Nordisk kernesikkerhedsforskning

Nordisk

kirnsSkcrhetsforskning

Pohjnismainen ydinturvailisuustutkirnus

Nordic

nuclear safety research

RAK-2

NKS/RAK-2(97)TR-C4 ISBN 87-7893-016-2

Description of Sizewell B Nuclear Power Plant

Geir Meyer Egil Stokke

Institutt for energiteknikk @FE) OECD Halden Reactor Project Halden, Norway

September 1997

Abstract
The intention of this report is to present a condensed technical description of Sizewell B in a language understandable to non-technical personnel. It is unavoidable that some parts will be less precise than the technically initiated would like to see, but hopefully the content still give a realistic picture of Sizewell B. The technical description is based on publicly available material, of which the Sizewell B safety report has been particularly useful. Nearly all figures and drawings found in this description are reproductions of corresponding material in the safety report.

To keep the description fiom becoming too voluminous it has been necessary to condense some background material down to a smal1 volume. Hopefully this has not
introduced any errors or inaccuracies, possible oversimplification at certain points must be weighed against the wish to cover most of the topics in the agreed table of contents for these NKS reports. The authors would like to thank Nuclear Electric plc and Sizewell B staff for the goodwill they showed us and the background material made available. The description reflects the authors understanding of the issues and is entirely their responsibility. The report has a limited distribution in accord with the agreed distribution list, the authors take no responsibility for any unauthorised use of the report or its contents.

NKS/RAK-2(97)TR-C4 ISBN 87-7893-016-2 Information Service Department, Ris, 1997 The report can be obtained fiom:

NKS Secretariat
P.O.Box49 DK-4000 Roskilde Denmark

Phone: +45 4677 4045 Fax: +45 4677 4046 http://www.risoe.dk/nks e-mail: annette.lemmens@risoe.dk

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 2. SUMMARY OF DESIGN DATA................................................................................................... 2.1 General design features .................................................................................................... 2.2 Comparison with similar reactor types ............................................................................
3. SITE AND REGION ..................................................................................................................... 3 . 1 Selection of the site ........................................................................................................... 3.1.1Geographical location .................................................................................................... 3.2Description of the site ....................................................................................................... 3.2.1Site use and topography ................................................................................................

2 2 3 4 4 4 4
4

3.2.2Geology........................................................................................................................... 4. SAFETY CRITERIA ..................................................................................................................... 4.1 Safety related design criteria ........................................................................................... 4.2 Classification of structures, systems and components ..................................................... 4.3 Conditions of design..........................................................................................................

4 5 5 5 6 6 6 7 7
7

4 . 4Missile protection .............................................................................................................. 4.5 Fire protection criteria ......................................................................................................

5. TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION AND DESIGN EVALUATION OF SYSTEMS, STRUCTURES AND COMPONENTS................................................................................... 5.1 Plant arrangement............................................................................................................ 5.2Building and structures .................................................................................................... 5.3 Reactor core and other reactor vessel internals ............................................................... 5 . 3 . 1 Mechanical design......................................................................................................... 5.3.2Nuclear design .............................................................................................................. 5.3.3Thermal and hydraulic design ...................................................................................... 5 . 4 Reactivity Control systems ............................................................................................... 5.5 Reador main coolant system ........................................................................................... 5 . 5 . 1 System information ....................................................................................................... 5.5.2Reactor vessel................................................................................................................ 5.5.3Reactor coolant piping .................................................................................................. 5.5.4Reactor coolant pumps .................................................................................................. 5.5.5Steam generators .......................................................................................................... 5 . 5 . 6 Pressuriser .................................................................................................................... 5.5.7Pressuriser relief tank .................................................................................................. 5.5.8Safety and relief valve systems .................................................................................... 5.5.9Valves ............................................................................................................................ 5.6 Residual heat removal systems ....................................................................................... 5 . 7 Emergency core cooling systems ..................................................................................... 5.8 Containment systems ...................................................................................................... 5.8.1Overall system information ..........................................................................................

9 11 13 15 16 16 16 17 19 21 24 27 30 30 31 31 33 35 35

5.8.2 Containment structure................................................................................................. 5.8.3 Containment penetrations............................................................................................ 5.8.4 Containment isolation system ...................................................................................... 5.8.5 Pressure reducing and heat removal systems.............................................................. 5.8.6 Containment gas Control system.................................................................................. 5.8.7 Secondary containment................................................................................................ 5.9 S t e m and power conversion systems ............................................................................. 5.9.1 Overall system information .......................................................................................... 5.9.2 Turbine-generator......................................................................................................... 5.9.3 Main steam supply system ........................................................................................... 5.9.4 Main condensers and evacuation system ..................................................................... 5.9.5 Turbine gland sealing system....................................................................................... 5.9.6 Turbine bypass system ................................................................................................. 5.9.7 Condenser cooling system............................................................................................. 5.9.8 Condensate and feed water system .............................................................................. 5.9.9 Condensate cleanup system ..........................................................................................

35 35 35 35 37 37 37 37 37 39 39 41 41 41 42 43

5.9.10 Stem generator blowdown system ............................................................................. 45 5.9.11 Safety and relief valves ............................................................................................... 5.9.12 Other turbine auxiliary systems................................................................................. 5.10 Fuel and component handling and storage systems ..................................................... 5.10.1 New h e l storage ......................................................................................................... 5.10.2 Spent h e l storage ....................................................................................................... 5.10.3 Handling and inspection systems ............................................................................... 5.11 Radioactive waste systems............................................................................................. 5.11.1 Liquid waste systems .................................................................................................. 5.11.2 Gaseous waste systems ............................................................................................... 5.11.3 Solid waste systems .................................................................................................... 5.12 Control and instrumentation systems ........................................................................... 5.12.1 Overall system idormation ........................................................................................ 5.12.2 Protection system........................................................................................................ 5.12.3 Regulating system....................................................................................................... 5.12.4 Instrumentation system.............................................................................................. 5.13 Electrical power systems ............................................................................................... 5.13.1 Main transformer and connected equipment ............................................................. 5.13.2 Plant distribution system ........................................................................................... 5.13.3 Standby power supply................................................................................................. 6. FIRE PROTECTION ................................................................................................................... 6.1 Buildings, layout and materials ...................................................................................... 6.2 Fire-fighting equipment .................................................................................................. 7. PLANT PERFORMANCE DURING NORMAL OPERATION ................................................... 7.1 Phases of normal operation ............................................................................................. 7.2 Plant statistics ................................................................................................................. II 45 45 45 45 45 46 46 50 51 52 52 53 54 55 55 55 55 55 57 57 57 58 58 58

8. ACCIDENT ANALYSES .............................................................................................................

.

59 59 60

8.1Malfundions in Merent systems ................................................................................... 8.1.1Internal and external hazards ......................................................................................

9. RADIATION PROTECTION ....................................................................................................... 61 9 . 1 Basic radiation protection criteria and derived working d e s ....................................... 61 9.1.1Dose limits..................................................................................................................... 61 9.2Shielding .......................................................................................................................... 62 9 . 3 Radiation.......................................................................................................................... 62 63 9.3.1Radiation levele............................................................................................................. 9.3.2Radiation monitoring .................................................................................................... 64 9.4Monitoring systems and action levels for radioactive releases to the environment .......64 9.4.1Monitoring of releases to the atmosphere .................................................................... 64 9.4.2Monitoring of releases to water .................................................................................... 64 10 OFFSITE DOSE ASSESSMENT............................................................................................... 10.1 Releases under operating conditions ............................................................................. 10.1.1Radiation doses ........................................................................................................... 10.2 Releases under hazardous conditions............................................................................ 10.2.1Contamination of the enviroment............................................................................. 10.2.2Radiation doses ...........................................................................................................
11. PLANNING. ORGANISATIONAND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL ...................................

65 65 65 65 65 66 67 67 67 68 68 68 69 69 70

11.1 Production department .................................................................................................. 11.1.1Management support department .............................................................................. 11.1.2Technical support department .................................................................................... 11.1.3Training programme ................................................................................................... 11.1.4Operating procedures, instructions and orders .......................................................... 12. ORGANISATION OF THE AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. 12.1 h a l organisation.......................................................................................................... 13. PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT..............................................................................

