V. USUFRUCT Bachrach v. Seifert and Elianoff G.R. No. L-2659, October 12, 1950, 87 Phil. 483 Ozaeta, J.

FACTS: The deceased E. M. Bachrach, who left no forced heir except his widow Mary McDonald Bachrach, in his last will and testament made various legacies in cash and willed the remainder of his estate. The estate of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc., received from the latter 54,000 shares representing 50 per cent stock dividend on the said 108,000 shares. On June 10, 1948, Mary McDonald Bachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant of the estate, petitioned the lower court to authorize the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, as administrator of the estate of E. M. Bachrach, to transfer to her the said 54,000 shares of stock dividend by indorsing and delivering to her the corresponding certificate of stock, claiming that said dividend, although paid out in the form of stock, is fruit or income and therefore belonged to her as usufructuary or life tenant. Sophie Seifert and Elisa Elianoff, legal heirs of the deceased, opposed said petition on the ground that the stock dividend in question was not income but formed part of the capital and therefore belonged not to the usufructuary but to the remainderman. While appellants admit that a cash dividend is an income, they contend that a stock dividend is not, but merely represents an addition to the invested capital. ISSUE: Whether or not a dividend is an income and whether it should go to the usufructuary. HELD: Yes. The usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all the natural, industrial, and civil fruits of the property in usufruct. The 108,000 shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. The 54,000 shares of stock dividend are civil fruits of the original investment. They represent profits, and the delivery of the certificate of stock covering said dividend is equivalent to the payment of said profits. Said shares may be sold independently of the original shares, just as the offspring of a domestic animal may be sold independently of its mother. If the dividend be in fact a profit, although declared in stock, it should be held to be income. A dividend, whether in the form of cash or stock, is income and, consequently, should go to the usufructuary, taking into consideration that a stock dividend as well as a cash dividend can be declared only out of profits of the corporation, for if it were declared out of the capital it would be a serious violation of the law. Under the Massachusetts rule, a stock dividend is considered part of the capital and belongs to the remainderman; while under the Pennsylvania rule, all earnings of a corporation, when declared as dividends in whatever form, made during the lifetime of the usufructuary, belong to the latter. The Pennsylvania rule is more in accord with our statutory laws than the Massachusetts rule. Hemedes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107132, October 8, 1999, 316 SCRA 347 Gonzaga Reyes, J. FACTS: Jose Hemedes, father of Maxima Hemedes and Enrique D. Hemedes. Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled "Donation Inter Vivos with Resolutory Conditions" whereby he conveyed ownership over the subject land, together with all its improvements, in favor of his third wife, Justa Kausapin, subject to the following resolutory conditions that upon her death or marriage, the donee shall revert the said property to anyone of Jose Hemedes children. On September 27, 1960 a "Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion" was

made conveying to Maxima Hemedes. She had it titled and mortgage it to R & B Insurance with an annotation of Usufruct in favor of her stepmother, Justa Kausapin. Unable to pay the mortgage, R & B Insurance extra-judicially foreclosed the property. However, Justa Kausapin executed another agreement or Kasunduan on May 27, 1971 to his stepson, Enrique D. Hemedes. He obtained tax declarations and pay realty taxes from thereon. The Ministry of Agrarian Reform Office conducted a cadastral survey and indicated Enrique Hemedes as the owner. Enrique Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty Const. Corp. (Dominium), a sister company of Asia Brewery. Asia Brewery started to introduce some improvements already when R & B insurance informed them that they are the owners of the property where these improvements are being built. ISSUE: Whether or not the kasunduan executed by Justa Kausapin in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes was valid. HELD: No. The court dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the CA. It held that Maxima failed to comply with the requirements of Art. 1332 of the civil code and also failed to repudiate Justa Kausapins allegation that she did not execute such a deed and she never allowed to use the land as security for the loan. It was found that the deed of conveyance to Maxima was spurious and it follows that the original title she had for the property was also null and void so as the mortgage to R & B Insurance. On the other hand, Kausapin executed an affidavit to affirm the authenticity of the the kasundudan in favor of his stepson, Enrique Hemedes whom she is dependent from for her financial support. Fabie v. Gutierrez David G.R. No. L-123, December 12, 1945, 75 Phil. 536 Ozaeta, J. FACTS: The petitioner Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of certain houses located at 372-376 Santo Cristo, Binondo, and 950-956 Ongpin, Santa Cruz, Manila, under the ninth clause of the will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey. The owner of Santo Cristo property abovementioned is the respondent Juan Grey, while those of the Ongpin property are other person not concern herein. Previous to September 1944 litigation arose between Josefa Fabie as plaintiff and Juan Grey as defendant and the owner of the Ongpin property as intervenors, involving the administration of the houses mentioned. ISSUE: Whether or not the action instituted by the petitioner Josefa Fabie is a purely possessory action and as such within the jurisdiction of said court, or an action founded on property right and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court. HELD: Yes. It is admitted by the parties that the petitioner Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of the property in question and that the respondent Juan Grey is the owner thereof. It is likewise admitted that by virtue of a final judgment entered in Civil Case No. 1659 of the Court of First Instance of Manila between the usufructuary and the owner, the former has the right to collect all the rents of said property for herself with the obligation on her part to pay all the real estate taxes, special assessments, and insurance premiums, and make all necessary repairs thereon, and in case default on her part the owner shall have the right to do all those things, in which event he shall be entitled to collect all subsequent rents of the property concerned until the amount paid by him and the expenses of collection are fully satisfied, after which the usufructuary shall again collect the rents. There is therefore no dispute as to the title to or the respective interests of the parties in the property in question. The naked title to the
1

property is to admittedly in the respondent Juan Grey, but the right to all the rents thereof, with the obligation to pay the taxes and insurance premiums and make the necessary repairs, is, also admittedly, vested in the usufructuary, the petitioner Josefa Fabie, during her lifetime. Construing said judgment in the light of the ninth clause of the will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey, which was quoted in the decision and by which Josefa Fabie was made by the usufructuary during her lifetime of the income of the property in question, we find that the said usufructuary has the right to administer the property in question. All the acts of administration to collect the rents for herself, and to conserve the property by making all necessary repairs and paying all the taxes, special assessments, and insurance premiums thereon were by said judgment vested in the usufructuary Vda. De Aranas v. Aranas G.R. No. L-56249, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 415 Paras, J. FACTS: Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic Church, died on January 19, 1953. He had executed on June 6, 1946 his Last Will and Testament which was admitted to probate on August 31, 1956. In said Last Will and Testament, Fr. Teodoro Aranas stipulated the special administration of the remainder of his estate (after returning to his brothers Aniceto and Carmelo or their heirs all properties acquired by him including 10 parcels of land inherited by him from his parents) by Vicente Aranas, a faithful and serviceable nephew and designating him also as recipient of 1/2 of the produce of said properties after deducting the expenses for the administration and the other 1/2 of the produce to be given to the Catholic Church for the eternal repose of the testator's soul. Said pertinent provision reads as follows: It is my will that the lands I had bought from other persons should be converged and placed under a special administrator. The special administrator of these lands, for his office, should receive one half of all the produce from which shall be deducted the expenses for the administration, and the other half of the produce should be received by the Roman Catholic Church and should be spent for my soul, Vicente B. Aranas (Tingting), because he is a faithful and serviceable nephew, should be the first special administrator of said properties, without bond, until his death or until he should not want to hold the said office anymore. Anyone of the sons of my brother Carmelo Aranas can hold the said office of special administrator, and none other than they. Their father, my brother Carmelo Aranas shall be the one to decide who among them shall hold the said office, but upon the death of my said brother Carmelo Aranas, his said sons will have power to select the one among them ourselves. The special administration is perpetual. ISSUE: Whether or not perpetual inalienability and administration of the estate of the late Fr. Teodoro Aranas is null and void for being violative of Article 870 of the NCC.

other benefits arising from the usufruct. Neither are the naked owners (the other heirs) of the properties, the usufruct of which has been given to Vicente Aranas prohibited from disposing of said naked ownership without prejudice of course to Vicente's continuing usufruct. To void the designation of Vicente Aranas as usufructuary and/or administrator is to defeat the desire and the dying wish of the testator to reward him for his faithful and unselfish services rendered during the time when said testator was seriously ill or bed-ridden. Locsin v. Valenzuela G.R. No. L-51333, May 18, 1989, 173 SCRA 454 Feliciano, J. FACTS: Petitioners were co-owners of a large tract of agricultural land known as Hacienda Villa Regalado. A portion of this land known as Lot No. 2-C-A-3 was subject to lifetime usufructuary rights of respondent Helen Schon. The bulk of this lot was cultivated by the lessees who customarily delivered the rentals to respondent. In 1972, PD 27 was enacted, decreasing the Emancipation of Tenants. The tract of land owned in common by the petitioners, including the portion thereof subject to petitioners usufructuary rights, fell within the scope of the Operation Land Transfer. Petitioners sought the opinion of the Department of Agrarian Reform(DAR) as to who should be entitled to receive the rental payments which continued to be made by the tenants to respondent. The DAR District Officer rendered the opinion that the rental payments were properly considered as amortization payments for the land and as such should pertain to the landowners and not the usufructuary. ISSUE: Whether or not the usufructuary was extinguished by PD 27 and who, between the naked owner and the usufructuary, should be entitled to the amounts paid by the tenants beginning October 21, 1972. HELD: Yes. The usufruct which had therefore existed as a jus in re aliena in favour of Helen Schon was effectively extinguished by PD 27. To hold, as private respondent apparently urges would obviously defeat the purpose of the land reform statute. PD 27 was enacted to emancipate the tenants from bondage of the soil by giving to the tenant-farmers ownership of the land which they were cultivating. Ownership over the lands subjected to the Operation Land Transfer moved from the registered owner to the tenants. The Court holds that Lot No. 2-C-A-3 having been declared part of the land reform area and subjected to the Operation Land Transfer, the payments made on October 21, 1972 by the tenant-farmers constituted amortization payments on the cost of the land that they were required to pay under PD 27. These payments, therefore, legally pertain to the petitioners as part of the compensation for the dominion over the land of which they were deprived of by operation of PD 27.

Valisno v. Adriano G.R. No. L-37409, May 23, 1988, 161 SCRA 398 HELD: No. Vicente Aranas as a usufructuary has the right to enjoy Grino Aquino, J. the property of his uncle with all the benefits which result from the normal enjoyment (or exploitation) of another's property, with the FACTS: Plaintiff appellant Nicolas Valisno alleges that he is the obligation to return, at the designated time, either the same thing, owner of a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija which he bought from his or in special cases its equivalent. This right of Vicente to enjoy the sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco. Said land is planted with fruits of the properties is temporary and therefore not perpetual as watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco and other vegetables and there is a limitation namely his death or his refusal. Likewise his adjoins the land of Felipe Adriano, on the bank of the Pampanga designation as administrator of these properties is limited by his River. At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was refusal and/or death and therefore it does not run counter to Art. irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canal about 870 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioners. Be it noted 70 meters long, traversing Adrianos land. Later, Adriano levelled that Vicente Aranas is not prohibited to dispose of the fruits and a portion of the irrigation canal so that Valisno was deprived of the
2

irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his 57 hectare land. Thus, Valisno filed a complaint for deprivation of waters rights in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications (Bureau PWC). Bureau PWC ruled in favour of Valisno. Instead of restoring the irrigation canal, Adriano asked for a reinvestigation of the case which was granted. In the meantime, Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense due to his urgent need to irrigate his watermelon fields. Valisno then filed a complaint for damages. However, the Secretary of Bureau PWC reversed its decision and dismissed Valisnos complaint. It held that Eladio Adrianos water rights which had been granted in1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or 1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of the water rights since then for a period of more than five years extinguished the grant by operation of law. Hence, the water rights did not form part of his hereditary estate which his heirs partitioned among themselves. Likewise, Valisno, as vendee of the land which Honorata received from her fathers estate did not acquire any water rights with the land purchased. The trial court held that Valisno had no right to pass through the defendant's land to draw water from the Pampanga River. It pointed out that under Section 4 of the Irrigation Law, controversies between persons claiming a right to water from a stream are within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Bureau-PWC and his decision on the matter is final, unless an appeal is taken to the proper court within thirty days. The court may not pass upon the validity of the decision of the Public Works Secretary collaterally. Furthermore, there was nothing in Valisnos evidence to show that the resolution was not valid. It dismissed the complaint and counterclaim. Valisnos motion for reconsideration was denied, and he appealed to the Court of the Appeals who certified the case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether the provisions of the Irrigation Act (Act No. 2152) or those of the Civil Code should apply to this case. HELD: The provisions of the Civil Code shall apply. The existence of the irrigation canal on Adrianos land for the passage of water from the Pampanga River to Honorata's land prior to and at the time of the sale of Honorata's land to Valisno was equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue using it as provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code: The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or maintained by the owner of both shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that he easement may continue actively and passively, unless at the time, theownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common on by two or more persons (Civil Code). This provision was lifted from Article 122 of the Spanish Law of Waters which provided: Whenever a tract of irrigated land which previously received its waters from a single point is divided through inheritance, sale or by virtue of some other title, between two or more owners, the owners of the higher estates are under obligation to give free passage to the water as an easement of conduit for the irrigation of the lower estates, and without right to any compensation therefore unless otherwise stipulated in the deed of conveyance. The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and transfer of the water rights and improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's property. By the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the vendor Honorata Adriano Francisco sold, ceded, conveyed and transferred to Dr. Nicolas Valisno all "rights, title, interest and participations over the parcel of land above-

described, together with one Berkely Model 6 YRF Centrifugal Pump G" suction, 6" discharge 500-1500 GPM, with Serial No. 5415812 and one (1) set of suction pipe and discharge of pipe with elbow, nipples, flanges and footvalves," and the water rights and such other improvements appertaining to the property subject of this sale. According to Valisno, the water right was the primary consideration for his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property would be unproductive. Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person. The fact that an easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does detract from its permanency as property right, which survives the determination of the necessity. As an easement of waters in favor of Valisno has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference (19 CJ 984), such as Adrianos act of levelling the irrigation c anal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.

Ronquillo, et. al. v. Roco, et. al. G.R. No. L-10619, February 28, 1958, 103 Phil. 84 Montemayor, J. FACTS: Plaintiff Leogario Ronquillo have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road which traversed the land of the defendants, Rocos, in going to Igualdad Street and the market place of Naga City for more than 20 years and that the Rocos have long recognized and respected the private legal easement of a right of way of said plaintiffs. On May 12, 1953, the defendants along with a number of men maliciously obstructed plaintiffs right of way by constructing a chapel in the middle of the said road and then later, by means of force, intimidation, and threats, illegally and violently planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire and closed hermitically the road passage way thereby preventing the plaintiff from using it. The plaintiff claims that he has already acquired the easement of right of way over the land thru prescription by his continuous and uninterrupted use of the narrow strip of land as passage way. However, plaintiffs complaint was dismissed by the CFI. ISSUE: Whether or not an easement of right of way can be acquired by prescription. HELD: No. The Court held than an easement of right of way may not be acquired thru prescription because though it may be apparent, it is nevertheless discontinuous or intermittent, and therefore, under Article 622 of the New Civil Code, can be acquired only by a virtue of a title. Furthermore, a right of way cannot be acquired by prescription because prescription requires that the possession be continuous and uninterrupted.

Taedo v. Bernad G.R. No. L-66520 August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 86 Padilla, J. FACTS: Private respondent Antonio Cardenas owned Lot 7501-A and Lot 7501-B. On the said two lots, a septic tank was constructed for the common use of the occupants of both lots.
3

Cardenas sold Lot 7501-A to herein petitioner Taedo and the other Lot 7501-B was also mortgaged to Taedo as a security for the payment of loan with an agreement that Cardenas would only sell Lot 7501-B to him. However, said Lot 7501-B was sold to herein respondent Spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim. Upon learning of the said sale, Taedo offered to redeem the property from Sim but the latter refused. Instead, Sim blocked the sewage pipe connecting the building of Eduardo Taedo built on Lot 7501A, to the septic tank in Lot 7501-B. He also asked Taedo to remove that portion of his building enroaching on Lot 7501-B. Taedo was then constrained to file an action for legal redemption and damages invoking Article 1622 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, respondent Spouses claimed they are the absolute owners of Lot 7501-B and that Eduardo Taedo has no right to redeem the land under Art. 1622 of the Civil Code as the land sought to be redeemed is much bigger than the land owned by Taedo.

appellate court went on to rule that ". . . in the interest of justice and in the exercise by this Court of its equity jurisdiction, there is no reason for Us in not treating the easement here sought by appellees Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc. and Perfecta Guangco as one that is not dependent upon the claims of the parties but a compulsory one that is legally demandable by the owner of the dominant estate from the owner of the servient estate." ISSUE: Whether or not the easement may be granted to private respondent over the land of Costabella.

HELD: No. It is already well-established that an easement of right of way, as is involved here, is discontinuous and as such can not be acquired by prescription. Insofar therefore as the appellate court adhered to the foregoing precepts, it stood correct. Unfortunately, after making the correct pronouncement, the respondent Appellate Court did not order the reversal of the trial ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners right to continue to use the court's decision and the dismissal of the complaint after holding septic tank, erected on Lot 7501-B, ceased upon the subdivision that no easement had been validly constituted over the petitioner's of the land and its subsequent sale to different owners who do not property. Instead, the Appellate Court went on to commit a have the same interest. reversible error by considering the passageway in issue as a compulsory easement which the private respondents, as owners HELD: No. Applying Article 631 and 624 of the Civil Code, no of the "dominant" estate, may demand from the petitioner the latter statement abolishing or extinguishing the easement of drainage being the owner of the "servient" estate. was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot 7501-A to Eduardo Taedo. Nor did Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe Based on Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, the owner of the and septic tank by the occupants of Lot 7501-A before he sold dominant estate may validly claim a compulsory right of way only said lot to Eduardo Tafiedo. Hence, the use of the septic tank is after he has established the existence of four requisites, to wit: (1) continued by operation of law. Accordingly, the spouses Romeo the (dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables and is and Pacita Sim the new owners of the servient estate (Lot 7501- without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after payment of B), cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the servitude. proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. In the case at bar, there is Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals absent any showing that the private respondents had established G.R. No. 80511 January 25, 1991, 193 SCRA 333 the existence of the four requisites mandated by law. Sarmiento, J. Encarnacion v. Court of Appeals FACTS: Petitioner owns the real estate properties situated at Sitio G.R. No. 77628, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 74 Buyong, Maribago, Lapu-Lapu City, on which it had constructed a Fernan, C.J. resort and hotel. The private respondents, on the other hand, are the owners of adjoining properties. Before the petitioner began the FACTS: Petitioner owns the dominant estate bounded on north by construction of its beach hotel, the private respondents, in going to the servient estate owned by respondents and an estate owned by and from their respective properties and the provincial road, Magsino, all of which are located in Talisay, Batangas. The passed through a passageway which traversed the petitioner's servient estate is bound on the north by the national highway. To property. In 1981, the petitioner closed the aforementioned provide access to the highway, a one meter road path was paved passageway when it began the construction of its hotel, but through in which half of its width was taken from the estate of nonetheless opened another route across its property through Magsino and the other half from the estate of the respondent. which the private respondents, as in the past, were allowed to Petitioner started a nursery plant type of business in which pass. Later, or sometime in August, 1982, when it undertook the pushcarts were used to haul the plants from his estate to and from construction of the second phase of its beach hotel, the petitioner his nursery and the highway, using the one meter road path. As fenced its property thus closing even the alternative passageway his business grew, he bought a jeepney to enable him to transport and preventing the private respondents from traversing any part of more plants and soil catering to the now bigger demand. The it. Therefore, an action for injunction with damages was filed problem however was that the jeepney cannot pass through the against the petitioner by the private respondents before the then road path since its width would not be accommodated by a one Court of First Instance of Cebu. meter width. Petitioner made a request upon the respondent to sell to him 1 meters of their property so that the pathway may The CFI rendered a decision on March 15, 1984 finding that the be widened to enable his jeepney to pass through. The private respondents had acquired a vested right over the respondents refused. Petitioner went to court praying that he passageway in controversy based on its long existence and its would be granted the additional land to the right of way already continued use and enjoyment by the private respondents and also constituted but the trial court rendered a decision adverse to the by the community at large. On appeal, Appellate Court held as petitioner because there was no such necessity as it was shown without basis the trial court's finding that the private respondents that there was the presence of dried river bed only 80 meters had acquired a vested right over the passageway in question by away from the property of the petitioner which he may use as an virtue of prescription. The appellate court pointed out that an alternative route. The CA affirmed said decision of the trial court. easement of right of way is a discontinuous one which, under Article 622 of the New Civil Code, may only be acquired by virtue of a title and not by prescription. That notwithstanding, the
4

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to be granted his prayer to buy the additional land to increase the existing one meter road path. HELD: Yes. Even with the presence of the dried river bed, upon thorough investigation, it was found to be an inadequate right of way because a concrete bridge traverses it thereby the jeep would have to jump over said bridge which has a height of 5 meters in order to reach the highway. It was also found that during the rainy season, the same was impassable as it became flooded. This right of way could not provide adequate access to the highway thereby when an estate has no access to a public road, it may demand for a right of way. Furthermore, under Article 651 of the Civil Code, it is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the right of way. In this case, since the business of the petitioner grew larger and pushcarts became tedious to transport his nursery plants, it became necessary for him to do so with a jeepney. And in order to efficiently make such transportation of his plants, the right of way had to be widened to accommodate the width of the jeepney of the petitioner. The petitioner thus shall be granted the additional land to the existing right of way. Case v. Heirs of Tuason G.R. No. L-5044, December 1, 1909, 14 Phil. 521 Torres, J. FACTS: The counsel for the heirs of Pablo Tuason and Leocadia Santibaez alleged that the parties whom he represents are owners in common of the property adjoining that of the petitioner Edwin Case on the southwest. The latter, extended his southwest boundary line to a portion of the lot of the said heirs of Tuason and Santibaez. They alleged that the true dividing line between the property of the petitioner and that of the said heirs is a belonging to the respondents, and that about two years ago, when Case made alterations in the buildings erected on his land, he improperly caused a portion of them to rest on the wall owned by the respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not the wall is the property of the heirs of the late Tuason and Santibaez. HELD: The wall in controversy belongs to the heirs of the late Tuason and Santibaez for the reason, among others, that in the public document by which one of their original ancestors acquired on the 19th of April, 1796, the property now possessed by them, it appears that property was then already inclosed by a stone wall. The wall supports only the property of the respondents and not that of the petitioner, can not be a party wall, one-half of which along its entire length would belong to the adjoining building owned by Mr. Case. There is not sufficient proof to sustain such claim, and besides, the building erected thereon disproves the pretension of the petitioner. Under article 572 of the Civil Code the easement of party walls is presumed, unless there is a title or exterior sign, or proof to the contrary, among others, in dividing walls adjoining buildings up to the common point of elevation. The legal presumption as to party walls is limited to the three cases dealt with in the said article of the code, and is that of juris tantum unless the contrary appear from the title of ownership of the adjoining properties, that is to say, that the entire wall in controversy belongs to one of the property owners, or where there is no exterior sign to destroy such presumption and support a presumption against the party wall.

