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LIM V CA 214 SCRA 237 SEPTEMBER 25, 1992 FACTS: Petition for review on the rule of confidentiality the patient-doctor relationship November 25, 1987 Juan Sim filed with Pangasinan RTC a petition for annulment based on Art 36, alleging that Nelly Lim (petitioner) is suffering from schizophrenia before, during and after marriage and until the present January 11, 989 Sim announced he will present Dr Lydia Acampado (psychiatrist) as a witness on January 25, 1989 Petitioner opposed on the grounds that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged since Dr Acampado had examined Lim in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her with schizophrenia. Subpoena was issued on January 12, 1989 petitioner filed urgent motion to quash subpoena and suspend January 24, 1989 proceedings. Overruled Respondent claimed that Dr Acampado will be presented as expert witness and would not testify on any information acquired while attending to the petitioner as doctor. petitioner filed with CA petition for certiorari and prohibition but was March 3, 1989 denied on September 18, 1989 on the ground that petitioner failed to establish the confidential nature of the testimony obtained from Dr Acampado ISSUE: Whether Dr Acampado can be presented as expert witness in testifying schizophrenia in case where petitioner is her client HELD: In order for patient-doctor privilege can be claimed, the following requisites must concur: 1. Privilege claimed is in a civil case 2. The person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine 3. Such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity 4. The information was necessary for him to enable him to act in that capacity These requisites must concur with the 4 fundamental conditions necessary for invoking doctorpatient confidentiality: 1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed 2. Element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties 3. The relation must be one which the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered 4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must greater than the benefit thereby gain for correct disposal of litigation Dr Acampado was only presented as an expert witness; she did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner. There is nothing specific or concrete offered to show that the information obtained from Dr Acampado would blacken the petitioner s reputation/character. Lastly, she makes no claim in any of her proceedings that her counsel had objected to any questions asked of the witness on the ground thatit elicited an answer that would violate the confidentiality privilege. SALITA V MAGTOLIS 233 SCRA 100 JUNE 13, 1994 FACTS: Erwin Espinosa (32) and Joselita Salita (22) were married on January 25, 1986. Separated in 1988 and Erwin sued for annulment on the basis of psychological incapacity January 7, 1992 petitioner filed annulment on the grounds that Erwin is psychologically incapacitated; also moved for bill of particulars

ISSUE: Whether bill of particulars submitted by Erwin is of sufficient definiteness to enable petitioner to properly prepare her responsive pleading HELD: YES. SC held that the bill of particulars filed by Erwin is sufficient to state a cause of action. Private respondent already alleged that petitioner is unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession (upon his time and efforts). To demand more detail would be asking for information on evidentiary facts. SC sees no need to define or limit the scope of Art. 36 of the Family Code since the actual issue is with the sufficiency of the bill of particulars. AFFIRMED CA DECISION. KROHN V CA 233 SCRA 146 JUNE 14, 1994 FACTS: A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in evidence before the trial court in a petition for annulment of marriage grounded on psychological incapacity. The witness testifying on the report is the husband who initiated the annulment proceedings, not the physician who prepared the report. Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn, invoking doctor-patient confidentiality, seeks to enjoin her husband from disclosing the contents of the psychiatric evaluation report. June 14, 1964 Edgar Krohn Jr. and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married in San Marcelino Manila. In 1971, Paz underwent psychological testing in an effort to ease marital strain; 1973 both separated 1975 Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report signed by Dr Cornelio Banaag and Baltazar Reyes. November 2, 1978 Edgar obtained a decree from family court nullifying his marriage with Paz. On June 10, 1979, decree was confirmed and pronounced final July 30, 1982 Pasig CFI granted voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership Edgar filed petition for annulment, citing the confidential psychiatric October 23, 1990 evaluation report May 8, 1991 Edgar testified on the contents of the psych report but was objected due to patient-doctor confidentiality. Petitioner asserted that there is no factual or legal basis for Edgar s claims since reports were fabricated. June 4, 1991 RTC admitted confidential psychiatric report as evidence Petitioner argued pursuant to Sec. 24 (c), Rule 130 ROC<, prohibits a physician from testifying on matters which he may have acquired in attending to a patient in a professional capacity, more so a third person testifying on privileged matters between a physician and patient or from submitting any medical report prepared by a physician which the latter has acquired as a result of his confidential and privileged relation with the patient May 29, 1991 Edgar opposed Paz motion to disallow the introduction of the confidential psych report as evidence ISSUE: Whether or not the confidential psychiatric report obtained by Edgar Krohn constitutes as evidence in filing an annulment complaint on the account of psychologicalincapacity HELD: NO. In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report. Such testimony then is considered nothing but hearsay. PETITION DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT. SANTOS V CA 240 SCRA 20 JANUARY 4, 1995

