Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.

com/abstract=2086630








LEGAL RESEARCH PAPER SERIES
Paper No 41/2012 November 2013






The Generality of Law




TIMOTHY ENDICOTT



Revised 9 November 2013













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< http://ssrn.com/abstract=2086630>


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Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2086630
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2086630

1

lorLhcomlng ln
Luls uuarLe d'Almelda, !ames Ldwards and Andrea uolceLLl , eds.,
!"#$%&' )*+ )#,-./ .01" 23&4"5- 36 *#7.
(ParL ubllshlng 2013)
"#$ %$&$'()*+, -. /(0

1lmoLhy LndlcoLL
1


123+'(4+5

ChapLer 2 of 1he ConcepL of Law ls an accldenLal essay on Lhe generallLy of law. ParL polnLs
ouL ways ln whlch generallLy ls a necessary feaLure of law. Pls accounL can be made more
compleLe (secLlon 1: CenerallLy), and l argue LhaL parLlcularlLy ls also a necessary feaLure of
law (secLlon 2: arLlcularlLy). 1hen l ask whaL 'necessary' means ln all Lhese clalms (secLlon 3:
necesslLy). lL ls a popular ldea LhaL legal LheorlsLs should noL Lry Lo ldenLlfy necessary
feaLures of law, l argue LhaL Lhe popular ldea ls a mlsLake. l conclude by argulng LhaL ParL
should have been more wllllng Lo pass value [udgmenLs abouL law (secLlon 4: value). 1he
elucldaLlon of Lhe necessary feaLures of law depends on an elucldaLlon of Lhe value of law.

67+)*&$5

89 %$&$'()*+,
898 "#$ :$&$'()*+, -. )(03
(9 1;;)*4(2*)*+, +- ;$'3-&3 (&< +- 4-&<74+
29 "*=$
49 >)(4$
89? "#$ :$&$'() (7+#-'*+, -. )$:() *&3+*+7+*-&3
89@ "#$ :$&$'()*+, -. +#$ 3,3+$=
89A 1 :$&$'() #(2*+ -. -2$<*$&4$
89B C-&4)73*-& -& :$&$'()*+,
?9 >('+*47)('*+,
?98 "#$ )$:() 3,3+$=D3 &$$< .-' ;('+*47)(' -'<$'3
?9? >('+*47)(' &-'=3 *& 3(&4+*-&3 (&< '$=$<*$3
?9@ E$+$'=*&*&: +#$ 7&<$+$'=*&$<
?9A C-&4)73*-& -& ;('+*47)('*+,
@9 F$4$33*+,
A9 G()7$


ln Lhe 30 years slnce lL was wrlLLen, 01" 23&4"5- 36 *#7
2
has shaped legal phllosophy. lL has noL
done so by creaLlng a school, buL by dolng someLhlng more frulLful, someLhlng LhaL l am sure ParL
found Lroubllng. ?eL he musL also have found lL rewardlng. 1he book lnsplred people Lo explaln why
Lhey dlsagree wlLh lL, and lL sLlll does Loday.
1he book ls durable ln anoLher way: lLs argumenLs are noL daLed. 1he Lone ls daLed. lL ls Lhe
sound of nlneLeen-flfLles Lngland. lf you wanL a gulde Lo Lhe era and Lo Lhe mllleu ln whlch ParL was
wrlLlng, you can flnd lL ln !enlfer ParL's auLoblography, +/8 9" :3 93,".
3
1here, you wlll flnd a
klndred Lone of volce and Lhe same longlng for candour and clarlLy, whlch !enlfer ParL and P.L.A.

1
lellow ln Law, 8alllol College, and uean of Lhe laculLy of Law, unlverslLy of Cxford. l am graLeful for
commenLs from !ohn llnnls, and from Lhe edlLors of Lhls volume.
2
P.L.A.ParL, 01" 23&4"5- 36 *#7, 2
nd
ed (Cxford unlverslLy ress, 1994), referred Lo below as CL".
3
eLer Palban ubllshers, London, 1998.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2086630

2

ParL shared as members of an Lngllsh lnLelllgenLsla ln Lhe nlneLeen flfLles, when Lhe Lngllsh dld noL
really Lhlnk of Lhemselves as havlng an lnLelllgenLsla. lL was a dlfferenL era, and ln Lhe sound of LhaL
era, Lhe book ls daLed.
8uL ln Lhe LruLhs lL sLaLes abouL Lhe naLure of law, lL ls noL daLed. And Lhe errors ln Lhe book
are, ln ParL's phrase, polnLers Lo Lhe LruLh now. lf you read Lhe book you wlll flnd an elucldaLlon of
Lhe naLure of law, offered Lo you by a person who ls sLrlvlng for clarlLy. l guaranLee LhaL you wlll flnd
someLhlng Lo dlsagree wlLh. lL may glve you polnLers Lo Lhe LruLh.
ln Lhe elghL pages of ChapLer 2 of 01" 23&4"5- 36 *#7, ParL merely ldenLlfles a Lheory LhaL
he ls golng Lo address. ChapLer 2 does noL even clear Lhe ground for Lhe consLrucLlon of hls own
Lheory (he clears Lhe ground ln ChapLers 3 and 4, by demollshlng Lhe Lheory ldenLlfled ln ChapLer 2).
?eL Lhere ls a greaL deal ln Lhls shorL, prellmlnary chapLer. lL ls an accldenLal essay on Lhe generallLy
of law. l call lL accldenLal because Lhere ls no lndlcaLlon LhaL ParL seL ouL Lo glve an accounL of
generallLy.
1he slmple lmperaLlve Lheory ls, accordlng Lo ParL, Lhe Lheory LhaL laws are coerclve orders.
Pe uses AusLln's verslon of Lhe Lheory ln seLLlng up hls LargeL, because AusLln presenLed Lhe Lheory
more clearly and slmply Lhan 8enLham dld. 8efore ldenLlfylng Lhe errors ln Lhe Lheory, ParL seLs ouL
Lo make lL a Lheory worLh dlsagreelng wlLh. A Lheory ls worLh dlsagreelng wlLh noL slmply ln vlrLue of
belng wrong, buL only lf we can learn someLhlng worLhwhlle from lLs mlsLakes. ParL suggesLs LhaL we
have more promlse of learnlng someLhlng, lf we flrsL show how lL can besL be defended. lf Lhe laws
of a counLry are coerclve orders, lL mlghL seem LhaL Lhey are llke Lhe commands of a gunman. 8uL
Lhe slmple lmperaLlve Lheory can acLually dlsLlngulsh law from Lhe commands of a gunman, ln
varlous ways. ln ChapLer 2, ParL explalns how LhaL can be done, seLLlng up a form of Lhe lmperaLlve
Lheory LhaL would be worLh dlsagreelng wlLh. Pe alms Lo 'secure LhaL Lhe docLrlne we shall conslder
and crlLlclse ls sLaLed ln lLs sLrongesL form' (CL 18). ln ChapLers 3 and 4 he uses Lwo relaLed errors
LhaL he found ln Lhe lmperaLlve Lheory (ln a nuLshell, lLs accounL of Lhe normaLlvlLy of rules ls lnepL,
and so ls lLs Lheory of a normaLlve sysLem) as polnLers Lo Lhe LruLh abouL Lhe naLure of law. 1hose
errors wlll be more useful for LhaL purpose, lf Lhe Lheory ls presenLed as sLrongly as posslble. ChapLer
2 ls an essay on ways ln whlch Lhe lmperaLlve Lheory could dlsLlngulsh beLween laws and Lhe
commands of a gunman, AusLln could have agreed wlLh lL.
1he essay Lakes Lhe form of a llsL. lL ls orlglnal, a llLLle blL absenL-mlnded, and lncompleLe.
ParL sLarLs numberlng Lhe feaLures LhaL dlsLlngulsh laws from Lhe commands of Lhe gunman, Lhen
sLops numberlng Lhem, and he never makes lL very clear how many Lhere are. And he never polnLs
ouL whaL unlfles Lhem.
01" '"&",#;%-< 36 ;#7 ls whaL unlLes Lhem. 1hey all reflecL Lhe necesslLy, ln any accuraLe
accounL of laws, and ln any accuraLe accounL of Lhe exlsLence and auLhorlLy of legal lnsLlLuLlons and
of legal sysLems, of proposlLlons LhaL generallse across classes of lnsLances. l wlll ouLllne Lhe ma[or
ways ln whlch law ls necessarlly general (secLlon 1). l wlll sLarL from ParL's accounL, buL l wlll lnclude
aspecLs of generallLy ln law LhaL hls accldenLal essay does noL menLlon.
1he mosL lmporLanL respecL ln whlch ParL's accounL can be compleLed ls by explalnlng Lhe
roles and Lhe lmporLance of parLlcular norms ln a legal sysLem. ParL says LhaL parLlcular orders are
elLher excepLlonal, or are 'anclllary accompanlmenLs' of general forms of dlrecLlon (CL 21). Pere ls
Lhe mosL sLrlklng lncompleLeness ln hls accounL of generallLy. l wlll argue ln secLlon 2 LhaL
parLlcularlLy, Loo, ls a necessary feaLure of a legal sysLem. arLlcular orders are noL excepLlonal, and
lL ls mlsleadlng Lo call Lhem 'anclllary'. 1hls ls Lo Lake noLhlng away from ParL's lnslghL LhaL law
necessarlly lncludes general rules. 1he generallLy of law ls besL undersLood ln llghL of Lhe necessary
parLlcularlLy of law, and Lhe comblnaLlon of generallLy and parLlcularlLy ls lLself a necessary feaLure
of a legal sysLem.
ln secLlon 3, l wlll dlscuss whaL 'necessary' means ln Lhese clalms. lL ls a popular ldea LhaL
legal LheorlsLs should noL Lry Lo ldenLlfy necessary feaLures of law, l Lhlnk LhaL Lhe popular ldea ls a
mlsLake. ln secLlon 4, l wlll conclude by argulng LhaL ParL's purposes call for value [udgmenLs abouL
law. ln hls meLhod of uslng lnslghLs lnLo Lhe use of language Lo draw concluslons as Lo whaL ls

3

necessarlly Lhe case abouL law, ParL shows a sLudled amblvalence Loward Lhe value of law. We can
geL furLher wlLh ParL's own Lask -Lhe elucldaLlon Lask- lf we are, lnsLead, whole-hearLed ln
undersLandlng and saylng whaL ls good and bad abouL law. ln seLLlng Lhe agenda for Lhe book aL Lhe
end of ChapLer 1, ParL says LhaL Lhe errors of Lhe slmple lmperaLlve Lheory are 'a polnLer Lo Lhe
LruLh' (CL 17). ParL's amblvalence ls an error LhaL ls a polnLer Lo a LruLh: LhaL Lhe elucldaLlon of Lhe
concepL of law depends on an elucldaLlon of Lhe value of law.