It can not be presumed that the aforesaid portion was a party wall, and that it was not exclusively owned by the respondents, inasmuch as the latter have proven by means of a good title that has not been impugned by the petitioner, that when one of their ancestors and principals acquired the property the lot was already inclosed by the wall on which the building was erected; it must therefore be understood that in the purchase of the property the wall by which the land was inclosed was necessarily included. Choco v. Santamaria G.R. No. 6076, December 29, 1911, 21 Phil. 132 Mapa, J. FACTS: The defendant in the building of his house, has made several openings and windows in the walls of the house on both sides overlooking then property of the plaintiff; that at the time the defendant was building his house, and the windows and the openings were being made, the plaintiffs protested, and later on and in the year 1905 made written protest and demand on the defendant, and the defendant received the written protest and referred it to his counsel, who, from the evidence, appears to have suggested an amicable and adjustment of the matter, but the adjustment was not made, and this action was brought. The Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Severina and Flora Choco, and against the defendant, Isidro Santamaria, forever prohibiting the opening of the window stated, which must be closed, and forever prohibiting the opening of the windows and openings marked, which must be closed or made to conform to the requirements of law with regard to dimensions and an iron grate embedded in the wall, with the costs of the action. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred by not ordering in his judgment the final and perpetual closing of the large window opened in the balcony of the back part of the appellee's house and that, though the appellant's lot can be seen through the window, it is not contiguous to the latter's property. HELD: To judge from the photographic views, it opens on the boundary line between the said lot and that the appellee and is situated perpendicularly above a part of the wall that belongs to the appellants. This opinion is corroborated by the testimony of the defendant's witness who took the said photographs, in so far as he said that "a part of the window in question is in front of the plaintiffs' property, since between it and the plaintiffs' property there does not intervene the distance required by law that of two meters in the first case, and 60 centimeters in the second, therefore, its opening is a manifest violation of the provisions of article 582 of the Civil Code which reads as follows: Windows with direct views, or balconies or any similar openings projecting over the estate of the neighbor, cannot be made if there is not a distance of, at least, 2 meters between the wall in which they are built and said estate. Neither can side nor oblique views be opened over said property, unless there is a distance of 60 centimeters. Because of the lack of the distance required by law, the window in question must be closed, and consequently the judgment appealed from should be modified in this sense, as regards this window. Solid Manila Corporation v. Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc. G.R. No. 90596, April 8, 1991, 195 SCRA 748 Sarmiento, J. FACTS: Petitioner Solid Manila Corporation is the owner of the land in Ermita, Manila. The same lies in the vicinity of another parcel, registered in the name of the private respondent Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc. The private respondents title came from a prior owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto reserved as
5

easement of way. As a consequence, there is an annotation which was entered wherein a construction of private alley has been undertaken. However, the petitioner averred that they and their neighbors have been using the private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep until sometime in 1983. Due to this, the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered used. The petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private respondent to have the gates removed and to allow full access to the easement. The court a quo issued ex parte an order directing the private respondent to open the gates. However, the Court of Appeals ordered the restoration of the annotation. They ruled that an easement is a mere limitation on ownership and that it does not impair the private respondents title, and that since the private respondent had acquired title to the property, merger brought about an extinguishment of the easement. The petitioner then averred that the very deed of sale executed between the private respondent and the previous owner of the property excluded the alley in question, and that in any event, the intent of the parties was to retain the alley as an easement, notwithstanding the sale. ISSUE: Whether or not an easement had been extinguished by merger. HELD: No. The Court held that no genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the same person. Merger then, as can be seen, requires full ownership of both estates. One thing ought to be noted here, however. The servitude in question is a personal servitude, that is to say, one constituted not in favor of a particular tenement but rather, for the benefit of the general public as stated in Article 614 of the Civil Code. In personal servitude, there is therefore no owner of a dominant tenement to speak of, and the easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at large. Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant owner relationship, and the termination of that relation leaves the easement of no use. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor of the public, if that is possible, no genuine merger can take place that would terminate a personal easement. Floro v. Llenado G.R. No. 75723, June 2, 1995, 244 SCRA 713 Romeo, J. FACTS: Petitioner Simeon Floro is the owner of Floro Park Subdivision who has its own egress and ingress to and from the Mac Arthur Highway by means of its Road Lot 4 and the PNR level crossing. On the other hand, Respondent Orlando Llenado, is the registered owner of Llenado Homes Subdivision, adjacent to Floro Park Subdivision. Prior to its purchase by Llenado, the land was known as the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision, a duly licensed and registered housing subdivision in the name of Soledad Ortega. Bounded on the South by the 5 to 6 meter-wide Palanas Creek, which separates it from the Floro Park Subdivision, and on the west by ricelands belonging to Marcial Ipapo. the Llenado Homes does not have any existing road or passage to the Mac Arthur Highway. However, a proposed access road traversing the idle riceland of Marcial Ipapo has been specifically provided in the subdivision plan of the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision which was duly approved by the defunct Human Settlement Regulatory Commission. Meanwhile, the Llenados sought, and were granted permission by the Floros to use Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision as passageway to and from MacArthur Highway. However no contract of easement of right of way was ever

perfected by both parties. Later, Floro barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks, wooden posts and adobe stones, thereby preventing its use by the Llenados. Llenado instituted a complaint before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan against Floro for easement of right of way. The RTC granted the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and ordered Floro to open the road and pay damages. Thereafter, the trial court rendered another judgment dismissing the case and lifting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction previously issued and ordered the plaintiff to pay defendant damages and costs. On appeal by Llenado on the CA, the judgment of the RTC was reversed ordering Floro to open roads 4 and 5 and remove all the objects that prevent passage on road 5 and to pay the plaintiff damages with costs and payment of indemnity for the easement of right of way. ISSUE: Whether or not Llenado is entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way. HELD: No. For the Llenados to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil Code, the preconditions provided under Articles 649 and 650 thereof must be established. These preconditions are: (1) that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1); (2) after payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1); (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and, (4) that the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest (Art. 650). The burden of proving the existence of the prerequisites to validly claim a compulsory right of way lies on the owner of the dominant estate. On the past subdivision plans by Emmanuel Homes which is bought by Llenado, there is an indication of an access road through IPAPOs property although it was not properly paved, a dirt road will suffice. Seeing this, Llenado has failed to comply with the first requirement. If the servitude requested by Llenado is allowed, other subdivision developers/owners would be encouraged to hastily prepare a subdivision plan with fictitious provisions for access roads merely for registration purposes. Furthermore, if such practice were tolerated, the very purpose for which Presidential Decree No. 957 was enacted, that is, to protect subdivision buyers from unscrupulous subdivision owners/developers who renege on their duties to develop their subdivisions in accordance with the duly approved subdivision plans, would be defeated. In order to justify the imposition of the servitude of right of way, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of a necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the servitude, the same should not be imposed. The complaint for easement of right of way filed by Llenado in the lower court did not contain a prayer for the fixing of the amount that he must pay Floro in the event that the easement of right of way is constituted. Thus, the existence of the second requisite has likewise not been established. Private respondent Llenado admitted that the Ipapo riceland was no longer being cultivated. Indications are that it has already been abandoned as a ricefield. There was no reason for private respondent's failure to develop the right of way except the inconvenience and expenses it would cost him. Hence, the third requisite has not been met. Failing to establish the existence of the prerequisites under Articles 649 and
6

650 of the Civil Code, private respondent Llenado's bid for a compulsory easement of right of way over Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision must fail. Quimen v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 112331 May 29, 1996, 257 SCRA 163 Bellosillo, J. FACTS: Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves, as they did, with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina abutting the municipal road. Located directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their brother Antonio designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter divided into two (2) equal parts, now Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B. The latter Lot is behind the property of Sotero, father of private respondent Yolanda Oliveros. Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia who was then acting as his administratrix. According to Yolanda, when petitioner offered her the property for sale she was hesitant to buy as it had no access to a public road. But Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the assurance that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property. Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacia's property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her property. Later, Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6-B, located directly behind the property of her parents who provided her a pathway between their house from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari sari store of Sotero, and Anastacia's perimeter fence. The store is made of strong materials and occupies the entire frontage of the lot measuring four (4) meters wide and nine meters (9) long. Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with facility because the store itself obstructs the path so that one has to pass through the back entrance and the facade of the store to reach the road. Finally, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way through Anastacia's property. The report was that the proposed right of way was at the extreme right of Anastacia's property facing the public highway, starting from the back of Sotero's sari-sari store and extending inward by one (1) meter to her property and turning left for about five (5) meters to avoid the store. However, the trial court dismissed her complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision declaring that she was entitled to a right of way on petitioners property and that the way proposed by Yoland would cause the least damage and detriment to the servient estate. ISSUE: Whether or not passing through the property of Yolanda's parents is more accessible to the public road than to make a detour to her property and cut down the avocado tree standing thereon. HELD: Yes. The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.

judicial appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and the easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other words, where the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be preferred. De Jesus, et. al. v. Homart Corporation, et. al. G.R. No. 44191 R, August 28, 1974, 19 CA Rep. 831

FACTS: Jesus and Luz Miranda de Jesus are owners of the building located in Tondo, Manila. They brought an action for damages against Homart Corporation and Howmill Manufacturing Corporation, owners of the land adjoining the plaintiff on the same street where a sixty storey concrete building was constructed. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants failed to observe the necessary care and precautions to protect the construction of the plaintiffs by depriving it of sufficient lateral or subjacent support, thereby causing it to sink in some parts; its walls, ceilings, and floorings to crack in some places; and by the careless manner of handling the cement used the roofings of the building of the plaintiff were damaged with the accumulated debris piled thereon. ISSUE: Whether or not proper precautions had been taken by the defendants in constructing the building in question so as to prevent causing damage to the building of the plaintiff. HELD: No. Article 684 of the New Civil Code provides No property shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or building sufficient lateral or subjacent support. A reading of Article 684 shows that the duty of an adjacent owner not to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support is an absolute one. It does not depend on the degree of care and precaution made by the proprietor in making the excavation or building on his land. Plaintiffs house which adjoins the seven storey concrete building constructed by the defendants had sunk by about eight inches. The sinking of the left side of the house of the plaintiffs was due to the weakening of subjacent support and to the weight of the seven storey concrete building constructed by the defendant, as the excavation made necessarily disturbed the subjacent soil of the plaintiffs land. Defendants having failed to provide the plaintiffs land and house with sufficient lateral and subjacent support are liable for damages. La Vista Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 95252, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 498 Bellosillo, J.

FACTS: The Tuasons owned a vast tract of land in Quezon City and Marikina, and when they sold to Philippine Building Corporation a portion of their landholdings, it was expressly provided in the Deed of Sale with Mortgage that the boundary line The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail between the property sold and the adjoining property of the over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of Tuasons shall be a road fifteen (15) meters wide, one-half of
7

which shall be taken from the property sold to the Philippine Building Corporation and the other half from the portion adjoining belonging to the Tuasons. Philippine Building Corporation then sold and assigned with the consent of the Tuasons, the subject parcel of land to ATENEO which assumed the mortgage and the obligation in the seven and one-half roadway.

Alcantara v. Reta, Jr. G.R. No. 136996, December 14, 2001, 372 SCRA 364 Pardo, J.