14.REFERENCES........................................................................................................................... 71

III

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure I. Diaphragm wall ................................................................................................................................ 2 Figure 2. Site layout......................................................................................................................................... 7 Figure 3. Main plant layout.............................................................................................................................. 8 Figure 4. Core arrangement during cycle I .................................................................................................... 10 Figure 5. Reactor vessel ................................................................................................................................. 12 Figure 6. Control rod drive mechanisms......................................................................................................... 13 Figure 7. Fuel assembly ................................................................................................................................. 14 Figure 8. Fuel rod .......................................................................................................................................... 15 Figure 9. Reactor coolant system ................................................................................................................... 17 Figure 1O. Reactor vessel and internals.......................................................................................................... 18 Figure I I . Reactor coolant main pipework . plan ........................................................................................... 20 Figure 12 Reactor coolant main pipework .elevations .................................................................................. 21 Figure 13. Reactor coolant pump ................................................................................................................... 22 Figure 14. Reactor coolant pump support....................................................................................................... 23 Figure 15 Steam generator ............................................................................................................................ 24 25 Figure 16. Steam generator support ............................................................................................................... . Figure 17. The pressuriser.............................................................................................................................. 27 Figure 18. Reactor pressure control system.................................................................................................... 28 Figure 19. Pressuriser supports ...................................................................................................................... 29 Figure 20. Safety injection. residual heat removal and spray system .............................................................. 32 Figure 21. Engineered safetyfeatures ............................................................................................................ 34 Figure 22. Reactor building heat removal systems.......................................................................................... 36 Figure 23. Turbine. steam and condensate system .......................................................................................... 38 Figure 24. Main condenser............................................................................................................................. 39 Figure 25. One leg of the main steam system .................................................................................................. 40 Figure 26. Main circuluting water system....................................................................................................... 41 Figure 27. Main feed water system ................................................................................................................. 43 Figure 28. Steam generator blowdown system ................................................................................................ 44 Figure 29. Fuel route and storage .................................................................................................................. 46 Figure 30. Liquid waste channel A and BI simplified ...................................................................................... 47 Figure 31. Liquid waste system Activeluundry and hot shower plus Chemicaldrains tank. both simplified48 Figure 32. The secondary liquid waste system (simplified) .............................................................................. 49 50 Figure 33. The gaseous radwaste system (simplified)...................................................................................... Figure 34. The solid waste processing (simplifed) .......................................................................................... 51 Figure 35 Defence-in-depth........................................................................................................................... 52 53 Figure 36. Instrumentation and control system ............................................................................................... Figure 37. Primary Protection System (PPS)and the protection computer system .......................................... 54 Figure 38. Main and essential electrical systems ............................................................................................ 56

. .

LIST OF TABLES Table I . Reactor core........................................................................................................................................ Table 2. Fuel ..................................................................................................................................................... Table 3. Reactor vessel details........................................................................................................................ Table 4. Reactor coolant pipes details............................................................................................................. Table 5. Reactor c o o h t pumps details........................................................................................................... Table 6. Steam generator details..................................................................................................................... Table 7. Pressuriser details............................................................................................................................. Table 8. Residual heat removal pumpdlow head safeiy injectionpumps.......................................................... Table 9. High head safeiy injectionpumps detail ............................................................................................ Table I O. Accumulators details ....................................................................................................................... Table I I . Refuelling water storage tank details............................................................................................... Table 12. Spray pumps details......................................................................................................................... Table 13. Turbine conditio............................................................................................................................ Table 14. Circulating water pumps.................................................................................................................. Table 15. Main feedwater pumps..................................................................................................................... . . feedwater pumps............................................................................................................... Table 16. Auxiliary Table 17. P h t statistics................................................................................................................................. Table 18. Dose limits ...................................................................................................................................... Table 19. Direct radiation exposure of station staff ......................................................................................... Table 20. Annua1 collective dose ..................................................................................................................... Table 21. Highest individual task dose ............................................................................................................ Table. 22. Fadt frequency targets....................................................................................................................
9 9 19 20 23 26 30 31 33 33 34 37 37 42 42 42 58 61 62 63

64
66

1 .

INTRODUCTION

The Sizewell B Nuclear Power Station is the first Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) built in UK. Originally planned as the first in a series there is at present uncertain whether there w i l l be more PWRS built in UK in the near future, and Sizewell B will remain the only PWR in UK for some years to come. The design of Sizewell B started in 1980s,based on the WestinghousdBechtel SNUPPS concept (Standardised Nuclear Unit Power Plant System). It has thus been possible to draw on the considerable knowledge and experience accumulated from design and construction of nuclear power plants utilising this technology. The reference plant for the original design is the Callaway plant in Missouri, USA, but experience derived from the French nuclear power program has also been taken into account in the construction of Sizewell B. The planning/design period stretched over a number of years, in no smal1 part due t o a prolonged public debate over the safety and economy of nuclear power. Changes and additions to the original design were introduced to satise very stringent demands to reliability and to lower the probability for failure of safety significant systems. Safety analyses of the as-built NPP shows that even w i t h very conservative assumptions the risk to public health from credible accidents is acceptably low. Construction orders for Sizewell B were placed in 1987, construction started 1988. First criticality was achieved in March 1994,commercial operation in February 1995.

2.
2.1

SUMMARY OF DESIGN DATA

General design features

Sizewell B is a 4-loop PWR of Westinghouse type with two turbines. Thermal capacity is 3411 MWt, rated net electrical output is 1188 MWe (gross 1258MWe). The nuclear steam supply system and turbines are enclosed within a prestressed concrete containment structure of double shell type. The reference plant for the original design is Callaway NPP, Missouri, USA. To fulfil UK requirements the original design had to be modified, particularly as concerns capacity and redundancy of safety systems. A special design feature is the subterranean diaphragm wall enclosing the central parts of the plant (reactor building, turbine plant, radwaste building etc. The wall is 0.8 m thick and goes down to the London clay stratum (40-50 m below surface). It greatly facilitated construction of the plant as it effedively restricted the infiux of water without lowering the ground water level outside the diaphragm wall. Thus there were no problems with settling of foundations which could have created problems for the adjacent Sizewell A, neither have there been any adverse effects on agriculture from sinking ground water level. Resumably the diaphragm wall will also be an efficient banier against contamination of groundwater in case radioactivity is released to the ground within the plant.

Figure 1, Diaphragm waii

2.2

Comparison with similar reactor types

The Sizewell B plant is by design quite similar to recently construded SNUPPS plants and newer French WPs. The reactor vessel is made by Framatome Energy, instrumentation and Control systems are largely by Westinghouse, and turbine generators are delivered by GEC Alsthom. The SNUPPS concept is based on Westinghouse primary circuit and s t e m supply systems, the standardised plant layout is by Bechtel Power Corporation (USA). The reference plant is Callaway (Mo., USA), but the reference design has been modified to meet British standards and requirements. Especially the design of safety systems and support systems important for safety has been altered to enhance reliability and performance. The number of high head injedion pumps has been increased from two to four, the capacity of accumulators is higher, additional pumps are installed in the auxiliary feedwater system, and there are altogether four diesel generators feeding into four separate groups of safeguards equipment. Sizewell B is also equipped with two separate shutdown systems, the Primary Protection System and the Secondary Protection System. Both function as independent systems able to shut down the"reactor and initiate start-up of safeguards plant. The containment is of the large dry, double shell type, the primary containment design pressure is 4.46 bar (overpressure 3.4 bar). Free volume is app. 90 O00 m3, this is one of the largest containments in the industry. EdFs N4 series of nuclear stations is in many respeds close to Sizewell B design. m e r e has been close contact between Nuclear Electric and other Utility organisations to derive maximum benefit from experiences made by the nuclear industry world-wide. EdFs Chooz B1 is the fmst of the 1400 MWe N4 stations in operation, its instrumentation and Control system is in principle fully digitalized though there is a hardwired safety auxiliary panel which can be used for safe shutdown and controlling shutdown conditions. The experiences collected from operation of Sizewell B and Chooz B in the coming years should provide valuable input to the design of NPPs and to assessment of the reliability of new I & C technology.

3 .
3.1

SITEANDREGION
Selection of the site

The criteria for site selection of nuclear power plants firstly take into account the safety of the public and environmental factors. An ample supply of cooling water is of particular importance for a large PWR.Economy and closeness to major electricity consumer areas are further aspects to be considered when safety principles related to siting are satisfied. The siting of a nuclear power station at Sizewell in East SuiXolk was proposed in 1958, and a Magnox NPP (Sizewell A) with two reactors was construded and put into operation in 1966. In 1980 CEGB (Central Electricity Generating Board) proposed that the first PWR in Britain should be constructed at the site close to the Magnox station. A public inquiry (1983-85) delayed the final decision, consent to build was given in 1987.
3.1.1

Geagraphicai location

Sizewell B is located in the same area as Sizewell Al and A2, two Magnox reactors of 250 MWe that started operation in 1966. The location is on the south-east coast of England (East SuiXolk), geographical co-ordinates 52"12'N,Ol"37'E. The closest cities are Ipswich (-30 km)and Norwich (-50 km), the distance fkom London is approximately 150 km.
3.2

Description of the site

The coastal area is flat and the land surrounding the station is partly marshland, partly farmland with some conifer plantations. The site is on the shoreland, sand covering most of ground d o m towards the shore on the east side.
3.2.1

Site u88 and topography

Sizewell B is situated adjacent to the Sizewell A plant, this makes for efficient utilisation of land area but may have some adverse effects such as resettling of Sizewell A foundations. This required protective measures, the most striking being the construction of a 0.8 m thick diaphragm wall extending 35-56 m down from ground level. The site is quite flat, and the diaphragm wall encloses all the main structures of process plant and radwaste building, total length of wall is 1260 m.
39.2

Geology

There is a top layer of sand 40 to 50 meters thick, underneath there is a layer of London clay which is nearly impermeable to water. Further down there are new layers of sand, clay and then chalk at about 80 m below groud level.

4.