89 %$&$'()*+,

898 "#$ :$&$'()*+, -. )(03

(9 1;;)*4(2*)*+, +- ;$'3-&3 (&< +- 4-&<74+

1he flrsL Lwo modes of generallLy lle ln Lhe scope of a law such as a crlmlnal prohlblLlon on murder,
or an lncome Lax. Such laws are general (1) as Lo Lhe Lype of conducL requlred or prohlblLed or
regulaLed, and (2) as Lo Lhe persons Lo whom Lhey apply. 8y deflnlng a class of acLlons, law makers
very ofLen lmpllclLly provlde LhaL Lhe law LhaL Lhey are maklng ls Lo apply generally Lo persons who
engage ln Lhose acLlons. We mlghL say LhaL generallLy as Lo persons ls [usL one aspecL of generallLy ln
Lhe conducL regulaLed by general rules, lL ls a form of generallLy LhaL deserves aLLenLlon because of
Lhe importance -for attaining the rule of law- of regulating not a particular person's
conduct, but the conduct of persons generally in the community.
1here ls a class of persons who are sub[ecL Lo Lhe crlmlnal law or Lo Lhe lncome Lax, and
Lhere ls a class of acLlons LhaL counL as murder or as earnlng lncome, and Lhe obllgaLlons Lo pay Lhe
Lax, and noL Lo commlL murder, apply generally Lo ordered palrs of persons and acLlons wlLhln Lhe
relevanL classes. SomeLlmes, lawmakers come ouL and express Lhe general appllcaLlon of a rule boLh
Lo a class of persons, and Lo a class of acLlons. 1he Canadlan prohlblLlon on murder Lakes Lhe form of
a general sLaLemenL LhaL:

'Lvery one who commlLs flrsL degree murder or second degree murder ls gullLy of an
lndlcLable offence and shall be senLenced Lo lmprlsonmenL for llfe.'
4


Cf course, Lhere are legally valld orders LhaL are parLlcular as Lo Lhe conducL requlred, or as Lo Lhe
person Lo whom Lhe order applles- an order LhaL a defendanL musL pay damages ln a speclfled
amounL, or a senLence of lmprlsonmenL agalnsL a parLlcular person for an offence, or an anLl-soclal
behavlour order addressed Lo a parLlcular person, prohlblLlng a class of conducL. And general rules
may be parLlcular ln some respecL: a rule maklng a sLreeL one-way does noL apply Lo sLreeLs ln
general, buL Lo -1%/ sLreeL ln parLlcular. 8uL lL ls general as Lo Lhe class of conducL (drlvlng on Lhe
sLreeL) and as Lo persons Lo whom Lhe prohlblLlon applles.
3


29 "*=$

1he second mode of generallLy ln law menLloned ln ChapLer 2 ls Lhe endurlng or '"sLandlng" or
perslsLenL' characLer of a law (CL 23). erslsLence ls generallLy ln appllcablllLy Lo a class of occaslons

4
Crlmlnal Code (8SC, 1983, c C-46), 233(1).
3
Are Lhere parLlcular ,=;"/? 1he ldea of a rule lnvolves noL only normaLlvlLy, buL also regularlLy (unllke Lhe ldea
of a ,=;%&', whlch ls Lyplcally parLlcular), everyLhlng properly called 'a rule' ls general ln some respecL. A rule
may be parLlcular ln varlous respecLs, buL every rule ls more or less general ln one or more modes. So ln order
Lo esLabllsh LhaL generallLy ls a necessary feaLure of law, lL would be enough Lo esLabllsh LhaL rules are a
necessary feaLure of law. 1hls essay argues noL slmply LhaL law necessarlly lncludes rules, buL LhaL law
necessarlly lncludes rules LhaL are hlghly general, ln a varleLy of respecLs, and LhaL Lhls ls noL only a necessary
LruLh buL an lmporLanL LruLh.

4

across Llme. A Lax law, unllke a demand from a gunman Lo hls vlcLlm, perslsLs ln Llme. Laws Lyplcally
apply generally across Llme. 1he Llme durlng whlch a law ls Lo be ln effecL may be prescrlbed by a
lawmaker (and Lhen Lhe rule wlll apply generally durlng LhaL Llme, raLher Lhan aL one parLlcular
momenL). 8uL ofLen Lhe lawmaker wlll say noLhlng, and Lhen a law remalns valld generally from Lhe
Llme of lLs maklng unLll lL ls repealed.
6


49 >)(4$

Laws such as lncome Laxes, or prohlblLlons on homlclde, are general as Lo Lhe place aL whlch Lhe
lncome ls earned or Lhe homlclde ls prohlblLed. 1helr exLenL may be regulaLed by complex rules as Lo
whaL counLs as earnlng Lhe lncome wlLhln Lhe relevanL [urlsdlcLlon, and rules regulaLlng borderllne
cases and overlaps wlLh [urlsdlcLlons of oLher auLhorlLles.
7
8ules may apply ln parLlcular places, buL
general appllcaLlon ln a LerrlLory ls aL Lhe core of legal orderlng. 1he reason ls Lhe relaLlon beLween
law and pollLlcal communlLles. 1he relaLlon beLween a people and a LerrlLory ln a pollLlcal
communlLy lmplles a need for laws LhaL apply generally Lo Lhe LerrlLory. noL every law need apply
generally Lo Lhe LerrlLory, of course, buL every legal sysLem LhaL regulaLes Lhe llfe of Lhe communlLy
musL lnclude laws LhaL apply generally Lo Lhe LerrlLory. no prohlblLlon on homlclde would achleve lLs
purpose lf lL were noL general Lo Lhe LerrlLory for whlch Lhe law ls made, resLrlcLlons on arblLrary
deLenLlon are unflL for purpose lf Lhey do noL apply LhroughouL Lhe LerrlLory ln whlch execuLlve
offlclals exerclse auLhorlLy, clLlzenshlp laws LhaL do noL apply Lo a whole LerrlLory would noL creaLe a
shared clLlzenshlp, pollce powers LhaL do noL effecLlvely exLend LhroughouL a LerrlLory creaLe
enclaves for lawlessness. 1hese forms of LerrlLorlal generallLy -and many oLhers- are essenLlal Lo Lhe
rule of law.
!usL as laws remaln valld unLll repealed unless a lawmaker decldes oLherwlse, Lhey exLend
LhroughouL Lhe [urlsdlcLlon unless a lawmaker decldes oLherwlse. As ParL says,

'ln a modern sLaLe lL ls normally undersLood LhaL, ln Lhe absence of speclal lndlcaLlons
wldenlng or narrowlng Lhe class, lLs general laws exLend Lo all persons wlLhln lLs LerrlLorlal
boundarles.' (CL 21)

Such laws are general noL only as Lo Lhe class of conducL and as Lo Lhe class of persons, and as Lo Lhe
Llme durlng whlch Lhey apply, buL also as Lo Lhe LerrlLory wlLhln whlch Lhe conducL ls requlred or
permlLLed or prohlblLed.

89? "#$ :$&$'() (7+#-'*+, -. )$:() *&3+*+7+*-&3

1he generallLy of laws reflecLs generallLy ln Lhe auLhorlLy of Lhe law makers who make Lhem. Lvery
legal sysLem glves auLhorlLy Lo law makers noL only Lo make parLlcular orders, buL Lo regulaLe Lhe llfe
of Lhe communlLy generally. And Lhe generallLy of legal auLhorlLy ls also enLalled by whaL ParL says,
aL Lhe end of hls llsL, abouL Lhe supremacy of law. Law ls made by lnsLlLuLlons LhaL are supreme
wlLhln Lhe sysLem, and are lndependenL from oLher lnsLlLuLlons or persons.
Supremacy ls general power. noLhlng could counL as a legal sysLem, ln whlch Lhere was no
general auLhorlLy Lo regulaLe Lhe llfe of Lhe communlLy. 1he supremacy of law enLalls aL leasL four
modes of generallLy: ln Lhe scope of Lhe auLhorlLy of legal lnsLlLuLlons as Lo persons and as Lo sub[ecL
maLLer, ln Lhe perslsLence ln Llme of legal lnsLlLuLlons, and ln Lhelr auLhorlLy across a LerrlLory. 1here
ls no /=5,">" auLhorlLy wlLhouL '"&",#; power Lo make law. l do noL Lhlnk LhaL Lhe auLhorlLles ln a

6
lor Lhe besL dlscusslon of 'Lhe general prlnclple' LhaL a law remalns valld unLll lL explres accordlng Lo lLs
Lerms, or unLll a deadllne lmplled ln lLs maklng, or unLll lL ls repealed, see !ohn llnnls, '8evoluLlons and
ConLlnulLy of Law', ln A.W.8.Slmpson, ed, ?@63,$ A//#</ %& B=,%/5,=$"&4" (Second serles, Cu 1973) 44 aL 61-3.
7
See arL xlv of Lhe Canadlan Crlmlnal Code. LlmlLs on Lhe general LerrlLorlal appllcaLlon of a law may be
expressed ln varlous ways, such as ln Lerms of a llmlL on Lhe [urlsdlcLlon of a courL.