FACTS: Alcantara and the other petitioners claim that they were tenants or lessees of the land owned by Reta. The land has been converted into a commercial center and Reta is threatening to On their part, the Tuasons developed a part of the estate adjoining eject them. They claim that since they are legitimate tenants or the portion sold to Philippine Building Corporation into a residential lessees of such land, they have the right of first refusal to village known as LA VISTA Subdivision. Thus the boundary purchase the land in accordance with Section 3(g) of Presidential between LA VISTA and the portion sold to ATENEO was the 15- Decree No. 1517, the Urban Land Reform Act. They also claimed meter wide roadway known as the Mangyan Road. The Tuasons that the amicable settlement executed between Reta and Ricardo developed its 7.5-meter share of the 15-meter wide boundary, Roble, one of the petitioners, was void ab initio for being violative while ATENEO deferred improvement on its share and erected of PD No. 1517. On the other hand, Reta claimed that the land is instead an adobe wall on the entire length of the boundary. question is not within the scope of PD No. 1517 since it was not proclaimed as an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). Alcantara, ATENEO subsequently sold to Solid Homes Inc. the land which among others, then filed complaint for the exercise of the right of the latter developed into a subdivision now known as LOYOLA first refusal under PD No. 1517 in the Regional Trial Court. Grand Villas. Solid Homes Inc. now claims to have an easement However, such complaint was dismissed and such dismissal was of right-of-way along Mangyan Road through which they could affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition was filed. have access to Katipunan Avenue. ISSUE: Whether the Alcantara and the other petitioners have the LA VISTA however instructed its security guards to prohibit agents right of first refusal. and assignees of Solid Homes, Inc., from traversing Mangyan Road, and even constructed concrete posts that prevented the HELD: No. The land involved has not been proclaimed an Urban residents of LOYOLA from passing through. Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). In fact, petitioners filed a petition with the National Housing Authority requesting that said land be Solid Homes, Inc., filed a case before the Regional Trial Court and declared as an ULRZ. Clearly, the request to have the land prayed that LA VISTA been joined from preventing and obstructing proclaimed as an ULRZ would not be necessary if the property the use and passage of LOYOLA residents through Mangyan was an ULRZ. PD No. 1517 pertains to areas proclaimed as Road. The lower court recognized the easement of right-of-way ULRZ. Consequently, petitioners cannot claim any right under the along Mangyan Road in favor of Solid Homes, Inc., and ordered said law since the land involved is not an ULRZ. LA VISTA to pay damages. On appeal by LA VISTA, the decision of the lower court was affirmed. To be able to qualify and avail of the rights and privileges granted by the said decree, one must be: (1) a legitimate tenant of the land ISSUE: Whether or not there is an easement of right-of-way over for ten (10) years or more; (2) must have built his home on the Mangyan Road. land by contract; and, (3) has resided continuously for the last ten (10) years. Those who do not fall within the said category cannot HELD: Yes. The predecessors-in-interest of both LA VISTA and be considered "legitimate tenants" and, therefore, not entitled to Solid Homes, Inc., i.e., the Tuasons and the Philippine Building the right of first refusal to purchase the property should the owner Corporation, respectively, clearly established a contractual of the land decide to sell the same at a reasonable price within a easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road. A voluntary reasonable time. easement is quite evidently manifested in the stipulation in the Deed of Sale with mortgage executed by them. When the Reta denies that he has lease agreements with Alcantara and easement was established by their contract, the parties Roble. Alcantara, on the other hand, failed to present evidence of unequivocally made provisions for its observance by all whom in a lease agreement other than his testimony in court. Reta allowed the future might succeed them in dominion. It is thus very Roble to use sixty-two (62) coconut trees for P186 from where he apparent that the parties and their respective predecessors-in- gathered tuba. This arrangement would show that it is a usufruct interest intended to establish an easement of right-of-way over and not a lease. Roble was also allowed to construct his house Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both as dominant and on the land because it would facilitate his gathering of tuba. This servient estates. would be in the nature of a personal easement under Article 614 of the Civil Code. Whether the amicable settlement is valid or not, With this, the free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road the conclusion would still be the same since the agreement was created by the voluntary agreement between Ateneo and Solid one of usufruct and not of lease. Thus, Roble is not a legitimate Homes, Inc., is thus legally demandable (Articles 619 and 625, tenant as defined by PD No. 1517. New Civil Code) with the corresponding duty on the servient estate not to obstruct the same. With regard to the other petitioners, Reta admitted that he had verbal agreements with them. This notwithstanding, they are still LA VISTA contends that there are other routes to LOYOLA from not the legitimate tenants who can exercise the right of first refusal Mangyan Road, however, this should not be taken into under PD No. 1517. From the moment Reta demanded that the consideration since the opening of an adequate outlet to a petitioners vacate the premises, the verbal lease agreements, highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not which were on a monthly basis since rentals were paid voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an monthly, ceased to exist as there was termination of the lease. easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property In conclusion, none of the petitioners is qualified to exercise the right, which survives the termination of the necessity. right of first refusal under PD No. 1517.

There was also no intention on the part of Reta to sell the property. Hence, even if the petitioners had the right of first refusal, the situation which would allow the exercise of that right, that is, the sale or intended sale of the land has not happened. PD No. 1517 applies where the owner of the property intends to sell it to a third party.

even before he bought the land, the Gabriels had constructed the aforementioned small house that encroached upon the two-meter easement. Petitioner was also unaware that private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991 for easement. As successors-in-interest, Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to enforce the contract of easement. On August 13, 1991, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued, ordering the Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals Gabriels to provide the right of way and to demolish the small G.R. No. 114170, January 15, 1999, 301 SCRA 52 house encroaching on the easement. On January 5, 1995, Judge Mendoza, J. Tirso Velasco issued an Alias Writ of Demolition. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Third Party Claim with Prayer to Quash Alias Writ FACTS: Private respondent Metropolitan Fabrics, Inc. (MFI) and of Demolition. He maintains that the writ of demolition could not petitioner Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. (PCRI) executed a apply to his property since he was not a party to the civil case. Memorandum of Undertaking (MOU) wherein PCRI acceded to MFIs request to redeem three of the seven lots foreclosed and ISSUE: Whether or not the easement on the property binds won by the former in the ensuing public auction. The MOA was petitioner. conditioned upon the agreement that the petitioner shall be given a right of way on the existing private road which forms part of the HELD: Yes. Unlike other types of encumbrance of real property, a area to be redeemed by private respondents. Later, PCRI filed an servitude like a right of way can exist even if they are not injunctive suit against MFI alleging, inter alia, that the latter, in expressly stated or annotated as an encumbrance in a Torrens violation of the terms of the MOU, refused to allow PCRI to make title because servitudes are inseparable from the estates to which excavations on one side of the access road for the installation of they actively or passively belong. Moreover, Villanueva was bound water. The trial court granted the petition for the issuance of the by the contract of easement, not only as a voluntary easement but writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. On appeal, the CA set as a legal easement. A legal easement is mandated by law, and aside the assailed order of the trial court; hence, this petition for continues to exist unless its removal is provided for in a title of review on certiorari. PCRI contends that it is entitled to the conveyance or the sign of the easement is removed before the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction as may be execution of the conveyance conformably with Article 649 in gleaned from the following provision in the MOU: The above cited accordance with Article 617 of the Civil Code. lot, being an existing private road, will remain open to ingress and egress for whatever kind of passage in favor of PROSPERITY National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 114348, September 20, 2000, 340 SCRA 661 FINANCIAL RESOURCES, INC. or its successors=in-interest. Pardo, J. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction FACTS: A free patent over 3 hectares of land in Cagayan was ordering private respondent to allow petitioner to undertake issued and registered in the name of private respondent Dick excavations along the access road for the purpose of installing Manglapus predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manglapus. The land water pipes. was granted to the latter subject to the provisions of sections 113, 121, 122 and 124 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which provide Held: Yes. There is no question as to the meaning of the terms that except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, ingress and egress. They give petitioner the right to use the units, or institutions, the land hereby acquired shall be inalienable private road as means of entry into and exit from its property on and shall not be subject to encumbrance for a period of 5 years the northwestern side o f the compound. The question concerns from the date of this patent and shall not be liable for the the meaning of the phrase for whatever kind of passage. The satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of that trial court read this phrase to mean that petitioner had the right to period. Subsequently, private respondent Manglapus acquired the make excavations on the side of the access road in order to install lot from Vicente Manglapus by absolute sale and was later a network of pipes. The word passage does not, however; registered 11 years later from the issuance of patent. Meanwhile, clearly and unmistakably convey a meaning that includes a right petitioner National Irrigation Administration entered into a contract to install water pipes on the access road. The ordinary meaning of with Villamar Development Construction. Under the contract, the word, as defined in Websters Dictionary, is that act or action petitioner NIA was to construct canals in Cagayan. NIA then of passing: movement or transference from one place or point to entered a portion of petitioners land and made diggings and another. this legal meaning is not different. It means, according to fillings thereon. Private respondent then filed a complaint for Blacks Law Dictionary, the act of passing; transit; transition. damages alleging that petitioners diggings and fillings destroyed the agricultural use of his land and that no reasonable compensation was paid for its taking. Villanueva v. Velasco G.R. No. 130845, November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 99 ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner NIA should pay Manglapus Quisumbing, J. just compensation for the taking of a portion of his property for use as easement of a right of way. FACTS: Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 127862 HELD: No. We find that NIA is under no obligation. We sustain the of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. He bought it from Pacific appeal. We agree with NIA that the Transfer Certificate of Title Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of said property. When and the Original Certificate of Title covering the subject parcel of petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a small house on its land contained a reservation granting the government a right of southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter wide way over the land covered therein. easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, in a Under the Original Certificate of Title, there was a reservation and Contract of Easement of Right of Way. Unknown to petitioner, condition that the land is subject to to all conditions and public
9

easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed by law, especially thouse mentioned in Sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. This reservation, unlike the other provisos imposed on the grant, was not limited by any time period and thus is a subsisting condition. Section 112, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provides that lands granted by patent, shall further be subject to a right of way not exceeding twenty meters in width for public highways, railrods, irrigation, ditches, aqueducts, telegraphs and telephone lines, and similar works as the Government or any public or quasi-public service or enterprises, including mining or forest concessionaires may reasonably require for carrying on their business, with damages for the improvements only. Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements. In the present case, we find and declare that a legal easement of a right-of-way exists in favor of the government. The land was originally public land, and awarded to respondent Manglapus by free patent. The ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally private property, in which case, just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an easement of a right of way. Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 125018, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 145 Bellosillo, J. FACTS: Petitioner Remman Enterprises, Inc. and private respondent Crispin Lat are adjoining landowners in Lipa City. The land of Lat is agricultural and planted mostly with fruit trees while Remmans land is devoted to its piggery business. The latters land is 1 meters higher in elevation than that of respondent Lat. Meanwhile, respondent noticed that petitioners waste disposal lagoon was already overflowing and inundating of Lats plantation. He made several representations with petitioner but they fell on deaf ears. Consequently, the trees growing on the flooded portion where it was inundated with water containing pig manure, started to wither and die. Private respondent then filed a complaint for damages alleging that the acidity of the soil in his plantation increased because of the overflow of the water heavy with pig manure from petitioners piggery farm. Petitioner denied the allegations and claimed that the construction of additional lagoons was already adopted to contain the waste water coming from its piggery to prevent any damage to the adjoining estate. Petitioner also argued that the damages, if any, were due to a fortuitous event. ISSUE: Whether or not the damages were due to a fortuitous event. HELD: No. We cannot agree with petitioner. We defer instead to the findings opions expressed by the lower courts: Even assuming that the heavy rains constituted an act of God; by reason of their negligence, the fortuitous event became humanized, rendering appellants liable for the ensuing damges. In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 649 (1993), the Supreme Court held: Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape liability for the loss or damages sustained by private respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. This event then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human factor negligence or imprudence had intervened. The effect tehn of the force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the participation of man.

Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. As regards the alleged natural easement imposed upon the property of appelle, resort to pertinent provisions of applicable law is imperative. Under Article 637 of the Civil Code, it is provided that lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which they carry with them. The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase the burden. A similar provion is found under Article 50 of the Water Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1067), which provides that lower estates are obliged to receive the water which naturally and without the intervention of man flow from the higher estates, as well as the stone or eath which they carry with them. The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this natural flow, unless he provides an alternative method of drainage; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase this natural flow. As worded, the two aforecited provisions impose a natural easement upon the lower estate to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man descend from higher estates. However, where the waters which flow from a higher estate are those which are artificially collected in man-made lagoons, any damage occasioned thereby entitles the owner of the lower or servient estate to compensation.

Jesus

is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. Municipality (now City) of Pasig, Metro Manila G.R. No. 152230, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 235 Callejo, Sr., J.

v.