SAFETYCRITERLA

The safety criteria for nuclear power plants in Britain must comply with the requirements set down in the Nuclear Installations Act (1965) and the Health and Safety at Work Act (1974). The design guidelines applied include certain numerical targets quoted below.
4.1 Safety related design criteria

The overriding concern is the safety of the public, this is transformed into requirements t o be fulfilled concerning the probability of accidents which may lead to health risks from radiation o limit the risk to the public the following numerical targets are set regarding the exposure. T probability of accidents:
0

The t o t a l frequency of all accidents leading to uncontrolled releases should be less than 1 0 " per reactor year. The overall design shall ensure that the frequency of any single accident that could lead to a large uncontrolled release of radioactivity shall be less than lo-' per reactor year. The predided frequency of accident that could result in doses of one Emergency Reference Level (ERL) should not exceed 10" per reactor year.

An example of EF& dose is a 100 mSv whole body dose to a member of the public.
In order t o satisS. these criteria the reliability of engineered safeguard features has to be correspondingly high. The shutdown system, emergency systems and the protective baniers must be shown to independently function such that the above targets are met for any credible accident.

UK design criteria include the 30 minute rule,- no operator action shall be required for at least 30 minutes after a design basis event sequence is initiated. In essence this means that automatics and safeguard systems are able to adequately Control the power plant and ensure
that there are no uncontrolled releases dwing that period.
4.2 Classification of structures, systems and components

Building structures are classified in 3 categories according to their safety function:

0

Categoryl. Structures whose function or integrity is required to allow the reactor to be safely shutdown and cooled after a safe shutdown earthquake and which are designed to remain operational aRer that event. (Safe shutdown earthquake: Peak horizontal acceleration of 0.25 g.) CategoryS. Structures whose integrity or function is not directly required for nuclear safety, but which are designed to behave, under safe shutdown earthquake loading, in a manner which would not impair the function of Category 1 structures, systems or components. CategoryN. Structures which are not seismically designed.

4.3 Conditions of design

The overall safety gods, some of which are quoted above (4.1 Safety related design criteria) must be refleded in the design principles and translated into specific requirements at plant and o be able to assess the safety of the plant as such it is necessary to perform a system level. T comprehensive analysis of a l l part systems where the effeds of systems interadions are fully taken into account. A Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) that covers all protective or mitigating measures in the event a fault occurs is an effective to01 for identiwng weaknesses in design and elucidating the interplay of subsystems.

An extemive probabilistic safety analysis has been performed for Sizewell B and is included in
the Pre-Operational Safety Report submitted to the Nuclear Installations Inspedorate (NII) in November 1992. The analysis covered internal and external hitiatom, beyond design basis initiating faults and non-core sources of radioadivity. Analysis of shut-down conditions were also included. A brief description of the Sizewell B PSA is found in sedion i3 Probcrbi&?tic sufefy
-8e88Wnt.

4.4 Missile protection

The main barrier in missile'protection is the containment strudure, internal missiles may constitute a hazard but here only external missiles are discussed.

A directed missile or an aeroplane would have to severely damage or penetrate the containment to cawe a major release of radioadivity. A breach of containment does not necessarily imply that the primary circuit or other radioadivity confining barriers will be damaged. For accidents outside the containment, say damage to the Control m m or the turbine plant the shutdown and protection systems should ensure that the reador is brought to a stable condition.
Sizewell B has a double containment, the inner principal containment is a 1.3 m thick prestressed concrete cylindrical shell surmounted by a 1 m thick hemispherical shell. The internal steel liner is an airtight membrane, it also aids in distributing the load over a larger area in case of developing cracks or fissures. Design pressure is 4.46 bar, tests on scaled-down models has shown that the more than twice this pressure is needed for the containment to fail. In view of the rugged strudure of the containment the station should be well proteded against external missiles.

4.5 Fire protection criteria

The fire protection criteria aim firstly at prevention, secondly at fire Control and mitigation should a fire occur. The design provides for 3 hour principal fire barriers to be built around redundant and diverse t r a i n s of safety systems. In addition it provides for further 1 hour fire barriers within the principal barriers, in some cases the additional fire barriers are 3 hour rated fire barriers.

5.

TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION AND DESIGN EVALUATION OF SYSTEMS,

STRUCTURES AND COMPONENTS

5.1

Plant arrangement

Figure 2, Site layout shows the layout of the plant site. The site is about 500 m times 500 m, with the reactor, turbine and radwaste buildings in the central part. The cooling water canals and the pump house are on the east side of the site.
5.2

Building and structures

Figure 3, Main plant layout identifies the main buildings within the site. Of particular interest is the containment structure which encloses the primary circuit and the s t e m generators. Sizewell B has a double-walled containment, the primary (inner) containment of prestressed concrete being the main protective barrier. It is designed to withstand an overpressure of 0.345 M P (-3.4 bar), a steel liner ensures airtightness. Pressure tests have shown that leakage is only about 25% of the prescribed limits, the elasticity of the containment is also as expected.

Figure 2, Site layout

Figure 3, Main plant layout

5.3

Reactor core and other reactor vessel internals

Apart from the h e l assemblies the core components consists of the rod cluster Control assemblies which are used for core reactivity Control during normal operation and for reactor shutdown, the burnable poison assemblies which are used for temporary reactivity Control to compensate for the excess reactivity of the new kel, the primary and secondary source assemblies which give sufficient count rates on the neutron monitors outside the core at shutdown and the thimble plug assemblies which restrict coolant bypass leakage flow. It is only the rod cluster Control assemblies that are moveable in operation. See Table i, Reactor core for details on the core and Table 2, Fuel for details on the hel. The rod cluster assemblies consists of 53 Control assemblies each containing 24 absorber rods which again consists of two silver-indium-cadmium alloy rods encapsulated in a stainless steel tube.The assemblies are grouped into three Control banks and six shutdown banks, see Figure 4, Core arrangement during cycle 1.

Figure 4, Core arrangement during cycie 1

The burnable poison assemblies are not med to any extent in fuel reloads but are required during the f k t load consisting of h s h h e l only.

In the fmt core there are eight primary source assemblies w h i c h are identical to the burnable poison assemblies except that a primary source rod consisting of califoniium-252 within a stainless steel tube is replacing one of the thimble plug rodlets. Thereafir there are eight
secondary source aasemblies replacing the primary source assemblies. Each secondary assembly consists of four secondary source rods consisting of a stack of pellets of 78% antimony and 22% beryllium by weight in a stainless steel tube.

A thimble plug assembly consists of 24 thimble plug rodlets which are made of a solid rod of stainless steel, suspended from a holddown assembly or top plate.

1 0

5 . 3 . 1

Mechanicai design

The vessel is made ofring forgings and at the heads single-piece dome forgings are used, see Figure 5, Reactor vessel for details. The drive mechanism is an electromagnetic jacking device moving the rods in small steps. If the eledric current is interrupted the Control rods will drop by gravity into the core. All parts exposed to reactor coolant are made from three types of material; stainless steels, nickelchromium-iron alloys and cobalt-based alloys. All pressure-retaining parts are made from stainless steel or austeitic nickel-based alloys. Hard chrome plate and Stellite-6 have been used for bearings and surfaces subjected to wear. See Figum 6, Control rod drive mechanisms for how the rod drive mechanism is arranged. The absorber rods are kept in place by a spring at the top of the tube which is sealed at the top and bottom by stainless steel end plugs. The poison assemblies consists of a number of burnable poison rods suspended from a hold-down assembly. Both primary and secondary neutron source assemblies are located at the corred height for primary/secondary protection system source range detectors or postfault monitoring neutron detectors.
,

Penetration tubes are welded to the reactor vessel bottom head to allow for in-core flux mapping. The temperature of some h e l assemblies are measured by thermocouples above the core.

11

Figure 5, Reactor vessel

12

Misritr Shicld

Figure 6, Controi rod drive mechanisms

5.3.8 Nuclear d d g n

The core contains 193 fuel assemblies where the firet fuel cycle have three fuel regions; 65 assemblies with 2.1%by weight uranium-235, 64 assemblies with 2.6%by weight uranium-235 and 64 assemblies with 3.1% by weight uranium-235. For details, see Figure 4, Core arrangement during cycle 1.

13

The fuel assemblies are built as a 17 x 17 square array with 264 fuel rods in each assembly, see Figure 7, Fuel assembly. Each fuel rod is made of a Zircaloy-4 tube filled by a stack of fuel pellets, see Figure 8, Fuel rod. The pellets are smal1 cylinders of uranium dioxide slightly enriched in the uranium-235 isotope with a length of just over 13 mm and a diameter of around 8 111111. A fuel rod is around 3.9 m high and 9.5 mm in diameter

Figure 7, Fuel assembly

14

HOMdown spring

Plenum

Fwlpellet

Fuelcbdding

Eiotiom end piug

Figure 8, Fuel rod

5 . 3 . 3 Thennal and hydraulic design

The core heat is 3411 M W and heat transferred to stem is 3428 MW (including pump losses).
Caolant inlet temperature is 292.4"C and outlet temperature is 323.4"C. The coolant pressure at inlet is 158.3 bar a and at outlet 155.1bar a. The coolant flowrate is 19.2 Wsec and the volume of water in primary circuit is 334.5 ms. Of the coolant flow approximately 5.8% bypasses the core, of which 2% is associated with the h e l assembly thimbles and 3.8%is associated with the internal structures.

