H I N D E S S A N D H I R S T : A C R I T I C A L REVIEW

Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer* Readers of Socialist Register c a n n o t fail t o have noted a steady flow of t e x t s b y a g r o u p of writers in England which has a t t e m p t e d n o t h i n g less t h a n t h e cleansing of marxism of all its impurities. F r o m this vast stream, we have chosen t o e x a m i n e o n e particular currentthe w o r k associated with Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst, especially their four b o o k length statem e n t s : Pre-capitalist modes of production (hereafter PCMP), Mode of production and social formation (an a u t o c r i t i q u e of PCMP, hereafter MPSF), and t h e t w o volume work Marx's "Capital" and capitalism today (MCCT, I, II). The latter, in particular, " i n t e r v e n e s " politically and m a y be t a k e n t o c o n d e n s e t h e socialism of their project.
1

Despite o u r a u t h o r s ' bans and proscriptions, we h a p p e n t o believe t h a t we are living in a material world which has a history. It is thus, for us, of s o m e m o m e n t briefly t o stress t h e location of their work within o n e wider t r a d i t i o n which has entailed an e x t r a o r d i n a r y intellectualisation of b o t h marxist t h e o r y and t h e socialist p r o j e c t . T h e work we are criticising represents perhaps t h e most n o t o r i o u s e x a m p l e of this. There is t h u s a similarity in t h e styles and practices of this kind of work and its basic division b e t w e e n mental and manual labourcontributing t o t h e deskilling of t h e working class t h a t has a c c o m p a n i e d t h e restructuring of capitalism since t h e 1950s. These t w o bases have i m p o r t a n t implications for t h e n o t i o n s of socialism within t h e texts w e are examining. We begin o u r critical survey w h e r e t h e y begin, with their apriorism, with their c o m m i t m e n t t o a world which is only discursivethe spoken and t h o u g h t worlda universe of c o n c e p t s . We show h o w this, and indeed m a n y of their errors, springs from a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p r o d u c t i o n , of b o t h what it is and how Marx analysed it. This leads us briefly to consider their claim of " n e c e s s a r y n o n - c o r r e s p o n d e n c e " and t h e f u n d a m e n t a l circularity of their a r g u m e n t s . We c o n c l u d e b y stressing t h e political and theoretical significance of history as part of t h e socialist projectthat of exposing and o v e r c o m i n g " t h e O b v i o u s " , t h e m a n y and misleading forms in which Capitalism's relations present themselves " o n t h e surface of society."
2 3

*We are most grateful to Edward Thompson for his detailed c o m m e n t s on the final draft of this paper. Given our general debt to his work and our specific differences it is more than necessary to add the usual statement that the final text is our responsibility alone.

194

HINDESS & HIRST: A CRITICAL REVIEW

195

Starting with concepts Despite their denial of w h a t t h e y misleadingly call t h e "epistemological p r o j e c t " (Cf. MPSF; MCCT, I. 2 2 7 , 2 3 8 ) , their o w n project has always entailed an e p i s t e m o l o g y . T h e y have assumed t h a t "Classical m a r x i s m " begins w i t h concepts. T h e y have argued t h a t we have t o cleanse o u r theoretical and philosophical e q u i p m e n t . Marx fought this fallacy for m o s t of his life. He recognised t h a t it enshrined t h e m o s t general of all ideological distortionsa m e t a p h y s i c a l n o t i o n of consciousnesswhich sustained t h e seeming vanguard role for intellectuals and r e c u p e r a t e d t h e f u n d a m e n t a l division b e t w e e n m e n t a l and m a n u a l labour. This is why o u r scholars start w i t h c o n c e p t s . If this seems harsh, consider t h e following passage.
4

Political problems cannot be taken simply as they arise and are specified in political debate. They require critical theoretical evaluation and they may require reconstruction, but t h e y are nevertheless of fundamental importance for the conceptualisation of definite social formations as arenas of political practice. The mode in which political problems are posed and theorised depends on the level of development of both politics and of Marxist theory and on the extent to which they are inscribed one in the other. Mode of Production and Social formation has suggested that o n e reason for the signal failure of Marxist analyses of modern British capitalism lies in the weakness of the "left" in this country, its doctrinaire gesture politics, its failure to engage major political issues and forces and its consequent failure to generate political problems for theorisation. (MCCT, I- 316)

Like so m a n y of t h e heavy p r o n o u n c e m e n t s of these writers, this finely mixes t h e trivial b u t t r u e and t h e novel b u t erroneousa r e p r o d u c t i o n of t h e obviousness of t h e world we all live within! T h e left is weak in England, it seems, because, t h a t is t o say, t h e left is weak. . . Behind this schema, however, is a set of j u d g e m e n t s on t h e essentially nonpolitical " n a t u r e " of t h e working class. This, of course, reinforces their o w n significance as t h e theorists w h o can supply this " l a c k . " C o n s e q u e n t u p o n this p r o f o u n d " a n a l y s i s " and their celebration of t h e separateness and discreteness of t h e p h e n o m e n a l forms of capitalist social relations of p r o d u c t i o n , t h e y argue t h a t " i t follows"as Hindess and Hirst t e x t follows Hirst a n d Hindess t e x t n o d o u b t that the working class is not automatically or essentially socialist, that workingclass politics are not automatically progressive. (MCCT, I: 242)

This is carried f u r t h e r :

There is in capitalist social relations no necessary process that subjects this category of agents [that is, economic agents] to tendencies toward homogenization or unification at the political level. It follows [N.B.] that the basis of support for socialist politics must be created by the effects of the political actions of socialists themselves. (MCCT, 11: 2 5 8 )

196

THE SOCIALIST REGISTER 1978

Behind these u n e x c e p t i o n a l (and largely Leninist) claims are t h e most p r o f o u n d l y <jt!-socialist (and un-marxist) c o m m i t m e n t s which s t e m from their beginning w i t h c o n c e p t s . Marx said of t h e first Confusius in 1880"So m a n y w o r d s , so m u c h idiocy"and we d o urge readers t o s t u d y these t e x t s carefully. Behind t h e volume of w o r d s is a specific c o m m i t m e n t . Engels and Marx waged a struggle t h r o u g h their lives against t h o s e w h o t h o u g h t history comprised o n l y theoretical struggles, w h o argued t h a t liberation was primarily a mental a c t i o n . As The German Ideology states, such scholars seek t o solve " t h e m y s t e r y of t h e o r e t i c a l b u b b l e b l o w i n g " b y :
resolving the ready-made nonsense into some other freak, i.e. of presupposing that all this nonsense has a special sense which can be discovered; while really it is only a question of explaining these theoretical phrases from the actual relations.
5

Later, in a general a r g u m e n t against idealistic apriorism, Marx and Engels n o t e t h a t for such ideologists " r e l a t i o n s b e c o m e c o n c e p t s . . . t h e c o n c e p t s of t h e relations also b e c o m e fixed c o n c e p t s in their m i n d . " (Ibid., p. 92) Over a decade laterin a w o r k safely o n t h e "scientific" side of t h e Grand C a n y o n of t h e epistemological break, t h e m u c h abused 1857 " I n t r o d u c t i o n " t o his GrundrisseMaxx again discusses t h a t p h i l o s o p h i c kind of consciousness:
for which conceptual thinking is the real human being, and for which the conceptual world as such is the only reality, the movement of the categories appears as the real act of production. . .
6

He goes o n t o talk a b o u t t h e " r e a l " subject, and its necessary priority t o any t h i n k i n g ( " t h i s holds for science as well" he emphasised). Finally, in a famous passage in t h e 1 8 8 0 " N o t e s o n A d o l p h Wagner", which first identified t h e species Confusius, Marx w r o t e :
In the first place I d o not start out from "concepts". . . What 1 start out from is the simplest social form in which the labour-product is presented in contemporary society, and this is the c o m m o d i t y . I analyze it, and right from the beginning, in the form in which it appears. . . . . . our obscurantist. . . has not noticed that m y analytic method, which does not start out from man, but from the analytically given social period, has nothing in c o m m o n with the academic German method of connecting concepts ("with words we can in heat debateAVith words a system designate").
7