FACTS: Respondent Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E.R. Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig Public Market to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig where 60 to 70 houses, mostly made of light materials, were located. The road has to be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code, so that fire trucks could pass through in case of conflagration. Likewise, the residents in the area needed the road for water and electrical outlets. The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791 square meter property of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho, which is abutting E.R. Santos Street. Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefore. The ordinance stated that the property owners were notified of the municipalitys intent to purchase the property for public use as an access road but they rejected the offer. The municipality then filed a complaint against the Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under Section 19 of the Republic Act No. 7160 or otherwise known as the Local Government Code. The Cuancos then contended that they had sold the said property to petitioner Jesus is the Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. (JILCSFI) as evidenced by a deed of sale. When apprised about the complaint, petitioner JILCSFI filed a motion for leave to intervene as defendant-in-intervention which was granted. The petitioner JILCSFI asserted that the respondent must comply with the requirements for the establishment of an easement of
10

at the time of Cosme Pidos death, title to the property continued to be registered in the name of the Vasquez spouses. Upon obtaining the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of Rights in his favor, de los Reyes filed the same with the Registry of Deeds as part of a notice of an adverse claim against the original certificate of title. Thereafter, delos Reyes sought for Acap to personally inform him that he had become the new owner of the land and that the lease rentals thereon should be paid to him. Delos Reyes alleged that he and Acap entered into an oral lease agreement ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner JILCSFIs contentions are wherein Acap agreed to pay 10 cavans of palay per annum as tenable. lease rental. In 1982, Acap allegedly complied with said obligation. In 1983, however, Acap refused to pay any further lease rentals HELD: No. The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of on the land, prompting delos Reyes to seek the assistance of the constructing a road. The respondent is not mandated to comply then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) in Hinigaran, Negros with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under Occidental. The MAR invited Acap, who sent his wife, to a the New Civil Code. Case law has it that in the absence of conference scheduled on 13 October 1983. The wife stated that legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain the she and her husband did not recognize delos Reyess claim of may determine the location and route of the land to be taken ownership over the land. On 28 April 1988, after the lapse of four unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious. (4) years, delos Reyes filed a complaint for recovery of possession Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and and damages against Acap, alleging that as his leasehold tenant, there is genuine necessity of public character. Governmentmay Acap refused and failed to pay the agreed annual rental of 10 not capriciously choose what private property should be taken. cavans of palay despite repeated demands. On 20 August 1991. right-of-way, more specifically, the road must be constructed at the point lease prejudicial to the servient state, and that there must be no adequate outlet to a public highway. The petitioner also claimed that the portion of the lot sought to be expropriated is located at the middle protion of the petitioner s entire parcel of land, thereby splitting the lot into two halves, and making it impossible for the petitioner to put up its school building and worship center. The respondent has demonstrated the necessity for constructing a road from E.R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas Bukid. The witnesses, who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although there were other ways through which one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except through the newly constructed Damayan Street. This is more than sufficient to establish that there is a genuine necessity for the construction of a road in the area. After all, absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice. Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioners property and not elsewhere. We note that the wheras clause of the ordinance states that the 51-square meter lot is the shortest and most suitable access road to connect Sto. Tomas Bukid to E.R. Santos Street. The respondents complaint also alleged that the said portion of the petitioners lot has been surveyed as the best possible ingress and egress. However, the respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence. Acap v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 118114, December 7, 1995, 251 SCRA 30 Padilla, J. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject declaration of heirship and waiver of rights is a recognized mode of acquiring ownership by private respondent over the lot in question. HELD: An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising from a juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to give rise to ownership over the res. That right or title must be completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process. While title is the juridical justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in question. Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership are generally classified into two (2) classes, namely, the original mode (i.e., through occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or intellectual creation) and the derivative mode (i.e., through succession mortis causa or tradition as a result of certain contracts, such as sale, barter, donation, assignment or mutuum).

In the case at bench, the trial court was obviously confused as to the nature and effect of the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of FACTS: The title to Lot 1130 of the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran, Rights, equating the same with a contract (deed) of sale. They are Negros Occidental was evidenced by OCT R-12179. The lot has not the same. In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties an area of 13,720 sq. m. The title was issued and is registered in obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a the name of spouses Santiago Vasquez and Lorenza Oruma. determinate thing, and the other party to pay a price certain in After both spouses died, their only son Felixberto inherited the lot. money or its equivalent. Upon the other hand, a declaration of In 1975, Felixberto executed a duly notarized document entitled heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public instrument when Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs Cosme Pido. Since 1960, Teodoro Acap had been the tenant of a adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among portion of the said land, covering an area of 9,500 sq. m. When themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement ownership was transferred in 1975 by Felixberto to Cosme Pido, between the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Acap continued to be the registered tenant thereof and religiously paid his leasehold rentals to Pido and thereafter, upon Pidos Hence, there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary death, to his widow Laurenciana. The controversy began when rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. The first presumes the Pido died interstate and on 27 November 1981, his surviving heirs existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. The executed a notarized document denominated as Declaration of second is, technically speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership Heirship and Waiver of Rights of Lot 1130 Hinigaran Cadastre, where there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a wherein they declared to have adjudicated upon themselves the known right with knowledge of its existence and intention to parcel of land in equal share, and that they waive, quitclaim all relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the right, interests and participation over the parcel of land in favor of succession. Private respondent, being then a stranger to the Edy de los Reyes. The document was signed by all of Pidos heirs. succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership Edy de los Reyes did not sign said document. It will be noted that over the subject lot on the sole basis of the waiver document
11

which neither recites the elements of either a sale, or a donation, providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in or any other derivative mode of acquiring ownership. order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper. Judicial action will be necessary as without it, the extrajudicial resolution will remain contestable and subject to judicial invalidation, unless attack thereon should become barred by De Luna v. Abrigo acquiescence, estoppel or prescription. G.R. No. L-57455, January 18, 1990, 181 SCRA 150 Medialdea, J. In the instant case, trial court was therefore not correct in holding that the complaint is barred by prescription under Article 764 FACTS: Prudencio de Luna donated a portion of a lot of the because Article 764 does not apply to onerous donations. As Cadastral Survey of Lucena to the Luzonian University provided in the donation executed on April 9, 1971, compliance Foundation. The donation was embodied in a Deed of Donation with the terms and conditions of the contract of donation, shall be Intervivos and made subject to certain terms and conditions and made within five (5) years from its execution. The complaint which provided for the automatic reversion to the donor of the donated was filed on September 23, 1980 was then well within the ten (10) property in case of violation or non-compliance. The foundation year prescriptive period to enforce a written contract pursuant to failed to comply with the conditions of the donation. De Luna Article 1144 par. 1, counted from April 9, 1976. "revived" the said donation in favor of the foundation, in a document entitled "Revival of Donation Intervivos" subject to terms and conditions which among others, required it to construct a chapel, a nursery and a kindergarten school in the donated Reyes v. Mosqueda property within five (5) years from execution. The automatic G.R. No. L-45262, July 23, 1990 reversion to the donor of the donated area in case of violation of Gutierrez, Jr., J. the conditions was also provided. The foundation, through its president, accepted the donation. A "Deed of Segregation" was FACTS: On May 15, 1969, Dr. Emilio Pascual executed a Deed of later executed by De Luna and the foundation whereby the area Donation of real property located at 1109-1111 R. Papa St. Tondo, donated was adjudicated to the foundation. The heirs of de Luna Manila in favor of Ofelia Parungao, a minor, with her mother, later filed a complaint with the trial court alleging that the terms Rosario Duncil, accepting the gift and donation for and in her and conditions of the donation were not complied with by the behalf. However, Ursula Pascual alleged that Dr. Pascual during foundation. Thus, it prayed for the cancellation of the donation and his lifetime on November 2, 1966 executed a Donation mortis the reversion of the donated land to the heirs. The foundation causa in her favor covering the said property. Parungao, upon invoked, among others, the defense of prescription of action. The reaching the age of majority was able to register the Deed of court dismissed the complaint. It ruled that under Article 764 of the Donation with the Register of Deeds in Manila and was issued a New Civil Code, actions to revoke a donation on the ground of TCT. non-compliance with any of the conditions of the donation shall prescribe in four years (4) counted from such non-compliance. In On September 23, 1976, Ursula executed a deed of absolute sale the instant case, the four-year period for filing the complaint for over the Tondo property in favor of Benjamin, Oscar, Jose, and revocation commenced on April 9, 1976 and expired on April 9, Emmanuel Reyes. Benjamin filed a complaint for the declaration 1980. Since the complaint was brought on September 23, 1980 or of nullity of the TCT of Parungao and/or reconveyance of the deed more than five (5) months beyond the prescriptive period, it was of title. The CFI of Manila declared the TCT in the name of already barred by prescription. Parungao null and void and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the title. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint is one for judicial decree of 1966 donation to Ursula was inter vivos, which meant that the revocation of the donation in question as contemplated in Article property was already transferred to Ursula at that time. 764 of the New Civil Code and which prescribes in four (4) years and not an action to enforce a written contract which prescribes in ISSUE: Whether or not the donation to Ursula was Inter Vivos or ten (10) years. Mortis Causa. HELD: The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause. It was made subject to the burden requiring the donee to construct a chapel, a nursery and a kindergarten school in the donated property within five years from execution of the deed of donation. It is true that under Article 764, actions for the revocation of a donation must be brought within for (4) years from the noncompliance of the conditions of the donation. However, the said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts. Therefore, the rules on contracts and the general rules on prescription and not the rules on donations are applicable in the case at bar. Furthermore, while the judicial action for the rescission of a contract is generally not necessary where the contract provides that it may be automatically revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions, however, where one of the parties contests or denies the rescission, judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement HELD: It was a Donation Inter Vivos. The title given by the donor in the deed of donation is not a determinative factor which makes the donation inter vivos or mortis causa. It is the body of the document of donation and the statements contained therein and not the title that should be considered in ascertaining the intent of the donor. In the case, the donor used the term donation Mortis Causa but from the stipulations of the deed, it can be clearly inferred that he was actually executing a donation Inter Vivos to Ursula. The transfer of ownership over the properties donated to Ursula was immediate and independent of the death of Dr. Pascual since it was a donation Inter Vivos. The provision as regards the reservation of properties for the donor's subsistence in relation to the other provisions of the deed of donation confirms the intention of the donor to give the naked ownership of the properties to Ursula immediately after the execution of the deed of donation. Hence, he could not have donated the property again in 1969 in favor of Parungao since the lot was already transferred to Ursula at that time.
12

Liguez v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-11240, December 18, 1957, 102 Phil. 577 Reyes, J.B.L., J. FACTS: The case began upon complaint filed by petitionerappellant against the widow and heirs of the late Salvador P. Lopez to recover a parcel of land in barrio Davao. Plaintiff averred to be its legal owner, pursuant to a deed of donation of said land, executed in her favor by the late owner, Salvador P. Lopez, on 18 May 1943. The defense interposed was that the donation was null and void for having an illicit causa or consideration, which was the plaintiff's entering into marital relations with Salvador P. Lopez, a married man; and that the property had been adjudicated to the appellees as heirs of Lopez by the court of First Instance, since 1949.

Pershing Tan Queto v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-35648, March 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 54 Paras, J. FACTS: Herein private respondent Restituta Tacalinar Guangco de Pombuena received the questioned lot from her mother Basilides Tacalinar either as a purported donation or by way of purchase with P50 as the alleged consideration thereof. The donation or sale was consummated while Restituta was already married to her husband Juan Pombuena. Juan then filed for himself and his supposed co-owner Resitituta an application for a Torrens Title over the land which was later on granted pronouncing him (married to Resitiuta) as the owner of the land.