15

6.4 Reactivity Control systems

Reactivity is controlled by the inherent negative power feedback (hel temperature and moderator temperature), by Control rods and boric acid injedion systems. The emergency boration system contains a boron solution with a concentration of 7000 ppm. The maximum time between the release of the drive rod and to the rods are filly inserted is 2.2 seconds. 6.5 Reactor main coolant system
5.0.1 System information

The reactor coolant system consists of the reactor pressure vessel, four steam generators, four reactor coolant pumps, the reactor internal structures and the reactor pressure Control system, see Figure 9, Reuctor coolunt system. The normal flowrate is 19114 kg/s with a l l four pumps running. At power levels below 15% the reactor is manually controlled. At least two reactor coolant pumps are kept operable with one in operation during hot shutdown conditions to ensure uniform boron concentration, and the coolant system pressure and temperature are held at no-load conditions. The chemical and volume Control system is connected to the cold legs of coolant loops 1 and 2 and to the reactor coolant pump seals. The letdown paths from the reactor to the system is from loop 3 and 4 crossover leg. The make-up water system is connected via the chemical and volume Control system. Suction for the residual heat removal system is taken from the hot legs of loop 1 and 4 and coolant is returned to all four cold legs. Each of the four accumulators of the emergency core cooling system is connected to a separate cold leg. The emergency boration system is connected to each of the four cold legs and to each of the four crossover legs.

n the The nuclear sampling system is connected to hot leg of loop 1 and 3 and to the water Space i pressuriser.

1 6

Figure 9, Reactor coolant system

5.5.2

Reactor vessel

The vessel, see Figure 10,Reactor vessel and internais, has been made from ring forgings with single-piece dome forgings for the spherical sections of the upper and lower heads with inlet and outlet nozzles symmetrically located around the vessel. The upper head can be removed and has two grooves cut in the flange to house hollow metallic O-rings and is penetrated by a vent line and by Inconel-600 tubes used in the rod cluster Control assembly drive mechanisms or for instrumentation adapters. There is 58 penetrations for access for core instrumentation in the dome forging in the lower head of the vessel. All internal surfaces are clad with eorrosion resistant stainless steel. The core barre1 is a 7.87 m high cylinder with an internal diameter of 3.76 m and with a thickness of 57 mm. The upper core support is a 305 mm thick forging and the upper core plate is 76 mm thick. All major components are fabricated from stainless steel with
17

some parts made from austenitic nickel-based alloys. The cobalt content of the stainless steel has been limited to reduce the levels of activity in the primary coolant.

/ I M t c ha n i sm s

Control Rod Drive

Therrnal Slctvc

Uppcr Corc Support

\
Alignmcnt Block
Reactor Vessel

Neutron Shitid Pad

Lowcr

Corc Support

Instrument at ion Thimbiea

Figure 10, Reactor vessel and internais

18

Table 3, Reactor vessel details

5.5.3

Reactor coolant piping

The main reador coolant system pipework consists of the outlet piping from the reador, called hot leg pipes, the piping linking the steam generator to the reactor coolant pumps, called crossover or intermediate leg, the reactor inlet piping, called the cold leg, and the pipework conneding to the pressuriser. See Figure 11, Reactor coolant main pipework - plan, Figure 12, Reactor coolant main pipework - elevations and Table 4, Reactor coolant pipes details for details. The main coolant pipes are made of seamless straight lengths of pipe and statically cast bends. The piping and fittings which make up the loop are austenitic stainless steel. The safeguard system and auxiliary lines are seamless straight lengths and either forged elbows or bends forged from seamless pipe.

19

Skam Gene rat o r

Pressu r iser

Figure 11, Reactor coolant m a i n pipework plan

20

Stram Gcnrraior

Rcasior VcsscI

Hot Leg

L
View A-A

Stram Generator

Crossover Leg

[vl

Rroctor Coolant
Pump

V i e w 8-B

Reoctor Vrsscl

Reactor Coolant
Pump

J
Vicw C-C

Figure 12, Reactor coolant main pipework elevations

5.5.4

Reactor coolant pumps

The pumps are single-stage, single-speed centrifugal pumps, see Figure 13, Reactor coolant pump. They are vertically mounted and driven by an above-mounted, air-cooled, three-phase induction motor. The pumps are each supported on three columns, see Figure 14, Reactor coolunt pump support. Apart from specialised components all components are made of corrosion resistant austenitic stainless steel. The flywheel ensures a prolonged coastdown following pump trip and ensures an adequate transition between forced circulation and natural circulation in the case of total loss of forced circulation.

Two of the pumps are connected to one of the 1 1kV unit boards and the two other to the other board. During start-up and shutdown at least one pump will work to prevent thermal and boron concentration gradients.

21

Pump, motor shafi and frame vibration levels, motor bearing temperatures, oil sump levels, cooling water flow, pressure and temperatures and motor rotor and stator winding temperatures are monitored continuously.

Figure 13, Reactor coolant pump

22

Crossover Leg

Figure 14, Reactor coolant pump support

23

5.5.5 S t e m generators

Each steam generator is vertically mounted and consists of three main sections; a hemispherical bottom head, the middle section which contains the inverted U-tubes and the upper section with moisture separators, see Figure 15, Steam generator. The steam generator is supported by four vertical wide flange columns, see Figure IS, Steam generator support. The steam outlet nozzle restricts the maximum rate of heat removal in the case of a secondary side depressurization. Provisions are made t o detect primary-to-secondaryleakage. The bottom head is a one-piece forging and clad with austenitic stainless steel. It is divided into two by a 50.8 mm thick divider plate. The main feedwater is entering the steam generator through a 368 mm nominal bore nozzle.

Figure 15, Steam generator

24

, Upper

Lateral Support

.al Support

Columns

Oirection of Thtrmal Expansion

Figure 16, Steam generator support

25

Number Overall height Upper part diameter Lower part diameter

I

4 20.8 m 4.51 m 3.48 m

I I Secondary side shell r-----

Makrials

low alloy steel ----___------------------

Primary side shell

I I

low alloy steel clad with stainless steel

631 mm

Tubesheet thickness
I

u-tubes

I I

Total heat transfer area

5110 m2

I
I

r----

Outlet

293.8"C -----4.8 tdsec

! Flowrate
I

I I

Secondary skam side

I r---------

227C Feedwater temperature ___--__-_------------

0.25% wetness

Table 6, Steam generator detaiis

26

5.5.6 Pressuriser

The pressuriser, see Figure 17, The pressuriser and Table 7, Pressuriser details, is a part of the reactor pressure Control system which comprises among other the pressuriser, surge line, heaters, spray lines and valves and the pressuriser relief tank (see chapter 5.5.7), see Figure 18, Reactor pressure Control system. The pressuriser is a vertically mounted cylindrical vessel with water filling normally between 25% and 60% of the volume. The pressure can be raised by using the heaters or reduced by spray, where the spray is taken from two of the cold legs or from an auxiliary spray line. The pressuriser is supported by its skirt and four steel bumpers, see Figure 19, Pressuriser supports.

Figure 1 7 ,The pressuriser

27

Figure 18, Reactor pressure control system

28

Stismic Supports

Skirt

Ptessur iser

//
Figure 19, Pressuriser supports

Boaring Plate

Bolt s

Citructurc
in Pressuriser Ceii

29

Number Overall height Inside diameter

16.1m 2.13 m
low alloy steel (clad)
I

Material

! Water at full power

30.6 m s

Heaters
I I
I

Total heater power

1 . 8 MW

I I
I
I

Capacity (at that pressure) per

valve

53 kg/sec

Table 7, Pressuriser detaiis

S.S.7

Pressurieer relief tank

The pressuriser relief tank is a horizontally mounted cylindrical vessel with semi-elliptical ends made of stainless steel. It can take steam to 110% of the volume above the pressuriser water level at full load conditions. Bursting discs, venting into the reactor building, have a capacity greater than the total capacity of the pressuriser relief valves.
S.5.8

Safety and relief valve systems

Each pair of pilot operated safety relief valves is arranged in series with the first one acting as a pressure relief valve and the second ading as an isolation valve. The primary protection system, see chapter 5.12.2 Protection system, monitor the reactor coolant temperature and u8es the pilot operated safety valves if the pressure is to0 high. At temperatures below 177C the maximum
30

allowable pressure is reduced. Another safety relief valve is conneded to the crossover leg of loop 3 in case the primary protection system should fail. The spring operated safety relief valves are arranged in parallel and operated by the fluid pressure. They ads as a diverse overpressure relief system for the pilot operated valves. For capacities and other details see Table 7, Pressuriser details.
5.5.8 Valves

M e r e n t types of valves are used: Swing-type non-return valves for all non-return valves above 50 mm, they have no body penetration; Piston liR-type non-return valves for sizes of 50 mm diameter and below, they have a body guided piston; Gate valves with hardened seal faces, for sizes above 50 mm the stem sealing arrangement is a double packed stuffing box with intermediate lantern ring and leak-off connections; Globe valves with gland sealed stems for sizes above 50 mm; Globe valves with hermetically sealed stems for sizes of 50 mm and less; Minor valves for vent and drain lines.