Hindess and Hirst, and their co-workers, e m p l o y a universalistic and idealistic n o t i o n of language. O m i n o u s l y , in their autocritique, t h e y have warned us t h a t " T h e o r e t i c a l discourse, like discourse in general, speaking and writing, is an unlimited p r o c e s s . " (MPSF, p. 7) Marx's view of language

HINDKSS & HIRST: A CRITICAL REVIEW

197

was rather different, indeed he frequently argued against e x a c t l y t h e " m e n t a l i z a t i o n of language" which o u r obscurantists e m p l o y . A p a r t from t h e (generally ignored) sustained a r g u m e n t s in The German Ideology we find very clear s t a t e m e n t s in t h e 1857 " I n t r o d u c t i o n " , for e x a m p l e :
6

Production by an isolated individual outside societya rare exception which may well occur when a civilised person in w h o m the social forces are already dynamically present is cast by accident into the wildernessis as much of an absurdity as is the development of language without individuals living together and talking to each o t h e r .
9

Against bis Confusius' idealism, Marx argued t h a t p e o p l e begin " w i t h taking hold of certain things in t h e external world in a c t i o n . " Through these e x t e n d e d and specific histories, p e o p l e :
1 0

will christen these things linguistically, distinguished empirically [erfabrungsmassig, i.e. by experience] from the rest of the external world. . . this linguistic designation only expresses as an idea what repeated corroboration in experience has accomplished. . . (Ibid.)

O u r new scholars seem t o u n d e r s t a n d language as did t h e LeftHegeliansmateriality, specificity, along, of course, with historical e x p e r i e n c e , have all b u t disappeared. But, as Marx, V o l o s i n o v " and m a n y o t h e r s have establishedlanguage is a social p h e n o m e n o n , p a t t e r n e d and fissured t h r o u g h t h e m o d e s of its p r o d u c t i o n . Even t h o u g h , as RossiLandi has argued:
in linguistic production, as in material production, it can happen, and it usually does, that the constant capital takes on a sort of apparently autonomous, monstrous life of its o w n , subordinating to itself those expenders of linguistic power, without w h o m it could never have forms nor could it continue to e x i s t .
12

That is t o say, t h e p o w e r of language is not a p r o p e r t y inherent in it (language is not a t h i n g ) , " b u t comes from t h e fact t h a t we use it w h e n we s p e a k " (a social relation a m o n g s t people). Capitalism transforms t h e properties of relations (and t h e p o w e r of people) into qualities of things. This is n o t , however, merely an illusion. As Rubin emphasised:
in capitalist society the "material" element, the power of capital, dominates. This is not an illusory, erroneous interpretation (in the human mind) of social relations among people, relations of domination and subordination; it is a real, social f a c t .
13

When Althusser (and he was b y n o means t h e first) argued t h a t t h e r e is a

198

THE SOCIALIST REGISTER 1978

difference b e t w e e n an object and t h e idea of t h a t object, he did it t o m a k e possible t h e eventual e m a n c i p a t i o n of t h e working class from t h e "violence of t h i n g s " , t o show, in brief, t h e p o t e n t i a l infinity of t h e ways that things could be (used and t h o u g h t ) . Marx, o n e might hazard, was also c o m m i t t e d to t h e view t h a t " t h i n g s could be different." Hindess and Hirst separate ideas, from t h e things t h e ideas relate t o , as a form of c o n c e p t u a l essentialism; ideas have been so distanced from things t h a t t h e world is left as it is. This is clear, for e x a m p l e , in their rejection of t h e idea " o f m o n e y as a sign and t h u s m o n e y as t h e measure of value." (MCCT, II: 14 t h e " a n d t h u s " as so oftendoes n o t follow, b u t we will let t h a t go). T h e y stress t h a t this m e a n s we have t o u n d e r s t a n d " c o m m o d i t i e s , m o n e y , e t c " as entities, as things. Not, t h a t is, ways of seeing/saying things. Marx frequently n o t e d how an " u n c r i t i c a l idealism" regarding concepts eventuates in an " u n c r i t i c a l positivism" regarding t h e world. Such c o n c e p t s are n o t free-floating, t h e y are "categories for t h e p h e n o m e n a l forms of essential relations." These forms may be, and in capitalism frequently are, systematically misleading, t h u s t o begin with " p u r e " c o n c e p t s entails t h e theoretical r e p r o d u c t i o n of precisely t h a t Obvious, taken-for-granted world which socialists o u g h t t o be overcoming.
14

This s y s t e m a t i c r e p r o d u c t i o n is c o m p o u n d e d b y w h a t we can only charitably call a partial reading of t h e " G r e a t M a r x i s t s " t h e y c o n s t a n t l y invoke. T h u s , for a single e x a m p l e , t h e y use a q u o t a t i o n from Lenin's " T h e discussion of self-determination s u m m e d u p " at least t h r e e t i m e s ' to justify their general a r g u m e n t for t h e "specificity" (i.e. t h e non-classrelatedness) of the political. T h e r e is within this single textlet alone t h e range of Lenin's workscope for a different i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and we urge readers t o s t u d y his whole t e x t . T h e point is simply t h a t Lenin does not begin with perfect c o n c e p t s and then engage in an analysis, he is enmeshed in a set of struggles. His work is, in fact, riddled with contradictionsas is Bolshevismbecause of t h e e x t r e m e l y c o m p l e x p r o b l e m s of socialist c o n s t r u c t i o n .
5

A related way in which Hindess and Hirst r e p r o d u c e " t h e O b v i o u s " involves their typically K a u t s k y a n ( a n d Leninist in t h e sense of What is to he doner') c o n c e p t i o n of where correct ideas c o m e from. Certainly, it seems, not from political struggles waged b y s u b o r d i n a t e d g r o u p s . Our scholars systematically misread t h e fragility and c o m p l e x i t y of historical experience, seeing in povertyas Marx argued against Proudhonnothing b u t poverty. T h e y t h u s fail t o see t h e ways in which an a p p a r e n t a c c e p t a n c e of t h e " p o w e r s t h a t b e " can a c c o m p a n y a sustained c o n t e m p t for t h o s e powers. Power has t o be respectedit can only be treated lightly b y t h o s e w h o have never felt, or w h o no longer feel, its consequences. Mao, in various speeches, has outlined this in a c o h e r e n t p r o g r a m m e : strategically we should despise all our enemies, b u t tactically we must t a k e t h e m seriously. If we d o n o t despise t h e m strategically, we can easily b e c o m e

HINDESS & HIRST: A CRITICAL REVIEW

199

o p p o r t u n i s t , "all u n i t y and n o s t r u g g l e " ; if w e refuse t o t a k e t h e allpervasive p r o b l e m s of capitalism seriously, w e shall m a k e adventurist errors, "all struggle and n o u n i t y . " T h e w o r k of E d w a r d Thompson has d e m o n s t r a t e d h o w t h e English working class was m a d e b y taking capitalism seriously in each and every particular whilst retaining an extensive c o n t e m p t for it, manifest in m a n y ways (several of them theoretical) as intense resistance. Speaking of an earlier period, T h o m p s o n has recently argued h o w within an a p p a r e n t " h e g e m o n y " t h e s u b o r d i n a t e d g r o u p s d o n o t a c c e p t t h e definitions forced u p o n t h e m from above, h o w , in s u m , t h e r e is an alternative culture w h i c h " c o n s t i t u t e s an ever present t h r e a t t o official descriptions of r e a l i t y . "
1 6 17

"Classical marxism" and production We should, of course, k n o w b e t t e r t h a n t o talk of origins. But w h e n t h e classical marxism Hindess and Hirst " p r o b l e m a t i s e " as often as n o t t u r n s o u t t o have been given its p h e n o m e n a l form in certain seminars which graced t h e Ecole N o r m a l e Superieure in 1 9 6 5 , there is a p o i n t in drawing a t t e n t i o n t o t h e fact. Hor these o b s c u r a n t i s t s r e p e a t e d l y w r i t e as if classical marxism, in their version, and their o w n " a l t e r n a t i v e " e x h a u s t e d all possibilities. T h e r h y t h m i c emphasis "Hither. . ." "or. . ." is one of their favourite devices:
Either, economism, or the non-correspondence of political forcesthat is the choice which faces M a r x i s m .
18

Hither the articulation of relations and forces of production is conceived in terms of s o m e kind of necessity so that the character of one thing [N.B.] the relations or the forces, is deducible from the concept of the other, or it must [N.B.] be conceived in terms of the connection between social relations and the forms in which their conditions of existence are secured. (MCCT, I: 226) Either economism: political and cultural means of representation are determined by the e c o n o m y . Or the means of representation are not determined by the e c o n o m y and there is no necessity for the political and cultural representation of classes and their interests. The choice for Marxism is clear. Either we effectively reduce political and ideological phenomena to class interests determined elsewhere (basically in the e c o n o m y ) . . . Or we must face up to the real a u t o n o m y of political and ideological phenomena. . ,
1 9

We shall r e t u r n t o these n o t i o n s in a later section, w e cite t h e passages t o s h o w t h e form of their discourse either this Active dogmatically f o r m u l a t e d version of classical marxism or t h e latest, sensible cure-all bearing their own brand-name.

