squad #illings !arried out by +.S. trained first infantry BrigadeBs intelligen!e unit. Two +.S. military advisers !ontrolled intelligen!e department and paid for unitBs operating e>penses. 6is unit performed A. e>e!utions between April and Culy 0121. ashington ;ost !onfirmed +.S. advisers wor# in liaison with Dirst brigade and CIA pays e>penses for intelligen!e operations in the brigades. 9artine- said his first brigade unit atta!hed to +.S.(trained Atla!atl battalion$ whi!h slaughtered the Cesuit priests. 9ember of his unit$ :s!ar 9ariano Amaya %rimaldi has !onfessed to slayings. In These Times$ 2/0./011@$ p. 0A urope: Watch List Europe$ 01.3(14. :peration %ladio. Dirst s!andal was dis!overy of assassination teams in 0134 lin#ed to Bundes Deuts!her Cugend , a right(wing politi!al organi-ation in 6esse$ %ermany. They prepared list of %erman politi!ians who Imight !ooperate with SovietsJ. BBC &0114'. %ladio , Timewat!h &Trans!ript of 5 part program'$ pp. 01(4@ #eorgia: Watch List %eorgia$ 0115. oodruff wor#ed for 4 months as CIABs Tbilisi station !hief posing as a State Department regional(affairs offi!er. 6e to help %ugulad-e upgrade %eorgian intelligen!e servi!e and to monitor fa!tional struggle. )ewswee# 2/45/0115$ p. 02 #erman": Watch List %ermany$ 013@(3.. In about 013@ pa!ifist ideas to be eradi!ated. +.S. formed %erman youth league &Bund Deuts!her Cugend &BDC'' in Dran#furt. ;sy!hologi!al indo!trination given by ;aul "uth. BDC was a militant organi-ation$ a !ounterweight to !ommunist(run

free %erman youth &DDC' run from East Berlin to infiltrate . %erman youth. BDC passed letters and bro!hures through Iron Curtain and pasted slogans on walls. Chan!ellor Adenauer wanted !old war and wanted to use the BDC. :tto Cohn told by State offi!ial Linn that it had un!overed neo()a-i unit BDC run by ;eters$ that was organi-ing se!ret firing e>er!ises and training for partisan warfare in the :delwald. BDC had drawn up a bla!#list of left(wing so!ialists who were to be arrested or even murdered in event of atta!# from east. Iearly version of %ladio politi!al and staybehind operationJ. Cohn$ :. &01?1'. Twi!e Through the "inesG the Autobiography of :tto Cohn$ pp. 40@(03 %ermany$ 013@(1@. Bonn offi!ials said government to disband se!ret resistan!e net :peration %ladio. Se!tion !onsisted of former )a-i SS and affen(SS offi!ers as well as members of an e>treme right(wing youth group that drew up plans to assassinate leading members of So!ialist Demo!rati! ;arty in event of +SS7(invasion. 8Statewat!h8 !ompilation filed Cune 011.$ p. 00 %ermany$ 0134(10. CIABs stay(behind program !aused s!andal in 0134 when est %erman poli!e dis!overed CIA wor#ing with a 4$@@@(member fas!ist youth group led by former )a-is. %roup had a bla!# list of people to be liquidated in !ase of !onfli!t with the +SS7. "emb#e !ase. The )ation$ ./?/0114$ p. ..? %ermany$ 0135. &Stay(behind operation %ladioF'. In 0135 mass arrests of neo()a-i militant organi-ation within ran#s of %erman youth fellowship &BDC' dis!overed. %roup held se!ret night maneuvers in :denwald with CIA instru!tors. They preparing for war with East %ermany and prepared lists of !ommunists$ left(wing sympathi-ers and pa!ifists who were to be arrested in !ase of emergen!y. 9embers en!ouraged to infiltrate East %erman youth league &DDC'. :peration e>posed in press and s!ores of youths arrested in East %ermany as spies$ propagandists or provo!ateurs$ and senten!ed to terms of up to nine years of hard labor. 6agan$ l. &01?1'. The Se!ret ar for Europe$ p. A2 %ermany$ 0135. +.S. Intelligen!e offi!er told :tto Cohn$ head of BD=$ one of its agents in East %ermany to defe!t with a list of East %erman agents in est. 53 Communist spies arrested after Easter. "ater it found many of those arrested were inno!ent. Arrests followed with apologies. Disaster !aused by over(-ealous +.S. intelligen!e offi!er. est %erman businessmen as !onsequen!e afraid to do business with east. This a goal of +.S. ;oli!y , was this a deliberate 8mista#eF8 6agan$ l. &01?1'. The Se!ret ar for Europe$ p. 20 #reece: Watch List %ree!e$ 01?A. After CIA(ba!#ed !oup$ the army and poli!e sei-ed almost 0@$@@@ prisoners$ mostly left(wing militants$ though politi!al leaders of all shades ta#en in!luding prime minister *anelopoulos and members of his Cabinet$ trade union members$ <ournalists$ writers$ et!. The lists had been provided by the sympathi-ers in the poli!e and the se!ret servi!e. Dinal lists #ept up to date by C:" %eorge "adas.

Details of fate of the arrestees. Tomp#ins$ ;. &+npublished manus!ript'. Strategy of Terror$ pp. 05(2 #uatemala: Watch List %uatemala$ 013.. Death squads and target lists. S!hlesinger$ S.$ N *in-er$ S. &0125'. Bitter Druit 01A$ pp. 4@A(2$ 440 %uatemala$ 013.. %oal of CIA was apprehension of suspe!ted !ommunists and sympathi-ers. At CIA behest$ Castillo Armas !reated !ommittee and issued de!ree that established death penalty for !rimes in!luding labor union a!tivities. Committee given authority de!lare anyone !ommunist with no right of defense or appeal. By 00/40/013. !ommittee had some A4$@@@ persons on file and aiming to list 4@@$@@@. S!hlesinger$ S.$ N *in-er$ S. &0125'. Bitter Druit$ p. 440 %uatemala$ 013.. The +.S. Ambassador$ after overthrow of Arben- government$ gave lists of radi!al opponents to be eliminated to ArmasBs government. )AC"A 4/0125$ p .. The military !ontinued up to at least 01A1 to use a list of A4$@@@ pros!ribed opponents$ drawn up first in 013.. )AC"A &maga-ine re "atin Ameri!a' 4/0125$ p. 05 %uatemala$ 013.. After Armas made president$ labor !ode forgotten and wor#er organi-ers began disappearing from united fruit plantations. 6ersh$ B. &0114'. The :ld Boys$ p. 535 %uatemala$ 013.. Department of State Se!retary Dulles told Ambassador ;eurifoy to have the government s!our the !ountryside for !ommunists and to slap them with !riminal !harges. A few months later the government began to perse!ute hundreds for vague !ommunist !rimes. The )ation$ 0@/42/01A2$ p. ... %uatemala$ 013. +.S. Ambassador ;eurifoy$ after Arben- resigned$ gave %uatemalan armyBs !hief of staff a list of 8!ommunists8 to be shot. The !hief of staff de!lined. The )ation ?/3/0113$ pp. A14(3 %uatemala$ 0120(21. Israeli *nesset member %eneral ;eled said in Central Ameri!a Israel is Bdirty wor#B !ontra!tor for +.S. 6elped %uatemala regime when Congress blo!#ed 7eagan administration. Israeli firm Tadiran &then partly +.S.(owned' supplied %uatemalan military with !omputeri-ed intelligen!e system to tra!# potential subversives. Those on !omputer list had an e>!ellent !han!e of being 8disappeared.8 It was 8an ar!hive and !omputer file on <ournalists$ students$ leaders$ leftists$ politi!ians and so on.8 Computer system ma#ing up death lists. Co!#burn$ A. N Co!#burn$ ". &0110'. Dangerous "iaison$ p. 401 %uatemala$ 0123(15. CIA !olle!ted intelligen!e re ties between %uatemalan insurgents and Cuba. CIA passed the information to +.S. military$ whi!h was assisting %uatemalan army e>tinguish opposition. ashington ;ost$ 5/5@/0113$ A0$0@

%uatemala$ 0122(10. CIA station !hief in %uatemala from 0122 to 0110 was a Cuban Ameri!an. 6e had about 4@ offi!ers with a budget of about E3 million a year and an equal or greater sum for 8liaison8 with %uatemalan military. 6is <ob in!luded pla!ing and #eeping senior %uatemalan offi!ers on his payroll. Among them was Alpire-$ who re!ruited for CIA. Alpire-Bs intelligen!e unit spied on %uatemalans and is a!!used by human rights groups of assassinations. CIA also gave %uatemalan army information on guerrillas. )ew Oor# Times$ ./4/0113$ A00 #uatemala: Death Squads %uatemala$ 0135(2.. Dor 5@ years the CIA has been ban#rolling a man reported to be behind right(wing terror in Central Ameri!a. The CIABs protPgP$ 9ario Sandoval Alar!on$ former =i!e ;resident :f %uatemala$ now heads the )ational "iberation 9ovement &)"9' founded in 0135 by CIA as a paramilitary for!e to overthrow Arben-. By mid(01?@s Sandoval emerged as head of the organi-ation. The hite 6and or "a 9ano Blan!o with !lose ties to the )"9 was responsible for as many as 2@@@ deaths in the 01?@s plus more in the 01A@s. Sandoval a pillar of the orld Anti(!ommunist "eague. The CIA still funds Sandoval. Ca!# Anderson$ ashington ;ost$ 0/5@/012. %uatemala$ 013.(A?. Effe!t of CIA !oup organi-ed labor all but wiped out. +nion membership dropped 0@@$@@@ to 4A$@@@ immediately and !ontinued de!line thereafter$ in part due to death squad a!tivity. Barry$ T.$ and ;reus!h$ D. &012?'. AID"D in Central Ameri!a$ p. 40 %uatemala. ;oli!e trained by AID publi! safety program murdered or disappeared 03$@@@ people. "ernou>$ ;. &0124'. Cry of the ;eople$ p. 02? %uatemala$ 013.(2.. See Ca!# Anderson !olumn 8"in#s 7eported Among "atin Death Squads.8 ashington ;ost$ 0/04/012.$ ). =A.$ p. 03 %uatemala$ 01A@(A4. +nder Arana presiden!y$ with 9ario Sandoval Alar!on and others involved in right(wing terrorism$ Arana unleashed one of the most gruesome slaughters in re!ent "atin Ameri!an history &only in Chile$ following the !oup against Allende was the degree of violen!e greater'. The )ew Oor# Times reported in Cune 01A0 that at least 4@@@ %uatemalans were assassinated between 00/01A@ and 3/01A0H most !orpses showed signs of torture. 9ost of #illing attributed to the offi!ially supported terrorist organi-ations :<o ;or :<o &an eye for an eye' and 9ano Blan!a. Cones$ S.$ and Tobis$ D. &Eds.'. &01A.'. %uatemala$ pp. 4@4(5 %uatemala$ 01A@(2A. =iolen!e by se!urity for!es organi-ed by CIA$ trained in torture by advisors from Argentina$ Chile. Supported by weapon$ !omputer e>perts from Israel. 9arshall$ C.$ S!ott ;.D.$ and 6unter$ C. &012A'. The Iran(Contra Conne!tion$ p. 055 %uatemala. 01?@(24. Trained military death squads who used 8terror ta!ti!s8 from #illing to indis!riminate napalming of villages. Spe!ial Dor!es almost !ertainly parti!ipated in operations despite Congressional prohibition. 9arshall$ C.$ S!ott ;.D.$ and 6unter$ C. &012A'. The Iran(Contra Conne!tion$ p. 015

%uatemala$ 013.. The +.S. ambassador$ after overthrow of Arben- government$ gave lists to Armas of radi!al opponents to be eliminated. )AC"A &maga-ine re "atin Ameri!a' 4/0125$ p. . %uatemala$ 0123. The orld Anti(!ommunist "eagueBs point man$ 9ario Sandoval Alar!on$ remains a "eague member even after e>posed as a death squad patriar!h who was on the CIA payroll. Ca!# Anderson$ ashington ;ost$ 2/1/012? %uatemala$ 0121. Climate of terror grips %uatemala. *illers$ bombers said to target !ivilian rule. ashington ;ost$ 1/41/0121$ A .3 %uatemala$ !ir!a 01?2(A@. +.S. !ounterinsurgen!y program turned area into bloody war -one ta#ing the lives of thousands of peasants. Dormed 9ano Blan!a or hite 6and. ;lan used through out !ountry in 01A@. )AC"A &maga-ine re "atin Ameri!a'$ 5/A.$ p. 01 %uatemala. Arti!le by %ary Bass and Babette %runow on the %uatemalan !ounterinsurgen!y for!es. "ies of our Time$ ?/0115$ pp. 00(05 %uatemala. At least three of re!ent %(4 !hiefs were paid by CIA. Crimes are merely e>amples of a vast$ systemati! patternH Ithe guiltyJ are only !ogs in a large +.S. government apparatus. Colonel 6oo#er$ former DIA !hief for %uatemala$ says$ 8it would be an embarrassing situation if you ever had a roll !all of everybody in %uatemalan army who ever !olle!ted a CIA pay!he!#.8 6oo#er says CIA payroll is so large that it en!ompasses most of ArmyBs top de!ision(ma#ers. Top !ommanders paid by CIA in!lude %eneral 7oberto 9atta %alve-$ former army !hief of staff$ head of presidential %eneral Staff and !ommander of massa!res in El Mui!he departmentH and %eneral %rama<o$ defense minister during the armed for!esB abdu!tion$ rape and torture of Dianna :rti-$ an Ameri!an nun. 6oo#er says he on!e brought %rama<o on a tour of +.S. Three re!ent %uatemalan heads of state !onfirm CIA wor#s !losely with %(4. %en. :s!ar 6umberto 9e<ia =i!tores &military di!tator from 0125 to 012?' how death squads had originated$ he said they started 8in the 01?@s by CIA.8 %eneral Efrain 7ios 9ontt &di!tator from 0124 to 0125 and the !urrent !ongress president'$ who ordered main high(land massa!res &??4 villages destroyed$ by armyBs own !ount'$ said CIA had agents in the %(4. CIA death squads by Allan )airn. The )ation$ ./0A/0113 %uatemala. CIA wor#s inside a %uatemalan army unit that maintains a networ# of torture !enters and has #illed thousands of %uatemalan !ivilians. %(4$ sin!e at least ?@s$ has been advised$ trained$ armed and equipped by +.S. under!over agents. :ne of Ameri!an agents who wor#s with %(4$ is 7andy Capister. 6e has been involved in similar operations with army of neighboring El Salvador. A weapons e>pert #nown as Coe Ca!arino$ has operated through out Caribbean$ and has a!!ompanied %(4 units on missions into rural -ones. Ca!arino Ipossibly a CIA offi!erJ. Celerino Castillo$ a former agent of DEA who dealt with %(4 and CIA in %uatemala$ says he wor#ed with Capister as well as with Ca!arino. Colonel Alpire- at "a Aurora base in %uatemala Denied involvement in deaths of Bama!a and Devine. 6e said CIA advises and helps run %(4. 6e praised CIA for 8professionalism8 and !lose rapport with %uatemalan offi!ers. 6e said that agen!y operatives often !ome to %uatemala on temporary duty$ and train %(4.

CIA gives sessions at %(4 bases on 8!ontra(subversion8 ta!ti!s and 8how to manage fa!tors of power8 to 8fortify demo!ra!y.8 During mid(012@s %(4 offi!ers were paid by Ca!# 9!Cavitt$ then CIA station !hief. CIA 8te!hni!al assistan!e8 in!ludes !ommuni!ations gear$ !omputers and spe!ial firearms$ as well as !ollaborative use of CIA(owned heli!opters that are flown out of piper hangar at "a Aurora !ivilian airport and from a separate +.S. Air fa!ility. %uatemalan army has$ sin!e 01A2$ #illed more than 00@$@@@ !ivilians. %(4 and a smaller$ affiliated unit !alled Ar!hivo have long been openly #nown in %uatemala as the brain of the terror state. ith a !ontingent of more than 4$@@@ agents and with sub(units in lo!al army bases$ %(4 !oordinates torture$ assassination and disappearan!e of dissidents. CIA Death Squads by Allan )airn. The )ation$ ./0A/0113 %uatemala$ 013.(13. Dor at least five years$ Colonel Alpire- was also a well(paid agent for CIA and a murderer$ a +.S. Congressman says. Alpire- has been lin#ed to the murder of 9i!hael Devine$ an Ameri!an inn#eeper who lived and wor#ed in the %uatemalan <ungle$ and the torture and #illing of Efrain Bama!a =elasque-$ a leftist guerrilla who was the husband of Cennifer 6arbury. CIA ties began in 013.$ when Alpire- was about five years old. The CIA engineered a !oup in %uatemala that overthrew a leftist president and installed a right(wing military regime. CIABs station in %uatemala began re!ruiting young and promising military offi!ers who would provide information on the left(wing guerrillas$ the internal wor#ings of %uatemalaBs intertwined military and politi!al leadership$ union members$ opposition politi!ians and others. Alpire- was sent in 01A@ to S!hool of the Ameri!as &S:A'$ an elite and re!ently mu!h(!riti!i-ed +.S. Army a!ademy at Dort Benning$ %a. 6uman(rights groups and members of !ongress point out that S:ABs graduates in!lude 7oberto DBAubuisson$ leader of death squads in El SalvadorH 01 Salvadoran soldiers named in the 0121 assassination of si> Cesuit priests and three soldiers a!!used of the 012@ rape and murder of four +.S. !hur!h wor#ersH "t. %en. 7aoul Cedars and other leaders of the military <unta that ran 6aiti from 0110 to 011.H %eneral 6ugo Ban-er$ di!tator of Bolivia from 01A0 to 01A2$ and %eneral 9anuel Antonio )oriega of ;anama$ now imprisoned in +.S. In 01A@s Alpire- was an offi!er in a !ounterinsurgen!y unit #nown as *aibiles. *aibiles be!ame notorious in the early 012@s$ #nown as s!or!hed earth years$ when tens of thousands of Indians were #illed as military swept a!ross rural %uatemala$ systemati!ally destroying villages. %uatemalan governmentBs own !ount$ !ampaign left .@$@@@ widows and 03@$@@@ orphans. In late 012@s$ Alpire- served as a senior offi!ial of an intelligen!e unit hidden within the general staff and be!ame a paid agent of CIA who paid him tens of thousands of dollars a year. Intelligen!e unit$ #nown as 8Ar!hivo$8 or ar!hives$ stands a!!used of assassination$ infiltration of !ivilian agen!ies and spying on %uatemalans in violation of the nationBs Constitution. Ar!hivo wor#s li#e the CIA. 8It was also wor#ing as a death squad.8 )ew Oor# Times$ 5/43/0113 %uatemala$ 013.(13. +.S. +nder!over agents have wor#ed for de!ades inside a %uatemalan army unit that has tortured and #illed thousands of %uatemalan !iti-ens$ per the )ation wee#ly maga-ine. 8wor#ing out of the +.S. Embassy and living in safe houses and hotels$ agents wor# through an elite group of %uatemalan offi!ers who are se!retly paid by CIA and impli!ated personally in numerous politi!al !rimes and assassinations BBunit #nown as %(4 and its se!ret !ollaboration with CIA were des!ribed

by +.S. and %uatemalan operatives and !onfirmed by three former %uatemalan heads of state. Colonel Culio 7oberto Alpire-$ %uatemalan offi!er impli!ated in murders of guerrilla leader Efrain Bama!a =elasque- , husband of an Ameri!an lawyer , and ran!her 9i!hael Devine dis!ussed in an interview how intelligen!e agen!y advises and helps run %(4. 6e said agents !ame to Central Ameri!an !ountry often to train %(4 men and he des!ribed attending CIA sessions at %(4 bases on 8!ontra(subversion8 ta!ti!s and 8how to manage fa!tors of power8 to 8fortify demo!ra!y8 the )ation quoted +.S. and %uatemalan intelligen!e sour!es as saying at least three re!ent %(4 !hiefs have been on CIA payroll , %eneral Edgar %odoy %atan$ Colonel :tto ;ere- 9olina and %eneral Dran!is!o :rtega 9enaldo. QIt would be embarrassing if you ever had a roll !all of everybody in %uatemalan army who ever !olle!ted a CIA pay!he!#$BB report quoted Colonel %eorge 6oo#er$ +.S. DIA !hief in %uatemala from 0123 to 0121$ as saying. 6uman rights group Amnesty International has said %uatemalan army #illed more than 00@$@@@ !ivilians sin!e 01A2 with %(4 and another unit !alled Ar!hivo #nown as main death squads. 7euters$ 5/5@/0113 %uatemala$ 01?@(1@. 6uman rights groups say at least .@$@@@ %uatemalans 8disappeared8 in last three de!ades. 9ost were poor Indians. Anthropologists$ led by Clyde Snow$ dug away at a village site. 9aria "ope- had a husband and a son in one grave. She said on morning of =alentineBs Day 0124$ members of anti(guerrilla militia too# her husband and others. They had refused to <oin militias #nown as !ivil self( defense patrols and were #illed. Si> un#nown !landestine graves in San Cose ;a!ho. 6uman rights groups blame most disappearan!es on army(run !ivil self(defense patrols set up under presiden!ies of %eneral "u!as %ar!ia and Brig. %en. 7ios 9ontt. There are hundreds of !landestine graves filled with vi!tims of the militias$ right(wing death squads and brutal !ounterinsurgen!y !ampaigns. ashington Times$ 2/3/0114$ p. A1 %uatemala$ 01A@(13. Cennifer 6arburyBs story. Time$ ./5/0113$ p. .2 %uatemala$ 0120(13. DIA reports re 9") parti!ularly disturbing$ as they raise grave questions about e>tent of +.S. #nowledge of 9") a!tivities in earlier years when 9") leader 9ario Sandoval Alar!on was tied to 7eagan AdministrationBs efforts to support Contras. 6aving !ome to power in 013. with the CIA(ba!#ed overthrow of Colonel Ca!obo Arben-e$ 9") leader Sandoval was a!!used in 012@ by Elias Barahona$ former press se!retary to the %uatemalan Interior 9inister$ of having wor#ed for CIA. 6ead of )ational Congress from 01A@ to 01A.$ at whi!h time he was made vi!e president$ a position he #ept until his term e>pired in 01A2$ Sandoval is widely regarded as father of "atin Ameri!aBs 8death squads.8 In 01A@Bs$ he had a !lose relationship with 7oberto DBAubuisson$ deputy !hief of El SalvadorBs national se!urity agen!y &Anseal'. DBAubuisson reportedly was behind El SalvadorBs death squads. Sandoval was so !lose to 7eagan administration that he was one of only two %uatemalans invited to attend 7eaganBs inauguration. Intelligen!e , a !omputeri-ed intelligen!e newsletter published in Dran!e$ ./4./0113$ p. 0 %uatemala$ 012.(13. Arti!le$ 89urder as ;oli!y.8 ashington was supporting %uatemalan army in a number of waysG green berets trained *aibul massa!re for!e$ the armyBs self(pro!laimed 8messengers of death.8 +.S. openly sold weapons to %uatemala

, used in massa!re in Santiago Atitlan. 6undreds of +.S. troops &mostly )ational %uard' helped !ivi! a!tion and road building in massa!re -ones. The )ation$ ./4./0113$ pp. 3.A(2 %uatemala$ 0123(15. CIA !olle!ted intelligen!e re ties between %uatemalan insurgents and Cuba , CIA passed the information to +.S. military$ whi!h was assisting %uatemalan army e>tinguish opposition. ashington ;ost$ 5/5@/0113$ A0$0@ %uatemala$ 0123(13. Bombings against military(reformist Christian Demo!rati! ;arty &DC%' of then ;resident =ini!io Cere-o to topple Cere-o$ who per!eived as being too soft on rebels. A 0@/0122 DIA intelligen!e report alerted Ameri!an authorities that 9")$ whi!h was involved in 8plotting a !oup against Cere-o in the past$8 is 8now apparently prepared to use violent ta!ti!s to undermine DC% government.8 9") 8is reportedly planning a bombing !ampaign dire!ted against members of ruling DC%. 9") intends to use re!ently obtained e>plosives to target personal vehi!les of DC% Congressional representatives in order to frighten them. After assessing their impa!t$ 9") will !onsider initiating a se!ond stage of its anti(DC% !ampaign that will in!lude #illing of various individuals. 9") has sele!ted potential targets in %uatemala !ity. +.S. Army and DIA$ getting regular$ high(level intelligen!e from senior %uatemalan army offi!ers and other sour!es about !rimes$ notably murder$ being !ommitted by %uatemalan army personnel. Sour!e and depth of intelligen!e raises questions about what +.S. %overnment a!tually #new about %uatemalan army !ompli!ity in !ivilian murders in that !ountry throughout the 012@s$ in!luding alleged involvement of %uatemalan Colonel Culio 7oberto Alpire-$ then a CIA agent$ in 011@ and 0114 murders of Ameri!an inn#eeper 9i!hael Devine and guerrilla fighter Efrain Bama!o =ela-que-$ husband of an Ameri!an$ Cennifer 6arbury.8 Intelligen!e , a !omputeri-ed intelligen!e newsletter published in Dran!e$ ./4./0113$ p. 0 %uatemala$ 0122(10. CIA station !hief in %uatemala from 0122 to 0110 was a Cuban Ameri!an. 6e had about 4@ offi!ers with a budget of about E3 million a year and an equal or greater sum for 8liaison8 with %uatemalan military. 6is <ob in!luded pla!ing and #eeping senior %uatemalan offi!ers on his payroll. Among them was Alpire-$ who re!ruited others for CIA. Alpire-Bs intelligen!e unit spied on %uatemalans and is a!!used by human rights groups of assassinations. CIA also gave %uatemalan army information on the guerrillas. )ew Oor# Times$ ./4/0113$ A00 %uatemala$ 0121. 43 students in two years #illed by squads. Entire university student asso!iation has been silen!ed. +.S. ba!#ed governments in virtual geno!ide have more than 03@$@@@ vi!tims. AI !alled this geno!ide a 8government program of politi!al murder.8 The )ation$ 5/3/011@$ !over$ p. 5@2 %uatemala$ 011@(13. 9ember of 6ouse Intelligen!e Committee$ 7obert %. Torri!elli &D( )C.' said$ in letter to ;resident Clinton$ that a %uatemalan military offi!er who ordered #illings of an Ameri!an !iti-en and a guerrilla leader married to a )orth Ameri!an lawyer was a paid agent of CIA. CIA #new of #illings$ but !on!ealed its #nowledge for years. Another member of 6ouse Intelligen!e Committee !onfirmed Torri!elliBs !laims. Torri!elli wrote in letter to ;resident that the 8Dire!t involvement of CIA in the murder

of these individuals leads me to the e>traordinary !on!lusion that the agen!y is simply out of !ontrol and that it !ontains what !an only be labeled a !riminal element.8 Colonel Culio 7oberto Alpire-$ Bama!a$ and 9i!hael Devine. Tim einer$ )ew Oor# Times$ 5/45/0113 %uatemala$ 011@(13. Arti!le$ El Bu#iBs Tale , 9urder of 9i!hael Devine. Covert A!tion Information Bulletin &Muarterly'$ Summer 0113$ pp. 54(5A %uatemala$ 011@(13. Arti!le$ The Agen!y$ :ff Target. Two Deaths$ a 7ogue CIA Informant and a Big ;ot of Trouble. 7e deaths of 9i!hael Devine and Efrain Bama!a =elasque- , 6arburyBs husband. CIA paid Colonel Alpire- E.5$@@@ after it learned of !over up of deaths. +.S. )ews N orld 7eport$ ./0@/0113$ p. .? %uatemala$ 011@(13. Assassin of 9i!hael Devine and of the husband of Cennifer 6arbury$ Colonel Culio 7oberto Alpire-$ was on CIABs payroll and had attended S!hool of Ameri!as &S:A' on two separate o!!asions. In Canuary 0113 when State and )SC pie!ed together what CIA #new$ the ambassador demanded removal of CIABs station !hief. CIA fought to stop dis!losure of its relationship with the Colonel. Administration offi!ials began to mistrust what CIA was saying about the !ase. The Colonel first !ame to +.S. In 01A@ as an army !adet at S:A. 6e returned to S:A in 0121$ to ta#e year long Command and %eneral Staff !ourse when he was already on CIA payroll. In 011@$ 9i!hael Devine$ who ran a hotel$ apparently stumbled on a smuggling operation involving %uatemalan military. 6e was #illed. )ew Oor# Times$ 5/4./0113$ A5 %uatemala$ 011@(13. CIA last month removed its station !hief in %uatemala for failing to report promptly information lin#ing a paid CIA informer to the slaying of a %uatemalan guerrilla fighter married to Cennifer 6arbury. %uatemalan army Colonel Culio 7oberto Alpire-$ was paid E..$@@@ by CIA in 0114 for se!retly supplying intelligen!e on the !ivil war. At time of payment CIA had eviden!e lin#ing him to the slaying of +.S. !iti-en 9i!hael Devine &after he found about a military smuggling operation or be!ause he had a weapon'. ashington ;ost$ 5/43/0113$ A0$4@ %uatemala$ 011@(13. Clinton has threatened to fire anyone in CIA who withheld information from him about a!tivities of its informant in %uatemala$ Colonel Culio 7oberto Alpire-. hat is more li#ely to be agen!yBs undoing is its failure to tell !ongress that only si> months after he graduated from !ommand(level !ourses at S!hool of Ameri!as Colonel Alpire-$ a member of military intelligen!e on agen!yBs payroll$ ordered murder of a +.S. !iti-en$ illiam Devine$ and then torture(murder of husband of an Ameri!an woman. hite 6ouse offi!ials$ and ;resident Clinton in parti!ular$ were very angry about %uatemalan affair but )SC Anthony la#e was arguing that there is no eviden!e that CIA tried to de!eive president. "os Angeles Times reported that late last year State Department found information about Devine murder in its files that appeared to have originated with CIA and had not been passed on to hite 6ouse. This dis!overy prompted State Department and hite 6ouse to as# CIA for more information. State initially as#ed CIA for information on rebel Commandante Efrain Bama!a =elasqueand re!eived a few modest files. Several wee#s later$ State again as#ed CIA for information but this time on 8Commandante Everardo$8 whi!h was Commandante

Bama!aBs well(#nown nom de guerre. :nly then did CIA produ!ed in!riminating data that it held solely under that name. CIA has tried to ease situation with a rare 8lea#8 about itself to press. :n 5/4.$ "os Angeles Times quoted 8CIA sour!es8 as saying Agen!y was only told after the fa!t that its %uatemalan informant$ Colonel Alpire-$ was present at #illing in 011@ of Devine$ a +.S. !iti-en who ran a popular tourist resort in %uatemala. CIA insisted to the paper that it !ut ties with Colonel at that point$ but$ signifi!antly$ sour!es did not put a date on rupture. That gave it 8wiggle room8 to say it didnBt find out about ColonelBs involvement in 9ar!h 0114 torture(murder of Bama!a until early this year. CIA gave Colonel Alpire- a 8final payment8 of E..$@@@ at about time of Bama!aBs murder. ;er )ational publi! radio !ommentator Daniel S!horr$ CIA station !hief in %uatemala has been fired for failing to relay information. But )ew Oor# Times says he was reassigned to "angley in Canuary$ after +.S. Ambassador to %uatemala a!!used him of withholding information. CIA has assigned its inspe!tor %eneral$ Dred 6it-$ to investigate. CIA station !hief in Swit-erland$ who held a top position at Department of :perations &D:' "atin Ameri!an Division from 011@ to 0114$ is now being questioned$ as is Ca!# Devine$ who headed division from Canuary 0125 until last :!tober. 6e was appointed Asso!iate Deputy Dire!tor of :perations in :!tober after Cohn 9a!%affin was removed from that post for se!retly giving an award to a senior operative who had <ust been dis!iplined in Ames !ase. DevineBs su!!essor is a woman$ first to dire!t a D: division. She is in her 3@s$ was previously station !hief in El Salvador$ and is said by offi!ials outside CIA to be very forth!oming about !ase. Intelligen!e , a !omputeri-ed intelligen!e newsletter published in Dran!e$ 5/4A/0113$ p. 5@ %uatemala$ 011@(13. %uatemalan soldiers #illed 9i!hael Devine under orders from Colonel 9ario %ar!ia Catalan$ per !onvi!ted soldier$ Solbal. 6e #illed as the army !onvin!ed he had bought a stolen rifle. They tortured him before #illing him. Solbal says Colonel Alpire- gave food and shelter to the #illers. ashington Times$ 3/03/0113$ A05 %uatemala$ 011@(13. "etter from Congressman Torri!elli to ;resident Clinton about involvement of CIA in two murders in %uatemala. 5/44/0113 %uatemala$ 011@(13. 7ep. 7obert Torri!elli$ D()C.$ who is on the 6;SCI$ has requested an investigation from the Custi!e Department on role of the CIA in the murder of 9i!hael Devine and Efrain Bama!a =elasque-. 7equest was made in a letter to ;resident Clinton. %uatemalan intelligen!e offi!er who ordered the murders$ Colonel Culio 7oberto Alpire-$ was a paid agent of the CIA. Torri!elli !laims that the )SA$ CIA$ State Department.$ and )SC !overed up the involvement of a paid agent in the murders. Devine$ who was #illed in 011@$ was an Ameri!an !iti-en and =elasque-$ who was #illed in 0114$ was married to an +.S. Citi-en. C)) 6eadline )ews$ 5/45/0113 and A;$ 5/45/0113 %uatemala$ 011@(13. 7evelations about a CIA informer lin#ed to two murders &Devine and Bama!a' in %uatemala helped e>hume embarrassing relationship between +.S. military and intelligen!e personnel and a Central Ameri!an regime notorious for human rights violations. ashington ;ost$ ./4/0113$ A41

%uatemala$ 011@(13. Tim einer arti!le 8A %uatemalan :ffi!er and the CIA.8 Colonel is re!alled as a 8good soldier8 and a murdering spy. )ew Oor# Times$ 5/4?/0113 %uatemala$ 011@(13. Two !olonels suspended in %uatemala for !overing up 011@ #illing of 9i!hael Devine. :ne was a paid CIA informant at time of #illing. Colonel 9ario %ar!ia Catalan also suspended. ashington ;ost$ ./4A/0113$ A41 %uatemala$ 011@(13. ife of 9i!hael Devine dis!usses slaying of her husband. )ew Oor# Times$ 5/42/0113$ A0$? %uatemala$ 0110(1.. State Department reported in 0110$ that 8military$ !ivil patrols and poli!e !ontinued to !ommit a ma<ority of ma<or human rights abuses$ in!luding e>tra<uridi!ial #illings torture and disappearan!es.8 %uatemalan !ounterinsurgen!y !ampaign devised by +.S. !ounterinsurgen!y e>perts Caesar Sereseres and Colonel %eorge 9inas. Dormer served as a !onsultant to 7A)D Corporation and State DepartmentBs :ffi!e of ;oli!y ;lanning. 9inas served as military atta!he in %uatemala in early 012@s. Both en!ouraged population !ontrol su!h as =ietnam(style military( !ontrolled strategi! hamlets and !ivilian defense patrols. Today %uatemala is largest warehouse for !o!aine transshipments to +.S. Drug trade run by military whi!h tries to blame the leftists. Covert A!tion Information Bulletin &Muarterly'$ Spring 011.$ pp. 42( 55 %uatemala$ 0110(13. +.S. 6ad information in 0@/0110 lin#ing a paid CIA informer in slaying of a +.S. !iti-en. Colonel 7oberto Alpire- was dropped from CIABs payroll but remained a !onta!t through A/0114 , when he allegedly ordered another #illing of Efrain Bama!a =elasque- , husband of Cennifer 6arbury. ashington ;ost$ 5/4./0113$ A0$4A %uatemala$ 0114. 7ights abuses in %uatemala !ontinue$ paramilitary !ivilian patrols , self defense patrols , a!!used of !ampaign of terror$ !ontrol rural areas. ;atrols answer to military. ashington ;ost$ 0@/./0114$ A53 %uatemala$ 0113. ;resident Clinton said he would dismiss any CIA offi!ial who withheld information on death of Cennifer 6arburyBs husband. 7ep Torri!elli said CIA withheld information for years. ashington Times$ 5/43/0113$ A5 %uatemala$ 01A@(13. Dis!ussion of Torri!elli$ 6arbury$ Devine$ Bama!o$ et!. The death of husband of 6arbury not a rogue operation. This was standard operating pro!edure in El Salvador and %uatemala and elsewhere around the globe. CIA organi-ed death squads$ finan!ed them$ equipped them$ trained them$ et!. ThatBs what the CIA does. :n!e in a de!ade the +.S. publi! hears about this. CIA should be abolished. The CIA mislead Congress about the Devine !ase. %etting rid of CIA is not enough , the CIA did not a!t alone. The )ational Se!urity Agen!y and the Army may have been involved in %uatemala. The ;rogressive$ 3/0113$ pp. 2$1 $aiti: Watch List

6aiti$ 012?(15. In 012? the CIA funded the national intelligen!e servi!e &SI)' under guise of fighting nar!oti!s , but SI) never produ!ed drug intelligen!e and used CIA money for politi!al operations. Sin involved in spying on so(!alled subversive groups...they doing nothing but politi!al repression...they targeted people who were for !hange. CIA used distorted data to dis!redit Aristide. )AC"A &9aga-ine re "atin Ameri!a'$ 4/011.$ p. 53 6aiti$ 011@(1.. Emannuel Constant$ leader of 6aitiBs D7A;6 hit squad$ wor#ed for CIA and +.S. intelligen!e helped laun!h D7A;6. 6aitiBs dreaded atta!hes paid for by a +.S. %overnment(funded pro<e!t that maintains sensitive files on 6aitiBs poor. The )ation$ 0@/4./011.$ .32 6aiti$ 011@(1.. +.S. offi!ials involved in refugee poli!y have ba!#grounds suggestive of ;hoeni>(li#e program a!tivities. "uis 9oreno$ State Department$ has ba!#ground in !ounterterrorism. %unther agner$ senior intelligen!e offi!er at I)SBs southwest regional offi!e$ assigned to investigate repression against repatriated refugees. agner had served as publi! safety adviser to =ietnamese )ational Spe!ial Bran!h for 3 years and later advised Somo-aBs )ational %uard. I)S database on all asylum interviews at %uantanamo. I)S$ on demand$ gave State Department unrestri!ted a!!ess to all interview files. +.S. :ffi!ers hand 6aitian authorities !omputer print(outs of names of all 6aitians being repatriated. CIA funded servi!e intelligen!e na!ionale &SI)'$ whoBs de fa!to primary fun!tion was a war against popular movement , in!luding torture and assassination , a fa!t admitted by a CIA offi!er to an offi!ial in AristideBs government. +.S. shares 8anti(nar!oti!s intelligen!e8 with 6aitian military. The ;rogressive$ ./011.$ p. 40 6aiti$ 0110(1.. Asylum(promoting pro<e!t gets family information that fed into a !omputer pro<e!t that !ould be used to target for repression. The ;rogressive$ 1/011.$ pp. 01(4? 6aiti$ 0110(1.. Seven !hief atta!hes arranged #illings and brought vi!tims to houses. Dour of the seven wor#ed for Centers for Development and 6ealth &CDS'$ funded by +.S. AID. :ne was %ros Sergo$ and other was Drit- Coseph who !hief D7A;6 re!ruiter in Cite Soleil. Two others are 9ar! Arthur and %ors Danfan. CDS files tra!# every family in Cite Soleil. The )ation$ 0@/4./011.$ p. .?0 6aiti$ 011.. AID programs for 6aitian popular groupsH Immigration and )aturali-ation servi!e$ with !omputeri-ed files on 32$@@@ politi!al(asylum appli!ants and army intelligen!e S(4 se!tion of 1?th Civil Affairs Battalion assigned to monitor refugees at %uantanamo Bay. ;er Capt. Cames =i!#$ unit develops networ#s of informants and wor#s with marine !orps !ounterintelligen!e in 8identifying ringleaders of unrest and in weeding out troublema#ers.8 1?thBs files enter military intelligen!e system. %unther agner$ a former )a-i$ served with +.S. In ;hoeni> operation in =ietnam$ and in )i!aragua , now heads State DepartmentBs Cuba(6aiti tas# for!e. ;entagonBs Atlanti! !ommand !ommissioned Boo-$ Allen$ 6amilton$ to devise a !omputer model of 6aitian so!iety. 7esults of study given. ;riority of study to build an 8organi-ed information

ban#....8 no !hange e>pe!ted in ruling !lique of 6aiti. Arti!le by Allan )airn. The )ation$ 0@/5/011.$ pp. 5..(.2 $aiti: Death Squads 6aiti. CIA offi!er assigned 01A5(A3 Coordination with Ton(Ton 9a!oute$ 8Baby Do!8 DuvalierBs private death squad. Covert A!tion Information Bulletin &Muarterly'$ 1/012@$ p. 0? 6aiti$ 0123(15. CIA !reated an intelligen!e servi!e in 6aitiG )ational Intelligen!e Servi!e$ &SI)' from its initials in Dren!h$ to fight !o!aine trade$ but unit be!ame instrument of politi!al terror whose offi!ers engaged in drug traffi!$ #illings and torture. +nit produ!ed little drug intelligen!e. +.S. !ut ties to group after 0110 military !oup. )ew Oor# Times$ 00/0./0115 pp. 0$04 6aiti$ 012?(15 I)S database on all asylum interviews at %uantanamo. I)S$ on demand$ gave State Department unrestri!ted a!!ess to all interview files. +.S. offi!ers hand 6aitian authorities !omputer print(outs of names of all 6aitians being repatriated. CIA funded servi!e intelligen!e na!ionale &SI)'$ whoBs de fa!to primary fun!tion was a war against popular movement , in!luding torture and assassination , a fa!t admitted by a CIA offi!er to an offi!ial in AristideBs government. +.S. shares 8anti(nar!oti!s intelligen!e8 with 6aitian military. The ;rogressive$ ./011.$ p. 40 6aiti$ 011@(1.. Clinton administration denied report CIA helped set up 6aitiBs pro(army 9ilitia , D7A;6. :ffi!ials refused to !omment whether D7A;6 leader Emmanuel Constant was a paid CIA informant. 8)ation8 arti!le said Constant wor#ed for both the CIA and the DIA. Colonel Collins of DIA and Donald Terry of CIA were his !onta!ts. Collins urged Constant to set up D7A;6. 9r. Constant$ per ashington Times$ was a paid +.S. Informant on 6aitian politi!al a!tivities and assisting anti(drug efforts. 7elationship bro#en off early this year. D7A;6 has been lin#ed to murders$ publi! beatings and arson. CIA offi!ers in past wor#ed with 6aitiBs national intelligen!e servi!e. ashington Times$ 0@/A/011.$ A0? 6aiti$ 011@(1.. Emannuel Constant$ leader of 6aitiBs D7A;6 hit squad$ wor#ed for CIA and +.S. Intelligen!e helped laun!h D7A;6. 6aitiBs dreaded atta!hes paid for by a +.S. %overnment(funded pro<e!t that maintains sensitive files on 6aitiBs poor. In 0@/5/011.$ issue of )ation !arried )airnBs arti!le 8The Eagle is "anding$8 he quoted a +.S. offi!ial praising Constant as a young republi!an that +.S. Intelligen!e had en!ouraged to form D7A;6. Constant !onfirmed that a!!ount. 6e first said his handler was Colonel ;atri!# Collins$ DIA atta!he in 6aiti$ and later !laimed another +. S. offi!ial urged him to form D7A;6. Collins first approa!hed Constant while he taught a !ourse at 6Ms of CIA(run national intelligen!e servi!e &SI)' and built up a !omputer data base at Bureau of Information and Coordination. D7A;6 originally was !alled 6aitian 7esistan!e "eague. Constant was wor#ing for the CIA at SI) while it atta!#ed the poor. The )ation$ 0@/4./011.$ p. .32

6aiti$ 0110(1.. Emmanuel Constant &son of a Duvalier general'$ who had been on the CIA payroll sin!e the mid(B012@s. ith +.S. intelligen!e advi!e$ formed D7A;6$ a politi!al front and paramilitary death squad offshoot of the 6aitian army$ that began to systemati!ally target demo!rati! militants and hold the !ountry hostage with several armed stri#es. :n 0@/00/0115$ day +.S.S. 6arlan County and +.S. and Canadian soldiers were to land$ even though CIA had been tipped off$ D7A;6 organi-ed a do!#side demonstration of several do-en armed thugs. Ship turned around. +.S. asylum pro!essing program hand(pi!#ed and e>ported almost 4$@@@ grassroots leaders. In three years after !oup$ A$@@@(man army and its paramilitary assistants #illed at least 5$@@@ and probably over .$@@@ people$ tortured thousands$ and !reated tens of thousands of refugees and 5@@$@@@ internally displa!ed people. Covert A!tion Information Bulletin &Muarterly'$ inter 011./0113$ pp. A(05 6aiti$ 0110(1.. 6aitian paramilitary !hief spied for CIA. Emmanuel 8Toto8 Constant$ head of 6aitiBs notorious D7A;6$ se!retly provided information to +.S. intelligen!e while his group #illed people. Constant paid by CIA for giving intelligen!e offi!ers information about Aristide beginning shortly after Aristide ousted in 1/0110 !oup. CIA dropped him last Spring. ConstantBs organi-ation blamed for #illing hundreds of supporters of Aristide , and organi-ing demonstration that drove off +.S. troop( !arrying 6arlan County last :!tober. In 8)ation8 arti!le$ +.S. Defense Atta!he$ Colonel ;atri!# Collins$ had en!ouraged Constant to form D7A;6. +.S. intelligen!e agen!ies had e>tensive penetration of 6aitian military and paramilitary groups. +sing Constant as sour!e may e>plain why CIABs reporting on Aristide was s#ewed. D7A;6 not formed until 2/0115$ 1 months after Collins left 6aiti. ashington ;ost$ 0@/1/011.$ A0$5@ 6aiti$ 0115. Ooung men #idnapped by armed thugs seldom reappear. +nder de fa!to government$ as many as 5@@@ may have been #illed. Aristide negotiating his return with +). The )ation$ 3/5/0115$ p. 32@ 6aiti$ 0113. Interview with Allan )airn$ April 0113 8Criminal 6abits.8 L 9aga-ine ?/0113$ pp. 44(1 $onduras: Death Squads 6onduras$ 0120(2A. Dloren!io Caballero$ who served as a torturer and a member of a death squad$ said he was trained in Te>as by the CIA. 6e said he was responsible for the torture and slaying of 04@ 6onduran and other "atin Ameri!an !iti-ens. The CIA taught him and 4. other people in a army intelligen!e unit for ? months in interrogation. psy!hologi!al methods , to study fears and wea#nesses of a prisoner$ ma#e him stand up$ donBt let him sleep$ #eep him na#ed and isolated$ put rats and !o!#roa!hes in his !ell$ give him bad food$ throw !old water on him$ !hange the temperature. ashington ;ost$ ?/2/0122$ B5 6onduras$ !ir!a 0124(2A. Army Battalion 5/0?$ a spe!ial !ounterinsurgen!y for!e whi!h many !onsidered a #ind of death squad$ was formed in 012@. Dloren!io Caballero$ a former battalion member$ des!ribed a !landestine paramilitary stru!ture for repressing leftists. Caballero$ who studied interrogation te!hniques in 6ouston$ said the CIA was

e>tensively involved in training squad members. )AC"A 4/0122$ p. 03$ from )ew Oor# Times$ 3/4/012A 6onduras$ 9ar!h 012?. Apart from CIA training of a battalion impli!ated in death squad a!tivities and torture$ 6onduran army defe!tor said CIA arranged a fabri!ated for!ed 8!onfession8 by #idnapped prisoner that he headed a guerrilla front and had planned atta!#s against +.S. installations. This in operation truth. Choms#y$ ). &0122'. The Culture of Terrorism$ p. 451 6onduras. %eneral %. Alvare- 9artine-$ CIA(Contra point man in 6onduras$ had death squad operation run by 7i!ardo "au. Alvare- godfather to new CIA Chief of StationBs daughter. 9arshall$ C.$ S!ott ;.D.$ and 6unter$ C. &012A'. The Iran(Contra Conne!tion$ pp. A2(1 6onduras$ 0124(2?. Luniga told !ongressional staffers about the 50? Battalion established with the #nowledge and assistan!e of the +.S. Embassy. By 012. more than 4@@ 6onduran tea!hers$ students$ labor leaders$ and opposition politi!ians had been murdered. The CIA had #nowledge of the #illings. Luniga #illed in 1/0123. 9other Cones$ ./012A$ p. .2 6onduras. Capt. Ale>ander 6ernande-$ a graduate of +.S. International ;oli!e servi!es training program$ has played a !entral role in 6onduran death squad a!tivities and the war in )i!aragua. Early 012? )ew Oor# Times reports that CIA was providing 8training and advi!e in intelligen!e !olle!tion8 to 6ernande-B unit 8as part of a program to !ut off arms shipments from )i!aragua to leftist rebels in 6onduras and El Salvador.8 )ew Oor# Times also says that CIA #new of the assassinations but 8loo#ed the other way.8 The )ation$ ?/A/012?$ p. A15 6onduras$ !ir!a 0120(2.. 6onduran government established a se!ret unit that sei-ed$ interrogated$ tortured$ and murdered more than 05@ people between 0120(2.. +nit named Battalion 50?. +nit operated with CIA supervision and training and re!eived +.S. instru!tion in interrogation$ surveillan!e and hostage res!ue. Commander of unit in first years was a graduate of International ;oli!e A!ademy. )A$ 4/4@/0122$ pp. 44.(3 The !landestine houses and !ommand post of 50? were visited by CIA agents. )A$ 0/45/0122$ p. 23 6onduras$ )i!aragua$ 0124. A Contra !ommander with the DD) admitted he helped organi-e a death squad in 6onduras with the approval and !ooperation of the CIA. 6onduran government agreed to host the death squad and provide it with !over$ sin!e the group would #ill 6onduran dissidents at the governmentBs request. The !ommander admitted he parti!ipated in assassinations. CIA 8Colonel 7aymond8 !ongratulated the squad. The ;rogressive$ 2/012?$ p. 43 6onduras$ )i!aragua$ 012.(23. 6onduran army investigators report that Contras have been involved in death(squad #illings in 6onduras. At least 02 6ondurans and an un#nown number of Salvadorans and )i!araguans have been #illed by the Contras. ashington ;ost$ 0/03/0123$ A04

6onduras$ 012@(25. Agents of Battalion 50?$ a 6onduran death squad$ re!eived interrogation training in Te>as from CIA in 012@. CIA agents maintained !onta!t with unit in early 012@Bs$ visiting detention !enters during interrogation and obtaining intelligen!e gleaned from torture vi!tims. See Ameri!as at!h 86uman 7ights in 6onduras8 &9ay 012A'. Dillon$ S. &0110'. Commandos$ p. 0@0 6onduras$ 012@(25. %ustavo Alvare-$ formerly head of poli!e$ in 0120 a general running entire armed for!es. or#ed !losely with +.S. on Contras. Alvare- had organi-ed military intelligen!e Battalion 50? , first 6onduran death squad. Argentines sent 03(4@ offi!ers to wor# with Alvare- on Contras. Senior offi!er :svaldo 7iveiro. %arvin$ %. &0114'. Everybody 6as 6is :wn %ringo$ p. .0 6onduras$ 012@(21. CIA and State Department wor#ed with a 6onduran military unit !alled Battalion 50? during the 012@s. +nit was responsible for !ra!#ing down on dissidents. A;$ ?/04/0113. 6onduran spe!ial prose!utor for human rights as#ing the +.S. to turn over !lassified information on Ambassadors Cohn )egroponte and Chris Ar!os and several CIA agents !onne!ted to the disappearan!e of dissidents in the 012@s. A;$ ?/05/0113 6onduras$ 012@(21. Colonel %ustavo Alvare- 9artine- shot to death in 0121. Alvarespent years networ#ing with fas!ists and ultra right terrorists who in orld Anti( !ommunist "eague and its sister organi-ation$ the "atin Ameri!an Anti(!ommunist Confederation$ or CA". 6e most famous for streamlining 6ondurasBs death squads and uniting them under his !ontrol. Alvare- gathered together the )ational Dront for the Defense of Demo!ra!y$ the 6onduran Anti(!ommunist 9ovement &9AC6:'$ and the Anti(!ommunist Combat Army , death squads all , and !ombined them with several governmental for!es$ in!luding the Duer-as de Seguridad ;ubli!a &D+SE;'$ Departmento )a!ional de Investiga!iones &DI)'$ and Tropas Espe!iales ;ara Selva y )o!turnas &TES:)'. ith Dire!tor of Central Intelligen!e Casey$ Alvare- and )egroponte turned 6onduras into a staging ground for Contra in!ursions into )i!aragua. 6onduran Congress issued De!ree 55$ whi!h de!lared terrorist anyone who distributed politi!al literature$ asso!iated with foreigners$ <oined groups deemed subversive by the government$ damaged property$ or destroyed do!uments. Alvare-Bs for!es murdered upwards of 3@@ people. 6e ousted as 6ondurasBs di!tator in 012. and be!ame spe!ial !onsultant to 7A)D Corporation. "ies of our Time$ 5/011.$ pp. 5(3 6onduras$ 012@(21. Eleven senior offi!ers who are believed to have been involved with Battalion 50? have been !onvi!ted on !harges of #idnapping$ torturing and attempting to murder si> students in 0124. :ffi!ers in!lude one general$ nine !olonels$ and one !aptain. A;$ A/43/0113 6onduras$ 012@(21. See entry in "iaison from Baltimore Sun$ ?/00(02/0113 6onduras$ 012@(15. CIA(trained death squad issue in presidential !ampaign. In early 012@s$ Battalion 5(0?$ of 6onduran military whose members instru!ted by and wor#ed with CIA 8disappeared8 s!ores of a!tivists. Both !andidates a!!using other of !onne!tions to Battalion 5(0?. In 012@ 43(6onduran offi!ers to +.S. for training per

sworn testimony in International Court by 6onduran intelligen!e offi!er who parti!ipated , Dloren!io Caballero. %roup trained in interrogation by a team from DBI and CIA. Training !ontinued in 6onduras. +.S. Trainers <oined by instru!tors from Argentina and Chile , sessions fo!used on surveillan!e and res!uing #idnap vi!tims. Battalion 5(0? engaged in a program of systemati! disappearan!es and murder from 0120 to 012.. By 9ar!h 012.$ 0@@(03@ students$ tea!hers$ unionists and travelers pi!#ed up and se!retly e>e!uted. Squads$ a!!ording to Inter(Ameri!an Court of 6uman 7ights$ belonged to 5(0?. Squads modus operandi in!luded wee#s of surveillan!e of suspe!ts followed by !apture by disguised agents using vehi!les with stolen li!ense plates$ interrogation$ torture in se!ret <ails followed by e>e!ution and se!ret burial. CIABs !onne!tion to 5(0? !onfirmed by %eneral Alvare-$ who !reated and !ommanded squad from 012@ through 012.. 6e later be!ame !hief of poli!e and then head of the armed for!es. Alvare- said CIA 8gave good training$ lie dete!tors$ phone(tapping devi!es and ele!troni! equipment to analy-e intelligen!e.8 CIA men informed when 5(0? abdu!ted suspe!ted leftists. hen bodies found$ 5(0? put out story they #illed by guerrillas. CIA loo#ed other way. Ambassador )egroponte in 0124 denied e>isten!e of death squads. State Department was atta!#ing as !ommunist$ anti(demo!rati! and a terrorist group$ Committee for Defense of 6uman 7ights in 6onduras that was e>posing 5(0?. In a barra!#s !oup$ Alvare- for!ed into e>ile in 9iami and be!ame paid !onsultant to ;entagon writing study on low(intensity !onfli!t. 9embers of 5(0? still in positions of power in government. Congressional intelligen!e !ommittee in 0122 loo#ed into CIABs role with 5(0?$ but findings never published. :p(ed by Anne 9anuel. ashington ;ost$ 00/42/0115$ C3 6onduras$ 0124(25. E>(guard Benito 89a!#8 Bravo reportedly #illed do-ens of Contra re!ruits at his "a "adosa training base near El ;araiso. 9a!# suspe!ted many were Sandinista infiltrators. In one !ase$ DD) ordered four e>(guardsmen e>e!uted for insubordination and allegedly selling arms to El SalvadorBs D9"). They also had been a!!used of #illing re!ruits. 6onduran military parti!ipated in the e>e!ution. Dillon$ S. &0110'. Commandos$ pp. 002(04. 6onduras$ 0122. Dire!tor human rights !ommission in 6onduras and asso!iate #illed by assassins. The ;rogressive$ 4/011@$ p. .? 6onduras$ 0122. 6onduran human rights leader 7amon Custodio "ope- a!!used Battalion 5(0? of murdering a politi!ian and a tea!her on 0. Canuary 0122. Custodio relied on testimony by former battalion member sergeant Dausto Caballero. In 00/5@/0122. 6onduras was !ondemned by Inter(Ameri!an Court of 6uman 7ights in 0122 for disappearan!e of Angel 9anfredo =ela-que-. Battalion 5(0?$ along with D)I &Dire!torate of )ational Intelligen!e'$ and D+SE; &)ational ;oli!e' were impli!ated$ all of whi!h have re!eived training from CIA. Intelligen!e ;arapoliti!s$ 1/0122$ p. 2 6onduras$ 0122. Cose Isaias =ilorio$ an intelligen!e offi!er and former death squad member$ was shot dead on 0 Canuary 0122. Isaias was to testify before Inter(Ameri!an Court on 6uman 7ights &)ew Oor# Times$ 4@ Canuary 0122'. 6uman rights leader and legislator 9iguel ;avon was #illed on 0. Canuary 0122 after testifying before Inter(

Ameri!an Court. Also #illed was 9oises "andaverde$ a tea!her who was riding in ;avonBs !ar at the time of atta!#. Intelligen!e ;arapoliti!s$ 5/0122$ p. 04 6onduras$ Argentina$ 012@(21. A survivor tells her storyG treatment for a leftist , #i!#s and free-ing water and ele!tri! sho!#s. In between$ a visitor from CIA. CIA wor#ed !losely with the 6onduran military while the military tortured and #illed dissidents during the 012@s$ human rights groups said. A government offi!ial also said Argentine military advisers$ with +.S. support$ were brought in to help monitor leftist a!tivism. 8At least nine Argentine military &offi!ers'$ supported by the CIA$ trained many 6onduran offi!ers to prevent !ommunism from entering 6onduras$8 said "eo =alladares of the governmentBs human rights !ommission. Bertha :liva$ head of !ommittee of relatives of the disappeared$ !laimed CIA #new of disappearan!es by 6onduran se!urity for!es and that 8the +.S. Embassy had absolute power in this !ountry.8 in the first of a series of four arti!les$ the Baltimore Sun reported Sunday that CIA and the State Department !ollaborated with a se!ret 6onduran military unit #nown as Battalion 50? in the 012@s in !ra!#ing down on 6onduras dissidents. Dollowing a 0.(month investigation. In order to #eep up publi! support for 7eagan administrationBs war efforts in Central Ameri!a$ +.S. offi!ials misled !ongress and the publi! about 6onduran military abuses. Collaboration was revealed in !lassified do!uments and in interviews with +.S. and 6onduran parti!ipants. Among those interviewed by the Sun were three former Battalion 50? torturers who a!#nowledged their !rimes and detailed the battalionBs !lose relationship with CIA. 7amon Custodio$ president of non(government human rights !ommission$ said a former member of Battalion 50?$ Dloren!io Caballero$ dis!losed that CIA in early 012@s too# 4. soldiers to the +.S. for training in anti(subversive te!hniques. At the time$ Custodio said$ 86ondurasB poli!y was oriented to detaining and summarily e>e!uting those who did not please the government or the military.8 Battalion 50? was !reated in 012. and its first !ommander was %eneral "uis Alonso Dis!ua$ !urrent armed for!es !hief. A government report subsequently blamed it in the !ases of 02. missing people. Baltimore Sun$ ?/03/0113 6onduras$ Israel. During Contra war 6onduran military intelligen!e offi!ers on double salary from CIA and Colombian drug !artels$ who saw advantage of using 6onduran airstrips for transiting !o!aine under !over of war effort. Israelis also trained 6onduran death squads. Co!#burn$ A. and Co!#burn$ ". &0110'. Dangerous "iaison$ p. 443 6onduras$ Assassinations$ 012@(2.. CIA and Contras a!!used of running 6onduran death squads$ #illing over 4@@. CIA offi!ials 8loo#ed the other way8 when people disappeared. =iolen!e tapered off after ouster of CIA ba!#ed military !ommander Alvare-. 7i!ardo "au running Contra intelligen!e$ also death squads. A!!used arranging assassination Ar!hbishop 7omero in El Salvador. 9arshall$ C.$ S!ott ;.D.$ and 6unter$ C. &012A'. The Iran(Contra Conne!tion$ pp. 054(5 %ndonesia: Watch List Indonesia$ 01?5(?3. +.S. trained unionist spies laid groundwor# for post 01?3 !oup gestapu massa!re of leftists by gathering intelligen!e on leftist unionists. Counterspy$ inter 01A1$ p. 4A

Indonesia$ 01?3(??. 8+.S. offi!ialsB lists aided Indonesian blood bath in B?@s.8 +.S. offi!ials supplied the names of thousands of members of Indonesian Communist ;arty &;*I' to the army that was hunting them down and #illing them in a !ra!#down branded as one of the !enturyBs worst massa!res$ former +.S. Diplomats and CIA offi!ials say. 7obert C. 9artens$ Dormer member of embassyBs politi!al se!tion said$ 8it really was a big help to the army.... They probably #illed a lot of people...8 9artens said. 6e headed an embassy group of state Department and CIA offi!ials that spent two years !ompiling the lists. 6e said he delivered them to an army intermediary. The lists were a detailed whoBs who of the leadership of the ;*I that in!luded names of provin!ial$ !ity and other lo!al ;*I members and leaders of mass organi-ations. Ambassador 9arshall %reen$ his deputy Ca!# "ydman$ and politi!al se!tion !hief Edward 9asters admitted approving the release of the names. Army intermediary was an aide to Adam 9ali#. The aide$ Tirta *ent<ana Adhyatman$ !onfirmed that he had met with 9artens and re!eived lists of thousands of names...given to Su#arnoBs 6Ms. Information on who !aptured and #illed !ame to Ameri!ans from SuhartoBs 6Ms$ a!!ording to former CIA deputy !hief of station Coseph "a-ars#y. "a-ars#y said 8we were getting a good a!!ount in Ca#arta of who was being pi!#ed up$8...8the army had a Bshooting listB of about .$@@@ to 3$@@@ people.8 "a-ars#y said the !he!#(off wor# was also !arried out at CIABs intelligen!e dire!torate in D.C. By end of Canuary 01??$ 8the !he!#ed off names were so numerous the CIA analysts in ashington !on!luded the ;*I leadership had been destroyed.8 ashington ;ost$ 3/40/011@$ A3 Indonesia$ 01?3(??. In response to *athy *adaneBs 9ay 40 arti!le in ashington ;ost$ 7obert C. 9artens responds 8it is true I passed names of ;*I leaders and senior !adre system to non(!ommunist for!es during the si> months of !haos between the so(!alled !oup and the ultimate downfall of Su#arno. The names I gave were based entirely on Indonesian !ommunist press and were available to everyone. This was senior !adre system of the ;*I few thousand at most out of the 5.3 millions !laimed party members. I !ategori!ally deny that I headed an embassy group that spent two years !ompiling the lists.8 ashington ;ost$ ?/4/011@$ A02 Indonesia$ 0123. IndonesiaG years of living dangerously. CIABs role in bloody !oup in Indonesia in 01?3. +tne 7eader. 4/0110$ p. 52$ two pages %ndonesia: Death Squads Indonesia$ 01?3(?? Indonesian generals approa!hed +.S. for equipment 8to arm 9oslem and nationalist youths for use in !entral Cava against the ;*I.8 ashington responded by supplying !overt aid$ dispat!hed as 8medi!ines.8 ashington ;ost$ ?/05/011@$ A 44 Indonesia$ 01?3(??. *athy *adaneBs story for States )ews Servi!e dis!losed part played by CIA and State Department offi!ials in 01?3(?? blood bath in Indonesia. *adane reported that +.S. offi!ials in Ca#arta furnished names of about 3$@@@ !ommunist a!tivists to the Indonesian army and then !he!#ed off the names as the army reported the individuals had been #illed or !aptured. The )ation$ A/1/011@$ p. .5

Indonesia$ 01?3. CIA and State Department offi!ials provided name lists to Indonesian army that #illed 43@$@@@. The ;rogressive$ A/0@/011@$ p. 1 Indonesia$ 01?3. E>(agents say CIA !ompiled death lists for Indonesians. San Dran!is!o E>aminer$ 3/4@/011@ Indonesia$ 01?3(??. Arti!le by 9i!hael =ati#iotis and 9i#e DonteH 7ustle of %hosts. &01?3 Indonesian !oup'. Dar Eastern E!onomi! 7eview$ 2/4/011@$ 4 pages Indonesia$ 01?3(23. Death squads roam at will$ #illing subversives$ suspe!ted !riminals by thousands. Blum$ . &012?'. The CIA A Dorgotten 6istory$ p. 440 %ran: Watch List Iran$ 0135(3.. CIA gave Shah intelligen!e on Tudeh party fa!ilitate anti(Tudeh Campaign. %asiorows#i$ 9.C. &011@'. 8Se!urity 7elations Between the +nited States and Iran$ 0135(01A2$8 p. 03@ Iran$ 0135(?.. CIA station !hiefs in regular !onta!t with Shah and wor#ing level liaison relationship with SA=A* established by 3(man training team and smaller unit in SA=A* 6Ms for several years after training team left. CIA and SA=A* e>!hanged intelligen!e in!luding information on Tudeh party. %asiorows#i$ 9.C. &011@'. 8Se!urity relations between the +nited States and Iran$ 0135(01A2$8 pp. 433(3? Iran$ 0135. CIA prepared an arrest list for the overthrow operation. Copeland$ 9. &0121'. The %ame ;layer$ p. 01@ Iran$ 0135. +.S. Army !olonel wor#ing for CIA under !over of military atta!he wor#ed to organi-e and train intelligen!e organi-ation for Shah. Trained on domesti! se!urity$ interrogation. ;rimary purpose of &Ba#htiarBs intelligen!e unit later to be!ome SA=A*' to eliminate threats to Shah. %asiorows#i$ 9.C. &011@'. 8Se!urity 7elations Between the +nited States and Iran$ 0135(01A28 p. 03@ Iran$ 013.. Oear after !oup Ameri!an !ryptographi! e>perts and CIA agent played important part in rooting out !onspira!y army offi!ers lin#ed to Tudeh ;arty. *witny$ C. &012.'. Endless Enemies$ p. 0?3 Iran. During ShahBs reign$ thousands people #illed. 9any #illed at ShahBs dire!tive. 7afi-adeh$ 9. &012A'. itness$ p. 05. Iran$ 0125. CIA identifies to Iranian government 4@@ leftists who were then e>e!uted. The )ation$ 04/05/012?$ p. ??@ Iran$ 0125. In 0125$ when the Tudeh party was !losed down$ the CIA gave the *homeni government a list of +SS7 *%B agents operating in Iran. Two hundred suspe!ts were e>e!uted$ 02 +SS7 diplomats e>pelled and Tudeh party leaders imprisoned. ashington ;ost$ 0/05/012A$ A0$2

Iran$ 0125. To !urry favor with *homeni$ the CIA gave his government a list of +SS7 *%B agents and !ollaborators operating in Iran. The *homeni regime then e>e!uted 4@@ suspe!ts and !losed down the !ommunist Tudeh party. *homeni then e>pelled 02 +SS7 diplomats$ and imprisoned the Tudeh leaders. ashington ;ost$ 00/01/012?$ A42 %raq: Watch List Iraq$ 01?5. CIA supplied lists of !ommunists to Baath party group that led !oup so that !ommunists !ould be rounded up and eliminated. Co!#burn$ A. and Co!#burn$ ". &0110'. Dangerous "iaison$ p. 05@ %srael: Death Squads Israel. ;rime 9inister Oit-ha# Shamir headed a spe!ial hit squad during his ten years in 9ossad. Shamir headed the assassination unit from 0133(?. that !arried out atta!#s on per!eived enemies and suspe!ted )a-i war !riminals. Shamir re!ruited former members of the Stern %ang. ashington Times$ A/./0114$ A2 Israel$ 0114. Arti!le$ 86ow Israeli Commandos Are aging an +nder!over ar In :!!upied Territories.8 In Canuary 0114$ Israeli army laun!hed all(out offensive to end 87ed Intifadeh.8 +nder!over units 8Arabi-ed8 produ!ed a rash of deaths under !ontroversial !ir!umstan!es leading to !laims !ommando units are death squads. Sin!e Intifadeh began in 012A$ AA3 ;alestinians #illedH ?2@ more slain by their brethren mostly for !ollaboration. 6uman(rights organi-ations !ontend Sayarot shoot first and as# questions later. Time 2/50/0114$ pp. .1(3@ Israel$ 0114. IsraelBs assassination squad$ Duvdevan or Cherry has #illed one of its own by mista#e. Intelligen!e )ewsletter$ A/45/0114$ p. 3 Israel$ 0114. Israeli army had dis!harged !ommander of under!over unit for issuing orders to shoot at ;alestine a!tivists. +nit !ode(named Samson has had three !ommanders fired or pla!ed on trial within three years. 9ore than 5@ ;alestinians #illed this year by under!over troops$ who usually dress as Arabs. ashington ;ost$ 2/4?/0114$ A0. Israel$ 6onduras$ 0120(21. In 0120 "eo %leser$ 8!o(owner8 of International Se!urity and Defense Systems &ISDS' , a leading Israeli 8se!urity8 firm &Israeli Doreign Affairs 4/012A$ 3/012A$ /012A$ 4/0122$ 5/0121' identified repeatedly as an Israeli entity , began building Battalion 50?$ a unit of 6onduran military intelligen!e whi!h disappeared$ tortured$ then #illed its vi!tims. 6onduran %eneral alter "ope- 7eyes who C(I(C 6onduran armed for!es 012.(2?$ said 8we had Israeli advisers in Spe!ial Dor!es. They se!onded to Spe!ial Dor!es by Israeli mod$ although they !ame offi!ially as non(governmental.8 Their front IwasJ they IwereJ training se!urity groups but Ithey really gaveJ spe!ial operations !ourses on how ta#e over buildings$ planes$ hostages...Contras also ta#ing !ourses... !oordination between them and CIA. Israeli Doreign Affairs$ ./0121$ p. 0$.