A contract of lease over the lot was entered into between petitioner, Pershing Tan Queto and Restituta with the consent of her husband for a period of 10 years. The lease of contract having It was ascertained by the Court of Appeals that the donated land expired, Restituta filed for unlawful detainer against Tan Queto. originally belonged to the conjugal partnership of Salvador P. The unlawful detainer case was won by the spouses in the Lopez and his wife, Maria Ngo; that the latter had met and berated Municipal Court but on appeal in the CFI the entire case was Conchita for living maritally with her husband, sometime during dismissed because of a barter agreement whereby Tan Queto June of 1943; that the widow and children of Lopez were in became the owner of the disputed lot and the spouses became possession of the land and made improvements thereon; that the the owners of a parcel of land with the house thereon previously land was assessed in the tax rolls first in the name of Lopez and owned before the barter by Tan Queto. After the barter later in that of his widow.; and that the deed of donation was never agreement, Tan Queto constructed on the disputed land a recorded. concrete building without any objection from Restituta. Afterwards Restituta sued both Juan and Tan Queto for reconveyance of the Upon these facts, the Court of Appeals held that the deed of title over the registered but disputed lot, for annulment of the donation was inoperative, and null and void (1) because the barter, and for recovery of the land with damages. husband, Lopez, had no right to donate conjugal property to the plaintiff appellant; and (2) because the donation was tainted with The respondent courts decision which later on was affirmed by illegal cause or consideration, of which donor and donee were the Supreme court led to the reformation of the Contract of Sale of participants. the disputed lot from Basilides to Restituta from a sale to a conveyance of the share of Restituta in the future hereditary ISSUE: Whether or not the donation is valid. estate of her parents. Hence, this petition for a motion for reconsideration. HELD: In the present case, it is scarcely disputable that Lopez would not have conveyed the property in question had he known ISSUE: Whether or not the conveyance of the share of Restituta in that appellant would refuse to cohabit with him. The cohabitation the future hereditary estate of her parents was valid hence a was an implied condition to the donation, and being unlawful, paraphernal property. necessarily tainted the donation itself. HELD: No. The court ruled that the land is conjugal, not The rule that parties to an illegal contract, if equally guilty, will not paraphernal. The oral donation of the lot cannot be a valid be aided by the law but will both be left where it finds them, has donation intervivos because it was not executed in a public been interpreted by this Court as barring the party from pleading instrument (Art. 749, Civil Code), nor as a valid donation mortis the illegality of the bargain either as a cause of action or as a causa for the formalities of a will were not complied with. The defense. Memo auditor propriam turpitudinem allegans. allegation that the transfer was a conveyance to RESTITUTA of her hereditary share in the estate of her mother (or parents) The appellant seeks recovery of the disputed land on the strength cannot be sustained for the contractual transmission of future of a donation regular on its face. To defeat its effect, the appellees inheritance is generally prohibited. must plead and prove that the same is illegal. But such plea on the part of the Lopez heirs is not receivable, since Lopez, himself, if The fact is ownership was acquired by both JUAN and living, would be barred from setting up that plea; and his heirs, as RESTITUTA by tradition (delivery) as a consequence of the his privies and successors in interest, can have no better rights contract of sale (See Art. 712, Civil Code) with P50.00 (then a than Lopez himself. considerable amount) as the cause or consideration of the transaction. The lot is therefore conjugal, having been acquired by Appellees, as successors of the late donor, being thus precluded the spouses thru onerous title (the money used being presumably from pleading the defense of immorality or illegal causa of the conjugal there being no proof that RESTITUTA had paraphernal donation, the total or partial ineffectiveness of the same must be funds of her own). decided by different legal principles. In this regard, the Court of Appeals correctly held that Lopez could not donate the entirety of the property in litigation, to the prejudice of his wife Maria Ngo, because said property was conjugal in character and the right of Pajarillo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court the husband to donate community property is strictly limited by law G.R. No. 72908, August 11, 1989, 176 SCRA 340 Cruz, J.
13

FACTS: Perfecta Balane de Cordero died intestate in 1945 and leaving a tract of 28 hectares of land with buildings and improvements in the Quezon Province. On May 20, 1946, perfectas siblings Juana and Felipe executed a public instrument entitled Extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the decease Perfecta Balane de Cordero. In it they disposed that in according to Perfectas wishes and in consideration of love and affection, the said property be donated to private respondent Salud Suterio de Matias, Perfectas niece, who will assume the encumbrance/obligation to the Philippine National Bank in the amount of P 1,000. In the same document, the done accepted the donation in a public instrument. The instrument was never registered nor the title transferred to Saluds name alt hough she immediately took possession of the land. Sometime in 1951, Salud transferred the possession of the land to her mother Juana, who was then staying with her brother Claudio and his family. During the period they were occupying the land, Claudio paid realty taxes thereon. On May 25, 1956, Juana executed a deed of absolute sale conveying the land to Claudio. Two years later, Claudio had the land registered in his name. Claudio died in 1961 and his mother in 1963. On June 30, 1965, the private respondents Salud and Pedro Matias filed a complaint for the reconveyance of the property on the ground that the deed of sale in favour of Claudio was fictitious and the registration in his name was null and void. Salud claimed that no compensation was paid by Claudio and that the transaction was deliberately concealed from her by her brother and the defendants. ISSUE: Whether or not the extra-judicial settlement was a donation. HELD: Yes. Felipe and Juana had declared themselves the heirs of Perfecta and the owners of the property in question. As such, they were free to give the land to whomever they pleased and for whatever reason they saw fit. Hence, if they choose to respect Perfectas wishes and carry out her intentions by donating the land to Salud, there was no legal impediment to their doing so. There is no question that Felipe and Juana could have simply disregarded their sisters sentiments and decided not to donate the property to Salud. The fact that they did no do this speaks well of their integrity and their loyalty to their deceased sister. The extrajudicial settlement also reflects their own affection for Salud which constituted the valid consideration for their own act of liberality.

Petitioner filed a complaint against the donees for revocation of donation, invoking Article 760, par. 3 of the NCC. The trial court rendered a decision revoking the donation. On appal, The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed the complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the complaint to annul the subject donation. HELD: Yes. In the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by one who had previously donated some or all of his properties to another, the donor may sue for the annulment or reduction of the donation within 4 years from the date of adoption, if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted, taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the donation of the child (Articles 760, 761 and 763 of the NCC). Of course, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff-donor, who must allege and establish the requirements prescribed by law, on the basis of which annulment or reduction of the donation can be adjudged. Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the complaint for annulment does not allege that the subject donation impairs the legitime of the adopted child. Indeed, it contains no indication at all of the total assets of the donor. Nor is there proof of impairment of legitime. On the contrary, there is unrebutted evidence that the donor has another piece of land worth P273,420 in 1977. The legal situation of petitioner-donor is made worse by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that the grandfather of the donees was the owner pro indiviso of one-half of the donated land, the effect of which is to reduce the value of the donation which can then more easily be taken from the portion of the estate within the free disposal of petitioner.

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 77425, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 300 Regalado, J. FACTS: On August 23, 1930, the spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta executed a deed of donation in favor of herein petitioner Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel of land located at Cavite. The deed of donation provides that the donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a period of 100 years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise a violation of such condition would render ipso facto null and void the donation and the property would revert to the estate of the donors. However, on June 30, 1980 while within the prohibitive period to dispose, petitioner executed a deed of absolute sale of the property subject of the donation in favor of the petitioner-spouses Florencio and Soledad Ignao in consideration of the sum of P114,000.00. Hence, private respondents filed a complaint for the nullification of the deed of donation. In their answer, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss based on the grounds that the action has been barred by prescription because the complaint was filed four years after the sale, and that the complaint states no cause of action. ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation in favor of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila may be revoked. HELD: No. The complaint in the case at bar cannot be barred by prescription because the applicable prescriptive period is not the 4-year period provided in Article 764 of the New Civil Code, rather it is the 10-year period ordinary prescription shall apply because the deed of donation provides for the automatic reversion of the
14

Cruz v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-58671, November 22, 1985, 140 SCRA 245 Plana, J. FACTS: In 1973, Eduvigis Cruz, a childless widow, donated a 235.5 sq. m. residential lot in San Isidro, Taytay, Rizal together with the two-door apartment erected thereon to her grandnieces (private respondents Teresita, Lydia and Cecilia, all surnamed De Leon). The property was accordingly transferred to the names of private respondents. In 1974, Cruz judicially adopted Cresencia Ocreto, a minor, after which she extrajudicailly tried to revoke the donation, but the donee resisted, alleging that: (1) the property in question was coowned by Eduvigis Cruz and her brother, the late Maximo Cruz, grandfather of the donees, hence the latter own 1/2 of the property by inheritance; and (2) Eduvigis owns another property, an agricultural land of more than two hectares situated in Barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, hence the donation did not impair the presumptive legitime of the adoptive child.

property to the original owner in case of violation of any condition. The Court in the previous case of De Luna v. Abrigo has already settled such prescriptive period. However, although the action cannot be dismissed on the ground of prescription, the same should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. The cause of action of the private respondents is based on the th fact that the petitioner sold the lot during the 50 year of the prohibitive period of 100 years. Such prohibitive period imposed by the respondents was unreasonable because applying in analogy Articles 494 and 870 of the New Civil Code, the donor cannot order a prohibitive period of disposition exceeding 20 years. As such, the said condition regarding the prohibitive period being contrary to law shall be considered as null and void pursuant to Art. 727 of the New Civil Code but the donation shall remain valid and subsisting. Thus, respondents cannot anymore revoke the donation, and the sale of the property by the petitioner to the Ignao spouses shall be valid and with legal effects.

declared by the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals, for the resulting damages to the true owner and original plaintiff, Pedro Calapine. Petition granted.

Quilala v. Alcantara G.R. No. 132681, December 3, 2001, 371 SCRA 311 Ynares Santiago, J. FACTS: On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land. The "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" consists of two pages. The first page contains the deed of donation itself, and is signed on the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala as donor, Violeta Quilala as donee, and two instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the Acknowledgment, which states merely that Catalina Quilala personally appeared before the notary public and acknowledged that the donation was her free and voluntary act and deed. There appear on the left-hand margin of the second page the signatures of Catalina Quilala and one of the witnesses, and on the right-hand margin the signatures of Violeta Quilala and the other witness The deed of donation was registered with the Register of Deeds and, in due course, TCT No. 17214 was cancelled and TCT No. 143015 was issued in the name of Violeta Quilala. On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala likewise died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala. Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes, claiming to be Catalina's only surviving relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity, executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate, dividing and adjudicating unto themselves the above-described property. On September 13, 1984, respondents instituted against petitioner and Guillermo T. San Pedro, the Registrar of Deeds of Manila, an action for the declaration of nullity of the donation inter vivos. The trial court found that the deed of donation, although signed by both Catalina and Violeta, was acknowledged before a notary public only by the donor, Catalina. Consequently, there was no acceptance by Violeta of the donation in a public instrument, thus rendering the donation null and void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming with modification the decision of the trial court by dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action without prejudice to the filing of probate proceedings of Catalina's alleged last will and testament. ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation is void for lack of acceptance on the part of the donee Violeta Quilala. HELD: No. As stated above, the second page of the deed of donation, on which the Acknowledgment appears, was signed by the donor and one witness on the left-hand margin, and by the donee and the other witness on the right hand margin. Surely, the requirement that the contracting parties and their witnesses should sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument is not absolute. The intendment of the law merely is to ensure that each and every page of the instrument is authenticated by the parties. The requirement is designed to avoid the falsification of the contract after the same has already been duly executed by the parties. Hence, a contracting party affixes his signature on each page of the instrument to certify that he is agreeing to everything that is written thereon at the time of signing.