200

THE SOCIALIST REGISTER 1978

This is n o t t o d e n y t h a t t h e r e are p r o b l e m s with t h e claimcentrally advanced by Marx's 1 8 5 9 Preface (even if t a k e n with Engels' clarifications of t h e 1 8 9 0 s ) t h a t t h e e c o n o m i c is d e t e r m i n a n t in t h e last instance. Both " u l t i m a t e " in " u l t i m a t e d e t e r m i n a t i o n " and " r e l a t i v e " in "relative a u t o n o m y " are capacious c o n c e p t s . Althusser's own solution is well k n o w n : a n y social f o r m a t i o n has several distinct " i n s t a n c e s " , t h e e c o n o m i c , t h e political, t h e ideological, e t c . At any given t i m e these are related t h r o u g h a " s t r u c t u r e in d o m i n a n c e " in which t h e e c o n o m i c d e t e r m i n e s t h r o u g h t h e c o m b i n e d effectivity of all t h e instances. We are t h u s talking, t o use Althusser's t e r m s , of a structural rather t h a n a mechanical causality. What m a t t e r s here is t h a t this c o n c e p t i o n is t a k e n b y o u r luminaries as "classically m a r x i s t " (Cf. MCCT, I: Ch. 7). A n d , in their usual pioneering way ( t h e relevant p o i n t s being m a d e a d e c a d e previously, in reviews of Reading Capital, b y G l u c k s m a n n and P o u l a n t z a s ) t h e y have " d i s c o v e r e d " w h e r e Ecole N o r m a l e m a r x i s m w e n t w r o n g . Teleology, needless t o say: Althusser's s t r u c t u r a l causality entails t h e clearly teleological claim t h a t " t h e e c o n o m y secures its o w n c o n d i t i o n s of existence in t h e form of suitable political a n d cultural-ideological levels." (MCCT, /. 2 2 3 ) This error it is argued, springs from Althusser's " r a t i o n a l i s m " :
20 21

transposing a relation between concepts, between the concept of an e c o n o m y on the one hand and those of its conditions of existence on the other, into a relation of determination between objects. . . (MCCT, /. 2 2 3 ; Cf. MCCT, II. 241f)

T o regard c o n c e p t s as descriptive of real objects in no w a y necessitates ascribing t h o s e objects t h e p o w e r t o secure their o w n c o n d i t i o n s . But we willa^ainlet t h a t (as w i t h m a n y " s l i p p e r y " features of their logic) pass since w h a t interests us is their ensuing a r g u m e n t . F r o m t h e valid p o i n t t h a t :
if relations of production presupposes [sic] conditions of existence provided by other social relations they cannot generate those conditions or determine the social relations which provide them. (MCCT, I: 2 2 7 )

a n u m b e r of critical conclusions are d r a w n . First, it is argued, a n y "last i n s t a n c e " thesis m u s t in c o n s e q u e n c e be a b a n d o n e d , and t h e same holds for any p o s t u l a t e of forces/relations c o r r e s p o n d e n c e . S e c o n d , in t h e absence of t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e p o s t u l a t e and t h e last instance clause, t h e r e remains no g o o d reason for according t h e m o d e of p r o d u c t i o n t h e p r i m a c y it has t r a d i t i o n a l l y enjoyed in historical materialism. F o r t h e m , w h a t results is:
a reduced concept of a mode of production consisting of an e c o n o m y , a definite combination of relations and forces of production, having definite political, legal

HINDESS & HIRST: A CRITICAL REVIEW

201

and cultural conditions of existence which cannot be secured through the action of the e c o n o m y itself. (MCCT, I: 224)

The p r i m a r y object of marxist analysis ought t o be t h e social f o r m a t i o n u n d e r s t o o d as " a definite set of relations of p r o d u c t i o n together with t h e e c o n o m i c , cultural a n d political forms in which these c o n d i t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n are s e c u r e d . " (MCCT, 1: 2 2 2 , o u r emphasis) Third, and m o r e specifically, given this general non-derivability of social f o r m a t i o n from m o d e of p r o d u c t i o n , o u r a u t h o r s conclude t h a t :
political institutions and practices, ideologies and other cultural forms cannot be conceived as classes [sic] or the direct representation of their interests. (MCCT, I231-2)

Classes are "categories of e c o n o m i c a g e n t s " , defined b y their relations of possession of/exclusion from t h e means of p r o d u c t i o n , n o m o r e . This is t h e basis, t h r o u g h necessary n o n - c o r r e s p o n d e n c e and massive circularity, for t h e n o t o r i o u s revisionism of t h e conclusions t o MCCT, II At this p o i n t it is p e r t i n e n t t o d o s o m e t h i n g no longer t h o u g h t w o r t h while by m a n y marxists, in their haste t o t r u m p t h e latest cards in t h e Parisian packlook at M a r x . We will start w h e r e so m a n y have before, with t h e m u c h maligned 1 8 5 9 Preface. This informs us t h a t "social p r o d u c t i o n " entails "definite r e l a t i o n s " :
2 2

The totality of these relations of production constitutes the e c o n o m i c structure of societythe real foundation, on which legal and political superstructures arise and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond. The mode of production of material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual process of l i f e .
23

Let us begin with an a p p a r e n t lacuna. Neither here, nor a n y w h e r e else within t h e 1 8 5 9 Preface, does Marx enlighten us as to w h a t sort of social relation m a y or m a y n o t be a relation of p r o d u c t i o n . Unlike Hindess and Hirst ( a n d virtually all marxists since Engels) he provides no substantive definition whatsoever. Had Marx's latest revisers t r o u b l e d t o glance back b e y o n d 1 9 6 5 , t o t h o s e t e x t s of t h e 1840s which t h e 1 8 5 9 Preface q u i t e explicitly summarises, this " o m i s s i o n " might have given t h e m pause. The German Ideology (a work falling uneasily, in Althusser's fragmented Marx, b e t w e e n t h e p u r i t y of m a t u r i t y and t h e danger of y o u t h ) explains w h y Marx could not consistently have given a n y such specification of t h e concept:
definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into these definite social and political relations. Empirical observation must in each separate

202

THE SOCIALIST REGISTER 1978

instance bring out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation, the connection of the social and political structure with p r o d u c t i o n .
24

On this premise t h e only general c o n c e p t of p r o d u c t i o n relations we can develop is precisely t h e empirically o p e n - e n d e d o n e implicit in t h e 1859 Preface, viz., a n y social relation indispensable to a n y such m o d e . Since, f u r t h e r m o r e , " t h e e c o n o m i c s t r u c t u r e of s o c i e t y " comprises t h e t o t a l i t y of these p r o d u c t i o n relations, we c a n n o t p r o d u c e a substantive a priori definition of t h a t either. We have, t h e r e f o r e , n o g r o u n d s for a priori inclusion or exclusion of any substantively defined class of relation from " t h e e c o n o m y . " What defines a relation as e c o n o m i c c a n n o t be a n y innate p r o p e r t y which is t o be a p p r e h e n d e d o u t s i d e of historical c o n t e x t , b u t simply its indispensability t o a given " w a y in which people p r o d u c e their means of s u b s i s t e n c e . " If this is t h e " e c o n o m i c s t r u c t u r e " , w h a t t h e n of t h e " s u p e r s t r u c t u r e ? " The foregoing shows how there can be clearly necessary political, legal and cultural relations of productionrelations internal, that is, t o t h e e c o n o m i c structurewhich means t h a t t h e n o t i o n of " t h e political" etc., as distinct, as practices, as levels, as instances, or as institutions within a social formation, is distinctly d u b i o u s . Let us r e t u r n t o o u r t e x t again. Later in t h e 1 8 5 9 Preface, Marx writes:
25