Israel$ South Afri!a$ 012?(10. Israel trained members of In#atha hit squads aimed at Afri!an )ational Congress$ a disillusioned former leader of Lulu organi-ation has revealed. Israeli Doreign Affairs$ 4/4@/0114$ p. 5 Israel. 7an#s as fifth largest e>porter of arms in world$ a!!ording CIA estimates$ and has be!ome essential element global !ounterinsurgen!y business. 86it lists8 used by death squads in %uatemala have been !omputeri-ed with Israeli assistan!e and +-i ma!hine guns the standard weapon of death squads. Covert A!tion Information Bulletin &Muarterly'$ Summer 0122$ p. 3 %tal": Watch List Italy$ 013@(31. All Italian 8SIDA78 !ounterespionage offi!ers !olle!ted biographies on every deputy and senator. "ist in!reased to in!lude E!!lesiasti!sG .3$@@@ dossiers on them alone$ 03A$@@@ altogether$ 5@$@@@ dealing with Italians in world of business and industry. Drop !opies went to CIA. De "oren-oBs outfit to be!ome a tool for CIA. Tomp#ins$ ;. &+npublished manus!ript'. Strategy of Terror$ pp. 2(04 Italy$ 0131(?A. Carabinieri drew up plan ;iano Solo , for paramilitary to intervene in order to restore publi! order. Se!ret servi!es had massive program of surveillan!e of Italian politi!al and business figures. This partly intended to identify left(wing suspe!ts who would be rounded up and imprisoned in !on!entration !amps on Sardinia. Investigation revealed !reation of personal intelligen!e dossiers began in 0131 and 03A$@@@ files amassed. SIDA7 &military intelligen!e' dossiers emphasi-ed unfavorable signifi!an!e. SIDA7 dossiers routinely deposited at CIA 6Ms. SIDA7 planed mi!rophones in ;apal apartments and ;residentBs 7ome residen!e. :peration ordered by de "oren-o at request of CIA station !hief Colby. Some years earlier 7ome CIA station !hief Thomas *aramessines had as#ed %eneral de "oren-o$ then head of SIDA7$ for dossiers on Ileft(leaningJ politi!ians and in parti!ular for 9oroBs !ir!le of !ollaborators. illan$ ;. &0110'. ;uppetmasters$ pp. 53(A Italy$ 01?@(A@. %eneral de "oren-o$ whose SIDA7 be!ame SID$ implemented new %ladio pro<e!t to neutrali-e subversive elements. *nown as parallel SID$ it rea!hed into nearly every institution. %roup set up at request of Ameri!ans and )AT:. *nights of 9alta$ as well as freemasonry$ and its most notorious lodge , ;ropaganda Due$ or ;(4$ far more influential. "i!io %elli$ a #night. Coined +.S. ArmyBs CIC. To ferret out dissidents$ they prepared wat!h lists on thousands. 03A$@@@ files found in 9inistry of Interior. CIA obtained dupli!ates. Covert A!tion Information Bulletin &Muarterly'$ Summer 011.$ p. 4. Italy$ 01?@(A@. :peration Solo , a planned !oup against a leftist government did not o!!ur , but it was based on :peration %ladio. %iovanni de "oren-o$ as !hief of se!ret servi!es$ !ompiled dossiers$ in!luding tapes and photos$ on some 03@$@@@ people , priests$ politi!ians and unionists. 6e drew up plan to arrest many politi!ians$ ta#e over radio and T=$ sei-e offi!es and newspapers of left(wing parties. De "oren-o was organi-ing a dupli!ate of :peration %ladio in !ase left gained too mu!h power. 8Statewat!h8 !ompilation$ filed Cune 011.

Latin America: Death Squads "atin Ameri!a$ labor. AID"D !olle!ted detailed information about "atin Ameri!an labor leaders under prete>t surveys ne!essary for AID(finan!ed wor#erBs housing pro<e!ts. AID"D able obtain personal and politi!al history union members$ with address and photos. %iven CIA role in Chile$ +ruguay and Bra-il !oups$ among others$ it probable this information passed to military regimes and their se!ret poli!e. D" p. 452 from "ernou>$ ;. &0124'. Cry of the ;eople. pp. 404$ 44@ "iaison$ 01?@. Target lists maintained by all estern 6emisphere division stations. 9aintain in !ase lo!al government as#s for assistan!e in preventive detention of dangerous persons. Agee$ ;. &01A3'. Inside the CompanyG CIA Diary$ p. 00. "atin Ameri!a. CIA organi-es right wing terrorist organi-ations that atta!# and assassinate leftist politi!ians and others without impli!ating foreign governments. %roups in!lude 8"a 9ano Blan!o8 and 8:<o ;or :<o8 &%uatemala'$ 8"a Banda8 &Domini!an republi!'$ and 8Death Squad8 &Bra-il'. Counterspy$ 5/01A5$ p. . "atin Ameri!a. CIA trained assassination groups su!h as 6al!ones in 9e>i!o$ the 9ano Blan!a in %uatemala$ and the Es!uadron de la 9uerte in Bra-il. )AC"A &maga-ine re "atin Ameri!a' 2/01A.$ p. 00 "atin Ameri!a$ 0135(2.. The a!tivities of the death squads$ formed under CIA sponsorship in 013. Are loosely !ontrolled by an international organi-ation #nown as "a 9ano Blan!o &the hite 6and'. The front group is the CA"$ "atin Ameri!an Anti( !ommunist Dederation$ the "atin Ameri!an affiliate of the orld Anti(!ommunist "eague. Ca!# Anderson$ ashington ;ost$ 0/05/012. "atin Ameri!a. Terrorist groups !reated in most !ountries. %roups su!h as 8"a 9ano Blan!o8 atta!# and assassinate leftist politi!ians and others feared by military governments$ doing so without impli!ating poli!e or military. CIA impli!ated in attempts to organi-e the right into terrorist organi-ations. Counterspy$ RR/01A5$ p. . "atin Ameri!a$ 01?@(13. Colonel Alpire- a!!used #iller of Ameri!an inn#eeper and guerrilla leader$ graduated from S!hool of Ameri!as in 0121. :ther notable alumni in!ludeG 9anuel )oriega and :mar Torri<os$ former ;anamanian strongmenH 7oberto DBAubuisson$ leader of Salvadoran death squadsH 7oberto =iola and "eopoldo %altieri$ leaders of argentine dirty warH 9i!hael Dran!ois$ former 6aitian poli!e !hiefH 01 of 4A Salvadoran offi!ers !ited for murder of si> Cesuit priestsH 0@ of 04 Salvadoran offi!ers involved in El 9o-ote massa!reH 0@3 of 4.A Colombian offi!ers !ited for human rights violations in 0114H and$ former di!tators of Bolivia$ E!uador$ and ;eru. Time. ./0@/0113$ p. 4@ "atin Ameri!a$ 01A?. An Argentinean told S!herrer$ legal atta!he &DBI' Santiago$ that :peration Condor$ a nas!ent program among military intelligen!e servi!es of some "atin Ameri!an !ountries designed to lo!ate and eliminate one anotherBs fugitive

terrorists and e>iled dissidents. Ambitious leader of Chilean DI)A trying to institutionali-e pro!ess. Bran!h$ T. and ;roper$ E. &0125'. "abyrinth$ p. 045 "atin Ameri!a$ :peration Condor$ ;araguay$ 01A@(14. 04/0114 a ;araguayan <udge in a poli!e station found do!umentary history of de!ades of repression and +.S. intelligen!e !ooperation with ;araguay and other regional di!tatorships. Ar!hives detail fates of hundreds$ possibly thousands$ of "atin Ameri!ans se!retly #idnapped by right(wing regimes of the 01A@s. ;aper trail revealing elusive !onspira!y among se!urity servi!es of Argentina$ Bolivia$ Bra-il$ Chile$ ;araguay and +ruguay to eliminate foes without regard to borders. S#et!hy outlines of :peration Condor$ !an be partially filled in. Some of do!uments already disappeared. Dinders had unearthed <umbled mountain of papers outlining poli!e and military intelligen!e a!tivities during re!ently overthrown Stroessner regime. 6Ms of ;araguayan te!hni!al poli!e revealed more do!uments. . tons re!ords. Data !onfirmed arrest and #illing of politi!ians and e>!hange of prisoners with Argentina$ Chile and +ruguay. Dis!overed do!uments a bombshell that led to arrest of some of StroessnerBs old regime. Southern Cone repression #illed 3@$@@@$ disappeared 5@$@@@ , the ma<ority in Argentina and .@@$@@@ imprisoned. +.S. gave inspiration$ finan!ing and te!hni!al assistan!e for repression. CIABs te!hni!al servi!es division &TSD'$ provided ele!tri!al torture equipment. Covert A!tion Information Bulletin &Muarterly'$ Dall 011.$ pp. A(05 "atin Ameri!a$ 0115. Cames Carroll wrote editorial about +.S. ArmyBs S!hool of Ameri!as in Dort Benning. It is 8the +.S. s!hool that tea!hes militaries how to torture.8 Among renowned alumni are various "atin Ameri!an strongmen$ in!luding di!tators in Bolivia$ Argentina$ El Salvador and ;anama. In ;eru ? of army offi!ers !harged with re!ent murders of 1 students were S!hool of Ameri!as alumni. In 6onduras$ . of the high(ran#ing offi!ers who helped !reate 8Battalion 50?8 death squad graduated from the s!hool. In Columbia$ the list of offi!ers designated by human rights organi-ations as worst offenders reads li#e an honor roll from Dort Benning. In El Salvador$ 4 of 5 offi!ers !ited for the assassination of Ar!hbishop 7omero$ 5 of 3 !onvi!ted of #illing 5 9ary#noll nuns and their lay asso!iate$ and 01 of the 4? offi!ers impli!ated by +nited )ations. 8Truth Commission8 investigation of murder of Cesuits$ were graduates. 8Dor de!ades alumni of the S!hool of Ameri!as have helped fill morgues and mass graves of an entire !ontinent.8 Colonel "ouis 9i!hel Dran!ois has been most !losely lin#ed to 6aiti death squads$ and he is an alumni of the s!hool <ust as is %eneral 7aoul Cedars one of those CIA agents. L 9aga-ine$ 4/011.$ p. 4. Me&ico: Death Squads 9e>i!o$ 013A(21. The 9e>i!an DDS &Dederal Se!urity Dire!torate' li#e many estern( hemisphere intelligen!e organi-ations was !reation of CIA. DDS has state of the art !omputer and re!ords systems. Through DDS CIA able to #eep tabs on all embassies in 9e>i!o City. DDS wor#s !losely with +.S. In the suppression of leftists and politi!al parties. In early 01A@s$ )a-ar !reated the Brigada Blan!a$ a right(wing death squad that #illed hundreds$ probably thousands of 9e>i!an students and politi!al a!tivists. La!aris :sorio Cru-$ a member of death squad$ testified in Canada that$ between 01AA(24$ he part of team that #illed between ?@(03@ people. ;enthouse$ 04/0121

9e>i!o$ 01AA(21. +.S. loo#ed the other way when )a-ar$ head of DDS used his infallible &interrogation' te!hniques on behalf Ameri!an agen!ies while he !arried out hundreds$ perhaps thousands of politi!al e>e!utions of 9e>i!an leftists and politi!al dissidents. DDS &Dederal Se!urity Dire!torate' administering drug traffi!. ;enthouse$ 04/0121 'icaragua: Watch List Coseph Adams$ a former 9arine intelligen!e offi!er$ who served as !hief of se!urity for Aldolfo Calero$ helped maintain a list of !ivilians mar#ed for assassination when Contra for!es entered )i!aragua. The ;rogressive$ 5/012A$ p. 4. 'icaragua: Death Squads )i!aragua$ 0125(21. Enrique Bermude-$ a Contra leader$ said in Contra raids on e!onomi! targets in northern )i!aragua$ parti!ularly !offee plantations and farming !ooperatives$ any resistan!e brought brutal retribution. Commandantes in field authori-ed to sele!t those to die. Bermude- ordered prisoners to have throats !ut rather than waste bullets. Terrell$ C.$ and 9art-$ 7. &0114'. Disposable ;atriot$ p. 0.1 )i!aragua$ 0123(21. 8Death squad8 reports re Sandinistas first !ir!ulated by the CIA( funded ;uebla Institute in 0110 as !oming from the +) and :AS. hen !he!#ed out$ this proved to be not true. +n!lassified$ 1/0114$ p. 0. )i!aragua$ !ir!a 01.@(A1. +nder name Anti(Communist "eague )i!aragua. Conservative estimates say 5@$@@@ died four de!ades prior 01A2(A1 !ivil war. "ernou>$ ;. &0124'. Cry of the ;eople. pp. 20$ 1. 'or(a": Watch List )orway$ 01.A(1@. :peration %ladio$ formed in 01.A$ #ept tra!# of !ommunists and be!ame part of intelligen!e servi!e in 01.2. )orwegian bran!h e>posed in 01A2$ when an arms !a!he dis!overed. 8Statewat!h8 !ompilation filed Cune 011.$ p. 04 )anama: Watch List ;anama$ 0121(1@. +.S. says 1@ prisoners now held in ;anama. 9ost of those detained had been pi!#ed up by +.S. Dor!es based on wanted lists !ompiled by +.S. and ;anamanian authorities. ashington ;ost$ 0/01/011@$ A0? ;anama$ 0121. Several hundred people on list Endarra government see#s to detain. They arrested by +.S. troops. 9ost politi!al a!tivists and labor leaders were wanted. The )ation$ 0/41/011@$ p. 003 )aragua": Watch List ;araguay$ 01A4(25. The ;araguayan government e>pelled an author and released a do!ument supplied by the +.S. Embassy. The do!ument$ mar#ed se!ret$ in!ludes the

author among a list of ;araguayans said to have visited the +SS7 blo!. 4/3/0125$ A0$40 )hilippines: Death Squads

ashington ;ost

;hilippines. Arti!le 8Death Squads in the ;hilippines$8 by Doug Cunningham. Covert A!tion Information Bulletin &Muarterly'$ inter 0122 pp. 44(5 ;hilippines. 9ilitary used hunter #iller unit !alled s!out rangers to find enemy and either atta!# or report ba!# to battalion !ombat teams. Blaufarb$ D.S. &01AA'. The Counterinsurgen!y Era$ p. 42 ;hilippines. ;robable +.S. support for vigilante death squads in the ;hilippines. +sed in !oordination with other programs ma#ing up a total low intensity !onfli!t profile. )ational 7eporter$ Dall 012A$ pp. 4.(5@ ;hilippines$ 013@(3.. 9ilitary man who helped "ansdale was Charles Bohannan and "ansdaleBs !hief Dilipino asso!iate was Colonel )apoleon =aleriano whose 8s#ull squadrons8 beheaded suspe!ted 6u#s. *arnow$ S. &0121'. In :ur Image$ p. 53@ ;hilippines$ 01?1(25. 9ar!osB land reform failed and he approved !reation of 89on#ees8 a group used to intimidate and even murder 9ar!osB rivals. *arnow$ S. &0121'. In :ur Image. p.5A2 ;hilippines$ 01A5(25. In ;hilippines 0$0?? persons were #illed from 01A4(25. 6uman rights groups say most of vi!tims were opponents of ;resident 9ar!os. ashington ;ost$ ./04/012.$ A40 ;hilippines$ 012?(2A. 8=igilante Terror8 a report of CIA(inspired death squads in the ;hilippines. )ational 7eporter$ Dall 012A$ pp. 4.(50 ;hilippines$ 012?. See !hapter 8Dire!t +.S. 7ole in Counterinsurgen!y.8 in!ludes psywar operations$ vigilante and death squads. +SIA anti(!ommunist !ampaign of distributing films and written materials. Dilm 8Ameri#a8 shown. +se of Asian(Ameri!an Dree "abor Institute :perations. In 0123$ AAD"I spent up to E. million on organi-ational efforts$ the money !oming from the )ational Endowment for Demo!ra!y &)ED'. Bello$ . &012A'. +.S. Sponsored "ow Intensity Confli!t in the ;hilippines ;hilippines$ 9ar!h 012?. 7eagan signs finding in!reasing CIA involvement in ;hilippine !ounterinsurgen!y operations. )ew Aquino government is allegedly perpetrating a purge of opposition$ !arried out by more than 3@ death squads. 7amsey Clar#$ who investigated death squad a!tivity in 012A$ wrote in Cune that 8the vi!tims of vigilante violen!e are overwhelmingly poor farmers$ wor#ers$ slum dwellers$ and others who are pushing for signifi!ant land reform$ wage in!reases and prote!tion wor#ersB rights$ as well as those who oppose +.S. military bases.8 +psurge in death squad a!tivities are !oin!ident with in!reased CIA aid and was pre!eded by visit to ;hilippines by 9a<. %en. Cohn Singlaub. The )ation$ 1/01/012A$ pp. 431(?@

)uerto Rico: Watch List ;uerto 7i!o. DBI has institutionali-ed repression. It !reated 8subversive8 lists with names of more than 03@$@@@ 8independentistas8 who often find themselves thrown out of wor#. DBI agents organi-ed and trained death squads within the ;uerto 7i!an poli!e department )AC"A &maga-ine re "atin Ameri!a'$ 2/011@$ p. 3 )uerto Rico: Death Squads ;uerto 7i!o$ 01A2. 8;uerto 7i!oBs Death Squad 7equiem on Cerro 9aravillaG the ;oli!e 9urders in ;uerto 7i!o and the +.S. %overnment Cover(up.8 A boo# by 9anuel Suarereviewed in the ;rogressive$ 04/0122$ pp. .@(.4 Russia: Watch List 7ussia$ 011.. DBI to open 9os!ow offi!e with an eye on nu!lear traffi!#ing. DBI has about 4@ posts abroad at +.S. Embassies with its agents serving as legal atta!hes. They range in si-e from one agent to as many as eight$ plus support staff. DBI dire!tor Dreeh said the DBI wor#ing to set up <oint poli!e/intelligen!e data base with authorities in 7ussia and %ermany. ashington Times$ 3/4?/011.$ A5 South A*rica: Watch List South Afri!a$ 01?4. A tip from a paid CIA informant led to 01?4 arrest of )elson 9andela leader of the Afri!an )ational Congress. A CIA offi!er !laimed 8we have turned 9andela over to the South Afri!an se!urity bran!h.8 ashington ;ost$ ?/00/011@$ A02 South A*rica: Death Squads South Afri!a. Arti!le$ 8South Afri!an Death Squad ;lotG A 9issing ;ie!e to a ;u--le the 9edia onBt Solve$8 by Cane 6unter. E>tra$ 00/0114$ p. 4? South Afri!a. See arti!le 8South Afri!an Death Squads.8 Covert A!tion Information bulletin &Muarterly' Summer 011@$ pp. ?5(?? South Afri!a$ 012@(21. Details of South Afri!aBs death squads by a former poli!e Captain Dir# Coet-ee. %roup tra!#ed and #illed A)C a!tivists in Swa-iland$ Botswana and "esotho. )ewswee#$ 00/4A/0121$ p. 3? South Afri!a$ 012@(1@. ApartheidBs fier!est warriors in 012@s were South Afri!aBs army spe!ial for!es$ poli!e for!e #nown as *oevoet &!rowbar'$ and ;ortuguese(spea#ing 8buffalo8 battalion who ran a !ampaign of assassination and sabotage against the Afri!an )ational Congress. )ewswee#$ 1/0./0114$ p. .3 South Afri!a$ 0110(14. A3 C:SAT+ &labor union' members #illed during past two years by se!urity for!es. 9any other atta!#s. Briarpat!h maga-ine &Canada'$ 0@/0114$ pp. 33(? South Afri!a$ 0114. Slaughter in South Afri!a. )ewswee# 1/40/0114$ p. 3A

South America: Watch List South Ameri!a$ 01A@(A1. +.S. "egal atta!he Buenos Aires$ DBI agent 7obert S!herrer$ sent !able to D.C. Des!ribing operation. :peration Condor the !ode(name for !olle!tion$ e>!hange and storage intelligen!e re leftists$ !ommunists and 9ar>ists. Established between !ooperating intelligen!e servi!es in South Ameri!a to eliminate 9ar>ist a!tivities. :peration provided for <oint operation against targets in member !ountries...third and se!ret phase of operation involves formation of spe!ial teams from member !ountries who travel anywhere in world to !arry out san!tions up to assassination against terrorists from member !ountries. Spe!ial team from :peration Condor !ould be sent to lo!ate and surveil target. hen lo!ated$ a se!ond team would be sent to !arry out san!tion. 01A1 Senate 7eport$ based on CIA files$ says 8su!h a phase three operation planned in 01A. and planned on #illing 5 European leftists8 , one Carlos. ;lot foiled when CIA dis!overed it and warned host !ountries , Dran!e and ;ortugal. +.S. military offi!ers sent under auspi!es of AID oversaw formation of te!hni!al poli!e. :ne folder of ar!hives has !orresponden!e between ;araguayan ministers and +.S. Army Colonel 7obert Thierry$ who was serving as 8publi! administration adviser$8 who supervised formation of the te!hni!al poli!e. "etters from DBI agent S!herrer advising ;araguayan poli!e re targets. CIA also wor#ed with ;araguayans. Deputy DCI$ =ernon alters$ visited !ountry in 01A? who apparently approved abortive effort to get false passports for 4 Chilean DI)A agents , Armando Dernande- and 9i!hael Townley , who en route to +.S. To assassinate :rlando "etelier. The !ase of Eugenio Berios. Covert A!tion Information Bulletin &Muarterly' 04$ 3A$ 2$ 1 South America: Death Squads South Ameri!a$ 01A?. "etelier #illed by right wing Cuban e>iles !alled 8%usanos8 who are paid and trained by CIA and 8Chilean %estapo8 DI)A. %usanos regularly engage in terrorism against Cuba and "atin Ameri!an and Caribbean !ountries. Ta!ti!s in!lude blowing up airplanes$ embassies$ fishing boats$ and #idnappings. %usanos !onne!ted with poli!e of other right wing governments su!h as =ene-uela. Certain gusano operations dire!ted by CIAH :ther unilateral operations of DI)A. Counterspy$ 04/01A?$ p. 0@ S"ria: Watch List Syria$ 01.1. Dollowing CIA !oup of 9ar!h 01.1 CIA offi!er reported over 8.@@ Commies8 arrested. 9iddle East Cournal 3A Syria$ 01.1. The 6usni LaBim !oup of 5@ 9ar!h result of guarantee CIA that on!e firmly in power$ the +.S. would give de fa!to re!ognition with de <ure to follow in a few days and pointed out targets to be sei-ed. %ave him a list of all politi!ians who might be able to rally resistan!e. Copeland$ 9. &0121'. The %ame ;layer$ p. 1. !hailand: Death Squads

Thailand$ 01?3. Death squads. "obe$ T. &01AA'. +nited States national se!urity poli!y and aid to the Thailand poli!e ?A(A@ Thailand$ 01A5(A?. %eneral Saiyut *oedphon$ deputy head of CS:C and !lose ally of CIA$ admitted that CIA was !ollaborating with a variety of Thai se!urity agen!ies$ in!luding CS:C. Similarly$ deputy dire!tor of poli!e$ ithun Oasawat$ said he was re!eiving CIA advi!e and reports as late as 01A.. Ameri!an indo!trination of CS:C and border patrol poli!e during 01?@Bs produ!ed +.S. desired ob<e!tives. 8)awaophon8 !reated IS:C offi!ers who in turn has !lose !onta!ts with CIA$ employed !overt ta!ti!s to sear!h out 8subversive elements8 within the Thai population. Counterspy$ Summer 012@$ p. 0. Thailand$ 01A5(A?. The *rathin Daeng &7ed %uars'$ were groups of rightist students with poli!e support that had over 0@@$@@@ members in!luding government employees$ soldiers$ poli!emen$ et!. %roup re!eived support and assistan!e from the internal se!urity !ommand &where CIA had a presen!e' and the Thai Santiban a#a Spe!ial Bran!h. The 7ed %uars impli!ated in numerous bombings$ #illings$ shooting and harassment of labor leaders$ peasant leaders$ et!. Indo!hina 7esour!e Center Study$ 0/01AA Thailand$ 01A?. A high(ran#ing offi!ial of Seni ;ramo< government told a foreign visitor few wee#s before :!tober ? !oup$ both )awapon and the 7ed %aurs were being finan!ed by CIA. Counterspy$ 04/01A?$ p. 34 Thailand$ 01A?. :ver 0@$@@@ students$ professors$ politi!al figures$ labor and farm leaders arrested sin!e !oup. +.S. military aid in!reased. )ew <unta used CIA(trained for!es to !rush student demonstrators during !oup. 4 right(wing terrorist squads suspe!ted for assassinations tied dire!tly to CIA operations. Bulletin of Con!erned Asian S!holars$ v1 S5$ 1/01AA$ p. 4 Thailand$ 01A?. 7ed %aurs$ an organi-ation of the e>treme right$ staged provo!ations against progressive students and assassinations of a!tivists of farmersB federation of Thailand. The number of assassinations by right wingers soared in April 01A? during parliamentary ele!tions. Defense minister ;ramarn Adire#san$ leader of right wing Thai )ational party$ openly pro!laimed the slogan 8the right #ill the left.8 Syro#ons#i. &0125'. International Terrorism and the CIA$ p. 00A(002 Thailand$ 01A?. Thai border poli!e$ element of poli!e most involved in !ounterinsurgen!y and whi!h CIA !on!entrated most of its efforts$ !arried out an assault by fire against essentially unarmed students$ #illing at least 0@@. Counterspy$ 04/01A?$ p. 34 !ur+e": Watch List Tur#ey$ 01A0. Coup !arried out by !ounter(guerrilla$ the CIA$ the Tur#ey military and Tur#ish military intelligen!e &9IT'. CIA solely interested in prote!ting Ameri!an interests. CIA assisted 9IT in 01?@(?1 in drafting plans for mass arrests of opposition

figures similar to the pattern followed in Thailand$ Indonesia and %ree!e. In single night generals ordered .@@@ professors$ students$ tea!hers and retired offi!ers arrested. They tortured. Counterspy$ ./0124$ p. 43 ,rugua": Watch List +ruguay. CIA agent asso!iated with death squads. Every CIA station maintained subversive !ontrol wat!h list of most important left wing a!tivists. %ave names families and friends. Dran#ovi!h$ A. &012@'. :n Company Business. T= trans!ript$ 3/1/012@$ pp. 30(5 +ruguay$ liaison$ 01?.. Biographi!al data and photos. +ruguay has national voter registration that effe!tive identity !ard system. Drom liaison servi!e CIA station gets full name$ date and pla!e of birth$ parents names$ address$ pla!e of wor#$ et!. and id photos. Information invaluable for surveillan!e operations$ for subversive !ontrol wat!h list and for a variety of other purposes. CID(5?0 ,rugua": Death Squads +ruguay$ 01A@(A4. CIA operations offi!er used !over of AID publi! safety advisor to help set up Department of Information and Intelligen!e &DII'. DII served as a !over for death squad. Counterspy$ 3/01A1$ p. 0@ ,SSR: Watch List +SS7$ 011@ *%B Chairman =ladimir *ryu!h#ov said *%B to prote!t against anti( Communist for!es. Said western intelligen!e e>ploiting !urrent instability in +SS7. Certain radi!al movements being masterminded by foreign support. Certain groups had written 8bla!#lists8 of people who must be neutrali-ed. ashington ;ost$ 04/04/011@$ A02$4@ +SS7$ 011@. *%BBs *ryu!h#ov a!!uses CIA and other western intelligen!e agen!ies of gathering information on wor#ersB movements. ashington ;ost$ 04/45/011@$ A0$44 +SS7$ East %ermany$ 01.1(3A. "eague of Dree Curists &+DC' #ept a bla!#list of offenders against <usti!e , parti!ularly lawyers and poli!e , and published their a!tivities. )amed were mar#ed men$ whether they !ame to est as refugees or as a!!redited representatives of East %ermans. 6agan$ ". &01?1'. The Se!ret ar for Europe$ p. 4@@ +SS7$ Iran$ 0124. =ladimir *u-i!h#in$ a senior *%B offi!er in Tehran$ defe!ted to the British. CIA had a sharing agreement with 9I? and be!ame privy to !ontents of two trun#s full of do!uments. Drom those do!uments CIA prepared name lists of more than one hundred people$ mostly Iranians$ wor#ing as se!ret agents in Iran for the +SS7. Casey allowed this list be handed to the Iranians , who e>e!uted them. ;ersi!o$ C. &0110'. Casey$ p. 5@0 -ietnam: Watch List

=ietnam$ 01?3(?2. +.S./%overnment of =ietnam !reate list of a!tive )"D for assassination. After 01?2 Tet offensive$ names !entrali-ed to ;hoeni> !oordinators. Colle!t names of tens of thousands )"D suspe!ts. 9ilitary operations su!h as 9y "ai use ;hoeni> intelligen!e. By 01A5$ ;hoeni> generates 5@@$@@@ politi!al prisoners in South =ietnam. Counterspy$ 9ay 01A5$ p. 44 =ietnam$ 01?3(A@. Details re =ietnam. Drom 01?3(?2 +.S. and Saigon intelligen!e servi!es maintained an a!tive list of =iet Cong !adre mar#ed for assassination. ;hoeni> program for 01?1 !alled for 8neutrali-ing8 02@@ a month. About one third of =iet Cong targeted for arrest had been summarily #illed. Se!urity !ommittees established in provin!ial interrogation !enters to determine fate of =iet Cong suspe!ts$ outside of <udi!ial !ontrols. %reen Berets and )avy Seals most !ommon re!ruits for ;hoeni> program. %reen Beret Deta!hment B(3A provided administrative !over for other intelligen!e units. :ne was ;ro<e!t Cherry$ tas#ed to assassinate Cambodian offi!ials suspe!ted of !ollaborating with )orth =ietnamese$ *%B. Another was ;ro<e!t :a# targeted against South =ietnamese suspe!ted !ollaborators. They !ontrolled by Spe!ial Assistant for Counterinsurgen!y and Spe!ial A!tivities$ whi!h wor#ed with CIA outside of %eneral AbramsBs !ontrol. Stein. C. &0114'. A 9urder In artime$ pp. 5?@(0 =ietnam$ 01?A(A5 CIA developed ;hoeni> program in 01?A to neutrali-eG #ill$ !apture or ma#e defe!t =iet Cong infrastru!ture. =iet Cong infrastru!ture means !ivilians suspe!ted of supporting Communists. Targeted !ivilians not soldiers. ;hoeni> also !alled ;hung 6oang by =ietnamese. Due pro!ess totally none>istent. South =ietnamese who appeared on bla!# lists !ould be tortured$ detained for 4 years without trial or #illed. =alentine$ D. &011@'. The ;hoeni> ;rogram$ p. 05 =ietnam$ 01?A(A5 Distri!t Intelligen!e :perations Coordination Center &DI:CC'. Dien Ban !enter a model for all of ;hoeni>. Bldg 0@B > .@B. 9anned by two +.S. Soldiers$ 4 Census %rievan!e$ one 7ural Development !adre$ and one Spe!ial Bran!h. DI:CC intelligen!e !learinghouse to review$ !ollate$ and disseminate information. Immediate lo!al rea!tion. Ameri!ans #ept files of sour!es$ =iet Cong infrastru!ture and order of battle. 7ea!tion for!es 0@@ poli!e$ 0 ;7+ unit$ guides from !ensus grievan!e. 9arines s!reened !ivilian detainees using informants and DI:CCBs bla!#list. =alentine$ D. &011@'. The ;hoeni> ;rogram$ p.04? =ietnam$ 01?2(?1. +ntil late 01?2$ Saigon had run a program under whi!h 3@@$@@@ ID !ards were issued. =iet Cong made fa#e ones and many stolen. =iet Cong during Tet assigned teams to go door(to(door to !olle!t them. Saigon reissued !ards in 0@/01?2. By 0 9ay 01?1$ number of !ards issued was 0.3 million. Adams$ S. &011.'. ar of )umbers$ p. 020 =ietnam$ 01?2. ;hoeni> program quota of 02@@ neutrali-ations per month. =iet Cong Infrastru!ture System &=CIS' fed 5@@@ names =iet Cong infrastru!ture into !omputer at Combined Intelligen!e Center politi!al order of battle se!tion. Beginning of !omputeri-ed bla!#list. In Saigon DIA$ DBI and CIA used !omputers. +ntil 01A@ !omputeri-ed bla!#list a unilateral Ameri!an operation. =alentine$ D. &011@'. The ;hoeni> ;rogram$ 431

=ietnam$ 01?2. +.S. advisors wor#ed with %overnment of =ietnam !ounterparts to establish a list of those who were a!tive with the )"D and who were vulnerable to assassination. Counterspy$ 3/01A5$ p. 40 -ietnam: Death Squads =ietnam. Counterterror teams a#a ;rovin!ial 7e!onnaissan!e +nits &;7+'. Si> or do-en men !arried out !arefully planned forays$ !apturing or #illing identified !ommunists. Blaufarb$ D.S. &01AA'. The Counterinsurgen!y Era$ pp. 40@(00 =ietnam$ 01?@(15. 9ontagnards re!ruited in early 01?@s by Spe!ial Dor!es to fight =iet Cong. Did not surrender until 0114$ when they yielded weapons to +) for!es in Cambodia and brought to +.S. About ?@@ live in )orth Carolina. ;aul Campbell$ former SD who first Ameri!an to re!ruit them. *ay 7eibold head of =ietnam highlands assistan!e pro<e!t. 9ontagnards live in small apartments around 7aleigh with low( paying <obs. In 0@/01?0 Campbell$ then a SD Sergeant$ sent by CIA to re!ruit 9ontagnards. They to form village se!urity$ but soon being used for long(range re!onnaissan!e and in highly mobile stri#e for!es that hunted =iet Cong for wee#s at a time. 8 e #illed many =ietnamese.8 Arti!le by . Booth. ashington ;ost$ 04/4A/0115 =ietnam$ 01?3. CIA station helped !reate !ensus grievan!e units. CIA funded$ trained and guided !ounter terror teams who per Chief of Station de Silva$ were 8to bring danger and death to =iet Cong fun!tionaries.8 Corn$ D. &011.'. Blond %hostG Ted Sha!#ley and the CIABs Crusades$ p. 0A3 =ietnam$ 01??(A0. ;hoeni> operation designed to help +.S. military rea!h !rossover point$ where dead and wounded e>!eeded =iet CongBs ability to field repla!ements. In April 01?A$ ;resident Cohnson announ!ed formation of Civil :perations and 7evolutionary Development Support &C:7DS' for pa!ifi!ation. 7obert *omer as deputy !ommander of 9AC=(C:7DS. C:7DS budget about E. billion from 01?2(A0. C:7DS the management stru!ture for pa!ifi!ation programs. ;ersonnel both military and !ivilian. By 01A0$ 5@@@ servi!emen$ advisers to A7=)$ pla!ed under C:7DS. 04@@ !ivilians by 01A0. +.S. AID responsible for material aid. State and +SIA also provided personnel. But CIA played the !ru!ial role. C:7DS reinstated !ivi! a!tion teams under name 7evolutionary Development !adre. 7D program formed teams of 31 South =ietnamese$ divided into 5 00(man se!urity squads and 43 !ivi! a!tion !adres. Teams to spend ? months in a village to fulfill 8Eleven !riteria and 12 wor#s for pa!ifi!ation.8 0. Annihilation of ...!adreH 4. Annihilation of wi!#ed village dignitariesH et!. System pla!ed .@$@@@ two(way radios in villages. "and reform failed. &;hotos of ;hoeni> propaganda material'. Teams helped !reate 7egional and ;opular Dor!es &7D/;Ds'. 7uff(puffs$ suffered high !asualties. They represented half of South =ietnamese government for!es$ they had 33(??K of !asualties. They infli!ted 5@K of Communist !asualties. +nderground paramilitary effort !alled ;hoeni>$ whi!h in!luded a 8!ensus grievan!e$8 stay(behind. 6e a!tually a spy. All information fed into intelligen!e !oordination and e>ploitation program. =ietnamese at *omerBs request set up staff that$ with CIA$ was responsible for !oordinating intelligen!e reports on =iet Cong Infrastru!ture. Information from !ensus grievan!e$ military$ poli!e reports. paramilitary units$

in!luding CIABs ;rovin!ial 7e!onnaissan!e +nits and ruff(puffs. Arrestees , those not #illed when !aptured , ta#en to ;rovin!ial Interrogation Centers &;IC'. Also regional prisons and a national !enter. All finan!ed by CIA. ;roblems of !oordination and <ealousy. )umeri!al quotas !reated saying how many =CI to be eliminated ea!h month. Torture used in questioning. 9anning$ 7.$ &ed'$ &0122'. ar in the ShadowsG the =ietnam E>perien!e$ pp. 33(?3 =ietnam$ 01??. In 01?? re!y!led !ounter terrorists !alled ;rovin!ial 7e!onnaissan!e +nits &;7+' and managed by CIA offi!er in C:7DS 7DC/: :ffi!e. =alentine$ D. &011@'. The ;hoeni> ;rogram$ p. 00A =ietnam$ 01?2. CIA issued two handboo#s in Cune 01?2. :ne 8the =iet Cong *ey :rgani-ation Drom Central "evel Down to =illage and 6amlet "evels.8 Se!ond a manual of pro!edures from Saigon to DI:CCs. :ne report said 8as DI:CCs and ;I:CCs have refined data bases$ gained e>perien!e$ and mounted more operations against targeted individuals$ the neutrali-ation rate... over 0@@@ per month for last . months.8 %ia Dinh 8has more than quadrupled monthly rate of #illed$ !aptured and rallied.8 =alentine$ D. &011@'. The ;hoeni> ;rogram$ p. 01@ =ietnam$ 01A0. illiam E. Colby on Culy 01$ 01A0$ before Senate Sub!ommittee testified that CIABs :peration ;hoeni> had #illed 40$32A =ietnamese !iti-ens between Canuary 01?2 and 9ay 01A0. Counterspy$ De!ember 01A2$ p. ?

"ecember 11, 1223 Preemptive Manh!nting $he 'A4s +e, Assassination Program

Preempit e !anhunting" the #$A%s Ne& Assassination Program

by "O/G)A% 0A)#+$'+# The maIor media o"tlets have ignored the CIA?s on)going strategy of mass assassinations as one of the main weapons in 7"sh?s b"rgeoning global war of terror. This is why it came as something of a shock to highbrows and media elites when ,eymo"r /ersh' in a recent article for The (ew Oorker' revealed the existence of what he wrongf"lly referred to as 1a new ,pecial =orces operation1 that is intended to assassinate the people comprising 1the broad middle of the 7a?athist "ndergro"nd.1 This is a half)tr"th at best. To begin with' this is a CIA assassination program' not a ,pecial =orces programL and while /ersh is correct when he says the targets are members of the o"tlawed 7a?ath %arty' he tactf"lly skirts the fact that this assassination program is illegal beca"se it targets civilians not soldiers. Americans have denied these Ira$"i civilians d"e process

in their own co"ntry. 7ased on the word of a single anonymo"s informant' 7a?ath %arty members who have never harmed a single American can be detained indefinitely' tort"red "ntil they rat o"t some colleagres' or become a do"ble agent' or they can be assassinated along with their family' friends and neighbors. And not I"st 7a?ath %arty members' b"t anyone who gets their name on the CIA?s blacklist of political and ideological enemies. %reemptive anh"nting. The (ew %hoenix %rogram

The CIA has concocted vario"s e"phemisms for its long)standing policy of assassinating civilians whose ideas and political beliefs it hates. In a 24 A"ly 233> article for Co"nter%"nch titled (ation of Assassins' I listed some of them. 1targetted kill1 being the most pop"lar' along with ne"trali-e and 1exec"tive action1. I?ve been waiting for the new e"phemism with which the media will ass"age the p"blic and now we have it from disinformation specialist ,eymo"r /ersh. 1%reemptive anh"nting.1 %reemptive anh"nting is the new name for assassination and' according to /ersh #$"oting one of his "s"al anonymo"s so"rces&' the rationale for resorting to this immoral and illegal meas"re is that 1The only way we can win is to go "nconventional. <e?re going to have to play their game. G"errilla vers"s g"errilla. Terrorism vers"s terrorism. <e?ve got to scare the Ira$is into s"bmission.1 This is a textbook description of 1selective terrorism1 as the "ltimate form of psychological warfare' and /ersh is correct in describing %reemptive anh"nting as the rebirth of the CIA?s %hoenix %rogram in ,o"th Vietnam. =or those who are "naware of it' a typical %hoenix %rogram operation occ"rred in =ebr"ary :BFE' when former ,enator 7ob ;errey #now added to the BN:: Investigation team& led a seven) member (avy ,+A! team into Thanh %hong village and m"rdered more than a do-en women and childrenQa war crime for which ;erry received a 7ron-e ,tar. That?s rightQ;errey lied when he got back to camp and reported that he and his boys had killed 2: Viet Cong g"errillas. <e can expect a lot of this in Ira$' Afghanistan' and any other place 7"sh sends the CIA to terrori-e the civilian pop"loation into s"bmission. In Vietnam' ;errey R Company were s"pposedly after the local Comm"nist %arty 0istrict Chief. !ike the 7a?ath %arty in Ira$' the Comm"nist %arty was o"tlawed in ,o"th Vietnan' th"s providing the CIA with the pretext it needed to kill its members. A Vietnamese informant provioded the intelligence that ;errey based his mission on' and' in Ira$' the CIA?s %hoenix assassination teams will rely on paid' anonymo"s Ira$i informants to identify which 7a?ath %arty members will be m"rdered along with all their family' friends' and neighbors. And anyone else the CIA wants killed. That?s rightQterrori-ing the people into s"bmission is the point of %reemptive anh"nting' I"st as it was the point of the CIA?s %hoenix %rogram. As in ;errey?s operation in Thanh %hong' that means killing anyone in any way related to the target. /"ndreds of y !ai massacres occ"rred in

,o"th Vietnam in the name of %hoenix' and starting in Afghanistan and Ira$' the CIA will perpetrate a h"ndred times that many massacres aro"nd the world' in the name of George 7"sh' Ariel ,haron' and the A"daeo)Christian God. *ne final note. /ersh mentions that Israel is g"iding the CIA?s %hoenix %rogram in Ira$' and as everyone knows' the Israelis are the world?s masters of assassination and terrori-ing an entire people into s"bmission. <hat /ersh doesn?t mention is that the blanket of censorship that prevents the American media from critici-ing Israel for its war crimes has now been cast over 7"sh and the CIA' and all the people they "se to con$"er foreigns nations and assassinate people who never did any American any harmQ"ntil the Americans invaded their co"ntry. Compare America?s con$"est of Ira$ with Israeli?s con$"est of %alestine' and yo" begin to "nderstand. In each case the stragey is massive war crimes on the one hand' and targetted kills of inspirational leaders on the other. This devastating one)two p"nch is easier thro"gh the complicity of the corporate media. In this respect both /ersh and The (ew Oorker serve as essential instr"ments of the 7ig !ie that makes %reemptive anh"nting pop"lar and th"s possible. /is story in The (ew Oorker was no mistake' b"t merely a part of the psychological warfare campaign being waged by the 7"sh regime to s"bd"e the resistance of the American p"blic to this awf"l war. 0*6G!A, VA!+(TI(+ is the a"thor of The /otel Tacloban' The %hoenix %rogram' and T0O. /is fo"rth book' The ,trength of the <olf. The =ederal 7"rea" of (arcotics' :B>3):BFE' will be p"blished in ay 2334. /is latest article' 1<hose /omeland ,ec"rity1' appeared in the A"ly 233> iss"e of %entho"se aga-ine. =or information abo"t r. Valentine' and his books and articles' please visit his web sites at www.0o"glasValentine.com and http.NNmembers.a"thorsg"ild.netNvalentine

CIA and Operation Phoenix in Vietnam

by Ralph McGehee, 1995621619
+ntil outlawed in mid A@s CIA dire!tly involved in assassination attempts against Castro of Cuba$ and Congolese leader "umumba. CIA also en!ouraged plots that resulted in assassination of Domini!an 7epubli! ;resident Tru<illo$ South =ietnamese president )go Dinh Diem in ?5 and Chilean 7ene S!hneider in A5. 9ost e>tensive assassination op was :peration ;hoeni> !ondu!ted during latter part of =) war. Twentieth Century Dund. &0114'. The Need to Know: Covert Action and American Democracy$ 25.

=ietnam$ ?3(A@ details re =ietnam. Drom ?3(?2 +.S. and Saigon intel servi!es maintained an a!tive list of =C !adre mar#ed for assassination. ;hoeni> ;rogram for ?1 !alled for 8neutrali-ing8 02@@ a month. About one third of =C targeted for arrest had been summarily #illed. Se!urity !ommittees established in provin!ial interrogation !enters to determine fate of =C suspe!ts$ outside of <udi!ial !ontrols. %reen Berets and navy SEA"s most !ommon re!ruits for ;hoeni> ;rogram. %reen Beret deta!hment B(3A provided admin !over for other intel units. :ne was pro<e!t !herry$ tas#ed to assassinate Cambodian offi!ials suspe!ted of !ollaborating with )=)ese$ and #gb. Another was pro<e!t oa# targeted against svnese suspe!ted !ollaborators. They !ontrolled by spe!ial assistant for !ounterinsurgen!y and spe!ial a!tivities$ whi!h wor#ed with CIA outside of general abrams !ontrol. Stein. C. &0114'$ A Murder in Wartime$ 5?@(0. =ietnam$ ??(A5 ;hoeni> op from 0/?2 thru 3/A0$ C:7DS reported 4@$23A =CI #illed. %vt of =) reported .@$11. from 2/?2 thru mid A0. ;er !ord statisti!s 04..K Deaths !ould be attributed to ;hoeni> ops. *enneth osborn of program said ;hoeni> be!ame a depersonali-ed murder program. A dept of defense analyst thayer$ found that ?0? suspe!ted =CI targeted by ;hoeni> from 0/A@ thru 5/A0 were #illed by ;hoeni> for!es. After war )=)ese foreign minister )guyen Co Tha!h said CIABs assassination program slaughtered far more than the 40$@@@ offi!ially listed by the +.S. In some parts of south 13K of !ommunist !adre assassinated or !ompromised by ;hoeni>. 9anning$ 7.$ &ed'$ &0122'$ War in the Shadows: the Vietnam Experience$ A4. =ietnam$ ?2(A4 +nder ;hoeni> 8se!urity !ommittees8 in provin!ial 8interrogation !enters8 would determine fate suspe!ted )"D. Counterspy spring/summer A2$ 2. =ietnam$ ?1 +nder ;hoeni> in Culy ?1 8=ietnam information notes$8 a state dept publi!ation said target for ?1 elimination of 0$2@@ =CI per month. Dra-ier$ 6. &ed'. &01A2'$ nc!oa"in# the C$A$ 1A. =ietnam$ A5 A!!ording to Defense Dept offi!ial 4?$5?1 South =ietnamese !ivilians #illed under ;hoeni> while op under dire!t +.S. !ontrol &Can ?2 thru Aug A4 '. By same sour!e$ another 55$532 detained without trial. Colby in A5 admitted 4@$32A deaths thru end A0 $ 42$1A2 !aptured$ and 0A$A0A 8rallied8 to Saigon gvt. Thus appro> 5@K targeted individuals #illed. All ;hoeni> stats fail to refle!t +.S. A!tivity after 8offi!ial8 +.S. Control of op abandoned. Counterspy spring/summer A3 2. =ietnam$ A3 Counter(spy maga-ine des!ribes ;hoeni> ;rogram as 8the most indis!riminate and massive program of politi!al murder sin!e the na-i death !amps of world war two.8 Counterspy spring/summer A3 ?. =ietnam$ in 24 E>(;hoeni> operative reveals that sometimes orders were given to #ill +.S. military personnel who were !onsidered se!urity ris#s. 6e suspe!ts the orders !ame not from 8division8$ but from a higher authority su!h as the CIA or the :)I. Covert Action $n%ormation &u!!etin &now Covert A!tion Muarterly' summer 24 34. =ietnam. ;hoeni> ;rogram to neutrali-e =CI &ta> !olle!tors$ supply offi!ers$ politi!al !adre$ lo!al military offi!ials$ et!'. ;lan to send pru or poli!e teams to get in pra!ti!e$

death the frequent result of su!h ops$ some times through assassinations pure and simple. ;owers$ T. &01A1'$ The Man Who Kept the Secret$ 020. =ietnam. ;hoeni> ;rogram too# over 4@$@@@ lives$ ?3(A4 +.S. Congress$Church Committee 'eport. &01A?' B 0 4A. =ietnam$ Culy A0 Colby inserted !hart to 7epresentative 7eid showing that some ?A$424 persons had been neutrali-ed by ;hoeni> ops against =C between ?2(A0 :f these 50 per!ent had been #illed$ 4?K rallied$ and .5K !aptured or senten!ed. Dra-ier$ 6. &ed'. &01A2'. nc!oa"in# the C$$ 02. =ietnam$ ?A(A5 The ;hoeni> ;rogram used the CIABs assassination squads$ the former !ounter terror teams later !alled the provin!ial re!onnaissan!e units &;7+'. Te!hni!ally they did not mar# !adres for assassinations but in pra!ti!e the pruBs anti!ipated resistan!e in disputed areas and shot first. ;eople ta#en prisoner were denoun!ed in Saigon(held areas$ pi!#ed up at !he!#points or !aptured in !ombat and later identified as =C. Sheehan$ ). &0122'$ A &ri#ht Shinin# (ie$ A54. =ietnam$ ;hoeni> ;rogram$ late ?@ early A@ too# over 4@$@@@ lives in =ietnam. +.S. Congress$Church Committee 'eport. &01A?' B 0 4A. =ietnam. ;hung 6oang a#a ;hoeni> ;rogram quotas for units set by #omer for all 4.4 distri!ts. :ne result indis!riminate #illing with every body labeled =CI. ;owers$ T. &01A1'$ The Man Who Kept the Secrets$ 020(4. Confli!t$ li. "aw professor at +niversity of ashington$ Seattle$ 7oy ". ;rosterman$ designed the land reform program the +.S. %overnment promoted in the ;hilippines$ =ietnam$ and El Salvador. In ea!h pla!e the program was a!!ompanied by a rural terror. In =ietnam the ;hoeni> ;rogram #illed .@$@@@ !ivilian between August ?2 and mid(A0H in ;hilippines$ martial lawH in El Salvador$ a state of siege. Covert Action $n%ormation &u!!etin &now Covert A!tion Muarterly' inter 1@ ?1 Consequen!es. =ietnam$ ?A(A@ ;hoeni> a fias!o$ it unmanageable and en!ouraged outrageous abuses. =alentine$ D. &011@'$ The )hoenix )ro#ram$ 545. =ietnam$ A3 a!!ording to Dran# SneppBs Decent $nterva! up to thirty thousand spe!ial poli!e$ CIA and ;hoeni> related =ietnamese employees were left behind. Saigon CIA station managed to pull out only 35A of its 01@@ =ietnamese in!luding !lose to 0@@@ high(level =ietnamese who had built !lose relationships with the agen!y over the years. Covert Action $n%ormation &u!!etin &now Covert A!tion Muarterly' ?(A/A1 .. =ietnam$ ?2(A4 CI ;hoeni> pro<e!t run <ointly CIA and +.S. Army military intel. Counterspy 3/A5 40.

=ietnam$ A3 +.S. military provided appro> ?@@ !ase offi!ers to supplement .@(3@ CIA !ase offi!ers for ;hoeni> ops. Counterspy spring/summer A3 2. =ietnam. The ;hoeni> and the identity !ard programs. =ol#man$ E.$ N Baggett$ B. &0121'$ Secret $nte!!i#ence$ 03@. =ietnam$ ?3(?1 CI/pa!ifi!ation efforts initiated by Dren!h !ulminate in ;hoeni> ;rogram designed to eliminate =iet Cong infrastru!ture. 9ade offi!ial Cune ?2$ ;hoeni> was intensifi!ation of !i ops and involved 8mass imprisonment$ torture and assassination.8 Dor thorough ;hoeni> des!ription seeCountersp 3/A5 4@. =ietnam$ ??(A5 ;hoeni> ;rogram synthesis poli!e and pm programs. CIA managing !ensus grievan!e$ rd !adre$ !ounterterror teams and pi!s. 9ilitary intel wor#ing with mss$ A7=) intel and regional and popular for!es. Aid managing !hieu hoi and publi! safety$ in!luding field poli!e. )eeded to bring altogether under spe!ial poli!e. =alentine$ D. &011@'$ The )hoenix )ro#ram$ 11. =ietnam$ ?? beginning of ;hoeni> ;rogram. "v 402. ;hoeni> to in!rease identifi!ation =C infrastru!ture and passing info to military$ poli!e$ and other elements who were to indu!e defe!tions$ !apture them$ or atta!# them in their strongholds. Colby$ . &0121'. (ost Victory$ 4??. =ietnam$ ?A(A5 In ?A CIA proposed all +.S. Intel agen!ies pool info on =C at distri!t$ provin!e and Saigon levels for e>ploitation. ;rogram first !alled intel !oor and e>ploitation program &i!e>'. ;hoeni> the name of program. Assigned quotas for =C to be neutrali-ed. To fo!us poli!e and intel orgs. Against !ommunist apparatus. Blaufarb$ D.S. &01AA'$ The Counterinsur#ency Era$ 4.5(2. =ietnam$ ?A(A5 Distri!t intel ops !oor !enter &dioo!'. Dien ban !enter a model for all of ;hoeni>. Bldg 0@B > .@B. 9anned by two +.S. soldiers$ 4 !ensus grievan!e$ one rd !adre$ and one spe!ial bran!h. Dioo! intel !learinghouse to review$ !ollate$ and disseminate info. Immediate lo!al rea!tion. Ameri!ans #ept files of sour!es$ =CI and order battle. 7ea!tion for!es 0@@ poli!e$ 0 ;7+ unit$ guides from !ensus grievan!e. 9arines s!reened !ivilian detainees using informants and dioo!Bs bla!#list. =alentine$ D. &011@'$ The )hoenix )ro#ram$ 04?. =ietnam$ ?A 04/4@/?A ;rime 9inister signed dire!tive 21(th. T/vp/m legali-ing ;hung 6oang$ =) !lone of ;hoeni>. =alentine$ D. &011@'$ The )hoenix )ro#ram$ 0.2. =ietnam$ ?A ;hoeni> ;rogram in fledgling stage !on!eived and implemented by CIA. =alentine$ D. &011@'$ The )hoenix )ro#ram$ 0.A. =ietnam$ ?2 ;hoeni> ;rogram statisti!s were phony a bust and a fa#e. DeDorest$ :.$ N Chanoff$ D. &011@'$ S!ow &urn$ 3.(33. =ietnam$ ?1 ;rogram of ?1 !ampaign !alled for elimination of =CI. ;rogram be!ame #nown as ;hung 6oang or ;hoeni>. In ea!h provin!e the !hief established a provin!e

se!urity !ommittee &;SC'. ;SC !ontrolled the npff and sp who maintained provin!e interrogation !enters &pi!s'. Counterspy 3/A5 4@. =ietnam$ A0 CIA had no intention handling over atta!# on =CI to national poli!e !ommand. CIA advisers to spe!ial poli!e advised to begin forming spe!ial intel for!e units &sifu'. 2(9an teams !omposed of . volunteers ea!h from spe!ial poli!e and field poli!e. Sifu targeted at high(level =CI$ as substitutes for pru. They sign CIA planned manage atta!# on =CI thru sb$ while #eeping ;hoeni> inta!t as a way of defle!ting attention. =alentine$ D. &011@'$ The )hoenix )ro#ram$ 510. =ietnam$ A0 In revising ;hoeni> ;rogram &be!ause of all !ommunist penetrations in gvt' first steps to hire southeast asia !omputer asso!iates &managed by a CIA offi!er' to advise 4@@(odd =)ese te!hs to ta#e over 9AC= and C:7DS !omputers. =)ese were folded into big ma!# and ;hung 6oang management info system &phmis'. =alentine$ D. &011@'. The )hoenix )ro#ram$ 5?5. =ietnam$ A4 In report on ;hoeni> effe!tiveness in 1/A4 ;hung 6oang !rossed out and anti(terrorist inserted. The end of ;hoeni>F Some ;hoeni> ops in A5. =alentine$ D. &011@'. The )hoenix )ro#ram .@5$ .@?. =ietnam$ A3 +.S. Still involved in ;hoeni> in A3. ;rogram renamed spe!ial poli!e investigative servi!e &spis'. +.S. provides data pro!essing fa!ilities for spis thru$ Computer S!ien!e Servi!es$ in!. hi!h runs intel thru ma!hines to !lassify and !ollate them and then turns info over to spis. =alentine$ D. &011@'. The )hoenix )ro#ram$ .03. =ietnam. ;hoeni> ;rogram$ resour!es !ontrol program$ !he!#points$ identifi!ation !ard program$ paramilitary poli!e !alled the poli!e field for!e a 0@@ man mobile !ompany at least one assigned to ea!h provin!e. Aid helped upgrade poli!e and developed national poli!e a!ademy$ improved !ommuni!ations and files$ established one two(way radio in every village. Chieu hoi program. 7efugee generation programs. ;rovin!e !oordinating !ommittees supervised !ivi! a!tion on bridges$ roads$ publi! buildings$ agri!ultural e>tension wor#$ medi!al te!hni!ians and more. Blaufarb$ D.S. &01AA'. The Counterinsurgen!y Era$ 40A(2. =ietnam$ ?A(A5 The )hoenix )ro#ram used the CIABs assassination squads$ the former !ounter terror teams later !alled the provin!ial re!onnaissan!e units &;7+'. Te!hni!ally they did not mar# !adres for assassinations but in pra!ti!e the ;7+Bs anti!ipated resistan!e in disputed areas and shot first. ;eople ta#en prisoner were denoun!ed in Saigon(held areas$ pi!#ed up at !he!#points or !aptured in !ombat and later identified as =C. Sheehan$ ). &0122'$ A &ri#ht Shinin# (ie$ A54. =ietnam$ ;hoeni>. 7anelagh$ C. &012?'$ The A#ency .5A(..0. =ietnam$ poli!e. ;ubli! safety in!luded 9i!higan State +niversity program. 7esour!es !ontrol$ effort to regulate movement resour!es both human and material. In!ludes set up !he!#points roads and waterways$ mobile !he!#points. 7esulted in 3?@$@@@ arrests by 01?1. )ational identity registration program. Every =)ese 03 or older must register

and !arry identifi!ation !ard. Dingerprints obtained. :n!e !ompleted program to in!lude fingerprints$ photos and bio data. Surveillan!e of suspe!ts role of spe!ial poli!e bran!h. Sp agents penetrate subversive organi-ations and use intel !olle!tion$ politi!al data and files from !ensus data to separate good from bad. ;a!ifi!ation or ;hoeni> ;rogram. Systemati! effort at intel !olle!tion and e>ploitation. All intel servi!es and Ameri!aBs CIA and military intel orgs. ;ool data from informers and prisoners. ith this info poli!e and provin!ial re!onnaissan!e units ma#e raids in !ontested areas to sei-e or eliminate =CI agents. See *lare$ 9.T. &01A4'$ War Without End$ 4?3 for more death squads. =ietnam$ ??(A0 ;hoeni> op designed to help +.S. 9ilitary rea!h !rossover point$ where dead and wounded e>!eeded =CBs ability to field repla!ements. In ./?A ;res Cohnson announ!ed formation of !ivil ops and revolutionary development support &C:7DS' for pa!ifi!ation. 7. *omer as deputy !ommander of 9AC=(C:7DS. C:7DS budget about E. billion from ?2(A0. C:7DS the management stru!ture for pa!ifi!ation programs. ;ersonnel both military and !ivilian. By A0$ 5@@@ servi!emen$ advisers to A7=)$ pla!ed under C:7DS. 04@@ Civilians by A0. +said responsible for material aid. State and +SIA also provided personnel. But CIA played the !ru!ial role. C:7DS reinstated !ivi! a!tion teams under name revolutionary development !adre. 7d program formed teams of 31 S=)ese$ divided into 5 00(man se!urity squads and 43 !ivi! a!tion !adres. Teams to spend ? months in a village to fulfill 8eleven !riteria and 12 wor#s for pa!ifi!ation.8 0. Annihilation of ...CadreH 4. Annihilation of wi!#ed village dignitariesH et!. System pla!ed .@$@@@ two(way radios in villages. "and reform failed. &;hotos of ;hoeni> propaganda material'. Teams helped !reate regional and popular for!es &rf/pfs'. 7uff(puffs$ suffered high !asualties. They represented half of S=) gvt for!es$ they had 33(??K of !asualties. They infli!ted 5@K of !ommunist !asualties. +nderground pm effort !alled ;hoeni> whi!h in!luded a 8!ensus grievan!e$8 stay(behind. 6e a!tually a spy. All info fed into intel !oordination and e>ploitation program. =)ese at *omerBs request set up staff that with CIA was responsible for !oordinating intel reports on =C infrastru!ture. Info from !ensus grievan!e$ military$ poli!e reports. ;9 units ( in!luding CIABs provin!ial re!onnaissan!e units and ruff(puffs. Arrestees ( those not #illed when !aptured ( ta#en to provin!ial interrogation !enters &pi!'. Also regional prisons and a national !enter all finan!ed by CIA. ;roblems of !oordination and <ealousy. )umeri!al quotas !reated saying how many =CI to be eliminated ea!h month. Torture used in questioning. 9anning$ 7.$ &ed'$ &0122'$ War in the Shadows: the Vietnam Experience$ 33(?3. =ietnam$ A0 illiam E. Colby on <uly 01$ 01A0$ before Senate sub!ommittee testified CIA op ;hoeni> had #illed 40$32A =ietnamese !iti-ens between 0/?2 and 3/A0. In response to a question from mr. 7eid 8do you state !ategori!ally that ;hoeni> has never perpetrated the premeditated #illing of a !ivilian in a non(!ombat situationF8 Colby repliedG 8)o$ I !ould not say that...I !ertainly would not say never.8 Counterspy 04/A2 ?. =ietnam$ ?A Dirst 9AC= alloted ;hoeni> 04? offi!ers and n!os. By end ?A one n!o assigned to ea!h of 0@5 dio!!s then in e>isten!e. All military offi!ers and enlisted men assigned to ;hoeni> ;rogram too# orders from CIA. =alentine$ D. &011@'. The )hoenix )ro#ram$ 0.3.