P a r t s exposed to reactor coolant are made from stainless steel and corrosion resistant hardfacing
alloys and all valves performing a safety fundion are duplicated within their system and powered by segregated electrical supplies.
6.6 Residuai heat removal systems

Suction is taken from the loop 1 and loop 4 hot legs, see Figure 20, Safety injectwn, residual heat removal and spray system.It is a two way segregated system with two trains of equipment. The decay heat aRer shutdown w i l l typically be 1 . 5 % of Ml load rate &er one hour and 0.6% aRer one day. After around four hours on approach to cold shutdown the temperature would be below 177C and pressure below 2.93 MPa and then the residual heat removal system would be started. The residual heat removal system can also be med as a part of the emergency core cooling system, to provide back-up redundancy to the reador building spray system, to provide a letdown path for coolant from the reador when pressure is low, to ensure coolant flow when the reactor is shut down and the reactor coolant pumps cannot be run.
See Table 8, Residual heat removal pumpsllow h e d safety injection pumps for some more

details.

Table 8, Residual heat removal pumpdlow head safety injection pumps

31

sx

Figure 20, Safety Uection, residual heat removai and spray system

32

5.7

Emergency core cooling systems

The emergency core cooling system consists of the passive injection subsystem, the high head safety injection subsystem and the low head safety injection subsystem. The chemical and volume Control system charging pumps have sufficient capacity to maintain the water following a very small loss of coolant accident. See Figure 21, Engineered safety features and Figure 20, Safety injection, residual heat removal and spray system. The low head safety subsystem comprises the residual heat removal system pumps and heat exchangers, see chapter 5.6 Residual heat removal systems for details. The high head safety subsystem consists of four high head injection pumps, the reactor building recirculation sumps and the refuelling water storage tank. Each pump is powered from one of the four trains of the essential electrical system and can be used instead of the low head injedion pumps. For details about the pumps see Table 9, High head safety injection pumps detail. The refuelling water storage tank located outdoor contains borated demineralised water maintaned above 21C and has connections to the low head and high head injection pumps and the reactor building spray system pumps, see Figure 2, Site layout for placement. The reactor building sumps are lined with carbon steel plate and are located at the bottom of the reactor building and this is where the high head, low head and reactor building spray pumps take suction after the bulk of the refuelling water storage tank have been expended. The passive injection subsystem consists of four nitrogen pressurised accumulator tanks partially filled with borated water connected to the cold legs via a line which includes two nonreturn valves and a motorised isolating valve. The opening of the non-return lines is all that is needed for injection. For details of the accumulators see Table 10, Accumulators details.

33

Figure 21,Engineered safety features

acid concentration

Table 11,Refiielling water storage tank detaiis

34

5.8 Containment systems

0 . 8 . 1 Overall system information

The Sizewell B containment design reflects the stringent radiological requirements imposed by British authorities. As the ultimate barrier against releases to the environment it has to withstand the peak pressures and temperatures predided for the most serious accidents in design basis. Compared to the SNUPPS design the Sizewell containment has been modified to accommodate the increased volume of equipment and to ensure that safety margins required by British standards were met. A notable addition is the secondary containment which envelops the primary containment and act as a second barrier against releases.
0.8.2 Containment stnicture.

The containment is cylindrical with a half-sphere dome, radius 22.8 m and inside height of 64 m The primary containment is made of prestressed concrete with very heavy bar reinforcements. The cylindrical shell is 1.375 m thick, the dome 1 m thick. A 6 mm thick steel liner covem the entire inside containment wall. A secondary containment encloses the primary containment.
0 . 8 . 3 Contalliment penetrations.

The containment has the standard penetrations: Personnel hatch, main steam line penetrations and ventilation pipes etc.
0.8.4 Containment isolation system

For those process lines that conned to the reactor coolant system or containment atmosphere and goes through the primary containment ther are normally at least two isolation valves in series. The valves are locked closed ones or automatic isolation ones. In the case of loss of power the valves goes to the position with greatest safety. At least one isolation valve is used for those process lines that do not conned to coolant or containment atmosphere but goes through the primary containment.
Some parts of the main steam lines do not isolate automatically, among these are the relief valves and the steam lines to the auxiliary feedwater pump turbines.
The primary protection system controls all containment isolation valves through two phases of signals, where one phase is for closing valves that can be closed without increasing the potential of damage to the reactor building equipment and s t i l l permit safeguards equipment to function, and the other phase is for isolating the component cooling water lines for the coolant pumps and

the heat exchangers for the reactor coolant drains tank and the excess letdown.
0.8.0 Pressure reduchg and heat removal systems.

The spray system discharges borated water that reduces the pressure in the containment. It consists of two independent trains, see Figure 20, Safety injection, residual heat removal and spray system and Table 12, Spray pumps details. The residual heat system pumps can be used as spray pumps and the spray pumps as residual heat system pumps. The reactor building heat removal system consists of several parts, see Figure 22, Reactor building heat removal systems. During normal operation is three out of four fans sufficient
35

enough, and after a loss of coolant accident one fan together with one train of the spray system are suficient too cool the reactor building.

stlom Gmmtor

Figure 22, Reactor buiiding heat removal systems

36

........................

Table 12, Spray pumps details

S.8.6 Containment gas Control system.

The combustible gas Control system that prevents the accumulation of hydrogen to reach unacceptable limits consists of the hydrogen mixing fans, the reactor building coolers, the hydrogen recombiners and the hydrogen monitoring subsystem and is capable of keeping the hydrogen concentration below 3%volume.
5.8.7 Secondary containment.

Sizewell B has a secondary containment of lightweight concrete enclosing the primary containment. The emergency exhaust system maintains a negative pressure in the case of a release. Should any leakages occur from the primary containment these w i l l then be collected and filtered in the secondary containment before being released through the ventilation stacks.
5.9 S t e m and power conversion systems
5.9.1 Overall system information

There are four steam generators delivering steam through two main loops to the two main turbine generators. The output from the s t e m generators are cross-connected to balance the flow and pressure when the demand from the two turbines differ.
S.9.2 Turbine-generator

A turbine set consist of a high pressure turbine and three low pressure turbines. Both high and low pressure types are double flow, for other details see Table 13, Turbine conditions and Figure 23, Turbine, steam and condensate system.
The rotor and stator of the generator are cooled respectively by hydrogen and water. The generator produces 629.5 MW power continuously at 23.5 kV.

Table 13, Turbine conditions

37

Figure 23, Turbine, steam and condensate system

38

5.8.3 Main s t e m supply system

Steam from the steam generators are transferred to the m a i n turbine generators and the auxiliary steam system. If there should be a reactor trip, steam is dumped to the condensers or the atmosphere. See Figure 25, One leg of the main steam system for more details of the s t e m flow.
5.9.4 Main condensers and evacuation system

The condenser is of the single pass transverse type, see Figure 24, Main condenser. It is proteded against overpressure by bursting diaphragms. m e r e are three vacuum pumps to extrad non-condensable gases and air from each condenser.

Figure 24, Main condenser

39

1P

az

E E
1

Figure 25, One leg of the main steam system

40

5.9.5 Turbine gland sealing system

The turbine gland sealing system is a part of the turbine auxiliary systems and prevents air from leaking into or out of the end glands of the turbine rotor and the governor valve spindle glands.
5.9.6 Turbine bypass system

The bypass system dumps s t e m t o both condensers and to the atmosphere.

5.9.7 Condenser cooling system

Sea water is taken through a single intake tunnel and through the fine mesh revolving screens, see Figure 26, Main circulating water system and Table 14, Circulating waterpumps.

Figure 26. Main circulatine water svstem

41

Table 14, Circulating water pumps

5.9.8

Condensate and feed water system

The condensate system consists of two trains where each train uses three 50% (of turbine flow) pumps to extract condesate for delivering to the polishing plant and low pressure heaters and finally to the deaerator. The polishing plant consists of four mixed bed demineraliser units that removes corrosion products and condenser leakage impurities. There are three m a i n feedwater pumps for each turbine with one in stand-by, see Table 15, Main feedwater pumps. They take suction from the deaerators and sends the water through the high pressure heaters to the steam generators. If the main feed water pumps are not available the auxiliary feedwater pumps are used, see Table 16, Auxiliary feedwater pumps. For details of the layout of the feed water system, see Figure 27, Main feed water system.

1 Temperature
Table 15, Main feedwater pumps

156C

42

Figure 27, Main feed water system

0.9.9

Condensate cleanup system

The pH and oxygen content of the condesate is controlled by injecting hydrazine or ammonia after the condesate polishing plant.

43

5.9.10 Steam generator blowdown system

The blowdown system controls the s t e m chemistry and purity in the s t e m generators, see

Figure 28, Steam generator blowdown system.

Figure 28, Steam generator blowdown system

44

5.9.11 Safety and relief valves

There is one quick-closing main isolating valve with bypass, five spring-operated safety valves and an air-operated globe relief valve in each s t e m line, see Figure 25, O m leg of the main steam system for more details.
5.9.12 Other turbine a d a r y systems

Them are severally systems that support the main turbine generator in different ways; to supply steam to the feed heaters and the deaerators, to lubricate the turbine generator end exciter bearings, to prevent air leakage into the glands, see 5.9.5 Turbine gland sealing system, and to provide oil storage and transfer facilities for the lubricating oil systems.