With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations, the distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the e c o n o m i c conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophicalin short, ideological forms in which men b e c o m e conscious of this conflict I that of forces/relations] and fight it o u t .
2 6

What we suggest is t h a t t h e b a s e / s u p e r s t r u c t u r e m e t a p h o r relates t o the latter forms of consciousness alone. This has additional w a r r a n t from t h e e m p l o y m e n t , in The German Ideology, of t h e adjective "idealistic" or " i d e o l o g i c a l " w h e n e v e r t h e m e t a p h o r of s u p e r s t r u c t u r e is u s e d . T o e x t e n d t h e a r g u m e n t . Capital, as a n u m b e r of recent a u t h o r s have established, is, inter alia, an e x p l a n a t i o n of ideology. Marx seeks to c o m b a t t h e w a y s in which t h e a p p a r e n t separability of " i d e a s " actually diminishes t h e p o w e r of h u m a n g r o u p s . Moreover, when this separation is challenged
2 7 2 8

"Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology as well as the forms of consciousness corresponding to these, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence."
29

T h a t f o r m u l a t i o n , again, is t a k e n from The German Ideology. T o return t o Capital: t h e r e Marx explains t h e illusions of capitalist p r o d u c t i o n in t e r m s

HINDESS & HIRST: A CRITICAL REVIEW

203

of t h e material e x p e r i e n c e which sustains t h e m . He distinguishes, specifically, b e t w e e n w h a t he calls essential relations, capitalism's " m a t e r i a l g r o u n d w o r k or set of c o n d i t i o n s of e x i s t e n c e , " and t h e phenomenal forms in which these relations manifest themselves in o u r daily experience. It is t h e empirically explicable deceptiveness of t h e latter w h i c h a c c o u n t s for t h e ideological character of o u r " s p o n t a n e o u s " c o n c e p t i o n s , of " t h e O b v i o u s . " We are arguing t h a t t h e b a s e / s u p e r s t r u c t u r e m e t a p h o r can best be unders t o o d as a popularised expression of j u s t this distinction. T h e base is t h e t o t a l i t y of p r o d u c t i o n relations, in t h e sense clarified a b o v e ; t h e supers t r u c t u r e is n o t a separate b o d y or kind(s) of relations, b u t s i m p l y the p h e n o m e n a l forms in which these selfsame relations of p r o d u c t i o n manifest themselves " o n t h e surface of s o c i e t y " and t o w h i c h everyday c o n c e p t i o n s c o m m o n sense, in brief"correspond." S u c h w o u l d include n o t o n l y t h e n u m e r o u s deceptive " e c o n o m i c " forms which Marx analysed in Capital, b u t equally, a n d f r o m o u r p o i n t of view crucially, t h e apparently independent legal and political " i n s t a n c e s " of b o u r g e o i s s o c i e t y . It is supremely ironical, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t m a n y marxists have t a k e n t h e b a s e / s u p e r s t r u c t u r e m e t a p h o r as an o r t h o d o x y , as a m o d e l . Our recent epigones go furtherthey celebrate t h e separateness and a u t o n o m y of all t h e s e fetishized appearances, here again t h e y translate qualities of relations into things!
3 0 31

O u r reading here, finally, forces us t o r e t h i n k d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h e " B a s e " will have m u c h t h a t is " n o n - e c o n o m i c " within it, while links b e t w e e n " b a s e " a n d " s u p e r s t r u c t u r e " c a n n o t b e t h o s e of e x t e r n a l cause, b u t are internal relations. As M a c l n t y r e arguedbefore 1 9 6 5 :
As Marx depicts it the relation between basis and superstructure is fundamentally not only not mechanical, it is not even causal. What may be misleading is Marx's Hegelian vocabulary. Marx certainly talks of the basis "determining" the superstructure and of a "correspondence" between them. But the reader of Hegel's Logic will realise that what Marx envisages is something to be understood in terms of the way in which the nature of the concept of a given class, for example may determine the concept of membership of that class. . . The e c o n o m i c basis of a society is not its tools, but the people co-operating using these particular tools in the manner necessary to their use, and the superstructure consists of the social consciousness moulded by and the shape of this c o o p e r a t i o n .
32

F u n d a m e n t a l l y a n d this t h e y share n o t o n l y w i t h Ecole N o r m a l e marxism b u t w i t h m a n y othersHindess and Hirst misunderstood p r o d u c t i o n . This has been t h e central t h e m e of o u r writings for s o m e y e a r s so we can be brief. Marx included within " t h e e c o n o m i c s t r u c t u r e of s o c i e t y " all social relations entailed in a given m o d e of p r o d u c t i o n ; he sees t h e " s u p e r s t r u c t u r e " as t h e f o r m s (including t h e m e n t a l c o n c e p t s and images) in which these relations are presented. T h e entire Hindess and Hirst project rests u p o n a fallacious p r o b l e m . T h e r e is no q u e s t i o n of having t o d e d u c e n o n - d e d u c i b l e c o n d i t i o n s of existence from t h e concept of an
3 3

S .R.

204

THE SOCIALIST REGISTER 1 9 7 8

e c o n o m y or having t o a t t r i b u t e t o this e c o n o m y t h e p o w e r t o secure t h e m . First, t h e relevant c o n c e p t (if it is to be a c c u r a t e to reality and n o t "forcibly a b s t r a c t e d " ) includes " n o n - e c o n o m i c " c o n d i t i o n s ; s e c o n d , it is n o t in a n y case a m a t t e r of d e d u c t i o n . What is or is not g e r m a n e to p r o d u c t i o n is t o be ascertained empirically; scientific c o n c e p t s are
34

a posteriori c o n s t r u c t s . Starting with a false p r o b l e m , e m p l o y i n g a conventionalist e p i s t e m o l o g y and an a prioristic m e t h o d o l o g y , o u r a u t h o r s p r o d u c e n o t so m u c h false, as r e d u n d a n t s o l u t i o n s . With a m o r e realistic c o n c e p t of p r o d u c t i o n , o n e which is f u n d a m e n t a l l y neither a prioristic nor r e d u c t i o n i s t ( b u t is b o t h materialist a n d historical) there is n o need t o e x p u n g e t h e central place which social relations and social forms of p r o d u c t i o n have always had within marxism. As t h e Gruudrisse phrases it:
When we consider. . . society in the long view and as a whole, then the final result of the process of social production always appears as the society itself, i.e. the human being in all its social relations. . . The conditions and objectifications of the process are themselves equally m o m e n t s of it. . .
3 S

P r o d u c t i o n entails definite social (political, legal, m o r a l , cultural. . .) relations a n d t h u s their " s u p e r s t r u c t u r a l " forms of m a n i f e s t a t i o n ; t h a t is ( p a r t of) w h a t it is. T o say this does not entail a claim t o t h e effect t h a t all social relations are " r e d u c i b l e " t o p r o d u c t i o n , t h e q u e s t i o n is always an empirical o n e . Marx held t h a t as a m a t t e r of fact p r o d u c t i o n relations were t h e core social relationsestablishing t h e limits of variation for given epochsin all h i t h e r t o existing f o r m a t i o n s . Indeed, o n e w a y in which he conceptualised c o m m u n i s t society was in t e r m s of t h e m o r e conscious and m o r e collective recognition/realisation of t h e centrality of p r o d u c t i o n relations. In such a social f o r m a t i o n politics would b e c o m e t h e " a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h i n g s " because t h e " v i o l e n c e of t h i n g s " w o u l d be diminished as t h e e m a n c i p a t i o n of labour begins.
* * *