=ietnam$ ?2(A5 ;hoeni> !i/terror op funded and !overed by +.S. Aid$ C:7DS pa!ifi!ation survey$ publi! employment pro<e!ts$ and other benign agen!ies. Counterspy may A5 44. =ietnam$ A0 0.A Billion dollars go to C:7DS in ;hoeni> ;ro<e!t. Colby refuses !ongressional audit ;hoeni> funds before !ommittee. Counterspy 3/A5 4.. =ietnam$ A0 hen questioned !on!erning una!!ounted(for 0.A Billion dollars whi!h had finan!ed mu!h of !overt aspe!t of ;hoeni> ;rogram$ Ambassador Colby assured house sub!ommittee on foreign ops and govt info$ all main problems has been resolved and Congress !ould rest assured aberrations of brutality would remain at a minimum. 6e did not #now how many inno!ent vi!tims the program had #illed$ maybe 3$@@@$ maybe more. 6e did not have authority to dis!uss reasons why Congress !ould not audit 0.A billions worth of ta>payers funds whi!h went to C:7DS. Counterspy 3/A5 4.. =ietnam$ ?1 Colby rendered due pro!ess obsolete. =CI target bro#en into three !lasses a$ for leaders and party membersH b$ for holders of responsible <obsH !$ for ran#(and file. De!ision ! !ategory to be ignored sin!e ;hoeni> dire!ted at =CI !ommand and !ontrol stru!ture. 6amlet Evaluation System &6ES' e>plained. 6es guesstimate of =CI in 0/?1 was A3$@@@. =alentine$ D. &011@'. The )hoenix )ro#ram$ 4?@. =ietnam$ A0 6ouse sub!ommittee on foreign operations and gvt. Info. investigates ;hoeni>. Colby insists pro<e!t 8respe!table8$ brutality minimi-ed. Estimates 3@@@ #illed. Congress denied audit of ;hoeni> funds. Counterspy may A5 4.. =ietnam$ ?A(A5 CIA developed ;hoeni> ;rogram in ?A to neutrali-eG #ill$ !apture or ma#e defe!t =CI. =CI means !ivilians suspe!ted of supporting !ommunists. Targeted !ivilians not soldiers. ;hoeni> also !alled ;hung 6oang by =)ese. Due pro!ess totally none>istent. S=)ese who appeared on bla!# lists !ould be tortured$ detained for 4 years without trial or #illed. =alentine$ D. &011@'. The )hoenix )ro#ram$ 05. =ietnam$ ?2 ;hoeni> !i/terror program established by ThieuBs presidential de!ree$ literally written by CIA man illiam Colby. De!ree and future authori-ations indi!ated that suspe!ts !ould be arrested without a warrant or !opy of !harges and detained on basis of poli!e dossier heresay eviden!e. :n!e arrested$ suspe!t !ould not !onfront a!!users or see dossier$ was denied bail legal !ounsel$ and was denied a trial or even a hearing. At best oneBs !ase was reviewed by provin!e se!urity !ommittee !omposed of milt and intel offi!ers. +nder ;hoeni> all rights of due pro!ess stripped. Counterspy inter A2 42. Covert Action $n%ormation &u!!etin 05G5$ 0?(0AG?(0@H 0AG.2(.1H 44G4$.$?$0@(4.H 8from ;hoeni> asso!iates to !ivilian(military assistan!e$8 44G02(01H 8from the hessians to the !ontrasG mer!enaries in the servi!e of imperialism$8 44G0@(00. 21 An arti!le by 7ob 7osenbaum from interviews with %eneral Se!ord and Ted 8Blond %host8 Sha!#ley. They give their answers to questions about Iran(Contra$ se!ret war in "aos$ ;hoeni> ;rogram in =ietnam$ CIA(9afia plots of the si>ties. Sha!#ley dis!usses

!harges of opium smuggling in "aos by elements supported by CIA. ;hotos of Se!ord and Sha!#ley. Sha!#ley interview in his ris#(assessment !onsulting firm$ 7osslyn(based 7esear!h Asso!iates International. =anity fair$ 0/1@ A4(AA$ 04?(2$05@(0 =ietnam ?2(A5 Evan ;ar#er$ Cr.$ Cohn 9ason$ and Cohn Tilton all from CIA were men who headed ;hoeni> ;rogram when it supposedly transferred to military and C:7DS. 7oger 9!Carthy said CIA very mu!h involved with ;hoeni>. Corn$ D. &011.'$ &!ond *host: Ted Shac"!ey and the C$A+s Crusades$ 015. =ietnam. Cohn 9urray$ of 6D$ and his wife Delores$ former CIA ops offi!er$ sending letters of dis!losures re Sha!#ley. 6e !overtly !onta!ted illiam 9iller$ staff dire!tor of Chur!h Committee$ and told how Sha!#ley and 6elms in A@ arranged to #eep CIA from being impli!ated in 9y "ai massa!res. &Some eviden!e suggested massa!re related to CIABs ;hoeni> ;rogram.' Corn$ D. &011.'$ &!ond *host: Ted Shac"!ey and the C$A+s Crusades$ 5@4. =ietnam$ ?A 3@ offi!ers and enlisted men invited to <oin !ounter insurgen!y program. Those who a!!epted by CIA <oined as <unior offi!er trainees. 9ost assigned to provin!es as rd!/p or rd!/o advisers and many as ;hoeni> !oordinators. =alentine$ D. &011@'. The )hoenix )ro#ram$ 012. =ietnam$ ?2(?1 7obert *. Brown &later editor of Soldier of Dortune maga-ine' wor#ed with Cames *. Damron$ CIABs pro<e!t !oordinator for the ;hoeni> ;rogram in %ia Dinh provin!e. ;igeon$ 7. &012?'. The So!dier o% ,ortune$ ... =ietnam$ :rrin DeDorest$ with +.S. Air Dor!e spe!ial investigations early on. Coined CIA in ?2 as !hief interrogator 6au )ghia provin!e in bien hoa under !over of :ffi!e of Spe!ial Assistan!e &:SA'. Duties in!luded inspe!tion of pi!s$ training =)ese in interrogation. 9onitoring intel produ!tion. 6e dis!overed pi!s poorly run$ ;hoeni> ;rogram slipshod$ and CIA had been unable generate single agent. +sing methods learned while wor#ing with Capanese national poli!e in identifying$ !ommunist agents$ disregarding CIA methods$ DeDorestBs efforts produ!ed 2@K hard intel in =). 9inni!#$ . &0114'. Spies and )rovacateurs$ 3@(0. training$ 33 Eisenhower establishes publi! safety program whose goal is to train foreign poli!e units in$ among other things$ !ounterinsurgen!y. ?4 ;rogram be!omes :ffi!e of ;ubli! Safety whi!h eventually pro!ures .@@ offi!ers in .3 !ountries and yearly budget 3@ million. 9u!h of ;hoeni> funding and training was thru :ffi!e of ;ubli! Safety. By A3 ops had distributed 4@@ million in equipment foreign poli!e$ trained A@@@T senior poli!e offi!ials$ and trained over 0 million ran# and file poli!e offi!ers worldwide. Counterspy inter A2 41(5@. =ietnam$ A3 Counter(spy maga-ine des!ribes ;hoeni> ;rogram as 8the most indis!riminate and massive program of politi!al murder sin!e the na-i death !amps of world war two.8 Counterspy Spring/Summer A3 ?. =ietnam. Dormer ;hoeni> advisor ayne Cooper said 8:peration ;hoeni> was a unilateral Ameri!an program8$ and *lare !onfirmed by saying 8although most of the

dirty wor# was performed by indigenous operatives$ ;hoeni> was designed$ organi-ed$ finan!ed$ and administered by +.S. authorities.8 Counterspy inter A2 4A. =ietnam. 8;hoeni> demonstrated that the +.S. %overnment through the CIA will !reate$ impose$ and !ondu!t an operation in another !ountry without a semblan!e of a mandate from a given people or their representatives as long as the operation is !onsidered in interest of +.S. governmental ob<e!tives.8 Counterspy inter A2 4A(2. =ietnam$ 31(?1 the SEA"s and the ;hoeni> ;rogram. The Intel Coordination and E>ploitation ;rogram &ICEU' was a <oint 9AC=/CIA op ( forerunner of ;hoeni>. SEA"s helped train =)ese personnel. SEA"s assigned ops deta!hments. SEA"s wor#ed with ;7+s. By ?2$ with prisoner snat!hes$ ambushes$ and in!reasing =C defe!tions$ ICEU program neutrali-ing 2@@ =CI every month. ;hoeni> began A/0/?2. Des!ription of the provin!e intel ops !oordinating !enter &pio!!' and the distri!t &dio!!'. Combatting =CI in urban areas responsibility of national poli!e for!e and poli!e field for!e. SEA"s taught ;7+sin me#ong delta. Des!ription of prus. They the most effe!tive native troops. By end of ?2$ the iv !orps ;7+swere almost entirely advised by seal personnel. Seal advisors a!!ompanied ;7+son average of 03 missions a month. Des!ription of ops. Do!#ery$ *. &0110'. SEA(s in Action$ 0?A(0A?. =ietnam$ ?2(A5 ttwo small groups wrea#ed havo! on the =CI. The ;rovin!ial 7e!onnaissan!e +nits &;7+' and the )avyBs SEA"s. ;7+s and SEA"s often wor#ed together and both #illed many =CI and guerrillas (( the enemy had wrapped itself in the population. Together they were fewer than ?@@@ men. They had a!!ess to the best intel often !oming dire!tly from CIA. ;ru had roots in the !ounterterror teams of the early ?@s. In ?? the !t be!ame prus. Details of the ma#eup and re!ruiting sour!e of the prus. ;7+soften #illed targets. 9ilitary parti!ipation in the pru program was to end in 0@/A@. ;ru was the most effe!tive a!tion arm of the ;hoeni> ;rogram. Details of the SEA"s larger(than(life reputation earned in =). Andrade$ D. &011@'$ Ashes to Ashes$ 0A0(011. =ietnam$ ?3(A4 During )i>onBs first 4 0/4 years$ state department offi!ially admits that the CIA(run ;hoeni> ;rogram murdered or abdu!ted 53$A@2 =)ese !ivilians$ .$25? more than the pentagon !laimed the )"D had assassinated or #idnapped during the same period$ and a monthly in!rease over the 4@@ #illed by the CIA every month under <ohnson. Senator %ravel edition$ &01A0'$ )enta#on )apers v 5@@. =ietnam$ ?3(A5 ;hoeni> ;rogram torture ta!ti!s in!lude rape$ ele!tri! sho!#$ water torture$ hanging from !eiling$ beatings$ in!ar!eration and e>e!ution. Counterspy 3/A5 0?. =ietnam$ ?1(A0 *. Barton :sborn$ ;hoeni> agent$ testified to Congress 8I never #new an individual to be detained as a =C suspe!t who ever lived through an interrogation in a year and a half. +! 00.. )ote says this testimony given before +.S. Congress$ -eari. 503( 540. =ietnam$ A5 8The prime differen!e between the types of intelligen!e provided to the military units and the ;hoeni> !oordinator was that all information going to ;hoeni> was of a politi!al nature ... I was following through on a reported &=C' suspe!t that one of my agents had identified. The man was interrogated at the marine !ounter(

intelligen!e !omple> and I was invited to witness it. As I entered the hoo!h the man was being ta#en out$ dead. 6e died from a si> in!h dowel pushed through his ear and into his brain.8 Barton :sborn$ former ;hoeni> !ase offi!er before Armed Servi!es Committee$ 01A5. Counterspy Spring/Summer A3 A. =ietnam. Colby supervised est of pi!s in ea!h of S=)Bs .. provin!es. Ea!h !enter !onstru!ted with CIA funds. Agen!y personnel dire!ted ea!h !enters op mu!h of whi!h !onsisted of torture !arried out by =) nationals. Coi 4@A. Colby admitted serious abuses !ommitted under ;hoeni>. Dormer intel offi!ers !ame before Congressional !mttees to des!ribe repeated e>amples torture. 9ar!hetti$ =.$ N 9ar#s$ C.D. &01A.'$ The C$A and the Cu!t o% $nte!!i#ence$ 4@A see fn. =ietnam$ ??(A. CIA analyst$ )elson 6. Bri!#man$ on 00/?? produ!ed basi! guidelines for Ithe ;hoeni> ;rogramJ in a memorandum that des!ribed the =CI and suggested whi!h parts of it should be targeted. 6is memo said ran#(and(file members were not legitimate targets 8be!ause they were most often unwilling parti!ipants in the revolution.8 Bri!#man !alled for using all available intelligen!e servi!es to neutrali-e the =CI. 7obert *omer was so impressed he assigned Bri!#man to the revolutionary development offi!e. 6e adopted bri!#manBs suggestion that there was no need to begin a new anti(v!i program$ only that the e>isting programs be brought together and managed by a single bureau. 6e re!ommended the +.S. Agen!ies get their houses in order before bringing in the gvn. Bri!#man 8deserved the !redit8 for the ;hoeni> ;rogram. A program !alled intel !oordination and e>ploitation &i!e>' was the first stru!ture. Evan par#er named dire!tor of i!e> but #omer had full !ontrol. +.S. 9ilitary relu!tantly parti!ipated initially. I!e> offi!ially !reated on A/1/?A$ although basi! stru!ture had been in pla!e a year. Building of distri!t ops and !oordinating !enters &doi!!' whi!h by late ?A were !alled distri!t intel and ops !oordinating !enters &dio!!s'. 9AC= dire!tive 520(.0 statedG 8to !oordinate and give impetus to +.S. and gvn operations...Dire!ted toward elimination of the =C infrastru!ture.8 I!e> pla!ed under !ords. South =ietnamese were unwilling to ta#e program seriously. Andrade$ D. &011@'$ Ashes to Ashes$ 32(A@. =ietnam$ ?A(A4 *. Barton :sbornBs testimony re the ;hoeni> ;rogram before the house !ommittee on government ops$ 2/A0. :sborn !hara!teri-ed program as a 8sterile$ depersonali-ed murder program.8 Andrade$ D. &011@'$ Ashes to Ashes$ >v(>vi. =ietnam$ ?A The ;hoeni> &;hung 6oang' program was offi!ially born on 04/4@/?A when the S=)ese premier issued a de!ree. This differed from ICEU only in offi!ial S=)ese support for the program. Seal(and(sear!h op in Bui Cui village. "77; ambush parties. ;eopleBs self(defense for!es &psdf' started after Tet$ it was a nationwide system of lo!al militias. Andrade$ D. &011@'$ Ashes to Ashes$ A4(20. =ietnam$ ?2(A@ ;I:CCC had e>tensive dossiers on =CI and the !hieu hoi program was the largest produ!er of ;hoeni> intel. 054. A !riti!ism of ;hoeni> was the !overt !ontrol by CIA. Despite influ> of military advisers$ CIA !ontrolled !hain of !ommand and purse strings. Colby$ top man of C:7DS in ?1 had been with CIA. Ameri!an dire!tors of ;hoeni> at national level were all CIA. In A/?1 the system !hanged. 89anagement and support fa!ilities for ;hoeni> were offi!ially transferred from the offi!e of the spe!ial

assistant to the ambassador &osa' &!ia' to 9AC=$ who assumed full responsibility for providing for or arranging monetary and logisti!al support through Ameri!an !hannels.8 Drom Culy ?1 on$ CIA made up only a small part of the program. Details of numbers neutrali-ed and differen!es between CIA and military estimates. The use of dio!! =CI target folders$ a simple prepared set of biographi!al$ operational$ and administrative questions. By the end of 01A@ one hundred thousand !opies had been distributed. A sophisti!ated !omputeri-ed !ollation program !alled the ;hung 6oang 9anagement Info System &;69IS' was implemented. The program !ombined the national poli!e tra!#ing system with =CI info to gear up poli!e for handling both. ;69IS was manned by =ietnamese$ using Ameri!an advisers as trainers. 053(?. Andrade$ D. &011@'$ Ashes to Ashes$ 05.. =ietnam$ ?2 ;resident Thieu with the help of illiam Colby$ *omerBs deputy for C:7DS$ drafted a de!ree that offi!ially san!tioned ;hoeni>/;hung 6oang on A/0/?2. Arti!le 5 was of paramount importan!e (( it defined who was or was not a member of the =CI. Arti!le 5 (( definitionsG the =iet Cong infrastru!ture is all =iet !ong$ politi!al and administrative organi-ations established by the !ommunist party whi!h goes under the name peopleBs revolutionary party$ from the !ities to the !ountryside. The Central :ffi!e of South =ietnam &C:S=)' is the highest level steering organi-ation...And the front for the liberation of South =ietnam &)"DS=)'....=iet Cong military units$ members of mass organi-ations established by the =iet Cong$ !iti-ens for!ed to perform as laborers$ or !ivilians in areas temporarily !ontrolled by the =iet !ong$ are not !lassified as belonging to the =iet Cong infrastru!ture. Definition ad<usted over time. Andrade$ D. &011@'$ Ashes to Ashes$ 2.. =ietnam$ 1. =) re<e!ts visit of e>(CIA !hief Colby$ now a ashington lawyer$ who had planned to visit as a dire!tor of a +.S.(based investment fund. Dund dire!tors had planned to hold a re!eption 9onday. Event !an!eled$ and dire!tors will meet in Bang#o#. Colby was CIABs !hief in Saigon during war and was asso!iated with ;hoeni>$ an op to root out rural support for !ommunist guerrillas via sweeping arrests$ torture and e>e!ution of suspe!ts. Criti!s said most of those #illed were inno!ent peasants. Chica#o Tri.une 04/5/1. 40. =ietnam$ a!!elerated pa!ifi!ation !ampaign$ Culy ?2 Thieu with ColbyBs help issued de!ree est ;hoeni> !ommittees at national$ regional and provin!ial and even distri!t level$ 8to whi!h all the agen!ies involved had to furnish representation.8 Colby$ . &01A2'. -onora.!e Men$ 4?A. =ietnam$ Australia$ =ietnam$ ?4(A5 Australian AATT= teams operated in =) often in CIA ;hoeni> op. QBla!# teamB !ommanded by Ameri!an of australian usually given target figure. 6e pinpointed and bla!# team would go out$ usually dressed in enemyBs gear and the assassination then blamed on =C. Toohey$ B.$ N ;inwill$ . &011@'$ /yster: The Story o% the Austra!ian Secret $nte!!i#ence Service 2A(22. =ietnam$ i!e> intel !oor and e>ploitation 9AC=/!ia program to wor# on =CI with =ietnamese !ooperation. Colby helped devise program whi!h be!ame ;hoeni>. Colby$ . &01A2'$ -onora.!e Men 4?A.

=ietnam$ )ational Se!urity study memo$ ?A(?1 said although ;hoeni> laun!hed in De! ?A$ =ietnamese !ooperation minimal and only after Ameri!an prodding$ Thieu issued a de!ree in Culy ?2 dire!ting networ# to be set up. ;rogram for!ed on =)ese. ;ru supervised$ !ontrolled and finan!ed by Ameri!ans. Dra-ier$ 6. &ed'. &01A2'$ nc!oa"in# the C$A$ 000(043. =ietnam$ ;hoeni> ;rogram most notorious of !ounterinsurgen!y programs. :riginated by robert w. *omer$ who now headed Civilian :perations 7evolutionary Development Staff &C:7DS'$ ;hoeni> designed to root out se!ret =iet!ong infrastru!ture in South =ietnam. 9iller$ ). &0121'. Spyin# %or America5A1. =ietnam$ ;hoeni>$ ?2(A@ In ?1 CIA apparently had atta!# squeamishness and pulled out of C:7DS. Con!luded ;hoeni> inappropriate. It believed )orth had moved away from military engagement to la!ing entire gvt with spies (( possibly as many as 5@$@@@ so ThieuBs gvt !ould be easily overthrown. Barit-$ ". &0123'. &ac"%ire$ 4?1. =ietnam$ ;hoeni> op. Every person who ran program from Saigon assigned to program from CIA. Colby and 4@$@@@ T figure of persons #illed under ;hoeni>$ see fn ag ..@. ;hoeni> %eneral 7anelagh$ C. &012?'$ The A#ency .5?(..0. =ietnam$ ;hoeni> ;rogram$ beginning !ir!a ??(?A C:7DS pa!ifi!ation program. *omer settled on massive intel program on =C who !ould be neutrali-ed by S=) for!es. Dirst !alled ICEU. )ame !hanged to ;hoeni> in ?1 with S=) version phung hoang. 6ad interrogation !enters in ea!h of S=)s 453 distri!ts and .. provin!es$ !ard files and !omputeri-ed inde>es. ;ruBs of 3@ to 0@@ men. In ;hoeni> CIA provided weapons$ paid for Saigon !omputer files$ funded and trained ;7+Bs and passed intel to ;hoeni>. Colby told senate ;hoeni> #illed 4@$32A =CI. hen questions arose re legality Colby retreated and said 2AK #illed in regular military a!tions. Two army lts. Told federal <udge they order to maintain #ill quota 3@ =CI a month. ;rados$ C. &012?'$ )residents+ Secret Wars$ 5@A(50@. =ietnam$ ;hoeni> ;rogram evaluation. 7obert *omer wrote ;hung 6oang has been a small$ poorly managed$ and largely ineffe!tive effort. Clearly ;hoeni> failed to eliminate the infrastru!ture that remained after heavy losses of tet. Ce 4A.(2. Colby !ontinued to see ;hoeni> as !ontributing usefully to atta!# on =C. Blaufarb$ D.S. &01AA'$ The Counterinsur#ency Era$ notes 542. =ietnam$ ;hoeni> ;rogram$ <uly ?1 8=ietnam information notes8 a State Dept publi!ation saysG target for 01?1 !alls for elimination of 0$2@@ =CI per month. Dra-ier$ 6. &ed'. &01A2'. nc!oa"in# the C$A$ 1A. =ietnam$ ;hoeni> ;rogram. ;art of total pa!ifi!ation program of gvt =). Colby testified that in over two and a half years there were 41$@@@ !aptured$ 0A$@@@ defe!ted and 4@$3@@ #illed$ of whi!h 2AK were #illed by regular and paramilitary for!es and 04K by poli!e and similar elements. =ast ma<ority #illed in military !ombat$ fire fights$ or ambushes$ and most of remainder were #illed in poli!e a!tions attempting to !apture

them. 9a<or stress to en!ourage !apture. Borosage$ 7.".$ N 9ar#s$ C. &eds.'. &01A?'$ The C$A ,i!e$ 01@. =ietnam$ ;hoeni> ;rogram. Muotas and indis!riminate #illing of people. CIA !on!eived and organi-ed program and regional and provin!ial offi!ers in !harge were all CIA. Colby a!tually wrote ;hoeni> dire!tive whi!h Thieu was finally pressured into adopting <uly ?2 Colby !on!eded ;hoeni> re!orded deaths of 4@$32A. ;owers$ T. &01A1'. The Man Who Kept the Secrets$ 020(4. =ietnam$ ;hoeni> ;rogram$ ?A(A3 Targets members =CI. ?5A 9ilitary intel advisers assigned to ;hoeni>. 9u!h money given to =)ese poli!e to e>pand detention fa!ilities. ;hoeni> orgG first the distri!t !o ( ordination !enter$ dio!!$ that maintained dossiers on suspe!ted =C. :n!e enough eviden!e person pla!ed on poli!e green list. Suspe!t then <ailed without right to !ivilian trail. In !ordon and sear!h ops all villagers lined up and wal# past poli!e !he!#point. )e>t level provin!e interrogation !enter$ pi!$ staffed by S=)ese$ Ameri!ans and CIA. After interrogation$ suspe!t passed on to provin!e se!urity !ommittee$ !omprised of poli!e !hiefs$ military and poli!e intel and advisors. Dinally suspe!ts !ould be imprisoned under law for 4 years. This one way to neutrali-e. :ther way via ;rovin!ial 7e!onnaissan!e +nits$ ;7+s$ who would #idnap or assassinate agents targeted by dio!!. 6ad Ameri!an advisors from SEA"s$ %reen Berets. :ffi!ial amnesty program !alled !hieu hoi used to !onvin!e =C to surrender. =C !ategori-ed as a$b$ or !. A were #ey members$ ! least impt. )ational poli!e detention !enter pro!essed 02@$@@@ a year. Ameri!an money and effort went into national identifi!ation !ard$ id$ pro<e!t. All =ietnamese over age 03 <ailed if did not !arry a !ard a 7A)D !omputer tra!#ed the 03 million suspe!ts also !ross(lin#ed to 0@ million dossiers and fingerprints. The Dossier issue ?$ 00/25 0.(3. =ietnam$ ;hoeni>$ A4(A5 The D(? program was a defensive measure to bolster ;hung 6oang after the Easter :ffensive. D(? sought to in!rease pressure on the =CI by allowing provin!e !hiefs to move against suspe!ted !adre on the strength of a single report rather then the usual three. ith the !ulmination of the D(? program in early A5$ the ;hoeni> ;rogram !ame to an end. In the spring of A4 phung hoang was absorbed into the national poli!e. The last Ameri!an advisers left =) in de!ember A4. =arious tables$ !ommand stru!ture !harts in appendi>. Andrade$ D. &011@'$ Ashes to Ashes$ 450(430. =ietnam$ ??(A5 ;hoeni> ;rogram synthesis poli!e and pm programs. CIA man managing !ensus grievan!e$ rd !adre$ !ounterterror teams and pi!s. 9ilitary intel wor#ing with mss$ arvn intel and regional and popular for!es. Aid managing !hieu hoi and publi! safety$ in!luding field poli!e. )eeded to bring altogether under spe!ial poli!e. =alentine$ D. &011@'. The )hoenix )ro#ram$ 11. =ietnam$ ?A(A5 CIA developed ;hoeni> ;rogram in ?A to neutrali-eG #ill$ !apture or ma#e defe!t =CI. =CI means !ivilians suspe!ted of supporting !ommunists. Targeted !ivilians not soldiers. ;hoeni> also !alled phung hoang by =)ese. Due pro!ess totally none>istent. S=)ese who appeared on bla!# lists !ould be tortured$ detained for 4 years without trial or #illed. =alentine$ D. &011@'. The )hoenix )ro#ram$ 05.

=ietnam$ ?2(A4 )"D a!!ording to )i>on adm de!imated during Tet :ffensive$ remainder by ;hoeni> ;rogram. )vese offi!er reported ;hoeni> resulted in loss of thousands of our !adres. ;roof in 4 remaining offensives. In A4 and in A3 they did not rely on guerrillas. Barit-$ ". &0123'$ &ac"%ire$ 4A5. =ietnam$ ?2 ;hoeni> ;rogram quota of 02@@ neutrali-ations per month. =iet Cong Infrastru!ture system &v!iis' fed 5@@@ names =CI into !omputer at !ombined intel !enter politi!al order battle se!tion. Beginning of !omputeri-ed bla!#list. In Saigon DIA$ DBI and CIA used !omputers. +ntil A@ !omputeri-ed bla!#list a unilateral Ameri!an op. =alentine$ D. &011@'. The )hoenix )ro#ram$ 431.

The Phoenix Program

a book by 0o"glas Valentine Ama-on

Extract
The y !ai assacre and The 8Tiger Cages9

Quotes
As for the American role' according to "ldoon' 1yo" can5t have an American there all the time watching these things.1 1These things1 incl"ded. rape' gang rape' rape "sing eels' snakes' or hard obIects' and rape followed by m"rderL electrical shock #1the 7ell Telephone /o"r1& rendered by attaching wires to the genitals or other sensitive parts of the body' like the tong"eL 1the water treatment1L 1the airplane'1 in which a prisoner5s arms were tied behind the back and the rope looped over a hook on the ceiling' s"spending the prisoner in midair' after which he or she was beatenL beatings with r"bber hoses and whipsL and the "se of police dogs to ma"l prisoners. All this and more occ"rred in %ICs. p.ED 1(ow everyone knows abo"t the airborne interrogation@taking three people "p in a chopper' taking one g"y and saying. Talk'5 then throwing him o"t before he even gets the chance to open his mo"th. <ell' we wrapped det [detonator] cord aro"nd their necks and wired them to the detonator box. And basically what it did was blow their heads off. The interrogator wo"ld tell the translator' "s"ally a ,o"th Vietnamese intelligence officer' 5Ask him this.5 /e5d ask him' 5<ho gave yo" the g"nM5 And the g"y wo"ld start to answer' or maybe he wo"ldn5t@maybe he5d resist @b"t the general idea was to waste the first two. They planned the snatches that way. %ick "p this g"y beca"se we5re pretty s"re he5s VC cadre@these other two g"ys I"st r"n errands for him. *r maybe they5re nobodyL Tran' the farmer' and his brother (g"yen. 7"t bring in two. %"t them in a row. 7y the time yo" get to yo"r man' he5s talking so fast yo" got to pop the weasel I"st to sh"t him "p.1 After a moment5s silence he added' 1I g"ess yo" co"ld say that we wrote the book on terror.1 %age F> #hardcover edition&

*n A"g"st 2D' :BC3' an article appeared in The (ew Oork Times hinting that the CIA' thro"gh %hoenix' was responsible for y !ai. The story line was advanced on *ctober :4' when defense attorneys for 0avid itchell @ a sergeant acc"sed and later cleared of machine)g"nning scores of Vietnamese in a drainage ditch in y !ai @ citing %hoenix as the CIA?s 8systematic program of assassination'9 named +van %arker as the CIA officer who 8signed doc"ments' certain blacklists'9 of Vietnamese to be assassinated in y !ai. <hen we spoke' %arker denied the charge. ......As in any large)scale %hoenix operation' two of Task =orce 7arker?s companies cordoned off the hamlet while a third one @ Calley?s @ moved in' clearing the way for ;oto"c and ,pecial 7ranch officers who were 8bro"ght to the field to identify VC from among the detained inhabitants.9 .....The CIA' via %hoenix' not only perpetrated the y !ai massacre b"t also concealed the crime. ....As Aeff ,tein said' 8The first thing yo" learn in the Army is not competence' yo" learn corr"ption. And yo" learn Pto get along' go along.?9 6nfort"nately not everyone learns to get along. *n ,eptember >' :BEE' Hobert T?,o"vas was apparently shot in the head by his girl friend' after an arg"ment over a bottle of vodka. The two were homeless' living o"t of a van they had parked "nder a bridge in %ittsb"rgh. T?,o"vas was a Vietnam veteran and a participant in the y !ai massacre. .....T?,o"vas?s attorney' George 0avis' traveled to 0a (ang in :BC3 to investigate the massacre and while there was assigned as an aide a Vietnamese colonel who said that the massacre was a %hoenix operation and that the p"rpose of %hoenix was 8to terrori-e the civilian pop"lation into s"bmission.9 0avis told me. 8<hen I told the people in the <ar 0epartment what I knew and that I wo"ld attempt to obtain all records on the program in order to defend my client' they agreed to drop the charges.9 .....7art *sborn #whose agent net ,tein inherited& is more specific. 8I never knew in the co"rse of all those operations any detainee to live thro"gh his interrogation'9 *sborn testified before Congress in :BC:. 8They all died. There was never any reasonable establishment of the fact that any one of those individ"als was' in fact' cooperating with the VC' b"t they all died and the maIority were wither tort"red to death or things like thrown o"t of helicopters.9 [book extract] The y !ai assacre and The 8Tiger Cages9 by 0o"glas Valentine 7"t the American establishment and media denied it then' and contin"e to deny it "ntil today' beca"se %hoenix was a genocidal program )) and the CIA officials' members of the media who were complicit thro"gh their silence' and the red)blooded American boys who carried it o"t' are all war criminals. As ichael Hatner a lawyer at the Center for Constit"tional Hights told Co"nter%"nch. 1;errey sho"ld be tried as a war criminal. /is actions on the night of =ebr"ary 24)2D' :BFB when the seven man (avy ,eal "nit which he headed killed approximately twenty "narmed Vietnamese civilians' eighteen of whom were women and children was a war crime. !ike those who m"rdered at y !ai' he too sho"ld be bro"ght into the dock and tried for his crimes.1 ......A famo"s %hoenix operation' known as the y !ai assacre' was proceeding along smoothly' with a grand total of D34 Vietnamese women and children killed' when a soldier named /"gh Thompson in a helicopter g"nship saw what was happening. Hisking his life to preserve that 1social contract'1 Thomson landed his helicopter between the mass m"rderers and their victims' t"rned his machine g"ns on his fellow Americans' and bro"ght the carnage to a

halt. .....It was the CIA that forced soldiers like ;errey into %hoenix operations' and the hidden hand of the CIA lingers over his war crime. ;errey even "ses the same rationale offered by CIA officer 0e,ilva. According to ;errey' 1the Viet Cong were a tho"sand per cent more r"thless than1 the ,eals or 6.,. Army. [233:] 7ob ;errey' CIA <ar Crimes' And The (eed =or A <ar Crimes Trial by 0o"glas Valentine

The !' (ai !assacre an) The *Tiger #ages+

+xcerpt from The %hoenix %rogram by 0o"glas Valentine

The !' (ai !assacre

The y !ai massacre was first reported in arch :BFB' one f"ll year after the event. In April :BFB' beca"se of congressional $"eries' the case was given to the Army inspector general' and in A"g"st Army Chief of ,taff <illiam <estmoreland t"rned the case over to the Army?s Criminal Investigation 0ivision #CI0&. In (ovember :BFB ,eymo"r /ersh broke the story' telling how D34 Vietnamese civilians were massacred by members of a 6.,. infantry company attached to a special battalion called Task =orce 7arker. Ten days after /ersh broke the story' <estmoreland ordered General <illiam %eers to cond"ct an official in$"iry. +van %arker contended to me that %eers got the Iob beca"se he was not a <est %oint grad"ate.2 /owever' %eers?s close ties to the CIA may also have been a factor. In <orld <ar II' %eers had commanded *,, 0etachment :3:' in which capacity he had been +van %arker?s boss. In the early :BD3s he had been the CIA?s chief of training and its station chief in Taiwan' and as ,AC,A in :BFF %eers had worked with the CIA in form"lating pacification policy. /aving had several commands in Vietnam' he was well aware of how the war was being cond"cted. 7"t the most concl"sive evidence linking %eers to the CIA is the report he s"bmitted in arch :BC3' which was not made available to the p"blic "ntil :BC4 and which caref"lly avoided implicating the CIA. The perf"nctory trials that followed the %eers in$"iry amo"nted to slaps on the wrist for the defendants and f"elled r"mors of a cover)"p. *f the thirty people named in the report' charges were bro"ght against sixteen' fo"r were tried' and one was convicted. <illiam Calley?s sentence was $"ickly red"ced' and in conservative $"arters he was venerated as a hero and scapegoat. !ikewise' the men in Calley?s platoon were exc"sed as victims of VC terror and good soldiers acting "nder orders. *f nearly two tho"sand Americans s"rveyed by Time maga-ine' FD percent denied being "pset. Oet' if most Americans were willing to accept the massacre as necessary to ens"re their sec"rity' why the cover)"pM <hy was the massacre portrayed as an isolated incidentM *n A"g"st 2D' :BC3' an article appeared in The (ew Oork Times hinting that the CIA' thro"gh %hoenix' was responsible for y !ai. The story line was advanced on *ctober :4' when defense attorneys for 0avid itchell @ a sergeant acc"sed and later cleared of machine)g"nning scores

of Vietnamese in a drainage ditch in y !ai @ citing %hoenix as the CIA?s 8systematic program of assassination'9 named +van %arker as the CIA officer who 8signed doc"ments' certain blacklists'9 of Vietnamese to be assassinated in y !ai.> <hen we spoke' %arker denied the charge. A defense re$"est to s"bpoena %arker was denied' as was a re$"est to view the y !ai blacklist. *"tside the co"rtroom CIA lawyer Aohn Greaney insisted that the agency was 8absol"tely not9 involved in y !ai. <hen asked if the CIA had ever operated in y !ai' Greaney replied' 8I don?t know.9 7"t as has been established in this book' the CIA had one of its largest contingents in S"ang (gai %rovince. [,ee. ap of ,o"th Vietnam ) pop)"p window] +specially active were its Cens"s Grievance cadre' directed by the ,on Tinh 0istrict H0 Cadre intelligence chief' /o (goc /"i' whose V(S00 cadres were in y !ai on the day prior to the massacre. A Catholic from (orth Vietnam' /"i reportedly called the massacre 8a small matter.9 4 To "nderstand why the massacre occ"rred' it helps to know that in arch :BFE cordon and search operations of the type Task =orce 7arker cond"cted in y !ai were how H0 Cadre intelligence officers contacted their secret agents. The %eers report does not mention that' or that in arch :BFE the forty)one H0 teams operating in S"ang (gai were channeling information on VCI thro"gh /"i to the CIA?s paramilitary adviser' who shared it with the province %hoenix coordinator. The %hoenix coordinator in S"ang (gai %rovince at the time of the y !ai massacre was Hobert 7. Hamsdell' a seventeen)year veteran of the Army CI0 who s"bse$"ently worked for ten years as a private investigator in =lorida. Hamsdell was hired by the CIA in :BFC. /e was trained in the 6nited ,tates and sent to Vietnam on =ebr"ary 4' :BFE' as the ,pecial 7ranch adviser in S"ang (gai %rovince. Hamsdell' who appeared incognito before the %eers panel' told newsmen that he worked for the Agency for International 0evelopment. In Cover)"p ,eymo"r /ersh tells how in =ebr"ary :BFE Hamsdell began 8ro"nding "p residents of S"ang (gai City whose names appeared on %hoenix blacklists.9D +xplained Hamsdell. 8After Tet we knew who many of these people were' b"t we let them contin"e to f"nction beca"se we were controlling them. They led "s to the VC sec"rity officer for the district. <e wiped them o"t after Tet and then went ahead and picked "p the small fish.9F The people who were 8wiped o"t'9 /ersh explains' were 8p"t to death9 by the %hoenix ,pecial %olice.9 C Hamsdell 8simply eliminated everyone who was on those lists'9 said Gerald ,to"t' an Army intelligence officer who fed Hamsdell names. 8It was recrimination.9 JE Hecrimination for Tet' at a minim"m.
J In A"g"st :BFF the CIA?s paramilitary adviser in S"ang (gai' Heed /arrison' "nwittingly sent 6,AI0 employee 0wight *wen into an amb"sh o"tside T" (ghia. The g"erillas who killed yo"ng *wen were from the =orty)eighth VC 7attalion.

6nfort"nately' according to Handolph !ane @ the S"ang (gai %rovince ACV intelligence adviser @ Hamsdell?s victims 8were not Vietcong.9B This fact is corroborated by Aeffrey ,tein' a

corporal working "ndercover for the D2Dth IG' r"nning agent nets in S"ang (am and so"thern Th"a Thien provinces. According to ,tein' the V(S00 was a Vietnamese militarist party that had a 8world fascist allegiance and wanted to overthrow the Vietnamese government from the rightT The people they were naming as Comm"nists were left)wing 7"ddhists' and that information was going to the %hoenix program. <e were being "sed to assassinate their political rivals.9 :3 Thro"gh the ,on Tinh 0I*CC' %hoenix Coordinator Hamsdell passed Cens"s Grievance) generated intelligence to Task =orce 7arker' estimating 8the 4Eth 7attalion at a strength of 4D3 men.9 The %eers report' however' said that 43 VC at most were in y !ai on the day prior to arch :F and that they had left before Task =orce 7arker arrived on the scene. :: Hamsdell told the %eers panel' 8Very frankly' anyone that was in that area was considered a VC, [Vietcong s"spect]' beca"se they co"ldn?t s"rvive in that area "nless they were sympathi-ers.9 :2 *n the basis of Hamsdell?s information' Task =orce 7arker?s intelligence officer' Captain ;oto"c' told !ie"tenant Colonel =rank 7arker that 8only VC and active VC sympathi-ers were living [in y !ai and y ;he].9 7"t' ;oto"c said' beca"se leaflets were to be dropped' 8civilians wo"ld be o"t of the hamlets...by 3C33 ho"rs.9 :> %hoenix Coordinator Hamsdell then provided ;oto"c with a blacklist of VCI s"spects in y !ai' along with the l"dicro"s notion that all 8sympathi-ers9 wo"ld be gone from the hamlet by early morning' leaving 4D3 hard)core VC g"erillas behind. Oet 8the link between Hamsdell and the poor intelligence for the :F arch operation was never explored by the %eers %anel.9 :4 As in any large)scale %hoenix operation' two of Task =orce 7arker?s companies cordoned off the hamlet while a third one @ Calley?s @ moved in' clearing the way for ;oto"c and ,pecial 7ranch officers who were 8bro"ght to the field to identify VC from among the detained inhabitants.9 :D As /ersh notes parenthetically' 8,hortly after the %hoenix blacklist was sharply red"ced.9 :F y !ai 4 operation' the n"mber of VCI on the

In an "nsigned' "ndated memo on %hoenix s"pplied by Aack' the genesis of the blacklist is described as follows. There had been a rel"ctance to exploit available so"rces of information in the hamlet' village and district. It was' therefore' s"ggested that effective Cordon and ,earch operations m"st rely on all locally available intelligence in order to deprive the Viet Cong of a sanct"ary among the pop"lation. It was in this context that caref"lly prepared blacklists were made available. The blacklists were f"rnished to assist the Allied operational "nits in searching for specifically identified people and in screening captives or local personnel held for $"estioning. The information for the blacklists was prepared by the %olice ,pecial 7ranchJ in conI"nction with intelligence collected from the %rovince Interrogation Centers.
J In A"ne :BEE S"ang (gai ,pecial 7ranch chief ;ie" participated in a Vatican ceremony which elevated Catholics killed in Vietnam to the stat"s of martyrs.

;oto"c was charged by the %eers panel with concealing evidence and falsifying reports' with having 8a"thori-ed the killing of at least one VC s"spect by members of the (ational %olice'9 and with having 8committed the offense of maiming by c"tting off the finger of a VC s"spect.9 :C

The CIA' via %hoenix' not only perpetrated the y !ai massacre b"t also concealed the crime. The %eers panel noted that 8a Cens"s Grievance Cadreman of ,on y Village s"bmitted a written report to the Cens"s Grievance chief' S"ang (gai' on :E arch :BFE'9 indicating that 8a fierce battle with VC and local g"errillas9 had res"lted in 42C civilian and g"errilla deaths' 2C in y !ai and 433 in the nearby hamlets of Th"an Oen and 7inh 0ongT:E The appearance of this report coincided with the release by Hobert Thompson of a 8capt"red9 doc"ment' which had been 8mislaid9 for nineteen months' indicating that the C"c (ghien C"" had assassinated 2'C4E civilians in /"e d"ring Tet. The only person named as having received the Cens"s Grievance report is !ie"tenant Colonel <illiam G"inn' who testified in ay :BFB that he 8co"ld not recall who specifically had given it to him.9 In 0ecember :BFB G"inn' when shown a copy of the Cens"s Grievance report' 8ref"sed f"rther to testify and accordingly' it was not possible to ascertain whether the :E arch Cens"s Grievance report was in fact the one which he recalled having received.9:B <ith that the matter of the Cens"s Grievance report was dropped. The y !ai cover)"p was assisted by the ,on Thinh 0istrict adviser' aIor 0avid Gavin' who lost a report written on April :: by Tran (goc Tan' the ,on Tinh district chief. Tan?s report named the D34 people killed at y !ai' and Tan said that 8he disc"ssed [the report] with Gavin9 b"t that 8Gavin denies this.9 ,hortly thereafter aIor Gavin became !ie"tenant Colonel Gavin.
23

The +leventh 7rigade commander dismissed Tan?s charges as 8baseless propaganda.92: 7arker?s afteraction report listed no civilian deaths. Civilian deaths in ,o"th Vietnam from :BFD "ntil :BC> are estimated at :.D millionL none is reported in 6.,. military afteraction reports. The %eers panel cited 8evidence that at least at the S"ang (gai %rovince and ,on Tinh 0istrict levels' and possibly at 2nd AHV( 0ivision' the ,enior 6.,. military advisors aided in s"ppressing information concerning the massacre.9 22 Task =orce 7arker commander !ie"tenant Colonel 7arker was killed in a helicopter crash on A"ne :>' :BFE' while traveling back to y !ai as part of an investigation ordered by the S"ang (gai %rovince chief' Colonel ;hien. ;hien is described 8as a big time crook9 and a V(S00 politico who 8had a family in /"e9 and was afraid the VC 8were going to make another /"e o"t of S"ang (gai.9 %rovince Chief ;hien and the dep"ty province senior advisor' !ie"tenant Colonel G"inn' both 8believed that the only way to win the war was to kill all Viet Cong and Viet Cong sympathi-ers.9 2> The last piece in the y !ai p"--le concerned Hobert /aeberle and Aay Hoberts' Army reporters assigned to Task =orce 7arker. After the massacre Hoberts 8prepared an article for the brigade newspapers which omitted all mention of war crimes he had observed and gave a false and misleading acco"nt of the Task =orce 7arker operation.9 Hoberts was charged by the %eers panel with having made no attempt to stop war crimes he witnessed and for failing to report the

killings of noncombatants. /aeberle was cited by the panel for withholding photographic evidence of war crimes and for failing to report war crimes he had witnessed at y !ai. As Aeff ,tein said' 8The first thing yo" learn in the Army is not competence' yo" learn corr"ption. And yo" learn Pto get along' go along.?9 24 6nfort"nately not everyone learns to get along. *n ,eptember >' :BEE' Hobert T?,o"vas was apparently shot in the head by his girl friend' after an arg"ment over a bottle of vodka. The two were homeless' living o"t of a van they had parked "nder a bridge in %ittsb"rgh. T?,o"vas was a Vietnam veteran and a participant in the y !ai massacre. T?,o"vas?s attorney' George 0avis' traveled to 0a (ang in :BC3 to investigate the massacre and while there was assigned as an aide a Vietnamese colonel who said that the massacre was a %hoenix operation and that the p"rpose of %hoenix was 8to terrori-e the civilian pop"lation into s"bmission.9 0avis told me. 8<hen I told the people in the <ar 0epartment what I knew and that I wo"ld attempt to obtain all records on the program in order to defend my client' they agreed to drop the charges.9 2D Indeed' the y !ai massacre was a res"lt of %hoenix' the 8Ierry)b"ilt9 co"nterterror program that provided an o"tlet for the repressed fears and anger of the psyched)"p men of Task =orce 7arker. 6nder the aegis of ne"trali-ing the infrastr"ct"re' old men' women' and children became the enemy. %hoenix made it as easy to shoot a Vietnamese child as it was to shoot a sparrow in a tree. The amm"nition was fa"lty intelligence provided by secret agents harboring gr"dges @ in violation of the agreement that Cens"s Grievance intelligence wo"ld not be provided to the police. The trigger was the blacklist. As +d "rphy said' 8%hoenix was far worse than the things attrib"ted to it.9 Indeed' the range of transgressions generated by %hoenix was all)encompassing b"t was most evident in its post) apprehension aspect. According to Aeff ,tein' the CIA 8wo"ld direct the %H6 teams to go o"t and take care of a partic"lar target...either capt"re or assassination' or kidnapping. ;idnapping was a common thing that they liked to do. They really liked the whole Aohn <ayne bit @ to go in and capt"re someone at night. ... They?d p"t him in one of these garbage collection type bins @ and the helicopter wo"ld pick "p the bin and fly him off to a regional interrogation center. 8I think it?s common knowledge what goes on at the interrogation center'9 ,tein writes. 8It was common knowledge that when someone was picked "p their lives were abo"t at an end beca"se the Americans most likely felt that' if they were to t"rn someone like that back into the co"ntryside it wo"ld I"st be like m"ltiplying (!= followers.9 2F 7art *sborn #whose agent net ,tein inherited& is more specific. 8I never knew in the co"rse of all those operations any detainee to live thro"gh his interrogation'9 *sborn testified before Congress in :BC:. 8They all died. There was never any reasonable establishment of the fact that any one of those individ"als was' in fact' cooperating with the VC' b"t they all died and the maIority were wither tort"red to death or things like thrown o"t of helicopters.9 2C

The *Tiger #ages+

*ne of Aohn /art?s original IC+U charges was to develop a means of containing within the GV(?s I"dicial system the explosion of civilian detainees. 7"t as (elson 7rickham explained' no one wanted to get the name of the Aailer of Vietnam' and no agency ever accepted responsibility. ,o another o"tcome of %hoenix was a prison system filled to overflowing. It was not "ntil April of :BC3' when ten Vietnamese st"dents p"t themselves on display in a room in the ,aigon College of Agric"lt"re' that treatment of political prisoners gained the attention of the press. The st"dents had been tried and convicted by a military field co"rt. ,ome were in shock and being fed intraveno"sly. ,ome had had bamboo splinters shoved "nder their fingernails. *ne was deaf from having had soapy water po"red in his ears and his ears po"nded. The women st"dents had been raped as well as tort"red. The c"lprits' claims 0on !"ce in his book /ostages of <ar' were ,aigon?s =irst 0istrict police' who "sed false doc"ments and signat"res to prove g"ilt' and "sed tort"re and dr"gs to extract confessions. The case of the st"dents prompted two congressmen to investigate conditions at Con ,on %rison in A"ly :BC3. Initially' Hod !andreth advised station chief ,hackley not to allow the congressmen to visit' b"t ,hackley saw denial as a tacit admission of CIA responsibility. ,o !andreth passed the b"ck to 7"-- Aohnson at the Central %acification and 0evelopment Co"ncil. Thinking there was nothing to hide' Aohnson got the green from light General ;hiem. /e then arranged for Congressmen A"g"st"s /awkins and <illiam Anderson and their aide Tom /arkins to fly to Con ,on accompanied by %"blic ,afety Adviser =rank <alton. Acting as interpreter for the delegation was 0on !"ce' a former director of the International Vol"nteer ,ervice who had been living in Vietnam since :BDB. %rison reform advocate !"ce had gained the tr"st of many Vietnamese nationalists' one of whom told him where the notorio"s tiger cages #tiny cells reserved for hard)core VCI "nder s"pervision of (g"yen inh Cha"' 8the Heformer9& were located at Con ,on %rison. 6pon arriving at Con ,on' !"ce and his ento"rage were greeted by the prison warden' Colonel (g"yen Van Ve. /arkins presented Ve with a list of six prisoners the congressmen wished to visit in Camp =o"r. <hile inside this section of the prison' !"ce located the door to the tiger cages hidden behind a woodpile at the edge of a vegetable garden. Ve and <alton protested this depart"re from the g"ided to"r' their exclamations prompting a g"ard inside the tiger cage section to open the door' revealing its contents. The congressmen entered and saw stone compartments five feet wide' nine feet long' and six feet high. Access to the tiger cages was gained by climbing steps to a catwalk' then looking down between iron grates. =rom three to five men were shackled to the floor in each cage. All were beaten' some m"tilated. Their legs were withered' and they sc"ttled like crabs across the floor' begging for food' water' and mercy. ,ome cried. *thers told of having lime b"ckets' which sat ready above each cage' emptied "pon them. Ve denied everything. The lime was for whitewashing the walls' he explained' and the prisoners were evil people who deserved p"nishment beca"se they wo"ld not sal"te the flag. 0espite the fact that Congress f"nded the GV(?s 0irectorate of Corrections' <alton acc"sed the congressmen of interfering in Vietnamese affairs. Congressman /awkins expressed the hope that American %*<s were being better treated in /anoi.

The extent of the tiger cage flap was a brief article in The (ew Oork Times that was rep"diated by 6.,. a"thorities. In ,aigon the secret police cornered !"ce?s landlady and the 6.,. +mbassy acc"sed !"ce of being a Vietcong agent. Hod !andreth approached 7"-- Aohnson with the idea of circ"lating evidence of !"ce?s alleged homosex"ality' b"t Aohnson nixed the idea. <hen !"ce began writing articles for Tin ,ang' all iss"es were promptly confiscated and his press card was revoked. =inally' !"ce was expelled from Vietnam in ay :BC:' after his apartment had been ransacked by secret policemen searching for his records. =ort"nately !"ce had mailed his notes and doc"ments to the 6nited ,tates' and he later compiled them in /ostages of <ar. ichael 0rosnin' in the ay >3' :BCD iss"e of (ew Times' $"otes %hoenix legal adviser Hobert Go"ld as saying' 8I don?t know for s"re' b"t I g"ess Colby was covering "p for Con ,on too. (othing really was changed after all that p"blicity... the inmates who were taken o"t of the Tiger Cages were simply transferred to something called ?cow cages'? which were even worse. Those were barbed wire cells in another part of the camp. The inmates were shackled inside them for months and left paraly-ed. I saw loads of spidery little g"ys @ they co"ldn?t stand and they co"ldn?t walk' b"t had to move aro"nd on little wooden pallets.92E According to Go"ld' 8It was a well known smirking secret in certain official circles that with all the p"blicity abo"t the Tiger Cages' no one ever fo"nd o"t abo"t the cow cages.9 2B Added Go"ld. 8The responsibility for all this is on the Americans who p"shed the program. <e finally made some paper reforms' b"t it didn?t make any difference. The %rovince ,ec"rity Committees did whatever the hell they wanted and the press"re o"r Pne"trali-ation? $"otas p"t on them meant they had to sentence so many people a month regardless. And God' if yo" ever saw those prisons.9 >3 In /ostages of <ar 0on !"ce refers to the GV( as a 8%rison Hegime9 and calls %hoenix a 8microcosm9 of the omnipotent and perverse 6.,. infl"ence on Vietnamese society. /e blames the program for the deterioration of val"es that permitted tort"re' political repression' and assassination. 8<hile few Americans are directly involved in the program'9 !"ce writes' 8%hoenix was created' organi-ed' and f"nded by the CIA. The district and provincial interrogation centers were constr"cted with American f"nds' and provided with American advisers. S"otas were set by Americans. The national system of identifying s"spects was devised by Americans and "nderwritten by the 6.,. Informers are paid with 6, f"nds. American tax dollars have covered the expansion of the police and paramilitary "nits who arrest s"spects.9 >: Th"s' !"ce writes' 8the 6.,. m"st share responsibility for the nat"re of the ,aigon government itself. It is a government of limited scope whose very essence is dictated by American policy' not Vietnamese reality.9>2 7"t the CIA absolved itself of responsibility' saying that ab"ses occ"rred in the absence of 6.,. advisers and that oversight was impossible. /owever' if the CIA had accepted responsibility' it wo"ld have n"llified the pla"sible denial it had so caref"lly c"ltivated. !ike %hoenix' the prison system was intentionally 8Ierry)b"ilt'9 enabling sadists to fall thro"gh the gaping holes in the safety net. <rites !"ce. 8Ab"ses of I"stice are not accidental b"t an integral part of the %hoenix %rogram.9 =or example' 8The widespread "se of tort"re d"ring interrogation can be explained by the admissibility of confession as evidence in co"rt...and by the fact that local officials are "nder

press"re from ,aigon to sentence a specific n"mber of high level VCI officials each month.9 /e adds that 8%hoenix was named after the all seeing mythical bird which selectively snatches its prey @ b"t the techni$"es of this operation are anything b"t selective. =or many Vietnamese' the %h"ng /oang program is a constant menace to their lives.9 >>

Notes
:. cColl"m interview. 2. %arker interview. >. 8Calley 0efense Asks 0isclos"re of Top),ecret 0ata on ,ong y'9 The (ew Oork Times' A"g"st 2D' :BC3 4. <all interview. D. ,eymo"r /ersh' Cover)6p #(ew Oork. Handom /o"se' :BC2& p. EC. F. /ersh' p. EE. C. /ersh' p. EE. E. /ersh' p. EE. B. /ersh' p. EE. :3. yra ac%herson' !ong Time %assing #(ew Oork. ,ignet' :BE4&' p. F2D. ::. Aoseph Goldstein' The y !ai assacre and Its Cover)"p #(ew Oork. The =ree %ress' :BCF&' p. 2DF. :2. /ersh' p. B>. :>. /ersh' p. B>. :4. /ersh' p. BD. :D. Goldstein' p. :4D. :F. /ersh' p. BD. :C. Goldstein' p. >>B :E. Goldstein' p. 2C3 :B. Goldstein' p. 2CC 23. Goldstein' p. 2CE 2:. Goldstein' p. 2EE 22. Goldstein' p. >:> 2>. /ersh' pp. :EE):EB. 24. ac%herson' p. F2D. 2D. Interview with George 0avis. 2F. Aeffrey ,tein and ichael T. ;lare' 8=rom the Ashes. %hoenix'9 Commonweal' April 23' :BCD' p. :DB. 2C. 86.,. Assistance %rograms in Vietnam'9 p. D>. 2E. ichael 0rosnin' 8%hoenix. The CIA?s 7iggest Assassination %rogram9 #(ew Oork Times' A"g"st 22' :BCD&' p. 24. 2B. 0rosnin' p. 24. >3. 0rosnin' p. 2>. >:. 0on !"ce' /ostages of <ar #Indochina Heso"rce Center' :BC>& p. 2F. >2. !"ce' p. 2C. >>. !"ce' %. 24.

,lossar' Agroville @ #;h" Tr" at&. garrison comm"nity into which r"ral Vietnamese were forcef"lly relocated in order to isolate them from the Viet Cong. AHV( @ Army of the Hep"blic of Vietnam Cens"s Grievance #CG& @ CIA covert action program designed to obtain information on the VCI thro"gh static agents in villages' or mobile agents in armed propaganda teams. [7ack] CI* @ Central Intelligence *rgani-ation. formed in :BF: to coordinate ,o"th Vietnamese foreign and domestic intelligence operations. 0I*CC @ 0istrict Intelligence and *perations Coordination Center. office of the %hoenix adviser in each of ,o"th Vietnam?s 2D3 districts. [7ack] =ree =ire Vone @ Area in ,o"th Vietnam where 6.,. military personnel had the a"thority to kill anyone they targeted. GV( @ Government of Vietnam [7ack] IC+U @ Intelligence coordination and exploitation. original name of the %hoenix program' formed in A"ne :BFC. [7ack] ;"omintang #; T& @ *fficial r"ling party of the Hep"blic of China #Taiwan&' formed by 0r. ,"n Oat)sen in :B::. ACV @ ilitary Assistance Command' Vietnam. arrived in ,aigon in =ebr"ary :BF2 as a "nified command "nder the Commander in Chief' %acific' managing the 6.,. military effort in ,o"th Vietnam. [7ack] (IC @ (ational Interrogation Center. CIA facility b"ilt in :BF4 inside CI* head$"arters in the naval shipyard in ,aigon. (!= @ (ational !iberation =ront. formed in :BF3 by the vario"s ins"rgent gro"ps in ,o"th Vietnam. [7ack] (VA @ (orth Vietnamese Army %h"ng /oang @ The mythological Vietnamese bird of conI"gal love that appears in times of peace' pict"red holding a fl"te and representing virt"e' grace' and harmony. Also the name given to the ,o"th Vietnamese version of %hoenix. [7ack] %rovince ,ec"rity Committee #%,C& @ nonI"dicial body charged with the disposition of capt"red VCI. [7ack] %H6 @ %rovincial Heconnaissance 6nits. mercenary forces "nder the control of the CIA in ,o"th Vietnam. [7ack] H0 @ Hevol"tionary 0evelopment. CIA program to b"ild s"pport for the GV( in provinces of ,o"th Vietnam. [7ack] H0C @ Hevol"tionary 0evelopment cadre. ,o"th Vietnamese trained by the CIA at V"ng Ta" to pers"ade the citi-ens of ,o"th Vietnam so s"pport the central government.

H0CN* @ Hevol"tionary 0evelopment Cadre' *perations. CIA officer in charge of paramilitary operations in a province. H0CN% @ Hevol"tionary 0evelopment Cadre' %lans. CIA officer in charge of liaison with the ,pecial 7ranch in a province. ,AC,A @ ,pecial assistant #to the chairman of the Aoint Chiefs of ,taff& for Co"nterins"rgency and ,pecial Activities. office within the Aoints Chiefs with responsibility for %hoenix policy. [7ack] 6,I, @ 6nited ,tates Information ,ervice. branch of the 6.,. government responsible for cond"cting psychological operations overseas. VC @ Viet Cong. Vietnamese Comm"nist VCI @ Viet Cong Infrastr"ct"re. all Comm"nist party members and (!= officers' pl"s Vietcong and (VA sabote"rs and terrorists. [7ack]

ay :C' 233: A Co"nter%"nch ,pecial Heport

-ragging Bo./ Bo. 0erre'" #$A 1ar #rimes" An) The Nee) -or A 1ar #rimes Trial
by 0o"glas Valentine 7y now everybody knows that former ,enator 7ob ;errey led a seven)member team of (avy ,eals into Thanh %hong village in =ebr"ary :BFB' and m"rdered in cold blood more than a do-en women and children. <hat hardly anyone knows' and what no one in the press is talking abo"t #altho"gh many of them know&' is that ;errey was on a CIA mission' and its specific p"rpose was to kill those women and children. It was illegal' premeditated mass m"rder and it was a war crime. And it5s time to hold the CIA responsible. It5s time for a war crimes trib"nal to examine the CIA5s illegal activities d"ring and since the Vietnam <ar. <ar Crimes As %olicy <ar crimes were a central was part of a CIA strategy for fighting the Vietnam <ar. The strategy was known as Contre Co"p' and it was the manifestation of a belief that the war was essentially political' not military' in nat"re. The CIA theori-ed that it was being fo"ght by opposing ideological factions' each one amo"nting to abo"t five percent of the total pop"lation' while the remaining ninety percent was "ncommitted and wanted the war to go away.

According to the CIA5s mythology' on one side were comm"nist ins"rgents' s"pported by comrades in /anoi' oscow and %eking. The comm"nists fo"ght for land reform' to rid Vietnam of foreign intervention' and to "nite the north and so"th. The other faction was composed of capitalists' often Catholics relocated from (orth Vietnam in :BD4 by the CIA. This faction was fighting to keep ,o"th Vietnam an independent nation' operating "nder the direction of $"iet Americans. Ca"ght in the crossfire was the silent maIority. The obIect shared by both factions was to win these "ndecided voters over to its side. Contre Co"p was the CIA5s response to the reali-ation that the Comm"nists were winning the war for the hearts and minds of the people. It also was a response to the belief that they were winning thro"gh the "se of psychological warfare' specifically' selective terror the m"rder and m"tilation of specific government officials. In 0ecember :BF>' %eer 0e,ilva arrived in ,aigon as the CIA5s station chief. /e claims to have been shocked by what he saw. In his a"tobiography' ,"bHosa' 0e,ilva describes how the VC had 1impaled a yo"ng boy' a village chief' and his pregnant wife on sharp poles. To make s"re this horrible sight wo"ld remain with the villagers' one of the terror s$"ad "sed his machete to disembowel the woman' spilling he fet"s onto the gro"nd.1 1The Vietcong'1 0e,ilva said' 1were monstro"s in the application of tort"re and m"rder to achieve the political and psychological impact they wanted.1 7"t the methodology was s"ccessf"l and had tremendo"s intelligence potential' so 0e,ilva a"thori-ed the creation of small 1co"nter)terror teams'1 designed 1to bring danger and death to the Vietcong f"nctionaries themselves' especially in areas where they felt sec"re.1 /ow Co"nter)Terror <orked In Vietnam Thanh %hong village was one of those areas where Vietcong f"nctionaries felt sec"re. It was located in ;ien /oa %rovince' along the ekong 0elta. *ne of Vietnam5s most densely pop"lated provinces' ;ien /oa was precario"sly close to ,aigon' and is criss)crossed with waterways and rice paddies. It was an important rice prod"ction area for the ins"rgents as well as the Government of Vietnam' and th"s was one of the eight most heavily infiltrated provinces in Vietnam. The estimated 4C33 VC f"nctionaries in ;ien /oa acco"nted for more than five percent of the ins"rgency5s total leadership. *peration ,peedy +xpress' a (inth Infantry sweep thro"gh ;ien /oa in the first six months of :BFB' killed an estimated ::'333 civilians) s"pposedly VC sympathi-ers. These f"nctionaries formed what the CIA called the Vietcong Infrastr"ct"re #VCI&. The VCI consisted of members of the %eople5s Hevol"tionary %arty' the (ational !iberation =ront' and other Comm"nist o"tfits like the <omen5s and ,t"dent5s !iberation Associations. Its members were politicians and administrators managing committees for b"siness' comm"nications' sec"rity' intelligence' and military affairs. Among their main f"nctions were the collection of

taxes' the recr"itment of yo"ng men and women into the ins"rgency' and the selective assassination of GV( officials. As the CIA was well aware' /o Chi inh boasted that with two cadre in every hamlet' he co"ld win the war' no matter how many soldiers the Americans threw at him. ,o the CIA adopted the /o5s strategy)b"t on a grander and bloodier scale. The obIect of Contre Co"p was to identify and terrori-e each and every individ"al VCI and hisNher family' friends and fellow villagers. To this end the CIA in :BF4 la"nched a massive intelligence operation called the %rovincial Interrogation Center %rogram. The CIA #employing the 6, company %acific Architects and +ngineers& b"ilt an interrogation center in each of ,o"th Vietnam5s 44 provinces. ,taffed by members of the br"tal ,pecial %olice' who ran extensive informant networks' and advised by CIA officers' the p"rpose of the %ICs was to identify' thro"gh the systematic 1interrogation1 #read tort"re& of VCI s"spects' the membership of the VCI at every level of its organi-ationL from its el"sive head$"arters somewhere along the Cambodian border' thro"gh the region' city' province' district' village and hamlet committees. The 1indispensable link1 in the VCI was the 0istrict %arty ,ecretary the same individ"al 7ob ;errey5s ,eal team was o"t to assassinate in its mission in Thanh %hong. =rankenstein5s onster

Initially the CIA had tro"ble finding people who were willing to m"rder and m"tilate' so the Agency5s original 1co"nter)terror teams1 were composed of ex)convicts' VC defectors' Chinese ("ngs' Cambodians' ontagnards' and mercenaries. In a =ebr"ary :BC3 article written for Tr"e aga-ine' titled 1The CIA5s /ired ;illers'1 Georgie)Anne Geyer compared 1o"r boys1 to 1their boys1 with the $"alification that' 1Their boys did it for faithL o"r boys did it for money.1 The other big problem was sec"rity. The VC had infiltrated nearly every facet of the GV()even the CIA5s "nilateral co"nter)terror program. ,o in an attempt to bring greater effectiveness to its secret war' the CIA started employing (avy ,eals' 6, Army ,pecial =orces' =orce Hecon arines' and other highly trained Americans who' like 7ob ;errey' were 1motivationally indoctrinated1 by the military and t"rned into killing machines with all the social inhibitions and moral comp"nctions of a Timmy cVeigh. +xcept they were sec"re in the knowledge that what they were doing was' if not legal or moral' fra"ght with *ld Testament)style I"stice' rationali-ing that the Viet Cong did it first. +vent"ally the irrepressible Americans added their own improvements. In his a"tobiography ,oldier' Anthony /erbert describes arriving in ,aigon in :BFD' reporting to the CIA5s ,pecial *perations Gro"p' and being asked to Ioin a top)secret psywar program. <hat the CIA wanted /erbert to do' 1was to take charge of exec"tion teams that wiped o"t entire families.1 7y :BFC' killing entire families had become an integral facet of the CIA5s co"nter)terror program. Hobert ,later was the chief of the CIA5s %rovince Interrogation Center %rogram from A"ne :BFC thro"gh :BFB. In a arch :BC3 thesis for the 0efense Intelligence ,chool' titled 1The

/istory' *rgani-ation and od"s *perandi of the Viet Cong Infrastr"ct"re'1 ,later wrote' 1the 0istrict %arty ,ecretary "s"ally does not sleep in the same ho"se or even hamlet where his family lived' to precl"de any inI"ry to his family d"ring assassination attempts.1 7"t' ,later added' 1the Allies have fre$"ently fo"nd o"t where the 0istrict %arty ,ecretaries live and raided their homes. in an ens"ing fire fight the secretary5s wife and children have been killed and inI"red.1 This is the intellect"al context in which the ;errey atrocity took place. This CIA strategy of committing war crimes for psychological reasons to terrori-e the enemy5s s"pporters into s"bmission also is what differentiates ;errey5s atrocity' in legal terms' from other pop"lar methods of mass m"rdering civilians' s"ch as bombs from the sky' or economic boycotts. Oes' the CIA has a global' illegal strategy of terrori-ing people' altho"gh in typical CIA lexicon it5s called 1anti)terrorism.1 <hen yo"5re waging illegal warfare' lang"age is every bit as important as weaponry and the will to kill. As George *rwell or (oam Chomsky might explain' when yo"5re deliberately killing innocent women and children' half the co"rt)of)p"blic)opinion battle is making it so"nd legal. Three *ld Vietnam /ands in partic"lar stand o"t as examples of this incest"o"s relationship. (eil ,heehan' CIA)nik and a"thor of the aptly titled 7right ,hining !ie' recently confessed that in :BFF he saw 6, soldiers massacre as many as F33 Vietnamese civilians in five fishing villages. /e5d been in Vietnam for three years by then' b"t it didn5t occ"r to him that he had discovered a war crime. (ow he reali-es that the war crimes iss"e was always present' b"t still no mention of his friends in the CIA. =ormer (ew Oork Times reporter and a"thor of The 7est and The 7rightest' 0avid /alberstam' defended ;errey on behalf of the media establishment at the (ew ,chool camp"s the week after the story broke. CIA flack /alberstam described the region aro"nd Thanh %hong as 1the p"rest bandit co"ntry'1 adding that 1by :BFB everyone who lived there wo"ld have been third) generation Vietcong.1 <hich is CIA revisionism at its sickest. =inally there5s (ew Oork Times reporter Aames !emoyne. <hy did he never write any articles linking the CIA to war crimes in VietnamM 7eca"se his brother Charles' a (avy officer' was in charge of the CIA5s co"nter)terror teams in the 0elta in :BFE. %hoenix Comes To Thanh %hong The CIA la"nched its %hoenix %rogram in A"ne :BFC' after :> years of tinkering with several experimental co"nter)terror and psywar programs' and b"ilding its network of secret interrogation centers. The stated policy was to replace the bl"dgeon of indiscriminate bombings and military search and destroy operations which had alienated the people from the Government of Vietnam with the scalpel of assassinations of selected members of the Viet Cong Infrastr"ct"re.

A typical %hoenix operation began in a %rovince Interrogation Center where a s"spected member of the VCI was bro"ght for $"estioning. After a few days or weeks or months "ndergoing vario"s forms of tort"re' the VCI s"spect wo"ld die or give the name and location of his VCI comrades and s"periors. That information wo"ld be sent from the Interrogation Center to the local %hoenix office' which was staffed by ,pecial 7ranch and Vietnamese military officers "nder the s"pervision of CIA officers. 0epending on the s"spected importance of the targeted VCI' the %hoenix people wo"ld then dispatch one of the vario"s action arms available to it' incl"ding ,eal teams like the one 7ob ;errey led into Thanh %hong. In =ebr"ary :BFB' the %hoenix %rogram was still "nder CIA control. 7"t beca"se ;ien /oa %rovince was so important' and beca"se the VCI5s 0istrict %arty ,ecretary was s"pposedly in Thanh %hong' the CIA decided to handle this partic"lar assassination and mass m"rder mission witho"t involving the local Vietnamese. ,o instead of dispensing the local co"nter)terror team' the CIA sent ;errey5s Haiders. And that' very simply' is how it happened. ;errey and crew admittedly went to Thanh %hong to kill the 0istrict %arty ,ecretary' and anyone else who got in the way' incl"ding his family and all their friends. %hoenix Comes /ome To Hoost 7y :BFB the CIA' thro"gh %hoenix' was targeting individ"al VCI and their families all across Vietnam. *ver 23'333 people were assassinated by the end of the year and h"ndreds of tho"sands had been tort"red in %rovince Interrogation Centers. *n 23 A"ne :BFB' the !ower /o"se of the Vietnamese Congress held hearings abo"t ab"ses in the %hoenix VCI elimination program. +ighty)six 0ep"ties signed a petition calling for its immediate termination. Among the charges. ,pecial %olice knowingly arrested innocent people for the p"rpose of extortionL people were detained for as long as eight months before being triedL tort"re was commonplace. (oting that it was illegal to do so' several dep"ties protested instances in which American troops detained or m"rdered s"spects witho"t Vietnamese a"thority. *thers complained that village chiefs were not cons"lted before raids' s"ch as the one on Thanh %hong. After an investigation in :BC3' fo"r Congresspersons concl"ded that the CIA5s %hoenix %rogram violated international law. 1The people of these 6nited ,tates'1 they Iointly stated' 1have deliberately imposed "pon the Vietnamese people a system of I"stice which admittedly denies d"e process of law'1 and that in doing so' 1we appear to have violated the :B4B Geneva Convention for the protection of civilian people.1 0"ring the hearings' 6.,. Hepresentative *gden Heid said' 1if the 6nion had had a %hoenix program d"ring the Civil <ar' its targets wo"ld have been civilians like Aefferson 0avis or the mayor of acon' Georgia.1 7"t the American establishment and media denied it then' and contin"e to deny it "ntil today' beca"se %hoenix was a genocidal program )) and the CIA officials' members of the media who

were complicit thro"gh their silence' and the red)blooded American boys who carried it o"t' are all war criminals. As ichael Hatner a lawyer at the Center for Constit"tional Hights told Co"nter%"nch. 1;errey sho"ld be tried as a war criminal. /is actions on the night of =ebr"ary 24)2D' :BFB when the seven man (avy ,eal "nit which he headed killed approximately twenty "narmed Vietnamese civilians' eighteen of whom were women and children was a war crime. !ike those who m"rdered at y !ai' he too sho"ld be bro"ght into the dock and tried for his crimes.1 %hoenix' alas' also was fiendishly effective and became a template for f"t"re CIA operations. 0eveloped in Vietnam and perfected with the death s$"ads and media blacko"t of Afghanistan and +l ,alvador' it is now employed by the CIA aro"nd the world. in Colombia' in ;osovo' in Ireland with the 7ritish IF' and in Israel with its other kindred spirit' the ossad. The paymasters at the %entagon will keep cranking o"t billion dollar missile defense shields and other 7"sh leag"e boondoggles. 7"t when it comes to making the world safe for international capitalism' the political trick is being more of a homicidal maniac' and more cost effective' than the terrorists. Incredibly' %hoenix has become fashionable' it has adhered a kind of political cachet. Governor Aesse Vent"ra claims to have been a (avy ,eal and to have 1h"nted man.1 =anatical right)wing 6, Hepresentative 7ob 7arr' one of the Hep"blican impeachment cli$"e' has introd"ced legislation to 1re)legali-e1 assassinations. 0avid /ackworth' representing the military establishment' defended ;errey by saying 1there were tho"sands of s"ch atrocities'1 and that in :BFB his own "nit committed 1at least a do-en s"ch horrors.1 Aack Valenti' representing the b"siness establishment and its financial stake in the iss"e' defended ;errey in the !A Times' saying' 1all the normalities #sic& of a social contract are abandoned'1 in war. 7"llshit. A famo"s %hoenix operation' known as the y !ai assacre' was proceeding along smoothly' with a grand total of D34 Vietnamese women and children killed' when a soldier named /"gh Thompson in a helicopter g"nship saw what was happening. Hisking his life to preserve that 1social contract'1 Thomson landed his helicopter between the mass m"rderers and their victims' t"rned his machine g"ns on his fellow Americans' and bro"ght the carnage to a halt. ,ame with screenwriter and Io"rnalist 7ill 7royles' Vietnam veteran' and a"thor 7rothers In Arms' an excellent book abo"t the Vietnam <ar. 7royles t"rned in a b"nch of his fellow arines for killing civilians. If Thompson and 7royles were capable of taking individ"al responsibility' everyone is. And many did.