3

legal sysLem need Lo clalm unllmlLed auLhorlLy.
8
8uL lL ls absoluLely necessary LhaL Lhelr auLhorlLy Lo
regulaLe Lhe llfe of a communlLy should exLend generally across an exLremely wlde class of conducL.
Legal sysLems also necessarlly have Lrlbunals of general [urlsdlcLlon.
9
SeLLlng up a Lrlbunal
wlLh [urlsdlcLlon Lo declde a parLlcular maLLer, such as an #$ 134 war crlmes Lrlbunal, ls an
exLraordlnary measure. lL can be approprlaLe lf Lhere ls some urgenL necesslLy for a Lrlbunal capable
of decldlng Lhe maLLer, and no regular Lrlbunal has Lhe comblnaLlon of [urlsdlcLlon and effecLlveness
Lo declde Lhe maLLer. 8uL courLs of regular, perslsLenL, general [urlsdlcLlon over classes (and ln facL,
over very broad classes) of legal dlspuLe ln a LerrlLory are necessary feaLures of a legal sysLem.
We should also polnL ouL anoLher mode of generallLy ln a legal sysLem, whlch ls noL
accounLed for ln ChapLer 2. lL reflecLs an lncompleLeness ln ParL's accounL of Lhe concepL of law
(alLhough you may Lhlnk LhaL lL ls only a fallure Lo menLlon someLhlng Loo obvlous Lo menLlon).
Along wlLh rules of recognlLlon, change, and ad[udlcaLlon, he should have polnLed ouL Lhe cenLral
role, ln any concelvable legal sysLem, of execuLlve rules- rules auLhorlslng acLlon ([urldlcal and non-
[urldlcal) on behalf of Lhe publlc. 01" 23&4"5- 36 *#7 does noL menLlon Lhe essenLlal role ln law of
Lhe execuLlve funcLlons of Lhe sLaLe. 1hls lacuna ls undersLandable, slnce Lhe leglslaLlve and
ad[udlcaLlve funcLlons are paradlgmaLlcally legal funcLlons, and we Lend Lo Lhlnk of leglslaLures and
courLs as Lhe branches of governmenL responslble for Lhe law. 8uL Lhe 5,%>#,< funcLlons of any sLaLe
are execuLlve, and Lhe law musL auLhorlse and supporL and conLrol Lhose funcLlons. A legal sysLem
necessarlly confers general execuLlve auLhorlLy on agencles of Lhe sLaLe. ln facL, every acLual legal
sysLem confers a complex varleLy of general compeLencles on a complex (and parLly buL noL enLlrely
hlerarchlcal) array of agencles. And every legal sysLem necessarlly lmposes general llmlLs on
execuLlve acLlon, and necessarlly lmposes general obllgaLlons on execuLlve acLors. Moreover, Lhe
prlmary responslblllLy for susLalnlng a legal sysLem -for Lhe rule of law- lles wlLh Lhe execuLlve, and
noL wlLh Lhe leglslaLure or Lhe courLs.
10

llnally, [usL as rules of change and ad[udlcaLlon and execuLlve rules are necessarlly general,
we can say Lhe same of rules of recognlLlon. 8ules of recognlLlon are necessarlly general rules, for
reasons LhaL follow from Lhe generallLy of rules of ad[udlcaLlon and of change and execuLlve rules.

89@ "#$ :$&$'()*+, -. +#$ 3,3+$=

1hls ls lmplled by Lhe polnLs made above abouL Lhe auLhorlLy of legal lnsLlLuLlons wlLhln a sysLem:
Lhe legal /</-">, lLself, has general auLhorlLy over persons, over Lhe sub[ecL maLLer of legal orderlng,
and over Lhe communlLy's LerrlLory, and Lhe sysLem lLself perslsLs ln Llme.

89A 1 :$&$'() #(2*+ -. -2$<*$&4$

llnally, we should noLe LhaL law ls generally effecLlve. ln any legal sysLem Lhere ls, ln a phrase LhaL
ParL borrows from !ohn AusLln, a 'general hablL of obedlence'. All hablLs have aL leasL Lwo modes of
generallLy: lf you have a hablL, you have a dlsposlLlon LhaL applles generally Lo lnsLances or occaslons
wlLhln a class of conducL, and Lhe hablL, belng a dlsposlLlon, has some degree of general perslsLence
across Llme. When ParL and AusLln speak of a general hablL, Lhey mean a hablL LhaL ls also general ln
a furLher respecL: lL ls held generally by Lhe members of a communlLy. AlLhough Lhere may well be
members of Lhe communlLy who do noL have Lhe hablL, Lhey are excepLlons. ParL says LhaL Lhe
general hablL of obedlence ls a vague characLerlsLlc of law, buL cruclal (CL 24, 'cruclal' ls a word we
musL come back Lo). And ParL adds someLhlng Lo Lhls LhaL l have noL counLed as a separaLe

8
See 1lmoLhy LndlcoLL, 'lnLerpreLaLlon, !urlsdlcLlon, and Lhe AuLhorlLy of Law' (2007) 6 Amerlcan hllosophlcal
AssoclaLlon newleLLer 14-19.
9
noL necessarlly 'general [urlsdlcLlon' ln Lhe sense ln whlch Lhe Lngllsh Plgh CourL ls a courL of general
[urlsdlcLlon, see ! C2#,-D E F55", 0,%G=&#; [2011] ukSC 28, and Lhe dlscusslon aL flrsL lnsLance by Laws L!,
[2010] 2 WL8 1012.
10
See LndlcoLL, +$>%&%/-,#-%E" *#7 (2
nd
ed, 2011), ChapLer 1.

6

characLerlsLlc, whlch ls LhaL ln a legal sysLem Lhere ls 'a conLlnulng bellef ln Lhe consequences of
dlsobedlence' (CL 23).
ln every legal sysLem, Lhe execuLlve auLhorlLles of Lhe sLaLe, ln parLlcular, have a general
hablL of obedlence Lo Lhe law (Lhere may be excepLlons, and even wldespread excepLlons, and
excepLlons Lo Lhls generallsaLlon Lyplcally deparL from Lhe rule of law).

89B C-&4)73*-& -& :$&$'()*+,

ParL llsLs mosL of Lhese modes of generallLy ln ChapLer 2,
11
buL he does noL presenL all of Lhem as
lnsLances of generallLy.
12
ParL only uses 'generallLy' as a Lerm for Lhe flrsL Lwo modes of generallLy
menLloned above, as Lo Lhe persons and conducL regulaLed by a law (CL 21). l have argued LhaL all of
Lhe feaLures he polnLs ouL (whlch dlsLlngulsh laws from Lhe commands of a gunman, even under Lhe
slmple lmperaLlve Lheory) are modes of generallLy ln law. So are Lhe addlLlons l have made Lo Lhe
llsL.
As an accounL of generallLy ln law, ChapLer 2 ls lncompleLe. 1haL ls excusable, because ln Lhe
resL of ParL's book, we can flnd much of whaL ls needed Lo compleLe lL. lf he had been wrlLlng hls
essay on generallLy more dellberaLely, he could have polnLed ouL LhaL Lhe secondary rules of
recognlLlon, change and ad[udlcaLlon ln a legal sysLem are all necessarlly general rules. 1o hls llsL of
Lhe essenLlal framework rules of recognlLlon, change, and ad[udlcaLlon, he should have added
execuLlve rules, Lhey musL be general, Loo.
Lvery legal sysLem necessarlly dlsplays generallLy ln (aL leasL) Lhe followlng modes:


H-<$3 -. :$&$'()*+, *& )(0

Legal sysLems necessarlly
lnclude '7)$3 '$:7)(+*&: +#$
)*.$ -. +#$ 4-==7&*+, LhaL
are general as Lo:
/$:() *&3+*+7+*-&3 necessarlly
have general auLhorlLy. 8ules
of change and ad[udlcaLlon
and execuLlve rules are
general as Lo:

9. /$:() 3,3+$=3 Lhemselves
necessarlly perslsL generally ln Llme,
and are ln effecL ln a LerrlLory ln
general, and Lhe scope of Lhelr
auLhorlLy ls general as Lo persons
and conducL. 8ules of recognlLlon
are necessarlly general rules.


10. 1he exlsLence of a legal sysLem
necessarlly lnvolves a <*3;-3*+*-& +-
-2$<*$&4$ (by offlclals and by non-
offlclals) LhaL ls general as Lo Lhe
class of laws LhaL are obeyed, Lhe
class of persons who obey, and Lhe
Llme and place aL whlch Lhe
dlsposlLlon subslsLs.

1. ersons Lo whom
Lhey apply
2. ConducL whlch Lhey
regulaLe
3. 1he Llme aL whlch
Lhey are ln effecL
4. 1he place ln whlch
Lhey apply.
3. 1he persons sub[ecL Lo
Lhe lnsLlLuLlons'
[urlsdlcLlon
6. 1he sub[ecL maLLer of
Lhelr [urlsdlcLlon
7. 1he Llme aL whlch
Lhey have [urlsdlcLlon
(perslsLence ln
exlsLence of legal
lnsLlLuLlons ls
lmpllcaLed ln Lhls
mode of generallLy)
8. 1he place aL whlch
Lhey have [urlsdlcLlon.



11
1o be speclflc, he llsLed generallLy of appllcaLlon of laws Lo persons and Lo conducL, Lhe sLandlng characLer of
laws, Lhe exlsLence of a general bellef ln Lhe execuLlon of sancLlons, a hablL of general obedlence, and Lhe
supremacy of law (whlch lmplles generallLy of auLhorlLy).
12
lor example, ParL conLrasLs Lhe perslsLence of law wlLh 'Lhe feaLure of generallLy', as Lwo dlfferenL feaLures
LhaL dlfferenLlaLe law from Lhe gunman slLuaLlon (CL 22).

7


?9 >('+*47)('*+,

ParL more-or-less sLumbled lnLo Lhe accounL of Lhe generallLy of law ln ChapLer 2, whlle preparlng
AusLln's Lheory for demollLlon. lL ls hardly surprlslng LhaL Lhe accounL ls lncompleLe. A more
compleLe accounL would explaln Lhe role of parLlcularlLy ln law, Lo puL Lhe role of generallLy ln lLs
Lrue perspecLlve.
1he lmporLance of parLlcular legal rullngs ls noL adequaLely reflecLed ln ParL's raLher by-Lhe-
by suggesLlon LhaL parLlcular norms are excepLlonal or anclllary. Pere ls whaL he says:

'Lven ln a complex large socleLy, llke LhaL of a modern sLaLe, Lhere are occaslons when an
offlclal, face Lo face wlLh an lndlvldual, orders hlm Lo do someLhlng. A pollceman orders a
parLlcular moLorlsL Lo sLop or a parLlcular beggar Lo move on. 8uL Lhese slmple slLuaLlons are
noL, and could noL be, Lhe sLandard way ln whlch law funcLlons, lf only because no socleLy
could supporL Lhe number of offlclals necessary Lo secure LhaL every member of Lhe socleLy
was offlclally and separaLely lnformed of every acL whlch he was requlred Lo do. lnsLead
such parLlcularlzed forms of conLrol are elLher excepLlonal or are anclllary accompanlmenLs
or relnforcemenLs of general forms of dlrecLlons whlch do noL name, and are noL addressed
Lo, parLlcular lndlvlduals, and do noL lndlcaLe a parLlcular acL Lo be done.' (CL 20-21)

lL ls Lrue LhaL some forms of parLlcular ;"'%/;#-%3& are excepLlonal, such as an acL of aLLalnder, or an
enacLmenL deslgned Lo deprlve a parLlcular clalmanL of Lhe effecL of a courL order,
13
or Lhe old
pracLlce of leglslaLlve dlvorce. Some such acLs are vlolaLlons of Lhe requlremenLs of Lhe rule of law,
preclsely because of Lhelr parLlcularlLy. 1hls does noL mean LhaL parLlcular leglslaLlon ls generally
bad, buL we can aL leasL say LhaL parLlcular enacLmenLs are proper uses of leglslaLlve power only
when Lhere ls some reason for parLlcularlLy. An acL of arllamenL for Lhe creaLlon of a rallway
company or oLher publlc body can be an example, and of course Lhere are many oLhers. 8uL Lhe
mosL obvlous and lmporLanL example of parLlcular leglslaLlon ls Lhe approval of a budgeL (as ln Lhe
annual llnance AcL ln Lhe unlLed klngdom), whlch lncludes a leglslaLlve auLhorlsaLlon of parLlcular
expendlLure. 1haL process ln a leglslaLure ls [usLlflable because of Lhe value, ln Lhe lnLeresLs of
responslble governmenL, of flscal accounLablllLy Lo a leglslaLlve assembly. ln facL, lL ls so lmporLanL a
leglslaLlve funcLlon LhaL you may conclude LhaL generallLy ls &3- Lhe norm ln leglslaLlon, afLer all. lL ls
aL leasL enough Lo show LhaL parLlcular leglslaLlon ls noL necessarlly conLrary Lo Lhe rule of law. 8uL
cerLaln sorLs of parLlcular leglslaLlon are excepLlonal, and Lhe excepLlonallLy of lnsLrumenLs such as
acLs of aLLalnder or dlvorce shows someLhlng lmporLanL abouL parLlcularlLy ln law: -1" #55;%4#-%3& 36
-1" 43>>=&%-<H/ ;"'#; /-#&$#,$/ -3 # 5#,-%4=;#, 4#/" ls noL (and lL should noL be) a sLandard funcLlon
of Lhe leglslaLure. 1hls ls one aspecL of Lhe separaLlon of powers and, llke Lhe connecLed ldeal of Lhe
rule of law, Lhe separaLlon of powers ls achleved by every legal sysLem Lo some exLenL (even lf Lhere
are defecLs ln Lhe separaLlon of powers ln every legal sysLem).
8uL ln Lhe appllcaLlon of Lhe communlLy's sLandards by [udlclal Lrlbunals, of course,
parLlcularlLy ls Lhe norm. Lvery courL order ls parLlcular ln one or more of several modes: as Lo
persons affecLed, as Lo conducL requlred, and expressly or lmpllclLly as Lo Llme and place. And
parLlcularlLy ls essenLlal Lo Lhe execuLlve funcLlon of governmenL. 1haL parLlcularlLy ls ln Lurn
essenLlal Lo governmenL by law, and ParL downplays lL when he polnLs ouL LhaL parLlcular orders
could noL Lake Lhe place of general rules.
lf [udlclal and execuLlve orders are noL excepLlonal, are Lhey 'anclllary accompanlmenLs or
relnforcemenLs of general forms of dlrecLlons', as ParL suggesLs? lL ls Lrue LhaL Lhey may lnvolve Lhe
appllcaLlon of a general rule. ParL menLlons a Lax lnspecLor's demand LhaL you pay whaL you already

13
As Lhe uk War uamage AcL 1963 deprlved Lhe plalnLlff of damages LhaL had been awarded agalnsL Lhe
governmenL ln I=,>#1 ?%; E *3,$ +$E34#-" [1963] AC 73, for desLrucLlon of properLy carrled ouL by 8rlLlsh
forces Lo prevenL Lhe properLy from falllng lnLo enemy hands.

8

owe, by Lhe appllcaLlon of Lhe general law. And he says LhaL dlsobedlence of a general rule 'may be
offlclally ldenLlfled and recorded and Lhe LhreaLened punlshmenL lmposed by a courL' (CL 21). 1he
suggesLlon ls LhaL Lhe general rule ls whaL maLLers, and Lhe parLlcular order of a courL merely
esLabllshes whaL Lhe general rule already requlres.
1hls Lerse accounL of Lhe role of orders obscures Lhelr lmporLance. 1hey are, ln facL,
necessary elemenLs ln a legal sysLem. LeL us focus on [udlclal orders, for relaLlve slmpllclLy. We need
Lo sLarL by undersLandlng Lhe lmporLance ln law of Lwo parLlcularlzlng funcLlons, ln Lhe exerclse of
boLh funcLlons, a legal lnsLlLuLlon creaLes a new, parLlcular norm. l wlll borrow Lhe Lerms LhaL
SLephen SmlLh uses for Lhem, ln hls sLudy
14
of legal orders:

1. I$;)*4(+*J$ -'<$'3K glvlng effecL Lo exlsLlng duLles under general rules as applled Lo
parLlcular cases, and
2. C'$(+*J$ -'<$'3K maklng a legal deLermlnaLlon of a maLLer LhaL ls noL deLermlned by
a general rule.

!udges carry ouL boLh funcLlons.

?98 "#$ )$:() 3,3+$=D3 &$$< .-' ;('+*47)(' -'<$'3

lf you have commlLLed a serlous assaulL, Lhe general rule makes whaL you have done a crlme, and lL
ls a crlme before Lhe courL so decldes. ?ou commlLLed a crlme when you commlLLed Lhe assaulL, buL
you are noL convlcLed unLll a courL makes a parLlcular declslon Lo convlcL you. lL ls unlawful for you
Lo be punlshed by Lhe sLaLe, wlLhouL a parLlcular declslon of Lhe courL LhaL you have commlLLed
assaulL.
Suppose LhaL Lhe pollce have caughL you red-handed, and you freely admlL Lhe crlme, and
you do noL wanL a Lrlal. Why can'L Lhe sLaLe slmply puL you ln prlson? 1here are aL leasL Lwo reasons,
whlch correspond Lo Lhe Lwo parLlcularlzlng funcLlons llsLed above. llrsL, Lhe sLaLe needs Lo esLabllsh
LhaL Lhe rule applles Lo your case. And lL needs a rule-governed process for dolng so, noL only Lo be
falr Lo you (or no [udlclal declslon would be needed when you freely admlL Lhe crlme), buL also for
Lhe sake of responslble governmenL, whlch requlres a process by whlch Lhe communlLy (and noL [usL
Lhe prosecuLlon and Lhe defendanL) can be saLlsfled LhaL Lhe defendanL has commlLLed an offence.
1hls aspecL of crlmlnal process dlsLlngulshes lL from, e.g., Lhe LorL process, under whlch Lhe
vlcLlm of Lhe LorL need noL brlng Lhe maLLer Lo a courL, and Lhe sLaLe cannoL ordlnarlly do so unless lL
ls Lhe vlcLlm, and you can reach a seLLlemenL wlLh Lhe vlcLlm preclsely Lo avold a [udlclal process. lL
mlghL seem LhaL Lhls aspecL of process ln prlvaLe law shows LhaL law slmply may or may noL requlre
parLlcular declslons. 8uL even ln Lhe LorL process, a parLlcular declslon of Lhe courL ls essenLlal, lf any
sLaLe acLlon ls Lo be underLaken on Lhe basls LhaL a LorL was commlLLed.
ln facL, law ls &"4"//#,%;< parLlcular, noL merely ln Lhe Lrlvlal sense LhaL general rules apply Lo
parLlculars, buL because general rules are noL enough: Lhe sysLem musL have Lechnlques for Lhe rule-
governed appllcaLlon of Lhe law Lo parLlculars by Lhe lnsLlLuLlons of Lhe sysLem, chlefly Lo lmpose Lhe
rule of law on lLs own operaLlon.
Crders Lyplcally creaLe new rlghLs or obllgaLlons or llablllLles -even ln Lhe case of an order for
paymenL of a flxed penalLy, such as a parklng LlckeL. 8efore Lhe LlckeL ls lssued, you are llable Lo be
flned. AfLer lL ls lssued, you have been flned, and you now have a new obllgaLlon Lo pay Lhe flne (and
you become llable Lo whaLever penalLles Lhere may be for non-paymenL of Lhe flne). 1he prohlblLlon
on parklng had effecL before Lhe LlckeL was lssued ([usL as a prohlblLlon on homlclde has effecL
before a courL convlcLs you of homlclde). 8uL Lhe lssuance of Lhe parklng LlckeL has consequences
such as auLhorlsaLlon of parLlcular enforcemenL measures, whlch Lhe general rule does noL have.
1he parklng LlckeL %/ anclllary Lo Lhe prohlblLlon on parklng, ln a sense, and yeL ParL obscured Lhe
lmporLance of parLlcular orders when he dlsmlssed Lhem as anclllary.

14
'Why CourLs Make Crders (And WhaL 1hls 1ells us AbouL uamages)' (2011) 64 2=,,"&- *"'#; J,3G;">/ 31-87.

9

1he law musL regulaLe lLs own appllcaLlon. 1here are varlous ways ln whlch orders for Lhe
paymenL of a Lax mlghL be made -by courLs llke Lhe Lngllsh Plgh CourL, or by a speclallzed Lrlbunal or
commlsslon lndependenL of Lhe governmenL, or by Lhe Lax collecLors Lhemselves. Pere ls Lhe
essenLlal polnL: lf Lhe Lax collecLors Lhemselves have power Lo Lake coerclve acLlon for Lhe collecLlon
of Lhe Lax 7%-13=- an order, Lhe communlLy falls (Lo LhaL exLenL) Lo achleve Lhe rule of law. 1he
fallure mlghL be as serlous as lf Lhere were no general rule, so LhaL Lhe Lax collecLors could Lake whaL
Lhey llke. 1hls ls Lrue even when Lhere ls no lssue of any klnd as Lo Lhe naLure of Lhe prlmary
obllgaLlon or llablllLy under Lhe general law, when courLs lssue repllcaLlve orders.