Necessary non-correspondence and circularity As S t u a r t Hall has perceptively noticed, w h a t Hirst

proposes is a necessary noncorrespondenceleading, as he quite rigorously understands, to the absolute a u t o n o m y of all practices, the impossibility of history and the abandoning of any concept of " c o m p l e x u n i t y . "
36

In particular, t h e r e is a sustained series of a r g u m e n t s ( r e p e a t e d in different t e x t s in almost t h e same words) t o " p r o v e " t h a t class should o n l y refer to categories of economic agents. In this perspective class struggle b e c o m e s

HIND ESS & HIRST: A CRITICAL REVIEW

205

" t h e struggle of organised bodies of labourers and capitalists" t h a t is " e c o n o m i c class r e l a t i o n s " plus " t h e intervention of definite political, legal, and cultural d e t e r m i n a t i o n s . " T h e r e are a c u t e tensions here:
Where there are capitalist relations of production there must political forces, (our e m p h a s i s )
37

be conflicting

Where there are economic class-relations there must be political and ideological forces having different effects on those classes. (MCCT, I: 2 4 1 , our emphasis) A precondition for political programmes adapted to the conditions of struggle is a recognition of basic political realities and the limits they enforce. It is toward this end that this book is directed. (MCCT, II: 2 9 3 , our emphasis)

T h e r e are p r o b l e m s with t h e force of t h e " m u s t " and " l i m i t s " in these s t a t e m e n t s . T h e second q u o t a t i o n c o n t i n u e s :
But there are no grounds for supposing that these forces are the products of the classes representing themselves and their interests in political and ideological forms. There is no necessity for political and ideological forces to be polarised around the membership of the different classes. (MCCT, /. 241-242)

T h e " g r o u n d s " here seems t o relate t o historical investigations; t h e " n e c e s s i t y " (like t h e uses of " a u t o m a t i c a l l y " o r "essentially" in o t h e r q u o t a t i o n s ) simply caricatures historical materialism. Socialist g r o u p s have paid a t t e n t i o n t o t h e c o n t r a d i c t o r y n a t u r e of political and cultural relations since t h e 1830s. But, of course, having declared (along with Henry Ford) t h a t history is rubbish, o u r Confusiuses will n o t discover a n y t h i n g of t h e real f o u n d a t i o n s of socialist c o n s t r u c t i o n . In fact, because t h e y d o n o t u n d e r s t a n d p r o d u c t i o n , t h e y simply split off a t h o r o u g h l y e c o n o m i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n of " t h e e c o n o m y " (with, now, " e c o n o m i c a g e n t s " ) from ideational versions of all o t h e r p r o d u c t i o n relations. This distinctive m e t h o d o l o g y has been generalised in Hirst's m u c h q u o t e d analysis of " t h e classic [N.B.] p r o b l e m of i d e o l o g y " : this it seems, requires:
that there be a correspondence (the latter determines the former) and a noncorrespondence (the former misrepresents the latter) between ideology and the reality it represents.
38

This, it must i m m e d i a t e l y be stressed, presupposes (i) t h a t " c o r r e s p o n d i n g " relations are " d e t e r m i n i n g " relations b e t w e e n independent entities, and (ii) t h a t ideology is simply ideational. But, let us follow t h e vanguard further:

206

THE SOCIALIST REGISTER 1978

If there is any determining action of the means of representation in constituting what is "represented" by them then these forms of correspondence/noncorrespondence are shattered. There is no necessary relation between the conditions of existence of the means of representation and what is produced by those means, no necessity that they "represent" those conditions. (IbiJ.)

We d o not k n o w a n y " m e a n s of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " t h a t cannot assist in constituting w h a t it representswhether it is t h e code of t h e Hollywood cinema, t h e materials used b y J.M.W. T u r n e r or t h e language on this p a g e . The second part of t h e q u o t a t i o n is confused, t h e point being not t h a t means of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (sign systems) d e m o n s t r a t e their own c o n d i t i o n s of existence in w h a t t h e y represent ( b u t it is necessarily t h e case t h a t their o w n c o n d i t i o n s have t o be sustained and r e p r o d u c e d ) b u t t h a t t h e y represent quite other realities. T h a t is to say, with Marx, t h a t representations (and images) of t h e real relations can never totally e x h a u s t c o n c r e t e reality. Indeed to d o g m a t i z e t h e correctness of " T h e o r y " or " S c i e n c e " will distort and even prevent h u m a n e m a n c i p a t i o n . For Marx, t h e task of science was t o m a k e possible t h e accelerated t r a n s f o r m a t i o n (and n o t merely u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) of t h e realms of s t u b b o r n , human-limiting, " o b j e c t i v i t y . " T h u s are t h e b o u n d a r i e s of necessity to be pushed back! But then Hirst and his colleagues have a b a n d o n e d scientific socialism in favour of t h e rule of discoursea fitting slogan for these a u t h o r s .
3 9

Having s u n d e r e d p r o d u c t i o n relations, it is t o be e x p e c t e d t h a t their t e x t s will be disfigured by a c o n s t a n t circularity which, if w e m a y play their game for a m o m e n t , was inscribed in their project from t h e start. Their claim t o found a newly cleansed politics is simply not s u b s t a n t i a t e d . As P u t n a m has seen, their w o r k argues t h a t c o n c e p t s " a r e formed and d e p l o y e d in t h e definition and solutions posed b y political practice. . . Hindess and Hirst's g r o u n d is t h e c o n s t a n t l y shifting o n e of political p r a c t i c e . " But we t h e n have to ask with G r a h a m Burchell " w h a t is this 'politics' of which t h e y s p e a k ? " It follows, it seems, t h a t :
40 4 1

Accepting non-correspondence means abandoning the evaluation of political forces in terms of correspondence, and evaluating them instead relative to one's conception of socialist organisation and ideology and relevant to one's conception of the dominant political i s s u e s .
42

Really? One's very own j u d g e m e n t s ? Matters b e c o m e murkier since evaluating ideologies " a l w a y s entails political calculation and always takes place from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of a political p o s i t i o n . " Whilst politics must be evaluated " i n t e r m s of a definite c o n c e p t i o n of socialist organisation and ideology and an e s t i m a t i o n of t h e d o m i n a n t political issues of t h e d a y . " (MCCT, I: 2 3 8 ) This is their " s o l u t i o n " , vicious circularity: ideologies
43

HINDESS & HIRST: A CRITICAL REVIEW

207

m u s t be evaluated from a political position and political positions m u s t be calculated from a (correct) ideological c o m m i t m e n t . T h e latter entails a n o t i o n of " s o c i a l i s m " . How is this defined?
Socialism is a political ideology which bases itself on the objective of constructing a planned and non c o m m o d i t y form of production and distribution. . . (MCCT, II. Cf. MCCT, I: 491.) If there is no revolutionary conjuncture, the process of socialist construction must first take the form of building the economic and political conditions (N.B.] for a socialist e c o n o m y . (Ibid., 2 6 4 )

But t h e r e are p r o b l e m s entailed in t h e m o r e detailed specification. Firstafter m u c h rolling of d r u m s and clashing of cymbalswhat t h e y revealingly call t h e " d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n reform and revolution m u s t collapse." (MCCT, /. 3 1 7 ) This is:
4 4

Socialist politics can no longer be conceived as necessarily oriented toward the one big push that finally knocks capitalism out of the w a y and clears the ground for something else. (Ibid.) An anti-capitalist standpoint need not imply ignorance of the role of management or an inability to intervene with a definite position on questions of capitalist organisation or calculation where there is political debate and a question of public policy. (MCCT, II. 260)

Who really o p e r a t e s o n t h e big push t h e o r y as a set of tactics? Who does n o t o p e r a t e o n t h e basis of being able t o u n d e r s t a n d capitalism? T h e p r o b l e m is precisely t h e relation b e t w e e n these t w o kinds of worksome e l e m e n t of t h e f o r m e r ' s t o t a l view, its sustained c o n t e m p t , has t o be retained. Or, if t h e latter alone is extensively practised t h e n precisely t h a t " r e f o r m i s m " t h e y castigate w i t h i n t h e leaders of T r a d e s Unions and t h e L a b o u r Party is w h a t results. S e c o n d , while t h e y correctly s u p p o r t Marx's c o n t e n t i o n t h a t " p l a n n e d a n d co-operative p r o d u c t i o n " :
would overcome the "anarchy" of capitalist production. . . In doing so socialism must deconstruct capitalist forms of economic organisation; breaking up the forms of independence Marx calls socialisation. (MCCT, 151)

T h e y s h o w real restrictions o n this " d e c o n s t r u c t i o n . " T h e y accept t h e distorting prism of " n a t i o n a l " e c o n o m y n o t as t h e obvious and e l e m e n t a r y starting p o i n t , b u t as t h e final constraints and c o n d i t i o n s of socialist struggle. (MCCT, IT. 243f.) T h e y also declare:
Most advanced capitalist societies have removed significant areas of education

208

THE SOCIALIST REGISTER 1 9 7 8

from the sphere of c o m m o d i t y forms of distribution and several have done the same for the distribution of medical care. (MCCT, /. 317; Cf. MCCT, II: 264f., 285f.)