FACTS: Leouel Santos (petitioner) and Julia Rosario Bedia were married on September 20, 1986 in Iloilo City Julia left for the US as a nurse. She did not disclose where she lived; May 18, 1988 petitioner tried to locate her in the US but was unsuccessful. He then filed with RTC a complaint for nullity of marriage May 31, 1991 Julia opposed complaint and alleged that the petitioner was the one who had been irresponsible and incompetent No collusion proven by the provincial prosecutor November 6, 1991 court dismissed the case for lack of merit. Petitioner appealed on the basis that Julia s failure to return and lack of communication proves she is psychologically incapacitated ISSUE: Whether Julia s behavior (failure to return home and lack of intention of communicating with Leouel) constitutes as psychological incapacity HELD: Psychological incapacity is characterized by: 1. Gravity; 2. Juridical antedence and; 3. Incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. Psychological incapacity does not cover all psychoses (extremely low intelligence, immaturity, etc) Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate." The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity. PETITION DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT DISSENTING OPINIONS: J. PADILLA Julia appears to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital obligation i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband. While it is true that vagueness of psychological incapacity may allow easy escape for couples out of their marriage, there are

enough safeguards in this contingency, i.e. intervention of the State through public prosecutor, to guard against collusion. The fact that Julia did not attempt to communicate with Santos for some time and did not even divulge her address is a clear indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations although these indications were manifest AFTER the celebration of the marriage. The court is limiting the interpretation of Art. 36 too much. VOTE TO NULLIFY MARRIAGE CHI MING TSOI V CA G.R. NO. 119190 JANUARY 16, 1997 FACTS: Petition for annulment on the ground of psychological incapacity May 22, 1988 Chi Ming Tsoi married Gina Lao Tsoi (respondent). Petitioner refuses to copulate with respondent. Gina claims that petitioner is impotent, a closet homosexual and marriage should be annulled due to psychological incapacity According to the petitioner, he loves his wife very much and does not want the marriage to be annulled. Upon physical examination, petitioner s penis has a soft erection ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner s refusal to copulate constitutes psychological incapacity HELD: One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. PETITION DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT REPUBLIC V OLAVIANO MOLINA G.R. NO. 108763 FEBRUARY 13, 1997 FACTS: petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code. April 14, 1985 Roridel Olaviano and Reynaldo Molina were married and after a year, had a son. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility: dependent on parents, squandered money, quarrelsome 1987 Separated after Roridel became the breadwinner; Reynaldo abandoned them after a few weeks August 28, 1989 Reynaldo admitted they can longer live as husband and wife due to: 1. Roridel s strange behavior on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; 2. Roridel s refusal to perform her marital duties and; 3. Roridel s failure to run the household and run their finances Olaviano s allegations were corroborated by her friends, Ruth Salas (social worker) and Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison (psychiatrist); submitted documents confirming such while Reynaldo did not present any evidence during pre-trial May 14, 1991 Family court declared marriage null and void. CA affirmed the same ISSUE: Whether opposing and conflicting personalities is equivalent to psychological incapacity; Guidelines of proving psychological incapacity HELD: In Santos v CA, psychological incapacity refers to not just mental or physical incapacity but should be characterized by: a. gravity; b. juridical antecedence; c. incurability. In the present case, there is no clear indication that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity but more of a