?9? >('+*47)(' &-'=3 *& 3(&4+*-&3 (&< '$=$<*$3

'CreaLlve' orders lnvolve a second, very lmporLanL mode of parLlcularlLy.
Cnce a crlmlnal convlcLlon ls enLered, lL may Lake a parLlcular declslon of Lhe courL Lo speclfy
Lhe punlshmenL (ofLen wlLhln a range seL by leglslaLlon). 1hls second role -deLermlnlng senLence
wlLhln a range- ls noL anclllary, aL leasL, noL ln Lhe sense LhaL lL ldenLlfles and records Lhe effecL of a
general rule. very Lyplcally, aL leasL for mosL serlous offences, Lhe courL's senLenclng declslon ls a
creaLlve declslon, auLhorlsed by a general rule. Ceneral leglslaLlon can consLraln Lhe dlscreLlon of
[udges and regulaLe Lhe ways ln whlch Lhey exerclse dlscreLlon, and leglslaLures have ofLen seL ouL Lo
consLraln and Lo regulaLe senLenclng. 1he resulLs lnvolve forms of arblLrarlness, lnsofar as flxed
penalLles prevenL Lhe senLenclng declslon from reflecLlng Lhe facLs LhaL make a parLlcular offence
more or less serlous Lhan oLher offences of Lhe same caLegory. And Lhe aspecLs of human slLuaLlons
and human conducL LhaL make an offence more or less serlous are so radlcally varlous LhaL no
leglslaLlve scheme of sancLlons could provlde ln advance for a senLence Lallored Lo Lhe facLs of every
offence. lf you Lry Lo lmaglne a sysLem of crlmlnal senLenclng LhaL asslgned no dlscreLlon Lo Lhe
[udge, you would flnd yourself lmaglnlng a scheme LhaL lnvolves radlcal forms of arblLrarlness LhaL
are lnlmlcal Lo Lhe ldea of a punlshmenL flLLed Lo Lhe offence. no auLhorlLy could engage ln
5=&%/1>"&-, wlLhouL aL leasL holdlng lLself ouL as flLLlng Lhe acLlon Lo Lhe offence. So Lhe creaLlvlLy
lnvolved ln senLenclng ls essenLlal Lo punlshmenL.
8ecause Lhls polnL exLends more broadly Lo any general auLhorlLy Lo lmpose sancLlons and
Lo award remedles, Lhe maklng of parLlcular orders ls a necessary parL of a legal sysLem. 1he polnL
applles Lo remedles ln prlvaLe law, [usL as lL applles Lo sancLlons ln crlmlnal law. An award of general
damages very commonly creaLes a speclflc norm, for example by speclfylng a sum Lo be pald ln
compensaLlon. 1he award ls auLhorlzed by Lhe general law, and lL even seems Lo Lake Lhe form of an
#55;%4#-%3& of a general rule of law, whlch may be formulaLed by saylng LhaL Lhe clalmanL ls Lo
recelve:

'.LhaL sum of money whlch wlll puL Lhe parLy who has been ln[ured, or who has suffered, ln
Lhe same poslLlon as he would have been ln lf he had noL susLalned Lhe wrong for whlch he
ls now geLLlng hls compensaLlon'.
13


1he deflnlLe descrlpLlon ('LhaL sum...') seems Lo presenL Lhe amounL Lo be awarded as lf lL were
already deLermlned by Lhe general law, buL of course lLs conLenL ls &3- deLermlned. 1he reason ls
noL slmply LhaL Lhe rule ls a general one, so LhaL Lhe sum depends on Lhe facLs, and ls dlfferenL ln
dlfferenL cases. ln many parLlcular cases, Lhere ls ln facL no raLlonal crlLerlon for concludlng LhaL
some preclse sum of money wlll puL a parLy who has wrongfully suffered, e.g., a chronlc backache, ln
Lhe same poslLlon as lf Lhe wrong had noL been susLalned.
16
And yeL, Lhe sysLem needs a resoluLlon.

13
Lord 8lackburn ln *%E%&'/-3&" E 01" !#7<#,$/ 23#; 23>5#&< (1879-80) L8 3 App Cas 23 (Pouse of Lords),
clLed ln !""/ E K#,;%&'-3& 9">3,%#; )3/5%-#; :)L 0,=/- (Pouse of Lords) [2003] ukPL 32, [2004] 1 AC 309.
16
1he precedenLs of Lhe sysLem may consLraln Lhe creaLlve role of Lhe courL subsLanLlally, so LhaL, for example,
lL may be well esLabllshed ln one [urlsdlcLlon LhaL some parLlcular sum would be an excesslve award for a
backache, and well esLabllshed ln anoLher [urlsdlcLlon LhaL Lhe same sum would be lnadequaLe. Ceneral rules

10

Crdlnarlly, Lhe courL's role ln provldlng resoluLlon requlres an order for Lhe paymenL of a preclse
sum of money, so LhaL Lhe defendanL wlll know whaL sum Lo pay, and Lhe clalmanL can know
wheLher hls or her legal rlghL under Lhe order has been fulfllled, and so LhaL Lhe offlclals of Lhe
sysLem can know wheLher Lhe defendanL ls ln compllance wlLh Lhe order of Lhe courL. 1he
deLermlnaLlon lLself ls noL Lhe resulL of applylng Lhe general law, and yeL a legal sysLem needs Lhe
deLermlnaLlon Lo be made. 1he award would be arblLrary, lf lL were deLermlned by general rules.
reclse, preauLhorlzed sancLlons and remedles are, of course, posslble. 8uL no legal sysLem
could achleve Lhe purpose of regulaLlon of Lhe llfe of Lhe communlLy enLlrely Lhrough such
Lechnlques. So Lhe rule of law, ln lLs opposlLlon Lo arblLrary rule, demands a faclllLy for parLlcular
creaLlve orders. 1hls ls an lmporLanL mode of parLlcularlLy ln law.

?9@ E$+$'=*&*&: +#$ 7&<$+$'=*&$<

1he exerclse of an express dlscreLlon Lo lmpose a senLence wlLhln a range lnvolves an auLhorlzaLlon
and a responslblllLy Lo deLermlne whaL Lhe law has noL deLermlned. lL creaLes a new, parLlcular, legal
norm. ueLermlnlng Lhe undeLermlned ls characLerlsLlc of Lhe [udlclal role noL only ln crlmlnal
sancLlons and clvll remedles, buL also ln Lhe exerclse of express dlscreLlons (e.g., as Lo cosLs). lL ls also
characLerlsLlc of Lhe exerclse of all Lhe lmpllclL dlscreLlons LhaL resulL from vagueness ln general laws.
And because vagueness ls a necessary, common, and lmporLanL feaLure of general laws,
17
Lhls form
of creaLlvlLy ls commonly requlred of courLs, and Lhelr role ln exerclslng lL ls lmporLanL, and legal
sysLems necessarlly lnvolve Lhls creaLlvlLy.
CourLs applylng Lhe law very commonly creaLe &"7 obllgaLlons or llablllLles, by speclfylng
whaL ls lefL unspeclfled ln Lhe law. ln hls Lerse accounL of Lhe role of parLlcularlLy ln law, ParL
neglecLs Lhe facL LhaL parLlcular orders very commonly creaLe &"7 legal obllgaLlons and creaLe &"7
legal rlghLs. A legal sysLem could noL operaLe wlLhouL a faclllLy for carrylng Lhls ouL.

?9A C-&4)73*-& -& ;('+*47)('*+,

ParL polnLs ouL LhaL parLlcular orders 'are noL, and could noL be, Lhe sLandard way ln whlch law
funcLlons' (CL 21). 8uL we mlghL [usL as well say LhaL general rules are noL, and could noL be, 'Lhe
sLandard way ln whlch law funcLlons'. lor law could noL posslbly funcLlon merely as a sysLem of
general rules.
1ry Lo lmaglne a legal sysLem ln whlch Lhere are only general rules, wlLh no legal Lechnlques
for Lhelr appllcaLlon Lo parLlcular cases. lL would be ln mere deadlock lf offlclals of Lhe sLaLe were
unable Lo LreaL Lhe rules as havlng some consequence, whenever anyone consldered LhaL Lhe
general rules have a dlfferenL consequence. lL would noL be ln deadlock lf, wlLhouL legal provlslon for
any parLlcular declslon, execuLlve offlclals could collecL Lhe Laxes coerclvely, or lmpose punlshmenL
for crlmes, when Lhey conclude LhaL Lhe vlcLlm ls llable Lo Lhe Lax or Lo Lhe punlshmenL under Lhe
general law. 1o lmaglne Lhls scenarlo ls Lo lmaglne Lhe radlcal abandonmenL of Lhe rule of law. 1he
maklng of parLlcular orders ls necessary for law.
So Lhe connecLlon beLween parLlcularlLy and generallLy ln a legal sysLem ls much more
complex Lhan ParL says, ln ChapLer 2 of 01" 23&4"5- 36 *#7. 8uL Lhe necesslLy and Lhe lmporLance of
parLlcular orders are compaLlble wlLh ParL's lnslghL LhaL Lhe generallLy of law ls a necessary feaLure
of law. And we should keep ln mlnd one flnal, cruclal feaLure of Lhe rule of law (a respecL ln whlch,
you mlghL say, parLlcular orders are, ln a sense, 'anclllary' Lo general rules): ln a legal sysLem, Lhere

of damages would have Lo Lurn lnLo hlghly arblLrary Larlffs, ln order Lo remove Lhe dlscreLlon subsLanLlally. And
Larlffs could never abollsh Lhe dlscreLlon of Lhe courL, because of Lhe varleLy of posslble ln[urles and of oLher
posslble losses.
17
See LndlcoLL, 'Law ls necessarlly vague' (2001) 7 *"'#; 01"3,<, 379-383, and LndlcoLL '1he value of
vagueness', ln Andrel Marmor & ScoLL Soames (eds.), J1%;3/351%4#; M3=&$#-%3&/ 36 *#&'=#'" %& -1" *#7
(Cxford unlverslLy ress, 2011).

11

can be no parLlcular orders wlLh legal effecL, excepL lnsofar as Lhe legal offlclal who creaLes a new
legal obllgaLlon or llablllLy, does so ln Lhe exerclse of a general legal auLhorlsaLlon Lo do so.