This (and from Hirst

follows from their reductionist a n d e c o n o m i s t i c notion of p r o d u c t i o n their decision t h a t " c o m m o d i t i e s , m o n e y , e t c . " are entities). They t h e same premisesoperate with a n impoverished n o t i o n of power. has a r g u e d :

I would assert that. . . outside specific institutional forms state power does not exist. . . Classes d o not have "interests" and are not political actors. Only definite organisations, or even individual agents, are political forces. . .
4 S

F r o m this, of course, it

follows:

State apparatuses and their powers have differential degrees of utilisation in the promotion of socialist policies, they d o not form "one reactionary mass", any more than the "state" forms a single entity (except in the constitutional sense). (MCCT, II: 2 6 7 , our emphases)

We are into t h e land of " t a k i n g p o w e r " a n d n o t " t r a n s f o r m i n g circumstances a n d selves." Unless socialist c o n s t r u c t i o n is concerned t o challenge each a n d every relation, image a n d "fact"and t o t r a n s f o r m t h e m where t h e y are found t o relate t o capitalist m o d e s of p r o d u c t i o n or o t h e r forms of i n h u m a n c o n s t r a i n t , t h e n w h a t is called " s o c i a l i s m " will r e p r o d u c e d o m i n a t i o n , s u b o r d i n a t i o n a n d i m p o v e r i s h m e n t . If y o u take away history as fictive delusionsthen all this d a n g e r o u s nonsense follows. In fact, S t a t e apparatuses c o n d e n s e a n d represent centuries of b l o o d y f o r m a t i o n , alwaysever ( t o sing their t u n e for a s e c o n d ) against class alternatives a n d "foreign c o m p e t i t i o n " , favouring particular forms of capitalist p r o d u c t i o n . This has been well d o c u m e n t e d in t h e case of England since t h e start of t h e 1 6 t h century. I n n o c e n t l y use a n y of t h o s e cultural or political relations of p r o d u c t i o n specifically forged internally in capitalism's long rule a n d y o u will r e p r o d u c e t h e d e f o r m a t i o n s a n d crippling agonies of capitalist p r o d u c t i o n a n d divert, slow-down o r even halt ( a n d perhaps reverse) t h e long struggle for socialist forms of life.
4 6

Conclusion: on the political necessity of history Hindess a n d Hirst a n d their co-workers r e p r o d u c e t h e Obvious world. T h e y d o n o t provide us with a n y means of c o m p r e h e n d i n g t h a t world as historically c o n s t r u c t e d . T h e y d o n o t share Marx's c o m m i t m e n t t o t h e fact t h a t things could be different. T h e y d o n o t u n d e r s t a n d t h a t for Marx

HINDESS & HIRST: A CRITICAL REVIEW

209

(and others) socialist c o n s t r u c t i o n entails t h e s i m u l t a n e o u s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of circumstances (things) and people themselves. In this revolutionas Marx defined it through his lifeall t h e c o m p l i c a t e d l y c o n n e c t e d relations and forms of capitalist p r o d u c t i o n must be subject to t h e most c o m p r e h e n sivebecause collective, as for o n c e t h e s u b o r d i n a t e d can t a k e their destiny into their own handsscrutiny and change. What we find in these textsapart from a general historical ignorance (which does n o t , of course, stop historical facts from being e m p l o y e d , Cf. VICCT, lh 24X, 2 4 9 , 251)is a failure t o c o m e to grips with t h e ways that socialist practices in t h e last ten years have challenged and o p e n e d what was taken as marxist political t h e o r y . For t h e m , for example, Mind is n o t only all b u t sexed:
No one in his right mind would consider that the conditions for a revolutionary seizure of power exist in this country. (MCCT, II. 2 4 0 ; Cf. [bid., p. 260)

The manliness of mind is, as t h e y say, " p e r t i n e n t in its effects" (does it not also reveal its c o n d i t i o n s of existence?).
The category of economic agents is fissured by numerous divisions with various determinations and effects (differences of income, working conditions, type of occupation, "race", nation and region, to name the major ones). (MCCT, II: 258)
4 7

Their general strategy involves:

taking seriously issues that may, superficially, appear remote from socialism and giving them a high order of priority in the struggle. Issues such as civil rights, the position of w o m e n , the control of environment and living space, all involve moving outside the traditional appeals of workerism. (MCCT, II: 2 9 2 , our emphasis)

This is not merely a polemical p o i n t either. Lucy Bland, Harrison, Frank Mort and Christine Weedon have n o t e d :

Rachel

it is their initial failure, in the construction of their problematic [in PC.MP], to reveal that sex and gender relations are power relations (involving domination and subordination) which enables Hindess and Hirst to consider the maintenance and reproduction of social relations as relatively u n i m p o r t a n t .
48

In a sense, the internal consistency of Hindess and Hirst's conceptual framework can remain intact by virtue of the absence of what is perhaps the most significant determinant in those societies, that is, the level of gender politics. What we would question here is not merely an omission from their analysis, but the overall conceptualisation of the political level itself. (Ibid., p. 160)

210

THE SOCIALIST REGISTER 1978

A l t h o u g h this is said of early pre-capitalist societies (and PCMP), things have n o t progressed. There are m a n y similar absences. It is as well t o remembersince his apostles have clearly forgotten that Althusser celebrates (in a form and to a degree with which we entirely concur) Marx's theoretical discovery as " t h e c o n t i n e n t of h i s t o r y . " In t h e same t e x t , Althusser also stressed t h a t :
There is no such thing as a process except in relations (sous des rapports): the relations of production ( t o which Capital is restricted) and other (political, ideological r e l a t i o n s .
49

Marx's m e t h o d c a n n o t be b r o k e n into (correct) analytic and (false) historic p o r t i o n s : Marx's n o t i o n of a critique establishes " t h e points where historical investigation must e n t e r i n . " Marx's critique p r o d u c e s concepts which are rational for analytic purposes, as " p r i m a r y e q u a t i o n s . . . which point t o w a r d s a past lying behind the s y s t e m " (Ibid.) they expose neither t h e naturalness nor t h e logicality of p h e n o m e n a l f o r m s / c o n c e p t s , but their historicity. Hindess and Hirst, b y contrast, engage in conceptual reproduction: handing us back a mystified version of t h e Obvious, a dehistoricized, universalised, mentalized, desocialized world in which t h e violence of things and t h e separateness of p h e n o m e n a are n o t simply massively evident b u t positively celebrated.
s o

Hindess and Hirst are part of t h o s e w h o m Marx called t h e "vulgar m o b " w h o offer us such scraps of bourgeois wisdom as that t h e s t u d y of history is " n o t only scientifically b u t also politically valueless." (I'CMl', p. 312). We call t h e m bourgeois because t h a t is w h o m their anti-history premises serve. Marx was clear o n this very p o i n t :
from the moment that the bourgeois mode of production and the conditions of production and distribution which correspond to it are recognised as historical, the delusion of regarding them as natural laws of production vanishes and the prospect opens up of a new society. . .
s l