Phoenix 2e.orn
There is no do"bt that 7ob ;errey committed a war crime. As he admits' he went to Vietnam with a knife clenched between his teeth and did what he was trained to do kidnap' assassinate

and mass m"rder civilians. 7"t there was no point to his atrocity as he soon learned' no controlling legal a"thority. /e became a conflicted individ"al. /e remembers that they killed women and children. 7"t he thinks they came "nder fire first' before they panicked and started shooting back. The fog of war clo"ds his memory 7"t there isn5t that m"ch to forget. Thanh %hong was ;errey5s first mission' and on his second mission a grenade blew off his foot' abr"ptly ending his military career. %l"s which there are plenty of other people to remind ;errey of what happened' if anyone will listen. There5s Gerhard ;lann' the ,eal who disp"tes ;errey5s acco"nt' and two Vietnamese s"rvivors of the raid' %ham Tri !anh and 7"i Thi !"am' both of whom corroborate ;lann5s acco"nt' as does a veteran Viet Cong soldier' Tran Van H"ng. As C7, (ews was caref"l to point o"t' the Vietnamese were former VC and th"s hostile witnesses and beca"se there were slight inconsistencies in their stories' they co"ld not be believed. ;lann became the target of ;errey5s pr machine' which dismissed as an alcoholic with a chip on his sho"lder. Then there is Aohn 0eCamp. An army captain in Vietnam' 0eCamp worked for the organi-ation "nder CIA exec"tive <illiam Colby that ostensibly managed %hoenix after the CIA let it go in A"ne :BFB. 0eCamp was elected to the (ebraska ,tate ,enate and served "ntil :BB3. A Hep"blican' he claims that ;errey led an anti)war march on the (ebraska state capitol in ay :BC:. 0eCamp claims that ;errey p"t a medal' possibly his bron-e star' in a mock coffin' and said' 1Viet Cong or (orth Vietnamese troops are angelic compared with the r"thless Americans.1 ;errey claims he was in %er" visiting his brother that day. 7"t he definitely accepted his edal of /onor from Hichard (ixon on :4 ay :BC3' a mere ten days after the *hio (ational g"ard killed fo"r st"dent protestors at ;ent ,tate. <ith that badge of honor pinned on his chest' ;errey began walking the gilded road to s"ccess. +lected Governor of (ebraska in (ovember :BE2' he started dating 0eborah <inger' became a celebrity hero' was elected to the 6, ,enate' became vice)chair of ,enate Committee on Intelligence' and in :BB3 staged a r"n for president. *ne of the most highly regarded politicians in America' he showered self)righteo"s criticism on draft dodger 7ill Clinton5s penchant for lying. 7ob ;errey is a symbol of what it means to be an American' and the patriots have rallied to his defense. And yet ;errey accepted a bron-e star "nder false pretenses' and as Aohn 0eCamp s"ggests' he may have been fragged by his fellow ,eals. =or this' he received the edal of /onor. Aohn 0eCamp calls 7ob ;errey 1emotionally dist"rbed1 as a res"lt of his Vietnam experience. And ;errey5s behavior has been pathetic. In order to protect himself and his CIA patrons from being tried as a war criminals' 7ob ;errey has become a pathological liar too. ;errey says his actions at Than %hong were an atrocity' b"t not a war crime. /e says he feels remorse' b"t not g"ilt. In fact' he has contin"ally rehabbed his position on the war itself)moving from an opponent to more recently an enth"siast. In a :BBB col"mn in the <ashington %ost' for example' ;errey

said he had come to view that Vietnam was a 1I"st war. 1<as the war worth the effort and sacrifice' or was it a mistakeM1 ;errey wrote. 1<hen I came home in :BFB and for many years afterward' I did not believe it was worth it. Today' with the passage of time and the experience of seeing both the benefits of freedom won by o"r sacrifice and the h"man destr"ction done by dictatorships' I believe the ca"se was I"st and the sacrifice not in vain.1 Then at the 0emocratic %arty Convention in !os Angeles last s"mmer ;errey lect"red the delegates that they sho"ldn5t be ashamed of the war and that they sho"ld treat Vietnam veterans as war heroes. 1I believe I speak for ax 7a"c"s and every person who has ever served when I say I never felt more free than when I wore the "niform of o"r co"ntry. This co"ntry ) this party ) m"st remember.1 =reeM =ree to m"rder women and children. Is this a conscio"sness of g"ilt or imm"nityM C7, (ews also participated in constr"cting a c"rtain of lies. As does every other official government or media o"tlet that knows abo"t the CIA5s %hoenix %rogram' which contin"es to exist and operate worldwide today' b"t fails to mention it. <hyM 7eca"se if the name of one targeted Viet Cong cadre can be obtained' then all the names can be obtained' and then a war crimes trial becomes imperative. And that5s the last thing the +stablishment will allow to happen. Average Americans' however' consider themselves a nation r"led by laws and an ethic of fair play' and with the ;erry confession comes an opport"nity for America to redefine itself in more realistic terms. The discrepancies in his story beg investigation. /e says he was never briefed on the r"les of engagement. 7"t a 1pocket card1 with the !aws of !and <arfare was given to each member of the 6, Armed =orces in Vietnam. 0oes it matter that ;errey wo"ld lie abo"t thisM Oes. General 7r"ce %almer' commander of the same (inth 0ivision that devastated ;ien ;oa %rovince in :BFB' obIected to the 1invol"ntary assignment1 of American soldiers to %hoenix. /e did not believe that 1people in "niform' who are pledged to abide by the Geneva Conventions' sho"ld be p"t in the position of having to break those laws of warfare.1 It was the CIA that forced soldiers like ;errey into %hoenix operations' and the hidden hand of the CIA lingers over his war crime. ;errey even "ses the same rationale offered by CIA officer 0e,ilva. According to ;errey' 1the Viet Cong were a tho"sand per cent more r"thless than1 the ,eals or 6.,. Army. 7"t the Geneva Conventions' c"stomary international law and the 6niform Code of ilitary A"stice all prohibit the killing of noncombatant civilians. The alleged br"tality of others is no I"stification. 7y saying it is' ;errey implicates the people who generated that rationale. the CIA. That is why there is a moral imperative to scr"tini-e the %hoenix %rogram and the CIA officers who created it' the people who participated in it' and the Io"rnalists who covered it "p to expose

the dark side of o"r national psyche' the part that allows "s to employ terror to ass"re o"r world dominance. To accomplish this there m"st be a war crimes trib"nal. This won5t be easy. The 6, government has gone to great lengths to shield itself from s"ch legal scr"tiny' at the same it selectively manip"lates international instit"tions' s"ch as the 6(' to go after people like ,lobodan ilosevic. According to h"man rights lawyer ichael Hatner the legal aven"es for bringing ;errey and his cohorts to I"stice are $"ite limited. A civil s"it co"ld be lodged against ;errey by the families of the victims bro"ght in the 6nited ,tates "nder the Alien Tort Claims Act. 1These are the kinds of cases I did against GramaIo' %angaitan #Timor&'1 Hatner told "s. 1The main problem here is that it is do"btf"l the Vietnamese wo"ld s"e a liberal when they are dying to better relations with the 6,. I wo"ld do this case if co"ld get plaintiffs))so far no l"ck.1 According to Hatner' there is no stat"te of limitations problem as it is newly discovered evidence and there is a stron arg"ment partic"larly in the criminal context that there is no stat"te of limitations for war crimes. 7"t criminal cases in the 6, present a diffic"lt' if not impossible' prospect. (ow that ;errey is discharged from the (avy' the military co"rts' which went after !t. Calley for the y !ai massacre' has no I"risdiction over him. 1As to criminal case in the 6,))my pretty answer is no'1 says Hatner. 1The 6, first passed a war crimes stat"te #:E 6,C sec. 244: <ar Crimes& in :BBF)) that stat"te makes what ;errey did a war crime p"nishable by death of life imprisonment))b"t it was passed after the crime and criminal stat"tes are not retroactive.1 In :BEE' Congress enacted a stat"te against genocide' which was might apply to ;errey5s actions' b"t it to can5t be applied retroactively. Generally at the time of ;errey5s acts in Vietnam' 6, criminal law did not extend to what 6, citi-ens did overseas "nless they were military. [As a senator' ;errey' it sho"ld be noted' voted for the war crimes law' th"s opening the opport"nity for others to be prosec"ted for crimes similar to those he that committed b"t is shielded from.] The 6nited (ations is a possibility' b"t a long shot. They co"ld establish an ad hoc trib"nal s"ch as it did with the Hwanda ICTH and O"goslavia ICTO. 1This wo"ld re$"ire action by 6( ,ec"rity co"ncil co"ld do it' b"t what are the chancesM1 says Hatner. 1There is still the prospect for a 6, veto <hat that really points o"t is how those trib"nals are bent toward what the 6, and <est want.1 %rosec"tion in Vietnam and or another co"ntry and extradition is also a possibility. It can be arg"ed that war crimes are crimes over which there is "niversal I"risdiction))in fact that is obligation of co"ntries)"nder Geneva Convention of :B4E))to seek o"t and prosec"te war criminals. 16niversal I"risdiction does not re$"ire the presence of the defendant))he can be indicted and tried in some co"ntries in absentia))or his extradition can be re$"ested1' says Hatner. 1,ome co"ntries may have stat"tes permitting this. ;errey sho"ld check his travel plans and hire a good lawyer before he gets on a plane. /e can "se ;issinger5s lawyer.1 C%

0o"glas Valentine is the a"thor of The %hoenix %rogram' the only comprehensive acco"nt of the CIA5s tort"re and assassination operation in Vietnam' as well as T0O a chilling novel abo"t the CIA and the dr"g trade.

How the CIA penetrates the Left Check it out at the Lew Rockwell Show "Doug Valentine belongs to that precious remnant of journalists an historians with the wis om to see our time! the integrit" an courage to write about it! an the literar" grace to bring it all chillingl" ali#e$ %his in ispensable book ma" &uite well be the best "et in the author's alrea " singular bo " of work$ He takes us again into that ark inner realit" of polic" an politics that Americans so tragicall" en" an e#a e! an gi#es us back a reflection there is no en"ing! no escaping$ If there is hope for America at this moment of so man" reckonings! it is out of pages like these$" Roger (orris! author of Richar (ilhous )i*on+ %he Rise of an American ,olitician

,ublishe -orks %he Hotel %acloban! a highl" praise account of m" father's e*periences in a .apanese prisoner of war camp in -orl -ar II$ %he ,hoeni* ,rogram! escribe b" ,rofessor Alfre -$ (cCo" as "the efiniti#e account" of the CIA's most secret an ea l" co#ert operation of the Vietnam -ar$ %D/! a no#el about an Air 0orce photojournalist who participates in an unusual militar" mission in 1234$ %he Strength of the -olf+ %he Secret Histor" of America's -ar on Drugs! recipient of the Choice Aca emic 5*cellence Awar $ %he Strength of the ,ack+ %he ,olitics! ,ersonalities an 5spionage Intrigues %hat Shape the D5A! escribe b" ,eter Dale Scott as "an in ispensible resource for those who wish to un erstan the politics of rug enforcement in America6 an for those with an" sense of the subject7s real importance it is a gripping rea as well$" %he Hotel %acloban an %he ,hoeni* ,rogram are a#ailable through i8ni#erse$com as backinprint books un er the Authors 9uil imprint$ %D/ is also a#ailable through i8ni#erse$com$ See m" :ooks page for or ering information$

(" research an inter#iew notes! an tape recor e inter#iews with numerous CIA officers are a#ailable to the public at the )ational Securit" Archi#e %he Douglas Valentine Vietnam Collection at the )ational Securit" Archi#e in -ashington! DC! has been open an use b" researchers since earl" ;<<4$ %he Collection contains the research material! inclu ing au io files of inter#iews with senior CIA an militar" officers in the ,hoeni* program! original han written inter#iew notes! an go#ernment ocuments obtaine from CIA an militar" officers as well as through 0=IA re&uests! for m" book %he ,hoeni* ,rogram$ %he Collection can onl" be use in the )ational Securit" Archi#e's Rea ing Room6 it is not a#ailable for interlibrar" loan an an appointment must be ma e to use it$ %he "resgui e" link below will help an"one who wants to rea the material$

0ollow this link to learn how to use the Archi#e's Rea ing Room Link to the ocument the Department of .ustice poste online regar ing m" ,ri#ac" Act re&uest from the CIA$ %his case was hear in fe eral court ,hoeni* au io files an ocuments at Cr"ptocomb

(an" of the most important ,hoeni* ocuments an the first four tape inter#iews are up at Cr"ptocomb$ (ore to follow$ %he ocuments show the e#elopment of >targete kills!? "a ministrati#e etention" an "High Value" rewar s programs! among other things rele#ant to the eternal war on terror an Homelan Securit"$ inter#iew with .o"ce ,owers @3$4(:A A am 5ngel re#iews Strength of the ,ack .ohn .iggens re#iews Strength of the ,ack %homas -ilkinson re#iews Strength of the ,ack Ron .acobs Re#iew of Strength of the ,ack Click this link to or er m" new book Strength of the ,ack$ View the ust jacket tooB Article in the Sun a" Republican! 11C;;C<2 Ron .acobs re#iews Strength of the -olf Carlo ,arcelli re#iews Strength of the -olf %he Strength of the -olf has been publishe online in Russian an is a#ailable b" clicking this link A am 5ngel @author of %opiar"A re#iews %D/ )ational Securit" Archi#e In e* to the Valentine Vietnam Collection @D1$DE:A Some ocuments from the file the CIA keeps on me as a result of m" work on %he ,hoeni* ,rogram @3DF$<E:A

interesting link

=rom 6ri 0owbenko W www.conspiracyplanet.com X http.NNed"cate)yo"rself.orgNcnNcriminalsinaction2BI"n34.shtml %osted A"ne 2B' 2334

3ea) Spooks 3on4t (ie 5An) 3on4t 3eal 3rugs Either6 .' 7ri 3o&.enko
<ar criminal and notorio"s CIA klllerN dr"g trafficker Ted ,hackley' known as 5The 7lond Ghost' died on 0ecember B' 2332. The 6ltimate Cold <ar Apparatchik' Ted ,hackley was the notorio"s 0irector of 5*peration %hoenix5 in !aos and Viet (am' and th"s responsible for a sla"ghter which claimed the lives of over 43'333 Vietnamese civilians "nder the g"ise of ne"trali-ing comm"nist sympathi-ers. According to many credible reports' ,hackley was involved in covert and illicit dr"g trafficking and weapons sales as late as the notorio"s Iran)Contra scandal' in which a h"ge $"antity of weapons fell into terrorist hands. /e took part in a scandalo"s affair in which !ibyan terrorists "nder weaponry and military training from the 6,. "ammar S"adaffi received

7ehind the scenes' he was one of the most infl"ential members of the CIA from the :BF3s thro"gh the :BE3s' being the 0ep"ty 0irector to CIA 0Irector George /erbert <alker 7"sh. ,hackley was also the a"thor of 1The Third *ption1 #0ell %"blishing&' a g"ide for training indigeno"s homegrown terrorist gro"ps in foreign lands' a failed and flawed policy which can be held responsible for the state of the world today. An excellent analysis of ,hackley5s role in geo)politics and the rise of American +mpire is incl"ded in the following excerpt from 0avid /offman5s 1The *klahoma City 7ombing1 )) *r consider the words of !t. Col. 7o Grit-' former commander of the ,pecial =orces in !atin America and the most decorated soldier in Vietnam. Grit- made a trip to the Golden Triangle in :BE> to search for American %*<s' a mission that was "ltimately stonewalled. Grit- believes the %*<s are being "sed as dr"g m"les' and the government doesn5t want them ret"rned alive' for fear they wo"ld expose the *ctop"s. As Grit- said. 1[They] wo"ld not want the American %*<s to come home. 7eca"se when they do' there will be an investigation as to why they were abandoned. At that time we will "ncover

this secret organi-ation and its illicit dr"g money and financing. The ,ecret Team wo"ld then be exposed.1[::22] As Grit- later wrote in Called to ,erve. If Hichard Armitage was' as ;h"n ,a avowed' a maIor participant in parallel government dr"g trafficking' then it explained why o"r efforts to resc"e %*<s had been inexplicably foiled' time after time... If it was tr"e' Hichard Armitage wo"ld be the last man in the world who wo"ld desire to see prisoners of war come home alive.[::2>] As 1,pecial Cons"ltant to the %entagon on the IAs'1 in 7angkok in :BCD' Armitage reportedly spent more time repatriating opi"m profits then recovering %*<s. In :BCF' when ;h"n ,a was still selling heroin to CIA officials' the head of the CIA was none other than George 7"sh.[::24] =ormer presidential candidate /. Hoss %erot' who was appointed presidential investigator for %*<N IA affairs' came "pon the same information' and was warned by former 0efense ,ecretary =rank Carl"cci to stop p"rs"ing the connections to Armitage. As he sadly explained to a gro"p of %*<N IA families in :BEC. 1I have been instr"cted to cease and desist.1[::2D] Ironically' between :BEC and :BB:' Vice)%resident 7"sh served as head of the ,o"th =lorida 0r"g Task =orce' and later as chair of the (ational (arcotics Interdiction ,ystem' both set "p to 1stem1 the flow of dr"gs into the 6.,. <hile 7"sh was dr"g c-ar' the vol"me of cocaine sm"ggled into the 6.,. tripled.[::2F] Celerino 1Cele1 Castillo' the 0+A5s head agent in +l ,alvador and G"atemala from :BED to :BB:' told reporters and ,enate investigators of n"mero"s known dr"g traffickers who "sed hangers controlled by *liver (orth and the CIA in +l ,alvador5s Ilopango military airbase. <hen Castillo naively tried to warn 7"sh at a 6.,. embassy party in G"atemala' 7"sh 1I"st shook my hand' smiled and walked awayY1[::2C] 17y the end of :BEE'1 added Castillo' 1I reali-ed how hopelessly tangled the 0+A' the CIA' and every other 6.,. entity in Central America had become with the criminals. The connections boggled my mind.1[::2E] 1The CIA @ they5re making deals with the 0evil'1 adds is smarter than they are.1[::2B] ike !evine. 16nfort"nately' the 0evil

,ome of those devils' like on-er al);assar @ 1b"siness partner1 of Hichard ,ecord and *liver (orth @ wo"ld be "tili-ed to do the *ctop"s5s dirty work. Another name ;h"n ,a mentioned repeatedly was Ted ,hackley.[::>3] A long)time CIA player' Theodore G. ,hackley #known as 1The 7lond Ghost1& began his Agency career as CIA ,tation Chief in iami' where he directed the CIA5s A N<AV+ *peration' a post)7ay of %igs attempt to assassinate =idel Castro and wreck havoc within that sovereign nation. 6tili-ing C"ban expatriates' the CIA cond"cted h"ndreds of sabotage raids against C"ba in direct violation of the

6.,. (e"trality Act. ,hackley also worked in close partnership with ,am Giancana' and ,antos Trafficante.[::>:]

ob fig"res Aohn Hoselli'

<hile the operation was sh"t down in :BFD' d"e mainly to revelations of organi-ed crime connections and dr"g sm"ggling' many of the participants remained in iami' contin"ing their illegal activities. !ater' as ,tation Chief of !aos' ,hackley directed aIor General Hichard ,ecord5s air wing in tactical raids against the Comm"nist %athet !ao' who happened to be General Vang %ao5s main competition in the opi"m trade. 7y keeping the %athet !ao b"sy with the help of the CIA and the American military' %ao5s /mong tribesmen were able to become the region5s largest heroin prod"cers.[::>2] *f co"rse' ,hackley' his dep"ty Tom Clines #who s"pervised the air base in !ong Tieng&' and their colleag"es in CIA front companies like Air America were only too happy to help' sm"ggling heroin to the 6.,. in the g"tted bodies of dead GIs #with the assistance of their old ob b"ddy ,antos Trafficante' who had helped form their VHNHI=!+ assassination team' and Vietnamese Air =orce General (g"yen Cao ;y&' and la"ndering the profits in the ("gan)/and bank. As a :BE> <all ,treet Ao"rnal article stated. Investigations following r. ("gan5s death and the fail"re of the bank revealed widespread dealings by ("gan)/and with international heroin syndicates' and evidence of massive fra"d against 6.,. and foreign citi-ens. any retired high)ranking %entagon and CIA officials were exec"tives of or cons"ltants to ("gan)/and.[::>>][::>4]J ,hackley' along with ("gan)/and5s attorney @ former CIA 0irector <illiam Colby @ directed the infamo"s 1%hoenix %rogram'1 a largely s"ccessf"l attempt to 1ne"trali-e1 by tort"re and m"rder approximately 43'333 Vietnamese civilians s"spected of being Viet Cong sympathi-ers. *ne %hoenix operative' testifying before Congress' stated that %hoenix was 1a sterile' depersonali-ed m"rder programY it was completely indiscriminate.1 The assassinations wo"ld contin"e in (icarag"a "nder the code)name 1*peration %egas"s.1[::>D][::>F] After becoming the head of the CIA5s <estern /emisphere operations #!atin American 0ivision& in :BC2' ,hackley s"pervised the overthrow of the Chilean government #1*peration Track II1& by m"rdering democratically elected %resident ,alvador Allende. <ith the backing of the CIA "nder ,hackley' the military led a violent co"p by Hight)wing General A"g"sto %inochet' which res"lted in the abolishment of the Constit"tion' the closing of all newspapers save for two Hight)wing dailies' the o"tlawing of trade "nions' the s"ppression of all political parties' and the arrest' tort"re' and exec"tion of tho"sands.[::>C] After a brief stint as 0irector of the =ar +ast 0ivision' ,hackley directed CIA agent +dwin <ilson in training the ,hah of Iran5s notorio"s secret police' the ,avak' who ro"tinely tort"red and m"rdered the ,hah5s opponents. !ater ,hackley wo"ld assist more directly in these efforts. [::>E]

In :BCD' ,hackley became Associate 0irector in the 0irectorate of *perations' which p"t him in charge of Covert)*perations' Co"nter)Intelligence' and ironically' Co"nter)(arcotics' all "nder the command of George /erbert <alker 7"sh. These associations nat"rally led to ,hackley playing a role in the formation of the 1,ecret Team'1 #to coin a phrase invented by Col. !. =letcher %ro"ty& the covert and illegal enterprise that was the driving force behind the Iran)Contra operation. 0onald Gregg' one of ,hackley5s s"bordinates d"ring his ,aigon ten"re' wo"ld later become Assistant (ational ,ec"rity Advisor d"ring Iran)Contra' reporting directly to Vice)%resident 7"sh. It was against this backdrop that ,hackley served as a 1cons"ltant1 to players s"ch as 7"sh' ,ecord' (orth' and Casey in their illegal and bloody g"ns)for)dr"gs network that res"lted in tens of tho"sands of deaths and the flooding of o"r streets with tons of dr"gs. As <all ,treet Ao"rnal reporter Aonathan ;witny writes abo"t Ted ,hackley in his book' The Crimes of %atriots. !ooking at the list of disasters ,hackley has presided over d"ring his career' one might even concl"de that on the day the CIA hired ,hackley it might have done better hiring a ;G7 agentL a ,oviet mole probably co"ld not have done as m"ch damage to the national sec"rity of the 6nited ,tates with all his wile as ,hackley did with the most patriotic of intentions. 7etween ,hackley5s C"ban and Indochinese campaigns' more dope dealers were probably p"t onto the payroll of the 6nited ,tates Government' and protected and enco"raged in their activities' than if the government had simply gone o"t and hired the afia @ which' in the case of the C"ban campaign' it did. CIA 0irector Admiral ,tansfield T"rner forced ,hackley to resign from the Agency in :BCB' d"e to his 1"na"thori-ed1 dealings with rog"e agent +dwin <ilson' who was selling plastic explosives to !ibya #with ,hackley5s approval&. /ad he not left' ,hackley wo"ld likely have become head of the Agency.[::>B] George 7"sh' who headed the Agency in :BCF' strongly desired to contin"e in that post. /e was not reappointed when Aimmy Carter took office.[::43]J oreover' T"rner' who had little faith in /6 (IT #/"man Intelligence& so"rces' decided to reshape the CIA along more advanced technological lines. As a res"lt of T"rner5s infamo"s 1/alloween assacre'1 the CIA c"t its field agents from several tho"sand to I"st over >33. As %resident Aimmy Carter wo"ld later state' 1<e were aware that some of the "n$"alified and incompetent personnel whom he discharged were deeply resentf"l.1[::4:] The old hands of the Agency' who formerly had at their disposal almost "nlimited 17lack 7"dget1 f"nds for covert operations' were s"ddenly forced into retirement' or forced into lockstep with T"rner5s new g"idelines.

Altho"gh CIA 0irector <illiam Casey hired 2'333 new covert operators in :BE3' many CIA critics felt T"rner5s actions had already ca"sed the secret cells of the good)old)boy networks to b"ry themselves @ and their illegal activities @ even deeper. It is this element' birthed in the hysteria of the Cold <ar' legitimi-ed by the paranoia of the (ational ,ec"rity state' and n"rt"red by the politics of greed' that has b"ried itself in the core of American politics. As long)time Army Criminal Investigator Gene <heaton defines it. 1An elite' very clandestine' very covert gro"p within the intelligence comm"nityY. The CIA and 0IA is I"st the lightening rod for the people who really control things.1 Those who co"ld accept the idea of government foreknowledge of the *klahoma City bombing wo"ld be hard)pressed to accept the notion that certain factions within the government might have orchestrated the bombing itself. Those who have a diffic"lt time accepting this are stymied by what they perceive as 1government.1 As <heaton explains' 1The government is I"st a b"nch of mon"ments' office b"ildings' comp"ters' and desks. They don5t see the cra-ies in the government @ the little conspiratorial cli$"es within the government.1[::42] These little conspiratorial cli$"es @ the same players that ,hackley intersects with' going back to C"ba' !aos' Afghanistan and (icarag"a @ have been involved for decades in everything from dr"g and g"n)r"nning' to assassinations' covert warfare' and o"tright terrorism. It is a terrorism that increasingly has no partic"lar face' no ideological credo' no political goal. It is a terrorism motivated by power and greed.[::4>] 7y no means the lone man behind the c"rtain' Ted ,hackley represents one of the more visible of this lexicon of covert operators "pon whom the powers that be depend on for their endless s"pply of 1black ops1 and dirty tricks. %erhaps this is how ,hackley knows' or seems to know' the complex tr"th behind *klahoma City. It is a tr"th that remains hidden behind a sophisticated labyrinth of covert operatives' all of whom converge at similar times and places. They are' as 0avid Corn writes' 1the little faceless gray men we never see and seldom hear abo"t.1 Those we call the 1,hadow Government'1 the 1%arallel Government'1 the 1+nterprise'1 the 1*ctop"s'1 or a half)a)do-en other names' are caref"lly hidden behind an endless roster of official titles and d"ties' and a plethora of familiar)so"nding organi-ations and instit"tions. These same faceless little gray men wo"ld pop "p in the *klahoma City bombing conspiracy like interminable weeds between the cracks of the pavement. =rom the 7ay of %igs to Iran)Contra to *klahoma City' the names' faces' and players wo"ld coalesce for a brief moment in time into an indisting"ishable menagerie of politicos and spooks' terrorists and assassins @ to commit their terrible deed' then fade into the seamless world were little distinction is made between assets and criminals.[::44] Ted ,hackley was officially forced to resign from the CIA d"e to his dealings with friend and renegade agent +dwin <ilson. <ilson and former CIA employee =rank Terpil had sm"ggled

two tons of C)4 to !ibya' and at the behest of ,hackley' had set "p terrorist training camps there "tili-ing Green 7erets led to believe they were working for the Agency. The ostensible p"rpose of this mane"ver was to permit the CIA to gather information on ,oviet and !ibyan weapons and defense capabilities' and to learn the identities of foreign nationals being trained for g"errilla warfare. 6pon obtaining their passports and travel plans' ,hackley wo"ld alert their home co"ntry5s secret police' who wo"ld then assassinate them "pon their ret"rn.[::4D] <hile <ilson was sentenced to a long prison term' Terpil fled to C"ba' and has since been involved in n"mero"s dealings with the %!* and other terrorists' s"pplying them with sophisticated assassination weapons' detonators' and comm"nication systems.[::4F] Terpil also s"pplied tort"re devices to 6gandan 0ictator Idi Amin' who "sed a bomb s"pplied by Terpil to assassinate ;enyan cabinet member 7r"ce c;en-ie.[::4C]J *ne month later' Terpil was implicated in the m"rder of three exec"tives of the I7+U corporation @ a high)technology company that was doing b"siness with the ,avak. Aohn /arper' I7+U5s former director of sec"rity' said that while in Tripoli' he saw a mock)"p of the amb"sh site at the training facility that Terpil and <ilson had set "p.[::4E]Z Headers will recall this is the same =rank Terpil that was seen by Cary Gagan in exico City with *mar #,am ;halidM&' six months before the *klahoma City bombing. 1I saw him down in exico'1 recalled Gagan' 1in (ovember of 5B4' in exico CityY with *mar.1 Gagan said he and *mar met Terpil at the /otel aria Isabelle in the Vona Hosa district. Gagan didn5t know who Terpil was at the time' b"t described him as a fat' balding' F3ish fellow' who was 1terribly dressed.1 In other words @ =rank Terpil. 1I heard the name beca"se I knew <ilson5s name from the =lorence =ederal %enitentiary in Colorado.1 Gagan said that one of his intelligence contacts' a man named 0aniel' told him abo"t Terpil. 1The conversation came "p in reference to the Gander' (ewfo"ndland crash'1 said Gagan. <as Terpil in exico to s"pply explosives to *marM <hile Gagan wasn5t privy to the conversation' he believes that was the p"rpose of the meeting. <hen <ilson and Terpil were selling arms and explosives to !ibya' they were reporting to none other than Ted ,hackley. ;witny notes that <ilson and Terpil were hiring anti)Castro C"bans from ,hackley5s old A N<AV+ program [and Green 7erets] to assassinate %resident Saddafi5s political opponents abroad. ,ome 6.,. Army men were literally l"red away from the doorway of =ort 7ragg' their (orth Carolina training post. The GIs were given every reason to believe that the operation s"mmoning them was being carried o"t with the f"ll backing of the CIA.Y[::4B] Headers will also recall that while Timothy cVeigh was still in the Army' he wrote his sister a letter telling her that he had been picked for a ,pecial =orces #Green 7eret& Covert Tactical 6nit

#CT6& that was involved in illegal activities. These illegal activities incl"ded 1protecting dr"g shipments' eliminating the [*ctop"s5s dr"g] competition' and pop"lation control.1 This is exactly what ,hackley' Clines' and ,ecord did in !aos @ assassinating and bombing Vang %ao5s opi"m competition o"t of existence. Co"ld this CT6 cVeigh claims he was recr"ited for be a latter)day version of ,hackley5s assassinsM =ormer federal grand I"ror /oppy /eidelberg said cVeigh5s letter indicates that he t"rned them down' while former =7I ,AC Ted G"ndersen claims cVeigh act"ally worked for the gro"p for a while' then became disenchanted.[::D3] If cVeigh had act"ally been recr"ited for s"ch a gro"p' the $"estion arises of what cover)story he was given. As disc"ssed' it is highly likely he was told that he was on an important mission @ to infiltrate a terrorist organi-ation and prevent a bombing. Considering cVeigh5s backgro"nd and character' it is "nlikely he is a terrorist who set o"t to m"rder :FB innocent people. Also recall that cVeigh was seen with /"ssain al)/"ssaini. The Ira$is wo"ld provide a convincing and pla"sible exc"se if cVeigh was led to believe he was part of a sting operation. 1,on' yo" were a hero in the G"lf <ar. Oo"r co"ntry needs yo" now in the fight against terrorism.1 It is a story a yo"ng' impressionable man like cVeigh wo"ld fall for. It is also possible that cVeigh was sheep)dipped as disgr"ntled ex)GI for infiltration into the neo)(a-i comm"nity' which wo"ld provide a doorway into the bombing conspiracy thro"gh places like +lohim City. *r perhaps' as a res"lt of his becoming 1disenchanted1 and 1leaving1 the CT6' he became targeted for 1termination'1 and was set "p as a fall)g"y. ,"ch is standard operating proced"re for those who attempt to leave the world of covert operations. +ither way' the fact that there appeared to be two 1Timothy cVeighs'1 I"st as there were two *swalds' wo"ld s"ggest a sophisticated intelligence operation' one that was designed to p"t cVeigh in the wrong place at the wrong time. !ike *swald' cVeigh probably believed himself to be a government agent' part of a secret proIect. !ike *swald' cVeigh was not told what the plan really involved' and was trapped' framed' and made a patsy. This goes a long way towards explaining why an armed cVeigh didn5t shoot and kill *fficer Charles /anger when he was stopped on the Interstate after the bombing. <hy wo"ld a man who had I"st killed :FB men' women' and children balk at killing a cop #a member of the system that cVeigh allegedly hated& on a lonely stretch of highwayM The only possible answer is that cVeigh believed he was part of a sting operation @ a government asset @ and wo"ld be protected. <hatever cVeigh5s act"al p"rpose and intent' it is c"rio"s' to say the least' that Ted ,hackley wo"ld tell 05=erdinand Carone that the perpetrator of the bombing was somebody from here.

/ow did he knowM Hoger oore' the mysterio"s g"n dealer whom the government claimed cVeigh and (ichols robbed to 1finance1 the bombing' ran a company next to 7ahia ar arina in ,o"th =lorida #a pop"lar hang)o"t for the Iran)Contra crowd&' which man"fact"red high)speed boats. The boats @ sold thro"gh Intercontinental Ind"stries of Costa Hica #an *llie (orth 1c"t)o"t1& @ were "sed to mine (icarag"a5s harbors in 1*peration Cordova /arbor.1[::D:] *ne so"rce I spoke to said oore had direct contact with *liver (orth. 1I don5t know who his [ oore5s] contact was on Iran)Contra beyond 0on Aranow. I know he had access and wo"ld talk directly to *liver (orth. /e knew =elix Hodri$"e- pretty well' he knew (ester ,anche-' anny 0ia-' all those g"ys aro"nd Aeb [7"sh] pretty well.1 This so"rce also claimed that oore was a 1paymaster1 for Tom %osey5s Civilian ilitary Assistance #C A& @ the covert paramilitary operation that served as the primary nex"s for arming the Contras. A retired CIAN0IA agent I spoke to in Arkansas' said 1[ oore] was an Agency contractor.1 *ther so"rces say oore was an informant for the =7I. /e allegedly tried to sell heavy weapons to the ilitia of ontana # * & as part of an =7I sting operation. A call to * indicated that oore had indeed stopped by for a friendly chat. /e told Handy Trochmann' one of * 5s leaders' that he was traveling the co"ntry meeting with militia gro"ps in an attempt to verify black helicopter sightings and r"mors of 6( troop movements. This seems a pec"liar pastime for a man who worked for a network of spooks devoted to bypassing and s"bverting the Constit"tion.[::D2]J <hat is also pec"liar is a letter written by oore to cVeigh in early :BBD. Introd"ced at the trial of Terry (ichols' the letter' speaks of 1a planY to bring the co"ntry down and have a few more things happen.1[::D>] Hobert 17"d1 c=arlane went on to form his own cons"lting firm' and Ioined the board of American +$"ity Investors #A+I&' fo"nded by %rescott 7"sh. A+I5s board of directors reads like a <ho5s <ho of the spook world' incl"ding former CIA officials George Clairmont and /oward /ebert' and CIA lawyer itch Hogovin' who was George 7"sh5s legal co"nsel when he was 0irector of the Agency.[::D4] A+I invested in a T"lsa' *klahoma company. /awkins *il and Gas' from :BEE to :BB:. c=arlane was a 1cons"ltant1 for /awkins and several other companies on the +ch power proIect in %akistan' which re$"ired fre$"ent trips to that co"ntry.[::DD] This was d"ring the tail end of the largest covert operation the 6.,. ever cond"cted @ the arming of the "Iahadeen' who trained in %akistan. c=arlane sat on the 123E Committee'1 who5s Iob it was to proc"re weapons for the "Iahadeen' and arms contracts for the %akistani government.

Hecall that Hichard Armitage' who was the contact for =a-oe /a$' governor of the (orthwest =rontier %rovince' also sat on the 123E Committee.1 As Alfred A. cCoy writes in The %olitics of /eroin in ,o"theast Asia. It5s known that the CIA paid the Afghan g"errillas' who were based in %akistan' thro"gh 7CCI. Y That the %akistan military were in fact banking their dr"g profits' moving their dr"g profits from the cons"ming co"ntry back to %akistan tho"gh 7CCI. In fact the boom in the %akistan dr"g trade was financed by 7CCI.Y 7CCI also served as a cond"it for the Iran)Contra operation' largely thro"gh Gaith %haron' former head of ,a"di Intelligence' who operated o"t of Islamabad' %akistan. The ,a"dis played a maIor role in f"nding the "Iahadeen and [via the re$"est of ,ecord and c=arlane] the Contras. c=arlane @ who former ossad official Ari 7en enashe claims is a ossad asset @ worked with the president of /awkins5 International 0ivision' "Ieeb Hehman Cheema' on the +ch proIect. <as /ani ;amal5s s"pposed statement that ;halid was connected to the ossad acc"rateM A prominent "slim comm"nity leader' Cheema claims he does not know ,am ;halid.[::DF] Interestingly' Gagan said that at one point' Terry (ichols rende-vo"sed with his iddle +astern friends at the Islamic society of (evada. Cheema is chairman of the Islamic ,ociety of T"lsa. Is there a connectionM And what of Cheema5s links to c=arlaneM <as c=arlane "sing /awkins as a front for CIA activities in %akistanM It is perhaps prophetic that many of the terrorists implicated in the maIor bombings of the last decade attended the terrorist conference held in the (orthwest =rontier %rovince town of ;onli' %akistan in A"ly of :BBF. As noted' *sama bin !adin' a ,a"di who f"nded the "Iahadeen and was implicated in the Hiyadh and 0hahran bombings' #a close associate of ,heik Abdel *mar Hahman' implicated in the <orld Trade Center bombing&' Ahmed Aibril #who bombed %an Am :3>&' and senior representatives of Iranian and %akistani intelligence' and /amas' /i-bAllah' and other gro"ps attended the conference.[::DC] ,tephen Aones claimed he had learned thro"gh the ,a"di Arabian Intelligence ,ervice that Ira$ had hired seven %akistani mercenaries @ "Iahadeen veterans @ to bomb targets in the 6.,.' one of which was the Alfred %. "rrah 7"ilding.[::DE] A"st who were these 1%akistani mercenaries'1 and were they really working for Ira$M

The 3ea)l' 89peration Phoenix8

$his is the carnage o- 7im 7ones4 Peoples $emple in G!yana, %o!th America8

'ndependent investigators no, believe this to have been an e*perimental death, tort!re, and brain,ashing camp clandestinely r!n by the 'A8$o cover !p their atrocities, the 'A ordered an assassin team to go in and .ill 7ones and his -ollo,ers8 $he G!yana coroner reported that most died og!nshot ,o!nds, not cyanide poisoning8

by Texe

arrs

http.NNwww.texemarrs.comN In Vietnam' in the F3s and C3s' the 6nited ,tates really got its concentration camp program in high gear. The CIA and 6.,. Army special "nits set "p a string of tort"re and death camps thro"gho"t ,o"th Vietnam. The program was called "Operation Phoenix." ,ometimes' entire villages and towns were targeted for extinction. y !ai was one s"ch village' and 6.,. Army !t. <illiam Calley and his soldiers carried o"t orders and wiped o"t h"ndreds of men' women and children at y !ai. A"st like in (a-i Germany and ,talinist H"ssia' the genocidal b"tchers of the 6.,.A. "sed the best of statistical and high tech methods in their Vietnamese concentration camp program. 0eath $"otas had to be f"lfilled by village chiefs' local political b"rea"crats and lower)level commanders.

As 0o"g Valentine points o"t in his powerf"lly doc"mented book' The Phoenix Program' 1ne"trali-ation $"otas p"t on them meant they had to sentence so many people a month regardless. And God' if yo" ever saw those prisonsT1 In Hostages of War' 0on !"ce also examines the perverse %hoenix %rogram' reco"nting its massive and "nI"stifiable "se of tort"re' repression' and assassination. ost victims' he notes' were innocent' bro"ght in only after a nosey neighbor' village gossipper' or family enemy falsely reported them to a"thorities as a potential threat to sec"rity. any were acc"sed of saying something they sho"ldn5t have said' or of 1ins"fficient s"pport1 for the political system. 7oth Valentine and !"ce say this demented brainchild system came straight o"t of The Company #the CIA& in !angley' Virginia. Comp"ters were "sed by the th"gs that ran it' and everyone in a"thority' from the military officials' to the 6.,. Ambassador' the b"rea"crats of the ,tate 0epartment' and the occ"pants of the <hite /o"se' knew of Phoenix. 7"t@consider this@the American people knew little or nothing abo"t %hoenix. And to this day' over three decades later' the press #C7,' (7C' A7C' <ashington %ost' etc.& still ref"se to report the facts. Those who scoff at the very word' 1conspiracy'1 better rethink things. /ow often have yo" heard the fa"lty rhetoric' 1*h' I don5t believe in conspiracies. If that was tr"e' why don5t I read abo"t it in the newspaper or see it exposed on the TV newsM1 ,"re' I"st the way Phoenix was so co"rageo"sly exposed by o"r bold Io"rnalists' h"hM

1+verything

"st Change1

Investigators fo"nd this rail car' e$"ipped with shackles' parked in an isolated area on the train tracks. It appears to be designed to transport prisoners. In my video' Gulag USA' yo" will see I"st how close we are to that scary night when the Iackbooted th"gs of America5s r"thless new ,pecial =orces Gestapo will begin breaking down doors and ha"ling Christians and patriots off to the camps. These g"lag camps are already b"ilt. They are being f"rnished with the most heino"s of tort"re devices. ,ome will be e$"ipped with g"illotines and crematoria. Th"mbscrews' cattle prods' branding irons' sk"ll cr"shers' tong"e clamps' and microchip implantation devices will be "sed in dark d"ngeons of tort"re and death. 7"sh' Ashcroft' Tenet and the boys are preparing the way' conditioning the mass p"blic' ro"sing fear and alarm' declaring that cell after cell of domestic and foreign terrorists are o"t there' 1plotting more crimes of infamy.1 If necessary' <ashington' 0.C. tells "s' the Constit"tion m"st be shelved. The need for the peoples5 sec"rity and safety make the 7ill of Hights anti$"ated and obsolete. Tort"re' also' m"st be made acceptable say Aewish lawyers like (ew Oork5s Alan 0ershowit- and associates. 0"ring the =rench Hevol"tion' as the asonicN Ill"minist plotters omino"sly ro"nded "p frightened legions of bewildered men' women' and children targeted for rape' tort"re' mass drownings' and the g"illotine' the revol"tionary leaders of the government in %aris' led by Hobespierre' Voltaire' and other Ill"minists' cried o"t "Everything now is different. Everything has hanged. !iberty re"uires a tion. #arpe $iem% &'ei(e the day%)" !isten closely' my friends'

for that same' fatal cry is being lo"dly cried o"t' even today' in the 6.,.A. And the same devils are behind it.

Na:i killing o; ci ilians

[back] %hoenix programme

[/itler and the (a-i5s were ,atanic' which was where he obtained his power and oration ability from :. *ne of it5s trademarks is /"man ,acrifice' hence the killing and terrorising of civilians))) energy and negative emotions)))food for reptilians :.]

The roots of the CIA %hoenix programme))the (a-is.

[233B] (otorio"s ,, "nit 5traced5 7ritish historian (orman 0avies estimates that on I"st A"g"st D alone some >D'333 men' women and children were killed in cold blood. Given a free rein by ,, commander)in)chief /einrich /immler' 0irlewanger5s men also participated in gang rape' tort"re and the practice of bayoneting babies as a way of striking terror into %oles.

#$A Na:i connections

[back] CIA

[The roots of the (a-i5s and their e"genic5s programme lie in the 6,A #f"nded by Hockefeller& as revealed by +dwin 7lack' yo" can see the (a-i symbols' =asces in yo"r face now. Ill"minati bankers created them and carried on f"nding them thro"gho"t the war :. ,o it was to be expected that the CIA wo"ld import their kin from Germany after the war)))):D33 (a-i doctors and researchers "nder *peration %aperclip' some of them went into the n"clear ind"stry in !os Alamos' b"t many of them were placed in key positions in hospitals and in medical research facilities' both in the 6nited ,tates and in Canada' eg engele went into ;6ltra while <ernher von 7ra"n headed "p (A,A. =rit- ;raemer for many years was %lans *fficer at the %entagon. ae 7r"ssell identified him as 1("mber *ne1 most powerf"l person in the 6nited ,tates. ,he s"spected that he was the very same =rit- ;raemer who was very high "p in /itler5s regime and personally responsible for extremely strategic fascist atrocities in <<II General Heinhard Gehlen was /itler?s Chief of Intelligence against H"ssia. 6pon arriving in <ashington 0.C. in :B4D' Gehlen met extensively with %resident Tr"man' General <illiam 8<ild 7ill9 0onovan' 0irector of the *ffice of ,trategic ,ervices #*,,& and Allen 0"lles' who wo"ld later become the stalwart head of the CIA. Gehlen ret"rned to <est Germany in the s"mmer of :B4F with a mandate to reb"ild his espionage organi-ation and res"me spying on the +ast at the behest of American intelligence. ,o it is no s"rprise to find the CIA has behaved like the (a-is with F million deaths to their name' along with sla"ghter of civilians' mostly women and children #operation %hoenix&' which was what the ,, "sed to do as a matter of co"rse :' along with heino"s mind control 5experiments5 that are based on the tort"re of children.]

See. (a-i connections to Allopathy (a-i killing of civilians S"otes re /itler %aperclip

See. H"din
[ller

engele Versch"er Goebbels

engele' Aoseph Heinhardt Gehlen /itler /einrich

[vid] /ow the CIA was hiIacked by the (a-is and their s"pporters in Corporate America =rom the book 1America5s (a-i ,ecret1 0eathbed confessions' photos s"pport claims that George /. ,cherf#f&' Ar.' was the 4:st 6.,. president 7y 0on (icoloff Berman reco!nted ho, %.orzeny ,as -o!nd 9not g!ilty: at the +!remb!rg trials, and then !shered into the 'A8 9%ome ;2,222< %8%8 +azi ,ar criminals, not =!st roc.et scientists, ,ere bro!ght to America a-ter the ,ar8:
$he 'A4s Man> $he %trei.her hronology o- &elmet

[233:] <*H,T ;+%T ,+CH+T, *= T/+ 76 7!I(G 7+AH ) the CIAN(AVI marriage [233:] The CIA5s <orst);ept ,ecret. (ewly 0eclassified =iles Confirm 6nited ,tates Collaboration with (a-is [:BE4] The (a-i Connection to the Aohn =. ;ennedy Assassination by ae 7r"ssell *peration %aperclip ass Graves *f Children =o"nd (ear ontrealL Another 0"plessis *rphan Tells *f 7eing Tort"red As A Child In CIA +xperimentaion %rograms 6sing (a-i 0octor [ edia] 7ritish nerve gas death tests Phad (a-i scientists? =ord and the =[hrer 7y ;en ,ilverstein [Interview with Gregory 0o"glas] [ller' chief of the Gestapo' was officially listed as killed d"ring the final days of <orld <ar II 0eathbed confessions' photos s"pport claims that George /. ,cherf#f&' Ar.' was the 4:st 6.,. president 7y 0on (icoloff

Book
America5s (a-i ,ecret. An Insider5s /istory by Aohn !oft"s

Quotes
I provide hard' doc"mented evidence of the direct involvement of ex)(a-is at the very highest levels of (A,A. 2& I provide doc"mented evidence of the direct ties between military intelligence personnel' the Army Intelligence agency' and the onroe Instit"te' a (ew Age

sacred cow for many people. >& I provide doc"mented evidence of the sort of electronic mind control technologies that are now available )) like a patent that permits the direct' electronic transmission of voices into the h"man a"ditory cortex via p"lsed microwaves. 4& I talk abo"t the k"ndalini )) the nat"ral' cosmic' s"premely powerf"l spirit"al power that is in all h"man beings. D& And' I talk abo"t the o"t)of)body phenomenon. Too 5Conspiratorial5 =or ,trieberT ,h"nned by 0reamland 7y Hichard ,a"der' %h.0.

!' (ai massacre

[back] Vietnam war

[back] %hoenix programme

[A %hoenix operation. The m"rder of D34 civilians' primarily women and children' incl"ding infants' on arch :F' :BFE. any of the victims were sex"ally ab"sed' beaten' tort"red' or maimed' and some of the bodies were fo"nd m"tilated.] Civilian deaths in ,o"th Vietnam from :BFD "ntil :BC> are estimated at :.D million

Book
The y !ai assacre and Its Cover)6p. 7eyond the Heach of !awM . The %eers Commission Heport by Aoseph Goldstein' <illiam H. %eers' 7"rke arshall' Aack ,chwart-' 6nited ,tates 0epartment of the Army #Corporate A"thor&

Quotes
*n A"g"st 2D' :BC3' an article appeared in The (ew Oork Times hinting that the CIA' thro"gh %hoenix' was responsible for y !ai. The story line was advanced on *ctober :4' when defense attorneys for 0avid itchell @ a sergeant acc"sed and later cleared of machine)g"nning scores of Vietnamese in a drainage ditch in y !ai @ citing %hoenix as the CIA?s 8systematic program of assassination'9 named +van %arker as the CIA officer who 8signed doc"ments' certain blacklists'9 of Vietnamese to be assassinated in y !ai. <hen we spoke' %arker denied the charge. ......As in any large)scale %hoenix operation' two of Task =orce 7arker?s companies cordoned off the hamlet while a third one @ Calley?s @ moved in' clearing the way for ;oto"c and ,pecial 7ranch officers who were 8bro"ght to the field to identify VC from among the detained inhabitants.9 .....The CIA' via %hoenix' not only perpetrated the y !ai massacre b"t also concealed the crime. ....As Aeff ,tein said' 8The first thing yo" learn in the Army is not competence' yo" learn corr"ption. And yo" learn Pto get along' go along.?9 6nfort"nately not everyone learns to get along. *n ,eptember >' :BEE' Hobert T?,o"vas was apparently shot in the head by his girl friend' after an arg"ment over a bottle of vodka. The two were homeless' living o"t of a van they had parked "nder a bridge in %ittsb"rgh. T?,o"vas was a Vietnam veteran and a participant in the y !ai massacre. .....T?,o"vas?s attorney' George 0avis' traveled to 0a (ang in :BC3 to investigate the massacre and while there was assigned as an aide a Vietnamese colonel who said that the massacre was a %hoenix operation and that the p"rpose of %hoenix was 8to terrori-e the civilian pop"lation into s"bmission.9 0avis told me. 8<hen I told the people in the <ar 0epartment what I knew and that I wo"ld attempt to obtain all records on the program in order to defend my client' they agreed to drop the charges.9 .....7art *sborn #whose agent net ,tein inherited& is more specific. 8I never knew in the co"rse of all those operations any detainee to live thro"gh his interrogation'9 *sborn testified before Congress in :BC:. 8They all died. There was never any reasonable establishment of the fact that any one of those individ"als was' in fact' cooperating with the VC' b"t they all died and the maIority were wither tort"red to death or things like thrown o"t of helicopters.9 [book extract] The y !ai assacre and The 8Tiger Cages9 by 0o"glas Valentine 7"t the American establishment and media denied it then' and contin"e to deny it "ntil today' beca"se %hoenix was a genocidal program )) and the CIA officials' members of the media who were complicit thro"gh their silence' and the red)blooded American boys who carried it o"t' are all war criminals. As ichael Hatner a lawyer at the Center for Constit"tional Hights told Co"nter%"nch. 1;errey sho"ld be tried as a war criminal. /is actions on the night of =ebr"ary 24)2D' :BFB when the seven man (avy ,eal "nit which he headed killed approximately twenty "narmed Vietnamese civilians' eighteen of whom were women and children was a war crime. !ike those who m"rdered at y !ai' he too sho"ld be bro"ght into the dock and tried for his

crimes.1 ......A famo"s %hoenix operation' known as the y !ai assacre' was proceeding along smoothly' with a grand total of D34 Vietnamese women and children killed' when a soldier named /"gh Thompson in a helicopter g"nship saw what was happening. Hisking his life to preserve that 1social contract'1 Thomson landed his helicopter between the mass m"rderers and their victims' t"rned his machine g"ns on his fellow Americans' and bro"ght the carnage to a halt. .....It was the CIA that forced soldiers like ;errey into %hoenix operations' and the hidden hand of the CIA lingers over his war crime. ;errey even "ses the same rationale offered by CIA officer 0e,ilva. According to ;errey' 1the Viet Cong were a tho"sand per cent more r"thless than1 the ,eals or 6.,. Army. [233:] 7ob ;errey' CIA <ar Crimes' And The (eed =or A <ar Crimes Trial by 0o"glas Valentine

El !o:ote massacre
[back] +l ,alvador The +l o-ote assacre took place in the village of +l o-ote' in ora-\n department' +l ,alvador' on 0ecember ::' :BE:' when ,alvadoran armed forces trained by the 6nited ,tates military killed at least :333 civilians in an anti)g"errilla campaign. It is rep"ted to be the worst s"ch atrocity in modern !atin America history. [:BE2] assacre *f /"ndreds Heported In ,alvador Village

[2334] Haymond 7onner and the ,alvadoran Civil <ar :BE3 to :BE> 7y Aohn =. ;irch

Book
The assacre at +l o-ote by ark 0anner

External
The Tr"th of +l o-ote by ark 0anner

Quotes
H"fina co"ld not see the childrenL she co"ld only hear their cries as the soldiers waded into them' slashing some with their machetes' cr"shing the sk"lls of others with the b"tts of their rifles. any others @ the yo"ngest children' most below the age of twelve @ the soldiers herded from the ho"se of Alfredo \r$"e- across the street to the sacristy' p"shing them' crying and screaming' into the dark tiny room. There the soldiers raised their :Fs and emptied their maga-ines into the roomf"l of children. <hen they reached the playing field' 8there were maybe thirty children'9 he says. 8The soldiers were p"tting ropes on the trees. I was seven years old' and I didn?t really "nderstand what was happening "ntil I saw one of the soldiers take a kid he had been carrying @ the kid was maybe three years old @ throw him in the air' and stab him with a bayonet. 8They slit some of the kids? throats' and many they hanged from the tree. All of "s were crying now' b"t we were their prisoners @ there was nothing we co"ld do. The soldiers kept

telling "s' POo" are g"errillas and this is I"stice. This is I"stice.? =inally' there were only three of "s left. I watched them hang my brother. /e was two years old. I co"ld see I was going to be killed soon' and I tho"ght it wo"ld be better to die r"nning' so I ran. I slipped thro"gh the soldiers and dived into the b"shes. They fired into the b"shes' b"t none of their b"llets hit me.9 .....There was one in partic"lar the soldiers talked abo"t that evening #she is mentioned in the T"tela !egal report as well&. a girl on !a Cr"- whom they had raped many times d"ring the co"rse of the afternoon' and thro"gh it all' while the other women of +l o-ote had screamed and cried as if they had never had a man' this girl had s"ng hymns' strange evangelical songs' and she had kept right on singing' too' even after they had done what had to be done' and shot her in the chest. ,he had lain there on !a Cr"- with the blood flowing from her chest' and had kept on singing @ a bit weaker than before' b"t still singing. And the soldiers' st"pefied' had watched and pointed. Then they had grown tired of the game and shot her again' and she sang still' and their wonder began to t"rn to fear @ "ntil finally they had "nsheathed their machetes and hacked thro"gh her neck' and at last the singing had stopped. The Tr"th of +l o-ote by ark 0anner In some cases' as we saw later' in late :BE: of co"rse there was' what is now fairly well known' the massacre in +l a-ote. And this was a case where the first American trained battalion was sent o"t over Christmas time in :BE: into rebel controlled territory and it swept thro"gh this territory and killed everybody' everyone they co"ld find ) incl"ding the children. <hen two American reporters' Hay 7onner and Alma Aimapareta #M&' went to the scene of this atrocity in Aan"ary of :BE2' they were able to see some of what was left behind and they interviewed witnesses who had s"rvived' and came o"t with stories describing what they had fo"nd. This was of co"rse extremely "psetting to the Heagan administration' which at that time was abo"t to certify that the ,alvadoran military was showing respect for h"man rights' and that was necessary to get f"rther f"nding and weapons for the ,alvadoran military. And I was at those hearings which occ"rred afterwards' on the hill' and when Tom +nders who was then Assistant ,ecretary *f ,tate for Inter)American affairs gave his description of how the ,tate 0epartment had investigated this and had fo"nd really nothing had happened or that they had fo"nd no evidence of any mass killing' and they arg"ed with great cleverness that the last cens"s had not shown even that many people in +l a-ote ) there were not the E33 or so who were alleged to have been killed ) only 233 had lived there to begin with' and many still lived there' he said. *f co"rse it wasn5t tr"e' b"t it was' I g"ess in their view' necessary ) it was necessary to conceal what was going on. And' it became necessary then' to also discredit the Io"rnalists' so Haymond 7onner' and Alma and others' who were not accepting this story' had to be made to seem to be liars. They had to be destroyed. And the administration began developing their techni$"es' which they always were very good at ) they were extremely good at p"blic relations' that5s what5s they had ) many of them had come from ) the %resident himself had been an advertising fig"re for General +lectric ) and they were very adept at how to present things in the most favorable way for them. [:BB>] =ooling America. A talk by Hobert %arry

The Truth of El 9o-ote

:" (ark Danner

6EADI)% up into the mountains of 9ora-Vn$ in the bright$ !lear air near the 6onduran border$ you !ross the Torola 7iver$
the wooden slats of the one(lane bridge !lattering beneath your wheels$ and enter what was the fier!est of El SalvadorWs -onas ro<as , or Xred -ones$Y as the military offi!ers #new them during a de!ade of !ivil war , and after !limbing for some time you ta#e leave of the worn bla!#top to follow for several miles a bone(<arring dirt tra!# that hugs a mountainside$ and soon you will find$ among ruined towns and long(abandoned villages that are !oming slowly$ painfully ba!# to life$ a tiny hamlet$ by now little more than a s!attering of ruins$ that is being rapidly re!laimed by the earth$ its bro#en adobe walls !ra!#ing and !rumbling and giving way before an onslaught of weeds$ whi!h are fuelled by the rain that beats down ea!h afternoon and by the fog that settles heavily at night in the valleys. )earby$ in the long(depopulated villages$ you !an see stirrings of lifeG even in Arambala$ a mile or so away$ with its broad grassy pla-a bordered by !ollapsed buildings and dominated$ where on!e a fine !hur!h stood$ by a shell(po!#ed bell tower and a <agged adobe ar!h looming against the s#y , even here$ a boy leads a brown !ow by a rope$ a man in a billed !ap and blue<eans trudges along bearing lengths of lumber on his shoulder$ three little girls stand on tiptoe at a por!h railing$ waving and giggling at a passing !ar.

$n a remote corner o% E! Sa!vador0 investi#ators uncovered the remains o% a horri.!e crime 1 a crime that Washin#ton had !on# denied2 The vi!!a#ers o% E! Mo3ote had the mis%ortune to %ind themse!ves in the path o% the Sa!vadoran Army4s anti5 Communist crusade2 The story o% the massacre at E! Mo3ote 1 how it came a.out0 and hy it had to .e denied 1 stands as a centra! para.!e o% the Co!d War2

But follow the stony dirt tra!#$ whi!h turns and twists through the woodland$ and in a few minutes you enter a large !learing$ and here all is quiet. )o one has returned to El 9o-ote. Empty as it is$ shot through with sunlight$ the pla!e remains , as a young guerrilla who had patrolled here during the war told me with a shiver , espantosoG spoo#y$ s!ary$ dreadful. After a momentWs ga-e$ half a do-en battered stru!tures , roofless$ doorless$ windowless$ half engulfed by underbrush , resolve themselves into a semblan!e of patternG four ruins off to the right must have mar#ed the main street$ and a fifth the beginning of a side lane$ while an open area opposite loo#s to have been a !ommon$ though no !hur!h !an be seen , only a ragged #noll$ a sort of earthen platform nearly invisible beneath a great tangle of weeds and brush. Into this quiet !learing$ in mid(:!tober last year$ a !onvoy of four(wheel drives and pi!#up tru!#s rumbled$ disgorging into the !enter of El 9o-ote a s!ore of outsiders. Some of these men and women , most of them young$ and !asually dressed in T( shirts and <eans and wor# pants , began dumping out into the dust a glinting !lutter of ma!hetes$ pi!#s$ and hoes. :thers gathered around the hillo!#$ !onsulted !lipboards and noteboo#s and maps$ po#ed around in the man(high brush. Dinally$ they too# up ma!hetes and began to ha!# at the weeds$ being !areful not to pull any$ lest the movement of the roots disturb what lay beneath. Chopping and ha!#ing in the morning sun$ they un!overed$ bit by bit$ a mass of red(brown soil$ and before long they had revealed an earthen mound protruding several feet from the ground$ li#e a lopsided bluff$ and barely !ontained at its base by a low stone wall.

They pounded sta#es into the ground and mar#ed off the mound with bright(yellow tapeH they stret!hed lengths of twine this
way and that to divide it into quadranglesH they brought out tape measures and rulers and levels to re!ord its dimensions and map its !ontours. And then they began to dig. At first$ they loosened the earth with hoes$ too# it up in shovels$ dumped it into plasti! pails$ and poured it onto a s!reen large enough to require several people to sha#e it ba!# and forth. As they dug deeper$ they e>!hanged these tools for smaller$ more pre!ise onesG hand shovels$ trowels$ brushes$ dustpans$ s!reens. Slowly$ painsta#ingly$ they dug and sifted$ ma#ing their way through the several feet of earth and !rumbled adobe , remnants of a buildingWs walls , and$ by the end of the se!ond day$ rea!hing wood(beam splinters and tile shards$ many now bla!#ened by fire$ that had formed the buildingWs roof. Then$ late on the afternoon of the third day$ as they !rou!hed low over the ground and stro#ed with tiny brushes to draw away bits of reddish dust$ dar#ened forms began to emerge from the earth$ ta#ing shape in the soil li#e fossils embedded in stoneH and soon they #new that they had begun to find$ in the northeast !orner of the ruined sa!risty of the !hur!h of Santa Catarina of El 9o-ote$ the s#ulls of those who had on!e worshipped there. By the ne>t afternoon$ the wor#ers had un!overed twenty(five of them$ and all but two were the s#ulls of !hildren. "ater that afternoon$ the leaders of the team , four young e>perts from the Argentine Dorensi! Anthropology +nit$ who had gained a worldwide reputation for having e>humed sites of massa!res in %uatemala and Bolivia and ;anama and Iraq$ as well as in their own !ountry , piled into their white four(wheel(drive vehi!le and followed the bumpy$ stony road out of El 9o-ote &the Thistle'. Slowly$ they drove through Arambala$ waving to the smiling little girls standing on their por!h$ and out onto the !alle negra , the Xbla!# roadY , whi!h tra!ed its way up the spine of the red -one$ stret!hing north from the !ity of San Dran!is!o %otera to the mountain town of ;erquFn$ not far from the 6onduran border. At the bla!# road$ the Argentines turned left$ as they did ea!h evening$ heading down to %otera$ but this time they stopped in front of a small house , a hut$ really$ made of s!rap wood and sheet metal and set among banana trees some fifteen yards from the road. %etting out of the !ar$ they !limbed through the barbed wire and !alled out$ and soon there appeared at the door a middle(aged woman$ heavyset$ with high !hee#bones$ strong features$ and a powerful air of dignity. In some e>!itement$ the Argentines told her what they had found that day. The woman listened silently$ and when they had finished she paused$ then spo#e.

X)o les di<eFY she as#ed. &XDidnWt I tell youFY' XSi sZlo se o[a aquella gran grita-Zn.Y &XAll you !ould hear was that enormous s!reaming.Y' Dor eleven years$ 7ufina Amaya 9[rque- had served the world as the most eloquent witness of what had happened at El 9o-ote$ but though she had told her story again and again$ mu!h of the world had refused to believe her. In the polari-ed and brutal world of wartime El Salvador$ the newspapers and radio stations simply ignored what 7ufina had to say$ as they habitually ignored unpalatable a!!ounts of how the government was prose!uting the war against the leftist rebels. In the +nited States$ however$ 7ufinaWs a!!ount of what had happened at El 9o-ote appeared on the front pages of the ashington ;ost and the )ew Oor# Times$ at the very moment when members of Congress were bitterly debating whether they should !ut off aid to a Salvadoran regime so desperate that it had apparently resorted to the most savage methods of war. El 9o-ote seemed to epitomi-e those methods$ and in ashington the story heralded what be!ame perhaps the !lassi! debate of the late Cold arG between those who argued that$ given the geopoliti!al sta#es in Central Ameri!a$ the +nited States had no !hoi!e but to go on supporting a XfriendlyY regime$ however disreputable it might seem$ be!ause the alternative , the possibility of another Communist vi!tory in the region , was !learly worse$ and those who insisted that the !ountry must be willing to wash its hands of what had be!ome a morally !orrupting struggle. 7ufinaWs story !ame to ashington <ust when the !ountryWs paramount Cold ar national(se!urity !on!erns were !lashing , as loudly and unambiguously as they ever would during four de!ades , with its professed high(minded respe!t for human rights. In the +nited States$ the free press was not to be deniedG El 9o-ote was reportedH 7ufinaWs story was toldH the angry debate in Congress intensified. But then the 7epubli!an Administration$ burdened as it was with the heavy duties of national se!urity$ denied that any !redible eviden!e e>isted that a massa!re had ta#en pla!eH and the Demo!rati! Congress$ after denoun!ing$ yet again$ the murderous abuses of the Salvadoran regime$ in the end a!!epted the AdministrationWs X!ertifi!ationY that its ally was nonetheless ma#ing a Xsignifi!ant effort to !omply with internationally re!ogni-ed human rights.Y The flow of aid went on$ and soon in!reased.

By early 0114$ when a pea!e agreement between the government and the guerrillas was finally signed$ Ameri!ans had spent
more than four billion dollars funding a !ivil war that had lasted twelve years and left seventy(five thousand Salvadorans dead. By then$ of !ourse$ the bitter fight over El 9o-ote had largely been forgottenH ashington had turned its ga-e to other pla!es and other things. Dor most Ameri!ans$ El Salvador had long sin!e slipped ba!# into obs!urity. But El 9o-ote may well have been the largest massa!re in modern "atin(Ameri!an history. That in the +nited States it !ame to be #nown$ that it was e>posed to the light and then allowed to fall ba!# into the dar#$ ma#es the story of El 9o-ote , how it !ame to happen and how it !ame to be denied , a !entral parable of the Cold ar. In the wee#s that followed the dis!overy of the s#ulls of the !hildren$ as ea!h dayWs wor# at El 9o-ote yielded up a fresh harvest$ the initial numbers !ame to seem small. But in San Salvador$ five hours by road to the west$ where ;resident Alfredo Cristiani and the generals and the guerrillas(turned(politi!ians were struggling with one another about how to put in pla!e$ or not put in pla!e$ a purge of the offi!er !orps$ whi!h was proving to be the most diffi!ult provision of the ten(month(old pea!e a!!ord , struggling$ that is$ over what #ind of Xre!on!iliationY would !ome to pass in El Salvador after more than a de!ade of savage war , the first s#ulls of the !hildren were enough to provo#e a poisonous !ontroversy. Those twenty(three s#ulls$ and the nearly one hundred more that were un!overed in the su!!eeding days$ were a!!ommodated by the nas!ent Salvadoran body politi! in two ways. 9embers of human(rights groups &those members$ that is$ who had survived the war'$ along with the politi!ians of the left &many of whom had been guerrillas shortly before'$ hailed the dis!overy as definitive eviden!e that a matan-a , a great #illing , had ta#en pla!e in 9ora-Vn$ and that what they had been saying for eleven years had at last been proved true. 9embers of the government$ on the other hand$ and various military offi!ers found themselves for!ed to !on!ede that something had indeed happened in 9ora-Vn$ but they insisted that the situation was more !ompli!ated than it appeared. Dr. Cuan 9ateu "lort$ the dire!tor of El SalvadorWs Institute of Dorensi! 9edi!ine$ de!lared that the s#ulls themselves proved nothing$ for Xthere were an abundan!e of armed !hildren in the guerrillas.Y El Diario de 6oy$ an influential right(wing daily$ published a re!onstru!tion a!!ording to whi!h guerrillas had Xbarri!aded themselves in what seemed to have been a religious !enter and from there opened fire on the troops$ ma#ing the deaths of !hildren$ women and old people possible.Y ;resident

CristianiWs government$ already under atta!# for stalling in the dismissal of senior offi!ers$ maintained its position that no re!ords e>isted of any Army operation in 9ora-Vn in early De!ember of 0120. And yet on the ninth day of that month any reader of "a ;rensa %rVfi!a$ one of San SalvadorWs ma<or dailies$ !ould have learned that Xall the highways with a!!ess to %otera and the other towns in the Department of 9ora-Vn are under stri!t military !ontrol \ )o vehi!les or individuals are permitted to enter the -ones of !onfli!t in order to avoid a!!idents or misunderstandings \ )either was the entry of <ournalists or individuals permitted.Y The Department of 9ora-Vn had been sealed off from the rest of the !ountry. Dour thousand men$ drawn from the se!urity for!es , the )ational %uard and the Treasury ;oli!e , and from regular units of the Salvadoran Army$ were hard at wor#. The area north of the Torola 7iver$ the heart of the red -one$ was alive with the thud of mortars$ the !latter of small(arms fire$ and the intermittent roar of heli!opters. Two days before$ :pera!iFn 7es!ate , :peration 7es!ue , had begun. 9any of the towns and villages were already emptyH during and after Army operations of the previous spring and fall$ thousands of peasants had left their homes and begun a long tre# over the mountains to the 6onduran border and refugee !amps beyond. :f those who remained$ many made it a pra!ti!e$ at the first sign of any Army approa!h$ to leave their villages and hide in the !aves and ravines and gullies that honey!ombed the mountainous region. But El 9o-ote was !rowdedH in the days before :peration 7es!ue$ people from the outlying areas had flooded into the hamlet. X9any people were passing by the house$ saying$ ]Come on$ letWs go to El 9o-ote$W Y an old peasant named Sebastiano "una told me as he stood behind the yellow tape$ wat!hing the e>perts bent low over the brown earth of the sa!risty of Santa Catarina. Between their feet lay an e>panse of dar# rubble$ a miniature lands!ape of hills and ridges and valleys in every shade of brown. It too# a moment or two to distinguish$ among the dirty(brown hillo!#s$ the s#ulls and parts of s#ulls$ ea!h mar#ed with a bit of red tape and a numberH and$ beneath the s#ulls and s#ull fragments and the earthen rubble$ s!ores of small brown bundles$ heaped one on top of another$ twisted together$ the material so impregnated with blood and soil that it !ould no longer be re!ogni-ed as !lothing. Amid the rubble in the northeast !orner of the tiny room that had been !alled el !onvento &though it was really a #ind of !ombined sa!risty and parish house$ in whi!h an itinerant priest$ when he visited the hamlet$ would vest himself$ and sometimes$ perhaps$ stay the night'$ a dar#(haired young woman in denim overalls was #neeling. She slowly drew a small bundle toward her , it had beenlabelled )o. 31 , and began$ with almost agoni-ing gentleness$ e>tra!ting the brown bits and pla!ing them on a sheet of !ardboard. X"eft tibia$ fragments only$Y she sang out in a low monotone. X=ertebrae$ one$ two$ three \ si> of them \ Tibia$ left$ I thin# \ 9eta!arpals ...Y )ow she disentangled the bits of ruined fabri!G XBelt of brown leather$ metal bu!#le \ ;ants$ light in !olor$ with pat!hes of blue and green !olor in the posterior part \ In the pants po!#et \ ah \ um \Y The strong voi!e too# an odd slide downward and stopped. :ver her shoulder$ I saw her staring at something in her palm$ then heard her swear in a low voi!eG X6i<o de puta^Y She turned and opened her hand to reveal a tiny figureG a little horse of bright(orange plasti!. )o. 31 had been a lu!#y !hild$ had had a family prosperous enough to provide a lu!#y toy.