5 . 1 0 h e l and component handling and storage systems

Both new and used h e l is stored in the fuel building in the fuel storage racks which are located under water in the fuel storage pond, see Figure 29, Fuel route and storage. The h e l storage pond is a stainless steel lined reinforced cavity. There is room for five year of used fuel and onethird of a core of new fuel plus Space for a whole core of fuel. The Space can be expanded within the existing pond. The fuel storage racks are stainless steel storage cells with sheets of boronbearing polymer where the cells are arranged in a square lattice form. There is also boron in the fuel storage pond water.

All transport of fuel between the reactor building and the h e l building is done through the transfer tube.
5.10.1 New fuel storage

One-third core of new fuel is stored in the fuel storage racks in the fuel building.
5.10.2 Spent hiel storage

The spent fuel is stored in the fuel storage racks in the h e l building until it is sent for reprocessing.
5.10.3 Handling and inspection systems

During refuelling is the refuelling pool cavity filled with borated water, the internal strudure above the core is lifted out and placed in the refuelling pool cavity, the fuel assemblies are lif'ted out, rotated and placed in the transfer tube and transferred to the storage pond.

45

i ?

l i "
Figure 29, Fuel route and storage

.-

..

5 . 1 1 Radioactive waste systems

6.11.1 Liquid waste systems

Both reactor grade and non-reactor graw liquid waste are collected, processed an^ disposed of through the liquid waste system. The main parts are the drain channel A which receives and processes clean tritiated reactor grade wastes, the drain channel B which colleds and processes reactor coolant leakage plus active effluent from the dirty radwaste drain system, the active laundry and hot shower subsystem which takes water from washing machines, showers, sinks
46

and such, the chemical drains tank subsystem which collects the waste in two tanks, monitories and discharges the waste and the secondary liquid waste system which collects waste from the secondary systems (located in the turbine building). See the following figures for more details; Figure 30, Liquid waste channel A and B, simplified, Figure 31, Liquid waste system Active laundry and hot shower plus Chemical dmins tank, both simplified and Figure 32, The secondary liquid waste system (simplified).

I=

U
47

-O

Figure 3 0 ,Liquid w a s t e channel A and B, simplified

Figure 31, Liquid waste system Active laundry and hot shower plus Chemical drains tank, both simplined

48

Figure 32, The secondary liquid waste system (simpiiied)

49

6.11.2 Gaseous waste systems

The gaseous waste systems consists of the station heating, ventilation and air-conditioning system and the gaseous radwaste system which main task is to delay the short-lived radionuclides to be reduced by decay before being released, see Figure 33, The gaseous radwaste system (simplifid).

ts
a
a
ri1

fil

A
Figure 33,Tbe gaseous radwaste system (simplified)

50

5 . 1 1 . 3

Solid waste systems

The solid waste systems collect, process and package radioactive waste and store it u n t i l it is transported off site, see Figure 34, The solid waste processing (simplified).

I I

I
I I I I I I I I

Figure 34, The solid w a s t e processing (simpliied)

61

5.12 Control and instrumentation systems

6.12.1 Overall system information

The entire plant is built after the defence-in-depth concept, see Figure 35, Defence-in-depth, including the Control and instrumentation system. The Control and instrumentation system of Sizewell B is enhanced compared to the standard SNUPPS design. The system consists of the Integrated System for Centralised Operation (ISCO) which is a set of Control and data acquisition equipment and computer data processors giving the operators information about the plant, the Engineering Computer System (ECOS) which provides information for the engineers and maintenance stafF, and the reactor protection system, see Figure 36, Instrumentation and Control system. ISCO is a distributed computer system based on a updated version of Westinghouse Electrics Distributed Processing Family (WDPF) with two redundant Westnet highways, one used for safety category 1data and the other for safety category 2. In addition is an Ehternet information highway used for non-time-critical messages. The user interface of ISCO is called the Distributed Computer System (DCS) with Sun SPARC RISC workstations running Sun Solaris UNIX operating system performing the fundions of DCS. The lover level of the WDPF is called the Process Control System (PCS) and comprises the distributed I/O processors. It is conventional programmable logic controllers programmed via ladderlogic diagrams. Some of the new features of WDPF for Sizewell is the ability to execute operator Control from special dedicated Control panel switches instead of using a keyboard and the use of modern man machine interface via the SPARC displays. The High Integrity Control System (HICS) is a safety grade microprocessor I&C system from the Westinghouse Eagle family and provides the majority of the safety classified man-machine interface. In addition to wing the DCS displays it also uses four plasma screens in the main Control room which are non-breakable in the case of an earthquake destroying the normal cathode ray tube displays. HICS is split in four electrically and physically segregated redundant networks.

STATION

CONTROI.
SY!XEMS

(wIs<:ol

SA w r Y FEATURES

OPERAIOR

Figure 35, Defence-in-depth

62

Figure 3 6 ,Instrumentationand Control system

5.12.2 Protection system

The protection system is made up of two mutually diverse technologies using two-out-of-four voting. The first system is the Primary Protection System (PPS) which is a microprocessor system based on Westinghouse Eagle system and the other system is the Secondary Protection System (SPS)which is based on analogue trip units and Laddic magnetic logic (developed in the 1960s for gas cwled readors). There has been invested more than 500 man years into the design, manufacture, testing and assessment of the primary protection system. The PPS system takes input from plant sensors, nuclear instrumentation, rod position sensow and manual Control from the Control room. These input goes to a computer system which generates output to the reactor trip system, safety actuation equipment and other systems like the data processing system., see Figure 37, Primary Protection System (PPS)and the protectwn computer system. The PPS reactor trip parameters are source range neutron flux, intermediate range flux, power range flux, nitrogen-16 power measurement, core limit calculation for low DNBR (Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio), linear power density (kW/m), rod cluster Control assembly misalignment calculations, rod cluster Control assembly bank movement surveillance calculations, rod cluster Control assembly bank insertion calculations, pressuriser pressure, pressuriser level, reactor coolant system flow rate, reactor coolant cold leg narrow range 1 kV supply deteded, both temperature, steam generator narrow range water level, loss of 1 main turbines detected tripped, sdety injection signal from the primary protection engineered safety features actuation system. The SPS trip parameters are source range neutron flux, power range neutron flux, reactor coolant system narrow range pressure, reactor coolant pump motor speed, reactor coolant pump

53

motor current, s t e m generator narrow range water level, main steam isolation valve insufficiently open.

<

Nudear-,

G o d pas-

<

Protectioq Computer I_)<_ Safety Fedtu res> , System

Manual)-,

..-

<

Other S y s t e m 3

Input Signois

TdProm other channels

Figure 37, Primary Protection System (PPS) and the protection computer system

0 . 1 2 . 3 Regulating system

The station automatic Control system is a part of the high integrity Control system. It is not necessary with operator intervention for at least 30 minutes after a fadt, due to the design of the plant, Control and protection system. The HICS is safety category 1 and mainly controls safety category 1 equipment. The process Control system is safety category 2 and used for category 2 and 3 equipment.

54

6.12.4 Instrumentationsystern

Apart from the normal instrumentation there are also some special instrumentation systems used for calibration of the reactor protection system, providing post-fault monitoring and to give the operators information about the plant. Among these system we find the flux mapping system, the boron concentration monitoring system, the reactor vessel level instrumentation system, the core exit temperature measurement system, the loose parts and core vibration monitoring system, the fire detection system, the seismic instrumentation system, the radiological protection system, the health physics instrumentation and the main steam line nitrogen-16 gamma detectors. Post-fault neutron flux measurements are done by the secondary protection system source range detectors.

5 . 1 3 Electricai power systems

Sizewell B is connected to the external grid at three separate 400kV points, two at Bramford, one at Norwich and one at Pelham.
. 0.13.1 Main transformerand U
J M W ~ equipment ~ ~

The main generators produces electricity at 23.5 kV which is transformed up to 400 kV for the 1kV for station use, see Figure off-site distribution net, a minor share is transformed down to 1 38, Main and essential electrical systems. The gross electrical output is 1258 MW while the net electrical output is 1188 MW.
0.13.2 Plant distribution system

Power taken from both the external grid and the main generators are distributed around the plant at 1 1kV, 3.3 kV and 415 V. The electrical system is split in two, the main electrical system and the essential electrical system. The essential electrical system provides power to safety category 1and 2 equipment and to some category 3 equipment. There are two composite 1 1kV boards which are split into two segregated boards; a station and a unit board. The unit auxiliary boards 1 and 2 serve the auxiliaries of the main turbine generators 1 and 2 at 3.3 kV and indirectly at 415 V. The station auxiliary boards 1 and 2 supplies mainly the 3.3 kV to 415 V transformers for the reactor auxiliaries which do not need a supply from the essential system. The essential electrical system is powered through the four essential auxiliary transformers which transforms the 1 1kV from the four 1 1kV boards down to 3.3 kV. The system is divided into four independent trains where the essential a.c. system is segregated by three-hour fire barriers. There is always a minimum of two-way segregation.
5.13.3 Standby power supply