T o s u p p o r t Marx here is n o t to d e n y t h e difficulty of t h e struggles for t h a t society. Socialist c o n s t r u c t i o n begins long before a n y convenient b e n c h m a r k called ' " T h e " revolution and has t o work within t h e area of t h e o r y because it begins and c o n t i n u e s with a c o m m i t m e n t t o practical materialism. We are also stressing t h a t t h e resources of socialist construction are already herethey are, moreover, t h e only resources t h e r e arethe h u m a n beings w h o s e current labour sustains capital's rule and w h o s e images and relations are " s t a m p e d and m a r k e d " " t h r o u g h and t h r o u g h " as Marx and Lenin agreed, with t h e restrictions of capitalism. Neither, finally, are we denying t h a t during t h e long struggle for c o m m u n i s m there will have t o be struggles (as part of t h e way that a u t h e n t i c socialist c o n s t r u c t i o n is m a d e

HINDESS & HIRST: A CRITICAL REVIEW possible) against forms of domination and restriction not

211 directly or

generated within, although frequently r e l a t i o n s . We are t h i n k i n g identified between in t h e

sustained o r utilised b y , capitalist Differences and mental

here of r e l a t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e d as " g e n d e r "

" r a c e (skin c o l o u r ) " o r t h o s e f o u n d e d u p o n t h e T h r e e G r e a t h i s t o r y of socialist c o n s t r u c t i o n in t h i s and agrarian production, town and industrial

centurythose country

c e n t r a l l y relevant t o t h e t e x t s w e have b e e n criticisingbetween and manual labour. T h e real e m a n c i p a t i o n in t e r m s of a c c u m u l a t e d of l a b o u r entails a struggle on t h e

broadest major

f r o n t a n d in t h a t struggle historical materialismmarxist t h e o r y u n d e r s t o o d historical experienceremains our only and f u n d a m e n t a l s t a r t i n g p o i n t .

NOTES 1. MPSF was published b y Macmillan in 1 9 7 7 ; PCMP ( 1 9 7 5 ) and MCCT, I ( 1 9 7 7 ) and / / ( 1 9 7 8 ) all by Routledge. T h e latter rwo-volume work was jointly written with A n t h o n y Cutler and Athar Hussain. Other relevant major texts axe-.llirst: "Economic classes and politics" in A. Hunt (ed.) Class and class structure, Lawrence & Wishart, 1 9 7 7 (cited as "Hirst in Hunt"), "Althusser and the theory of ideology", Economy and Society 5(4) 1 9 7 6 ; Hindess: "The concept of class in Marxist theory and Marxist politics" in J. Bloomfield (ed.) Class, k.gemony and party, Lawrence & Wishart, 1 9 7 7 (cited as "Hindess in Bloomfield"), "Classes and politics in Marxist theory" in G. Lirtlejohn (et. al. eds.) Power and the State, Croom Helm, 1 9 7 8 (cited as "Hindess in Littlejohn"). Major reviews are: PCMP: J. Taylor, Critique of Anthropology ( 4 / 5 ) 1 9 7 5 and (6) 1 9 7 6 ; T. Asad and H. Wolpe, Economy and Society, 5(4) 1 9 7 6 ; R. Aya, Theory & Society 3(4) 1 9 7 6 and Monthly Review 29 (8) 1 9 7 8 ; D. Sayer, Sociology, 11(1)1977; S. Cook, Journal of Peasant Studies, 4 ( 4 ) 1 9 7 7 . PCMP and MPS I': G. Burchell, Radical Philosophy ( 1 8 ) 1 9 7 7 ; T. Putnam, Capital & Class (4) 1 9 7 8 ; R. Johnson, G. McLennan, B. Schwarz: Economy, culture and concept. Stencilled Paper no. 50, Birmingham, CCCS, Part III. MPSF: A. Hussain, Sociological Review 2 6 ( 1 ) 1 9 7 8 ; MCCT, / A. Hunt, Morning Star, 17 November 1 9 7 7 ; / and II: D. Sayer, "Cleansing the Temple?" Sociological Review, forthcoming; L. Harris "The science of the e c o n o m y " Economy & Society 7 ( 3 ) 1 9 7 8 . There is o n e major text which we d o not discuss - J . Ennew, P. Hirst, K. Tribe "Peasants as an economic category", Journal of Peasant Studies, 4 ( 4 ) , 1977because of the excellent critique offered in a parallel article to our ownT, Shanin Defining peasants (mimeo. Manchester University, 1978) which we hope will enjoy the widest circulation at an early date. 2. For s o m e general observations Cf. Simon Clarke, Capital and Class ( 2 ) 1 9 7 7 and his "Althusserian Marxism: a bourgeois disorder" (mimeo. October 1 9 7 6 ) , plus J. Ranciere, Radical Philosophy (7) 1 9 7 4 . We should also stress that the increasingly accepted notion that marxism is ideational a project constructed through establishing "Heroes and Icons of the Left"permeates many journals

212

SOCIALIST REGISTER 1978

and publishing houses, notably New Left Review and New Left Books. 3. Cf. N. Geras "Essence and appearance. . .", NLR (65) 1971 (reprinted in R. Blackburn, Ideology in social science, Kontana, 1972); J. Mepham "The theory of ideology in 'Capital' ", Radical Philosophy (2) 1 9 7 2 , reprinted in Working Papers in Cultural Studies (6) 1 9 7 5 ; D. Sayer, Marx's Method, (Harvester, 1979) Part I. 4. We do not intend to engage in a similar diversion as that of the very project we are criticising, thus we shall not discuss this aspect of their project. It has been well covered, see the Radical Philosophy and Economy and Society reviews listed in n. 1 above, plus the exceptionally useful text by G. McLennan in Economy and Society 7(2) 1 9 7 8 . For general criticismSayer "Science as critique" in J. Mepham and D. Ruben (eds.) Essays in Marxist Philosophy (Harvester, 1979) and Sayer Marx's Method, Ch. 1, which detail Marx's critique of all speculative theorising. 5. The German Ideology, Marx/Engels, Collected Works, (Lawrence & Wishart, 1 9 7 6 onwards) Vol. 5, p. 56 (Hereafter simply CW. . .). Wittgenstein's whole argument against "craving for generality" and "contempt for the particular" needs study in this connection. 6. "Introduction", Grundrisse, (Penguin, 1973), p. 1 0 1 . See Sayer Marx's Method, Ch. 4, for a detailed discussion of this text. 7. "Notes on Adolph Wagner" (in Marx, Texts on Method, ed. T. Carver, Blackwell, Oxford 1 9 7 5 ) , p. 198, 2 0 1 . For extended commentary see Sayer, Marx's Method. 8. For example CW: 5, pp. 43f. 9. "Introduction", Grundrisse, p. 8 4 . 10. "Notes on Adolph Wagner", p. 190. 11. V.N. Volosinov, Marxism and the philosophy of language, (New York Seminar Press, 1 9 7 3 ) . This is the 2nd ed., of 1 9 3 0 . See especially pp. 19f., 81f. and C. Woolfson, Marxism Today, 2 1 ( 8 ) 1 9 7 7 ; A. O'Shea, "Multiaccentuality and capitalism", M.A. Course Essay, University of Birmingham, CCCS, 1 9 7 7 ; R. Williams, Marxism and Literature, Oxford University Press, 1977. 12. R. Rossi-Landi, Ideologies of linguistic relativity, Hague, Mouton, 1 9 7 3 , p. 6 3 . 13. I.I. Rubin, T.ssays on Marx's theory of value, (Detroit, Black and Red, 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 57. Originally published 1 9 2 8 . 14. Marx, Capital, I (Moscow, Progress, 1 9 6 7 ) , p. 537. This can be seen in Marx's whole projectSayer's work already cited traces this; for early examples in Marx see CW: 3, pp. 3 2 6 - 3 4 8 , and much of Hegel's Philosophy of Right and 'The German Ideology (CW: 3 and 5 respectively). There is much of value here in Colletti's introduction to Marx, Early Writings, (Penguin, 1975). 15. Lenin, Collected Works, (Moscow, Progress) Vol. 22, pp. 355f. quoted in "Hirst in Hunt", p. 1 2 6 ; MCCT, I: 232f., MCCT, II. p. 237. We analyse the contradictory features of Lenin's writing in Corrigan, H. Ramsay and Sayer, Socialist construction, cited in n. 2 2 . 16. Thompson's extended discussions will soon be available in his book of essays The Poverty of 'Theory (Merlin, 1 9 7 8 ) , in the meantime we continue to stress the importance of his fundamentally theoretical statement The Making of the English Working Class, (Penguin, 1968). 17. K.P. Thompson "Eighteenth century F^nglish society", Social History 3(2) 1 9 7 8 , p. 1 6 4 . Cf. Corrigan, Ramsay, Sayer, Eor Mao, (Macmillan, 1979), Part II, Essay 4; Corrigan and Sayer, "Class struggle, moral relations, political e c o n o m y " , Radical Philosophy (12) 1975. 18. "Hirst in Hunt", p. 1 3 1 . 19. "Hindess in Littlejohn", pp. 9 6 - 9 7 . Cf. "Hindess in Bloomfield."