@9 F$4$33*+,

ln ParL's elucldaLlon of one aspecL of Lhe naLure of law (Lhe necesslLy of generallLy ln varlous
modes), and ln Lhe argumenL LhaL l have offered concernlng Lhe necesslLy of parLlcular orders, whaL
does 'necesslLy' mean? 01" 23&4"5- 36 *#7 dld noL expressly answer Lhls quesLlon, buL l do noL Lhlnk
LhaL lL ls dlfflculL. CenerallLy ls a necessary feaLure of law lf a legal sysLem (or a legal lnsLlLuLlon, or a
legal rule.) >=/- have lL, ln order Lo be a legal sysLem (or lnsLlLuLlon or rule.). And generallLy ls a
necessary feaLure of law, lf you and l >=/- refer Lo lL, Lo glve a good accounL of Lhe naLure of law.
Pere ls whaL ParL says aL Lhe beglnnlng of ChapLer 8, ln summlng up whaL ls needed for elucldaLlng
Lhe concepL of law:

'We have found lL necessary, ln order Lo elucldaLe feaLures dlsLlncLlve of law as a means of
soclal conLrol, Lo lnLroduce elemenLs whlch cannoL be consLrucLed ouL of Lhe ldeas of an
order, a LhreaL, obedlence, hablLs, and generallLy.' (CL 134)

We mlghL say LhaL lf we 4#&&3- explaln whaL ls dlsLlncLlve abouL law wlLhouL menLlonlng generallLy,
Lhen generallLy ls a &"4"//#,< feaLure of law.
We can geL a sense of whaL ParL means by 'necessary', from some perLlnenL words ln
ChapLer 2. ParL wrlLes abouL how people Lalk. Pe says LhaL Lhere ls a varleLy of soclal slLuaLlons ln
whlch people !"#$#!%&$'(%'!#))* use lmperaLlve forms of speech, Lhere are $&!+$$&,% maln Lypes of
soclal slLuaLlon ln whlch we address oLhers ln Lhe lmperaLlve, Lhose usages are marked by cerLaln
-#.')'#$ classlflcaLlons, 'pass Lhe salL please' ls +(+#))* a mere requesL, ,/$.#))* lL ls addressed by
Lhe speaker Lo one who ls able Lo render hlm a servlce, lL ls qulLe ,#%+$#) Lo say LhaL Lhe gunman
gave an order Lo hls henchman Lo 'shuL Lhe door', we do noL ,#%+$#))* speak of commands ln Lhe
case of governmenL, Lhe (%#,0#$0 form of a crlmlnal sLaLuLe ls general, 'we mlghL 1$/1&$)* say LhaL
Lhe gunman ordered Lhe clerk Lo hand over Lhe money and Lhe clerk obeyed'.
18

We can class Lhese low-key and senslble words lnLo Lwo caLegorles. ParL uses words ln Lhe
flrsL caLegory -words such as !+(%/.#$')*K +(+#))*K ,/$.#))*- Lo polnL ouL facLs: abouL Lhe way ln
whlch Lhese words are used, and abouL whaL we do (commonly, usually, normally). Llkewlse, he Lalks
abouL whaL we 2/+)0 (#*, and abouL whaL ls done ln a legal sysLem. 1haL ls Lhe flrsL caLegory: Lhese
words denoLe facLual regularlLles.
1he second caLegory ls Lhe clusLer of words such as !"#$#!%&$'(%'! and #11$/1$'#%& and
1$/1&$)*. !eremy 8enLham, Loo, used Lhe word 1$/1&$)* ln hls own, very dlfferenL meLhodology.
8enLham clalmed Lo ldenLlfy Lhe proper way Lo use words such as, for example, Lhe word $=-<. lL ls
proper Lo use LhaL word, accordlng Lo 8enLham, of a person who ls llable Lo Lhe lnfllcLlon of some
paln lf he or she does noL comply wlLh Lhe wlll of anoLher.
19
When 8enLham sald LhaL Lhls use of Lhe
word ls 5,35",, he dld noL mean LhaL lL ls cusLomary or usual or normal. ln facL, he LhoughL LhaL Lhe
cusLomary, usual, normal way of uslng words such as $=-< was mlsconcelved.
20

ParL uses Lhe word 1$/1&$)* ln a more dlffldenL sorL of way. unllke 8enLham, he [usL mlxes lL
ln (and he [usL mlxes ln Lhe relaLed word #11$/1$'#%&)*), wlLh Lhe flrsL caLegory of words - =/=#;;<,
&3,>#;;<, whaL we 73=;$ /#<. ParL Lalks ln Lhe same breaLh G3-1 abouL whaL people say, and abouL
whaL lL ls proper Lo say. lrom conslderlng Lhe ways ln whlch people use words, he says LhaL we can
galn wlsdom noL merely abouL a word, buL abouL ;#7. 1here ls a famous reference ln Lhe reface of

18
CL, ChapLer 2 passlm.
19
+ M,#'>"&- 3& N3E",&>"&- (1776), ed !.P.8urns and P.L.A.ParL (Cambrldge: Cambrldge unlverslLy ress,
1977) 113.
20
See LndlcoLL, 'Law and Language', ln !ules Coleman and ScoLL Shaplro, eds., 01" ?@63,$ )#&$G338 36
B=,%/5,=$"&4" (Cxford unlverslLy ress, 2004) 933 aL 939-43.

12

01" 23&4"5- 36 *#7 Lo !.L. AusLln, who sald LhaL we can use a sharpened awareness of words Lo galn
a sharpened awareness of Lhe phenomena (CL vll).
21
1he ldea ls puL more clearly by ParL hlmself ln
an endnoLe ln 01" 23&4"5- 36 *#7. ParL says LhaL,

'Lo ask ln whaL sLandard sorLs of slLuaLlon would Lhe use of senLences ln Lhe grammaLlcal
lmperaLlve mood be normally classed as orders, pleas, requesLs, commands, dlrecLlons eLc ls
a meLhod of dlscoverlng noL merely facLs abouL language, buL Lhe slmllarlLles and dlfferences
recognlsed ln language beLween varlous soclal slLuaLlons and relaLlonshlps. 1he appreclaLlon
of Lhese ls of greaL lmporLance for Lhe sLudy of law, morals and socleLy.' (CL 280)

ParL uses G3-1 caLegorles (lnslghLs as Lo how we ln facL use words, and lnslghLs as Lo how lL ls proper
Lo use Lhem) for Lhe same purpose. 1he purpose ls Lo polnL ouL characLerlsLlc feaLures of law, ln
order Lo elucldaLe Lhe concepL.
1he resulL of hls elucldaLlon ln ChapLer 2 ls a seL of clalms as Lo whaL ls necessarlly Lhe case:
a general hablL of obedlence Lo law, for example, ls 'a furLher necessary feaLure whlch we musL add
Lo Lhe gunman slLuaLlon, lf lL ls Lo approxlmaLe Lo Lhe seLLled slLuaLlon ln whlch Lhere ls law' (CL 23).
ln maklng clalms of necesslLy, ParL ls noL acLually dolng someLhlng dlsLlncL from saylng whaL ls
characLerlsLlc, recurrenL, famlllar, normal, naLural, sLandard, cusLomary, usual, normal, approprlaLe,
proper. Pe uses all Lhose Lerms, along wlLh 'necessary', ln polnLlng ouL Lhose feaLures of law LhaL we
>=/- aLLend Lo, lf we are Lo elucldaLe Lhe concepL of law. And Lhose are Lhe same feaLures LhaL a
rule or an lnsLlLuLlon or a sysLem >=/- dlsplay, accordlng Lo ParL, lf lL ls Lo counL as legal.
lf LhaL ls Lhe rlghL way Lo undersLand ParL's clalms of necesslLy, does lL slmply show LhaL ParL
makes Loo much of hls observaLlons abouL how people use words? CranLed LhaL people use words ln
Lhe ways he polnLed ouL, are Lhe assoclaLed feaLures of law &"4"//#,< feaLures? ueep hlsLorlcal rooLs
sLlll nourlsh a Lendency among some phllosophers Lo be susplclous of such clalms. lor mlllennla lL
has seemed Lo some LhaL Lhere ls no &"4"//#,< or "//"&-%#; conLenL Lo a human concepL.
?ou mlghL say LhaL Lhe lnsLances of /3>" concepLs obvlously have necessary feaLures.
Pavlng Lhree sldes ls a necessary feaLure of Lrlangles. lf a flgure does noL have Lhree sldes, Lhen for
LhaL reason lL does noL (lL 4#&&3-) counL as a Lrlangle. So a flgure &""$/ Lhree sldes Lo counL as a
Lrlangle, and Lhere lsn'L anyLhlng wrong wlLh saylng LhaL havlng Lhree sldes ls a necessary feaLure of
a Lrlangle. 8uL LhaL ls geomeLry. erhaps we should say LhaL Lhere ls noLhlng LhaL ls necessary or
essenLlal Lo Lhe concepLs of anyLhlng so conLroverslal, unsLable, and llmned by mulLlple
conLlngencles, as soclal Lheory?
8rlan LelLer has recenLly glven a vlgorous sLaLemenL of Lhls vlew. Pe says LhaL people should
abandon Lhe 'demarcaLlon problem' ln [urlsprudence -Lhe problem of how Lo dlsLlngulsh law and
morallLy. Pe says LhaL ParL and oLhers have Lrled Lo solve LhaL problem by ldenLlfylng necessary or
essenLlal feaLures or aLLrlbuLes or properLles of law LhaL dlsLlngulsh lL from morallLy. LelLer re[ecLs
Lhe aLLempL. ?eL he ldenLlfles one necessary feaLure of law:

'1he concepL of law ls Lhe concepL of an #,-"6#4-, LhaL ls, someLhlng LhaL necessarlly owes lLs
exlsLence Lo human acLlvlLles lnLended Lo creaLe LhaL arLefacL.'
22


LeL's ask wheLher LelLer has a case LhaL Lhls ls Lhe 3&;< necessary LruLh abouL law. Pls polnL ls LhaL
arLefacLs have no essenLlal aLLrlbuLes, because Lhey depend on human ends and purposes, and

21
Cf.: 'When we examlne whaL we should say when, whaL words we would use ln whaL slLuaLlons, we are
looklng agaln noL merely aL words (or meanlngs", whaLever Lhey may be) buL also aL Lhe reallLles we use Lhe
words Lo Lalk abouL: we are uslng our sharpened awareness of words Lo sharpen our awareness of, Lhough noL
as Lhe flnal arblLer of, Lhe phenomena.' -AusLln, J1%;3/351%4#; J#5",/, ed. !.C.urmson and C.!.Warnock (1961),
aL 130.
22
'1he uemarcaLlon roblem ln !urlsprudence: A new Case for ScepLlclsm' (2011) 31 ?@63,$ B3=,&#; 36 *"'#;
L-=$%"/ 663-677, 666.