After a moment$ the anthropologist 9er!edes Doretti said$ X:rdinarily$ we !ould use this for identifi!ation. I mean$ even after
eleven years$ any mother would re!ogni-e this as her #idWs$ you #nowFY She loo#ed ba!# at )o. 31 and then at the brown rubble. XBut here$ here they #illed all the mothers$ too.Y Behind the yellow tape$ Sebastiano "una and his wife$ Alba Igna!ia del Cid$ stood silent amid a #not of peasants$ wat!hing. They had wal#ed from their small house$ several miles outside El 9o-ote$ where the dirt tra!# <oins the bla!# road. Eleven years before$ in early De!ember$ s!ores of people were passing by their house$ pulling their !hildren along by the hand$ laboring under the weight of their belongings. XCome with us^Y they had !alled out to the old !ouple. XCome with us to El 9o-ote^Y The afternoon before$ the people of El 9o-ote had gathered$ some fifty yards from the !hur!h$ in front of the general store of

9ar!os D[a-$ the ri!hest man in town. 6e had summoned the townspeople$ neighbors and !ustomers all$ and when they had assembled , perhaps a !ouple of hundred of them$ the men in !aps and straw hats and the women in bright(!olored s#irts$ holding !hildren in their arms , 9ar!os D[a- addressed them from his doorway. 6e had <ust !ome up the mountain from his regular buying trip to San 9iguel$ he said$ and as he was waiting at the !he!#point in %otera$ at the entran!e to the red -one$ an offi!er in the town had greeted him , 9ar!os D[a-$ an important man$ had friends among the offi!ers , and then pulled him aside for a little tal#. D[a- would do well to sto!# up$ the offi!er said$ for soon the Army would laun!h a large operation in 9ora-Vn$ and Xnothing and no oneY would be permitted to enter or leave the -one. But his friend D[a- neednWt worry$ the offi!er assured him. The people of El 9o-ote would have no problems , provided they stayed where they were. In the street that day$ these words of 9ar!os D[a-Ws set off a debate. Some townspeople wanted to head for the mountains immediately$ for the war had lately been !oming !loser to the hamletH only the wee# before$ a plane had dropped two bombs near El 9o-ote$ damaging its one(room s!hool$ and though no one had been hurt$ the people had been terrified. XA lot of people wanted to leave , there was a lot of fear$Y 7ufina Amaya said when I visited her a year ago. XAnd a few people did leave. 9y godfather left$ with his family. 9y !hildren were !rying. They said$ ]9ama$ letWs go.W Y But 9ar!os D[a-$ a man of influen!e$ had put his prestige on the line$ and he insisted that his neighbors would be safe only if they stayed in their homes , that if they left the hamlet they and their families ris#ed being !aught up in the operation. XThat was the lie$Y 7ufina Amaya told me. XThat was the betrayal. :therwise$ people would have left.Y In the end$ 9ar!os D[a-Ws prestige de!ided the issue. Though the debate went on that afternoon and into the following morning$ most of the people of El 9o-ote finally a!!epted his assuran!es. They had seen soldiers before$ after allH soldiers often passed through on patrol and sometimes bought supplies in El 9o-ote. :nly the month before$ soldiers had !ome during an operation and o!!upied El Chingo and "a Cru-$ two hills overloo#ing the town$ and though the people of El 9o-ote !ould hear mortars and s!attered shooting in the distan!e$ the soldiers had not bothered them. In the !ra-y(quilt map of northern 9ora-Vn in 0120$ where villages XbelongedY to the government or to the guerrillas or to neither or both$ where the offi!ers saw the towns and hamlets in varying shades of pin# and red$ El 9o-ote had not been #nown as a guerrilla town. XThe Army spent a lot of time around here$Y 7ufina told me. X e all sold them food. If the soldiers were loo#ing to find guerrillas$ that was fine with us$ be!ause we didnWt have anything to do with them. And the guerrillas #new about our relations with the Army.Y

The guerrillas #new$ the soldiers #newG northern 9ora-Vn during the early eighties was a very small world$ in whi!h identity$
or the per!eption of identity$ often meant the differen!e between living and dying. That El 9o-ote in late 0120 was not a

guerrilla town is a fa!t !entral to 7ufinaWs story and lies at the heart of the mystery of what happened thereH and though it is a fa!t , one that almost everyone from the -one affirms , it seems to have nonetheless been a slightly more !ompli!ated fa!t than 7ufina ma#es out. As in many other !ommunities in northern 9ora-Vn$ the people of El 9o-ote were struggling to #eep their balan!e in the middle of the perilously shifting ground of a brutal war , were wor#ing hard to remain on friendly terms with the soldiers while fearing to alienate the guerrillas. CoaquFn =illalobos$ who was the leading !omandante of the ;eopleWs 7evolutionary Army &or E.7.;.'$ the dominant guerrilla group in 9ora-Vn$ told me flatly during an interview last year in his headquarters in San Salvador that the people of El 9o-ote Xwould not support usY , only to !on!ede twenty minutes later that his fighters had$ at least on some o!!asions$ bought supplies in the hamlet. XThey had the lowest level of relationship with us , only the very slightest !ommer!ial one$Y =illalobos said. "i!ho$ a rebel !ommander who had grown up in Co!oaitique$ a few miles from El 9o-ote$ a!#nowledged to me during an interview in ;erquFn that in the late seventies Xsome from El 9o-ote had been our supporters$Y but that long before 0120 these supporters Xhad !ome along with us$ they were with us.Y 6e added qui!#ly$ XThe people who were still in El 9o-ote were afraid of us.Y But the reason$ apparently$ was not only their fear , the fran# terror that many villagers in the -one felt about e>posing themselves to Army retribution , but their ideology. The guerrillasW support in 9ora-Vn had grown largely in soil made fertile by the wor# of Catholi! liberation theology$ but El 9o-ote had been uniquely unre!eptive to su!h blandishments$ for the hamlet was a stronghold of the ;rotestant evangeli!al movement. ;eople had begun to !onvert as early as the mid(si>ties$ and by 012@ it is li#ely that half or more of the people in El 9o-ote !onsidered themselves born(again ChristiansH the evangeli!als had their own !hapel and their own pastor$ and they were #nown , as were born(again Christians throughout Central Ameri!a , for their anti(Communism. XEveryone #new there were many evangeli!als in El 9o-ote$ and these people wouldnWt support us$Y "i!ho told me. XSometimes they sold us things$ yes$ but they didnWt want anything to do with us.Y So$ unli#e many other hamlets of 9ora-Vn$ El 9o-ote was a pla!e where the guerrillas had learned not to loo# for re!ruitsH instead$ a deli!ate !oe>isten!e had been forged , an unstated agreement by both parties to loo# the other way. The guerrillas passed by El 9o-ote only at night$ and when they did$ 7ufina says$ Xthe people would hear the dogs bar#ing and theyWd be afraid.Y She remembers seeing guerrillas only on!e in daylightG a few ragged young people$ unarmed and wearing !ivilian !lothes$ had !ome into the hamlet and tried to hold a meeting in the tiny !hur!h of Santa Catarina. 7ufina didnWt attend$ nor did most of the other townspeople. XI remember people saying$ ]DonWt get involved. "etWs <ust live and wor# and not get involved.W ;eople <ust didnWt want anything to do with it. I had four !hildren to loo# after. OouWre worrying about feeding your family$ and you try not to pay attention to these other things.Y And so when 9ar!os D[a- brought his news from %otera$ when he !onveyed the strong words of the offi!er and presented the !hoi!e as one of leaving the town and ris#ing Xgetting involvedY in the operation or of staying put and remaining safe$ there was never mu!h doubt about what the people of El 9o-ote would in the end de!ide. That very afternoon$ at 9ar!os D[a-Ws urging$ people began fanning out from the hamlet into the outlying distri!ts to spread the word that one and all should !ome to El 9o-ote$ and qui!#ly$ for only there would they be prote!ted. 9ar!os D[a- helped matters along by letting it be #nown that he would offer on !redit as mu!h food and other supplies as the new!omers needed. ;easants poured into the hamlet$ o!!upying every bit of spa!e. XAll the rooms in 9ar!os D[a-Ws house were filled with people$Y 7ufina re!alls. XEvery house had people staying there from outside.Y Even the !ommon in front of the !hur!h was !rowded with people$ for the few houses !ould not a!!ommodate them all. Y ]Come to El 9o-oteW , thatWs what everyone was saying$Y the old peasant Sebastiano "una told me. 6e and Alba Igna!ia del Cid had stood in front of their house$ had wat!hed the people pass. But they had de!ided not to go. XI had half an idea something bad might happen$Y Sebastiano said. XSo I told herY , nodding to his wife , Y ]Oou$ you go if you want to. IWm staying.W Y XAnd I$Y said Alba$ XI said$ ])o$ no$ I wonWt go without you$ be!ause theyWll as# me where my husband is. TheyWll say heWs not here be!ause heWs a guerrilla and then theyWll #ill me. Either we both go or we both stay.W Y So Sebastiano and Alba hid in the mountains above their house. They saw soldiers pass by$ and saw a heli!opter hover and des!end. And later they saw thi!# !olumns of smo#e rising from El 9o-ote$ and smelled the odor of what seemed li#e tons of roasting meat. Dour miles south of El 9o-ote$ outside the hamlet of "a %ua!amaya$ the guerrillas of the ;eopleWs 7evolutionary Army also awaited the soldiers. Drom their agents in the !apital$ they #new that large shipments of Ameri!an munitions had been arriving at Ilopango Airport$ and that tru!#loads of troops had begun moving along the ;an(Ameri!an 6ighway toward

9ora-Vn. :n De!ember 0st$ ConVs$ the most powerful !omandante in the -one$ had pulled aside Santiago$ the dire!tor of the E.7.;.Ws !landestine 7adio =en!eremos$ and informed him that Xan operation of great breadth$ named Ounque y 9artilloY , 6ammer and Anvil , was being planned. Santiago re!alls that Xintelligen!e sour!es within the Army itselfY had passed on a report of a #ey meeting at the 6igh Command. A!!ording to the sour!eWs re!onstru!tion$ the 9inister of Defense$ Colonel CosP %uillermo %ar![a$ de!lared to his offi!ers that :peration 7es!ue must Xwrest the offensive from the D.9.".).Y , the guerrilla umbrella group$ of whi!h the E.7.;. was one of five members. 6is =i!e(9inister$ Colonel Dran!is!o Adolfo Castillo$ added that the troops Xmust advan!e no matter what the !ost until we rea!h the !ommand post and 7adio =en!eremos.Y Then "ieutenant Colonel Domingo 9onterrosa Barrios$ the dynami! !ommander of the Plite Atla!atl Battalion$ bro#e in$ agreeing wholeheartedly that Xso long as we donWt finish off this 7adio =en!eremos$ weWll always have a s!orpion up our ass.Y Colonel 9onterrosa$ who at the time was the most !elebrated field !ommander in the Salvadoran Army$ was well #nown to have an obsession with 7adio =en!eremos. 6e was not aloneG the station$ whi!h spe!iali-ed in ideologi!al propaganda$ a!erbi! !ommentary$ and pointed ridi!ule of the government$ infuriated most offi!ers$ for its every broad!ast reminded the world of the ArmyWs impoten!e in mu!h of 9ora-Vn. Even worse$ the radio managed to be funny. XThey a!tually a!ted out this daytime serial$ li#e a soap opera$ with Ambassador 6inton in it$Y a +nited States defense atta!hP of the time re!alls. XTheyWd !all the Ambassador ]this gringo who is marrying a Salvadoran womanW Y , Deane 6inton was about to marry a woman from one of the !ountryWs wealthy families , Xand at the end theyWd say$ ]Tune in again tomorrow.W And you !ouldnWt do anything about it. 9ost people at the Embassy$ in!luding the Ambassador$ wanted to hear it.Y The mortified Salvadoran offi!ers maintained that the broad!asts originated in )i!aragua or 6onduras. Colonel 9onterrosa was mortified by 7adio =en!eremos as well$ but$ unli#e his !olleagues$ he had determined$ in his rage and frustration$ to do something about it. Dor 9onterrosa$ as Ameri!an military advisers had !ome to reali-e$ was a very different #ind of Salvadoran offi!er. By late 0120$ with Congress and the Ameri!an publi! having shown themselves resolutely opposed to dispat!hing Ameri!an !ombat for!es to Central Ameri!a$ it had be!ome quite !lear that the only way to prevent Xanother )i!araguaY was somehow to XreformY the Salvadoran Army. X e were on our last legs$Y an Ameri!an military adviser who was in the !ountry at the time told me. X e had to reform or we were going to lose. And it wasnWt be!ause the guerrillas were so goodH it was be!ause the Army was so bad.Y Salvadoran troops were sent into the field virtually untrained$ soldiers rarely left the barra!#s after five oW!lo!# in the afternoon$ and offi!ers rarely left the barra!#s at all. XThe institution simply did not support people being good !ommanders$Y this adviser said. XI mean$ who ever got relievedF Oou !ould surrender with eighty( five men and nothing at all would happen to you.Y As the Ameri!ans soon reali-ed$ however$ XreformY meant rema#ing an offi!er !orps that had developed its own$ very spe!ial !riteria for advan!ement and reward. These had to do not with military !ompeten!e but with politi!sG with showing unstinting loyalty to Xthe institutionY and$ above all$ to oneWs military(a!ademy !lass , oneWs tanda$ as it was !alled. A hundred teen(age boys might enter the %erardo Barrios 9ilitary A!ademy$ and from their number perhaps twenty toughened$ hardened men would emerge four years laterH throughout the ne>t quarter !entury$ these men would be promoted together$ would be!ome ri!h together$ and would gradually gain power together. If among them there proved to be embarrassing in!ompetents$ not to mention murderers and rapists and thieves$ then these men were shielded by their !lassmates$ and defended fero!iously. Dinally$ perhaps two de!ades after graduation$ one or two from the tanda , those who had stood out early on as presiden!iables$ as destined to be!ome leaders of the !ountry , would lobby within the offi!er !orps to be!ome the ;resident of El Salvador. 9onterrosa had graduated in 01?5$ and though the re!ords show him fourth in his !lass of nineteen$ it is a testament to the respe!t he inspired that many offi!ers now remember him as first. In the a!ademy$ he was a magneti! figure$ !harismati! from the start. Short$ with the simple fa!e and large nose of a Salvadoran peasant$ he wal#ed with the peasantWs long$ loping stride$ whi!h made his distin!tly nonmartial figure re!ogni-able from far off. %eneral Adolfo BlandZn$ a former !hief of staff$ who was in his last year in the a!ademy when 9onterrosa was in his first$ re!alls that the young man Xestablished himself immediately as the best in his !lass , the top ran# in studies$ physi!al !onditioning$ #nowledge of the !on!epts of war.Y )ormally$ of !ourse$ su!h prestige$ su!h respe!t from his !olleagues$ would brand him presiden!iable. But$ unli#e his fellows$ 9onterrosa was$ as BlandZn puts it$ Xthat rare thingG a pure$ one( hundred(per(!ent soldier$ a natural leader$ a born military

man with the rare quality of being able to instill loyalty in his men.Y In the years after his graduation$ 9onterrosa taught at the a!ademy$ too# !ourses from the Ameri!ans in ;anama$ travelled to Taiwan to study anti(Communist !ounter(insurgen!y ta!ti!s$ and served in the paratroops as part of El SalvadorWs first free(fall team. After the !ontroversial ele!tions of 01A4$ in whi!h a hard(line fa!tion of the military stole the ballot from what loo#ed to be a winning Christian Demo!rati! ti!#et$ led by San SalvadorWs 9ayor CosP )apoleZn Duarte$ 9onterrosa grew !lose to the new military ;resident$ Colonel Arturo 9olina. In the Army at this time$ the #ey fo!us was on politi!s$ and the struggle over El SalvadorWs stunted politi!al development in!reasingly split the !ountry$ and the offi!er !orps. By the late seventies$ after 9olina had given pla!e to %eneral Carlos 6umberto 7omero$ in another dubious ele!tion$ the situation had be!ome even more polari-ed. :n the far left$ several tiny guerrilla groups were #idnapping businessmen$ robbing ban#s$ and$ on o!!asion$ assassinating prominent rightist leaders. A!tivists on the moderate left$ having been denied an ele!toral path to the ;residential ;ala!e by the ArmyWs habitual ballot tampering$ <oined populist for!es in organi-ing vast demonstrations$ and managed to bring hundreds of thousands of people into the streets. The se!urity for!es generally responded to these demonstrations with unflin!hing violen!e$ shooting down s!ores$ and sometimes hundreds$ of Salvadorans. ithin the Salvadoran offi!er !orps$ the !ountryWs politi!al !risis had reopened a politi!al fault line that had spread apart periodi!ally throughout the !entury. Ba!# in 01?@$ a fa!tion of XprogressiveY offi!ers had staged a !oup$ but it had been qui!#ly reversed by a !onservative !ounter(!oupH in 01A4$ when DuarteWs vi!tory was stolen by !onservative offi!ers$ the progressives attempted another$ with the same result. Dinally$ in :!tober of 01A1$ with at least ta!it Ameri!an support$ a group of young XreformistsY who !alled themselves the <uventud militar , the Xmilitary youthY , overthrew %eneral 7omero and set in his pla!e a XprogressiveY <unta$ whi!h in!luded politi!ians of the left. As had happened two de!ades before$ however$ the !onservatives in the Army almost immediately regained the upper hand$ and now$ under !over of a more internationally a!!eptable XreformistY government$ they felt free to !ombat the XCommunist agitationY in their own parti!ular way , by intensifying the Xdirty warY against the left. The most visible signs of the Xdirty warY were mutilated !orpses that ea!h morning littered the streets of El SalvadorWs !ities. Sometimes the bodies were headless$ or fa!eless$ their features having been obliterated with a shotgun blast or an appli!ation of battery a!idH sometimes limbs were missing$ or hands or feet !hopped off$ or eyes gouged outH womenWs genitals were torn and bloody$ bespea#ing repeated rapeH menWs were often found severed and stuffed into their mouths. And !ut into the flesh of a !orpseWs ba!# or !hest was li#ely to be the signature of one or another of the Xdeath squadsY that had done the wor#$ the most notorious of whi!h were the +nion of hite arriors and the 9a>imiliano 6ernVnde- 9art[ne- Brigade. The latter was named for a general who had ta#en over the !ountry in 0150$ during a time of rising leftist agitation among the peasantry$ and had responded the following year with a !ampaign of repression so fero!ious that it !ame to be #nown simply as "a 9atan-a. Throughout the western part of the !ountry$ where an abortive rebellion had been !entered$ members of the )ational %uard$ along with !ivilian irregulars$ lined peasants up against a wall and shot them. Before the purge was over$ they had murdered well over ten thousand people. )ow rightist offi!ers who proudly !ounted themselves heirs of 9art[ne- determined to root out this new leftist infe!tion with equal thoroughness. Drawing on money from wealthy businessmen who had moved to 9iami to avoid #idnapping or assassination$ and benefitting from the theoreti!al guidan!e of ideologi!al !ompatriots in neighboring %uatemala$ the offi!ers organi-ed and unleashed an effi!ient !ampaign of terror in the !ities. The !ampaign intensified dramati!ally after the XprogressiveY !oup of :!tober$ 01A1. By the end of the year$ monthly estimates of the dead ranged as high as eight hundred. Against the urban infrastru!ture of the left , the networ# of politi!al organi-ers$ labor leaders$ human(rights wor#ers$ tea!hers$ and a!tivists of all progressive stripes whi!h had put together the enormous demonstrations of the late seventies , this te!hnique proved devastating. XThese people werenWt organi-ed militarily$ whi!h is what made them so easy to #ill$Y illiam Stanley$ a professor of politi!al s!ien!e at the +niversity of )ew 9e>i!o$ told me in an interview in San Salvador. As the repression went on$ month after month$ it be!ame less and less dis!riminating. XBy the end$ the #illing basi!ally outran the

intelligen!e !apability of the Army and the se!urity servi!es$ and they began #illing a!!ording to very !rude profiles$Y Stanley said. XI remember$ for e>ample$ hearing that a big pile of !orpses was dis!overed one morning$ and almost all of them turned out to be young women wearing <eans and tennis shoes. Apparently$ one of the intelligen!e people had de!ided that this ]profileW , you #now$ young women who dressed in that way , made it easy to separate out ]leftists$W and so that be!ame one of the profiles that they used to round up so(!alled subversives.Y Some !ivilians were !ertainly involved$ parti!ularly on the funding end$ but there !an be no doubt that the Xdirty warY was basi!ally organi-ed and dire!ted by Salvadoran Army offi!ers , and no doubt$ either$ that the Ameri!an Embassy was well aware of it. XThere was no se!ret about who was doing the #illing$Y 6oward "ane$ the publi!(affairs offi!er in the Embassy from 012@ to 0124$ told me in an interview. XI mean$ you formed that view within forty(eight hours after arriving in the !ountry$ and there was no se!ret at all about it , e>!ept$ maybe$ in the hite 6ouse.Y In publi!$ the fi!tion was resolutely maintained that the identity of the #illers was a mystery , that the !orpses were the wor# of Xrightist vigilantes.Y This !ampaign of lies was designed in part to a!!ommodate the squeamishness of the Administration in ashington$ whi!h had to deal with growing !on!ern in Congress about Xhuman(rights violations$Y parti!ularly after several notorious !ases$ in!luding the murder$ in 9ar!h of 012@$ of Ar!hbishop :s!ar 7omero while he said 9assH the rape and murder$ the following De!ember$ of four Ameri!an !hur!hwomenH and the assassination$ in Canuary of 0120$ of the head of the Salvadoran land( reform agen!y and two of his Ameri!an advisers. :n the evening of De!ember 0$ 0120$ Santiago$ the dire!tor of 7adio =en!eremos$ after learning from ConVs$ the !omandante$ about the !oming operation$ set out on foot from the guerrilla base at "a %ua!amaya$ four miles south of El 9o-ote. As dar#ness fell$ Santiago hi#ed east over the hills and through the gullies$ !rossed the 7[o Sapo$ and !limbed down into a heavily forested ravine at El Lapotal. 6ere$ dug into a ro!# ni!he half a do-en feet underground$ was the XstudioY of 7adio =en!eremos$ whi!h !onsisted of a small transmitter$ an unwieldy gasoline generator$ assorted tape re!orders$ mi!rophones$ and other paraphernalia$ and a fle>ible antenna that sna#ed its way up through a forest of brush. Santiago gathered his handful of young staff members$ and soon news of the !oming operation was broad!ast throughout the -one. Ba!# in "a %ua!amaya$ in a rough en!ampment in the open air$ perhaps two hundred young men and women$ outfitted in a motley !ombination of peasant !lothing and !amouflage garb$ were ma#ing preparations. Some !leaned their weapons , mostly old 90s and 9ausers$ along with a few !aptured Ameri!an 90?s. 9any of the women bent over smooth flat stones$ grinding !orn$ ma#ing the meal that would serve as the !ompanyWs fuel during the days ahead , for$ !onfronted with the arrival of thousands of troops$ the guerrillas of the E.7.;. were preparing not to fight but to flee. 9obility and qui!#ness had always been !entral to the guerrillasW strength$ along with their familiarity with the mountain terrain. "i#e El SalvadorWs other radi!al groups$ the ;eopleWs 7evolutionary Army had been the brain!hild of young urban intelle!tuals$ who had founded the organi-ation in 9e>i!o City in 01A4$ funded it during the mid(seventies largely by robbing ban#s and by sei-ing and ransoming wealthy businessmen$ and battled among themselves for its leadership$ using high(toned abstra!t arguments of the left &whi!h more than on!e deteriorated into violent s!hism'. XThe revolutionary pro!ess started in 9ora-Vn around 01AA or ]A2 with the !ons!iousness(raising of Christian ]base !ommunitiesW led by radi!al priests$Y said "i!ho$ the rebel !ommander$ whose parents were !ampesinos living on the other side of the bla!# road from El 9o-ote. X e young people would get together and read the Bible and apply it to our own situation$ and gradually we be!ame more politi!ally aware.Y hen the young men !ame of age$ the guerrilla leaders often urged them to <oin the Army , they had urged "i!ho to do so , in order to re!eive military training and gain firsthand #nowledge of the enemy while providing useful intelligen!e until they !ould return to their home provin!es to ta#e up arms. By 012@$ small groups of young guerrillas were operating throughout northern 9ora-Vn$ drawing food and support from sympatheti! peasants$ and laun!hing raids from time to time against the )ational %uard posts in the towns. They would atta!# suddenly$ #ill a few %uardsmen and !apture their weapons$ then fade ba!# into the bush. After the posts had been reinfor!ed$ the %uardsmen responded$ as they had done for years$ by beating or #illing peasants they suspe!ted of having been Xinfe!tedY with Communist sympathies. This qui!#ened the flow of able(bodied men and women into the mountains. Soon some villages were inhabited almost entirely by old people and mothers and their !hildren. The %uardsmen abandoned some towns

!ompletely , in effe!t$ !eding them to the !ontrol of the guerrillas. And the people abandoned other towns$ either fleeing to the refugee !amps beyond the 6onduran border or <oining the guerrillas$ and thus forming$ as time went on$ a quasi( permanent baggage train of masas$ or !ivilian supporters. XThe people who supported us moved around as our rear guard$ providing food and other help$Y "i!ho told me. XIn some areas$ our supporters were in the ma<ority$ in others not.Y The distin!tion between !ombatants and non!ombatants$ never very !lear in this guerrilla war$ was growing !loudier still. The Salvadoran 6igh Command had be!ome in!reasingly alarmed by the situation in 9ora-Vn. XThe military view the situation in the !ountryside as !riti!al$Y the +nited States Ambassador$ Dran# Devine$ wrote in a 012@ !able. X9any feel there are ]liberatedW areas where they dare not operate due to the !on!entration of leftist(terrorist strength.Y In Canuary of 0120$ the D.9.".). pro!laimed a Xfinal offensiveY , the badly equipped guerrillas hoped to provo#e a popular insurre!tion$ as the Sandinistas had done in )i!aragua eighteen months before$ and to do it in the days <ust before 7onald 7eagan too# power in ashington , but the people did not rise up$ and the offensive ended in a !ostly defeat. After the !ollapse$ hundreds of fighters streamed out of the !ities and headed for the mountains. 6aving failed to overthrow the government$ and having seen many of their !ivilian sympathi-ers liquidated in the past months by death squads$ the guerrillas de!ided to fo!us their for!es on a full(s!ale rural insurgen!y rooted in the northern mountains. By )ovember$ %eneral Dred D. oerner$ whom a worried ;entagon had sent to assess the Salvadoran war$ was !on!luding in a se!ret report that the situation on the ground had so deteriorated that a primary aim of the Salvadoran Army had now be!ome to Xprevent the establishment of an insurgent ]liberatedW -one in the Department of 9ora-Vn$ whi!h !ould lead to international re!ognition of the insurgents as a belligerent for!e.Y &Three months before$ Dran!e and 9e>i!o had re!ogni-ed the D.9.".). as Xa representative politi!al for!e.Y' If the guerrillas were not dislodged from 9ora-Vn$ the Salvadoran offi!ers feared$ they would ris# seeing their !ountry split in two. :n De!ember 0$ 0120$ after 7adio =en!eremos broad!ast word that the Army was !oming$ people throughout northern 9ora-Vn began tal#ing among themselves$ arguing$ and !oming to de!isions about what to do ne>t. 6undreds of people assembled outside the guerrilla !amp at "a %ua!amaya$ having pa!#ed up what tortillas and beans they had$ and gathered their !hildren$ ready for the hard tre# ahead. :n 9onday$ De!ember Ath$ the young men and women of 7adio =en!eremos began doing what they had pra!ti!ed many timesG rapidly dismantling the !omponents$ loading the generator aboard a mule$ and hoisting the transmitter$ the antenna$ and the other equipment on one anotherWs ba!#s. Then they hi#ed off to <oin the fighters at "a %ua!amaya. Around this time$ a!!ording to Coaqu[n =illalobos$ representatives of the guerrillas approa!hed El 9o-ote and attempted to warn the !ampesinos there. X e always had rear(guard people$ politi!al people$ behind the lines$Y he says. XSo when the fighting was beginning in the south they advised people in the north to leave the -one.Y But the people in El 9o-ote had already made their de!ision. XBe!ause they had little relation to us$ and be!ause they were evangeli!al$ they de!ided they had little to fear from the Army$Y =illalobos says. 9ore li#ely$ they had de!ided$ after listening to the words of 9ar!os D[a-$ that the danger would be greater outside the hamlet than within. X e told them what might happen$Y "i!ho says. XBut they didnWt believe that the Army would do anything to them.Y ;erhaps they regarded the guerrillasW warnings , those who heard them$ that is &7ufina$ for one$ heard nothing' , as attempts at re!ruitment. As the people of El 9o-ote well #new$ in the view of the Salvadoran Army$ to go with the guerrillas was to be a guerrilla. By Tuesday morning$ De!ember 2th$ the guerrillas at "a %ua!amaya !ould hear the sounds of battle$ of mortars and small( arms fire$ !oming$ it seemed$ from all dire!tionsH they #new by now that perhaps four thousand soldiers had entered the -one$ that troops had !rossed the Torola and were moving toward them from the south$ that others were approa!hing the Sapo from the east. The only way !lear had seemed to be to the north$ toward the 6onduran borderH but$ even as the 7adio =en!eremos announ!ers were putting out their last broad!ast$ urging the people of the -one to <oin the guerrilla !olumns$ the guerrillas heard the heli!opters approa!h and saw them pass overhead$ !arrying the troops of Domingo 9onterrosaWs Atla!atl Battalion

northward$ to the mountain town of ;erqu[n. To rea!h ;erqu[n from El 9o-ote$ you turn right on the bla!# road and begin to !limb. Soon the grade grows steeper$ the tropi!al brush gives pla!e to mountain pine$ and the air lightens and grows fresh. 6ere and there$ a bit of sorghum or !orn or maguey po#es out from among the trees$ but$ in!reasingly$ from the red soil of the mountainside only great white ro!#s grow. The overpowering fragran!e of freshly !ut pine announ!es the hamlet of "a Te<era and its sawmill$ a low building of unstripped logs surrounded by sta!#s of new plan#s. Dinally$ a sign announ!es ;erqu[nH the road tilts sharply upward and be!omes a street of large !obblestonesH and$ after a few momentsW <olting$ the traveller !omes upon a dramati!ally uneven town square$ whi!h$ despite blasted buildings and damaged streets$ remains an oddly beautiful$ vaguely otherworldly pla!e. At its heart is a bi-arre par#$ whi!h a!!ommodates many wildly slanting levels of green grass$ li#e lopsided terra!es on a !ultivated but dilapidated hillside. Bordering the par# are a yellow(painted !lini!$ a rough(hewn little hut$ and a remar#able !hur!h !rowned by a bulbous steeple. hen Colonel 9onterrosa set his heli!opter down here in De!ember of 0120$ he found a town in government hands$ but barely. :nly four months earlier$ in mid(August$ the guerrillas had swept out of the surrounding hills and overwhelmed the lo!al )ational %uard post$ #illing four men and !apturing five. XThere were many young ones$ but some really old ones$ too$Y !hildren in ;erqu[n told Alma %uillermoprieto$ then a stringer for the ashington ;ost. XThere were eight women. Some of them were in uniforms$ but most of them wore raggedy !lothes$ li#e us. e #new some of themH they were from this town.Y The guerrillas had spent a wee# and a half digging defensive tren!hes$ buying !orn from the lo!al !o_perative$ and mar!hing about the streets shouting X;ueblo libre^Y and other slogans. hen the Air Dor!e began bombing the !ity$ ten days later$ the guerrillas swiftly vanished$ fading into the mountains and ravines they #new so well$ and leaving behind the four dead men$ buried in a bomb !rater$ and also the !ivilians who had been there all along , the !ivilians who$ after playing host to the guerrillas for ten days$ now ga-ed with all inno!en!e into the fa!es of the )ational %uardsmen who had ta#en the pla!es of their dead !omrades. Colonel 9onterrosa had thought long and hard about !ivilians and guerrilla war$ about the ne!essity of !ounterinsurgen!y$ about the frustrations of the odd and bloody !onfli!t that the overe>tended Salvadoran Army had been fighting and losing. hen the men of his Atla!atl Battalion tou!hed down in ;erqu[n that Tuesday morning in De!ember$ storming from heli!opters in a !rou!h$ gripping their helmets tightly against the ba!#wash from the rotors$ the offi!ers had in their po!#ets lists of names to hand to the )ational %uardsmen. hile the Atla!atl !aptains mustered their troops$ the %uardsmen mar!hed off through the town and pounded on doors. They were big men$ well fed$ and they loo#ed even bigger than they were$ outfitted in high bla!# boots and uniforms of heavy greenish(brown !loth$ with automati! rifles on their ba!#s$ and ra-or( sharp ma!hetes hanging at their belts. XIn those days$ if they !ame to your house to as# you to !ome with them to ]do something$W youWd end up dead$Y a ;erqu[n man whom the %uardsmen visited that morning told me. hen he heard the pounding and pulled open the door to find the %uardsmen there glowering down at him , they always glowered$ for their business was$ and had been sin!e the early days of the !entury$ to indu!e fear in the !ountryside and to stamp out rebellion from the moment it revealed itself as a lessening of fear in a !ampesinoWs eyes , this man !ould only try to !ontrol his terror as the %uardsmen stared for a moment$ then bar#ed$ X6ey$ we have wor# to do^ Come with us and help us do it^Y The man !ame outside$ wat!hed as one of the %uardsmen ran his finger down the list that 9onterrosaWs men had handed him$ then loo#ed up$ e>!hanged glan!es with his partner$ and murmured$ XOa vamos dVndole.Y &X)ow letWs get started.Y' The ;erqu[n man #new what that meant , the #illing was to begin , and$ in a pani!$ he began to protest$ digging an identifi!ation !ard out of his po!#et and begging the %uardsmen to loo# at it !arefully. Dinally$ after a terrible few minutes$ he su!!eeded in !onvin!ing these impassive men that the name on the list was not his , that one of the surnames was different. )onetheless$ the %uardsmen hustled him along the streets with them$ and as they moved through town they pounded on other doors and !olle!ted other frightened men. Those men numbered ten by the time they rea!hed a field in front of the !lini!$ whi!h was a blur of una!!ustomed a!tivityG heli!opters landing and hovering and departing$ and$ amid the blast and the roar from the rotors$ hundreds of men in green moving about$ !he!#ing weapons$ !in!hing the straps on their pa!#s$ and tal#ing among themselves as offi!ers mar!hed ba!# and forth shouting orders. By then$ several hundred of the Atla!atl soldiers had

stormed off the heli!opters$ most of them in olive green$ and a few in !amouflage garb above bla!# <ungle boots. :n the shoulders of their uniforms they bore$ in white or yellow$ the figure of an Indian and the word XAtla!atlY &the name of a legendary Indian warrior who had led the fight against the !onquistadores'. To a pra!ti!ed eye$ they seemed a somewhat different breed from most Salvadoran soldiers , more businessli#e$ grimmer even , and their equipment was betterG they had the latest Ameri!an 90?s$ plenty of 9?@ ma!hine guns$ 1@(mm. re!oilless rifles$ and ?@( and 20(mm. mortars. But it wasnWt their equipment that made them Xthe Plite$ Ameri!an(trained Atla!atl BattalionY &as press a!!ounts invariably identified them'. It was their aggressiveness$ their willingness to Xdo the <obYG a willingness that the rest of the badly led and badly trained Army generally la!#ed. In part$ perhaps$ this aggressiveness was instilled by Ameri!an trainers , Spe!ial Dor!es personnel$ who$ beginning in 9ar!h$ had been !oming over from Southern Command$ in ;anama$ to show the Salvadoran re!ruits how to shoot and how to sei-e positions. 9ostly$ though$ it !ame from 9onterrosa. Among senior field !ommanders who in many !ases$ as one lieutenant put it to me$ XdonWt even own fatigues$Y 9onterrosa seemed a soldier of the !lassi! typeG aggressive$ !harismati!$ a man who li#ed nothing better than to get out in the field and fight alongside his troops. The Salvadoran grunts , mostly unlettered peasant boys$ many of whom had been pulled from buses or off !ountry roads and pressed into servi!e$ having re!eived little training and less regard from their offi!ers , loved 9onterrosa for his willingness to get down in the dirt with them and fight. The press loved him$ tooG not only was he a natural story but he was only too happy to invite reporters to !ome along with him in his heli!opter. And$ of !ourse$ the Ameri!ans loved him as wellG Colonel Cohn Cash$ a +nited States military atta!hP$ spea#s of Xa hot(shot strategist li#e 9onterrosa$ whom IWd put up against any Ameri!an hot shot.Y As the war moved de!isively to the !ountryside$ the Ameri!an government was no longer able to deny that it had a ma<or problem on its hands. The Salvadoran offi!ers were showing themselves utterly in!apable of fighting a war of rural !ounter( insurgen!y. )ot only was the Army$ with a total of thirteen thousand men fa!ing perhaps a third that many guerrillas$ terribly overstret!hed$ but its offi!er !orps was burdened by a by-antine politi!al stru!ture and a perverse system of anti(in!entives. The most important !ommands from the military point of view were from the point of view of most Salvadoran offi!ers the least desirable$ and the result was that those posts tended to be assigned to the politi!ally least powerful$ and often least talented$ members of the offi!er !orps. XThe guys in the real !ombat !ommands tended to be the total in!ompetents$Y Todd %reentree$ who was a <unior reporting offi!er in the +nited States Embassy at the time$ told me. XThese guys would be sent out there to the end of the line$ and theyWd spend their days drin#ing in the !uartel.Y Embassy offi!ials re!ommended$ !a<oled$ and finally urged reassignments$ but !hanges$ when they !ame at all$ !ame only after enormous effort. The e>planation was not <ust the superior politi!al and e!onomi! power of the right wing of the offi!er !orps but the fa!t that the tanda system$ in whi!h !lassmates$ no matter what their failings$ were fier!ely prote!ted$ appeared nearly impervious to outside pressure , in!luding pressure from the Ameri!ans$ who were now pouring hundreds of millions of dollars into the !ountry. As the offi!ers understood only too qui!#ly$ the ultimate san!tion that the Ameri!ans !ould brandish , turning off the aid spigot , threatened to hurt the Ameri!ans themselves as mu!h as it would hurt the Salvadorans$ sin!e the Ameri!an fear of a Communist El Salvador ta#ing its pla!e alongside Sandinista )i!aragua had be!ome overriding. Even during the final months of the Carter Administration$ this underlying reality be!ame embarrassingly evident$ when ;resident Carter$ after !utting off aid in response to the murder of the Ameri!an !hur!hwomen$ rushed to restore it only a few wee#s later$ in the fa!e of the rebelsW Xfinal offensive.Y 7onald 7eagan did not suffer from the same ambivalen!e. By the fall of 0120$ 7eagan had removed the outspo#en Ameri!an Ambassador$ 7obert hiteH had vowed$ through Se!retary of State Ale>ander 6aig$ to Xdraw the lineY in El Salvador against Communist subversion in the hemisphereH had almost doubled e!onomi! aid for El Salvador$ to a hundred and forty(four million dollars$ and in!reased military aid$ from twenty(si> million dollars to more than thirty(five millionH and$ in )ovember$ had begun funding the )i!araguan Contra fighters as a pro>y for!e against the Sandinista government. By late 0120$ the priorities of Ameri!an poli!y in El Salvador had be!ome unmista#able. The Ameri!ans had stepped forward to fund the war$ but they were unwilling to fight itH it would be left to the Salvadorans to defeat the guerrillas. XThe guerrilla always !arries his masas into battle with himY was a famous Army saying of the era$ a pie!e of re!eived wisdom from that dar#est period of the Salvadoran !ivil war$ and its author was Colonel 9onterrosa himself. It

was intended not only as a statement of fa!t but as a general affirmation of prin!ipleG in this bloody war$ in the red -ones$ there was really no su!h thing as a !ivilian. A large professional Army would have reo!!upied territory and sent out aggressive patrols$ all the while doing Xpoliti!al wor#Y in the !ountryside to regain the loyalty of the people. Indeed$ that was part of the rationale behind the sear!h(and(destroy operations. XThere are a lot of different names for !ounter(guerrilla fighting$Y Colonel Castillo$ then the =i!e(9inister of Defense$ told me in an interview. X hether they !all it 6ammer and Anvil$ or the ;iston$ or something else$ itWs all the same idea , to try to e>pel the guerrillas from the -one. After we managed to e>pel them$ they would lose the support of all the people they had indo!trinated.Y But in those days$ Castillo !on!eded$ the Army XdidnWt have enough equipment or for!es to maintain operations there for a long enough time.Y The result was that the Army would enter a -one in for!eH the guerrillas$ after a few minor engagements$ would fleeH and the soldiers$ after #illing a number of supposed XsubversivesY &!ivilians who may or may not have been guerrilla supporters but hadnWt been qui!# enough$ or smart enough$ to get out of the way'$ would eva!uate the -one$ leaving a to#en for!e behind , whi!h the guerrillas$ when they flowed ba!# in a few days later$ would maul and e>pel. The ArmyWs ta!ti! was not effe!tive$ and it made for great frustration. X hen I arrived here$ in Cune of 0124$ the Salvadoran offi!ers used to brag to me that they didnWt ta#e prisoners$Y Colonel Cash$ the military atta!hP$ said. XThey said$ ] e donWt want to dignify them by ta#ing prisoners.W They wouldnWt even !all them prisoners$ or guerrillas. They !alled them terroristas , delin!uentes terroristas.Y &%eneral BlandZn$ the former !hief of staff$ told me$ XBefore 0125$ we never too# prisoners of war.Y' As the guerrillas were redu!ed to the status of terrorist delinquents$ all !ivilians in !ertain -ones were redu!ed to the status of masas$ guerrilla supporters$ and thus be!ame legitimate targets. )orth of the Torola$ for e>ample$ it was believed that the !ivilians and the guerrillas were all mi>ed together$ and were indistinguishable. By late 012@$ the Army had begun the ta!ti! that illiam Stanley$ the politi!al(s!ien!e professor$ refers to as X#illing by -one.Y :ne of the first su!h operations too# pla!e in :!tober$ and began with a staff meeting in ;erqu[n. XColonel Castillo e>plained that it was ne!essary to stop the Communist revolution , that it was ne!essary to ma#e an e>ample of this pla!e$ so we wouldnWt have the same problems in other parts of the !ountry$Y an offi!er who had been present at the meeting told me. X6e said we must ta#e into a!!ount that the great ma<ority of the people here are guerrillas. So the idea was to surround them all$ to !reate this ]hammer and anvilW thing$ push all the people down to =illa El 7osario$ where a huge artillery barrage would be unleashed. The !ity would be totally destroyed. e were going to ma#e an e>ample of these people.Y The brutality of this operation provo#ed the first ma<or e>odus from 9ora-Vn$ as entire populations fled their villages for the refugee !amps in %otera$ or for the !amps over the border in 6onduras. Despite the ArmyWs su!!ess in ta#ing away the water$ however$ the fish !ontinued to multiply and grow stronger. In )ovember of 012@$ a month after the =illa El 7osario operation$ the guerrillas began to re!eive the first of a number of shipments of small arms from the Sandinista regime in )i!aragua , Xa mi>ture of fals$ 90?s$ and +-is$Y a!!ording to Stanley. After the !ollapse of the Xfinal offensive$Y in Canuary$ the guerrillas also benefitted from a fresh infusion of manpower$ in!luding not only the fighters who had fled the !ities but a number of important deserters from the Army. In front of the ;erqu[n health !lini! that Tuesday in early De!ember$ amid the ba!#wash from the heli!opters$ the men of the Atla!atl mustered and made ready. The )ational %uardsmen$ who by this time had !olle!ted the ten villagers$ pushed their relu!tant !harges forward through the troops until they rea!hed a tall$ green(eyed offi!er in !ombat fatigues$ who was striding about amid the !ommotion$ pointing here and there and issuing orders. :ne of the ;erqu[n men$ who had served in the Army several years before$ re!ogni-ed the offi!er as 9a<or )atividad de Ces`s CV!eres Cabrera$ a legendary figureG si>th in his a!ademy !lass$ a born(again Christian$ a fanati!al anti(Communist$ and now the e>e!utive offi!er of the Atla!atl Battalion. &"ater$ his legend grewG as a !olonel in !ommand of Chalatenango in 012?$ he for!ed all the residents of that substantial !ity to Xe>press their desire for pea!e ... their purity$ their soul$ and also their !leanlinessY by painting the entire !ity whiteH and in 0121$ on a Salvadoran highway$ CV!eres ordered his men to blo!# the !onvoy of the Ameri!an Ambassador$ illiam al#er$ and$ when the Ambassador refused to emerge and offer proof of his identity$ threatened to blow up his limousine with

antitan# weapons.' :n that Tuesday$ 9a<or CV!eres loo#ed over the ten men and gestured to five !aptains who were organi-ing the !ompanies under their !ommand. X6e put two of us with ea!h !ompany$Y one of the ;erqu[n men told me$ Xand he said$ ] e want you to !ome with us$ to show us the area.W Y They had been brought there to serve as guides for the Atla!atl. 9a<or CV!eres gathered the !aptains together$ gave them pseudonyms to be used over the radio during the operation , he himself would be #nown as Charlie , and issued a few orders. Then the five !ompanies of the Atla!atl moved out$ down the mountainside. Everywhere$ above the roar of the heli!opters$ !ould be heard the thud of mortars and the booming of artillery. XIt was a huge operation$Y the guide from ;erqu[n told me. XThere were heli!opters and planes and heavy equipment and troops all through the mountains$ and they even had animals to !art along some of the guns and ammunition.Y As the Atla!atl men set off south from ;erqu[n$ hundreds of other soldiers were moving steadily north. 6aving been deployed as a blo!#ing for!e along the Torola and Sapo 7ivers$ to the south and east$ and along the bla!# road$ to the west$ they were now tightening the !ir!le. These units$ the hammer of the operation$ were meant to push all the guerrillas in the -one up toward the anvil of the Atla!atl and !rush them against the best troops the Army had to offer. But$ as a lieutenant involved in the operation remar#ed to me$ Xyou ta#e troops from all over the !ountry and move them up to 9ora-Vn in about ninety tru!#loads$ right along the ;an(Ameri!an 6ighway , I mean$ you thin# somebody might noti!eFY As 9onterrosaWs men !ir!led the hills below ;erqu[n$ the guerrillas of the ;eopleWs 7evolutionary Army$ far to the south$ at "a %ua!amaya$ !ompleted their preparations. Confronted with a heavy for!e blo!#ing the river to the south$ and the Atla!atl moving down from the north$ the guerrillas would brea# straight west$ pun!hing their way through the militaryWs lines at the bla!# road. That night$ some of their train started the tre#G long !olumns of peasants$ their belongings$ food$ and young !hildren bundled on their ba!#s$ trudged single file through the mountains$ flowing in a vast no!turnal e>odus that would !arry them over the mountains to the 6onduran border. :n the morning of ednesday$ De!ember 1th$ while thi!# mist still !arpeted the valleys$ the men of the Third Company of the Atla!atl rose in their en!ampment on a hill !alled El %igante$ bro#e !amp$ and !ir!led ba!# toward the bla!# road. In the hamlet of "a Te<era that afternoon$ they sei-ed three !ivilians$ two youths and an old man of eighty or more$ hustled them along to a field not far from the sawmill$ and began interrogating them Xvery strongly$ very brutally$Y a!!ording to the guide from ;erqu[n. The offi!ers a!!used the men of being guerrillas$ demanded to be given the names of their !omrades$ to be told where they had hidden their weapons. hen the men denied the !harges$ 9a<or CV!eres de!lared that they would be e>e!utedH the #illing$ he said$ would begin here. But then a farmer from the area !ame forward. The two youths wor#ed for him$ he told the 9a<or$ and he protested vigorously that they had nothing to do with the guerrillas. :ne of the guides vou!hed for them as well$ and after a prolonged dispute the men were spared. This argument over identity$ over who was a guerrilla and who wasnWt and what !onstituted eviden!e one way or the other$ would re!ur during the ne>t two days. Already in "a Te<era$ offi!ers disagreed about whether the men should have been sparedH a!!ording to the guide$ Captain alter :swaldo Sala-ar$ the !ompany !ommander$ rea!ted angrily when he was told of a !omment from another offi!er that the lo!al people should be treated with respe!t unless there was eviden!e that they were guerrillas. XSala-ar said$ ])o$ these are all guerrillas$W Y the guide said. X6e said the soldiers !ould go ahead and #ill any of them$ or all of them.Y "ater that day$ a!!ording to the guide$ Captain Sala-ar let slip his suspi!ion that the other offi!er was in fa!t a guerrilla himself$ and vowed to assassinate him. This wasnWt simply paranoia. X e had tremendous infiltration in the Army at that time$Y the lieutenant involved in the operation told me. X e #new that !ertain sales of arms were going to these people$ that information was being lea#ed , all our operations$ all our movements$ were being lea#ed.Y The overwhelming suspi!ion that this engendered$ together with the growing pani! among the offi!ers about the deterioration in the government position$ gave the hardest(line offi!ers a de!isive upper hand. XThe hard(!ore guys there really did believe that it was a virus$ an infe!tion$Y Todd %reentree said. XTheyWd always say ]a

!an!erW , you #now$ ]Communism is a !an!er.W And so if youWre a guerrilla they donWt <ust #ill you$ they #ill your !ousin$ you #now$ everybody in the family$ to ma#e sure the !an!er is !ut out.Y These offi!ers$ of !ourse$ had Salvadoran history on their side. XThey had a ]#ill the seedW mentality$Y ;rofessor Stanley told me. XAfter all$ what happened in 0154F To this day$ when someone wants to ma#e a threat here$ why do they invo#e the name of 9art[ne-FY , the author of the 9atan-a. XBe!ause he is an i!on$ thatWs why. The idea of going out to the -ones and #illing everyone is not a new idea. ItWs a proved idea.Y ;utting that proved idea into pra!ti!e would be!ome the mission of the Atla!atl Battalion. 6oping to insure that at least one unit of the Salvadoran Army was adequately prepared to fight$ the Ameri!ans sent Spe!ial Dor!es instru!tors in early 0120 to train the first re!ruits of the new Immediate 7ea!tion Infantry Battalion &biri'. Oet$ as the Ameri!an advisers well #new$ the epithet of XPlite$ Ameri!an(trainedY that was hung on the Atla!atl by the press was a bit of a <o#e. XThey had no spe!iali-ed training$Y one of the original Spe!ial Dor!es trainers told me. XThey had basi! individuali-ed training , you #now$ basi! shooting$ mar#smanship$ squad ta!ti!s. I mean$ the differen!e was that the Salvadorans basi!ally had no trained units in the !ountry$ so this was going to be a unit that would be trained.Y Some offi!ials in the Embassy and the ;entagon had wanted the entire unit to be trained in the +nited States , and$ indeed$ later in the year re!ruits for the se!ond of the biris$ the Belloso$ would be flown en masse to Dort Bragg$ )orth Carolina. But the Atla!atl had something the Belloso didnWtG it had 9onterrosa. XThat the battalion wasnWt sent to the +nited States but was trained by 9onterrosa here was in large part a testament to his authority$Y a !ontemporary of 9onterrosaWs told me. XThe 6igh Command had been preparing him$ grooming him. 6e had ta#en all the !ourses the Ameri!ans offered$ in!luding those for the paratroopers and the !ommandos. 6is ambition be!ame very !on!rete around the time the Ameri!ans de!ided to dire!t a ma<or !ounter(insurgen!y effort here. hen the Atla!atl !ame along$ he <umped at it.Y Drom the beginning$ 9onterrosa wor#ed to give his new for!e a m[sti!a , a mystique. XThey shot animals and smeared the blood all over their fa!es$ they slit open the animalsW bellies and dran# the blood$Y a lieutenant in another unit told me. XThey were a hell of a raun!hy unit. They had no dis!ipline of fire$ none at all. I mean$ they saw something moving out there$ they shot it , deer$ pigs$ whatever. OouWd be out there in the field trying to sleep$ and all night those assholes would #eep shooting at things.Y A!!ording to one reporter$ the men of the Atla!atl !elebrated their graduation by !olle!ting all the dead animals they !ould find off the roads , dogs$ vultures$ anything , boiling them together into a bloody soup$ and !hugging it down. Then they stood at rigid attention and sang$ full(throated$ the unitWs theme song$ Somos %uerrerosa We are warriors6 Warriors a!!6 We are #oin# %orth to "i!! A mountain o% terrorists6 By the fall of 0120$ the Atla!atl was well on its way to building that mountain. The pattern of its operations had be!ome well #nownG units of the regular Army and the se!urity for!es would move into pla!e along the border of one of the red -ones$ walling it off$ with the help$ very often$ of a natural barrier$ li#e a river or a mountain range. Then a blo!#ing for!e would invade the -one$ pushing before it everyone and everything living. Dinally$ the heli!opters would sweep in$ and the men of the Atla!atl would storm out$ bombard all whom the trap had snared with artillery and mortar fire$ and then with small arms. It was the strategy of Xdraining the sea$Y or$ as 9onterrosa was heard to des!ribe it on o!!asion$ of "a "impie-a , the Cleanup. Those parts of El Salvador Xinfe!tedY by Communism were being ruthlessly s!rubbedH the !an!er would be !ut out$ even if healthy flesh had to be lost$ too. XEl 9o-ote was in a pla!e$ in a -one$ that was one hundred per !ent !ontrolled by the guerrillas$Y one of the original Ameri!an advisers with the Atla!atl told me. XOou try to dry those areas up. Oou #now youWre not going to be able to wor# with the !ivilian population up there$ youWre never going to get a permanent base there. So you <ust de!ide to #ill everybody. ThatWll s!are everybody else out of the -one. ItWs done more out of frustration than anything else.Y Coaqu[n =illalobos$ the E.7.;. !omandante$ freely !on!eded to me in an interview that in a number of the most notorious operations$ both before and after El 9o-ote$ many of the !ivilians #illed were in fa!t sympatheti! to the guerrillas. XIn San

=i!ente in 0124$ for e>ample$ the massa!re at El Calabo-o that involved more than two hundred people$Y he said. XThis was a situation where the Army was stronger$ where our guerrilla for!e was too wea# to prote!t our followers. e simply werenWt able to provide those people suffi!ient military prote!tion. It was the same in 012@ at the Sumpul 7iver in Chalatenango$ where a group of our sympathi-ers were fleeing$ trying to !ross the river.Y The guerrillas$ benefitting from very good intelligen!e and e>!ellent mobility$ generally managed to es!ape from the -ones ahead of the ArmyH it was their supporters$ and any other !ivilians who happened to be there$ who too# the punishment. In the !ase of many of the massa!res during the early eighties$ then$ the Salvadoran Army was managing to do what it set out to doG #illing Salvadorans who were sympatheti! to the insurgents. 6owever blatantly this behavior violated the rules of war , however infamous it was to murder men$ women$ and !hildren en masse$ without trial or investigation$ simply be!ause of the politi!al sympathies of some of their number , the strategy did at least have some rationale. Even against this grim ba!#ground$ El 9o-ote stands out. XEl 9o-ote was a town that was not militant$Y =illalobos said. XThatWs why what happened at El 9o-ote was spe!ial.Y Sometime during the in!ident at "a Te<era that ednesday afternoon$ word !ame over the radio that the Dirst Company of the Atla!atl had engaged the guerrillas. XThere was an e>!hange of fire$ an armed !onfrontation$Y the guide says. But$ li#e so mu!h else in this story$ the battle , its intensity$ even its pre!ise lo!ation , has be!ome a matter of fier!e dispute. Drom the start$ the Salvadoran military !laimed that the fighting too# pla!e at El 9o-ote itself. :n De!ember 0Ath$ a C.I.A. offi!er !abled from San Salvador that Xthe heaviest fighting had o!!urred at El 9o-ote \ where 5@ to 53 insurgents and four Salvadoran soldiers were #illed.Y It is impossible to #now for sure$ but from the !onte>t of the !able it seems very probable that the C.I.A. manWs information !ame$ one way or another$ from the Salvadoran Army. The guide$ on the other hand$ who was a few miles away and heard the report on the fighting as it !ame over the Atla!atl radio$ pla!es it Xaround Arambala. It was a little s#irmish$Y he told me$ Xand it happened at El ;ortillZn$ near Arambala , a little over a mile from El 9o-ote.Y =illalobos$ who appears to remember the operation in great detail$ also insists that the fighting too# pla!e at Arambala$ whi!h Xwas in effe!t our rear guard$Y he said. XAlthough most of the serious fighting too# pla!e south of us$ along the Torola$ there was a minor level of fighting$ in!luding maybe a little mortar fire$ near Arambala.Y 6e went on to say$ XItWs normal when you displa!e a large for!e to leave small units to prote!t the retreat and #eep up resistan!e.Y %uerrilla squads around Arambala$ north of "a %ua!amaya$ were in a perfe!t position to prote!t the flan# of the main guerrilla for!e as it retreated west. Santiago$ who was still in "a %ua!amaya$ readying his 7adio =en!eremos !rew for that nightWs retreat$ des!ribes how Xthe pressure of the enemy was growing in his north(south advan!e.Y :n that day$ he writes in his memoirs$ Xthe !omrades of the Dourth Se!tion too# by assault a position of the Atla!atl Battalion and !aptured two riflesY , a plausible number in view of the four dead that the Salvadoran Army apparently a!#nowledged. But Santiago ma#es no mention of the X5@ to 53 insurgentsY #illed that are !laimed in the C.I.A. !able$ and neither$ so far as I #now$ does any other guerrilla memoir. This would have been a very large number of deadH the fa!t that no one mentions them$ and the fa!t that$ in the wa#e of this fighting$ the guerrillas did indeed manage$ as Santiago re!ounts$ to Xmaintain the lines of fire and organi-e the movement to brea# the !ir!le and ma#e a <o#e of 9onterrosaWs hammer blowY , these two fa!ts lead one to wonder whether the offi!ers$ in providing their reports to their own superiors &and possibly to the C.I.A.'$ had !reated a vi!tory at El 9o-ote from what was in fa!t a defeat at Arambala. The offi!ers would have been espe!ially relu!tant to admit a defeat at the hands of the Dourth Se!tion. An Plite guerrilla unit$ it had been trained$ in large part$ by Captain Dran!is!o Emilio 9ena Sandoval$ an Army offi!er who had deserted to the guerrillas the previous Canuary. Salvadoran offi!ers had developed a deep hatred for 9ena Sandoval$ regarding him and others li#e him as mu!h more despi!able forms of life than$ say$ =illalobosG in their eyes$ the latter was merely a delinquent terrorist$ whereas offi!ers li#e 9ena Sandoval were traitors. And$ as it happened$ the offi!ers and men of the Atla!atl had a spe!ial reason not only to hate 9ena Sandoval but to remember with the greatest distaste the town of Arambala and also the hamlet of El 9o-ote$ <ust down the road.

It was near Arambala$ eight months earlier$ that the first unit of the brash new Atla!atl had ventured forth to show the guerrillas$ and the rest of the Army$ what it was made ofH and it was there that$ to the embarrassment of its offi!ers and men$ the highly touted new unit suffered a humiliating defeat , in large part be!ause Captain 9ena Sandoval had had the foresight to steal an Army radio when he !ame over to the guerrillas. Than#s to the radio and 9ena SandovalWs #nowledge of the enemyWs !odes$ the rebels were able to #eep one !ru!ial step ahead of their opponents. X e defended one line on the outs#irts of El 9o-ote$ whi!h the enemy was unable to ta#e for many days$Y 9ena Sandoval writes in his memoirs. XTheir !ost in !asualties #ept growing$ as did our morale. It had been twelve days of !ombat and we had almost no !asualties.Y Dinally$ after twenty(two days of intense fighting$ the guerrillas slipped away a!ross the bla!# road under !over of night. As for the Atla!atl$ news of its poor performan!e spread qui!#ly through the Army. Soon offi!ers and soldiers began passing on a little <o#e. The Atla!atlWs designation as a biri$ they said$ stood not for Immediate 7ea!tion Infantry Battalion$ as everyone had thought$ but for Immediate 7etreat Infantry Battalion. This #ind of needling would li#ely have assured that$ eight months later$ many offi!ers and soldiers in the Atla!atl would have retained vivid memories of Arambala and El 9o-ote. )ow$ after the initial engagement on ednesday$ a!!ording to the guide$ Xwe heard by radio that the other !ompany #illed people there.Y +nder the ga-e of 9a<or CV!eres$ who was then with the Dirst Company$ the troops entered the town of Arambala$ brought out the people who had remained there$ and assembled them in the pla-a. They led the women and !hildren to the !hur!h and lo!#ed them inside. Then the troops ordered the men to lie fa!e down on the ground$ whereupon they bound them$ blindfolded them$ and began to beat them$ demanding information about the guerrillas. A number of men , the guide believes as many as twenty &and his estimate agrees with the figure given in a detailed analysis of the operation in and around El 9o-ote by Tutela "egal$ the San Salvador Ar!hbishopri!Ws human(rights offi!e$ in )ovember$ 0110'$ though other estimates range as low as three , were ta#en from the assembly$ led away$ and e>e!uted. In Arambala$ the offi!ers still relied on their lists to sele!t who would die. 6owever$ by the following afternoon$ Thursday$ the lists had run out$ and at some point , perhaps that day$ perhaps late the day before , the offi!ers made a de!ision about the dire!tion the operation was to ta#e. Dor$ despite 7ufina AmayaWs bitter !onvi!tion that there had been a Xbetrayal$Y that the offi!er who had spo#en to 9ar!os D[a- as he left %otera had ta#en part in a nefarious plot to ma#e sure that the people of El 9o-ote stayed in their homes to await the fate that had been planned for them$ an equally li#ely e>planation , and$ in a way$ a more horrible one , is that the offi!er was in fa!t trying to do his friend D[a- and the people of the hamlet a favor$ for at that point nothing whatever may have been planned for them. henever the offi!ers made the de!ision$ it is !lear that by the time they rea!hed El 9o-ote they had ordered a !hange in ta!ti!s. XThey had lists from ;erqu[n south to Arambala$Y the guide told me. XBut farther down$ there were no lists. Darther down$ they #illed everything down to the ground. Darther down was s!or!hed earth.Y Cust after midnight on ednesday$ as the men of the Atla!atl settled down to sleep$ a long !olumn wound its way out of "a %ua!amaya and sna#ed slowly through the ravines and gullies$ heading west toward the bla!# road. The guerrillas and their entourage travelled quietlyG the only sound in the tense dar#ness was that of hundreds of moving feet. The fighters !ame first$ lugging their rifles and ammunition and whatever other supplies they !ould manage. Then !ame the !ivilian followers$ loaded down with their bundles of !lothing and sa!#s of tortillas and !offee$ and nervously hushing their !hildren. And at the rear !ame the men and women of 7adio =en!eremos$ bent under the weight of the transmitter and the generator and the other equipment that formed the stationWs heart. In the end$ it was these burdens whi!h betrayed themG the weight slowed them$ so that$ as they finally !ame within sight of the bla!# road$ struggling along in in!reasing pani!$ the dar#ness thinned and faded$ dawn bro#e behind them$ and they !ould see$ as they ga-ed upward from their hiding pla!e , a ravine full of pri!#ly maguey , the men of the Atla!atl rising and stret!hing there on the highway. :ne soldier was swirling his pon!ho around him to free it of moisture$ and the first rays of sunlight glinted off the droplets. The guerrillas had been !aught$ but turning ba!# was out of the questionH there was nothing for it but to run.