Eduarte v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 105944, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 391 Francisco, J. FACTS: Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 12,199 square meters. He executed a deed entitled Donation InterVivos ceding one -half portion thereof to his niece Helen S. Doria. Eventually, the whole parcel of land was ceded to Doria by Calapine. Doria then donated a portion of 157 square meters to the Calauan Christian Reformed Church. He also sold, transferred and conveyed unto the spouses Eduarte the parcel of land, saving the 700 square meters on which Dorias house was erected. However, Pedro Calapine filed a complaint against Doria, the Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. and the spouses Eduarte claiming that his signature to the deed of donation was a forgery. He prays for the revocation of the donation made in favour of Doria, to declare null and void the deeds of donation and sale that she had executed in favor of the Calauan Christian Reformed Church, Inc. and the spouses Eduarte. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are buyers in bad faith of the donated property. HELD: No. The rule is well-settled that mere possession cannot defeat the title of a holder of a registered torrens title to real property. When herein petitioners purchased the subject property from Helen Doria, the same was already covered by TCT No. T23205 under the latter's name. And although Helen Doria's title was fraudulently secured, such fact cannot prejudice the rights of herein petitioners absent any showing that they had any knowledge or participation in such irregularity. Thus, they cannot be obliged to look beyond the certificate of title which appeared to be valid on its fade and sans any annotation or notice of private respondents' adverse claim. Contrary therefore to the conclusion of respondent Court, petitioners are purchasers in good faith and for value as they bought the disputed property without notice that some other person has a right or interest in such property, and paid a full price for the same at the time of the purchase or before they had notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. And having established beyond doubt that Helen Doria fraudulently secured her title over the disputed property which she subsequently sold to petitioners, Helen Doria should instead be adjudged liable to private respondents, and not to petitioners as

15

Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely directory. The fact that one of the parties signs on the wrong side of the page does not invalidate the document. The purpose of authenticating the page is served, and the requirement in the above-quoted provision is deemed substantially complied with. In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does not also render the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered a private document in part and a public document in another part. The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the notary public in the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second page, which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first page of the notarized deed of donation, was made in a public instrument.

Enrique Hemedes whom she is dependent from for her financial support.

Siguan v. Lim G.R. No. 134685, November 19, 1999, 318 SCRA 725 Davide, Jr., C.J. FACTS: On 2 July 1991, a Deed of Donation conveying parcels of land and purportedly executed by LIM on 10 August 1989 in favor of her children, Linde, Ingrid and Neil was registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City. On 23 June 1993, petitioner filed an accion pauliana against LIM and her children to rescind the questioned Deed of Donation and to declare as null and void the new transfer certificates of title issued for the lots covered by the questioned Deed. Petitioner claimed therein that sometime in July 1991, LIM, through a Deed of Donation, fraudulently transferred all her real property to her children in bad faith and in fraud of creditors, including her; that LIM conspired and confederated with her children in antedating the questioned Deed of Donation, to petitioner's and other creditors' prejudice; and that LIM, at the time of the fraudulent conveyance, left no sufficient properties to pay her obligations. The RTC ruled in favor of Siguan and rescinded the Contract, but was reversed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Donation executed by respondent may be rescinded for being in fraud of her alleged creditor. HELD: We resolve these issues in the negative. Art. 1381 of the Civil Code enumerates the contracts which are rescissible, and among them are "those contracts undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any other manner collect the claims due them."

Hemedes v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 107132, October 8, 1999, 316 SCRA 347 Gonzaga Reyes, J. FACTS: Jose Hemedes, father of Maxima Hemedes and Enrique D. Hemedes. Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled "Donation Inter Vivos With Resolutory Conditions" whereby he conveyed ownership over the subject land, together with all its improvements, in favor of his third wife, Justa Kausapin, subject to the following resolutory conditions that upon her death or marriage, the DONEE shall revert the said property to anyone of Jose Hemedes children. On September 27, 1960 a "Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion" conveying to Maxima Hemedes. She had it titled and mortgage it to R & B Insurance with an annotation of USUFRUCT favor of her stepmother,Justa Kausapin. Unable to pay the mortgage, R & B Insurance extra-judicially foreclosed the property. However, Justa Kausapin executed another agreement or Kasunduan on May 27, 1971 to his stepson, Enrique D. Hemedes. He obtained tax declarations and pay realty taxes from thereon. The Ministry of Agrarian Reform Office conducted a cadastral survey and indicated Enrique Hemedes as the owner.

The action to rescind contracts in fraud of creditors is known as accion pauliana. For this action to prosper, the following requisites must be present: (1) the plaintiff asking for rescission has a credit prior to the alienation, although demandable later; (2) the debtor has made a subsequent contract conveying a patrimonial benefit to a third person; (3) the creditor has no other legal remedy to satisfy his claim; (4) the act being impugned is fraudulent; (5) the third person who received the property conveyed, if it is by onerous title, has been an accomplice in the fraud. The general rule is that rescission requires the existence of creditors at the time of the alleged fraudulent alienation, and this must be proved Enrique Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty Const. as one of the bases of the judicial pronouncement setting aside Corp.(Dominium), a sister company of Asia Brewery. Asia the contract. Without any prior existing debt, there can neither be Brewery started to introduce some improvements already when R injury nor fraud. While it is necessary that the credit of the plaintiff & B insurance informed them that they are the owners of the in the accion pauliana must exist prior to the fraudulent alienation, property where these improvements are being built. the date of the judgment enforcing it is immaterial. Even if the judgment be subsequent to the alienation, it is merely declaratory, ISSUE: Whether or not the kasunduan executed by Justa with retroactive effect to the date when the credit was constituted. Kausapin in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes valid. In the instant case, the alleged debt of LIM in favor of petitioner was incurred in August 1990, while the deed of donation was HELD: The court dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision purportedly executed on 10 August 1989. Even assuming of the CA. It held that Maxima failed to comply with the arguendo that petitioner became a creditor of LIM prior to the requirements of Art. 1332 of the civil code and also failed to celebration of the contract of donation, still her action for repudiate Justa Kausapins allegation that she did not execute rescission would not fare well because the third requisite was not such a deed and she never allowed to use the land as security for met. Under Article 1381 of the Civil Code, contracts entered into in the loan. It was found that the deed of conveyance to Maxima was fraud of creditors may be rescinded only when the creditors spurious and it follows that the original title she had for the cannot in any manner collect the claims due them. It is, therefore, property was also null and void so as the mortgage to R & B "essential that the party asking for rescission prove that he has Insurance. On the other hand, Kausapin executed an affidavit to exhausted all other legal means to obtain satisfaction of his claim. 20 affirm the authenticity of the kasundudan in favor of his stepson, Petitioner neither alleged nor proved that she did so. On this

16

score, her action for the rescission of the questioned deed is not maintainable even if the fraud charged actually did exist."

Sometime in 1989, the Meneses(heirs of Anatalia de Guzman) filed a complaint for annulment, partition and damages against the heirs of Cesario Velasquez(son of Tranquilina de Guzman) for the latters' refusal to partition the properties of the Spouses Aquino. The complaint alleged that before Leoncias death, she told that the documents of donation and partition which she and her husband earlier executed were not signed by them as it was not their intention to give away all the properties to Cesario Velasquez because Anatalia de Guzman who is one of her sisters had several children to support; and that Cesario Velasquez and his mother allegedly promised to divide the properties equally and to give the plaintiffs one-half thereof. Plaintiffs further claim that after the death of Leoncia, defendants forcibly took possession of all the properties and despite plaintiffs' repeated demands for partition, defendants refused.

Noceda vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 119730, September 2, 1999, 313 SCRA 504 Gonzaga Reyes, J. FACTS: Celestino Arbizo died in 1956 leaving behind a parcel of land having an area of 66,530 square meters. His heirs plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo extrajudicially settled the partition of the land with Directo getting 11,426 square meters, Noceda got 13,294 square meters, and Arbizo got 41,810 square meters. Plaintiff Directo donated 625 square meters of her share to defendant Noceda, who is her nephew being the son of her deceased sister However another extrajudicial settlement-partition was executed. Three fifths of the said land went to Maria Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and defendant Noceda got only one-fifth each.

Plaintiffs prayed for the nullity of the documents covering the properties in question since they do not bear the genuine signatures of the Aquino spouses, to order the partition of the properties between plaintiffs and defendants in equal shares and Sometime in 1981, Noceda constructed his house on the land to order the defendants to render an accounting of the produce of donated to him by Directo. Directo fenced the portion allotted to the land from the time defendants forcibly took possession until her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated portion, partition shall have been effected. and constructed thereon three huts. But in 1985, Noceda removed the fence earlier constructed by Directo, occupied the three huts Defendants filed their answer with counterclaim alleging that (3) and fenced the entire land of plaintiff Directo without her during the lifetime of spouses Aquino, they had already disposed consent. Directo demanded from Noceda to vacate her land, but of their properties in favor of petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, the latter refused. Hence, Directo filed a complaint for the recovery Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, and petitioners of possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of Anastacia and Jose Velasquez in the following manner: donation, against defendant Noceda (1) The third and sixth parcels were conveyed to defendants' late parents Cesario Velasquez and Camila ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of Noceda constitute ingratitude to de Guzman, by virtue of a Escritura de Donation Propter warrant revocation of the donation. Nuptias dated February 15, 1919; (2) The second parcel was conveyed to defendants' late HELD: Yes. It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied parents Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman by not only the portion donated to him by private respondent Aurora virtue of a deed of conveyance dated July 14, 1939; Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C which (3) The first parcel was likewise conveyed to defendants belongs to private respondent Directo, thus petitioner's act of Jose Velasquez and Anastacia Velasquez by virtue of a occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent Directo deed of conveyance (Donation Intervivos) dated April 10, without the latter's knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation 1939; which is an offense against the property of the donor and (4) As to the fourth and fifth parcels, the same were considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor. owned and possessed by third parties. The law does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be proved in the action for revocation. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, giving credibility to Santiago Meneses testimony; declaring the Donation Intervivos, The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one the Deed of Sale, the Deed of Donation, the Deed of Sale to third (1) year to be counted from the time (a) the donor had knowledge parties over the 4th and 5th parcels as null and void insofar as 1/2 of the fact; (b) provided that it was possible for him to bring the of the 6 parcels are concerned legitimately belong to the plaintiffs; action. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show proof of the and ordering the defendants to pay damages. Defendants concurrence of these two conditions in order that the one (1) year appealed the decision to respondent CA which affirmed the same. period for bringing the action be considered to have already A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners but the prescribed. No competent proof was adduced by petitioner to same was denied. prove his allegation. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have acquired absolute and exclusive ownership of the properties in question. Heirs of Cesario Velasquez v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 126996, February 15, 2000, 325 SCRA 552 Gonzaga Reyes, J. HELD: Yes. Private respondent Santiago Meneses failed to prove the nullity of the Deeds of Conveyance executed by the Aquino spouses in favor of petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman since he failed to FACTS: Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died adduce any evidence to support his claim other than his bare intestate sometime in 1945 and 1947, respectively and were allegations of its nullity. On the other hand, petitioners were able childless, leaving 6 parcels of land situated in Pangasinan. to show by documentary evidence that the Aquino spouses during Leoncia De Guzman was survived by her sisters Anatalia de their lifetime disposed of the four parcels of land subject of the Guzman and Tranquilina de Guzman. complaint, to wit: (a) Escritura de donation propter nuptias, (b) Deed of donation inter vivos, (c) Escritura de Compreventa with a
17