13

'human ends and purposes shlfL'. Law belng an arLefacL, lL seems LhaL whaL counLs as law depends
on someLhlng LhaL ls conLlngenL.
23

All sorLs of LruLhs abouL an arLefacL -say, a chalr- arlse from Lhe relevanL human purposes -
LhaL lL was deslgned Lo be saL upon, and Lherefore lL has exLenslon ln space and ls solld and durable,
and more-or-less flLs Lhe human form, and ls blgger Lhan a plnhead and smaller Lhan SaskaLchewan,
and so on. 8uL LelLer says:

'Chalrs can be made of sLone or wood or meLal. 1helr apparenL funcLlon-provldlng supporL
for Lhose who slL-can be dlscharged by boxes, LorLolses, car seaLs, and sLeps. Moreover,
some chalrs have as Lhelr acLual funcLlon ornamenLal decoraLlon, noL slLLlng, some serve
prlmarlly as shelves for sLacklng papers or books. Some chalrs have arm resLs, some do noL,
some have back resLs, some do noL. 8ecause human ends and purposes shlfL, Lhe concepL of
a 'chalr' has no essenLlal aLLrlbuLes.'
24


eople can slL on Lhlngs LhaL are noL chalrs, people can do oLher Lhlngs wlLh chalrs Lhan slL on Lhem,
and chalrs vary ln form and subsLance. So perhaps, slnce 'human ends and purposes shlfL', chalrs
have no necessary feaLures LhaL dlsLlngulsh Lhem from oLher Lhlngs?
lL ls Lrue LhaL human purposes may shlfL ln all dlrecLlons, from deslgnlng a plece of furnlLure
for seaLlng, Lowards sLacklng papers, Lowards home decoraLlon, Lowards bulldlng a llfe-savlng flre,
and ob[ecLs LhaL people call 'chalrs' can be puL Lo all Lhese purposes. And human purposes range
more wldely lnLo parody, so LhaL someone mlghL make a vaudevllle chalr deslgned Lo collapse as
soon as someone slLs on lL, or a modern arL chalr flfLy feeL Lall or made ouL of egg shells. And of
course, a person may remove Lhe seaL of a chalr Lo flx lL, and Lhen you cannoL even slL on lL. So lL
seems LhaL we cannoL say LhaL chalrs are necessarlly used, or necessarlly 4#& be used, or were even
necessarlly >#$", Lo be saL upon.
WhaL are we Lo do? We shouldn'L glve up alLogeLher on dlsLlngulshlng law from morallLy (or,
presumably, on dlsLlngulshlng chalrs from oLher Lhlngs), accordlng Lo LelLer:

'.l have conceded LhaL [udges have a defeaslble obllgaLlon Lo apply Lhe law and LhaL [udges,
llke oLher persons, oughL Lo do whaL ls morally rlghL. 1hls sLaLemenL already supposes LhaL
Lhe Lwo sources of norms, law and morallLy, are dlfferenL. 8uL of course Lhey are 3GE%3=/;<
dlfferenL ln many cases, and many conLexLs! lL ls a mlsLake Lo assume LhaL a dlsLlncLlon, Lo
be useful for >#&< purposes, has Lo be made ln Lerms of "//"&-%#; properLles LhaL wlll
demarcaLe #;; cases for all purposes, Lhe way Lhe molecular consLlLuLlon of waLer deflnlLely
seLLles Lhe sLaLus of all clear poLable llqulds. . lor mosL purposes, we operaLe qulLe well
wlLh Lhe meLhod of paradlgm cases, and analogles Lo Lhose cases.'
23


1haL ls a good meLhod. LeL's say LhaL Lhe paradlgm case of a chalr ls a plece of furnlLure deslgned
and crafLed for people Lo slL on,
26
a chalr may noL be a paradlgm chalr, so lL ls &3- a necessary LruLh

23
lb 3. LelLer comblnes LhaL argumenL wlLh an 'lnducLlve argumenL' from alleged pasL fallures of phllosophers
Lo ldenLlfy necessary feaLures of law. Pe menLlons Lhe lncompaLlble clalms of four legal phllosophers lncludlng
ParL (7). 8uL he offers no base for Lhe proposed lnducLlon, because he glves Lhe reader no reason Lo Lhlnk LhaL
any parLlcular one of Lhe confllcLlng clalms ls unLrue. 1hey cannoL all be Lrue, so he $3"/ offer a sound basls for
concludlng LhaL noL all legal phllosophers can be rlghL. ln order Lo conclude LhaL Lhere are no necessary LruLhs
LhaL answer problems of [urlsprudence, we would have Lo add Lhe premlse LhaL a necessary LruLh musL be
=&43&-,3E",/%#;;< Lrue.We should re[ecL LhaL furLher premlse, Lhe human capaclLy Lo dlspuLe Lhe lndlspuLable
makes conLroversy an lnadequaLe crlLerlon for concludlng LhaL a proposlLlon ls noL necessarlly Lrue.
24
lb 4-3.
23
lb 676.
26
ln facL, Lhe concepL ls more complex Lhan Lhls suggesLs, and Lhere would of course be more Lo be sald, such
as LhaL Lhe paradlgm case of a chalr ls dlsLlngulshable from a sLool by havlng a back resL (whlch, glven cerLaln
no doubL shlfLlng facLs abouL human physlology, makes lL apL for a parLlcular klnd of slLLlng or, you mlghL say,

14

LhaL a chalr has all Lhe feaLures of a paradlgm chalr. And Lhen, LelLer's meLhod of analogy helps us Lo
explaln Lhe varlous Lrlcky Lhlngs LhaL may be called 'chalrs' even Lhough Lhey do noL have Lhe LralLs
of Lhe paradlgm. 1herefore, Lhe meLhod of analogy helps us Lo deal wlLh Lhe lmpllcaLlons of Lhe
shlfLlng naLure of human purposes for Lhe meanlng and reference of an arLefacL Lerm:

A chalr LhaL has had lLs seaL removed for repalr may sLlll be a chalr, because of Lhe
slmllarlLles lL bears Lo paradlgm cases, and because Lhe dlsanalogy Lo paradlgm cases ls
accounLable ln llghL of Lhe repalr.
And even a chalr LhaL has slmply losL lLs seaL and ls noL belng repalred ls lnLelllglble #/ a chalr
ln a slmllar way -as a defecLlve chalr.
8orderllne cases are lnLelllglble #/ borderllne boLh by Lhelr analogles Lo and Lhelr dlfferences
from paradlgms.
1he vaudevllle chalr and Lhe modern arL chalrs are lnLelllglble as whaL Lhey are, ln llghL of Lhe
analogles #&$ $%/#&#;3'%"/ Lo paradlgms (Lhe comblnaLlon of slmllarlLles and dlsslmllarlLles
makes Lhe vaudevllle chalr a Lrlck chalr, and lends lrony Lo Lhe modern arL chalrs, nelLher
would work for Lhelr human purposes wlLhouL Lhe analogles Lo paradlgm chalrs).

LelLer's meLhod of analogy ls a sound and promlslng meLhod for maklng concepLs lnLelllglble, ln splLe
of (or raLher, ln llghL of) Lhe shlfLlng naLure of human purposes.
lronlcally, Lhls meLhod of analogy ls ParL's meLhod.
27
lL underlles hls Lalk of 'necesslLy'. And
Lhe meLhod acLually =&$",>%&"/ LelLer's vlew LhaL Lhere are no necessary LruLhs abouL arLefacL
concepLs.
noLhlng ls a paradlgm of a concepL unless lL has feaLures ln vlrLue of whlch we mlghL flnd lL
useful ln explalnlng Lhe appllcaLlon of Lhe concepL. An ob[ecL ls an lnsLance of Lhe concepL lf lL ls a
paradlgm. And an ob[ecL ls an lnsLance of Lhe concepL lf analogles Lo paradlgms [usLlfy Lhe exLenslon
of Lhe Lerm Lo Lhe ob[ecL. We add noLhlng Lo Lhls, lf we say LhaL an ob[ecL >=/- counL as an lnsLance
of Lhe concepL lf lL ls a paradlgm, and LhaL lL >=/- be approprlaLely analogous Lo a paradlgm, lf lL ls Lo
counL as an lnsLance (Lhere are many analogles beLween any parLlcular Lable and a paradlgm chalr,
buL Lhey do noL [usLlfy calllng Lhe Lable a 'chalr'). An ob[ecL ls noL a chalr (and we may [usL as well say
LhaL an ob[ecL 4#&&3- be a chalr), lf Lhe analogles Lo paradlgms do noL make sense of exLendlng Lhe
Lerm Lo apply Lo Lhe ob[ecL.
And Lhls ls Lhe polnL of conLacL beLween Lhe meLhod of analogy, and necessary LruLhs: Lhe
analogles Lo paradlgm chalrs musL [usLlfy calllng an ob[ecL a 'chalr', or lL ls noL a chalr. 1here ls LhaL
word 'musL'. lL should noL be off-puLLlng Lo anyone who adopLs Lhe meLhod of analogy. And
accepLlng Lhe meLhod means re[ecLlng LelLer's clalm LhaL Lhere are no necessary LruLhs abouL chalrs
-or abouL law.

A9 G()7$

aradlgms of arLefacLs are Lo be ldenLlfled, and analogles are Lo be drawn, ln llghL of Lhe values LhaL
are lmpllcaLed ln Lhe purposes and ends of arLefacLs such as law or such as chalrs. 1he paradlgm of a
legal sysLem ls good for Lhe purposes for whlch lL ls worLh crafLlng or susLalnlng a legal sysLem. Legal
sysLems are noL necessarlly good. Llke chalrs, Lhey can be badly made, and Lhey can be puL Lo bad
purposes. And a communlLy needs more Lhan [usL a legal sysLem. 8uL here ls a connecLlon beLween
law and morallLy: ln order Lo accompllsh Lhe morally good purposes for whlch a legal sysLem mlghL
be adopLed and esLabllshed and susLalned, lL ls necessary (e.g.) Lo make general rules. A legal sysLem

parLlcularly apL for slLLlng), and lL would be posslble Lo explaln why people don'L call a seaL ln a car or an
alrplane a 'chalr', and Lo say wheLher a Lhrone ls Loo fancy Lo be called a 'chalr'..
27
See, e.g., CL 81: 'Lhe dlverse range of cases of whlch Lhe word 'law' ls used are noL llnked by. slmple
unlformlLy, buL by less dlrecL relaLlons -ofLen of analogy of elLher form or conLenL Lo a cenLral case'.