XAdvan!e^Y ConVs ordered. )o one moved. XAdvan!e$ I say^Y A handful of guerrillas bro#e from their !over$ -ig-agging in a wild$ desperate sprint toward the road$ staggering under the weight of their equipment. A moment passed before they heard the shouts of the soldiers$ and a moment more before the bullets started to !ome. They too# !over and returned fire$ then again ran$ too# !over$ and firedH but they were badly e>posed$ and by the time they had managed to !ross a hundred and fifty yards of open !ountry three men had been hit. :ne of them$ Toni$ had been !arrying the transmitter$ and as he !ollapsed his pre!ious burden slipped from his ba!# and tumbled down$ end over end$ into another ravine. 6is !omrades gathered around him. Toni was dyingH the bullets #ept !omingH there !ould be no question of retrieving the transmitter. 9onterrosa would have his war pri-e. "ate that Thursday afternoon$ the men of the Atla!atl trudged into El 9o-ote. They found the streets deserted. Dor the last two days$ the thud of the mortars$ the fire!ra!#er sta!!ato of the small arms$ and the roar of the air!raft had been !oming steadily !loser$ and that morning heli!opters and planes of the Salvadoran Air Dor!e had strafed and bombed the area around the hamlet$ terrifying the inhabitants. XEverything was !loser every day$ louder every day$Y 7ufina Amaya told me$ Xand finally$ by that day$ the people were hiding in their houses.Y The strafing !eased not long before the men of the Atla!atl entered the hamlet$ dragging with them !ivilians they had found hiding along the way. Tired and impatient$ the soldiers swarmed about the houses of El 9o-ote and pounded on the doors with the butts of their 90?s. XSalgan^Y they shouted angrily. X%et out here^ %et out here now^Y 6esitantly$ the people !ame out into the twilight$ frightened$ bewildered$ unsure of what was happening. The soldiers$ !ursing and yelling$ pulled them forward$ hustled them along with the butts of their rifles$ herded everyone into the !enter of the street. 7ufina and her husband$ Domingo Claros$ emerged with their four !hildrenG he was !arrying three(year(old 9arta "iliVn and leading Cristino$ nine years old$ while 7ufina had five(year(old 9ar[a Dolores by the hand and !arried at her breast 9ar[a Isabel$ eight months old. XThey told us all to lie down in the street$ bo!a aba<oY , literally$ Xmouth downY , Xand they began pushing some of us down$Y 7ufina says. XAs my husband was setting the little girl down$ a soldier pushed him to the ground. The girl started to !ry. By then$ all the !hildren were !rying.Y The entire town lay li#e that$ perhaps four hundred people fa!e down in the dirt$ as dar#ness fell. Between the wailing of at least a hundred !hildren and the shouting of the soldiers , hundreds had entered the hamlet by now , the din must have been unbearable. The soldiers mar!hed up and down the lines of people$ #i!#ing one here and there$ stri#ing another with a rifle butt$ and all the while #eeping up a steady rain of shouted insults and demands. As 7ufina tells it$ a soldier would stop ne>t to a man or a woman$ #i!# the prone body$ and bar# out a questionG ho were the guerrillasF here were theyF here did they hide their gunsF The men and women of El 9o-ote insisted that there were no guerrillas there$ that they #new nothing of guerrillas or weapons. XIf you want to find guerrillas$Y one woman shouted tearfully$ raising her head from the ground$ Xgo out thereY , she waved toward the hills , Xoutside town. But here$ here weWre not guerrillas.Y This only made the soldiers angrier. XAll you sons of bit!hes are !ollaborators$Y an offi!er said. XOouWre going to have to pay for those bastards.Y At one point$ as 7ufina tells it$ the wealthy and influential 9ar!os D[a-$ lying in the street beside his wife and their sons and daughters$ raised his head. X ait^Y he pleaded. XThey promised me nothing would happen to the people here. The offi!er told me so.Y At that$ the Atla!atl offi!er laughed and said$ X)o$ motherfu!#er$ you all have to pay. )ow$ get your fa!e ba!# in the ground.Y And he raised his bla!# boot and pushed 9ar!os D[a-Ws head down into the dirt. XThey were very abusive$Y 7ufina says. X e !ouldnWt do anything. They had all these guns. e had to obey.Y Some of the soldiers too# down names as others went along the lines demanding to see peopleWs hands and pulling from their fingers any

rings they saw$ then ordering them to turn over their <ewelry and !ru!ifi>es and anything else that might have some value. The people of El 9o-ote lay there in the street$ their fa!es in the dust$ the !hildren sobbing$ for a long time. The soldiers yelled$ strode ba!# and forth$ aimed their weapons at them. X e thought that they were going to #ill us all , that we were senten!ed to die right there$Y 7ufina says. But finally the soldiers ordered them to get up. As the people of El 9o-ote !limbed unsteadily to their feet$ the soldiers bar#ed out an orderG they were to go ba!# into their houses$ the soldiers said$ and not let Xeven so mu!h as their nosesY po#e out the door. The people$ terrified$ grateful to be alive$ hurried into their houses , !rowded into them$ for virtually every room in the hamlet held e>tra people. )ow the wailing of !hildren made the houses seem smaller still. )o one slept. :utside$ the men of the Atla!atl shouted and laughed and sang songs$ pun!tuating the hilarity with !elebratory bursts of gunfire. 7ufina and her husband$ pa!#ed into a house with two other families$ struggled to !alm their !hildren. XThey were hungry$ and we had no food to give them$Y she says. X e were going to #ill a !hi!#en to feed them$ but as soon as we lit a !andle the soldiers yelled at us from the street to put out the light. :ur !hildren were s!ared$ and hungry$ and the littlest ones were messing all over themselves$ and we !ouldnWt even ta#e them outside to !lean them.Y So they huddled inside in the dar#ness$ listening an>iously to the laughter$ starting up ea!h time it was !ut by a burst of automati! fire$ and all the while trying to soothe the !hildren. XThe saddest thing was that the !hildren were !rying and we !ould do nothing for them$Y 7ufina says. Soon everything would be all right$ their parents assured them , soon they would be safe. ;erhaps the parents began to believe it themselves. After the terror of that evening$ after feeling the earth against their fa!es and the gun mu--les at their ne!#s$ 7ufina and her husband prayed that they had seen the worst$ that the soldiers would leave the ne>t day. X e were thin#ing that be!ause they hadnWt #illed us yet$ maybe they wouldnWt$Y 7ufina says. After all$ no one had really been harmed$ and$ even if the promises of 9ar!os D[a-Ws offi!er friend had been worthless , well$ the people here had never had trouble with the Army. The people #new that they werenWt guerrillas$ and the soldiers$ despite their angry shouting$ must #now it$ too. As the people of El 9o-ote huddled in their dar# houses$ down at :si!ala$ the base !amp of the operation$ south of the Torola 7iver$ the offi!ers were ta#ing sto!#. The first stage of the operation , the !onvergen!e of the Atla!atl !ompanies on El 9o-ote$ the !apture of the hamlet and its people , had gone well. XThe first phase was over$Y an offi!er involved in the operation told me. XAll the unit !ommanders !ame to :si!ala to tal# it over. I was heading for the mess hall$ and I bumped intoY , he named a ma<or who at that time was a #ey figure in military intelligen!e , Xand he said to me$ ]"oo#$ we might need you tomorrow. Be ready.W Y Then the ma<or gave the younger offi!er a rundown of the situation. X6e said$ ]Oou #now$ the first phase is over$ the units have gone through and done what theyWve had to do$ and now itWs <ust a question of going in there and interrogating those peopleW , you #now$ li#e ;.:. .s. I as#ed him if there had been any guerrillas there$ and he said$ ])o$ theyWre gone. But we might need you. e have people to interrogate. e have maybe si> hundred people altogether.W X That was a lot of people to interrogate. XIf I had gone in there$Y the offi!er told me$ XI would have e>pe!ted to spend two or three days$ !onsidering all the people they had.Y The two men stood there for four or five minutes while the ma<or briefed the younger man on the sort of information they wanted to get out of the prisoners. XBasi!ally$ we were loo#ing for the guerrillasW means of support , how they were getting their food$ and so on. eWd stopped a lot of their !ommuni!ations$ but we wanted to #now their logisti!s$ how they were

getting their supplies$ what their routes were$ and so on. Espe!ially$ we wanted to #now who it was theyWd infiltratedY , into the Army itself , Xand who was selling them arms. e had eviden!e that there was !onsiderable selling of arms from the Army at that time , I mean$ you !ould as# three and four times what a weapon was worth$ and these people would pay it$ and many of the soldiers !ouldnWt resist that. There was selling of information as well. All our operations were being lea#ed. Everyone wanted to ma#e a bu!# , that was the game.Y :ther offi!ers passed by as the two men tal#ed. That the first phase had been !ompleted$ that the Atla!atl had sei-ed El 9o-ote and now held its population prisoner , that mu!h was widely #nown among the offi!ers at :si!ala that night. X9y impression was that the plan was to spend the ne>t day interrogating these people$Y the offi!er told me. XAnd apparently that was the ma<orWs impression as well. But the ne>t day he never !alled me. And by that night everyone #new that something had happened.Y hile it was still dar#$ the soldiers !ame to 7ufinaWs door and began pounding on it with the butts of their rifles. XSalgan^Y they shouted on!e again. X%et out here^Y The families were hustled outside. X e wanted to give our !hildren food$Y 7ufina says$ Xbut they said$ ])o$ get out to the pla-a.W X All around$ the people were emerging from the housesH the soldiers pushed them along roughly$ and in the dar#ness they stumbled over the ground and bumped against one another. XDorm lines^Y the soldiers shouted. X9en and older boys over here^ omen and !hildren over there^Y Soon all the people of El 9o-ote were lined up in the pla-a. The soldiers ordered them not to move. They stood for hours. The !hildren$ having had no food and no rest$ sobbed and fussedH the mothers tried to quiet them. The soldiers$ unli#e the evening before$ said little. XThey <ust mar!hed up and down the lines loo#ing real mean and ugly$ not saying anything$Y 7ufina says. And so the sun rose on the people of El 9o-ote that Driday. Around seven$ they heard the sound of a heli!opter approa!hing. As it hovered overhead$ the soldiers began herding the people from the pla-a. The men were ordered into the !hur!h$ a small whitewashed building ad<a!ent to the even smaller sa!ristyH the women and !hildren were !rowded into the house of Alfredo 9Vrque-$ a small building on the main street a few feet from the larger house of 9ar!os D[a- and dire!tly opposite the !hur!h and the sa!risty. "oo#ing out a window of the tightly !rowded house , well over a hundred women and !hildren had been for!ed into a spa!e meant for perhaps a do-en , 7ufina saw the heli!opter tou!h down in the pla-a and half a do-en offi!ers !limb out. She saw several of them$ a!!ompanied by soldiers of the Atla!atl$ stride to the !hur!h$ where the men were being held. The others !ame mar!hing to the house where she was$ and pushed through the door into the pa!#ed$ noisy room. XThey had bayonets on their guns$ and they used them to push the women ba!#$Y 7ufina says. XThey said we were !ollaborators. They were angry. They #ept as#ing us where our pistols were$ where the men had hidden our guns$ and when we #ept saying$ again and again$ that we didnWt have any$ theyWd push at us with the bayonets. Then theyWd say$ ]Shut up$ old woman$ what are you !rying aboutFW They said theyWd #ill us if we didnWt tell them.Y After only a few minutes$ the offi!ers strode out$ leaving soldiers to guard the door. Around this time$ the heli!opter lifted off$ ta#ing at least some of the offi!ers along. )ow the women began to hear shouting from the !hur!h. X e !ould hear them yelling , the men$Y 7ufina says. XThey were s!reaming$ ])o^ )o^ DonWt do this to us^ DonWt #ill us^W X hen she heard the s!reams$ 7ufina$ who together with her !hildren had been sitting on a ben!h with her ba!# to the front wall of the house , the wall fa!ing the !hur!h , !limbed up on the ben!h so that she !ould loo# out a small window high up in that wall. Through the window she saw soldiers leading groups of men from the little whitewashed !hur!h , blindfolded men whose hands were bound behind them. Ea!h pair of soldiers led five or si> men past the house of Alfredo 9Vrque- and too#

them out of the hamlet in various dire!tions. After a time$ she saw her husband in one group$ and as she wat!hed$ along with young Cristino$ who had !limbed up ne>t to her$ eager to see what was happening$ they both saw him , Domingo Claros$ twenty(nine(year(old wood!utter$ husband of 7ufina and father of Cristino$ 9ar[a Dolores$ 9arta "iliVn$ and 9ar[a Isabel , bolt forward$ together with another man$ in a desperate effort to es!ape the soldiers. But there was nowhere to run. The men of the Atla!atl levelled their 90?s and brought both men down with short bursts of fire. Then the soldiers strode forward to where the men lay gasping on the ground$ and$ unsheathing their ma!hetes$ they bent over them$ grasped their hair$ <er#ed their heads ba!# sharply$ and beheaded them with strong blows to the ba!#s of their ne!#s. XI got down from the ben!h and I hugged my !hildren to me$Y 7ufina says. X9y son was !rying and saying over and over$ ]They #illed my father.W I was !rying. I #new then that they were all being ta#en away to be #illed. I <ust hugged my !hildren to me and !ried.Y hile the offi!ers had been questioning the women$ other offi!ers and soldiers were interrogating the men in the !hur!h. X9any of the men were bound$ blindfolded$ and for!ed to lie fa!e down on the ground while they were interrogated$Y a!!ording to the Tutela "egal report &whi!h was evidently !ompiled with the !o_peration of at least one soldier who had been present'. XThe soldiers would step on their ba!#s and pull their heads ba!# by their hair until they s!reamed in pain.Y Dor all their brutality$ however$ the interrogations of the men appear to have been almost as perfun!tory as those of the women. The offi!ers devoted s!ar!ely an hour to questioning the hundreds of supposed !ollaborators$ whi!h ma#es it diffi!ult to believe that they really e>pe!ted to a!quire useful intelligen!e from the people of El 9o-ote. At about eight oW!lo!#$ Xvarious of the men who had been gathered in the !hur!h were lifted off the ground and de!apitated with ma!hetes by soldiers$Y a!!ording to the Tutela report. XThe soldiers dragged the bodies and the heads of the de!apitated vi!tims to the !onvent of the !hur!h$ where they were piled together.Y It must have been at this point that the women in the house a!ross the street began to hear the men s!reaming. De!apitation is tiring wor#$ and slow$ and more than a hundred men were !rammed into that small building. After the initial beheadings , it is un!lear how many died inside the !hur!h , the soldiers began bringing the men out in groups$ and it was from one of the first of the groups that Domingo Claros had attempted to es!ape. hile 7ufina huddled with her !hildren in the !rowded house$ mourning her husband$ other women !limbed up on the ben!h beside her and peered out the small window. Drom here$ they$ too$ saw the soldiers ta#ing groups of men from the !hur!h and mar!hing them off in different dire!tions. :utside the hamlet$ on a hill #nown as El ;inalito$ the guides from ;erqu[n waited in the !ompany of several !orporals , the offi!ers had ordered them to stay there$ lest they be!ome !onfused with the townspeople during the operation , and throughout the morning the guides wat!hed the soldiers pass. XI saw them mar!hing along groups of maybe ten ea!h$Y one guide told me. XThey were all blindfolded$ and they had their hands tied behind their ba!#s. Then we would hear the shots$ the bursts from the rifles.Y :ut in the forest$ the soldiers for!ed the men to the ground and ordered them to lie flat$ with their fa!es against the earth$ as they had lain$ with their families$ the evening before. Then the soldiers lowered their 90?s and fired bursts into ea!h manWs brain. XAll morning$ you !ould hear the shots$ the !rying and the s!reaming$Y 7ufina says. In the house of Alfredo 9Vrque-$ some of the !hildren had be!ome hysteri!al$ and no one #new how to !alm them. Cristino begged his mother tearfully to ta#e them out of the house$ lest they be #illed$ as he had seen his father #illed. 7ufina !ould do nothing but point helplessly to the guards and try to !alm him. )one of the women had any idea what would happen ne>t. X e <ust !ried and hugged one another.Y Around midday$ a group of soldiers !ame into the house. X)ow itWs your turn$ women$Y one of the soldiers said. They were going to ta#e the women out now in groups$ the soldier e>plained$ and then$ he said$ the women would be free to go to their homes$ or down to %otera$ or wherever they li#ed. ith that$ the soldiers began pi!#ing out$ one by one$ the younger women and the girls$ and pulling them toward the door.

XThe girls would hang on to their mothers$ and the soldiers would !ome in and <ust grab them from their mothers$Y 7ufina says. XThere was a lot of s!reaming and shouting. Everyone was s!reaming$ ])o^ )o^ DonWt do this^W But the soldiers would hit the mothers with the butts of their rifles$ and they would rea!h behind and grab the girls and pull them along with them.Y Drom the house of Alfredo 9Vrque-$ the soldiers mar!hed the group of young women and girls , some of them as young as ten years old , out of the hamlet and up onto the hills #nown as El Chingo and "a Cru-. Before long$ the women in the house !ould hear s!reams !oming from the hills. The guides$ on El ;inalito$ nearby$ also heard the s!reaming. X e !ould hear the women being raped on the hills$Y the ;erqu[n man told me. XAnd then$ you #now$ the soldiers would pass by$ !oming from there$ and theyWd tal# about it. Oou #now$ they were tal#ing and <o#ing$ saying how mu!h they li#ed the twelve(year(olds.Y In the midst of this$ one or perhaps two heli!opters , a!!ounts differ$ as they do about many details of the story , tou!hed down in the pla-a in front of the !hur!h$ and a number of offi!ers !limbed out. Drom his vantage point on the hill$ the guide says$ he re!ogni-ed the distin!tive figure of an offi!er he had seen several times beforeG Colonel Caime Ernesto Dlores %ri<alba$ the !ommander of the Third Brigade$ in San 9iguel$ who was widely #nown as El %ordo &the Dat 9an'. Among the offi!ers a!!ompanying Colonel Dlores was one famous figure$ a small but !harismati! man whom the soldiers of the Atla!atl proudly pointed out to the guideG "ieutenant Colonel Domingo 9onterrosa$ their beloved !ommander. The offi!ers$ having been re!eived at their heli!opter by 9a<or CV!eres and the !ompany !aptains$ were es!orted to a house not far from the !hur!h$ and disappeared inside. After some time$ during whi!h the #illings went on around El 9o-ote , and also in the ad<a!ent hamlet of Tierra Colorada$ where patrolling Atla!atl troops had begun shooting people they found hiding in the houses , the offi!ers strolled out onto the !ommon$ !limbed ba!# into their heli!opter$ and lifted off from El 9o-ote. Around this time$ the soldiers returned to the house of Alfredo 9Vrque-. XI was still sitting on the ben!h with my #ids$Y 7ufina says. X hen they !ame ba!#$ they began separating the women from their #ids. They pulled the mothers away$ leaving the !hildren there !rying. They too# one group of women and then in a while they !ame ba!# and too# another. That was the saddest thing , little by little$ the mothers disappeared$ and the house be!ame filled mostly with !rying !hildren.Y 7ufina found herself in one of the last groups. XIt must have been five oW!lo!#. There were maybe twenty of us. I was !rying and struggling with the soldiers$ be!ause I had my baby on my !hest. It too# two soldiers to pull the baby from me. So when I !ame outside into the street$ I was the last in the group. I was !rying and miserable$ and begging %od to help me.Y The soldiers mar!hed the women down the main street. They passed the house of 9ar!os D[a- on the right and$ on the left$ that of Ambrosiano Claros$ where 7ufina and her family had spent the previous night. Ambrosiano ClarosWs house was in flames. XI saw other houses burning$ and I saw blood on the ground. e turned the !orner and wal#ed toward the house of Israel 9Vrque-. Then the woman at the head of the line , we were in single file , began to s!ream. She had loo#ed through the door and seen the people in the house.Y hat the woman had seen was thi!# pools of blood !overing the floor and$ farther inside$ piles of bloody !orpses , the bodies of the women who only minutes before had been sitting in the house with them$ waiting. XThe first woman s!reamed$ ]There are dead people^ TheyWre #illing people^W and everyone began s!reaming. All down the line$ the women began resisting$ hugging one another$ begging the soldiers not to #ill them. The soldiers were struggling with them$ trying to push the first women into the house. :ne soldier said$ ]DonWt !ry$ women. 6ere !omes the Devil to ta#e you.W X 7ufina$ still at the end of the line$ fell to her #nees. XI was !rying and begging %od to forgive my sins$Y she says. XThough I was almost at the feet of the soldiers$ I wasnWt begging them , I was begging %od. here I was #neeling$ I was between a !rab( apple and a pine tree. 9aybe that was what saved me. In all the yelling and !ommotion$ they didnWt see me there. The soldier

behind me had gone up front to help with the first women. They didnWt see me when I !rawled between the trees.Y The !rab(apple tree , whi!h still stands$ ne>t to the ruin of Israel 9Vrque-Ws house$ as gnarled and twisted an old !rab apple as one !an imagine , was within about fifteen feet of the house. XI !ouldnWt move$ !ouldnWt even !ry$Y 7ufina says. XI had to remain absolutely still and silent. The whole group was still outside the house , the women grabbing one another and hugging one another and trying to resist. Soon$ though$ the soldiers pushed some of them into the house. I !ouldnWt see inside$ but I started hearing shots and s!reams.Y Dinally$ when the s!reams and the gunfire had stopped$ some of the soldiers went off. A few minutes later$ they returned$ pushing along the last group of women$ and now 7ufina heard the sequen!e , the !ries of terror$ the s!reaming$ the begging$ and the shooting , all over again. After a time$ those sounds !eased. In the sudden silen!e$ s!attered shooting and fainter s!reams !ould be heard e!hoing from the hills. A few feet from where 7ufina lay hidden behind the tree$ nine or ten soldiers laid down their guns and !ollapsed wearily to the ground. X ell$ all these old bastards are dead$Y one said to somebody farther off. X%o ahead and burn the house.Y It was growing dar#$ and soon flames were rising from the house of Israel 9Vrque-$ highlighting the soldiersW fa!es and the trun# of the tree. It grew so hot that 7ufina began to fear that the tree would !at!h and she would be for!ed to run. She had remained perfe!tly still$ hardly daring to breathe$ and her legs had begun to fall asleep. And the soldiers$ still !lose enough to tou!h$ remained where they were$ smo#ing !igarettes and wat!hing the fire. X eWll <ust stay here and wait for the wit!hes of 9o-ote to !ome out of that fire$Y one said. The soldiers wat!hed the fire and tal#ed$ and 7ufina$ fro-en in her terror a few feet away$ listened. X ell$ weWve #illed all the old men and women$Y one said. XBut thereWs still a lot of #ids down there. Oou #now$ a lot of those #ids are really good(loo#ing$ really !ute. I wouldnWt want to #ill all of them. 9aybe we !an #eep some of them$ you #now , ta#e them with us.Y X hat are you tal#ing aboutFY another soldier answered roughly. X e have to finish everyone$ you #now that. ThatWs the !olonelWs order. This is an operativo de tierra arrasada hereY , a s!or!hed(earth operation , Xand we have to #ill the #ids as well$ or weWll get it ourselves.Y X"isten$ I donWt want to #ill #ids$Y the first soldier said. X"oo#$Y another said. X e have orders to finish everyone and we have to !omplete our orders. ThatWs it.Y At about this time$ up on the hill #nown as El ;inalito$ Captain Sala-ar was shrugging off a guideWs timid plea for the !hildrenWs lives. XIf we donWt #ill them now$Y he said angrily$ XtheyWll <ust grow up to be guerrillas. e have to ta#e !are of the <ob now.Y 9eanwhile$ the soldiers sat and ga-ed at the burning house. Dinally$ one stood up. X ell$ no wit!hes !ame out$Y he said. XThere are no wit!hes. "etWs go see what #ind of food they have in that store.Y ith that$ the other men got to their feet$ pi!#ed up their rifles$ and trudged off. A few minutes later$ 7ufina !ould hear$ from the store of 9ar!os D[a-$ Xbottles !lin#ing , you #now$ as if they were drin#ing sodas.Y The fire was still burning furiously$ but the big !rab(apple tree$ whi!h some mira!le had #ept from igniting$ shielded 7ufina from the heat. :ver the !ra!#ling of the fire she !ould still hear$ !oming from the hill !alled "a Cru-$ the s!reams of the girls. )ow and again$ she heard a burst of gunfire. After a time$ when the soldiers seemed to have finished drin#ing their sodas$ 7ufina heard !rying and s!reaming begin from the house of Alfredo 9Vrque-G the s!reaming of the !hildren. XThey were !rying$ ]9ommy^ 9ommy^ TheyWre hurting us^ 6elp

us^ TheyWre !utting us^ TheyWre !ho#ing us^ 6elp us^W XThen I heard one of my !hildren !rying. 9y son$ Cristino$ was !rying$ ]9ama 7ufina$ help me^ TheyWre #illing me^ They #illed my sister^ TheyWre #illing me^ 6elp me^W I didnWt #now what to do. They were #illing my !hildren. I #new that if I went ba!# there to help my !hildren I would be !ut to pie!es. But I !ouldnWt stand to hear it$ I !ouldnWt bear it. I was afraid that I would !ry out$ that I would s!ream$ that I would go !ra-y. I !ouldnWt stand it$ and I prayed to %od to help me. I promised %od that if 6e helped me I would tell the world what happened here. XThen I tied my hair up and tied my s#irt between my legs and I !rawled on my belly out from behind the tree. There were animals there$ !ows and a dog$ and they saw me$ and I was afraid they would ma#e a noise$ but %od made them stay quiet as I !rawled among them. I !rawled a!ross the road and under the barbed wire and into the maguey on the other side. I !rawled a little farther through the thorns$ and I dug a little hole with my hands and put my fa!e in the hole so I !ould !ry without anyone hearing. I !ould hear the !hildren s!reaming still$ and I lay there with my fa!e against the earth and !ried.Y 7ufina !ould not see the !hildrenH she !ould only hear their !ries as the soldiers waded into them$ slashing some with their ma!hetes$ !rushing the s#ulls of others with the butts of their rifles. 9any others , the youngest !hildren$ most below the age of twelve , the soldiers herded from the house of Alfredo 9Vrque- a!ross the street to the sa!risty$ pushing them$ !rying and s!reaming$ into the dar# tiny room. There the soldiers raised their 90?s and emptied their maga-ines into the roomful of !hildren. )ot all the !hildren of El 9o-ote died at the sa!risty. A young man now #nown as Chepe 9o-ote told me that when the townspeople were for!ed to assemble on the pla-a that evening he and his little brother had been left behind in their house$ on the outs#irts of the hamlet$ near the s!hool. By the ne>t morning$ Chepe had heard plenty of shootingH his mother had not returned. XAbout si> oW!lo!#$ around ten soldiers in !amouflage uniforms !ame to the house$Y Chepe says. XThey as#ed me where my mother was. I told them she had gone to the pla-a the night before. I as#ed them if I !ould see my mother$ and they said I !ouldnWt but I should !ome with them to the playing fieldY , near the s!hool. XThey said when we got there they would e>plain where my mother was.Y Carrying his little brother$ Chepe went with the soldiers and wal#ed along with them as they sear!hed house to house. X e found maybe fifteen #ids$Y he says$ Xand then they too# us all to the playing field. :n the way$ I heard shooting and I saw some dead bodies$ maybe five old people.Y hen they rea!hed the playing field$ Xthere were maybe thirty !hildren$Y he says. XThe soldiers were putting ropes on the trees. I was seven years old$ and I didnWt really understand what was happening until I saw one of the soldiers ta#e a #id he had been !arrying , the #id was maybe three years old , throw him in the air$ and stab him with a bayonet. XThey slit some of the #idsW throats$ and many they hanged from the tree. All of us were !rying now$ but we were their prisoners , there was nothing we !ould do. The soldiers #ept telling us$ ]Oou are guerrillas and this is <usti!e. This is <usti!e.W Dinally$ there were only three of us left. I wat!hed them hang my brother. 6e was two years old. I !ould see I was going to be #illed soon$ and I thought it would be better to die running$ so I ran. I slipped through the soldiers and dived into the bushes. They fired into the bushes$ but none of their bullets hit me.Y "ying amid the maguey that night$ 7ufina Amaya heard the !horus of s!reams dwindle to a few voi!es$ and those grew wea#er and wea#er and finally !eased. She heard the offi!ers order that fire be put to the house of Alfredo 9Vrque- and the !hur!h and the sa!risty$ and from the maguey she saw the flames rise and then she heard faint !ries start up again inside the buildings and the short bursts of gunfire finishing off a few wounded$ who had been for!ed by the flames to reveal that they were still alive. Soon the only sounds were those whi!h tri!#led down from the hills , laughter$ intermittent s!reams$ a few shots. :n "a Cru-$ soldiers were raping the young girls who were left. :n El Chingo and El ;inalito$ other soldiers busied themselves ma#ing !amp. Down in the hamlet$ a few troops wal#ed about here and there$ patrolling. )ot far from the still burning house of Israel 9Vrque-$ two soldiers halted suddenly$ and one of them pointed to the pat!h of maguey. 6e lowered his rifle and fired$ and

after a moment his !ompanion fired$ too. In the pat!h of brush$ the stream of bullets sent a dar#(green rain of maguey shreds fluttering to the earth. Then the soldiers !harged forward and began po#ing among the weeds. XShe was right here$Y one said$ pulling at some maguey. XI saw her$ I #now it.Y +p on the hills$ the soldiers listened to the shots$ e>!hanged glan!es$ and waited. Then they went on with what they had been doingG wat!hing the flames rise from the burning houses and tal#ing quietly among themselves$ telling tales of the dayWs wor#. They spo#e wonderingly about the evangeli!als$ those people whose faith seemed to grant them a strange power. XThey said maybe some of the people believed in %od so strongly that they <ust delivered themselves up$ they didnWt resist$Y the guide told me. XThey said some of the people were singing even as they were #illed.Y There was one in parti!ular the soldiers tal#ed about that evening &she is mentioned in the Tutela "egal report as well'G a girl on "a Cru- whom they had raped many times during the !ourse of the afternoon$ and through it all$ while the other women of El 9o-ote had s!reamed and !ried as if they had never had a man$ this girl had sung hymns$ strange evangeli!al songs$ and she had #ept right on singing$ too$ even after they had done what had to be done$ and shot her in the !hest. She had lain there on "a Cru- with the blood flowing from her !hest$ and had #ept on singing , a bit wea#er than before$ but still singing. And the soldiers$ stupefied$ had wat!hed and pointed. Then they had grown tired of the game and shot her again$ and she sang still$ and their wonder began to turn to fear , until finally they had unsheathed their ma!hetes and ha!#ed through her ne!#$ and at last the singing had stopped. )ow the soldiers argued about this. Some de!lared that the girlWs strange power proved that %od e>isted. And that brought them ba!# to the #illing of the !hildren. XThere were a lot of differen!es among the soldiers about whether this had been a good thing or whether they shouldnWt have done it$Y the guide told me. As the soldiers related it now$ the guide said$ there had been a disagreement outside the s!hoolhouse$ where a number of !hildren were being held. Some of the men had hesitated$ saying they didnWt want to #ill the !hildren$ and the others had ridi!uled them. A!!ording to one a!!ount$ a soldier had !alled the !ommanding offi!er. X6ey$ 9a<or^Y he had shouted. XSomeone says he wonWt #ill !hildren^Y X hi!h son of a bit!h says thatFY the 9a<or had shouted ba!# angrily$ striding over. The 9a<or had not hesitated to do what an offi!er does in su!h situationsG show leadership. 6eWd pushed into the group of !hildren$ sei-ed a little boy$ thrown him in the air$ and impaled him as he fell. That had put an end to the dis!ussion. )ow$ up on the hills$ the soldiers tal#ed and argued and wat!hed the burning houses$ while the two men down below still sear!hed among the maguey$ !ursing at the sharp thorns. XI #now she was here$Y the first soldier said. XI saw her. She was right here.Y X)o$ no$Y his !ompanion finally said. XThereWs no one here. OouWre <ust seeing the dead. OouWre seeing ghosts. The ghosts of the people you #illed are frightening you.Y ith that$ the soldiers loo#ed at ea!h other$ then turned and trotted ba!# to the !enter of the hamlet. Amid the maguey$ 7ufina Amaya !losed her eyes$ remained motionless. After a time$ she rea!hed out a hand and began groping about in the weeds$ slowly pulling the thorny strips to her$ gathering them into a pile and heaping them over her body. She lay there still when the stars began to disappear from the lightening s#y. She heard sounds of movement from the hills$ rising voi!es as the men wo#e$ urinated$ ate$ prepared their equipment. Shots e!hoed here and there$ interspersed with the

bar#ing and howling of dogs and the lowing of !ows as the soldiers #illed the animals one by one. Drom up on "a Cru- !ame a burst of high(pit!hed s!reaming and begging$ followed by a prolonged !horus of gunfire$ and$ at last$ silen!e. And then the men of the Atla!atl$ having !ompleted the operation in El 9o-ote$ moved out. 6ours earlier$ when the !hill of the night !ame on$ 7ufina Amaya had shivered$ for the maguey had badly ripped her blouse and s#irt. The thorns had torn the flesh of her arms and legs$ but at the time she hadnWt noti!ed. )ow she !ould feel the !uts$ swelling and throbbing$ and the blood$ dried and pri!#ly$ on her limbs. And as she lay sobbing amid the thorns$ listening to the soldiers pass$ her breasts a!hed with the mil# that had gathered there to feed her youngest !hild. 9ar!hing past the !hur!h$ whi!h was burning still$ past the !ar!asses of !ows and dogs$ and out of El 9o-ote$ the men of the Atla!atl did not see the dar# shape in the maguey pat!h$ the heap of dar#(green leaves. Their minds were on their wor#$ whi!h on that Saturday morning in De!ember lay ahead in the hamlet of "os Toriles. In "os Toriles$ Xthe soldiers pulled people from their houses and hustled them into the square$Y the guide told me$ Xand went down the line ta#ing money and anything of value out of peopleWs po!#ets. Then they <ust lined the people up against a wall and shot them with ma!hine guns. The people fell li#e trees falling.Y Even so$ the #illing in "os Toriles too# mu!h of the day. Some of the residents$ having seen the !olumns of smo#e rising the afternoon before from El 9o-ote$ had fled their homes and hidden in !aves above the hamlet. But most had stayed$ wanting to prote!t their homesG they remembered that on a previous operation soldiers had set fire to houses they found empty$ !laiming that they belonged to guerrillas. By afternoon$ the streets of "os Toriles were filled with !orpses. XIt was so terrible that we had to <ump over the dead so as not to step on them$Y the guide told me. XThere were dogs and !ows and other animals$ and people of all ages$ from newborn to very old. I saw them shoot an old woman$ and they had to hold her up to shoot her. I was filled with pity. I wished we had gone out and fought guerrillas$ be!ause to see all those dead !hildren filled me with sadness.Y As night fell$ the soldiers wal#ed through the town setting fire to the houses. It was dar# by the time they left "os Toriles$ to mar!h south toward the guerrilla stronghold of "a %ua!amaya. They made !amp in open !ountry$ rose at dawn$ and$ as they prepared to move out again$ Captain Sala-ar motioned them over. The men of the Atla!atl gathered in a !ir!le$ sitting !ross( legged on the ground as he stood and addressed them. XSebores^Y the Captain said angrily. X hat we did yesterday$ and the day before$ this is !alled war. This is what war is. ar is hell. And$ goddammit$ if I order you to #ill your mother$ that is <ust what youWre going to do. )ow$ I donWt want to hear that$ afterward$ while youWre out drin#ing and bullshitting among yourselves$ youWre whining and !omplaining about this$ about how terrible it was. I donWt want to hear that. Be!ause what we did yesterday$ what weWve been doing on this operation , this is war$ gentlemen. This is what war is.Y And for perhaps half an hour the Captain went on spea#ing in his angry voi!e$ and the men shifted uneasily. XThere had been a lot of tal# about whether it was right$Y the guide said$ Xand this had !learly got ba!# to the Captain.Y Dinally$ the tirade over$ the men got to their feet. Soon they were mar!hing south again. "ate that afternoon$ they rea!hed "a %ua!amaya. They found nothing there but dead animalsH the guerrillas had long sin!e departed. The soldiers spent two nights there$ resting and !leaning their equipment. 6eli!opters landed$ bringing Colonel Dlores and other top offi!ers$ who met with the Atla!atl offi!ers for Xevaluation and !o_rdination.Y The operation was now winding down. XIt was a wal#(through by then$ a <o#e$Y an offi!er in another unit told me. XThe guerrillas were long gone$ and everybody #new it.Y

:n the se!ond morning$ the men of the Atla!atl mar!hed west$ heading for the bla!# road. :n their way$ they passed the hamlet of "a Coya. XEverything was dead there , animals and people all mi>ed together$Y the guide said. X=ultures were everywhere. Oou !ouldnWt stand to be there$ be!ause of the stin#.Y Above the hamlet$ in the !aves and ravines and wooded gullies$ those who had managed to es!ape the troops shivered and waited$ and tried to #eep their !hildren still. Some had left their homes before the soldiers !ameH others had managed to flee when men from the Atla!atl$ on the day some of their !omrades were X!leansingY El 9o-ote$ stormed "a Coya. XSuddenly$ there was shooting and e>plosions all over$Y Andrea 9Vrque-$ who had been twenty years old at the time$ said. X e didnWt even see the soldiers at first. There were bullets flying everywhere. I grabbed my little girl , she was one and a half , and put her on my ba!#$ and we started !rawling through the brush with bullets flying and e>plosions all around.Y She showed me an ugly s!ar from a shrapnel wound on her #nee. X e !rawled and then we ran and ran$ and after a while my baby made sounds as if she were thirsty$ and I pulled her around and then I saw there was a wound in her head$ and I reali-ed I was !overed with blood.Y )o one else was around , the people had s!attered at the soldiersW assault , and Andrea 9Vrque- was too terrified to go ba!# toward "a Coya. 6olding her !hild in her arms$ she !limbed higher into the mountains$ found a !ave$ and tried to !are for her daughterWs wound with leaves and with water from a stream. Eight days later$ she found a sti!# and dug a hole and buried her little girl. Then$ delirious with grief and sho!# and terror$ she wandered high into the northern mountains. 9onths later$ the surviving villagers$ those few who remained in 9ora-Vn$ began to murmur fearfully to one another that a wit!h had !ome to haunt the mountains , a savage woman$ who !ould be glimpsed from time to time late at night by moonlight$ na#ed but for her waist(length hair$ as she !rou!hed by a stream and stripped the flesh from a wriggling fish with long$ sharp fingernails. The villagers were frightened of her$ for they #new that it was after the matan-a$ the great #illing of El 9o-ote$ that the wit!h had !ome to haunt the mountains. As the tide of soldiers ebbed from northern 9ora-Vn$ the guer( rillas flowed ba!# in. X e #new there would be #illing$ but we never e>pe!ted what we found$Y said "i!ho$ who was with one of the first units to return. XIt was desolation$ total desolation , not a person alive$ not an animal alive$ not a house that hadnWt been burned. There were bodies in the houses$ bodies in the fields$ bodies in the wells.Y The guerrillas immediately sent reports of the #illing to their !ommandersH but there was a problem. XThe !omandan!ia didnWt believe us , they didnWt believe the numbers$Y "i!ho said. XSo we began to !ount. e sent units all over loo#ing for bodies. A lot of them were not in the houses , they were lying out in the grass$ in the fields$ in the woods. e sent three reports up to the !omandan!ia$ and finally they sent other people down to the -one$ be!ause they still !ouldnWt believe the numbers.Y Survivors were straggling ba!# from the !aves and mountain gullies to find the pla-as of their ruined villages so thi!# with vultures that$ in the words of one man I tal#ed with$ Xthey seemed !overed by a moving bla!# !arpet.Y ;eople wept$ mourned$ and$ when they !ould$ buried their dead. ;edro Chi!as$ who had hidden in a !ave above "a Coya$ returned to the hamlet to find Xeverything burned$ everything dead , !orpses everywhere in the street$Y he said. XEverything was dead , !ows$ horses$ !hi!#ens$ pigs. e !ouldnWt do anything with the badly !harred people$ but the others we buried.Y As the survivors returned to the hamlets around El 9o-ote$ people from the -one were ma#ing !onta!t with representatives of So!orro Cur[di!o &whi!h was then the human(rights organi-ation of the Ar!hbishopri! of San Salvador'. 7oberto Cuellar$ a So!orro Cur[di!o offi!ial at the time$ remembers hearing from Xmembers of !hur!h groups$ and <ust people there$ you #now$ neighbors.Y ithin days , it is un!lear how many daysG limited and sometimes !onfli!ting memories ma#e this sequen!e parti!ularly diffi!ult to re!onstru!t , Cuellar telephoned the 7everend illiam ". ipfler$ who was the dire!tor of the human( rights offi!e of the )ational Coun!il of Chur!hes$ in )ew Oor#. XCuellar said the Atla!atl Brigade had !ommitted a massa!re in a town !alled El 9o-ote and in another !alled "a Coya$ and that he thought there might be hundreds #illed$ and nothing had been !leaned up yet$Y ipfler says. XSo!orro had an eyewitness a!!ount , it had got two people into El 9o-ote.Y ipfler immediately sent a telegram to Ambassador 6inton$ as#ing X!onfirmation or otherwiseY of Xreliable reports re!eived

here IthatJ indi!ate that between De!ember 0@ and 05 <oint military and se!urity for!es operation too# pla!e in 9ora-Vn Department whi!h resulted in over 1@@ !ivilian deaths.Y 6e also telephoned offi!ials at Amnesty International and other leading human(rights agen!ies in )ew Oor# and ashington$ and left a message for 7aymond Bonner$ at the )ew Oor# TimesW bureau in 9e>i!o City. As ipfler remembers it$ CuellarWs !all !ame no later than De!ember 4@th and probably earlier. &The telegram to 6inton$ sent under the name of the 7everend Eugene Sto!#well$ ipflerWs boss$ has been dated De!ember 03th$ only four days after the massa!re$ but there is a possibility that it was a!tually sent a few days later.' :n De!ember 0Ath$ an e>hausted Santiago staggered into a guerrilla !amp at Cu!uarVn , a town fifty miles south of "a %ua!amaya , along with the other =en!eremos people$ and there$ he says$ he found waiting for him a radio message from 9ora-VnG XThe Atla!atl Battalion massa!red a thousand peasants in various hamlets and villages.Y If SantiagoWs memory of the date is a!!urate$ then this number$ arrived at less than a wee# after the #illing$ !ould only have been a very rough estimateH soldiers still o!!upied "a %ua!amaya and the area of El 9o-ote$ and the guerrillas !ould have made no pre!ise !ount. But after days of !ounting in some of the stin#ing hamlets$ and the !ompilation$ with the help of survivors$ of partial lists of names$ the !omandantes had finally been for!ed to believe that many hundreds had died$ and they had apparently settled on the round number of a thousand. And now they wanted Santiago and the others ba!#$ with a new transmitter that had been awaiting them in Cu!uarVn$ so they !ould begin to ma#e the world believe as well. After five days of all(night mar!hes$ the small =en!eremos !rew trudged into the ravine at El Lapotal. It was noon on De!ember 4.th. :n Christmas Eve$ a!!ording to his memoirs$ Santiago was able to ta#e to the airwaves and tell the world that 7adio =en!eremos had been reborn , and to announ!e that during its two wee#s of silen!e a great #illing had ta#en pla!e in northern 9ora-Vn. It was the inauguration of an ambitious propaganda !ampaign$ whi!h gathered steam steadily through De!ember and Canuary$ and into Debruary. The propaganda was based on truth$ whi!h is supposedly the most effe!tive #ind$ but the Salvadoran government and$ later$ the Ameri!an government would s#illfully use the fa!t that it was propaganda , and parti!ularly the fa!t that the number of dead seemed to in!rease with ea!h broad!ast , to undermine its truth. :n De!ember 41th$ the guerrillas stormed the Army deta!hments that had been left to o!!upy some of the hamlets in the -one$ in!luding at "a %ua!amaya and at or near El 9o-ote itself. XThe atta!# on "a %ua!amaya be!ame a ma<or bloodbath$Y =illalobos$ the guerrilla !omandante$ told me. XThe lieutenant in !harge #new he was in a hopeless position$ but he refused to surrender , probably be!ause he #new what had happened at El 9o-ote$ and feared reprisals. e annihilated his position$ and he died in !ombat. e buried him in his uniform to honor him.Y The guerrillas too# seven prisoners in the operation$ and two of them were made use of a few days later in what Santiago !alls the Xinformation battle to denoun!e the geno!ide.Y Ea!h prisoner des!ribed what he had seen in Cerro ;ando$ a village three miles south of El 9o-ote. XI e>pe!ted to see dead$ be!ause we had tal#ed to troops who had already been out and they said they had #illed many guerrillas$Y a sergeant said. XThen we loo#ed in the houses \ and I reali-ed that it wasnWt the way they said$ be!ause I saw dead !hildren$ and the mother was hugging one of her !hildren , I thin# it was her youngest son.Y Santiago himself now visited El 9o-ote with his Xmobile unit$Y and broad!ast a des!ription of the devastation$ saying that Xit loo#s as if a !y!lone had passed throughYH that from the ruins of the sa!risty !ame Xa penetrating odor that indi!ated that beneath \ were to be found who #nows how many !adavers of the people of El 9o-oteYH and that in the shattered building he !ould see Xma!abre s!enes$ hun#s of human hair$ and fingers amid the rubble.Y "ate in De!ember$ the D.9.".). got in tou!h with 7aymond Bonner$ of the Times$ and informed him that his long(standing request to visit guerrilla(held territory would be approvedH he would be wel!ome to !ome to 9ora-Vn in early Canuary. Also around that time$ a guerrilla patrol stumbled upon some !ampesinos !owering in a ravine$ and dis!overed among them a near( hysteri!al woman of thirty(eight$ whose legs and arms and fa!e were s!ored with !uts. The peasants said that they had !ome upon her near a river , found her !rou!hed there nearly na#ed$ her limbs and body smeared with blood and !overed with thorns. XI !ould hardly spea#$Y 7ufina Amaya re!alls. XI tal#ed and !ried$ tal#ed and !ried , !ouldnWt eat$ !ouldnWt drin#$ <ust babbled and !ried and tal#ed to %od.Y )ow the guerrillas had found her$ and they re<oi!ed when they reali-ed who she was. XThey were all happy that there was at

least one survivor$Y 7ufina says. XThey all !ame up around me and hugged me. I didnWt #now what was going on$ who they were$ what they wanted.Y She was ta#en to El Lapotal and interviewed$ and before long the voi!e of 7ufina Amaya$ telling in !areful detail the story of what had happened in El 9o-ote$ was broad!ast throughout El Salvador. :n De!ember 50st$ the %eneral Command of the 9ora-Vn front of the D.9.".). issued Xa !all to the International 7ed Cross$ the :.A.S. 6uman 7ights Commission$ and the international press to verify the geno!ide of more than nine hundred SalvadoransY in El 9o-ote and the surrounding hamlets. X e as# these organi-ations to be the eyes of the worldWs !ons!ien!e$Y the !omandantes said. That night$ at the same time that 7adio =en!eremos was broad!asting a 9ass Xin memory of the thousand massa!red$Y El SalvadorWs provisional ;resident$ CosP )apoleZn Duarte$ felt obliged to ta#e to the airwaves and deny the a!!usations personally. The entire massa!re story$ he said$ was Xa guerrilla tri!#Y meant to smear his government at the very moment when the +nited States Congress was !onsidering aid to El Salvador. Duarte was right in at least one respe!tG though the El 9o-ote !ontroversy appeared to !enter on what had happened in a handful of hamlets in a remote region of El Salvador$ the real point of fo!us had shifted to ashington , and$ in parti!ular$ to Congress$ whi!h was per!eived as the wea# spot in the armor of the Salvadoran government. It was Congress that voted the money that paid for the Ameri!an guns and heli!opters and military advisersH and in re!ent years$ as the atro!ities had grown ever more frequent$ Congress had done so with in!reasing relu!tan!e. Two days before DuarteWs spee!h$ 7eagan had signed CongressWs amendment of the Doreign Assistan!e A!t of 01?0$ whi!h required the ;resident to X!ertifyY that the Salvadoran government Xis ma#ing a !on!erted and signifi!ant effort to !omply with internationally re!ogni-ed human rightsY and Xis a!hieving substantial !ontrol over all elements of its own armed for!es$ so as to bring to an end the indis!riminate torture and murder of Salvadoran !iti-ens by these for!es.Y If su!h a !ertifi!ation was not delivered to Congress by Canuary 41th$ and !onvin!ingly defended$ all funds and assistan!e for El Salvador would be immediately suspended. )ow all sides prepared for the debate over !ertifi!ation$ whi!h would provide !on!erned !ongressmen$ !hur!h leaders$ heads of human(rights groups$ and others with a new opportunity to do!ument the abuses !ommitted by the Salvadoran government in prose!uting the war. Administration offi!ials$ meanwhile$ both in ashington and in the Embassy in San Salvador$ prepared to defend the government and demonstrate that$ despite appearan!es$ the Salvadorans were improving in their respe!t for human rights. 9any of these offi!ials viewed the !ertifi!ation requirement with singular !ontempt. XIf Congress felt so strongly about human(rights abuses$ it !ould have simply !ut off aid$Y Elliott Abrams$ who had <ust been sworn in as Assistant Se!retary of State for 6uman 7ights and 6umanitarian Affairs$ told me. XBut Congress didnWt !ut off aid$ be!ause it didnWt want to ris# being blamed$ if the guerrillas won as a result$ for ]losingW El Salvador. Instead$ they required !ertifi!ation , whi!h is to say$ they agreed to fund the war while reserving the right to !all us Das!ists.Y Deane 6inton$ the +nited States Ambassador at the time$ later told an interviewer that he viewed !ertifi!ation Xas a way for the Congress \ to be for and against something at the same time.Y 6e went on to say that !ongressmen XdidnWt want to ta#e the responsibility to deny resour!es to the government of El Salvador and on the other hand they didnWt want to endorse it$ so they !reated a !ertifi!ation pro!edure and made the rest of us <ump through the hoop$ and the ;resident had to !ertify it$Y and added$ XIt is a politi!al !op(out by a lot of !ongressmen.Y At the root of this Xpoliti!al !op(out$Y in the unspo#en view of many Administration offi!ials$ was a simple truthG that when it !ame down to either supporting the Salvadoran government$ however unseemly its methods$ or allowing a vi!tory by the guerrillas the !hoi!e was !lear , and the only differen!e between the people in the Administration and the hypo!rites in Congress was that the 7eagan offi!ials were not afraid to say it straight out. Abrams told me$ XI used to say to people$ ]I mean$ I !an see arguing for an D.9.".). vi!tory on politi!al grounds or e!onomi! grounds , but on human(rights groundsF I mean$ thatWs !ra-y.W Y Abrams stood the human(rights argument on its head$ !ontending that to argue for an aid !utoff was$ in effe!t$ to argue for a guerrilla vi!tory$ and that at the end of the day$ however badly the Salvadoran government behaved$ those !olle!tive atro!ities !ould never approa!h the general disaster for human rights that an D.9.".). vi!tory would represent. Abrams was not alone in ta#ing this line of argument$ whi!h appears to have been aimed at persuading those , !onservative

Demo!rats most prominently , who$ however mu!h they deplored human(rights abuses in El Salvador$ nonetheless worried about ta#ing the blame for any advan!e of Communism in the hemisphere. The day after the !ertifi!ation was delivered to Congress$ the State Department sent out a !able$ over Se!retary of State 6aigWs name$ urging Ameri!an diplomats to des!ribe the El Salvador poli!y as Xa grit(your(teeth poli!yG to support a reformist <unta$ with a lot of bad eggs in and around it$ in order to avoid a Somo-a(Sandinista !hoi!e. Dor !riti!s to narrow their fo!us to the teeth(gritting without !onsidering the poli!yWs larger aims is shallow and unfair.Y Dor those who X!anWt ta#eY the !urrent Salvadoran government$ 6aig wrote$ Xthe honest response is not to say the <unta is , surprise , beset and flawed$ but rather to ma#e the !ase that itWs a!!eptable to the +nited States if El Salvador goes the Cuban way.Y It was against this ba!#ground that Ambassador 6inton and the State Department began re!eiving reports about a massa!re in 9ora-Vn. XComing on top of everything else$ El 9o-ote$ if true$ might have destroyed the entire effort$Y Thomas :. Enders$ the Assistant Se!retary of State for Inter(Ameri!an Affairs$ told me. X ho #nowsF I !ertainly thought that when I first heard about it.Y The Embassy began a !ounteratta!#$ following a pattern that it held to throughoutG undermining the reports not by investigating the fa!ts but by !asting doubt on their sour!e. In response to the request from the 7everend ipfler$ of the )ational Coun!il of Chur!hes$ 6inton !abled ba!#$ on Canuary 2th$ that he did Xnot #now what your sour!es are but the only sour!es that I have seen alleging something li#e this are !landestine 7adio =en!eremos reports.Y The Ambassador then quoted in full a heavy(handed =en!eremos te>t from Canuary 4nd$ in whi!h El 9o-ote was !ompared repeatedly to 9y "aiH added that he Xfound it interestingY that a guerrilla !ommuniquP two days earlier had not mentioned El 9o-ote at allH and !on!luded that he did not X!onsider 7adio =en!eremos to be a reliable sour!e.Y 6inton , who de!lined to be interviewed for this a!!ount , must have #nown that the )ational Coun!il of Chur!hes !ould not have got its information from 7adio =en!eremos. &Among other things$ ipflerWs !able was sent before the station had resumed broad!asting.' 6e himself had probably already re!eived reports from sour!es of his own that something had happened in 9ora-VnH after all$ no fewer than ten Ameri!an advisers were wor#ing with the Atla!atl at the time. A!!ording to one of them$ members of the 9ilgroup , the 9ilitary Advisory %roup at the Embassy , had telephoned the Atla!atl base in "a "ibertad within a few days of the massa!re. XThey !alled up and tal#ed to the Spe!ial Dor!es people and told them they wanted 9onterrosa to !ome in , they wanted to tal# to him about something that had happened during the operation$Y this adviser told me. XBut 9onterrosa <ust !limbed into his heli!opter and said$ ]If they want to tal# to me$ IWll be out with my troops.W 6e wasnWt going to go in and tal# to those guys. 6e said$ ]If I go in and let them tal# to me about this thing$ IWll never be able to get anyone to go out there and fight for me again.W And then he got into his heli!opter and too# offY , heading ba!# to 9ora-Vn. 6ow had the 9ilgroup offi!ers heard so qui!#ly that Xsomething had happenedY in 9ora-VnF Although the adviser believes it was the guerrillas who got word to the Embassy$ a number of highly pla!ed Salvadorans$ in!luding one prominent politi!ian of the time who had many friends among senior offi!ers$ !laim that two Ameri!an advisers were a!tually observing the operation from the base !amp at :si!ala. :n its fa!e$ the !harge is not entirely implausible , Ameri!an advisers had been #nown to violate the prohibition against a!!ompanying their !harges into the field , but it is impossible to !onfirm. Colonel 9oody 6ayes$ who was then the 9ilgroup !ommander$ refused to dis!uss El 9o-ote with me$ e>plaining that he didnWt #now Xwhat might still be !lassified$Y while offi!ers from the defense atta!hPWs offi!e and from 9ilgroup who were willing to tal# generally dismissed the !harge as unfounded. State Department offi!ials$ however$ were !learly worried about the possibility. XCertainly$ one of the issues I remember raising between us and the Embassy was$ ere there any Ameri!an advisers on this sortieFY Enders said. XThe Embassy made a great effort to tal# to advisers who were with the Atla!atl to try to find out the truth.Y :f !ourse$ had the truth been that Ameri!ans were at :si!ala$ it would have been a very hard truth to ma#e publi! , or$ for that matter$ to !onfide to a superior. The offi!ers involved would surely have #nown$ as Enders !on!eded$ that admitting su!h an unfortunate mis<udgment Xwould have ruined those guysW !areers , they would have been !ashiered. So no oneWs going to volunteer$ ]6ey$ I was up there.W Y By the same to#en$ Embassy offi!ials would have been a!utely aware of the effe!t su!h a revelation would have had on the entire Ameri!an effort in El Salvador. XIt would have been devastating$Y Enders said. XAmeri!an advisers with a unit that !ommitted an atro!ityF Devastating. Can you imagine anything more !orrosive of the

entire military effortFY Coming at su!h a time$ it might well have made the Salvadoran war$ in EndersW e>pression$ Xunfundable.Y Enders insists$ however$ that Xgiven the small numbers of advisers involved$ if theyWd been there we would have #nown about it.Y Sometime in mid(De!ember of 0120$ X!onta!ts of great !onfiden!e on the leftY approa!hed Todd %reentree$ the <unior reporting offi!er$ and told him that a massa!re had ta#en pla!e in 9ora-Vn. %reentree #new of :pera( tion 7es!ue from the defense atta!hPWs reports but #new nothing about a massa!re. XI first heard about it from the left$Y %reentree$ who is now the )i!aragua des# offi!er at the State Department$ says. XThe most important thing was that they offered me a spe!ial safe( !ondu!t to go up there and see it for myself. :bviously$ a de!ision had been ta#en very high up in the D.9.".). to do this for propaganda purposes. I #new the guerrillas would never have masqueraded something li#e this$ would never have fabri!ated it$ if they were offering safe(!ondu!t. I was !onvin!ed that something had gone on$ and that it was bad. I mean$ it was pretty !lear$ if they were going to do this$ that something must have happened.Y %reentree !onveyed this message from the left to Ambassador 6inton. A meeting was held. X6is response was ])o$ you !anWt do this under guerrilla es!ort$W Y %reentree says. Y ]That would be too ris#y$ and you would <ust be playing into their hands.W I mean$ I should emphasi-e that I never got the feeling that they <ust wanted this to go away. But there were politi!al and military !onstraints that we were operating under.Y *enneth Blea#ley$ who was the deputy !hief of mission$ told me XTodd was a very !ourageous young offi!er$ but it was <ust too mu!h of a ris# to send somebody out there.Y The de!ision was !learly the AmbassadorWs to ma#e. ;eter 7omero$ who was an El Salvador spe!ialist at the State Department$ says$ X6owever mu!h we might have wanted more information$ no one in State was going to ma#e that !all. It was !learly the AmbassadorWs !all. And at the time$ basi!ally$ the Embassy staff down there were targets , they were targeted by the D.9.".).Y %reentree was unable to a!!ept the guerrillasW offer to visit El 9o-ote and have a loo# for himself. But$ as he soon learned$ two other Ameri!ans were about to do <ust that. "ate on the evening of Canuary 5rd$ in the mountains near the Salvadoran border$ a dusty !ar pulled to a stop and disgorged into the barren 6onduran lands!ape two Ameri!ans in hi#ing boots. They slung their ba!#pa!#s on the ground$ stret!hed$ and after a few moments of sear!hing found a boy who had been waiting for them , their D.9.".). !onta!t. The boy led them into the quiet dar#ness$ heading down a ro!#y trail to the ban# of a river. In the moonlight$ the three stripped and$ holding their !lothing and their pa!#s above their heads$ pi!#ed their way unsteadily through the rushing !old water until they rea!hed the far shore , and the border of the guerrilla(held Department of 9ora-Vn. XI was s!ared$Y 7aymond Bonner said. XAll I !ould thin# was$ The military$ what if the military ambushes usFY It was not an idle fearH Bonner$ of the )ew Oor# Times$ and the photographer Susan 9eiselas , together with Alma %uillermoprieto$ of the ashington ;ost$ who followed them into 9ora-Vn ten days later , would be the first members of the Ameri!an establishment press to report on the Salvadoran war from the guerrilla side. Bonner and %uillermoprieto had both been wor#ing hard for months to arrange a trip in$ lobbying through D.9.".). !onta!ts in 9e>i!o and )ew Oor# as well as in El Salvador. In early De!ember$ they had finally seen their trips !onfirmed$ only to have them !an!elled after the start of :peration 7es!ue. "ater that month$ BonnerWs !onta!ts had informed him that the trip was on again. XTo the !harge that the guerrillas too# us in to report on the massa!re$ IWd say now$ ]OouWre damn right they did$W Y he said. XBut at the time I didnWt really #now about the massa!re.Y Bonner telephoned 9eiselas$ who was in )ew Oor#$ and$ in a magnanimous gesture$ before flying to Tegu!igalpa also put in a !all to %uillermoprieto$ in 9e>i!o City$ who immediately resumed her own Xdesperate$ intense$ round(the(!lo!# phone

lobbyingY with her D.9.".). !onta!ts. Ten days later$ after rende-vousing with a guerrilla !onta!t in the Tegu!igalpa mar#et$ she found herself being deposited Xunder a bush in the middle of the nightY near the 6onduran border$ along with a pile of supplies. Bonner and 9eiselas$ and %uillermoprieto$ des!ribe the trip in the same wayG hi#ing all night through the moonlit mountains$ and at dawn !oming upon the first guerrilla !amp , a s!attering of tents$ under pine trees$ that held twenty(five or thirty people. By dawn on the third day , Canuary ?th , Bonner and 9eiselas had rea!hed the area of El 9o-ote. XThere were bodies and parts of bodies$Y 9eiselas said. X e saw about twenty(five houses destroyed around Arambala and El 9o-ote. 9y strongest memory was this grouping of evangeli!als$ fourteen of them$ who had !ome together thin#ing their faith would prote!t them. They were strewn a!ross the earth ne>t to a !ornfield$ and you !ould see on their fa!es the horror of what had happened to them.Y At a burial near El Lapotal$ they were introdu!ed to 7ufina Amaya$ and Bonner interviewed her at length. A few days later$ the guerrillas gave him a handwritten list$ whi!h they said !ontained the names of those who had died at El 9o-ote and in the surrounding hamlets. XI did the tally$ !ame up with the number seven hundred$ tried to get the number of men$ women$ and !hildren$ got a sample of names$Y Bonner said. A few days later$ Bonner and 9eiselas began the hi#e ba!# to 6onduras. At the middle !amp$ they met a battered %uillermoprieto$ one of whose legs was swollen from an a!!ident involving a ro!# and a mule. At <ust about the time Bonner rea!hed 9e>i!o City and began to file his stories$ %uillermoprieto was nearing El 9o-ote. X e started smelling it from Arambala$Y she said. XThese #ids started leading me down paths and pointing to houses and saying again and again$ ]Aqu[ hay muertos$ aqu[ hay muertos.W The most traumati-ing thing was loo#ing at these little houses where whole families had been blown away , these re!ogni-able human beings$ in their little dresses$ <ust lying there mummifying in the sun. e #ept wal#ing$ got to El 9o-ote. e wal#ed down these !harming and beautiful roads$ then to the !enter of town$ where there was this #ind of rubbly pla!eY , the sa!risty , Xand$ in it$ a stupefying number of bones. There was a !harred wooden beam lying on top of the bodies$ and there were bones sti!#ing up$ and pie!es of flesh. Oou !ould see vertebrae and femurs sti!#ing out. )o attempt had been made to bury the bodies.Y In some sho!#$ she was led to "a %ua!amaya. XEveryone there had lost someone in his family , everyone , and everyone was in a state of !ontrolled hysteria.Y The great e>odus that had begun with the offensive in mid(De!ember was still under way. XIt was that massa!re$ the most horrible$ that really !aused the glass of water to overflow$Y "i!ho told me. X;eople flowed out of the -one$ either toward 6onduras or south toward %otera or into the guerrillas. A lot of people <oined us as !ombatants then.Y At the urging of ConVs$ the guerrilla !ommander$ %uillermoprieto saw 7ufina the ne>t day. "ater$ she spo#e to two young men who had seen their families murdered in "a Coya. Then$ thin#ing of Bonner and his head start$ she s!ribbled her story in her noteboo#$ folded up the pages$ and hid them in a plasti! film !annister. She found a guerrilla !ourier and persuaded him$ with some diffi!ulty$ to !arry the pre!ious !argo to Tegu!igalpa and deliver it to a !olleague$ who !ould telephone the story in to the ;ost. :n Canuary 4?th$ the day %uillermoprieto got ba!# to Tegu!igalpa$ the Times ran BonnerWs first story from 9ora-Vn$ headlined Xwith salvadorWs rebels in !ombat -one.Y %uillermoprieto had already been on the telephone to the ;ostWs foreign editor$ and they managed to get her El 9o-ote story$ along with a 9eiselas photograph of the rubble of the sa!risty$ onto the front page of the first edition of the ne>t dayWs paper , eighteen hundred words$ headlined Xsalvadoran peasants des!ribe mass #illingH woman tells of !hildrenWs death.Y Editors in the TimesW ashington bureau$ seeing the pie!e in the ;ostWs early edition$ telephoned )ew Oor#$ where BonnerWs El 9o-ote story had been awaiting editing at the foreign des#. Craig hitney$ then the deputy foreign editor$ and the des#men managed to rush BonnerWs slightly shorter arti!le$ headlined Xmassa!re of hundreds reported in salvador village$Y into the paperWs late edition. Si> wee#s after the massa!re$ El 9o-ote had made it onto

the front pages of Ameri!aWs two most important newspapers. The following day$ 7onald 7eagan sent to Congress the AdministrationWs !ertifi!ation that the government of El Salvador was Xma#ing a !on!erted and signifi!ant effort to !omply with internationally re!ogni-ed human rights.Y Two days later$ on Canuary 5@th$ Todd %reentree drove out to Ilopango Airport$ !limbed into a Salvadoran Army Alouette heli!opter$ and in a few minutes was sweeping over green vol!ani! lands!ape toward the mountains of 9ora-Vn. At his side was 9a<or Cohn 9!*ay$ of the defense atta!hPWs offi!e. A one(eyed marine &he had been wounded in =ietnam'$ 9!*ay was #nown to have the best !onta!ts among the Salvadoran offi!ers of any Ameri!an in the !ountry. The two men were headed for El 9o-ote to have a loo# for themselves. It was not the most propitious time. The Army was tenseH three days before$ guerrilla !ommandos had stormed Ilopango in a daring raid and had su!!eeded in destroying a large part of El SalvadorWs Air Dor!e as it sat on the tarma!. The raid , whi!h the guerrillas named :peration 9artyrs of 6eroi! 9ora-Vn$ in honor of those #illed in De!ember , would not loo# good in ashington. The !ongressional debate loomed large in the minds of those in the +nited States Embassy. XIt was in the middle of a phenomenally pa!#ed$ intense period down there$Y %reentree re!ently told me by telephone. X e had the investigation of the murders of the nuns$ we had the Constituent Assembly ele!tions !oming up$ and$ of !ourse$ we had the !ertifi!ationY , whi!h only intensified the pressure from Xthe politi!al mi!ros!ope in the States$Y as %reentree !alled it. XThe primary poli!y ob<e!tive at the time was to get the !ertifi!ation through$Y he said$ and the spe!ta!ular reports of the massa!re threatened the !ertifi!ation. XDrom the EmbassyWs point of view$ the guerrillas were trying to ma#e us loo# as bad as possible. They wanted to shut the whole thing down.Y The Ameri!ans landed at the brigade !ommand in San 9iguel to refuel and to re!eive their first briefing. XThe brigade !ommander was e>pe!ting us$Y %reentree said. XIn San 9iguel$ that was DloresY , Colonel Caime Ernesto Dlores %ri<alba$ the over(all !ommander of :peration 7es!ue. Also present$ %reentree believes , he is not absolutely !ertain , was Domingo 9onterrosa. The offi!ers gave the Ameri!ans Xa sort of after(a!tion report$ saying whi!h units were where$Y %reentree said. XAs I re!all$ the Atla!atl was the main !ombat unit$ and they tal#ed about this hammer(and(anvil nonsense. e were dismayed$ be!ause the Atla!atl was supposed to have developed new ta!ti!s$ but now they were ba!# to the same old shit , you #now$ insert a blo!#ing for!e and then !arry out a sweep.Y The message about El 9o-ote , the version that the Salvadoran Army had presumably already provided the defense atta!hPWs offi!e , was$ in effe!t$ that the Army had fought hard to dislodge a large !ompany of guerrillas from the town$ and though perhaps a few !ivilians had been #illed in the !rossfire$ soldiers !ertainly had not !arried out a massa!re. Colonel Dlores was not parti!ularly happy to see the Ameri!ans$ and it was !lear that his attitude was shared by the other offi!ers they en!ountered that day. As 9!*ay , who is now a !olonel atta!hed to nato headquarters in Brussels$ and was given permission to spea# publi!ly about the events at El 9o-ote by the Defense Department , told me$ XIn general$ we had very little !o_peration when we went to 9ora-Vn.Y They left San 9iguel and flew over the Torola toward El 9o-ote. XOou !ould see there had been a !ombat sweep through the area$Y %reentree said. XOou !ould tell El 9o-ote had been pretty mu!h destroyed. 7oofs were !ollapsed$ buildings were destroyed$ and the pla!e was pretty mu!h abandoned.Y As they flew over El 9o-ote$ %reentree went on$ he !ould see signs of battle. XThere was an es!arpment !lose to the town$ an obvious line of defense$ and you !ould see tren!h lines there. There were definitely fortifi!ations in the vi!inity.Y hen I pressed him for details$ he said that the fortifi!ations might have been !loser to Arambala$ a mile or so away. They made several passes at a !ouple of hundred feet$ then !ir!led around for a better loo#. XAs we lost altitude and got within range$ we got shot at$Y %reentree said. XThat was pretty standard stuff out there. It was definitely not a landing situation.Y They headed to %otera$ tou!hed down at the barra!#s$ and re!eived another briefing. XThe purpose of the briefing was to impress on us that this was a war -one out there$Y said Blea#ley$ the deputy !hief of mission$ who had !ome to %otera on

another heli!opter and met %reentree and 9!*ay there. The offi!ersW point was that Xnot only were they not out there #illing !ivilians but they were fighting for their lives in that very dangerous war -one to prote!t the !ivilians from guerrilla atro!ities.Y The Ameri!ans said theyWd li#e to have a loo#$ tal# to some people in and around the town. XIt was e>tremely tense$Y 9!*ay told me. XThe Army was !learly not happy with our presen!e there.Y A!!ompanied by a squad of soldiers$ 9!*ay$ %reentree$ and Blea#ley set off for the refugee !amp outside %otera. X e literally went up and down the streets$ saying$ ]6ey$ do you #now anyone from El 9o-oteFW Y Blea#ley said. XThe impression you got from people was that this was a !onfli!t -one$ that the people still up there were !amp followers$ you #now$ involved in the !onfli!t.Y And yet$ as 9!*ay a!#nowledged$ the presen!e of the soldiers made the tas# of !ondu!ting what would$ in any !ase$ have been diffi!ult interviews almost impossible. XOou had a bun!h of very intimidated$ s!ared people$ and now the Army presen!e further intimidated them$Y 9!*ay said. XI mean$ the Atla!atl had supposedly done something horrible$ and now these gringos show up under this pretense of investigating it$ but in the presen!e of these soldiers. It was probably the worst thing you !ould do. I mean$ you didnWt have to be a ro!#et s!ientist to #now what the Army people were there for.Y %reentree managed to spea# to a number of people , in!luding a mayor from one of the towns near El 9o-ote and several peasants who had lived near the hamlet , out of the soldiersW hearing. X9!*ay would wor# the military and #eep them distra!ted while I went out and around and tal#ed to people$Y %reentree said. The three Ameri!ans agreed that the information they gathered in the refugee !amp was not e>pli!it. As %reentree put it$ XI did not get any dire!t eyewitness a!!ounts of what had ta#en pla!e$ of the type that 7ay Bonner and Alma %uillermoprieto reported. It was more sort of the way people were tal#ing and the way the #ids around were still loo#ing as if theyWd been through hell$ and people saying$ ]Oes$ my wife was #illedW , that sort of thing.Y Sometime during these interviews$ he and 9!*ay be!ame !onvin!ed that something had happened in El 9o-ote. XOou !ould observe and feel this tremendous fear$Y 9!*ay said. XI was in =ietnam$ and I re!ogni-ed the ambien!e. The fear was overriding$ and we sensed it.Y X;eople were frea#ed out and pretty s!ared about tal#ing$ and stuff$Y %reentree said. )onetheless$ the interviews in the refugee !amp X!onvin!ed me that there probably had been a massa!re$ that they had lined people up and shot them.Y Blea#ley$ however &who$ as deputy !hief of mission$ was the senior offi!er of the three'$ told me that though Xit was !lear people had been #illed$ some of them !ivilians$ what we !ouldnWt answer was the fundamental question , you #now$ the differen!e between subduing a town and pulling out the !ivilians$ 9y "ai style$ and massa!ring them.Y Still$ %reentree said$ Xea!h person I tal#ed to !onfirmed the impression that something bad had happened$ but nobody was willing to go ahead and give the e>a!t story.Y 6e drew this !on!lusion Xfrom things they said$ their general manner , and their general unwillingness to tal#. And that in!ludes the soldiers as well. I mean$ you tal# to a soldier who thin#s heWs ta#en part in some heroi! operation , and a "atin soldier$ I mean , you !anWt get him to shut up. But these soldiers would say nothing. There was something there.Y Travelling with the squad of soldiers$ 9!*ay and %reentree left the refugee !amp &Blea#ley$ who had business in the !amp$ stayed at %otera'$ !limbed into a military <eep$ and headed up the bla!# road. X e went to five villages$Y 9!*ay said$ in!luding Co!oaitique$ within a few miles of El 9o-ote. X e tal#ed to a priest who gave us oblique information that something horrible had happened$ and that it was !ommitted by the Army.Y )ow the two men$ a!!ompanied by the soldiers$ set out for El 9o-ote to see for themselves. XBetween five and seven !li!#s south of Co!oaitique$ we were going to turn off the road toward the hamlet and head there !ross(!ountry$Y 9!*ay said. But the

soldiers had begun to grow quiet. XThere began to be !omplaints. They were already sensitive about the !ivilian with me. )ow they were getting more and more sullen. Oou #now$ theyWd loo# at the ground$ mumble something about being out of radio !onta!t.Y Dinally$ the group rea!hed the pla!e where theyWd have to leave the bla!# road for El 9o-ote. At that point$ the soldiers <ust stopped. XThe sergeant said$ ] eWre not going any farther$ weWre not going to help you.W It was made very !lear that we would get no more !o_peration.Y They had !ome very !lose to El 9o-ote. In less than an hour$ they !ould have seen for themselves the burned buildings$ the ruined sa!risty$ and the bodies. But$ with the soldiersW refusal to go on$ the Ameri!ans fa!ed the !hoi!e of heading on a!ross open !ountry , guerrilla(!ontrolled !ountry , without prote!tion or turning ba!#. XOou want to #now what made me de!ideFY 9!*ay said. X ell$ IWd been on that heli!opter over there$ and weWd re!eived fire$ and$ the month before$ the guerrillas had wiped out a whole !ompany up there. hat made me de!ide , me$ the big tough marineF I was s!ared shitless.Y The !hoi!e was !lear. The Ameri!ans$ with their soldier es!ort$ turned around and trooped ba!# to %otera$ and from there the heli!opter !arried them ba!# to the !apital. The investigation was over. At the Embassy$ %reentree sat down and began to write$ and by the following day$ after !onsultations with Blea#ley and review by others in the Embassy$ in!luding Ambassador 6inton$ a lengthy !able$ over the AmbassadorWs name$ was dispat!hed to ashington , a !able that provided the basis for what Assistant Se!retary of State Enders told Congress two days later. This !able$ whi!h was originally obtained in 0125 by a ashington resear!h group !alled the )ational Se!urity Ar!hives under a Dreedom of Information A!t request$ is a remar#able do!ument. Its opening paragraph , the all(important XsummaryY that heads diplomati! !ables , reads &with emphasis added' as followsG Embassy investigation of reported massa!re at El 9o-ote in!luding visit to the area by assistant Idefense atta!hPJ and IEmbassy offi!erJ !on!ludes followingG Although it is not possible to prove or disprove e>!esses of violen!e against the !ivilian population of El 9o-ote by %overnment troops$ it is !ertain that the guerrilla for!es who established defensive positions in El 9o-ote did nothing to remove them from the path of battle whi!h they were aware was !oming and had prepared for$ nor is there any eviden!e that those who remained attempted to leave. Civilians did die during :pera!iZn 7es!ate but no eviden!e !ould be found to !onfirm that %overnment for!es systemati!ally massa!red !ivilians in the operation -one$ nor that the number of !ivilians #illed even remotely approa!hed number being !ited in other reports !ir!ulating internationally. e are still pursuing question as to whi!h Army units were present in El 9o-ote. End Summary. In the entire summary$ only one point is !onsidered solid enough to be dubbed X!ertainY , that Xthe guerrilla for!es who established defensive positions in El 9o-ote did nothing to remove I!iviliansJ from the path of battle.Y And yet$ as %reentree !on!eded in our !onversation$ the des!riptions of fighting in El 9o-ote$ and of the Xdefensive positionsY there$ !ame largely$ if not e>!lusively$ from the Army briefings. XThe information that we had presented to us as !on!rete was$ of !ourse$ from the Army side$ about the !ondu!t of the !ombat operation$Y he said. The slender version of what happened in El 9o-ote seems to be a mi>ture of Army briefings and$ at best$ inferen!es by %reentree and Blea#ley. 6ow !ould the investigators be !ertain that the guerrillas did nothing to remove !ivilians Xfrom the path of battleYF The day before the trip to 9ora-Vn$ another <unior reporting offi!er had sent Blea#ley a memorandum passing along the report of a sour!e , the name is effa!ed in the version released by the government this fall , who$ while s#epti!al of the reported numbers of dead$ said that Xthe military did underta#e a sweep &]limpie-aW' of the area$ that residents of the area were given time to leave it$ that most did and that among the un#nown number of vi!tims of the operation were some &unspe!ified' evangeli!als who unwisely !hose to stay behind.Y &Blea#ley does not re!all the do!ument$ but he did say that it X!onforms with my memory of the time that there were people who were part of this new evangeli!al movement in El Salvador who would live in guerrilla areas and manage to stay above the !onfli!t.Y' It may be that some of the odd language of the summary &Xnor is there any eviden!e that those who remained attempted to leaveY' was influen!ed by this memorandum. In any event$ the assertion that guerrillas Xdid nothing to removeY !ivilians is a!tually !ontradi!ted later in the !able$ when the authors des!ribe an Xaged !oupleY who said that guerrillas Xtold them to leave in early De!ember.Y A!!ording to the !able$ this Xaged !oupleY returned to El 9o-ote after Xthe fighting had ended and soldiers were in !ontrol.Y hat did they findF XThey