HINDESS & HIRST: A CRITICAL REVIEW 20.

213

21.

22.

23. 24.

25.

26. 27.

28. 29. 30. 31.

32.

33.

34. 35. 36.

Engcls' letters to Schmidt, August 5 and October 27, 1890; to Bloch, September 21-22, 1890; to Mehring, July 14, 1 8 9 3 ; to Borgius, January 25, 1 8 9 4 (in Selected Correspondence, Moscow, Progress, 1975 or Selected Letters, Peking, ELPH, 1977) and Engels to Starkenberg, January 25, 1895 in the 1 9 5 6 ed. of Selected Correspondence. A. Glucksmann, "A ventriloquist structuralism", NL.R (72) 1 9 7 2 , originally published 1 9 6 7 . N. Poulantzas, "Vers une theorie marxiste", Temps Modernes (240) 1966. Space limitations mean that we do not develop or document this argument as fully as we wish. Eor amplification see Sayer, "Method and Dogma in Historical materialism", Sociological Review 2 3 ( 4 ) 1975; Marx's Method, Ch. 4, Section 1; "Science as Critique" and Corrigan, Ramsay, Sayer, Socialist construction and marxist theory: Bolshevism and its critique (London, Macmillan; New York, Monthly Review Press, 1 9 7 8 ) , Ch. 1. Marx, "Preface" in Selected Writings. . . (Bottomore and Rubel edition, Penguin, 1 9 6 3 , p. 67). CW: 5, p. 35, our emphases. That this is no youthful aberration can be seen from Capital, III (Moscow, Progress, 1 9 7 1 , p. 792) where Marx speaks of the need for "analysis of the empirically given circumstances." This analysis differs from that we have presented earlier (e.g. Sayer, "Method and Dogma"). Although we stand by the criticism of traditional readings given there, we would no longer draw the conclusion that the base/superstructure metaphor should be entirely displaced. Marx, "Preface", (ed. cit., p. 68) our emphasis. e.g. CW: 5: 8 9 , 373. The stress on forms in some of Engels letters (e.g. to Mehring, July 14, 1 8 9 3 ; to Bloch, September 21-22, 1890) is extremely pertinent here. Cf. Marx, "Eighteenth Brumaire", in this light. Cf. the material cited in n. 3 above. CW: 5, pp. 26-27. Note the similarity of the language to that of the 1859 Preface. Capital I (ed. cit., n. 14), p. 8 0 . Nicolaus, in his "Foreword" to the Penguin ed. of the C.rundrisse (p. 52) suggests this, as does Colletti, op. cit. It is central to recent debates on the State, e.g. in Germany, J. Holloway and S. Picciotto (eds.) State and Capital, Arnold, 1 9 7 8 ; Cf. Corrigan, Ramsay, Sayer, "The State as a relation of production", paper to B.S.A. 1 9 7 7 Conference, in revised form as Ch. 1 of P. Corrigan (ed.) State formation and capitalism, (Quartet, 1979). A. Maclntyre, "Notes from the Moral Wilderness, 1", New Reasoner (7) Winter 1 9 5 8 - 5 9 , quoted E.P. Thompson "Open Letter. . ." Socialist Register, 1 9 7 3 , n. 20, p. 97. Cf. B. Oilman, Alienation. . . Cambridge, 1 9 7 1 , "In defence of internal relations", Radical Philosophy (13) 1 9 7 6 . This is a central constituent of the two collective volumes already cited Socialist construction and marxist theory, and 1'or Mao. Other sketches can be seen in Corrigan, Journal of Peasant Studies, 2(3) 1975; Sayer, "Method and Dogma." As we indicated above, n. 4, we are not examining this issue herefor a general analysis see Sayer, "Science as Critique." Crundrisse, (ed. cit.), p. 7 1 2 . S. Hall: "Some problems with the ideology/subject couplet", Ideology and Consciousness (3) 1978, p. 120. Cf. his "Culture, the media and the 'Ideological effect' " in J. Curran (et. al. eds.) Mass communication. . . Arnold, 1977; "Re-thinking the 'base-and-superstructure' metaphor" in Bloomfield (op. cit., n. 1 above) and "The 'political' and the 'economic' in Marx's theory of

214

THE SOCIALIST REGISTER 1978

classes" in A. Hunt (op. cit., n. 1 above). 37."Hindess in Bloomfield", p. 105. Cf. "Hirst in Hunt" and "Hindess in Littlejohn". 38. Hirst on Althusser (op. cit., n. 1 above), p. 4 1 0 . Cf. N. Rose "Fetishism and ideology", Ideology and consciousness (2) 1977. 39. To think otherwise is essentially "preWittgenstein". Cf. T. F.agleton "Men without language: the novels of William Golding", Views (11) 1966, p. 37, and the chapters in M. Barrett, P. Corrigan, A. Kuhn, J. Wolff (eds.) Representation and cultural production (Croom Helm, 1 9 7 9 ) , especially the first. 40. Putnam, op. cit., n. 1 above, p. 153. 4 1 . Burchell, o p . cit., n. 1 above, p. 32. 4 2 . "Hirst in Hunt", p. 1 3 1 . 4 3 . Hirst on Althusser (op. cit., n. 1 above), p. 397. 4 4 . Cf. Corrigan, " D i c h o t o m y is contradiction", Sociological Review, 2 3 , 1975. 45. "Hirst in Hunt", p. 152. Their view of power is Left-Weberian in tendency. 46. Marx was clear on this, e.g. Capital I (ed. cit.) p. 7 5 1 . The "systematical combination" that is imperialism which Marx there described shows the dangerous limitations of any marxist analysis of socialist politics founded upon the "prism" of the national economy. Cf. P. Corrigan, "Feudal r e l i c s . . . " Sociology, 1 1 , 1 9 7 7 ; State formation. . . (op. cit., n. 31 above). 47. Our emphasis. Compare the description in Corrigan, "Politics of Production", Journal of Peasant Studies, 1 9 7 5 , p. 346, para 2. 4 8 . Women take issue. . . (Hutchinson, 1 9 7 8 ) , pp. 157-158. The criticism here can be applied to other texts e.g. "Hindess in Bloomfield" or "Hirst in Hunt." 49. L. Althusser, "Marx's relation to Hegel", ( 1 9 6 8 ) in his Politics and history (NL Books, 1 9 7 1 ) , p. 186. We do not accept his impoverished view of what Capital contains. 50. Grundrisse, ed. cit., p. 4 2 9 . Cf. Sayer, Marx's Method, Ch. 6. 51. Marx, theories of Surplus Value, III (Moscow, Progress, 1972), p. 4 2 9 . Cf. Sayer, "Science as Critique." Meillassoux makes a similar point in his criticism of I'CMP: Hindess and Hirst's denial of the significance of "historical social and political context" "throws doubt on their claim to be working within historical materialism." Meillassoux, as we do, sees their "point of view" as "a strict codification of the idealist-judicial approach of bourgeois science under the guise of Marxism." C. Meillassoux, I'.conomy & Society 7(3) 1978, p. 329.