Each train of the essential 3.3 kV system is connected to an essential diesel generator. In the case of loosing both off-site and essential diesel generator the reactor can be kept at hot shutdown for 24 hours through the supplies from batteries and the battery charging diesels. The essential d.c. power system which provides power to category 1equipment will provide 120 minutes of power &er loss of a.c. power, off-site power and essential diesels if the charging diesels are available at request.
65

"he essential uninterruptible power supply system provides 110 V a.c. single-phase to the reactor protection system. The system is category 1 and the batteries are rated to last for 120 minutes.
p-------TO
132W
A Station \ ' i32kV

132kV

f3ramtOl-d 1

------

B0tt.y Chorgrn ond Lov VattoQ. S r t u n s

Ly)*rd

E aauluoi8oord fB Station Boord UB UnitBootd

fg p L k L = " y

Figure 38, M a i n and essential electrical systems

66

6. FIREPROTECTION

The fire protection system comprises detection and suppression systems that cover the entire site. Several types of fire detectors are installed, chosen according to the type and nature of fire risk:
0

Smoke detedors Flamedetedors Heatdetectors

Fire alarm can be raised from manual stations, nowhere at the site is the distance to the nearest fire alarm more than 30 meters. Systems and equipment for fire fighting include: Fixed water suppression system. (Fire-fightingring main. Sprinkler and spray systems.) Fire hydrant systems. (External hydrant system.) Gaseous suppression. (Fixed halon suppression.)

Foam suppression
0

Portable extinguishers.

6.1 Buildings, layout and materials

The fire protection system has a secondary role in ensuring nuclear safety at the plant. Primarily one aims at a construction that minimises the risk for fires and - in the event of a fire passively restrids the damage to equipment and strudures. Segregation and sedioning of essential services equipment and fire resistant barriers are the principal means for fire risk minimisation and protection against fire induced events.
6.2 Fire-fighting equipment

The water reservoirs and the fire-fighting pumphouse supply the fixed fire-fighting ring main. The pumphouse contains three 100% diesel driven fire pumps and two 100% diesel driven hydrant pumps. The ring main feeds all fixed water suppression subsystems and the hose reel system. Automatic and manual sprinkler systems are widely used in the fixed water suppression system. These are mainly intended for suppressing fires in solid materials. Spray systems (deluge systems) are primarily intended for use against flammable liquid fires.

In the radwaste building Halon 1301 total flooding systems are installed. Hand-held portable fire extinguishers for manual fire-fighting are distributed throughout the site.

57

7. PLANT PERFORMANCE DURING NORMAL OPERATION

At the time of making this report (end 1996) Sizewell B has only been running for one cycle, but the first cycle performance is an early indicator for its 40 year design life. Throughout the first cycle plant performance and availability has been exceptional good
7.1 Phases of normal operation

Sizewell B is the fwst nuclear power station in UK to perform automatic frequency response operation to follow changes in demand.

7.2 Plant statistics

The first cycle statistics are excellent, even compared with similar plants. Sizewell B achieved 200 days of continuously running at 100%on 4 April 1996.

* MDC - Expressed as a % in MW. Actual

output compared to potential output.
Table 17, Plant statistics

68

8.

ACCIDENT ANALYSES

The accident analyses are based on event tree analysis for identified initiating events, combined with f a d t tree analysis of systems that may be called on to arrest a potentially dangerous sequence or mitigate its consequences. The starting point is the fault schedule, that is the list of initiating faults whose consequences are to be assessed. Sequences where safety systems and safeguards function as expeded do not lead to exceedance of plant safety limits, these are design basis faulta. m e r e are about 180 initiating faults in the f a d t schedule, leading to app. 5000 design basis faults. These design basis faults are supplemented by transient analyses to ascertain that structural integrity of components is not challenged and that process parameters are within acceptable bounds. Sequences leading to uncontrolled releases of radioadivity are beyond design basis faults. These faults can be grouped in two classes: Benign beyond design basis and large uncontrolled releases. The benign beyond design basis faults do not lead to releases larger than one ERL, uncontrolled relearres may require initiation of emergency measures. Plant damage sequences that are predicted to have roughly the same charaderistics as regards release and subsequent radiological effects are grouped together in four main types of plant damage states: Core damage (Loss of coolable geometry, core melt.)

Reador building bypass (Direct leak path, such as incomplete containment isolation).
Damaged reactor building (Sequences without core melt, but inadequate containment.) Ex-reactor plant damage states (Release from fuel pond, radwaste plant.) Possible radiological effeds of all sequences that may lead to uncontrollable releases are summed to give the total individual risk for death. The predicted limiting individual risk of death is 5.2 x los per year by early effeds, and 6.9 x per year due to fatal cancer. In total a risk of death assessed to 1.2 x lo- per year. his is nearly one order of magnitude less than the target of per year.
8 . 1

Malfunctions in different systems

To reduce the many design basis faults to a manageable number for radiological analysis they were grouped into nine categories comprising:
0

Leaks into the auxiliary building at power

Leaks into the auxiliary building at shutdown

Reador building loss of coolant accident at power
0

Reactor building loss of coolant accident at power Intact circuit faults at power

Intact circuit faults at shutdown

59

Refuelling route faults Ftadwaste budding faults

Faults involving other sources of radioactivity

For each category those with the more severe radiological consequences were use to characterise all sequences in that category, leading to a conservative assessment of the frequency of releases. The final result is w i t h i n acceptable bounds, as also shown by the above death risk assessment.
8 . 1 . 1 intrnai and external hazards

Various techniques were used to address hazards:

0

Event tree analysis F a d t tree analysis

Engineering judgement

Hazards assess in detail were:

Extremewinds
0

Extreme temperatures Aircrafkimpact Seismic hazard F'ires outside safety classified buildings

Droppedloads Pressure part failure Turbine disintegration

In general the most significant contributions to the frequencies of plant damage were from internal f i e s and earthquakes.

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9.

RADIATION PROTECTION Basic radiation protection criteria and derived working rules

9 . 1

The radiological protection criteria applied in the design and operation of Sizewell B NPP reflect compliance with governmental rules and regulations as given in Ionizing Radiation Regulations and the recommendations of the National Radiological Protection Board. It is a stated goal that the actual exposure shall be kept well below statutory limits, and that the ALARP (AsLow As Reasonably Practicable) principle is adhered to. The targets set shall apply to any individual member of Sizewell B staf, and to temporary or contract workers. The strategy used to achieve design targets can be summarised as follows:
o

Obtain overview and calculate strength of radiological sources Limit radiological hazards at source Systematic implementation of dose reducing measures in design Final assessment of operator and public exposures
Doselimits

o o o

9 . 1 . 1

See Table 18, Dose limits for the statutory limits for doses.

Organ

Annual dose equivalent

IEyes
Table 18, Dose h i t s

150 mSv

The design target for collective exposure is that it should not exceed 2 man Sv per year per GWe installed capacity. For Sizewell this transform into a design target of 2.4 man Sv/year.

For the target dose rates for direct radiation exposure of station staff, see Table 19, Direct radiation exposure of station staff.
For short to very short exposures dose rates in excess of 10 mSv/h may be allowed given that the yearly limit is not exceeded.

61

Access requirement

Dose equivalent rate, mSv/h

Il

Less than 1 man-hour/year

lo

Table 19, Direct radiation exposure of station staff

9.2

Shielding

The design of Sizewell B has taken account of experiences gained from SNUPPS reference plants and operation of other PWRS, particularly in France. Components or systems found to give large contributions to annu. stafT doses have been redesigned or changed to provide better shielding for workers. The measures include:
0

Improved shielding in the reador pressure vessel refuelling cavity Additional shielding during maintenance of steam generators and reador coolant pumps Substitution of Inconel-690 for Inconel-600 steam generator tubing

Design of pipework to reduce build-up of active materials

Remote in-service inspection of equipment has been introduced where possible, notably for reactor pressure vessel welds. All primary side inspection of the of the steam generators is done with automated equipment. Since refuelling adivities contribute strongly to collective dose there has been a determined effort t o reduce doses during refuelling.
9.3

Radiation

The principal sources of radiation are the core, primary coolant and the depositions in piping and components in the primary circuit. Induced sources, especially from cobalt and nickel isotopes, account for most of the occupational radiation exposure. A preliminary assessment showed that app. 85 % of occupational exposure is attributable to cobalt-60 and cobalt-58, the main component sources being steam generator tubing, steel alloys in primary circuit and Inconel grids in fuel assemblies.

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9 3 . 1

Radiation levels

An assessment of collective doses based on analyses of tasks - dose rates, duration, radiation
levels etc. was carried out to ascertain that contributions from different work functions were included: In-service inspection

Refue1 1 ing
Scheduled maintenance Unscheduled maintenance Waste processing Health physics Operation and surveillance Experience from PWR plants in Europe and USA shows that unscheduled maintenance accounts for roughly the same annual collective dose as does scheduled maintenance. The task-based analysis gave the following contributions to annual collective dose, see Table 20, Annual collective dose.

In-service inspection

230 Man mSv 260 Man mSv

I

11.7% of total 13.2% of total

Refuellinn
II

I
Unscheduled maintenance Waste processing

I
I

In-service testing.