!laimed they saw do-ens of bodies.Y This X!laimY is simply quoted$ without !omment$ as is the remar#$ in the ne>t paragraph$ by a man who X#new of violent fighting in El 9o-ote and other nearby !antonsY but was Xunwilling to dis!uss !omportment of government for!es saying ]This is something one should tal# about in another time$ in another !ountry.W X These quotations$ together with the flat statements to me from %reentree and 9!*ay that it was !lear to them at the time that Xsomething horribleY had happened at El 9o-ote$ that Xthere probably had been a massa!re$Y ma#e the !ableWs summary pu--ling$ to say the least. 7ead now$ the !ir!umspe!t lo!utions that dominate the summary ta#e on the aspe!t of shields , <udi!ious phrases by whi!h the investigators defle!ted the burden of e>pli!itly re!ounting what they strongly suspe!ted had happened. hat is !urious is how$ instead of building on their observations$ inferen!es$ and !on!lusions to present the best version possible of what probably happened$ they emphasi-e the gap between what !ould be definitively proved to have happened , whi!h$ of !ourse$ wasnWt mu!h$ given the reti!en!e of the people and the !onstraints on the investigatorsW movements , and what the newspapers and the guerrillas were !laiming had happened. It is a pe!uliar way of reasoning$ built$ as it is$ on the assumption that in the absen!e of definitive proof nothing at all !an really be said to be #nown. In effe!t$ offi!ials made a!tive use of the obsta!les to finding out the truth , and formidable obsta!les !ertainly e>isted in El Salvador in 0124 , to avoid saying !learly and honestly what they #new and what they suspe!ted. 9!*ay$ at least$ seems to have been troubled by this at the time. X e !ould not have said$ ]9y %od$ thereWs been a massa!re$W Y he told me. XBut$ truth be #nown$ the ambiguity of the !able that went out , in my own !ons!ien!e I began to question it. And then when I saw the )ew Oor# Times pie!e$ and the pi!ture$ that really got me to thin#ing. Bonner and I had gone to Muanti!o together$ went to =ietnam together.Y 9!*ay finally sent off another !able , Xthrough my own !hannels$Y presumably a military or an intelligen!e !ir!uit , Xand though I !anWt say !ategori!ally that I a!tually wrote ]something horrible happened$W what I said was to the effe!t that something had o!!urred$ be!ause of the fear we had dete!ted from the people there.Y 9!*ay$ of !ourse$ had reviewed the State Department !able before it was sent$ but he was not its authorH %reentree was. Though he was only twenty(eight years old$ %reentree had already earned the respe!t of his Doreign Servi!e !olleagues and , what was mu!h rarer in El Salvador , was !onsidered a !ompetent$ trustworthy offi!ial by many in the press !orps. Indeed$ even a de!ade later$ in his understanding of what had happened in El Salvador he seemed to me the most per!eptive of the Ameri!an offi!ials I interviewed. It was %reentree who embodied the +nited States government in the !losest !onta!t it would ma#e to the massa!re at El 9o-ote$ and yet it was %reentree who provided the reporting that would enable the government to deny that the massa!re had happened. It is tempting to !on!lude that he simply suppressed what was in!onvenient$ but the truth of what happened in the writing of the !able$ li#e most of the +nited StatesW dealings with the issue of Xhuman rightsY in El Salvador$ is rather more interesting than that. %reentreeWs re!olle!tion$ during a series of telephone interviews$ of the writing of the !able and of its !ontents followed a fas!inating progression. XAs I re!all$Y he told me$ XI gave the military a!!ount the benefit of the doubt$ but I probably put in the summary more ambiguity about what I felt.Y 6e went on to say$ XThere were probably a few lines in there that emphasi-ed that$ hey$ we infer from some of the information we pi!#ed up that something happened$ and so on.Y hen he was told no su!h ambiguity !ould be found in the summary , that$ in effe!t$ the only ambiguity in the !able was the !onfli!t$ wholly una!#nowledged$ between its !on!lusions and some of the observations in the body , he said he Ximagined that in the !learing pro!ess that got ta#en out.Y The X!learing pro!ess$Y in whi!h the !able made the rounds of offi!ials in the Embassy for review$ !entered on *enneth Blea#ley$ and his re!olle!tion of the trip$ alone among the re!olle!tions of the three$ !oin!ides with the !on!lusions drawn in the !able. )onetheless$ %reentree insisted to me that he Xdid not feel that what went out distorted beyond a!!eptabilityY what he had written. In a later !omment$ he stated emphati!ally$ XAt no time during my tour in El Salvador was a report that I had anything to do with ever distorted by the Embassy. Be!ause those are the standards that 6inton set.Y "i#e many in the Embassy$ and throughout the Doreign Servi!e$ %reentree had great respe!t for 6inton. 6e des!ribes 6inton as Xa totally !redible personY and$ in writing what he wrote$ he !learly felt the pressure to !onform to the older manWs standards. Oet it is hard not to suspe!t that %reentreeWs strong belief that the !able !ontained more XambiguityY than in fa!t it did refle!ts a lingering unease with the final produ!t , a !onfli!t that persists$ even after twelve years$ between what he wrote and what he

felt he should have written. XI had been in the Doreign Servi!e for only a !ouple of years at that time$Y %reentree told me$ Xand we had a very strong Ambassador$ and our instru!tions were to be !lear and !lean , to not distort. Oou write it down$ and then that be!omes the eyes and ears of the +nited States government. And this was espe!ially important be!ause the <ournalists reporting in El Salvador were thought to be biased. So if I had said everyone was !rying$ and everything , well$ that wouldnWt have had any !redibility$ either. e reported what we saw$ and the main requirement was to distinguish between what you saw and what other people said$ and$ even more than the standards of <ournalism$ to #eep your ]slantW out of what you were reporting.Y 6ad he not been operating under the !onstraints of politi!s in ashington$ what would he have written differentlyF

X ell$ I would have put in more strongly the impression that abuses against the !ivilian population probably too# pla!e in El 9o-ote and the surrounding areas during that operation.Y But he repeated$ XIt was <ust an impression. There was no dire!t !orroborating eviden!e.Y Oet this was his strongest impression$ and sin!e the limitations !aused it to be omitted$ didnWt they feel rather artifi!ial$ at the leastF XThatWs right$Y he said. XBut thatWs where$ I guess$ politi!al <udgment !ame into it. And it was not the <udgment that you would thin# , that$ you #now$ the AmbassadorWs got to ma#e sure that the information is politi!ally !orre!t. It was that$ for the rest of the report to have !redibility among people who were far away and whose priorities were , you #now$ weWre tal#ing about people li#e Tom Enders , whose priorities were definitely not ne!essarily about getting at e>a!tly what happenedG in order for the report to have !redibility$ all those things have to be #ept to a minimum.Y At that point$ one begins to understand the pressures on the Embassy$ and the effe!t that the great game of politi!s being played in ashington had on those who were supposedly a!ting$ within El Salvador$ as Xthe eyes and ears of the +nited States government.Y Ambassador 6inton was Xthe guy who sets the standards$Y %reentree said. XSo$ of !ourse$ sin!e I was a <unior offi!er$ my eyes were not on the poli!y. They were being very affe!ted by the things I was seeing and en!ountering out there. Drom the AmbassadorWs perspe!tive$ he had to #eep his eye on where we were supposed to be going in the !ountry$ and he had to put where the ]truthW was in the !onte>t of that. In other words$ the possibility that the guerrillas were ma#ing a ma<or propaganda ploy over a massa!re that might or might not have o!!urred in El 9o-ote$ and were doing so for the purpose of derailing +.S. poli!y , well$ what the Embassy had to say about that event had to be very$ very !arefully phrased and !ontrolled$ to get as !lose as possible to what happened and as far away as possible from propaganda on either side$ regardless of what might then happen to it on!e the report got to ashington and was one way or another translated into testimony before Congress.Y In reality$ then$ the admonition to be X!lear and !lean$Y to be XprofessionalY and Xnot distort$Y served as an e>!use to e>!lude from the !able the very things that had most impressed the men who a!tually ventured into the war -one. The emphasis on X!leanY reporting permitted the blinding and deafening of the government$ and served to remove from its field of per!eption what might have proved to be$ in the ashington of early 0124$ a very in!onvenient fa!t. In pla!e of 9!*ayWs !lear impression that Xsomething horrible happened$Y and of %reentreeWs !onvi!tion Xthat there probably had been a massa!re$ that they had lined people up and shot them$Y the !able supplied to offi!ials in the State Department a number of arguments that they might find useful in impea!hing the press a!!ounts of El 9o-ote , deeply misleading arguments that would form the basis of the governmentWs effort to dis!redit the reports of the massa!re. After !iting the numbers of dead that had appeared in the Times and the ashington ;ost$ the !able noted$ XIt is estimated that no more than 5@@ people were in the entire !anton prior to De!ember 0120Y , ignoring the fa!t that both newspapers had made it quite !lear that the massa!re too# pla!e in El 9o-ote and in a number of hamlets around it. As for the names of the dead Xsubsequently reported in the +.S. press$Y the !able suggested that those Xmay well have been e>tra!ts in whole or part from the !ivil registries \ stolen from Co!oaitique by subversives$Y though it offered no eviden!e whatever for this assertion. XI donWt re!all thin#ing it was what happened$Y %reentree said when he was as#ed about the Co!oaitique !laim$ Xbut I thought it was a

possibility.Y And yet he might have learned from Bonner &with whom %reentree was in frequent !onta!t' that the guerrillas had shown the reporter the list several days before they atta!#ed and !aptured Co!oaitique$ so the XpossibilityY that the names were a!tually drawn from !aptured !ivil registries from Co!oaitique , a !harge that an Assistant Se!retary of State would soon be repeating to the Congress of the +nited States , was not a possibility at all. XEl 9o-ote is in the heart of guerrilla territory$Y one reads on page 4 of the !able$ Xand its inhabitants have spent most of the past three years willingly or unwillingly !ooperating with insurgentsY , an odd lo!ution$ parti!ularly sin!e the ne>t senten!e notes the fa!t that X%overnment for!esY were last posted in El 9o-ote in August of 0120$ <ust four months before :peration 7es!ue. The observation about Xwillingly or unwillingly !ooperating with the insurgentsY e!hoes the attitude of the Salvadoran Army$ in whi!h anyone living north of the Torola must be$ a priori$ a guerrilla follower , and was thus$ in the offi!ersW view$ fair game. And yet %reentree !learly understood that the reality was more !omple>. X9ost of these people didnWt want anything to do with any of this stuff$Y he told me. XThey <ust wanted people to leave them alone ... They were vi!tims of this whole thing ... If they !ould get away by giving guerrillas some !orn and !hi!#ens$ and still live on their farms$ thatWs what they would do. At the same time$ if the people had to get by by giving !orn and !hi!#ens to the half a do-en %uardia )a!ional who were living in their town$ then they would do that , whatever it too# to enable them to live.Y It is an eloquent and !on!ise statement of what the !ivil war had done to many of the people of 9ora-Vn by 0120$ but$ unfortunately$ nothing near su!h depth of understanding is allowed to !ome through in the !able. The !able !on!ludes by noting that the defense atta!hPWs offi!e Xis attempting to determine whi!h Army units were present in El 9o-ote during and after the operation.Y :f !ourse$ if the Embassy wanted to dis!over what had happened in 9ora-Vn this should have been the other path of inquiryG putting the question dire!tly to the Ameri!an(funded and Ameri!an(trained Army. And yet si> wee#s after the events were alleged to have ta#en pla!e the Embassy reported that it had not managed to dis!over whi!h units were in El 9o-ote , this although at least ten Ameri!an advisers were assigned to the Atla!atl$ the unit a!!used in all the press reports. As several re!ently released !ables !onfirm$ however$ matters were a bit more !ompli!ated. :n the day %reentree and 9!*ay made their trip to 9ora-Vn$ Ambassador 6inton had a dis!ussion with Salvadoran Defense 9inister %ar![a , Xon margin of dinner$Y as he puts it in his !able , about El 9o-ote. The %eneral &%ar![a had been promoted on Canuary 4nd' was about to ma#e a trip to ashington to attend Xa Congressional prayer brea#fast$Y and the Ambassador warned him that he should Xbe ready to respond to 9ora-Vn massa!re story.Y %eneral %ar![a$ 6inton writes$ Xwas his usual !o!#y self. ]IWll deny it and prove it fabri!ated.W I wished him well and added he would have to e>plain away details provided by !orrespondents. It might be possible , we were investigating and were grateful for his help , but he should bear in mind that something had gone wrong. ho did it$ when$ and in what !ir!umstan!es was something else.Y Two days later$ on the afternoon of Debruary 0st$ an Ameri!an offi!er from the defense atta!hPWs offi!e travelled out to the Atla!atl headquarters and met with$ among others$ 9a<or CV!eres$ 9a<or CosP Armando A-mitia 9elara$ and "ieutenant Colonel 9onterrosa. The offi!erWs mission was Xto spe!ifi!ally determine if the battalion$ or elements thereof$ were involved in the fighting around and in El 9o-ote.Y After Xgreetings and pleasantries were e>!hanged$Y the Ameri!an put his question to the Colonel. X9onterrosa remained distantly !ourteous$ but he firmly told 7: I7eporting :ffi!erJ that he was not in a position to dis!uss these spe!ifi! sub<e!ts$ and that 7: had better obtain permission from the %eneral Staff of the Armed Dor!es before he !ame with su!h inquiries to his &"TC 9onterrosaWs' Battalion.Y Things had begun badly$ the Ameri!an reportsG XMuite fran#ly$ IIJ felt that the interview$ albeit short$ was thus to be terminated.Y The Ameri!an hastened to ma#e Xthe obligatory apologies for what the Colonel may have interpreted as impertinen!e. 7: also pointed out that !andid answers to the questions posed would fa!ilitate !ountering re!ent press releases whi!h were less than !omplimentary to the Armed Dor!es of El Salvador.Y 9a<or A-mitia now spo#e in Xwhat !an only be des!ribed as a parable$Y e>plaining that Xthe unit that had fought at El 9o-ote had had a tough time of itY and that Xbe!ause of the intensity and duration of the battle \ there were undoubtedly !asualties

among non(!ombatants.Y 9onterrosa put in that Xthe unit involved had had to fight through fi>ed enemy positions$ then$ on!e in the town$ fire was re!eived from the houses in the town.Y 6ere$ a!!ording to the Ameri!an offi!er$ X9onterrosa now utili-ed the first personG ]I do not have U(ray vision$ and I !annot see inside the house from whi!h someone is shooting at meH nor in those type of !ir!umstan!es am I very disposed to waste time trying to find out who else might be in the house.W ... At this point "TC 9onterrosa said \ he was only spea#ing in general$ not spe!ifi!$ terms about what had o!!urred at El 9o-ote.Y The Salvadorans$ it seems !lear$ are giving the Ameri!an a !onspiratorial win#H but the Ameri!an doesnWt seem to get it$ and he ventures to as# 9onterrosa if any prisoners had been ta#en. At this$ the Colonel again Xassumed an adamant demeanor$ and suggested that 7: !onsult with the general staff$ or get permission from the general staff to as# him su!h questions.Y 9a<or A-mitia$ as he es!orted the Ameri!an offi!er to his vehi!le$ Xa!ted apologeti! about the fa!t that they !ould not provide more fa!ts about El 9o-ote$ but he was sure that 7: understood what "TC 9onterrosa had been tal#ing about.Y In his summary the Ameri!an notes that Xthe two hours spent with these offi!ers was interesting$ to say the least. The nuan!es$ subtleties and indire!t !omparisons used by "TC 9onterrosa and 9a< A-mitia were intriguing. Oet the !entral questions remain without definitive answers.Y 6ere the offi!er ventures a Xpersonal opinionY that the XAtla!atl battalion or elements thereof parti!ipated in the atta!# on El 9o-ote$Y but he adds that Xpre!luding permission from %eneral %ar![a \ definitive answers \ may never be forth!oming.Y Ambassador 6inton$ !learly a bit frustrated$ now as#ed his 9ilgroup !ommander if Xit were possible 6igh Command did not #now where and when their field for!es operated. )o$ it was not$ he told me.Y The Ambassador sent this offi!er to see the Salvadoran !hief of staff$ who informed the Ameri!an that the XDefense 9inister wanted no one other than himself to deal with that question.Y 6inton$ having been rebuffed on his subordinateWs level$ now paid a personal visit to %eneral %ar![a. X e <oshed a bit as is our wont$Y reports 6inton$ des!ribing how the %eneral !omplimented him Xon my ashington ;ost interview whi!h he said put things e>a!tly right.Y 6inton reminds the %eneral that XTom IEndersJ had today gone to Congress to defend the additional 33 million in military assistan!eY and that Xin this !onne!tion \ reports published in the ashington ;ost and the )ew Oor# Times about alleged 9ora-Vn massa!re ... !aused great !on!ern.Y %ar![a replied$ a!!ording to 6inton$ that Xthe 9ora-Vn business was a ]novela$W pure 9ar>ist propaganda devoid of foundation. I said it was !learly propaganda that its timing had been !arefully !al!ulated but there were so many details that it was diffi!ult to deal with the stories.Y The Ambassador now as#s the %eneral about some of those details$ in!luding the identity$ among others$ of 9a<or CV!eres. The %eneral replies that CV!eres is Xa straightforward$ honorable soldier who would never have #illed women and !hildren as des!ribed in the story.Y After some dis!ussion$ %eneral %ar![a a!#nowledges that Xthe Atla!atl Battalion had been at El 9o-ote during the De!ember sweep$Y but then he Xreiterated that the story was a pa!# of lies.Y %ar![a does promise the Ambassador that he will loo# into the matter further. X6e as#ed me to leave with him the stories and I did so adding as a sweetener the ashington ;ost editorial of Canuary 41 supporting our !ommon poli!ies.Y :ne gets a vivid sense from these !ables of the frustrating position the Ameri!ans had pla!ed themselves in in their dealings with the Salvadoran military. The Salvadorans behave with an arrogan!e that bespea#s their awareness of their own power. ashington was behind them and they #new itG hy should they !omply with these lo!al offi!ials$ e>!ept in those !ases where they absolutely had toF In the !ase of El 9o-ote$ it was already !lear that they didnWt have to. %reentree remembers thin#ing as he sat in the heli!opter on the way ba!# to the !apital from 9ora-Vn$ XIf weWre really going to get to the bottom of this$ thereWs going to have to be a de!ision to put a tremendous amount of energy into it$ to !arry out a more formal investigation$ li#e the ones !ondu!ted for the Ameri!ansY , the four !hur!hwomen. XI remember feeling frustrated and dissatisfied with what we !ame ba!# with. But$ if weWd wanted to go any further with it$ it would have ta#en a de!ision to e>pend a tremendous amount of effort.Y )o su!h de!ision was ever made. Two days after %reentreeWs !able arrived at the State Department$ Assistant Se!retary Thomas :. Enders went up to Capitol 6ill. Sitting before the 6ouse Sub!ommittee on Inter(Ameri!an Affairs$ he set out to defend the ;residentWs !ertifi!ation that the Salvadoran government was ma#ing a X!on!erted and signifi!ant effort to !omply with internationally re!ogni-ed human

rights.Y Se!retary Enders told Congress that he would ma#e Xa !oherent attempt to answer the question that you have raised \ are we getting some results.Y X7esultsY he would interpret to mean improvement. Thus he would be arguing$ in essen!e$ that$ however horrendous Xthe human(rights situationY might now be in El Salvador$ the last year had in fa!t been less horrendous than the year before. The effe!t of this argument was to shift the ground of the debate. X;reviously$ it had been ] e thin# this human(rights thing is important and you donWt thin# itWs that important$W Y Aryeh )eier$ then the dire!tor of Ameri!as at!h$ told me. X hat the 7eagan Administration did was embra!e the prin!iple of human rights and then !ondu!t warfare over the fa!ts. The fight over El 9o-ote e>emplified this.Y The human(rights groups had geared up to fight this new warH Ameri!as at!h$ for e>ample$ whi!h had been founded only the summer before$ issued a boo#(length study$ X7eport on 6uman 7ights in El Salvador$Y on Canuary 4?th$ two days before the !ertifi!ation was sent up to Congress. Dor the human(rights groups and for leading Demo!rati! !ongressmen$ as well as for the Administration offi!ials$ the fight would !enter on information and how it was gathered. XA!!urate information$Y Se!retary Enders began. XI thin# we all have found out that is very hard to establish. The responsibility for the overwhelming number of deaths is never legally determined nor usually a!!ounted for by !lear or !oherent eviden!e. Seventy per !ent of the politi!al murders #nown to our Embassy were !ommitted by un#nown assailants.Y As in the !able$ the fa!t that the #illersW identities !ould not be definitively #nown$ though in most !ases few doubted who the #illers were$ was used as a shield , an e>!use to ignore what was #nown. In the absen!e of !on!lusive$ undeniable proof$ the government would feel free to assert that all was dar#ness. X e sent two Embassy offi!ers down to investigate the reports \ of the massa!re in 9o-ote$Y the Se!retary went on. XIt is !lear from the report that they gave that there has been a !onfrontation between the guerrillas o!!upying 9o-ote and atta!#ing government for!es last De!ember. There is no eviden!e to !onfirm that government for!es systemati!ally massa!red !ivilians in the operations -one$ or that the number of !ivilians remotely approa!hed the seven hundred and thirty(three or nine hundred and twenty(si> vi!tims !ited in the press.Y E!hoing the strategy suggested in %reentreeWs !able$ Enders went on$ XI note they as#ed how many people there were in that !anton and were told probably not more than three hundred in De!ember$ and there are many survivors in!luding refugees$ now. So we have to be very !areful about trying to addu!e eviden!e to the !ertifi!ation. e try$ our Embassy tries$ to investigate every report we re!eive.Y Si> days later$ Elliott Abrams$ the Assistant Se!retary of State for 6uman 7ights and 6umanitarian Affairs$ remar#ed to the Senate Doreign 7elations Committee that the El 9o-ote !ase Xis a very interesting one in a sense$ be!ause we found$ for e>ample$ that the numbers$ first of all$ were not !redible$ be!ause as Se!retary Enders notes$ our information was that there were only three hundred people in the !anton.Y The argument about numbers is$ of !ourse$ deeply misleading , no one who read the Times and the ;ost arti!les !ould have missed the fa!t that the #illing had ta#en pla!e in several hamletsH two of the three survivors %uillermoprieto quoted$ for e>ample$ were from "a Coya$ not El 9o-ote. But the argument e>emplifies a pattern. Claiming to have investigated Xthe fa!tsY and to have found Xno eviden!eY of a massa!re$ Ameri!an offi!ials then sei-ed on aspe!ts of the !harges that$ they said$ reveal them to be propaganda. X e find \ that it is an event that happened in mid(De!ember Ibut itJ is then publi!i-ed when the !ertifi!ation !omes forward to the !ommittee$Y Abrams told the Senate. XSo$ it appears to be an in!ident whi!h is at least being signifi!antly misused$ at the very best$ by the guerrillas.Y In an interview more than a de!ade later$ Abrams made the same argument. 6e pointed out that the massa!re had XsupposedlyY ta#en pla!e in De!ember$ and as#ed$ XIf it had really been a massa!re and not a firefight$ why didnWt we hear right off from the D.9.".).F I mean$ we didnWt start hearing about it until a month later.Y As has been noted$ the guerrillas first Xpubli!i-edY the massa!re about two wee#s after the event , as soon as they had got 7adio =en!eremos ba!# on the air. All the same$ it is indisputable that the volume of reporting about El 9o-ote from =en!eremos$ from human(rights groups$ and from the international press grew steadily throughout Canuary$ and rea!hed a !res!endo the day before 7eaganWs !ertifi!ation$ with the front(page stories in the ;ost and the Times. Certainly a signifi!ant

part of this publi!ity , it is impossible to say how mu!h , was owing$ dire!tly and indire!tly$ to the efforts of those$ beginning with the guerrillas and their international propaganda apparatus$ who had a strong interest in derailing the AdministrationWs poli!y in El Salvador. But Administration offi!ials fo!ussed obsessively on this unsurprising reality$ as if the very fa!t that the El 9o-ote story was being used as propaganda , that it was$ as Abrams put it$ Xsignifi!antly misused \ by the guerrillasY , in itself !onstituted proof that the massa!re hadnWt ta#en pla!e. To many in the Administration$ the importan!e of the massa!re was that it had su!h propaganda value$ and that the propaganda$ !oming at a !ru!ial time$ posed a threat to Ameri!an aid. ;reserving the Salvadoran government and helping it win the war were paramountH Ximproving human rightsY naturally too# a ba!# seat sin!e$ as the Administration li#ed to put it$ by far the worst disaster that !ould befall human rights in El Salvador was a Communist vi!tory. This attitude was no mystery to the Salvadoran leadersH despite the periodi! brouhahas over !ertain atro!ities$ they !ould see the bottom line quite !learly$ whi!h was$ as Abrams phrased it$ that Xwhatever you thin# of us from a human(rights point of view$ what you thin# of us from a se!urity point of view is determinative.Y To say the least$ this attitude did not en!ourage anyone in the State Department to ma#e any additional effort to find out what had happened at El 9o-ote. As far as the Department offi!ials were !on!erned$ %reentreeWs !able was the end of the matter. The !able had !ome from 6intonWs Embassy$ and 6inton had a great deal of prestige in the Department. By now$ however$ 6inton himself had ta#en a rather different view. XI would be grateful if Department would use e>treme !are in des!ribing my views on alleged massa!re$Y he !abled on Debruary 0st. Apparently$ ashington had sent out !ables saying that the Ambassador$ in his reply to the )ational Coun!il of Chur!hes$ had denied the massa!re had ta#en pla!e. X9y letter did not ]denyW in!identG it reported that at that time I had no !onfirmation and \ had no reason to believe =en!eremos reports. I still donWt believe =en!eremos version but additional eviden!e strongly suggests that something happened that should not have happened and that it is quite possible Salvadoran military did !ommit e>!esses.Y )ot only 9!*ay and %reentree but now 6inton himself had !ome to the !on!lusion that Xsomething happenedY at El 9o-ote , and 6inton had now told the State Department so. To this$ he added a fran# appraisal of the Salvadoran offi!ersW !redibility. XI find %ar![aWs assertion \ ]we have absolutely no information on military a!tions in El 9o-oteW to be stonewalling without !redibility. I have tried to warn him re need to fa!e up to problem$ but my impression is he thin#s !ategori! denial is way to handle question. Department offi!ers may wish to dis!uss matter with him \ before +.S. press gets to him.Y As it happened$ however$ XDepartment offi!ersY seem to have agreed with %eneral %ar![a. They had the %reentree !able$ and they would ma#e use of it. After all$ the question would !ome down to , as Abrams put it to me , XDo you believe the Embassy$ an agen!y of the +nited States government$ or Ameri!as at!hFY Ameri!as at!h and other human(rights organi-ations$ Abrams said$ Xdid not have a great deal of !redibility with us$Y for$ in his view$ they had ranged themselves on the side of those who argued$ in effe!t$ for an D.9.".). vi!tory$ and thus they served as willing tools of the hypo!rites in Congress who now for!ed Administration offi!ials to undergo a meaningless !ertifi!ation e>er!ise. XCertifi!ation was this politi!al game they were playing$Y 6oward "ane$ the Embassy press offi!er$ told me. XI mean$ everybody #new$ Congress #new$ what theyY , the Salvadoran government , Xwere doing down there. By then$ they had to #now$ unless they refused to see it. So they beat their breasts$ and tore their hair$ and yelled about human rights$ and made us <ump through this hoop !alled !ertifi!ation. If any Ambassador wanted to #eep his <ob$ he had to <ump$ whi!h meant essentially saying the half(empty glass was really half full. It was a game. I mean$ ]improvementW , whatWs improvement$ anywayF Oou #ill eight hundred and it goes down to two hundred$ thatWs improvement. The whole thing was an e>er!ise in the absurd.Y Ever the good soldier$ Enders on Capitol 6ill atta!#ed the numbers from the human(rights groups$ put forward the AdministrationWs numbers$ e>plained how$ despite all appearan!es$ the Salvadoran government was Xma#ing progress.Y 6e testified$ XThe results are slow in !oming. I would agree with you on that. But they are !oming \ The figures show it. e have September$ :!tober$ )ovember$ De!ember figures for 012@$ whi!h show something on the order of eight hundred$ seven hundred and seventy(nine$ five hundred and seventy(five$ and si> hundred and si>ty(five politi!al murders. That is for 012@. e have the same figures for this year whi!h show September$ a hundred and seventy(one$ :!tober$ a hundred and si>ty(one$ )ovember$ three hundred and two. It shows De!ember$ two hundred. :ur returns are showing mar#edly different numbers on

the same methodology.Y That methodology$ as anyone who had loo#ed into it #new$ was very obviously flawed. The AdministrationWs numbers$ drawn from the EmbassyWs wee#ly Xgrim gram$Y were based on reports in the Salvadoran newspapers$ all of whi!h not only ranged from !onservative to unabashedly right(wing but weighted their reporting toward the !ities. In 0120$ fewer people were being #illed in the !ities$ be!ause fewer a!tivists were there to be #illedH most of those who had not been liquidated in late 01A1 or 012@ had moved to the mountains. And the #illings in the mountains$ in the isolated hamlets and villages$ rarely rea!hed the pages of newspapers in the !apital. X"et me be !lear this is not a !omplete report$Y Enders told Congress. X)obody has a !omplete report \ But$ nonetheless$ it is a !oherent attempt to answer the question that you have raised \ are we getting some results. This is the indi!ation that I submit to you that we are.Y To this statement a number of !ongressmen responded with outraged eloquen!e. %erry Studds$ Demo!rat of 9assa!husetts$ told Enders$ XIf there is anything left of the English language in this !ity \ it is gone now$ be!ause the ;resident has <ust !ertified that up is down and in is out and bla!# is white. I anti!ipate him telling us that war is pea!e at any moment.Y It was an irresistible quote$ and it made for great television. But it didnWt ma#e any differen!e. Enders had supplied a X!oherent attempt to answer the questionY that Congress had posed$ and though Demo!rati! !ongressmen would not spare their voi!es$ or their sar!asm$ in noting Xthe :rwellian tones of this !ertifi!ation$Y as Steven Solar-$ Demo!rat of )ew Oor#$ put it , though !ongressmen atta!#ed the numbers and the methodology$ and the hearings be!ame !ontentious and angry , it was !lear that$ !ome what may$ there would not be the votes to !ut off aid to El Salvador$ for that$ as everybody #new$ would mean XlosingY the !ountry to the Communists. At root$ nearly everyone ta!itly agreed &the Demo!rats , whose purported XlossY of China three de!ades before was still a painful ;arty memory , no less than the 7epubli!an Administration and its allies' that that eventuality was too intolerable even to !ontemplate$ and that in the end the Salvadoran government$ by whatever means$ had to win the war$ or the !ountryWs se!urity would be una!!eptably threatened. And so$ be!ause of this underlying agreement$ the entire debate$ loud and angry as it appeared at first glan!e$ was not a debate. It was an e>er!ise for the !ameras. As for El 9o-ote$ sin!e the Salvadoran newspapers said nothing about it$ those who had died there merited no pla!e in the numbers Se!retary Enders brought to Congress. 6ad the massa!re somehow been XprovedY to the State DepartmentWs satisfa!tion , had it been$ somehow$ impossible for the Administration to deny , El 9o-ote would have had an ugly effe!t on the AdministrationWs numbersG politi!al murders would have shown an in!rease in De!ember from si> hundred and si>ty(five to well over a thousand$ rather than the sharp de!line he !laimed. ould this have led Congress to re<e!t the !ertifi!ation and !ut off aidF 7eading the re!ord now$ feeling on!e again the fear in ashington of an D.9.".). vi!tory and of the blame su!h a vi!tory might impose on Ameri!an politi!ians$ the question seems$ sadly$ diffi!ult to answer. Aid might have been redu!ed$ true$ but$ at most$ Congress might have managed to !ut off aid temporarily$ only to restore it again in a pani! , as Carter had done , at the first new guerrilla onslaught. But this is spe!ulation. In the event$ the dead of El 9o-ote did not really !ome into the dis!ussion at all. :n Debruary 0@th$ the all Street Cournal published a lengthy editorial headed XThe 9ediaWs ar$Y in whi!h it noted that the publi!Ws Xper!eptions are badly !onfusedY on the war in El Salvador$ and attributed mu!h of that !onfusion to Xthe way the struggle is being !overed by the +.S. press.Y 9ost notable were several paragraphs that too# up the question of El 9o-oteG Ta#e the re!ent !ontroversy over !harges of a Xmassa!reY by an elite battalion of the El Salvadoran army. :n Canuary 4A$ 7aymond Bonner of the )ew Oor# Times and Alma %uillermoprieto of the ashington ;ost simultaneously reported on a visit to rebel territory$ repeating interviews in whi!h they were told that hundreds of !ivilians were #illed in the village of 9o-ote in De!ember. Thomas :. Enders$ assistant se!retary of state for Inter(Ameri!an affairs$ later !ast doubt on the reports. There had been a military operation but no systemati! #illing of !ivilians$ he said$ and anyway the population of the village was only 5@@ before the atta!# in whi!h 14? people supposedly died. hen a !orrespondent is offered a !han!e to tour rebel territory$ he !ertainly ought to a!!ept$ and to report what he sees and

hears. But there is su!h a thing as being overly !redulous. 9r. Bonner reported Xit is !learY the massa!re happened$ while 9iss %uillermoprieto too# pains to say that reporters had been Xta#en to tourY the site by guerrillas with the purpose of showing their !ontrol and providing eviden!e of the massa!re. In other words$ whatever the mi>ture of truth or fabri!ation$ this was a propaganda e>er!ise. 7ealisti!ally$ neither the press nor the State Department has the power to establish !on!lusively what happened at 9o-ote in De!ember$ and weWre sure the sophisti!ated editors of the Times re!ogni-e as mu!h. Oet as an institution$ their paper has !losed ran#s behind a reporter out on a limb$ waging a little !ampaign to bolster his position by impugning his !riti!s. A Xnews analysisY !harged the government of sowing !onfusion by questioning press reports Xwithout presenting detailed eviden!e to support its position.Y The analysis posed the question of Xhow Ameri!an diplomats gather information abroad$Y but not the same question about Ameri!an reporters. :ddly missing from these paragraphs$ and from the rest of that very long editorial$ was any a!#nowledgment that the two reporters had a!tually seen !orpses , in %uillermoprietoWs !ase$ at least$ do-ens of !orpses , and that 9eiselas had ta#en photographs of those !orpses. Instead$ the editorial said that the two <ournalists Xrepeat interviews in whi!h they were told that hundreds of !ivilians were #illed in the village of 9o-ote$Y and then said immediately afterward that Enders Xlater !ast doubt on the reportsY , as if Enders$ or his representatives$ had a!tually made it to the village$ as if the #ind of eviden!e he was purveying were no different from what were$ after all$ two eyewitness a!!ounts$ if not of the events themselves$ then of their aftermath. The reporting done by the <ournalists and by the Embassy offi!ials is repeatedly yo#ed together$ as if the two parties had visited the same sites$ seen the same eviden!e$ tal#ed to the same people$ and merely drawn different !on!lusions. )either party$ the editorial de!lared$ Xhas the power to establish !on!lusively what happened at 9o-oteY , the impli!ation being$ as the Administration itself had argued repeatedly in its defense of its Salvadoran allies$ that$ sin!e there is no X!on!lusiveY a!!ount$ nothing !an be truly #nown. The idea that mu!h of a <ournalistWs business !onsists of a studied sifting of what is said and what is observed$ of a !areful wrestling with gradations of eviden!e$ and a !ontinual <udgment of the !redibility of witnesses , this notion is nowhere present in the si>teen paragraphs of the CournalWs editorial. Seven days after the CournalWs atta!# on the TimesW Xoverly !redulousY reporter$ the State Department re!eived a !able over the name of the Ambassador to 6onduras$ Cohn )egroponte$ reporting on a visit by an Embassy offi!ial and a 6ouse Doreign Affairs Committee staff member to the refugee !amp at Colomon!agua$ to whi!h many of the refugees from 9ora-Vn had fled two months before. A!!ording to the !able$ the refugees des!ribed to the Ameri!an diplomat Xa military sweep in 9ora-Vn De!ember A to 0A whi!h they !laim resulted in large numbers of !ivilian !asualties and physi!al destru!tion$ leading to their e>odus.Y The !able went on to say that Xnames of villages !ited !oin!ide with )ew Oor# Times arti!le of Canuary 42 same sub<e!t.Y The reporting offi!er added that the refugeesW Xde!ision to flee at this time when in the past they had remained during sweeps \ lends !redibility to reportedly greater magnitude and intensity of \ military operations in )orthern 9ora-Vn.Y This information was not made publi!. Si> months after the CournalWs atta!# on him$ 7aymond Bonner was gone from Central Ameri!a. Sin!e the El 9o-ote story and the !ontroversy surrounding it$ Bonner had been under great pressure$ enduring a steady fusillade of !riti!ism from the Embassy and the State Department$ as well as from various right(wing Ameri!an publi!ations for whom Bonner had !ome to symboli-e the supposed Xleftward tiltY of reporting in Central Ameri!a. In August$ 0124$ Bonner re!eived a telephone !all in his 9anagua hotel room informing him that he should report to the 9etro des# in )ew Oor#. The TimesW de!ision to remove a !orrespondent who had been the fo!us of an aggressive !ampaign of Administration !riti!ism no doubt had a signifi!ant effe!t on reporting from El Salvador. The )ew Oor# Times editors appeared to have X!avedY to government pressure$ and the Administration seemed to have su!!eeded in its !ampaign to have a troublesome reporter , the most dogged and influential in El Salvador , pulled off the beat. The publi! position of A. 9. 7osenthal$ then the e>e!utive editor of the Times$ has always been$ as he told me by telephone$ that Xat no time did anybody in the +nited States government suggest to me$ dire!tly or indire!tly$ that I remove 9r. Bonner$Y and$ further$ that Xanyone who would approa!h the )ew Oor# Times and suggest to me that I remove or punish a !orrespondent would have to be an idiot. To imply that a man who devoted himself to <ournalism would remove a reporter

be!ause of the +.S. government or the C.I.A.$ or whatever$ is ridi!ulous$ nacve$ !ruel$ and slanderous.Y A!!ording to 7osenthal$ Bonner was removed be!ause he had never been fully trained in the TimesW parti!ular methods. Bonner$ he said$ XdidnWt #now the te!hniques of weaving a story together \ I brought him ba!# be!ause it seemed terribly unfair to leave him there without training.Y Bonner had been trained as a lawyer$ had been an assistant distri!t attorney and a )aderWs 7aider$ and had <oined the Times as a stringer in Central Ameri!a. Seymour Topping$ then the managing editor$ told me that Xbe!ause we were !onsiderably pressed at the time in getting people into the field in Salvador$ we short(!ir!uited what would be our normal pro!ess of training people on 9etro to learn the style and methods of the Times.Y Bonner$ Topping went on$ Xhad done a first(!lass <ob of investigative <ournalism$ and there was never any question that he had !ome up with the fa!ts , that his stories were true. But$ if he had been more e>perien!ed$ the way he had written his stories , qualified them$ et!. , would have left him mu!h less open to !riti!ism.Y But XtrainingY was not the only issue , for that matter$ as Bonner pointed out to me$ he had spent a good part of 0120 on the 9etro des# , and$ at least in 7osenthalWs !ase$ the question of BonnerWs X<ournalisti! te!hniqueY seems to have been ine>tri!ably bound up with what the e>e!utive editor !ame to per!eive as the reporterWs left(wing sympathies. XIf anybody ever as#ed me to withdraw him$ heWd still be there$Y 7osenthal told me$ and !ertainly the idea that the government simply pressured the Times into withdrawing Bonner is wrong. 7osenthal suggests that others have promoted this version of the story be!ause XI was an agent of !hange in the Times$ and a lot of people didnWt li#e my politi!sYH but !onversations with a number of Times reporters and editors$ former and !urrent$ persuaded me that the !ampaign against Bonner was more effe!tive than it might have been be!ause of 7osenthalWs own politi!s. Several people told me that 7osenthal had made no se!ret that he was unhappy with Bonner$ be!ause the reporter$ as one !hara!teri-ed the editorWs view$ Xwas too willing to a!!ept the Communist side of the story. 6e was very vo!al that Bonner was sympatheti! to the Communist side in Central Ameri!a.Y The !riti!ism from the right , led by the all Street Cournal editorial on El 9o-ote , Xresonated with Abe$ be!ause it reinfor!ed his own suspi!ions about Bonner. There seemed to be a growing audien!e out there that agreed with Abe.Y Several !urrent and former Times employees &none of whom would spea# for attribution' pointed to a s!ene in a %eorgetown restaurant a few wee#s after the El 9o-ote story ran , it was the evening of the annual %ridiron dinner , in whi!h 7osenthal !riti!i-ed Bonner and angrily des!ribed the sufferings that Communist regimes infli!t on their people. &Bonner finally left the Times in 012.H in 012A$ he began writing for The )ew Oor#er , as did$ two years later$ Alma %uillermoprieto. 6e left the maga-ine in 0114H he is now writing spe!ial assignments for the Times.' El 9o-ote represented the !lima> of the era of the great massa!res. It was not the last of them , most notably$ in August of 0124 the Atla!atl$ in an operation similar to that in El 9o-ote$ #illed some two hundred people at El Calabo-o$ in the Department of San =i!ente , but after El 9o-ote the Army relied less and less on sear!h(and(destroy operations that entailed large(s!ale #illing of !ivilians. It may be that the guerrillasW use of El 9o-ote for propaganda and the !ontroversy that followed in the +nited States led senior offi!ers to begin to reali-e the potential !ost of su!h slaughter. It may be that the highly visible denun!iations in Congress finally lent the EmbassyWs habitual s!oldings a bit more !redibility. &Even someone as firmly !ontemptuous of !ongressional pressure as Elliott Abrams a!#nowledges that Xthe good(!op$ bad(!op routine with Congress was very effe!tiveY and that Xthere was some positive impa!t there in redu!ing the #illing.Y' It may be that the offi!ers reali-ed that lesser massa!res , of forty people or fewer$ say , !ould a!!omplish as mu!h without attra!ting so mu!h attention. 9ore important$ the #ey Salvadoran offi!ers no doubt reali-ed that El 9o-ote had a!!omplished its purpose. It was not only that in mu!h of north( ern 9ora-Vn the !ivilians had fled beyond the border , that in several #ey areas the water had been ta#en from the fish. It was what El 9o-ote had meant , what it had said , to those who remained. Dor El 9o-ote was$ above all$ a statement. By doing what it did in El 9o-ote$ the Army had pro!laimed loudly and unmista#ably to the people of 9ora-Vn$ and to the peasants in surrounding areas as well$ a simple messageG hatever the !ir!umstan!es$ the guerrillas !anWt prote!t you$ and we$ the offi!ers and the soldiers$ are willing to do absolutely anything to avoid losing this war , we are willing to do whatever it ta#es. By late 0124$ the tide had begun to turn in 9ora-Vn$ whi!h is to say not that the Army had begun to win but that it had be!ome less than !ertain that it would lose. The pre!eding 9ar!h$ the ele!tions for the Constituent Assembly$ on whi!h the 7eagan

Administration had set mu!h store$ had been a huge politi!al su!!ess for Administration poli!y$ with a mu!h higher turnout than had been e>pe!ted. By e>erting enormous pressure$ the Administration had su!!eeded in blo!#ing 7oberto dWAubuisson$ the best #nown of the ultra(rightists$ from be!oming provisional ;resident. Instead$ the offi!ers and party leaders and the Ameri!ans had agreed upon Alvaro 9agaba Bor<a$ a wealthy aristo!rat and international ban#er with many old friends in the offi!er !orps$ as a !ompromise. The su!!essful ele!tions and the !onsequent emergen!e of the highly presentable$ English(spea#ing 9agaba helped the Administration pla!ate Congress. &By the Culy !ertifi!ation report$ the Administration had altered its language from Xno eviden!e to !onfirmY to Xno eviden!e to supportY allegations of Xlarge(s!ale massa!res allegedly !ommitted by government for!esY , in dire!t !ontradi!tion of what 6inton$ and even %reentree$ had reported.' Congress more than doubled military aid$ from thirty(five million dollars to eighty(two million$ and in!reased e!onomi! aid to more than twi!e that. )ot only were the Ameri!ans sending new$ top(of(the(line equipment and plenty of ammunition but they were e>panding the Army , training hundreds of offi!ers and soldiers in the States. 9ost important$ Colonel Caime Dlores$ apparently be!ause of rather too blatant irregularities in his payroll in San 9iguel$ in!urred the wrath of 9agaba$ and was !onsequently XpromotedY from !ommand of the all(important Third Brigade to !ommand of the less important Dirst Brigade$ and$ finally$ to that of San SalvadorWs Dire Department. To repla!e Dlores in San 9iguel$ 9agaba drew on the obvious , the inevitable , !hoi!eG "ieutenant Colonel Domingo 9onterrosa. 9onterrosa thus be!ame the military !ommander of the entire eastern -one of El Salvador$ and entered upon the period of his greatest renown. =ery often$ the Army publi!ity people or the Ameri!an press people steered reporters straight to the dynami! !olonel. X6e was a phenomenon$Y "u!ia Annun-iata$ who travelled frequently with 9onterrosa as a !orrespondent for "a 7epubbli!a$ told me. XThe Ameri!ans were always telling us that here he was$ here was the new breed of offi!er they were always promising. 6e had embra!ed !ompletely the anti(Communist ideology of the Ameri!ans. By then$ he tal#ed not li#e some #ind of but!her but li#e an Ameri!an. 6e was !ompletely full of this idea of !onquering hearts and minds.Y In 01A2$ 9onterrosa had attended the ;oliti!al arfare Cadres A!ademy$ in ;eitou$ Taiwan$ and had been trained there in what he des!ribed to an interviewer as Xwar of the massesY and XCommunism of this side.Y 6eWd returned to El Salvador Xvery enthusiasti!Y about the s#ills he had learned , Xhow to pro<e!t ourselves to the !ivilian population and win them overY , but found to his dismay that senior offi!ers werenWt very interested. )ow he began to apply what heWd learned. X6e was always ta!ti!ally very good$Y "i!ho$ the rebel !ommander$ told me. XThen he began using mu!h more intelligent methods. Oou #now$ whenever he would ta#e a village he would !ome in personally and do politi!al wor# himself.Y 6is soldiers$ usually heli!opter(borne$ would storm a town$ flushing out the armed guerrillas$ and then 9onterrosa would arrive and gather the people together. X6e would ma#e a spee!h there in the pla-a$Y Annun-iata said. X6e would as#$ ] ho is si!#F ho needs helpFW Then he would say$ ]Do you #now these peopleFW , that is$ the guerrillas. And$ of !ourse$ no one would answer. And he would say$ in this soft voi!e$ ]Are you sureF Are you sure you donWt have a !ousin with themFW X By this time$ people all over the !ountryside re!ogni-ed the famous figure of 9onterrosa. 6e was short , stooped$ even , with a slight paun!h. X6e was !ompletely nonmartial$Y Annun-iata said. X6e always wore this tattered$ sweat(stained !amouflage(green bandanna on his head$ and he had a real Indian fa!e , big nose$ re!eding !hin. ith that bandanna$ he loo#ed li#e an old aunt. 6e was a bit of a fop$ a bit dandified. 6e had this young boy always with him$ a beautiful young boy of ten or twelve$ who too# !are of his things. 6e was always tou!hing his soldiers , very physi!al$ you #now. At night$ he would get in his red hammo!# and put on blue gloves and !over his fa!e with a blue towel. 6e was a real dandy. XIt was late in the afternoon$ and we were outside the town of Carolina$ on a hill above it. 9onterrosa was sitting on a low stone wall$ with his feet dangling over the side. 6e got on the radiophone and he !alled$ ]Charlie$ CharlieW , that was his !ode name , ]to :range$W and he gave the !o_rdinates$ and the planes !ame and bombed and all the while he was dire!ting the planes with the radio. e loo#ed down$ and we !ould see another Army unit entering the town and then the guerrillas leaving from the other side. XThe ne>t morning$ the people !ame out of the town in a long !olumn. Oou !ould see them winding their way up the hill in a

long line$ moving up to where 9onterrosa was sitting on the same wall$ leaning ba!#$ loo#ing halfway between a #ing and a hero. And$ one by one$ the peasants passed in front of him$ and ea!h of them had an offering. :ne of them would give him an egg$ another some tortillas$ another would push forward a young boy to sign up. And 9onterrosa would motion to an aide$ as he re!lined there li#e a 7oman emperor. I remember a father !arrying a little boy who had his head !overed with a white hand#er!hief$ and then when he !ame in front of 9onterrosa the father unveiled the #idWs head and you !ould see he had this big growth on his fa!e. And 9onterrosa nodded to an aide. The aide grabbed the radio and !alled in the heli!opter to ta#e the #id to the hospital in the !ity.Y By 0125$ 9onterrosaWs new ta!ti!s had begun to show some su!!ess. X6e !hanged the way he related to the lo!al population$ and he was less arrogant in his military stan!e toward us$Y =illalobos$ the E.7.;. !omandante$ told me. XThere was this first stage$ I thin#$ in whi!h he e>e!uted the massa!res not only be!ause it formed part of his military training and it was ta!ti!ally approved by the 6igh Command but also be!ause he didnWt thin# it would be!ome a politi!al problem. Then$ later$ he reali-ed that this sort of ta!ti! didnWt wor#. It did not produ!e a qui!# military vi!tory.Y Annun-iata agreed. X6e was not bloodthirsty$ but he was so neuroti!ally driven , he wanted at all !osts to win the war$Y she said. XThe point was to !reate a turning point$ a watershed$ to turn the tide$ and to do it by s!aring the hell out of the enemy. It was a deliberate demonstration of !ruelty to show them that the guerrillas !ouldnWt prote!t them. And he understood that you do this as !ruelly$ as brutally as possibleH you rape$ impale$ whatever$ to show them the !ost.Y To most of the reporters who !overed him now , few of whom had been in the !ountry in 0120 , El 9o-ote was <ust a distant rumor$ a dar# e!ho from the past. X6e was the press(!orps offi!er$ you #now$ very personable$Y Con "ee Anderson$ who was reporting for Time maga-ine$ said$ Xbut there was always this bu-- that he was responsible for El 9o-ote$ and$ of !ourse$ he always denied it.Y By this time$ 9onterrosa had a mistress in the press !orps , a beautiful young Salvadoran woman who wor#ed for an Ameri!an television networ#. Annun-iata re!alls$ X6e would heli!opter in to the Camino 7ealY , the San Salvador hotel favored by the international press , Xto visit her$ and he would burst through the door of the press offi!es in his !ombat fatigues and !ome over and loo# over your shoulder at what you were writing and say$ ]6ave you written about me todayFW Y 9onterrosaWs girlfriend let her !olleagues #now , spea#ing in all !onfiden!e$ of !ourse , that there had been Xa problemY with the El 9o-ote operation$ and although$ for understandable reasons$ she wasnWt free to go into details$ all one had to #now was that on that parti!ular day the Colonel had unfortunately Xlost radio !onta!tY with his men , with regrettable !onsequen!es. The guerrillas did not find this story very !onvin!ing. X6e was well #nown to all the guerrillas as the man who had ordered the massa!re$Y "i!ho said. XEverybody wanted to #ill him in !ombat.Y )ow$ however$ their adversary had begun doing what they themselves #new was the most effe!tive thing to do in order to win the warG Xpoliti!al wor#Y in the !ountryside. X6e started learningH he began to play football with the people$ help their families. e reali-ed that for someone as militarily talented as he was to start to do real politi!al wor# !ould be very dangerous. I thin# it was at the beginning of 0125 that we started ma#ing plans to #ill him.Y X=illalobos and 9onterrosa were obsessed with ea!h otherWs psy!hology$Y Annun-iata said. XDor 9onterrosa$ it was li#e loo#ing in a mirror. 6e had this obsession with the guerrillas , with #nowing them$ understanding them. 6e had studied all the different groups$ and !laimed he !ould always tell whi!h one had staged an operation. 6e felt he was the alter ego of the guerrillas. Every night$ out in the field$ he would listen to the radio$ first to the BBC and then to 7adio =en!eremos$ listening to what they said heWd done that day. Every night$ you !ould hear$ !oming from his hammo!#$ the ]InternationaleW playing over 7adio =en!eremos.Y As it happened$ 9onterrosaWs fas!ination with 7adio =en!eremos , his !apture of the transmitter$ after all$ had been the high point of :peration 7es!ue , had not es!aped the noti!e of his alter ego. XA basi! prin!iple of warfare is to study the psy!hology of the enemy !ommanders$Y =illalobos said. X9onterrosa was obsessed with war trophies. 6e got personally involved in !ombat situations when his men !aptured something , to su!h an e>tent that at times he lost the ability to !o_rdinate troop movements. :n!e$ he arrived personally to ta#e !harge of video re!ords that they had !aptured from us. Another time$ it was a s!ale model that we had used to plan an atta!#. Ea!h time$ he !ame himself. And he was desperate to

stop 7adio =en!eremos. I mean$ any !assette or tape re!order he found was turned into a great vi!tory.Y In!reasingly$ in late 0125 and on into 012.$ 9onterrosa had vi!tories to !elebrate. 6is Xbeans and bulletsY !ampaign was ma#ing progress in 9ora-Vn. The area under D.9.".). !ontrol was gradually shrin#ing$ and so$ even more !riti!ally$ was the guerrillasW manpower base. By the summer of 012.$ reports had begun !ir!ulating that the guerrillas were redu!ed to !ons!ripting !ivilians into their ran#s. That September$ the Ameri!ans gave the Army ten new 6uey heli!opters. X hen I saw that news about the heli!opters$ I told a friend$ ]9onterrosa will be !oming after us$W Y =illalobos said. Y ]6e will use those heli!opters to atta!# the !ommand post.W Y The delivery of the heli!opters$ not !oin!identally$ !ame at the time of a ma<or diplomati! initiative by the Salvadoran government. :n :!tober 03th$ ;resident CosP )apoleZn Duarte , he had won an ele!tion earlier that year$ and repla!ed 9agaba , <oined 9inister of Defense Carlos Eugenio =ides Casanova and other government representatives in a meeting with guerrilla leaders &among them %uillermo +ngo$ who had been DuarteWs =i!e(;residential running mate in the stolen ele!tions of 01A4'$ in "a ;alma$ about eighty miles west of 9ora-Vn. Three days after the meeting$ 9onterrosa laun!hed a ma<or offensive in 9ora-Vn$ a si>(thousand(man sweep !alled Torola I=. XThe war goes on$Y he told Cames "e9oyne$ of the )ew Oor# Times$ as they stood at the base at :si!ala$ wat!hing the men of the Atla!atl board the new 6uey heli!opters and lift off into the northern s#y. XThere are times when you have to ma#e war to gain pea!e.Y =illalobos would be !o_rdinating the response to Torola I=$ a !ampaign that$ in its broad outline$ appeared mu!h li#e :peration 7es!ue$ three years beforeG soldiers from regular Army units were storming north a!ross the Torola$ and the heli!opter(borne men of the Atla!atl were moving down from ;erqu[n and other mountain towns. This time$ however$ the guerrillasW response would be somewhat different. =illalobos and his staff were hard at wor# planning an ambush for the town of Coate!a$ a few miles east of El 9o-ote. It was a well(planned ambush , they had devoted many hours to its preparation , but an unusual oneG the guerrillas were planning to have the Army ambush them and thus X!aptureY a pri-e that they very mu!h wanted 9onterrosa to !laim. :n :!tober 44nd$ 9onterrosa heli!optered in to Coate!a. ith him was$ among others$ Con "ee Anderson$ of Time. XIt was real air(mobile ops$Y Anderson told me in an interview. XDlying around from one pla!e to another$ inserting troops$ !hoppering around$ moving several times a day.Y In Coate!a$ he said$ an advan!e platoon had flushed out the guerrillas the day before. )ow the people were gathered there$ waiting for 9onterrosa. XIt was this turfy pla-a in this ramsha!#le old hamlet , you #now$ !obblestones$ shaded front por!hes , and he gathered the townspeople around and gave them this hearts(and( minds sort of spee!h. 6e was sitting at a table with a mi!rophone in his hand$ and he had a woman so!ial wor#er and a !ivilian psy!hologist there beside him.Y Anderson quotes 9onterrosa as telling the peasants$ X e are your true brothers. eWre not the !areta#ers of the ri!h. Do you see any ri!h among usF e give our blood to the soil$ but itWs up to you to ma#e it fertile.Y Around that time$ not far from the pla-a where 9onterrosa was spea#ing$ his men had poun!ed on a group of hapless guerrillas. X e sent a !olumn of our fighters to fall into an ambush$Y =illalobos said$ Xand then they were supposed to leave the transmitter$ as if$ you #now$ theyWd had to abandon itY , as theyWd had to do three years before. XBut it didnWt wor# out that way. e werenWt able to get the transmitter up to where the !ombat too# pla!e. e were upset , we thought we had blown the operation. I mean$ they should have been suspi!ious.Y The rebels had left the transmitter near a graveyard on the outs#irts of Coate!a. )ot far away$ =illalobos and his men were waiting tensely$ listening intently to their radios. Suddenly$ they heard soldiers begin to tal# e>!itedly to one another. XAs soon as they found the transmitter$ there was a big !elebration$Y =illalobos said. X e !ould hear them tal#ing about all the pri-es they would get$ and so on.Y The soldiers began to !ongratulate one another$ spe!ulating on how happy the Colonel would be when his men brought him this pri!eless treasure. There was not a hint of suspi!ion. XCust as vanity blinded 9onterrosa$ it

blinded his soldiers as well$Y =illalobos said. X e <ust had to wait for his personal psy!hology to play itself out.Y "ate in the afternoon$ Con "ee Anderson sat down to interview the Colonel. X6e disappeared for a while$ and then he !ame ba!# very e>!ited$Y Anderson said. X6e sat down ne>t to me on the stoop of this old peasant house$ and he !onfided to me that he thought heWd found the transmitter. It was in this graveyard$ in a !emetery at the edge of this little hamlet. This was somewhat far from where things were happening$ itWs true$ but the town had definitely been theirs , I mean$ there were graffiti everywhere.Y Anderson sei-ed that moment to as# 9onterrosa about the rumors that still !lung to him about what had happened at El 9o-ote. XIt was late$ and we were sitting there$ <ust the two of us$ and I said$ ]Colonel$ quP pasZ en El 9o-oteFW And there was this long pause$ and he loo#ed away$ and finally he said$ ])o es !omo di!enW , ]ItWs not li#e they say.W X 9onterrosa would say no more$ but Anderson too# his answer as a ta!it !onfirmation that 9onterrosa had been involved in the massa!re. Shortly before$ Cames "e9oyne had as#ed 9onterrosa the same question$ and$ a!!ording to "e9oyne$ the Colonel$ in the aftermath of a long and e>hausting day of !ombat$ had answered more bluntly. X6e shrugged and said$ ]Oeah$ we did it. e !arried out a limpie-a there. e #illed everyone$W Y "e9oyne told me. X6e said$ ]In those days$ I thought that was what we had to do to win the war. And I was wrong.W X "ate that evening$ Anderson and his photographer left$ somewhat regretfully$ for the !apital. They needed to file their stories$ but they intended to re<oin 9onterrosa in his !hopper the following day. The ne>t day$ three senior offi!ers and a three(man Army television !rew arrived in Coate!a. Along with a lo!al priest and sa!ristan$ they planned to a!!ompany the vi!torious Colonel as he !arried his pri-e ba!# to the !apital. It was to be a triumphal entran!e. The !apture of the transmitter was an enormous propaganda vi!tory$ and 9onterrosa wanted to film it$ re!ord it$ publi!i-e it , to mil# it for all it was worth. The men !limbed aboard the heli!opter and too# their seats$ and as the rotors roared overhead soldiers began loading the equipment aboard. Sitting in the pla!e of honor beside 9onterrosa$ as it happened$ was Todd %reentree$ of the +nited States Embassy. X e were sitting together$Y %reentree said. X6e was bu!#ling in$ and people were stowing aboard all these duffelbags that belonged to different soldiers , you #now$ ]Ta#e this ba!# to my wife in San Salvador.W The transmitter must have been in one of those. Then a soldier !ame over to 9onterrosa to tell him he had a radio !all$ and he got off to ta#e it.Y %reentree was in a great hurry to get ba!# to the !apital , he has long sin!e forgotten why. XI saw that another heli!opter was getting ready to ta#e off$ and I was in su!h a hurry to get ba!# that I got off and !limbed aboard.Y :n a hill northwest of the town$ the guerrillas of the E.7.;. wat!hed e>!itedly as the 6uey slowly rose above the tree line. They waited until it had rea!hed its apogee$ pointed a remote(!ontrol devi!e in a dire!t line of sight$ and pressed the button. )othing happened. X e didnWt #now what had gone wrong$Y =illalobos said. X e thought we had a malfun!tion. Then we heard his press !onferen!eY , 9onterrosa was apparently being interviewed by radio$ announ!ing his destru!tion of 7adio =en!eremos , Xand we reali-ed that it was the wrong heli!opter.Y They sat tensely on the hill deep into the afternoon$ until at last$ after what must have seemed an interminable wait$ a se!ond heli!opter !limbed above the treetops and lofted into spa!e. The big air!raft rose high over Coate!a$ turned$ and began to head west$ toward the Sapo 7iver , toward the tiny hamlet of El 9o-ote. ;oised high in the blue s#y$ it !aught the sun. Dar below$ a man from ;erqu[n ga-ed upward$ squinted$ and then saw the ma!hine of war , he had seen su!h ma!hines so many times over 9ora-Vn , suddenly blossom into a great orange(and(bla!# fireballH and then he was deafened by the e>plosion. The man$ who had been for!ed to guide 9onterrosaWs men on their limpie-a three years before$ said$ XI remember thin#ing$ If only he had gone a few minutes more$ his blood would have been mi>ed with the soil of El 9o-ote.Y 9onterrosa was five years dead before the e>iles returned to 9ora-Vn. Crowded into the tru!#s and buses that !ame over the mountains from the 6onduran refugee !amps$ they flooded ba!# into the deserted villages and hamlets of the red -one. The

Salvadoran government !ould do nothing to stop them$ for it was )ovember$ 0121$ and a!ross the !ountry the guerrillas had unleashed a general offensive that$ in the politi!al sho!# it provo#ed$ would turn out to be the Salvadoran equivalent of TetG it would put an end to the long !ivil war. The fighting was espe!ially brutal in San Salvador$ where guerrillas dug themselves in in the !rowded slums$ and the military managed to e>tra!t them only by bombing and strafing !ivilian neighborhoods. But the turning point of the offensive$ and of the war itself$ !ame during the early hours of )ovember 0?th$ when !ommandos s!aled the ba!# wall of the shady !ampus of the +niversity of Central Ameri!a$ roused five Cesuit priests from sleep$ ordered them to lie with their fa!es against the ground$ and emptied automati! weapons into their brains. Before they departed$ the soldiers #illed a si>th priest$ the CesuitsW !oo#$ and her fifteen(year(old daughter. The s!ene they left behind , the obliterated s#ulls of the priests$ the green lawn soa#ed in blood and brains$ the fantasti!ally redundant number of spent !artridges , was one of spe!ta!ular !arnage. And though the soldiers made a halfhearted attempt to s!rawl a few leftist slogans$ it would very shortly be!ome !lear that those who had done this wor# were the men of the Atla!atl. It was an enormous politi!al blunder$ for it said to the world$ and espe!ially to the Ameri!ans in Congress$ that after the billions and billions of dollars and all the fine words about XtrainingY and Xreform$Y at bottom the Salvadoran Army remained what it had been at El 9o-ote. But by now 7onald 7eagan had gone$ and so had the ideologi!al threat he had so feared. The time had !ome to bring the war to an end. In the mountains of 9ora-Vn$ in what was still the red -one$ the refugees rebuilt their !ommunity. In the 6onduran !amps$ they had made friends among the international aid wor#ers$ and now$ with help from the European Community and other agen!ies$ they raised up new buildings of straight brown plan#sG a shoe fa!tory$ a handi!raft shop$ a nursery to hold the !hildren during the day when the people went to wor#. And they named their !ommunity Segundo 9ontes$ after one of the fallen Cesuits. :n :!tober 4?$ 011@$ ;edro Chi!as 7omero$ of "a Coya$ who had hidden in a !ave above the hamlet as the soldiers #illed his relatives and his neighbors$ went down to San Dran!is!o %otera and filed a !riminal !omplaint with the Court of the Dirst Instan!e$ a!!using the Atla!atl Battalion of responsibility for the #illings in El 9o-ote and the villages around it$ and as#ing that Cudge Dederi!o Ernesto ;ortillo Campos investigate and punish those responsible. Among the first witnesses to give testimony in the !ase was 7ufina Amaya 9Vrque-. The investigation pro!eeded haltingly$ and although Tutela "egal$ among other human(rights organi-ations$ tried to push the Cudge forward , by publishing$ in )ovember$ 0110$ the first full investigation of the El 9o-ote massa!re$ in!luding the names of seven hundred and ninety(four dead , it is hard to #now what might have !ome of it had not the government of ;resident Alfredo Cristiani and the !omandantes of the D.9.".). !ome together$ in 9e>i!o City in Canuary$ 0114$ and signed an agreement to end the twelve(year(old war. Among other things$ the agreement provided that the Army be purged of X#nown human rights violatorsY and redu!ed by halfH that the guerrillas disarm and some of their number <oin a new !ivilian poli!e for!eH and that the Atla!atl and the other rapid(rea!tion battalions be disbanded. The agreement also provided for a XTruth CommissionY that would ta#e on Xthe tas# of investigating serious a!ts of violen!e that have o!!urred sin!e 012@ and whose impa!t on so!iety urgently demands that the publi! should #now the truth.Y The e>perts from the Argentine Dorensi! Anthropology +nit entered the !ountry in Debruary$ and although the investigation was repeatedly stalled$ the people of 9ora-Vn helped it along &among other things$ by staging a boisterous demonstration in front of the %otera !ourthouse in April'$ and so did the three Truth Commissioners when they arrived$ in Cune. Dinally$ in :!tober$ the e>perts began to dig. And there$ on the third day$ in the silen!e of the ruined hamlet of El 9o-ote$ all the words and !laims and !ounter!laims that had been loudly made for nearly eleven years abruptly gave way before the mute for!e of material fa!t. The bones were there$ the !artridges were thereH the sleeping reality of El 9o-ote had finally been awo#en. They dug and sifted and !harted for thirty(five days$ and soon the !artridges and the !lothing and the bones and bone

fragments$ all labelled and pa!#ed away in bright manila envelopes and fresh new !artons$ would depart El 9o-ote and travel by !ar to a laboratory in San Salvador$ where the e>perts wor#ed away into De!ember. The following 9ar!h$ when the +nited )ations made publi! the Truth CommissionWs report$ entitled XDrom 9adness to 6opeG The 04(Oear ar in El Salvador$Y the analysis of the eviden!e was there$ laid out for the reader in !lear$ pre!ise language$ ea!h su!!essive senten!e demolishing one or another of the myths put forward during the previous twelve years. :f the hundred and forty(three s#ulls found$ all Xwere deposited during the same temporal event$Y whi!h is Xunli#ely to have o!!urred later than 0120.Y El 9o-ote !ould not have been a guerrilla graveyard$ as some had !laimed$ espe!ially sin!e all but twelve of the one hundred and forty(three remains identified turned out to be those of !hildren under twelve years of age$ in!luding at least one fetus$ found between the pelvi! bones of one of the adults. The !artridges re!overed in the sa!risty showed that Xat least twenty(four people parti!ipated in the shooting$Y and the distribution of the shells indi!ated that they fired Xfrom within the house$ from the doorway$ and probably through a window to the right of the door.Y Dinally$ of the two hundred and forty(five !artridge !ases that were studied , all but one from Ameri!an 90? rifles , X02. had dis!ernible headstamps$ identifying the ammunition as having been manufa!tured for the +nited States %overnment at "a#e City$ 9issouri.Y Drom this eviden!e and from a wealth of testimony$ the Truth Commission would !on!lude that Xmore than 3@@ identified vi!tims perished at El 9o-ote and in the other villages. 9any other vi!tims have not been identified.Y To identify them would li#ely require more e>humations , at other sites in El 9o-ote$ as well as in "a Coya and in the other hamlets where the #illing too# pla!e. But the Truth Commission has finished its report$ and$ five days after the report was published$ the Salvadoran legislature pushed through a blan#et amnesty that would bar from prose!ution those responsible for El 9o-ote and other atro!ities of the !ivil war. In view of this$ Cudge ;ortillo$ after allowing two Ameri!an anthropologists to wor# in the hamlet for several wee#s with in!on!lusive results$ in effe!t !losed down his investigation. The other vi!tims of El 9o-ote will !ontinue to lie undisturbed in the soil of 9ora-Vn. "ast Culy$ the Se!retary of StateWs ;anel on El Salvador$ !reated in the wa#e of the Truth Commission report$ !on!luded that the DepartmentWs handling of the massa!re investigation Xundermined the DepartmentWs !redibility with its !riti!s , and probably with the Salvadorans , in a serious way that has not healed.Y The panel !on!luded its review by noting that Xa massa!re had indeed o!!urred and the +.S. statements on the !ase were wrong. :n De!ember 00$ 0114$ two Embassy offi!ers went to El 9o-ote to attend a !eremony honoring those who had died in the massa!re.Y :nly the all Street Cournal remained more !ir!umspe!tH in Debruary$ in a report from El 9o-ote on its editorial page$ entitled XThe arWs :ver$ but El Salvador Still Dights ;ropaganda Battle$Y the Cournal !on!eded that while Xit appears that a massa!re of some #ind too# pla!e$ questions remain$Y in!luding$ the Cournal said$ X ho were the true perpetrators of this awful !rimeFY If you drive out from San Salvador today$ along the highway toward 9ora-Vn$ passing the barra!#s of the Domingo 9onterrosa Third Brigade$ and !rossing the narrow bridge on the Torola$ its wooden plan#s !lattering beneath your wheels$ you will find$ amid the sorghum and the !orn and the tufts of maguey$ the !lean new buildings of Segundo 9ontes$ housing the boot fa!tory and the handi!raft shop and the other fa!tories brought ba!# from the refugee !amps. In one of the buildings$ you will find the woman who fled "a Coya in 0120$ was for!ed to bury her wounded !hild in the mountains$ went mad$ and be!ame the wit!h of El 9o-ote that the villagers !ame to fear. Andrea 9Vrque- wor#s in the nursery$ !aring for the !hildren of Segundo 9ontes. Darther up the bla!# road$ if you step through the barbed wire you will find 7ufina Amaya living in a small house with her little girl$ 9arta$ who is now four years old. And if you head up the bla!# road to ;erqu[n$ with its battered !entral square and its mural of the slain Ar!hbishop 7omero$ you will !ome to 7adio =en!eremos$ whi!h has graduated from its various holes in the ground to an a!tual building on a nearby hillH !on!rete$ single story$ and small$ it is a museum now$ a gallery to e>hibit pi!tures of the stationWs former subterranean quarters. :ut in front$ beside a well(preserved bomb !rater with a !arefully tended stone(and(flower border$ and behind a brass plaque$ you will find a dramati!ally twisted and burned torso of steel. As the people there will tell you$ it is what remains of a heli!opter that was blown from the s#y one fine day$ and it happens to be the most !herished monument in all 9ora-Vn. TagsG Central Ameri!a$ "atin Ameri!a$ El Salvador