P500 consideration: (d) Deed of Conveyance with a consideration of P600 and confirming in the same Deed the Escritura de donation propter nuptias and Escritura de compraventa abovementioned. It was reversible error for the court to overlook Gonzales v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 110335, June 18, 2001, 358 SCRA 598 the probative value of these notarized documents. Melo, J. A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the FACTS: Deceased spouses Ignacio and Marina Gonzales were donee and the donation is perfected from the moment the donor registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land. Petitioners knows of the acceptance by the donee. Once a donation is are the successors-in-interest or the children and grandchildren of accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property the deceased spouses. On the other hand, private respondents donated. are the farmers and tenants of said spouses who have been cultivating the parcels of land even before World War II either The donation of the first parcel made by the Aquino spouses to personally or through their predecessors-in-interest. Marina petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez who were then 19 and Gonzales died intestate and appointed as administratix was 10 years old respectively was accepted through their father petitioner Lilia Gonzales. Prior to the partition of said estate, Cesario Velasquez, and the acceptance was incorporated in the Ignacio Gonzales executed a Deed of Donation in favor of his body of the same deed of donation and made part of it, and was grandchildren but was not registered. When Presidential Decree signed by the donor and the acceptor. Legally speaking there was No. 27 took effect, the landholdings of the said spouses were delivery and acceptance of the deed, and the donation existed placed under Operation Land Transfer. Private respondents were perfectly and irrevocably. The donation inter vivos may be revoked then issued the corresponding Certificates of Land Transfer. The only for the reasons provided in Articles 760, 764 and 765 of the administratix of the spouses estate, Lilia Gonzales filed an Civil Code. application for retention requesting that their property be excluded from the Operation Land Transfer. Initially, it was denied but was approved due to the deed of donation. The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman over the third and sixth parcels including a ISSUE: Whether or not the property subject of the deed of portion of the second parcel became the properties of the spouses donation which was not registered when P.D. No. 27 took effect, Velasquez since 1919. The deed of donation propter nuptias can should be excluded from the Operation Land Transfer. be revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and the other causes mentioned in Article 86 of the Family Code. The alleged HELD: No. Article 749 of the Civil Code provides inter alia that in reason for the repudiation of the deed, i.e., that the Aquino order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be spouses did not intend to give away all their properties since made in a public document, specifying therein the property Anatalia had several children to support is not one of the grounds donated and the value of the charges which the done must for revocation of donation either inter vivos or propter nuptias, satisfy. Corollarily, Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states although the donation might be inofficious. that the titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry The Escritura compraventa over another portion of the second of Property shall not prejudice third persons. From the for egoing parcel and the Deed of conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of provisions, it may be inferred that as between the parties to a Cesario and Camila Velasquez over the remaining portion of the donation of immovable property, all that is required is for said second parcel is also valid. In fact in the deed of sale, the Aquino donation to be contained in a public document. Registration is not spouses ratified and confirmed the rights and interests of Cesario necessary for it to be contained in a public document. It is not Velasquez and Camila de Guzman including the previous deeds necessary for it to be considered valid and effective. However, in of conveyance over the second parcel in the complaint and such order to bind third persons, the donation must be registered in the deed of sale became the basis for the issuance of TCT in the Registry of Property. In the case at bar, the donation executed by names of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman. The best Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his grand children, although in writing proof of the ownership of the land is the certificate of title and it and duly notarized, has not been registered in accordance with requires more than a bare allegation to defeat the face value of law. For this reason, it shall not be binding upon private TCT which enjoys a legal presumption of regularity of issuance. respondents who did not participate in said deed nor had no actual Notably, during the lifetime of Cesario Velasquez, he entered into knowledge thereof. contracts of mortgage and lease over the property as annotated at the back of the certificate of title which clearly established that he exercised full ownership and control over the property. Imperial v. Court of Appeals Petitioners were able to establish that these four parcels of land G.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999, 316 SCRA 393 were validly conveyed to them by the Aquino spouses, hence, Gonzaga Reyes, J. they no longer formed part of the conjugal properties of the spouses at the time of their deaths. As regards the fourth and fifth FACTS: Leoncio Imperial was the owner of a parcel of land with parcels, petitioners alleged that these were also conveyed to third an area of 32,837 sq. m. and located in Albay. On July 7, 1951, persons and they do not claim any right thereto. Leoncio sold the lot for Php 1.00 to his acknowledged natural son, petitioner in this case. Petitioner and Victor Imperial, adopted son In view of the foregoing, the action of partition cannot be of Leoncio, agreed that despite the designation of the contract as maintained. The properties sought to be partitioned by private Deed of Absolute Sale, the transaction is in fact a Donation. Two respondents have already been delivered to petitioners and years after, Leoncio filed a complaint for the Annulment of therefore no longer part of the hereditary estate which could be Donation. It was however resolved through a compromise partitioned. No co-ownership exists between private respondents agreement under the following terms and conditions: (1) Leoncio and petitioners. recognized and agreed the legality and validity of the rights of
18

petitioner; and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000 sq.m. portion of the donated land. Leoncio died leaving only two heirs: petitioner and Victor Imperial. On March 8, 1962, Victor was substituted in the complaint for annulment. He moved for the execution of judgment and it was granted. After 15 years, Victor died and was survived only by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon. Ricardo Villalon is a lessee of the portion of the subject property. Villalon died leaving his heirs, Cesar and Teresa Villalon, respondents in this case. In 1986, respondents filed a complaint for the annulment of the donation. Allegedly, it impairs the legitime of Victor Imperial. ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not the respondents have the right to question the inofficious donation and seek its reduction. 2.) Whether or not the 30-year prescriptive period is applicable in the reduction of the inofficious donation. HELD: 1.) Yes. At the time of the substitution, the judgment approving the compromise agreement has already been rendered. Victor merely participated in the execution of the compromise judgment. He was not a party to the compromise agreement. When Victor substituted Leoncio, he was not deemed to have renounced his legitime. He was therefore not precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the reduction. Nor are Victors heirs, upon his death, precluded from doing so. This is in accordance with Articles 772 and 1053 of the new Civil Code, to wit: Article 772. Only those who at the time of the donors death have a right to the legitime and their heirs and successors in interest may ask for the reduction of the inofficious donation xxx. and Article 1053. If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance, his rights shall be transmitted to his heirs. 2.) No. Under Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from the right of action accrues. Thus, the 10-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations required under Article 771 of the New Civil Code to the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs. The cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since only then that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be determined. It took 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this case. Thus, the action has long prescribed. Not only has prescription set in, they are also guilty of estoppel and laches. Fifteen years after the death of Leoncio, Victor died. Ricardo Villalon, Victors sole heir, died four years later. While Victor was alive, he gave no indication of any interest to contest the donation of his deceased father.

the Deed of Donation, the respondents imposed the condition that the said property should be used exclusively and forever for school purposes only. This donation was accepted by the District Supervisor of the Bureau, through an Affidavit of Acceptance and/or Confirmation of Donation. A school building was thereafter constructed on the donated land. However, another school building that was also supposed to be allocated for the donated parcel of land could not be released since the government required that it be built upon a 1 hectare parcel of land. By reason of this, the District Supervisor and the vice-mayors wife entered into a Deed of Exchange whereby the donated lot was exchanged with a bigger lot owned by the latter. Consequently, the school buildings were constructed on this new school site and the school building previously erected on the donated land was dismantled and transferred to the new location. One day, respondents were surprised when he saw the vicemayor constructing a house on the donated land. ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not there was a valid donation despite non-notation of the acceptance in the Deed of Donation, as required in Article 749. 2.) Whether or not the condition on the donation was violated. HELD: 1.) Yes. The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such is duly communicated to the donor. In the case at bar, a school building was immediately constructed after the donation was executed. Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the school building put up on the donated lot. The actual knowledge by respondents of the construction and existence of the school building fulfilled the legal requirement that the acceptance of the donation by the donee be communicated to the donor. 2.) No. There was no violation even after the donated lot was exchanged for another one. The purpose of the donation remains the same, which is for the establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.

Gestopa v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 111904, October 5, 2000, 342 SCRA 105 Quisumbing, J.

FACTS: Spouses Danlag were the owners of six parcels of unregistered lands. They executed three deeds of donation mortis causa, two of which were in favor of Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil. All deeds contained the reservation of the rights of the donors to amend, cancel or revoke the donation during their lifetime, and to sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties donated during the donors' lifetime, if deemed necessary. The spouses then executed another deed of donation inter vivos in favor of Mercedes which contained the condition that the donors, Danlag Republic of the Philippines v. Silim spouses, shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their G.R. No. 140487, April 2, 2001, 356 SCRA 1 lifetime and that the donee enjoy the fruits of the land during their Kapunan, J. lifetime and that the donee cannot sell or dispose of the land during the lifetime of the donors without their prior consent and FACTS: Respondent Spouses Silim and Mangubat donated a approval. Consequently, Mercedes caused the transfer of the 5,600 square meter parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public parcels of land's tax declaration to her name and paid the taxes on Schools of the Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur. In them.
19

Spouses Danlag sold two parcels of lots to Spouses Agripino and Isabel Gestopa and executed a deed of revocation recovering the six parcels of land subject to the deed of donation inter vivos. Mercedes Pilapil filed with the Regional Trial Court against the Spouses Danlag and Gestopa, for quieting of title over the parcels of land and alleged that the land was donated to her by Diego Danlag and that she accepted the donation openly and publicly exercised rights of ownership over the donated properties, and transferred the tax declarations to her name. She also alleged that the donation inter vivos was coupled with conditions and, according to Mercedes, since its perfection, she had complied with all of them; that she had not been guilty of any act of ingratitude; and that Diego Danlag had no legal basis to revoke the donation and then in selling the two parcels of land to the Gestopa spouses. In their opposition, the spouses Gestopa and the Danlag averred that the deed of donation was null and void because it was obtained by Mercedes through machinations and undue influence. Even assuming it was validly executed, the intention was for the donation to take effect upon the death of the donor and that the donation was void for it left the donor, Diego Danlag, without any property at all.

Sumipat v. Banga G.R. No. 155810, August 13, 2004 Tinga, J. FACTS: The spouses Placida Tabo-tabo and Lauro Sumipat acquired three parcels of land. The couple was childless. Lauro Sumipat, however, sired five illegitimate children. They are the petitioners herein. Lauro executed a document denominated Deed of Absolute Transfer and/or Quit-Claim over Real Properties in favor of the petitioners. On the document, it appears that the signature of his wife, Placida which indicates that she gave her marital consent. Moreover, it was alleged that Lauro executed it when he was already very sick and bedridden that upon petitioner Lydias request, their neighbor Benjamin Rivera lifted the body of Lauro whereupon Lydia guided his hand in affixing his signature on the document. Lydia left but later returned on the same day and requested Lauros unlettered wife, Placida to sign on the said document. After Lauros death, his wife, Placida and petitioners jointly administered the properties, 50% of the produce went to his wife. As wifes share in the produce of the properties dwindled, she filed a complaint for declaration of partition disclaiming any partition in the execution of the subject document.

ISSUE: Whether the donation is a donation inter vivos or a ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned deed by its terms or under donation mortis causa. the surrounding circumstances has validly transferred title to the HELD: The Court Rules that it was a donation inter vivos. The disputed properties to the petitioners. Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the reservation by the donor of lifetime usufruct indicated that he transferred to HELD: No. A perusal of the deed reveals that it is actually a Mercedes the ownership over the donated properties; that the gratuitous disposition of property a donation although Lauro right to sell belonged to the donee, and the donor's right referred Sumipat imposed upon the petitioners the condition that he and to that of merely giving consent; that the donor changed his his wife, Placida, shall be entitled to one-half (1/2) of all the fruits intention by donating inter vivos properties already donated mortis or produce of the parcels of land for their subsistence and support. causa; that the transfer to Mercedes' name of the tax declarations Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or pertaining to the donated properties implied that the donation was where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate inter vivos; and that Mercedes did not purchase two of the six instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the parcels of land donated to her. deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void. In this case, the donees acceptance of the donation In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the deed's is not manifested either in the deed itself or in a separate provisions must be read together. The granting clause shows that document. Hence, the deed as an instrument of donation is Diego donated the properties out of love and affection for the patently void. The Court declared that the deeds of sale donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos. Second, the questioned therein are not merely voidable but null and void ab reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to initio as the supposed seller declared under oath that she signed transfer the naked ownership over the properties. Third, the donor the deeds without knowing what they were. The significant reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance circumstance meant, the Court added, that her consent was not with his standing in society, indicating that the donor intended to merely marred by vices of consent so as to make the contracts part with the six parcels of land. Lastly, the donee accepted the voidable, but that she had not given her cons donation. An acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors' lifetime. The right to dispose of the properties belonged to the donee. The donor's right to give consent was merely intended to protect his usufructuary interests. The limitation on the right to sell during the donors' lifetime implied that ownership had passed to the donees and donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime. Hence, the moment that it was accepted by Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil, ownership of the properties was transferred.

20