49 Man mSv 527 Man mSv 191 Man mSv 237 Man mSv

2.5 % of total 26.7 % of total 9.7% of total 12.0 % of total

1 Operations and surveillance (estimated)

Table 20, Annual collective dose

Health physics is included as a 10 % allowance in the separate work functions.The target is that annual dose to an individual operator shall not exceed 10 mSv per year, which is achieved by requiring that no single task shall result in a dose of more than 10 mSv. The highest individual task dose for the most demanding tasks is given in Table 21, Highest individual tusk dose.

63

As seen from the table there is no single task contributing more than 10 mSv.
9.3.2

Radiation monitorhg

The process radiation monitoring systems and sampling systems provide the data required for proof of compliance with operational limits. Process monitors are located in active systems, nonactive auxiliary systems and in heating and ventilation systems. Health physics monitors dose rate levels, airborne activity and personnel contamination levels. The radwaste sampling system colleds samples from the radwaste process systems and the airborne discharge duds.
9.4 Monitoring systems and action levels for radioactive releases to the environment
9.4.1

Monitoring of releases to the atmosphere

The releases to the atmosphere are monitored by the measurement system for ventilation stack and ducts together with the sampling system for airborne activity.
9.4.2

Monitorhg of releases to water

The liquid radwaste system controls the activity of discharges to the sea. Normally the effluents are collected in hold-up tanks for sampling and filtration before being discharged t o the sea, but the system has facilities for further treatment of liquid waste if necessary.

64

10.

OFF'SITE DOSE ASSESSMENT

The off-site dose derives from airborne and liquid discharges, the main exposure pathways being:
0

External and internal exposure from airborne activity External exposure due to ground contamination

Internal exposure due to foodstufFs Handling of contaminated fishing gear

Direct radiation from site structures

10.1

Releases under operating conditions

10.1.1 Radiationdoaes

The estimated collective doses to the UK population due to airborne and liquid discharges from normal operation of Sizewell B are (per year): Liquid: Airborne: Total:

0.024man Sv 0.10man Sv 0.12man Sv

The annual dose to the critical member of the public due to liquid discharges is 14.8@v. The annual dose to the critical member of the public due to airborne discharges is 75 pSv. The annual dose to the critical member of the public at Sizewell village due to both liquid and gaseous discharges is 85 @v. The predicted doses are below the ICRP limits and the target limit set by NE (170pSv). 10.2

Releases under hazardous conditions

Abnormal conditions may arise due to faults in equipment and systems, operator error or external hazards such as storms, earthquakes or floods. A fault causing a release that may endanger public health must be shown to be of sufficiently low probability that it does not give a significant contribution to societal risk in general. Design targets for Sizewell B are defined in terms of an Emergency Reference Level (ERL). A dose below ERL to a member of the public is unlikely to justis. countermeasures. Releases larger than 1 ERL are referred to as uncontrolled releases.
10.2.1

Contamination of the enviroment

T o characterise off-site consequences there are defined 22 different release categories, primarily
in terms of effective doses to members of the public. These categories cover the whole range of design basis and uncontrolled releases. For assessment purposes an ERL is set equal to 0.1 Sv
65

(100 mSv), and large releases are characterised in terms of doses at a distance of 3 km from the. plant.
10.2.2

Radiation doses

With ERL as unit reference there has been defined fault frequency targets related t o fractions of ERL,see Table 2 2 ,Fault frequency targets.

For releases larger than 1ERL there are two target frequencies:
The summed frequency of uncontrolled releases shall be less than The contribution of any single fault shall be less than per year. per year.

Uncontrolled releases resulting from large accidents are often related to core damage frequency per year), but core damage is not synonymous (which for Sizewell B is assessed to be 9.54 x with uncontrolled release. Mitigation systems and release barriers intervention have to be taken into account to assess the probability for uncontrolled releases. Major releases do in general imply that some core damage must have occurred, though spent fuel in temporary storage may in theory cause a substantial source term for external release.

66

11.

PLANNING, ORGANISATION AND ADIMINISTRATIW CONTROL

The responsibility for station management rests solely with the station manager, who is in charge of all adivities on the station during plant operation. The station manager reports to the executive diredor of operations. The management structure refleds the extensive operating experience accumulated at Nuclear Electric, in addition one has drawn on experience with PWR operation world-wide and A structure with three main departments: recommendations of the IAEA.
0

Produdion department Management support department Technical support department

Each department is headed by a department manager. 11.1

Production department

The department has responsibility for

0

plant operation and surveillance testing routine maintenance and minor repairs radiological and chemical monitoring work scheduling and short-term planning communication with company produdion co-ordinators

The department decides how the plant is to be operated day-to-day and that the technical aspects of operation are in compliance with pertinent rules and regulations.
11.1.1

Management support department

The department has responsibility for business planning finance and procurement personnel and administration
training co-ordination

quality assurance emergency planning and industrial safety management information systems and communications

67

The department is responsible for maintaining an effective and clearly defined organisational framework.
11.1.2 Technicai support department

The department has responsibility for engineering, nuclear and other outage management safety case maintenance and maintenance strategy
0

operational experience feedback chemistry and health physics service

The department is responsible for formulating engineering and technical policies, t o plan and manage outages and modifications, and to ensure compliance with safety requirements.
1 1 . 1 . 3
Trainllig programme

There are station stafT training programmes which are mainly direded towards qualifying personnel for station operation. These programmes take advantage of the dedicated plant simulator and other facilities for training. Corporate training programmes include training in technical aspeds t o ensure that knowledge of and insight in PWR technology is imparted to stafTless diredly involved in operation.
11.1.4

Operating procedures, instructions and orders

Operational documentation consists of Station manuals (Technical descriptions, operation manuals, technical specifications).
0

Station emergency plan and handbook Nuclear Electric safety rules (Cover radiological, electrical and mechanical hazards).

Quality assurance programme Station records (Comprehensive record of station operation).

68

1 2 .

ORGANISATION OF TRE AUTHORITIES

1 2 . 1

Local organisation

The Health and Sdety Executive is the governmental agency in charge of nuclear safety. These responsibilities are taken care of by the Nuclear Installations Inspedorate (NII), which performs the actual technical Control and oversees the nuclear industry on behalf of the Government. Licences and permits are issued by NI1 acting as representative for the authorities.

69

1 3 .

PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT

A probabilistic safety assessment was performed for inclusion in the Re-Construction Safety
Report which was the basis for granting a license for Sizewell B. For the Re-Operational Safety Report a more comprehensive and detailed PSA was carried out, covering a wide range of operational states and initiating events. The underlying requirement was to provide thorough safety analysis of the design and to demonstrate that the risk to the public is below an acceptable level, notably that the probability of large or fatal doses is below per reactor year. The analysis considered internal, external and beyond design basis initiating faults together with non-core sources of radioactivity. Level 1PSA is concerned with the state of process and plant equipment resulting from a fault chain, Level 2 with containment pedormance and Level 3 with the release of radioactivity to the environment and radiological consequences. All 3 levels are covered in the Sizewell B probabilistic safety assessment. For the Level 1 analysis an initial list of about 170 initiators was drawn up, the possibility for each to occur in 6 different operational states were to be considered. To reduce the analysis to a manageable size there was extensive binning of fault sequences. Still there were 58 systems modelled and 61 f a d t trees analysed. Each fault tree typically consisted of 1500 components and 900 gates. There were several thousands cut-sets for each f a d t tree, a cut-off frequency of per year was used. The Sizewell PSA has a wider scope than most P S h and does not only look at the core melt frequency. If one considers internal initiators at power the core melt frequency is likely to be per reactor year. app. 2-3 For external initiators a list of 50 was reduced to 9 that were quantified: Seismic events, internal fires, fires external to the main building, temperature extremes, extreme wind, pressure part failure, turbine disintegration, aircraft crash and dropped load. The same plant damage states were used as for internal initiators. Of particular interest are the fault chains resulting from fires and seismic events. The analysis shows that seismic events are not major contributors to the overall results. The main contributors to the risk of death to an individual are: Small releases Beyond Design Basis Initiating Faults
38%
28.5%

These results show that the risk associated with credible faults have been reduced to the point where the less credible faults (that is Beyond Design Basis faults) contribute nearly as much as Design Basis faults. The target frequency for the analysis was that a release resulting in 100 mSv whole body dose at the plant perimeter should have a probability less than 10-6 per reactor year. The analysis shows the probability to be somewhat higher, but the risk is still acceptably low. In round figures the Sizewell B plant poses a risk to the public which is two to three orders of magnitude less than the total everyday risk caused by more familiar sources of risk.

70

14. REFERENCES

Sizewell B Safety Statement. SXB-IP-772OOUl.Nuclear Electric plc. January 1994. Proceedings of a Forum on Safety Related Systems in Nuclear Applications. The Royal Academy of Engineering. December 1992. ISBN 1 871634 24 5 ATOM 433 MarcWApril i994 Sizewell B technical outline, Nuclear Electric plc.

New Civil Engineer Sizewell supplement, New Civil Engineer October 1994
Sizewell B Power Station, Supplementto Civil Engineering vol. 108, special issue 1, February 1995

71

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