Fooling America
http.NNwww.foodline.comNcgi)binNlist,tates<ith!ocations.cgiA talk by Hobert %arry given in ,anta onica on arch 2E' :BB> http*++www.realhistoryar hives. om+ olle tions+ onspira ies+parryspee h.htm , trans ription of a tal- given on .ar h /01 23341 by 5obert Parry1 former ,P and 6ewsweeand now independent 7ournalist. Parry was one of the first reporters to brea- the story of 8ran#ontra1 and one of the first to report on the drug angle in 8ran-#ontra. Parry later pursued the strong eviden e that 5eagan and 9ush made an all-out effort to sabotage :immy #arter;s efforts to win the release of the 8ranian-held hostages before the 6ovember ele tion1 the episode -nown as the O tober 'urprise. %arry is the a"thor of several books' incl"ding <ooling ,meri a and Tri - or Treason' both p"blished by ,heridan ,$"are %ress. C"rrently' he p"blishes The #onsortium' a newsletter that reports on c"rrent events by showing the historical backdrop to the events and players. /e also p"blishes i.=. aga-ine' named in trib"te to both I. =. ,tone and George ,eldes5 newsletter 8n <a t. <ell' thank yo" for coming o"t tonight. I do want to first thank =AIH #=airness R Acc"racy In Heporting& for inviting me. It5s always a pleas"re to leave <ashington and come to the <est Coast. It5s a fascinating aspect of how <ashington and !os Angeles interrelate these days. I5m not s"re which city is more "sed to prod"cing fantasy than the other' b"t I always think that !A5s fantasy is often more entertaining. 7"t there is this tremendo"s sense of both envy and concern between <ashington and !A' b"t <ashington will often look down at !os Angeles as a place that prod"ces movies' sometimes like :<=' movies that were very "psetting to the <ashington establishment beca"se they s"ggested that there was a cover)"p of the m"rder of the %resident back in the :BF3s. 7"t yo" also find that people in <ashington are incredibly att"ned to what5s happening o"t here. I was talking to a Io"rnalist friend of mine the other day who was saying that there was' for ,pike !ee5s latest movie' she saw Vice %resident S"ayle in the line waiting to get into the movie' b"t he tho"ght it was a Homan spectac"lar' .al olm 2>. And then someone else said they saw Clarence Thomas waiting to get in' b"t he tho"ght it was an U)rated film. ,o <ashington is a place that does keep track of what is happening o"t here. *f co"rse' I5m not s"re that !os Angeles co"ld prod"ce entertaining shows like the . !aughlin ?roup' b"t it does do it5s best. Tonight I5d like to talk abo"t what I was doing in the :BE35s. I was a reporter for the Associated %ress. I started with the A% back in :BC4' and worked briefly in 7altimore and then in %rovidence' Hhode Island' where I covered some of the problems of the 0emocratic power str"ct"re there ) =reddy ,t. Germaine was of co"rse involved with the banks in a very "nsavory way. And event"ally I was bro"ght to <ashington for the A% back in :BCC and covered the Carter administration. And I was examining some of their' what seem like today rather minor scandals' things like the General ,ervices Administration' the waste and fra"d that was going on

there. And in :BE3' after the election' I was assigned to go work on the ,pecial Assignment team for the Associated %ress which was there investigative "nit. In history' A%5s investigative team was act"ally $"ite impressive. ,y /ersh had been there' a n"mber of important stories had been broken o"t of that investigative "nit' which at one time was ten' fifteen' twenty people. 7y the time I was there it had shr"nk to abo"t fo"r. I was assigned to do investigations. *ther people were doing things like col"mns abo"t the ,tate 0epartment or abo"t politics' and I was really the only investigative reporter so designated at the A%5s <ashington 7"rea" at that time. 7"t no one told me what to work on. And it str"ck me one day' as I was sitting aro"nd' that this administration had a thing abo"t Central America. At the time there had been a n"mber of atrocities that were occ"rring' and the fo"r American ch"rchwomen had been killed. And the explanations coming from this transition team were $"ite remarkable. If yo" remember' Aean ;irkpatrick s"ggested in one interview that these weren5t really n"ns' they were more political activists' which always str"ck me as an ama-ing s"ggestion that it5s okay to kill political activists. Anyway' it seemed like a very important area to them' one that might end "p driving m"ch of what they did' at least in terms of foreign policy and national sec"rity iss"es. ,o I began working on it. And that experience' in a way' shaped what I did for the rest of my time at the A%. And it was also striking to me that that experience was beyond anything I co"ld have imagine' as an American citi-en' watching. It was a case of wide) spread killing ) political killing ) of dissidents' tort"re' in the case of women often rape was involvedL and this government was not I"st s"pporting it' not I"st providing the weapons and the military s"pport' b"t trying to exc"se it' rationali-e it and essentially hide it. <hich is where I sort of came in and I think many people in the American press corps in <ashington came in' and the press corp in Central America. At the time the press corps was still the <atergate press corp' if yo" will. <e were fairly aggressive' we were not inclined to believe what we heard from the government' and sometimes we were probably obnoxio"s. 7"t we were doing o"r Iobs as I think' more or less' as they were s"pposed to be done. That is ) to act' when necessary' in an adversarial way. ,o when we began covering this topic in early :BE:' we had some very brave people in the field in +l ,alvador partic"larly and thro"gho"t Central America' and some of them risked their lives to cover that story. And those of "s back in <ashington who obvio"sly were not facing that kind of risk' were trying to get at things. Initially' and maybe we all sort of forget this' b"t I remember one of my first stories abo"t this had to do with how the ,tate 0epartment was co"nting "p the dead in +l ,alvador and who they were blaming. At that time the position was that the g"errillas were killing more than half of the people dying in the political violence and that the government was less responsible. ,o I went over to the ,tate 0epartment to review their methodology' and what I fo"nd was that the way they got their fig"res was that they took the total n"mber of people who had pres"mably died within a period of a month or so' and then each time the g"errillas wo"ld claim on a radio broadcast that they had killed some soldiers' if there was a battle going on and they said 1<e

killed ten soldiers1 and then the battle kept going on and it was twenty' and then it was fifty' and then another one of their stations wo"ld say fifty' what the ,tate 0epartment did was they added "p all the n"mbers. And so they were able to create these false fig"res to s"ggest that the government that the 6nites ,tates was s"pporting was not as c"lpable as the h"man rights gro"ps and partic"larly the Catholic ch"rch in +, were saying. It began a pattern of deception from the very beginning. +ven when there was something horrible happening in those co"ntries. +ven when h"ndreds' tho"sands of h"man beings were being taken o"t and killed' the role of the 6,. government became to hide it' to rationali-e it' to pretend it wasn5t that serio"s' and to try to discredit anyone who said otherwise. And the main targets of that were the reporters in the field' the h"man rights gro"ps' and to a degree' those of "s in <ashington who were trying to examine the policies to fig"re o"t what was really happening and what was behind this. I remember again after the new administration came in and of co"rse ,ecretary /aig made the remarkable comment that the fo"r ch"rchwomen were perhaps r"nning a road block' which is how they5d gotten killed. And even people in the ,tate 0epartment who at that time were investigating this fairly honestly ) they had not yet been p"rged ) were shocked that the ,ecretary wo"ld say s"ch a thing beca"se they knew what the circ"mstances were even then. They knew that they5d been stopped' they knew that they5d been sex"ally assa"lted' and shot at close range. (one of that' of co"rse' fit the image of r"nning a road block' and exchange of fire. 7"t the reality became the greatest threat' even at that stage' to what the new administration wanted to accomplish' and what they wanted to accomplish was I think something they felt strongly abo"t ideologically which was their view that the comm"nists were on the march' that the ,oviets were an expanding power' that yo" had to stop every left wing movement in its tracks and reverse it. And they were following of co"rse the theory that Aean ;irkpatrick had devised that the totalitarian states never reverse and change into democratic states' only a"thoritarian ones do' which as we know now is perhaps one of the most inacc"rate political theories. It5s best if yo"5re having a political theory' not to have it disproven so $"ickly' yo" know it might be best if yo" wo"ld' maybe fifty years from now yo" wo"ldn5t really know as m"ch. 7"t Aean ;irkpatricks5s was disproven very $"ickly b"t it was still the driving force behind the administration5s approach to a n"mber of these conflicts' and their I"stifications for going ahead and trying to cond"ct what became known later as the Heagan 0octrine which was to sponsor revol"tionary operations or what am I saying' co"nterrevol"tionary operations in many cases in vario"s parts of the world and in the Third <orld in partic"lar. In +, of co"rse' which was my first foc"s and the first foc"s of this policy' it was to protect a very br"tal government which was at that time killing literally from a tho"sand to two tho"sand people a month. These were political m"rdersL they were done in the most offensive fashion. I think any American' any average American' wo"ld have been shocked and wo"ld have opposed what his government was doing. ,o it became very important to keep that secret' or to minimi-e it' or rationali-e it or somehow saniti-e it. ,o what we saw' even at that early stage' was the combat that was developing and the combat in terms of the domestic sit"ation in <ashington was how do yo" stop the press from telling that

story. And m"ch of what the Heagan administration developed were techni$"es to keep those kinds of stories o"t of the news media. In some cases' as we saw later' in late :BE: of co"rse there was' what is now fairly well known' the massacre in +l a-ote. And this was a case where the first American trained battalion was sent o"t over Christmas time in :BE: into rebel controlled territory and it swept thro"gh this territory and killed everybody' everyone they co"ld find ) incl"ding the children. <hen two American reporters' Hay 7onner and Alma Aimapareta #M&' went to the scene of this atrocity in Aan"ary of :BE2' they were able to see some of what was left behind and they interviewed witnesses who had s"rvived' and came o"t with stories describing what they had fo"nd. This was of co"rse extremely "psetting to the Heagan administration' which at that time was abo"t to certify that the ,alvadoran military was showing respect for h"man rights' and that was necessary to get f"rther f"nding and weapons for the ,alvadoran military. And I was at those hearings which occ"rred afterwards' on the hill' and when Tom +nders who was then Assistant ,ecretary *f ,tate for Inter)American affairs gave his description of how the ,tate 0epartment had investigated this and had fo"nd really nothing had happened or that they had fo"nd no evidence of any mass killing' and they arg"ed with great cleverness that the last cens"s had not shown even that many people in +l a-ote ) there were not the E33 or so who were alleged to have been killed ) only 233 had lived there to begin with' and many still lived there' he said. *f co"rse it wasn5t tr"e' b"t it was' I g"ess in their view' necessary ) it was necessary to conceal what was going on. And' it became necessary then' to also discredit the Io"rnalists' so Haymond 7onner' and Alma and others' who were not accepting this story' had to be made to seem to be liars. They had to be destroyed. And the administration began developing their techni$"es' which they always were very good at ) they were extremely good at p"blic relations' that5s what5s they had ) many of them had come from ) the %resident himself had been an advertising fig"re for General +lectric ) and they were very adept at how to present things in the most favorable way for them. 7"t what we began to see was something that was "n"s"al I think even for <ashington ) certainly it was "n"s"al in my experience ) a very nasty' often ad hominem attack on the Io"rnalists who were not playing along. And the case of 7onner was important beca"se he worked for the 6ew @or- Times' and the 6ew @or- Times was one of those bastions of American Io"rnalism ) this was not some small paper' it was not some insignificant news fig"re. ,o there began an effort to discredit him and the <all ,treet editorial page was bro"ght into play' Acc"racy In edia was bro"ght into play' he was attacked ro"tinely by the ,tate 0epartment and <hite /o"se spokespeople' there were efforts to paint him as some kind of a comm"nist sympathi-er' the charge wo"ld go aro"nd that he was worth a f"ll division for the = !( ) the ,alvadoran g"errillas ) he was treated as an enemy ) someone who was anti)American' in effect. And sadly' it worked. I was in +, in *ctober of 5E2' I was down there to interview Hoberto 0obesan' who was head of the death s$"ads' and I was with a conservative activist' and after that interview we had l"nch with the head of the political)military affairs office at the +mbassy and the officer was then head of the military gro"p' and on the way back to the hotel' they were boasting abo"t how they had 1gotten1 Hay 7onner. 1<e finally got that ,on)of)a)7itch'1 they said' and at that time his removal had not yet been anno"nced' so it was very interesting to hear

that they knew what was abo"t to happen' and he was' in fact' removed by early :BE>' and then he was sort of sh"nted aside at the 6ew @or- Times and event"ally left. ,o the message was $"ite clearly made apparent to those of "s working on this topic that when yo" tried to tell the American people what was happening' yo" p"t yo"r career at risk' which may not seem like a lot to some people' b"t yo" know' reporters are like everybody else I g"ess ) they have mortgages and families and so forth and they don5t really want to lose their Iobs ) I mean it5s not something they aspire to. And the idea of s"ccess is to keep one of these Iobs and there are a lot of interesting perks that go with it' a certain amo"nt of esteem' yo" know' as well as yo" get paid pretty well. Those Iobs in <ashington ) yo" can often be making six fig"res at some of the maIor p"blications' so it5s not something yo" readily or easily throw away' from that working level. 7"t what happened in and aro"nd that same time frame' was the development' secretly' of another part of the Central America story' which was' of co"rse' the covert war in (icarag"a. And <illiam Casey and Honald Heagan began p"tting this operation together' and it involved b"ilding "p this paramilitary gro"p called the contras' and they were s"pposed to be seen as an indigeno"s fighting force' the American role was s"pposed to be minimi-ed or hidden' again' and that was how it was going to be sold to the American people. It was a classic covert operation' and then it was a legal one at that time ) it had been a"thori-ed "nder the finding provisions of the (ational ,ec"rity Act. 7"t there were problems with this war from very early on' and one of the problems was that the Contra5s weren5t very good at fighting ) they wo"ld go into some villages in (orthern (icarag"a and commit atrocities' which began filtering back also to <ashington. Congress began hearing abo"t them lining "p people in villages and killing them. 7"t it wasn5t a very effective gro"p in terms of like taking territory. And there was one story which I did later b"t goes back to this time' when the CIA' in :BE2' prepared a plan ) it was written by the head of military operations' named H"dy +nders' and r. +nders had this timetable' and it talked abo"t how the Contras were going to grow at a certain rate and where they5d be at a certain date and they had them marching into anag"a by the end of :BE> ) and so this was the plan. The plan was to' well' officially even to Congress the <hite /o"se was saying we have no intention of overthrowing the government of (icarag"a ) we5re simply trying to interdict weapons going to +l ,alvador. In their own files at CIA' the policy file for the Contra war contained this timetable to overthrow the government of (icarag"a. ,o this was their plan ) except that it wasn5t working. And so by early 5E>' it became clear even to people at CIA that the Contras weren5t what they hoped they5d be cracked "p to be' and they ended "p looking at this and saying we5re going to have to do some different things. %art of this problem tho"gh was still that' the longer this thing dragged o"t' the harder it was to keep all these secrets ) pl"s the Contras were still going o"t and killing people left and right. ,o 7ill Casey was st"ck with a bit of a problem. And he approached it ) as he was a very ) 7ill Casey is often' I think' misperceived ) he was a very smart man' and he was extremely committed ideologically to what he was doing' and he was a person who believed in making things happen ) whatever the r"les might be' or whatever the red tape might be. And so he sat down and developed some strategies in :BE> on what to do. *ne thing is they wo"ld need more time to train the Contras ) they weren5t going to work the way they were going. ,econdly' they

had to create the impression the Contras were better than they were' so people wo"ldn5t get tired of s"pporting them in Congress. ,o they decided the CIA wo"ld have to start sending in its own people' its own specially)trained !atino assets to begin doing attacks which the Contras co"ld then claim credit for' like blowing "p Corinto where they blew "p this oil depot in the little town of Corinto on the coast' they sabotaged some oil pipeline in %orto ,an 0ino' and these were all being done now by the CIA except that after they5d be done the agency g"ys wo"ld call "p the Contra spokesmen' in this case often +dgar Chimorro' and they5d get them o"t of bed and say' 1(ow yo"5re going to p"t a news release o"t saying that yo" g"ys have done this.1 (ow the reason of co"rse for that was to create the impression in the 6nited ,tates' to fool the American p"blic and the Congress' to make the American p"blic think the Contras were really $"ite effective ) that they were now r"nning sea assa"lts on (icarag"a ) pretty sophisticated st"ff for a paramilitary force. And Casey had some other ideas. /e also began to p"t together what became known later as the Psy hologi al Operations .anual or the ,ssassination .anual' and he a"thori-ed that in the ,"mmer of :BE>' to be prepared ) pl"s they prepared another little booklet on how if yo"5re a (icarag"an how yo" sabotage yo"r own government ) it was a delightf"l comic book which I later wrote abo"t at A% ) and it showed how yo"5d start off with' yo" know' calling in sick was one of the strategies to sabotage' and yo"5d b"ild "p to p"tting sponges in the toilet to make them back "p' as if any of these things work in (icarag"a to begin with' and then they ta"ght yo" how to make yo"r own malatov cocktails' it was sort of ) yo" grad"ated ) yo" moved "p in yo"r sabotage ) and they5d take these little comic books and the Contras were s"pposed to leave them behind wherever they5d go' so the people co"ld then start calling in sick. ,o that was one of his ideas. The other one was to do this book ) this very sophisticated book in many ways. It made reference to ancient scholars' and how yo" gave speeches' b"t the most interesting part was that there was a section abo"t how the Contras sho"ld "se 5selective "se of violence5 to 5ne"trali-e civilian targets5 that is civilian officials' I"dges' people of that sort. And the idea was' apparently' that yo" wo"ld kill these people or at least' yo" know' incapacitate them somehow' b"t what was the most remarkable thing abo"t that point was that' when this was finally "ncovered when I did a piece on this a year later or so' the CIA then arg"ed' 1<ell' yo" don5t "nderstand. <e were trying to get the contras to be sele tive in their violence against civilians' not indiscriminate.1 And that became act"ally the defense that was "sed by the CIA to explain why they were r"nning this booklet. 7"t anyway' these things were things that Casey p"t together in the s"mmer of 5E> b"t he had other plans' which is one section ) one of the sections of my book deals with this most remarkable operation that he came "p with at that time which is called the %"blic 0iplomacy Apparat"s. And what the %"blic 0iplomacy Apparat"s did was to make more systematic' to better staff' better finance this campaign to shape the reality that the American p"blic wo"ld see. They had a phrase for it inside the administration. It was called 5perception management5 and' with 6,. taxpayers dollars' they then went o"t and set "p offices' mostly at the ,tate 0epartment ) there was this *ffice of %"blic 0iplomacy5 for !atin America ) b"t secretly it was being r"n o"t of the (ational ,ec"rity Co"ncil staff. And the person who was overseeing it was a man named <alter Haymond. And r. Haymond had been a thirty) year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency and was the top propaganda expert for the agency in the world. /e shipped it over to

essentially r"n similar programs aimed at the American p"blic. And overseeing all of this was the 0irector of Central Intelligence' <illiam Casey. The doc"mentation on this now is extremely strong and clear' that even on matters of personnel' as well as on matters of general strategy' Casey wo"ld be given reports' asked to provide assistance' he wo"ld help or his people wo"ld help arrange bringing in people to staff this office. They even t"rned to psychological warfare experts from =ort 7ragg' who were bro"ght "p to handle the cable traffic coming in from Central America. And' as they say in their own doc"ments' the p"rpose of these psychological warfare specialists was to identify exploitable themes that co"ld be "sed against ) with the American p"blic ) to excite the American p"blic to be more and more angry abo"t what was happening in Central America. The doc"mentation is also clear that the idea was to find o"r 5hot b"ttons5 and to see what ) how they co"ld t"rn' twist' spin certain information to appeal to vario"s special gro"ps. They5d reached the point' and this was really being directed by the CIA' of breaking down the American people into s"bgro"ps' and there were people that they tho"ght might be' for instance the press ) they developed the themes relating to freedom of the press in !a %rensa' which was the newspaper in (icarag"a' which was opposed to the ,andinistas. They targeted Aewish Americans ) they had a special program to attack the ,andinistas or to paint them as anti) ,emitic' which of co"rse is one of the most' to my view' one of the most heino"s things a person or any gro"p co"ld be. 7"t' the idea in (icarag"a was to create this image' and then "se it to b"ild s"pport among Aewish Americans for the Contras. They did r"n into a bit of a problem with this' when they first devised it' which was that' they had not yet p"rged the 6,. +mbassy of honest foreign service officers' so when they were preparing this' the +mbassy' Ambassador Cranton #MM co"ldn5t hear the name&' sent "p a cable ) co"ple of cables ) they were classified and I was later able to get ahold of them ) which said it isn5t tr"eT That the ,andinistas are a matter of many things that are nasty and bad' b"t they5re not anti),emitic' and he said there was no verifiable gro"nd "pon which to make this charge. ,o what the <hite /o"se did was they kept that classified and went ahead with the charge anyway. It was I"st too good a theme. They also developed this ) what they called the 5feet people5 theme. This was one that was based on Hichard <orthl"nd5s polling data. Hichard <orthl"nd who was this sort of legendary' conservative polling strategist did polling of the American people ) they had special gro"ps of people to sample these things with' and they5d fo"nd o"t that most of the themes abo"t the comm"nist menace in Central America left people cold. They didn5t really take it that serio"sly ) it I"st didn5t hit the hot b"ttons right. 7"t they fo"nd that one hot b"tton that really' they co"ld really "se' was this idea of the /ispanic immigrants flooding into the 6nited ,tates. ,o they developed' what they called' the 5feet people5 arg"ment' which was that "nless we stopped the comm"nists in (icarag"a and ,an ,alvador' :3] ) they came "p with that fig"re somewhere ) :3] of all the people in Central America and exico will flood the 6nited ,tates. (ow' I s"ppose at this point already ) and this was abo"t 5E>)E4 ) we were sort of losing any to"ch with reality in <ashington after we had been "ndergoing this st"ff' b"t' if anyone had sat

down and really said 5okay' now does this make any senseM5' yo" were probably left with this opinion I think' which is that the massive flows of immigrants at that time were coming from +l ,alvador and G"atemala and of co"rse' from exico ) which was mostly economic ) and in G"atemala and +l ,alvador it was that there were conservative governments in place' and at that time the flow from (icarag"a wasn5t very great at all' and there was no :3] of the (icarag"an people having fled' so that wasn5t happening. There had been some flow of the wealthier (icarag"ans immediately after the revol"tion aro"nd :BCB' b"t' it was not "ntil later ) m"ch later act"ally ) 5ED)ED' act"ally 5EC)EE' when the flow of (icarag"ans increased beca"se as part of o"r strategy we were trying to destroy their economy. And after we destroyed their economy' people being people' they left ) or a lot of them left. 7"t still' the feet people arg"ment was considered very good beca"se it played to the xenophobia of America' and it gave some political clo"t to Heagan in making this case' and he was able to "se it with partic"lar effect with border state congressmen and senators who felt politically v"lnerable if their had been a s"dden s"rge of ref"gees across the border. ,o we had in place by this 5E>)E4 timeframe' this %"blic 0iplomacy office. And what it did was escalate the press"re on the Io"rnalists who were left' who were still trying to look at this in a fairly honest way and tell the American people what they co"ld find o"t. Oo" had cases' for instance at (ational %"blic Hadio' where' in sort of a classic example of this' the %"blic 0iplomacy team from ,tate began harassing (ational %"blic Hadio for what they considered reporting that was not s"pportive of the American position eno"gh. And finally' (%H agreed to have a sit)down with *tto Heich ) who was head of that office ) and one of his dep"ties' and they were partic"larly irate abo"t a story that (%H had r"n abo"t a massacre of some coffee pickers in (icarag"a ) and the story was more abo"t their f"neral' and how this had really destroyed this little village in (icarag"a' having lost a n"mber of the men in the town ) and the contras had done it so it didn5t look to good' and *tto Heich was f"rio"s and he said 5<e are monitoring (%H. <e have a special cons"ltant that meas"res how m"ch time is spent on things that are pro) Contra and anti)Contra and we find yo" too anti)Contra and yo"5d better change.5 (ow' the kind of effect that has is often s"btle. In the case of (%H' one thing that happened was that the foreign editor' named %a"l Allen' saw his next eval"ation be marked down' and the "se of this story was cited as one of the reasons for his being marked down and he felt that he had no choice b"t to leave (%H and he left Io"rnalism altogether. These were the kind of prices that people were starting to pay' all across <ashington. The message was $"ite clear both in the region and in <ashington that yo" were not going to do any career advancement if yo" insisted on p"shing these stories. The <hite /o"se is going to make it very' very painf"l for yo"r editors by harassing them and yelling at themL having letters sentL going to yo"r news exec"tives ) going way above even yo"r b"rea" chiefs sometimes ) to p"t the press"re on' to make s"re if these stories were done they were done only in the most tepid ways. And there also was' in an "nderreported side of this' there were these independent organi-ations' who were acting as sort of the <"rlit-er organ effect for the <hite /o"se attacks. %robably the most effective one from their side was Acc"racy In edia' which we find o"t' from looking at their internal doc"ments ) the <hite /o"se internal doc"ments' was act"ally being f"nded o"t of the <hite /o"se. There was ) in one case we have beca"se we have the records' the <hite /o"se organi-ed wealthy b"sinessmen' partic"larly those from the news media' from the conservative news media' to

come into the <hite /o"se to the sit"ation room where Charlie <ick' who was then head of 6,IA' pitched them to contrib"te a total of K233'333 to be "sed for p"blic diplomacy and the money is then directed to Acc"racy In edia and to =reedom /o"se and a co"ple of other organi-ations which then s"pport the <hite /o"se in its positions' and make the arg"ment that the <hite /o"se is doing the right thing and that these reporters who are getting in the way m"st be ,andinista sympathi-ers or m"st not be very patriotic or whatever we were s"pposed to be at the time. ,o yo" had this effect of what seemed to be independent organi-ations raising their voice' b"t' the more we kept finding o"t' the more we fo"nd at that these weren5t independent organi-ations at all. These were adI"ncts of a <hite /o"seNCIA program that had at its very heart the idea of how we reported the news in <ashington and how the American people perceived what was going on in Central America. I5m not s"re this has ever happened before ) I can5t think of it' b"t it was a remarkable change in the way that the government' as I g"ess Hoss %erot might say' was coming 1at1 the people rather than' yo" know' being 1of1 the people. The overall effect as this contin"ed over time was c"m"lative. Those of "s in the press who contin"ed ) who were not smart eno"gh to seek cover' fo"nd o"r work more and more being discredited' and "s personally being attacked' beca"se the game really became how do yo" destroy the investigator. And whether it be America5s watch' which was finding that the Contras were engaged in h"man rights violations as well as the ,andinistas #I sho"ld say&' or if it were the Catholic Ch"rch in +l ,alvador reporting "pon the atrocities there' or it was some Io"rnalist finding o"t abo"t the deceptions in <ashington' the best way to deal with that was to discredit the people who were doing the investigation. If yo" made them look like they were "npatriotic' wrongheaded' somehow s"bversive' the overall effect was to' first of all make it harder for them to do their Iob' and secondly when they did their Iob' people wo"ld tend not to believe it. ,o it worked' basically. ,o' as we get into the mid)E35s' we5re now in a sit"ation where it5s getting to"chier and to"chier to do these stories' b"t Congress' beca"se of the mining problems and beca"se of the bad p"blicity that followed' the disclos"re that the CIA was act"ally doing many of these things which the Contras had been claiming credit for' when that was exposed in :BE4 ) accidentally exposed by 7arry Goldwater on the floor of the ,enate ) what happened on that case was that Goldwater had gotten dr"nk and had gone down to the ,enate and started talking abo"t how the 6,. was mining the harbors of (icarag"a. And Hob ,immons' who was then staff director for the ,enate Intelligence Committee r"shed onto the floor to grab this slightly dr"nken ,enator and tell him that he wasn5t s"pposed to say that and they ) it was literally exp"nged from the Congressional Hecord' even tho"gh ) this was before C) ,pan so yo" co"ldn5t record it ) it was exp"nged from the Congressional Hecord b"t a very diligent reporter' 0avid Hodgers for the Wall 'treet :ournal' happened to be in the press gallery and wrote it down so it ran in the Wall 'treet :ournal and it got sort of o"t' and that contrib"ted mightily to the problems that they had in contin"ing the war. ,o Congress stopped the f"nding for the Contras. Immediately' and act"ally even before beca"se they knew there was going to be a problem' the <hite /o"se had this back"p plan' and it was' of co"rse' to have *llie (orth become the point man. ,o (orth becomes' secretly' the point man. /e is also being secretly s"pported by the CIA'

and by the (,A' and by other 6,. intelligence services. That comes o"t m"ch later. 7"t *llie (orth is now the man who is s"pposedly r"nning everything b"t that5s all secret too' at least from the American people. And he5s arranging to get weapons and raise money' and they5re doing their vario"s things they did with ,a"di Arabia and so forth' to get the money' and so we end "p with a lot of "s in <ashington really sort of knowing abo"t this. This isn5t like' all that secret' yo" know. I5d met *llie (orth in 5E> and he was act"ally a so"rce for many Io"rnalists beca"se he wo"ld' as part of the deal he wo"ld tell yo" some sexy st"ff abo"t the Achilles !a"rel or something' b"t yo" protect yo"r so"rce' so yo" wo"ldn5t really write abo"t him. 7"t I was writing abo"t him. And by the s"mmer of ED ) by A"ne of ED' I did the first story abo"t *liver (orth. And it was a very tepid story' I m"st say' looking back at it. I had gone to the <hite /o"se with it and they had flatly denied it. They said it was completely wrong' completely opposite from the tr"th ) and I at that point had still not ca"ght on to how dishonest these people had gotten. ,o I sort of softened it' b"t I still p"t it o"t ) we had this story o"t for A% abo"t *llie (orth' and how he was r"nning this Contra s"pport operation' and how the <hite /o"se was saying it wasn5t happening' and that led event"ally over that s"mmer to a few other stories appearing' and of co"rse it was all denied and the press"re on the Io"rnalists was so intense that the other news organi-ations backed away ) the 6ew @or- Times backed away' the Washington Post backed away' and it was left strangely to the A% and to the .iami Herald which was also following it with Al Charty5s work to p"rs"e this story ) and really the story of the decade' b"t no one wanted it. It was an ama-ing story ) it was a story abo"t a really remarkable character' with a remarkable s"pport cast' I mean' yo" know it was better than <atergate in that sense ) I mean' yo" had =awn /all as opposed to artha itchell' I mean this was a m"ch better storyT Oo" had this secret war being fo"ght' yo" had the government lying thro"gh its teeth every time it t"rned aro"nd' b"t no one wanted the story. The price had gotten too high. ,o as m"ch as I wo"ld like to say' like I was really some sort of Io"rnalistic geni"s who5d fig"red this all o"t' it didn5t re$"ire that m"ch. It I"st re$"ired sort of following the leads. They were all over the place. 7"t we5d learned to sort of shield o"r eyes from the leads in <ashington. And as we5re doing this ) I was now working with 7rian 7arger who we had bro"ght on at A% ) to help on this story' and we did the Contra)dr"g story in 0ecember of :BED' which was really well received aro"nd town [he said sarcastically]' and we then proceeded to follow the (orth network into early 5EF and we wrote the first story that there5d act"ally been a federal investigation in iami' of what we knew as the (orth network. It had been s"ppressed beca"se yo" weren5t s"pposed to investigate this beca"se it wasn5t happening anyway' and the 6,. attorney who make the mistake of trying to investigate this' or the assistant 6,. attorney ended "p in Thailand' working on some heroin case' and the investigation went literally nowhere. ,o this was what was happening by the ,"mmer of 5EF' when 7arger and I finally did a story ) we had 24 so"rces by this point ) it was getting silly' yo" knowM Oo" know' it wasn5t like two so"rces' or three so"rces' we were "p to 24' and some of them named' and we did this story in A"ne of 5EF where we laid a lot of it o"t ) we didn5t have all of it' I5ll grant ) we didn5t know abo"t ,ecord5s flights' b"t we had Hob *wen' and we had Aack ,ingla"b' and we had how the intermediaries were moving the weapons and so forth. ,o we get to this point' and we p"t this story o"t' and finally Congress ) which had been very afraid of to"ching this ) the democrats were extremely timid ) finally !ee /amilton' who was then Chairman of the ,enate Intelligence

Committee takes o"r little story with the rest of the Intelligence Committee over to the <hite /o"se and they sit down with *llie (orth and they say' 1Colonel (orth ) we have this story that says yo"5re doing these things which are kind of illegal' "h' what abo"t itM1 /e said' 1It5s not tr"e'1 they said 1Thank yo"'1 and they went back to Capitol /ill. And I get a call from one of /amilton5s aides' and he told me' he said ) I5ll never forget this' beca"se it was probably my worst moment in the whole Iran Contra ,candal ) I get this call from a 0emocratic aide who tells me that !ee /amilton has looked into my story' and he had a choice between believing these honorable men at the <hite /o"se or my so"rces and it wasn5t a close call. And so' at that point' we were' sort of' done. They co"ld have ) as Hoss %erot might say ) they co"ld have st"ck a fork in "s. 7arger was st"ck on the overnight at A% and was sort of p"shed o"t of the company ) he left. I was basically told' more or less' well' yo" know' take yo"r medicine like a man' yo" got it wrong' yo" know' and we were wrapping "p o"r investigation ) it was over. 0"ring that s"mmer we tried to get a longer version of this into any p"blication' virt"ally none wo"ld take it. 6one wo"ld take it ) I mean' we even went to Holling ,tone and they t"rned "s down. ,o that5s where we were. This phony' dishonest' false reality had won o"t. And the reality had lost o"t' and anyone who was cra-y eno"gh to act"ally believe in the reality was a real loser in <ashington. And then' as it all looked like it was pretty m"ch over' one of the last planes of *llie (orth5s little rag)tag air force' was ch"gging along over (icarag"a on *ctober Dth' :BEF' and I"st beca"se history is like this ) history is kind of' yo" know' it5s $"irky sometimes ) there was this teenager' draftee' never filed a ,A missile in his life' didn5t even know how to fire it exactly' b"t he described after the fact how he sort of aimed it at this plane that was sort of l"mbering along thro"gh the sky' and it went offT The ,A missile went off' and it went right at the plane' which really ama-ed this kid. They say it was ,oviet made ) I mean' what wo"ld yo" have tho"ghtM ,o the missile goes right at the plane and hits it right "nder one of the wings and the plane starts spiralling o"t of control. And another little $"irk of history is that ) most of the g"ys were kind of macho on board' and they didn5t wear parach"tes' b"t +"gene /asenf"s had I"st gotten a parach"te sent to him by one of his relatives' and beca"se he had the door open to start kicking o"t these weapons to the Contras' even tho"gh the plane spiraled o"t of control he co"ld crawl to the door and p"shed himself away from the plane and parach"ted down thro"gh the ,andinistas. And so' there was literally a smoking f"selage on the gro"nd in (icarag"a' and the press corps in <ashington s"ddenly said' 5oh geeT aybe we had missed something after all.5 7"t even then the <hite /o"se initially ) this was ) it was an interesting meeting. *ctober Cth' at the (,C ) they were in kind of a panic. *llie was o"t of the co"ntry working on the Iran proIect' so +lliot Abrams was chairing this meeting' and they were trying to fig"re o"t what to do ) what was their story going to be. !ater on I talked to one of the participants at this meeting and I said' 1Gee' what did yo" g"ys think yo" were "p toM 0id yo" think yo" sho"ldn5t I"st maybe fess "p at this pointM1 /e said 1(o. <e had been so s"ccessf"l in managing the information' we' yo" know' I"st tho"ght we co"ld I"st do anythingT1 ,o the anything they did was that they I"st started lying againT And they p"t o"t ) and it wasn5t I"st from the ,tate 0epartment anymore' it was from the

%resident of the 6nited ,tates' the Vice %resident of the 6nited ,tates' and virt"ally every senior official in the position to do anything abo"t this' came o"t and said there is no 6,. government connection to this flight. And +lliot even sort of came "p with this neat idea [so"nd lost for a moment] ) I know ,ingla"b pretty well and I happened to p"t a call in' and he hadn5t been told he was s"pposed to take the fall ) they hadn5t gotten aro"nd to telling him that. ,o when he flies back from Asia he lands' and he comes down off the plane and all these reporters are "p to him saying' The (ew Oork Times has I"st r"n this story based on a senior official saying it was yo"r plane and he said' 1I had nothing to do with that planeT1 ,o later on he told me that he have taken the fall if he5d only known that he was s"pposed to take the fall' b"t they hadn5t told him he was s"pposed to take the fall' so' cra-y eno"gh' he told the tr"th. ,o they were still looking for someone to take the blame on this' and then a very enterprising freelancer' an American Io"rnalist' went into the ,alvadoran telephone office' and since everything5s for sale down there' he bo"ght the phone records for the safe ho"se. They hadn5t tho"ght to' yo" know' take care of the phone records. And so he b"ys these phone records and' my goodness' there are all these calls to the <hite /o"se' and to *llie (orth5s personal line' as well as by the way to the Vice %resident5s office beca"se =elix Hodrig"e- who was r"nning the drops was calling virt"ally daily ) well maybe' certainly weekly ) the Vice %resident5s office to talk to then George 7"sh5s national sec"rity advisor 0onald Greg. ,o they had to come "p with some new stories again. And these stories kept shifting. 7"t what was incredible abo"t the whole thing was the arrogance that pervaded the <hite /o"se at this point. They really tho"ght they co"ld control how everybody in this co"ntry "nderstood the facts. They co"ld create the reality' and the press wo"ld go along with it' and thro"gh the press the American people wo"ld either be deceived or so conf"sed that they wo"ldn5t be able to do anything abo"t it anyway. The perception management wasn5t going to give "p. 7"t that began to ca"se problems when the next shoe falls' which is the disclos"re of the Iran initiative in early (ovember of 5EF' and that is also a problem legally' beca"se what they know inside the <hite /o"se which we don5t know yet' is that' in :BED the %resident had a"thori-ed the first shipment of missiles to Iran thro"gh Israel witho"t proper a"thori-ation. /e had not signed a findingL he was in violation of a felony which is called the Arms +xport Control Act. ,o they had to cover that "p. And what we saw was the next remarkable stage of this. And probably this is what changed a lot of how I saw Io"rnalism. *bvio"sly I5d not been really too thrilled by what I was seeing "p to this point' b"t the next phase was even more "nbelievable. And the next phase is the scandal was broken ) there are three parts to it basically. there5s the illegal shipments of weapons to the Contras in defiance of the law' the 7oland AmendmentL there is the problem of the Arms +xport Control Act' which %resident Heagan was violating back in 5EDL and of co"rse there5s what became the foc"s ) the crossover ) the "se of resid"als from the arms sales in Iran for the Contras ) the so)called 5diversion5 which many people feel was indeed a diversion of the p"blic at least. ,o yo" had these three elements. The <hite /o"se chose to make a stand on the latter one ) the diversion' and they proceeded to lie abo"t the other two. They p"t o"t false chronologies on Iran to show that the %resident did not know abo"t the 5ED shipment. They insisted ) even as Vice %resident 7"sh insisted "ntil 0ecember of 5EF that he had no idea

there was a Contra operation going on ) even tho"gh it had been m"ch of the press' he I"st hadn5t bothered to read it. ,o yo" had this decision to sort of deny straightforwardly' possibly acc"rately that the %resident did or did not know abo"t the diversion ) they said he didn5t. And that became the foc"s for the press and for the congress as the investigation gears "p' which is very bad eno"gh beca"se these other $"estions are very important. <as the %resident involved in a felony "nder the Arms +xport Control ActM <as he involved possibly in another type of crime by defying a law which he signed into law ) the 7oland AmendmentM Can the %resident I"st "nilaterally cond"ct war "sing third co"ntry f"ndingM All of these are very important $"estions to o"r democracy. 7"t the foc"s was on the diversion. And on that they felt they co"ld contain it as long as Aohn %oindexter said the b"ck stopped here' which of co"rse he wo"ld do. /owever' what we began to see very $"ickly in <ashington was almost a collaboration at this point to contain the scandal. *bvio"sly the <hite /o"se and the Hep"blicans had a very strong interest in containing this scandalL they were politically in hot water. 7"t the 0emocrats' and the press' were also inclined to contain the scandal. As the phrase went ) nobody wanted another <atergate. The people may have wanted another <atergate ) b"t that was the view in <ashington ) nobody wants other <atergate. And at this point' my last story for A% ) A% and I had really had some str"ggles beca"se altho"gh they were in a way happy with my work' b"t in a way I p"t them in some very to"gh spots' and they had not always been the best' b"t I m"st say they did p"t o"t most of o"r stories' event"ally' and they did the most' of any news organi-ation' b"t ) my last story for them in =ebr"ary of 5EC was ) we I"mped at one of the last firebreaks. <e bro"ght the story into the CIA. And I reported that the CIA had assisted (orth5s operation' despite their denialsL that (orth was "sing (ational ,ec"rity Agency highly)sensitive secret cryptology e$"ipment and had been passing it o"t like candy to all the people who were working with him ) they all had these ;!) 4>5s as they were called which co"ld send these secret messages back and forth' and so we5d broken that barrier. <e5d broken into the CIA. And then I went to 6ewswee-. aybe a mistake' I g"ess' in retrospect' b"t I went to (ewsweek. And I tho"ght ) I always think of 6ewswee- as what it "sed to be ) sort of a g"tsy maga-ine that had changed. ,o anyway I get to 6ewswee- and the first week I5m there' some stories abo"t these phony chronologies are circ"lating and I call a friend of mine on the (ational ,ec"rity Co"ncil staff and I say' 1<hat are yo" doing nowM Oo"5re doing false chronologies on how the Iran sales happenedM1 and he said' 17ob' yo" don5t "nderstand'1 he said 1These were orders from the *val *ffice. 0on Hegan sent down word that we were to protect the %resident and write him o"t of these events.1 And so' I tell my new 7"rea" Chief at 6ewswee- +van Thomas' and he5s real excited by this 5ca"se he gets excited' and he goes in and Tommy 0e=rank' who was the assistant 7"rea" Chief' calls another so"rce ) well known person whose name I can5t mention I g"ess' from the (,C' and this person said yes' that5s exactly right' we were told to do it. ,o 6ewswee- ran this ) I have one copy of this beca"se 6ewswee- sort of threw it away afterwards ) b"t we ran a cover story called 1Cover)"p1 and we reco"nt how' to protect the %resident' the (,C staffers were ordered to p"t these phony chronologies o"t. And what we didn5t reali-e at the time was we had I"st broken thro"gh the last firebreak. <e were in the *val *ffice with this story.

And the reaction was incredible. any of my colleag"es in the press attacked "s. The Wall 'treet :ournal' not I"st in its editorial pages b"t its news col"mns attacked "sL 6ewswee- ) of co"rse' 0on Hegan' who was one of the people of co"rse named here attacked "sL and 6ewsweedecided that they wanted to retract the story. And they sent me back to my so"rce' several times over the next period of time' to get him to take it back and he wo"ldn5t. /e said' I told yo" what I knew' and what do yo" want me to say' and I said well' we want to retract the story is what we want to do. Anyway' so one of my friends went aro"nd ) beca"se this was s"ch an embarrassment to 6ewswee- ) that he told me he went aro"nd (ewsweek and got all the copies he co"ld find and threw them away' so people wo"ldn5t know ) so there wo"ldn5t be a reminder ) it was sort of a 5nice thing5 he was doing ) so there wo"ldn5t be a reminder of my big mistake. And I fo"nd o"t fairly recently ) as recently as a year ago' 6ewswee- was going to A"dge <alsh5s office and asking him to give them information so they co"ld retract this story ) in their view ) to fix the historical record. 7"t of co"rse A"dge <alsh wo"ldn5t help them on it. ,o anyway' here we are' and the problem is ) and' "h' it5s hard to "nderstand if yo" haven5t lived in <ashington it may not make a lot of sense' b"t I5ll explain it anyway ) there were three choices at this point. Choice 1A1 was to tell the tr"th' to say that the %resident had violated a variety of laws' committed felonies' and violated o"r constit"tional safeg"ards abo"t the way we carry o"t wars in o"r co"ntry' and impeach him. *ption A. Then there was *ption 171 ) to tell the tr"th and have congress sort of say well' it5s okay with "s' which creates a dangero"s precedent for the f"t"re' that is' that now %resident5s wo"ld say well hey' look at the Heagan example' yo" know' if he can wage war privately' why can5t IM ,o that was *ption 17.1 And then there was *ption 1C1 ) to pretend it didn5t happen' or to pretend that' say' some !ie"tenant Colonel had done it all. ,o <ashington' I g"ess "nderstandably' settled on *ption 1C.1 And it didn5t hit me "ntil one evening in arch of 5EC' the Tower board had I"st come o"t with its report' which basically said that the %resident was a little bit asleep at the switch' b"t hey' yo" know' it was really these cra-y n"ts who did it' and we had one of these (ewsweek dinners ) they5re fancy affairs ) and it was at the 7"rea" Chief5s ho"se' and they5re catered' and there5s a t"xedoed waiter' and he po"rs the wine' there5s nice food' and I was new ) I came o"t of A% which is kind of a working classNworking man5s kind of news organi-ation so I wasn5t "sed to this. And we had as o"r g"est that evening 7rent ,cowcroft' who had been on the Tower 7oard' and 0ick Cheney' who was then ) who was going to be the ranking minority fig"re on the ho"se Iran)Contra Committee' and we5re going thro"gh this little delightf"l dinner' and at one point 7rent ,cowcroft says' he says 1<ell' I probably sho"ldn5t be saying this' b"t if I were advising Admirable %oindexter' and he had told the %resident abo"t the diversion' I5d advise him to say that he hadn5t.1 And being new to this whole' sort of game' I stopped eating' and looked across the table and said 1GeneralT Oo"5re not s"ggesting that the Admiral sho"ld commit perI"ry' are yo"M1 And there was kind of like an embarrassed little silence at the table' and the editor of

6ewswee-' who was sitting next to me' says ) I hope partly Iokingly b"t I don5t know ) he says' 1,ometimes we have to do what5s good for the co"ntry.1 ,o that became ) I somehow reali-ed I was in a different place than I tho"ght I5d been in yo" knowM ,o what happened then was that played o"t. It played o"t. And it played o"t almost predictably' almost sort of with a sadness. And even when *liver (orth finally told the tr"th' which was that he was ordered to do all this st"ff' and that there was a cover)"p going on ) yo" see' he even told them there was a fall g"y planned ) it was the first cover)"p that had been anno"nced probably in front of :33 million Americans and still it was believed by CongressT ,o !ee /amilton again' the same g"y who had accepted (orth5s word and other g"ys5 back in A"g"st of 5EF' he decides' as Chairman of the Iran)Contra Committee' that we all sho"ld sort of say that it was I"st these 5men of -eal5 ) there5d been a co"p d5etat in the <hite /o"se' we5d find o"t ) there5d been a I"nta of a !t. Col and maybe an Admiral here and there yo" know who were r"nning this policy and that somehow the CIA had missed it' the <hite /o"se had missed it' (,A had missed it ) it wasn5t like the H"ssians were doing this' it was like' being done' like' "nder their noseT 7"t' yo" know' okay ) it5s not very believable ) a lot of Americans didn;t believe it' to tell yo" the tr"th ) b"t in <ashington we believed it. <e all believed it. (ot all of "s' b"t we pretty m"ch had to believe it. And at (ewsweek and elsewhere we were told in the press this was not a story anymore' this was not to be p"rs"ed' I g"ess beca"se this wo"ldn5t be good for the co"ntry to p"rs"e it. And again' history being kind of $"irky' there was this other element of the story' which was that these three Hep"blican I"dges who picked independent co"nsel' picked !awrence <alsh to be the independent co"nsel on this investigation' and !awrence <alsh was sort of this non)descript sort of fellow ) he5s not a really sharp legal mindM 7"t he5s very honest ) and maybe they tho"ght they co"ld manage him. 7"t he I"st kept p"rs"ing the leads' and despite all the lies and the cover)"ps that went on' there were other breaks beca"se he kept p"rs"ing the leads' that yo" then had of co"rse' with the (orth trial and the %oindexter trial' these g"ys ) basically (orth saying ) here5s more and more evidence that these g"ys were r"nning this thing' and then in the %oindexter trial Heagan comes o"t and makes a complete fool of himself and is I"st all over the place with his story. 7"t then another event happens that we really don5t know m"ch abo"t ) and that event is that this g"y named Craig Gillan is hired to do a sort of clean)"p operation at the Independent Co"nsel5s office ) I"st to get the loose ends together so they can wrap "p the investigation and end this thing ) it5s :BB3. And Craig Gillan finds o"t that there are a lot of doc"ment re$"ests that had been sent o"t in the early days and some hadn5t been answeredT *ne was from Charlie /ill' who was an aide to George ,ch"lt-' and who was ) last time I knew he was at /oover "p at ,tanford ) and so they write to Charlie and they say Charlie ) yo" didn5t give "s yo"r notes. And Charlie finally sends his notes' and in it they find this strange reference to Casper <einberger taking all these notesT 7"t of co"rse Casper <einberger told them that he had no notes. Then as they follow those leads they find that in fact there had been an *val *ffice cover)"p' and that what we had seen' and what remarkably the <hite /o"se had been able to s"ccessf"lly maintain' in the defiance of all the logic and reason that sho"ld have been bro"ght to bear ) they were able to maintain for Jsix yearsJ what amo"nted to a felony obstr"ction of I"stice o"t of the <hite /o"se. And they did it "nder the nose of the Congress' "nder the nose of the <ashington press corp' and the way they were able to do it was essentially this acceptance in <ashington of an absol"tely phony reality' one which is accepted in sort of a consens"s way ) what yo"5ll hear if

yo" listen to the . !aughlin ?roup or these other shows is a general consens"s ) there may be disagreements on some points ) b"t there is a general consens"s of the world that is bro"ght to bear' and often it is in absol"te contradiction to the real world. It is a false reality ) it5s a <ashington reality. And what we have seen at the end of these twelve years' and what I g"ess the challenge of the moment becomes is how that gets changed. /ow do the American people really get back control of this ) not I"st their government' b"t of their history ) beca"se it5s really their history that has been taken away from them. And it5s really what the <ashington %ress Corps and the 0emocrats in Congress as well as the Hep"blicans are c"lpable of' was this fail"re to tell the American people their history. And the reason they didn5t was beca"se they knew' or feared' that if the American people knew their real history ) whether it goes back to the days of sla"ghters going on in +l ,alvador ) if they had known abo"t +l a-ote ) if they had known abo"t the little children that were p"t in the ho"se and shot to death and garroted ) that they wo"ldn5t have gone along with that. And if they had known that there were felony obstr"ctions of I"stice being carried o"t of the *val *ffice they wo"ldn5t have gone along with that either' and there wo"ld have been a real problem ) there wo"ld have been a political problem to contain I g"ess' b"t ) it is not the role of the <ashington press corp ) maybe this is so"nds like an "nderstatement' b"t it5s not the role of the <ashington press corps to take part in that. *"r Iob was s"pposed to be' I tho"ght' to kind of tell people what we co"ld find o"tT <e go in' we act nice' we ask a lot of $"estions' find some things and r"n o"t and tell youT <e5re sort of like spies for the people' yo" know' and instead' we sort of got in there ) and I g"ess it was real nice' we felt like we were insiders' we felt like these were all nice' respectable men ) they dressed well ) Casper <einberger went to every single one of these pressNgovernment f"nctions ) the Grid Iron Cl"b' the <hite /o"se Correspondents5 dinners' the Congressional correspondents5 dinners ) yo"5d always find Casper <einberger there. And so when he finally gets indicted the <ashington press corps comes o"t and says that5s a terrible thing to do' 5ca"se Casper <einberger5s a good manT /e went to all o"r partiesT /ow co"ld yo" think badly of himM And there was even a col"mn by liberal col"mnist Hichard Cohen in the <ashington %ost who said' it5s a terrible thing to indict Casper <einberger beca"se we shop at the same store in GeorgetownT /e said Casper <einberger even p"shed his own shopping cartT And before Thanksgiving one year' Hichard Cohen saw Casper <einberger b"ying his own t"rkey. And so how co"ld yo" think abo"t indicting a g"y for a felony obstr"ction of I"stice when he p"shes his own shopping cartM This may seem f"nny o"t here b"t in <ashington it5s notT This is very serio"s st"ffT I know I5m taking too long' b"t one other thing I wanted to talk abo"t was ) well' yo" know life being what it is' and history being $"irky as it is ) so I left 6ewswee- in :BB3 ) I was not on the best of terms with them ) beca"se I wo"ldn5t go along with this. I mean' I wo"ldn5t ) I kept saying first of all George 7"sh knew it and we sho"ld have told the people abo"t it in :BEE when he was r"nning for president ) we -new what he knew' we knew that his stories were absol"tely the most impla"sible' idiotic' embarrassing cover stories imaginable and they sho"ld not have been treated with the kind of respect they were treated with and we sho"ld definitely have p"rs"ed that. <e also knew that there was a a cover)"p going on ) which I kept insisting on even tho"gh 6ewswee- kept trying to retract it' and so I left. And I was going to do this book' and this book was going to be abo"t how <ashington sort of works or doesn5t' and abo"t how the press behaved sort of cowardly' and then I get this phone call one day' in A"g"st of :BB3' from %7,

<rontline' and they asked me if I wo"ld do some investigative work on this proIect called the *ctober ,"rprise. And I5d been thro"gh a lot' and I really didn5t want to go thro"gh any more. And of all the taboos ) obvio"sly for a long time the (orth network was I"st a 5cra-y conspiracy theory5' and then the idea that 7"sh was involved was a 5cra-y conspiracy theory5' and the idea that there was a cover)"p was a 5cra-y conspiracy theory5' and I5d seen all these conspiracy theories act"ally t"rn o"t to be true' so I really didn5t want to disco"nt anything witho"t having looked at it caref"lly' I tho"ght' and anyway I tho"ght it wo"ld be kind of wimpy' yo" know' "nprofessional and wimpy to say no. This was a rep"table o"tfit ) %7, <rontline wanted me to look at something and' as m"ch as I had my do"bts abo"t it I tho"ght' okay. ,o' I went off on this little strange advent"re. I had a prod"cer named Hobert Hoss who5s a wonderf"l g"y who speaks %ersian and has lived in the iddle +ast. <e took o"r little camera ) o"r little high eight camera ) and we went aro"nd as cheaply as possible' and we went to +"rope' we went to the <est Coast ) we interviewed some arms dealer over in ,anta onica ) and we went aro"nd and p"t together whatever we co"ld. And we fo"nd' to o"r s"rprise I think' that there was more there than we tho"ght. <e had do"bts abo"t a lot of it still' and we did not in o"r ) when we finally decided to go with the program we wanted we were very I think skeptical ) that we didn5t feel it was proven' b"t that there was eno"gh there that merited f"rther attention' I g"ess that5s a fair way to say where we ended "p. ,o we did this program' and it aired in April of 5B:. Gary ,ick the day before ) Gary ,ick was interviewed on o"r show ) he was a former national sec"rity man "nder Carter and a very respected historian' and it was partly his decision to think that this had happened that infl"enced "s to some degree' beca"se it wasn5t I"st cra-y arms dealers and intelligence g"ys ) it was also this fairly respectable g"y' and the day before o"r show aired he did a piece in the (ew Oork Times describing his angst and how he came to this concl"sion. And so this story that had sort of lived on the fringes for some time b"t which the government itself had bro"ght in on the p"blic record in a perI"ry trial in the ,pring of :BB3' and lost' this now moved into the mainstream m"ch more' and it drew ) even by the comparisons to the other st"ff ) this one was attacked' and contin"es to be attacked. =rontline commissioned a second program ) an "pdate' which we tried to do in I"st a very straightforward' honest way ) beca"se at that point the deb"nkers ) The (ew Hep"blic and (ewsweek act"ally leading the way ) we felt were wrong on a n"mber of points. 7"t we also felt that we didn5t think it was anywhere near proven and we did a show saying basically that' and trying to track Casey5s whereabo"ts and all the rest of the st"ff we did. Anyway' so after the second show' there was this Congressional investigation' which the Hep"blicans fo"ght' which George 7"sh personally strategi-ed to stop' and it was stopped in the ,enate with a filib"ster' b"t the /o"se approved an investigation ) the ,enate did a little one in one of the s"bcommittees' and it I"st has to be that !ee /amilton was of co"rse assigned to head the investigation. It wo"ldn5t have been fair otherwise ) see' !ee /amilton was a very honorable man' in many ways' I think' except he doesn5t believe anyone else can lie' I g"ess. /e was chairman of the iddle +ast s"bcommittee when the Iran st"ff was happening ) the Iran arms st"ff and he missed it. /e was then chairman of the intelligence committee when (orth was going f"ll board ) missed that. /e was then rewarded by being made head of the Iran)Contra investigation and he kind of missed that. And so' beca"se of his sterling record they made him head of the /o"se Task =orce on the *ctober ,"rpriseT And of co"rse then the /o"se Task =orce fo"nd that it was I"st fantasy' and they p"t o"t their report ) and I m"st say I5ve read a lot of

reports and I think it5s the worst one I5ve ever read ) b"t it was well)received in <ashington b"t I5m going to tell yo" one little ) I mean when people talk abo"t fantasy in <ashington ) there is this section in this report' and this I think is emblematic of it' where the /o"se wants to p"t Casey somewhere' and they decide that on A"g"st 2nd' :BE3' 7ill Casey was on !ong Island. And yo" look for why they think that ) this becomes important to the story and I5ll make it brief. <hen yo" look back at this' what they have is that' on A"g"st 2nd' Hichard Allen ) who was then a foreign policy advisor to candidate Heagan' wrote Casey5s !ong Island phone n"mber on the bottom of a sheet of paper. It was 7ill Casey' D:F' yo" know' whatever' and there5s no notation of a call or conversation' and Allen when he testified he said I think I called the n"mber' he said' b"t I don5t recall talking to Casey or even if the call was answered. And there5s no phone bill showing a call. ,o what normally people wo"ld say' even my fo"r year probably wo"ld say' is that doesn5t prove anything. That proves' like' -eroT If someone calls my n"mber in C3> in Arlington hey' I5m not thereT And it doesn5t matter that they call my n"mber' or write it down. Oet this becomes concl"sive proof to the task force that 7ill Casey was on !ong Island. (ow the reason that5s important is beca"se 7ill Casey was really at the 7ohemian Grove in "pstate California. And what we had' was ) he act"ally p"rchased their ann"al play book on A"g"st :st at the Grove' according to the Grove. <e had a contemporaneo"s diary entry from one of the people at the Grove that was in the same cottage Casey was in' atthew cGowan' who describes meeting with Casey that weekend' and they throw o"t that evidence' beca"se Hichard Allen wrote Casey5s phone n"mber down and it was a !ong Island n"mberT And yo" go to them and yo" say how ) !arry 7"rcello was the co"nsel here ) I5ve had these arg"ments and I5ve said !arry' this doesn5t prove anything' and they say' it does as far as we5re concerned. They p"t 7ill Casey ) they wanted him to be there act"ally the week earlier' the last week of A"ly' beca"se if yo" p"t him there that weekend' which they do' that disproves one of the allegations abo"t him meeting with Iranians in ,pain that weekend. ,o by p"tting him there the weekend earlier' when he was act"ally there the first weekend in A"g"st' yo" disprove an important allegation' and that means that one of these g"ys was I"st a liar and a fabricator' and we can all go home and feel happy abo"t it. Anyway' that5s a bit of a long way to explain that my last advent"re was on this *ctober ,"rprise thing' and I have written a second book' which reco"nts that little advent"re' and it5s called Tri or Treason' and it sho"ld be o"t' I g"ess later this year. This first book is more ) basically I talk abo"t how the 1conventional wisdom1 works' and I "se that to sort string along a lot of great little stories abo"t how ) my investigative st"ff and things that we fo"nd o"t along the way. The second book is really like a first person kind of magical mystery to"r thro"gh strange people. <hat I think is the bottom line of both books is that we are in great danger of losing o"r grasp of reality as a nation. *"r history has been taken away from "s in key ways. <e5ve been lied to so often. And important things have been blocked from "s. It was important to know that those little children were killed in +l a-ote. I have fo"r kids' and I know what they mean to me' and it5s always been a part of my Io"rnalism that I don5t want ) that if any of my sons will ever be taken off to war someplace' I want it to be done for a real reason ) not beca"se somebody made something "p. 7"t I also feel for people who lose their kids anywhere. And I think that the idea that o"r government wo"ld be complicit' not I"st in the killing' b"t in this very cynical effort to lie abo"t it' and hide abo"t it' and pretend it didn5t happen' and attack those who find o"t that it

did happen' is in many ways almost worse. It is something that' as a democracy' we can5t really allow to happen. The main problem' at this point' is that we have a set of establishments in <ashington that have failed "s' as a people. *bvio"sly the exec"tive branch did it beca"se it had its goals' and agendas' and it wanted to do these things' and maybe in some cases they were right. 7"t they sho"ldn5t have lied to "s. They sho"ldn5t have tried to create a false reality to trick "s into this. Congress failed beca"se it didn5t have the co"rage to stand "p and do oversight and perform its constit"tional responsibilities. 7"t what is perhaps most shocking to Americans is that the press failed. The press is what people sort of expect to be there as the watchdog' the final gro"p to sort of warn "s of danger. And the press Ioined it. And the press saw itself ) in the <ashington press corp I5m talking abo"t ) saw itself at the elite levels as part of the insider comm"nity. And as that evolved and then grew in the :BE35s' the press stopped performing its oversight responsibilities. And I think we have to fig"re o"t some way' as a people' to change that. There5ve been act"ally more changes I think in the political str"ct"re ) whatever anyone thinks of r. Clinton' at least there5s a change there. And he has different priorities. And in Congress there5s even been some change. 7"t the press has gone from being when I got there 5CC as a <atergate press corp' with its fa"lts' with being maybe a little too overly -ealo"s in p"rs"ing some minor infraction' b"t still ) it was there as the watchdog. <hat we have now' and its contin"ing into this new era' is the Heagan) 7"sh press corp. It5s the press corp that they helped create ) that they created partly by p"rging those' or enco"raging the p"rging of those who were not going along' b"t it was "ltimately the editors and the news exec"tives that did the p"rging. It wasn5t the <hite /o"se or the ,tate 0epartment or the +mbassy in +l ,alvador that drove Hay 7onner o"t of the 6ew @or- TimesL it was the 6ew @or- Times exec"tives who did it. And thro"gho"t that whole era it wasn5t the ,tate 0epartment or the <hite /o"se that r"ined %a"l Allen5s career at (%H' it was (%H exec"tives. And this was the case all the way aro"nd <ashington. The people who s"cceeded and did well were those who didn;t stand "p' who didn;t write the big stories' who looked the other way when history was happening in front of them' and went along either conscio"sly or I"st by cowardice with the deception of the American people. And I think that5s what we all have to sort of look at to see what we can do to change it. I think it will take a tremendo"s commitment by the American people to insist on both more honest Io"rnalism' more straightforward Io"rnalism' b"t also maybe even new Io"rnalism. There has to be some other way ) some other o"tlets. In a way' I5ve grown to despair at the possibility of reforming some of these organi-ations. aybe it can happen' b"t I think "ltimately' we5re going to have to see a new kind of media to replace this old one. End of tal-. There followed a "uestion and answer session - one of whi h was to the point of this newsgroup. He was as-ed for his opinion on the =ennedy assassination. Parr'/ /e5s asking what I might think abo"t the assassination of %resident ;ennedy. And I g"ess my answer abo"t that wo"ld be I don5t know. *ne of the great tragedies of losing o"r history which is what5s been happening thro"gho"t o"r lifetimes' has been that' beca"se of this sort of 5conventional wisdom5 or 5conventional reality5 that exists' certain things are not explored. I g"ess

in 5F> the conventional wisdom was of co"rse that it was a lone g"n acting by himself ) a cra-y man. And so the <arren Commission' like many other government investigations since' basically I"st reinforced ) ratified that belief. They may have been right ) I mean' I don5t know. [ an interIects 1there5ve been over F33 books on the s"bIect written ] )I knowT I5ve read some of them. 7"t ) all I5m saying is that if investigations aren5t done properly within a certain period of time it5s very hard to do them. I had a friend who was at TimeN!I=+ d"ring that period and he was following "p on the connections to (ew *rleans. 7"t TimeN!I=+ was so angry abo"t anyone even thin-ing that there might be another part of this story' that he "sed to have to p"t down different stories on his expense acco"nts ) like if he wo"ld to go to (ew *rleans to interview some of these g"ys that might have information he5d have to say he was there for the ardi Gras or something. /e co"ldn5t say he was there for the assassination of %resident ;ennedy beca"se he wo"ld have been considered some kind of a n"tT ,nd in answer to a "uestion about maybe the people don;t really want to -now the truth or ta-e responsibility to pressure the powers that be to tell the truth* Parr'/ I think probably a lot of people don5t want to know. I agree with that. I think' beca"se' it5s hard to know. And I wo"ld hear that a lot. That wo"ld be an arg"ment that wo"ld be "sed a great deal in the E35s after Iran)Contra was going along ) it wo"ld be that people were bored' they were tired' they didn5t want to hear abo"t it anymore. y feeling tho"gh is that it was the responsibility of the reporter to tell the people what he co"ld abo"t important events as fairly and as completely as possible. And it was less my responsibility to decide what they sho"ld know or sho"ldn5t know' or even wanted to know' b"t to make an honest I"dgment abo"t what was historically of importance and tell them what I co"ld. And even if it5s :3] of the p"blic that wants to know' they deserve to know. I don5t think yo" sho"ld do polls to find o"t what people want to hear and then tell them what they want to hear. I think to some degree the press needs to inform the p"blic abo"t st"ff that5s important. 8n answer to "do the people -now they;re being lied to"* Parr'/ <ell basically' the American people I think' from the polls' believe ) first of all they were interested in Iran)Contra' m"ch more so than the press wanted to think. I remember once at 6ewswee- a poll showed :N> of the people following the story closely' :N> following them a little bit' and a :N> of them not following them at all' and they said ) well' yo" see 2N> of the people aren5t following them very m"ch at all' so therefore' yo" know ) there were arg"ments that were kind of t"rned and twisted to make it appear that the p"blic didn5t really want to know. I think the p"blic did want to know. *llie (orth5s book was a bestseller ) a n"mber have been bestsellers ) that shows that they5re interested. %l"s' I think' they have a tremendo"s distr"st of how the government5s f"nctioned and they want to know when they5ve been lied to. It may not be that they care as m"ch abo"t all the details' b"t they s"re care if a man who is r"nning for %resident has lied to them in a maIor way' and expect the press to try to make a good)faith effort to discover that' and not to sort of go along and say gee' it wo"ld be too disr"ptive if people knew that.

The Santa #ru: !assacre No em.er 1<" 1991

[back] Indonesian genocide

*n (ovember :2' :BB:' Indonesian troops fired "pon a peacef"l memorial procession to a cemetery in 0ili' +ast Timor that had t"rned into a pro)independence demonstration. ore than 2C: +ast Timorese were killed that day at the ,anta Cr"- cemetery or in hospitals soon after. An e$"al n"mber were disappeared and are believed dead. This massacre' "nlike many others which occ"rred d"ring the co"rse of Indonesia5s 6.,.)backed occ"pation' was filmed and photographed by international Io"rnalists. Amy Goodman and Allan (airn' two 6.,. reporters' were beaten d"ring the massacre.

The Santa Cruz Massacre November 12, 1991

1<hen film footage of the massacre at ,anta Cr"-J. was broadcast to a"diences aro"nd the world it provoked a significant international o"tcry against the practices of the Indonesian military in Timor)!este.... /owever' ... even in the face of strong international demands to bring those who had killed "narmed demonstrators to acco"nt' the instit"tional practices of A7HINT(I provided the maIority of perpetrators who were most responsible with effective imp"nity.1 -- #hega% <inal 5eport of the #ommission for 5e eption1 Truth and 5e on iliation in East Timor &#,A5)

On 12th Anniversary o- $imor Massacre, Rights +et,or. /rges 7!stice, #$A+ %ays /8%8 and /+ M!st Act ?+ovember 11, 1211@

*n (ovember :2' :BB:' Indonesian troops fired "pon a peacef"l memorial proession to a cemetery in 0ili' +ast Timor that had t"rned into a pro)independence demonstration. ore than 2C: +ast Timorese were killed that day at the ,anta Cr"- cemetery or in hospitals soon after. An e$"al n"mber were disappeared and are believed dead. This massacre' "nlike many others which occ"rred d"ring the co"rse of Indonesia5s 6.,.)backed occ"pation' was filmed and photographed by international Io"rnalists. Amy Goodman and Allan (airn' two 6.,. reporters' were beaten d"ring the massacre.

The ,anta Cr"- assacre sparked the international solidarity movement for +ast Timor' incl"ding the fo"nding of the +ast Timor Action (etwork' and was the catalyst for congressional action to stem the flow of 6.,. weapons and other military assistance for Indonesia?s br"tal sec"rity forces. Ali Alatas' former foreign minister of Indonesia' called the massacre a 1t"rning point'1 which set in motion the events leading to +ast Timor5s coming independence. The people of +ast Timor now have their freedom and are an independent nation' b"t they have yet to see I"stice for decades h"man rights crimes inflicted on their people and co"ntry by the Indonesian military.
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