13

needs Lo offer Lhe modes of generallLy LhaL Lhe communlLy needs for lLs governance. Pere ls ParL
agaln, maklng hls flrsL polnL abouL Lhe generallLy of law:

'A pollceman orders a parLlcular moLorlsL Lo sLop or a parLlcular beggar Lo move on. 8uL
Lhese slmple slLuaLlons are noL, and could noL be, Lhe sLandard way ln whlch law funcLlons, lf
only because no socleLy could supporL Lhe number of offlclals necessary Lo secure LhaL every
member of Lhe socleLy was offlclally and separaLely lnformed of every acL whlch he was
requlred Lo do.' (CL 21)

ParL explalns Lhe necesslLy of generallLy by referrlng Lo Lhe lmposslblllLy of Lhe alLernaLlve: parLlcular
orders 'could noL be' Lhe sLandard way ln whlch law funcLlons. 8uL ParL's polnL -LhaL a socleLy could
noL 'supporL Lhe number of offlclals'- ls a dodge. 1he sallenL, undenlable, prlor LruLh, paLenLly
underlylng Lhe polnL abouL Lhe number of offlclals, ls LhaL Lrylng Lo regulaLe a communlLy wlLhouL
generallLy would ruln a legal sysLem.
?ou mlghL say LhaL Lhls conslderaLlon of value ls noL a maLLer of necesslLy, because lL ls
53//%G;" Lo have a legal sysLem LhaL does noL achleve Lhe value LhaL a good legal sysLem would
achleve. 1he lmperfecLlons are llkely Lo be slgnlflcanL even ln a good legal sysLem. ?eL Lhe
conslderaLlon of value sLlll lnvolves a necesslLy: lf we wanL Lo accompllsh Lhe goods LhaL can be
accompllshed Lhrough a legal sysLem, we &""$ general rules. LaLenL ln Lhe obvlous polnLs abouL a
legal sysLem made ln secLlons 1 and 2 above ls a seL of alluslons Lo Lhe E#;=" of generallLy and Lo Lhe
value of parLlcularlLy ln Lhe orderlng of Lhe communlLy.
1here ls an evldenL raLlonale for ParL's reLlcence ln Lylng necessary LruLhs abouL law Lo
asserLlons of value: he had a healLhy warlness of porLraylng law as necessarlly a good Lhlng, when lL
ls noL necessarlly a good Lhlng. 8uL Lhe reLlcence ls a mlsLake, because of Lhe connecLlon beLween
Lhe naLure of law, and Lhe goods LhaL lL can achleve. AlLhough noL every legal rule ls a good Lhlng
(and noL every legal sysLem ls a good Lhlng), no legal sysLem can be a good Lhlng wlLhouL generallLy
and parLlcularlLy ln Lhe modes seL ouL ln secLlons 1 and 2. 1hls ls a necessary connecLlon beLween
law and value LhaL ParL need noL have denled. lndeed, lL ls a form of necessary connecLlon LhaL ls
supporLed by ParL's asserLlons LhaL socleLles wlLh only 'prlmary rules of obllgaLlon' may suffer from
$"6"4-/ of uncerLalnLy, sLaLlc rules, and Lhe lnefflclency of 'dlffuse soclal pressure' ln dlspuLe
resoluLlon and enforcemenL. ParL says LhaL law provldes a 'remedy' for Lhese 'defecLs' (CL 92-4).
Agaln, a legal sysLem, wlLh lLs characLerlsLlc aspecLs of cerLalnLy and dynamlsm, and lLs Lechnlques
for effecLlve dlspuLe resoluLlon and enforcemenL, may be puL Lo evll purposes, and sLlll Lhere ls a
necessary connecLlon beLween law and morallLy, lf Lhose feaLures of law are needed for moral
purposes.
28

1here ls value for a communlLy ln havlng rules LhaL are general, ln Lhe ways LhaL ParL
polnLed ouL and ln oLher ways. 1he reason lL can be valuable Lo have law lles parLly ln Lhe value of
generallLy ln Lhe orderlng of Lhe communlLy. 1he paradlgm case of a legal sysLem has modes of
generallLy and parLlcularlLy because lL needs Lhem ln order Lo serve Lhe communlLy ln Lhe way LhaL
(belng a paradlgm of a legal sysLem) lL does. CenerallLy as Lo Llme and place are connecLed Lo Lhe
ldeal of Lhe rule of law, so are all Lhe aspecLs of generallLy. CenerallLy flnds a place ln all Lhe besL llsLs
of Lhe requlremenLs of Lhe rule of law.
29


28
lor a full explanaLlon of ParL's amblvalence abouL Lhe value of law, lL ls noL enough Lo polnL ouL hls senslble
lnslghL LhaL a law or a legal sysLem may noL be a good Lhlng, Lhe reLlcence also lnvolves hls amblvalence abouL
Lhe ob[ecLlvlLy of morallLy and, by lmpllcaLlon, of value. 1hls amblvalence ls expressed boLh ln Lhe 'osLscrlpL'
Lo 01" 23&4"5- 36 *#7 (CL 233), and ln Lhe reface Lo hls A//#</ %& B=,%/5,=$"&4" #&$ J1%;3/351< (Cxford
unlverslLy ress, 1983), see p.11.
29
Lon luller, 01" 93,#;%-< 36 *#7 (revlsed edlLlon, ?ale unlverslLy ress, new Paven 1969), ChapLer 2, !ohn
llnnls, :#-=,#; *#7 #&$ :#-=,#; !%'1-/ (Clarendon ress, Cxford, 1980), 270-271, !oseph 8az, 01" +=-13,%-< 36
*#7, 2
nd
ed (Cu 2009), 214-8. lor a helpful dlscusslon of Lhe relaLlon beLween generallLy and clarlLy ln Lhe

16

1hls connecLlon beLween Lhe naLure of law and Lhe good of a communlLy should be obvlous.
A communlLy ls a generallLy. 1he appllcaLlon of law generally Lo >3," -1#& 3&" 5#,-%4=;#, 5",/3& ls
essenLlal Lo lLs role as Lhe 43>>=&%-<H/ sysLem for Lhe good regulaLlon of Lhe communlLy's llfe. And a
legal sysLem could noL be a legal sysLem lf only one parLlcular person obeyed lL (general obedlence ls
'cruclal', as ParL says), because lL would noL be accompllshlng Lhe goods LhaL a legal sysLem ls
capable of accompllshlng. So Lhe generallLy of law ls necessarlly assoclaLed wlLh Lhe good of a
communlLy. lL would be deeply polnLless, ln regulaLlng Lhe dlrecLlon of Lrafflc on a sLreeL, Lo have a
one-way rule LhaL applled Lo some person ln parLlcular and noL Lo drlvers ln general. 1he raLlonale
for prohlblLlng murder, ln [usLlce and for Lhe publlc good, ls a raLlonale LhaL applles generally, so LhaL
a prohlblLlon on murder oughL Lo apply generally. ubllc auLhorlLles could noL pursue good purposes
wlLhouL general auLhorlLy over persons and over forms of conducL, or wlLhouL general auLhorlLy over
a LerrlLory. When ParL says LhaL 'ln a modern sLaLe lL ls normally undersLood LhaL. lLs general laws
exLend Lo all persons wlLhln lLs LerrlLorlal boundarles' (CL 21), he mlghL have added LhaL such a
normal undersLandlng makes sense because of Lhe value Lo Lhe communlLy of LhaL form of
generallLy. CenerallLy ls necessary ln, e.g., LaxaLlon for good publlc purposes - for efflclency, and for
prevenLlng abuse by Lax collecLors. Lndurance ln Llme of rules, lnsLlLuLlons, and Lhe sysLem lLself ls
necessary Lo Lhe very ldea of law, because a communlLy has a llfe LhaL exLends ln Llme. 8ules,
lnsLlLuLlons, and Lhe sysLem lLself could noL accompllsh Lhe goods LhaL law ls capable of
accompllshlng, lf Lhey vanlshed ln an lnsLanL.
Lvery one of Lhe modes of generallLy seL ouL ln secLlon 1 can be relaLed Lo value ln Lhls way,
and Lhe parLlcularlLy of law lnvolves Lhe conslderaLlons of value LhaL l seL ouL ln secLlon 2.
1he generallLy of law, lncldenLally, provldes one aspecL of Lhe soluLlon Lo Lhe 'demarcaLlon
problem' LhaL LelLer re[ecLs as an lll-formed problem. Law ls general wlLhln classes (of person, of
LerrlLory, of acLlvlLy.) LhaL correspond Lo a parLlcular communlLy, Lo lLs parLlcular sysLem, and Lo a
Llme durlng whlch Lhe sysLem ls ln effecL. AuLhorlLles, and Lhelr [urlsdlcLlons, are lnLrlnslc Lo Lhe
concepL of law. 1he generallLy of law cannoL be undersLood wlLhouL reference Lo [urlsdlcLlon. 8uL
[urlsdlcLlon ls noL essenLlal Lo Lhe concepL of morallLy (Lhough morallLy may requlre accepLance of an
auLhorlLy's [urlsdlcLlon). 1he generallLy of morallLy and Lhe generallLy of law are necessarlly
dlfferenL. And Lhe modes of parLlcularlLy LhaL are essenLlal Lo law are noL essenLlal Lo morallLy. 1here
ls much more Lo be sald abouL Lhe demarcaLlon beLween Lhe Lwo, buL Lhls ls enough Lo show LhaL
Lhe 'demarcaLlon problem' makes sense, and can be solved.
Law has a naLure or essence, whlch ls characLerlsed by lLs necessary feaLures. 1hey are Lhe
feaLures LhaL musL obLaln lf, e.g., a parLlcular norm ls a law, or a parLlcular lnsLlLuLlon ls a legal
lnsLlLuLlon, or a parLlcular communlLy has a legal sysLem. 1hey lnclude Lhe feaLures LhaL we musL
refer Lo lf we are Lo elucldaLe Lhe concepL. !urlsprudence has a greaL deal more Lo do, besldes
polnLlng ouL necessary LruLhs. 8uL dolng so ls parL of Lhe pro[ecL of maklng soclal llfe lnLelllglble.
ldenLlfylng Lhose LruLhs depends on ldenLlfylng Lhe value of law. necessary LruLhs abouL law (such as
LhaL lL lnvolves generallLy and parLlcularlLy ln Lhe modes seL ouL ln secLlons 1 and 2) are LruLhs
because of Lhe value of cerLaln aspecLs of paradlgm cases of law, such as Lhe generallLy and
parLlcularlLy LhaL Lhey lnvolve.


rule of law, see aul ?owell, 'LeglslaLlon, Common Law and Lhe vlrLue of ClarlLy', ln 8lchard Lklns ed., 93$",&
21#;;"&'"/ -3 -1" !=;" 36 *#7 (WelllngLon: Lexlsnexls, 2011).