difficulty or neglect in performing marital obligations. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities but they must show that they are incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness Guidelines for Psychological Incapacity: 1. Burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage 2. Root cause of psychological incapacity must be: a. medically or clinically identified; b. alleged in the complaint; c. sufficiently proven by experts and; d. clearly explained in the decision 3. Psychological incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time (during) celebration of marriage need not be perceivable at such time but must be existing at the time thereof or prior to it 4. Incurability clinically permanent or incurable. Such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marital obligations, not necessarily those related to marriage. 5. Gravity must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume essential marital obligations. Mild character biological peculiarities, e.g. mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as such. There is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person that effectively incapacitates the person from fulfilling his/her essential marital obligations 6. The essential marital obligations must be those mentioned in Art 68-71 of the Family Code as well as Art 220, 221, And 225 relating to parents and children 7. Interpretations given by the court should be given respect 8. Participation of the State Fiscal or Solicitor General must appear as counsel for the State PETITION IS GRANTED. MARRIAGE IS VALID AND SUBSISTING SEPARATE OPINIONS: J. PADILLA Maintained position in Santos v CA. Each case must be judged based on its own facts. The trial judge must take pains in examining the actual milieu and CA must avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trail court. J. ROMERO Psychological incapacity should not be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties (imbecility), there is a resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage voidable under Art 45 of Family Code. Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage HERNANDEZ V COURT OF APPEALS 320 SCRA 76 DECEMBER 8, 1999 FACTS: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA dated January 30, 1996 affirming RTC decision dated April 10, 1993 which dismissed the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner Lucita Estrella (petitioner) and Mario Hernandez were married on January 1, 1981 in Silang, Cavite with three children July 10, 1992 petitioner filed before Tagaytay RTC a petition for annulment on the grounds of psychological incapacity; from the time of the marriage up to present, cohabited with another woman, immature and irresponsible, had STD, alcoholic October 8, 1992 Mario did not answer Lucita s allegations. Assistant provincial prosecutor found no evidence of collusion April 10, 1993 RTC dismissed petition for annulment. January 30, 1996, CA affirmed RTC decision

ISSUE: Whether alcoholism constitutes as psychological incapacity; Whether CA erred in holding that the petitioner failed to show that Mario s psychological incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of marriage HELD: Respondent s alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to perform essential marital obligations. As in Republic v CA, expert testimony should be presented to establish the precise cause of respondent s alleged psychological incapacity in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage rests on the petitioner. CA DECISION AFFIRMED MARCOS V MARCOS 343 SCRA 755 OCTOBER 19, 2000 FACTS: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring nullity of marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement that the respondent should be examined a physician or psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration September 6, 1982 Brenda Marcos (petitioner) and WilsonMarcos (respondent) married before Pasig MTC and May 8, 1983 married again before Rev. Eduardo Ealeazar (command chaplain); had 5 children Husband has no work, often quarrel and beat her and the children. He would even force her to have sex with him. In 1992, they were living separately petitioner left with her children because respondent turned violent; October 17, 1994 underwent medical exam contusions due to physical violence August 1995 petitioner went back to get missing child but was chased by respondent with samurai Social worker Sonia Millan s study indicated that their children described their father as cruel and physically abusive Dr Natividad Dayan (psychologist) evaluated the appellee while appellant did not RTC found respondent to be psychologically incapacitated but CA reversed the decision because psychological incapacity has not been established sufficiently by the evidences presented ISSUE: Whether or not the evidences presented in the said case are substantive and sufficient in ruling nullity of marriage; Whether the testimony of expert witness is required HELD: Although the respondent failed to provide material support to the family, became abusive and abandoned them, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his defects were already present at the time of the marriage or that it is incurable. His alleged psychological illness was only traced to the time he lost his job and not at the inception of the marriage. Art 36 of Family Code is not to be confused with divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a part at the time of the marriage and is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond provided in Art 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of Family Code. Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. At best, the

evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void. Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them. PETITION DENIED. REPUBLIC V DAGDAG 351 SCRA 425 FEBRUARY 9, 2001 FACTS: For review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CAG.R. CY No. 34378, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 380-0-90 declaring the marriage of Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Erlinda Matias herein respondent (16 yrs old) married Avelino September 7, 1975 Parangan Dagdag (20) at INC Cuyapo Nueva Ecija. With two children. After marriage, habitual disappearance of Avelino, alcoholic, forced her to have sex with him, physically abusive 1993 Avelino abandoned his family. Respondent found that he was imprisoned and he escaped from jail on October 22, 1985 July 3, 1990 Erlinda filed with Olongapo RTC declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino was at large, summons were served by publication. During trial, she presented her sister-in-law as a witness Investigating officer found no collusion between said parties December 17, 1990 RTC declared marriage null and void August 21, 1991 motion for reconsideration from OSG that alcoholism, physical violence and abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity. April 22, 1983 CA affirmed RTC decision ISSUE: Whether or not RTC and CA correctly declared the marriage as null and void under Art. 36 on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic and fugitive from justice HELD: Respondent failed to comply with guideline #2 of Molina case which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts. No psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of the husband. The allegation that he is a fugitive was also not sufficiently proven. The Investigating prosecutor also was not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since RTC rendered decision prematurely. MALCAMPOS-SIN V SIN 355 SCRA 285 MARCH 26, 2001 FACTS: Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity June 4, 1987 Florence Malcampo (petitioner) and Philipp Sin (respondent), a Portuguese citizen, were married at St. Jude Catholic Parish, Manila September 20, 1994 Florence filed with Pasig RTC a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage June 16, 1995 RTC dismissed Florence s petition December 19, 1995 Florence filed a notice of appeal to CA April 30, 1998 CA dismissed Florence s petition and affirmed RTC decision June 23, 1998 petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with CA but was denied on January 19, 1999 ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in denying the petitioner s motion for reconsideration in declaring the nullity of her marriage with the respondent

HELD: The SC reversed the decision and remanded it to the RTC for proper re-trial, providing guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family CodE (based on Molina case): 1. The burden of proving the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubts should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage (semper praesumitur pro matrimonio). This is rooted in the fact that both the Constitution and the Law cherish the validity of the marriage and the unity of the family. 2. The root cause of psychological incapacity must be: a. medically or clinically identified; b. alleged in the complaint; c. sufficiently proven by experts and; d. clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically (sic) ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. 3. The incapacity was be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and is still existing 4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. 5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. 7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts." There is no state participation in the instant case other than the manifestation filed with the RTC on November 16, 1994. The state did not file any pleading, motion or position paper, at any stage of the proceedings. PESCA V PESCA 356 SCRA 588 APRIL 17, 2001 FACTS: Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent. March 3, 1975 Lorna Pesca (petitioner) and Zosimo Pesca (respondent) were in Bacolod and had 3 children. As a seaman, he did not often stay with petitioner. In 1988 respondent showed signs of immaturity, cruelty, was a habitual drinker November 19, 1992 petitioner left with her children due to his cruel behavior but returned and gave Zosimo a second chance.

March 22, 1994 respondent assaulted petitioner so petitioner decidedly to leave Zosimo. Petitioner filed for annulment, invoking psychological incapacity as grounds April 25, 1994 summons were served on respondent but he failed to file an answer within reglamentary period. August 3, 1994 prosecutor submitted report that no collusion exists between both parties January 11, 1995 respondent filed an answer denying psychological incapacity November 15, 1995 RTC granted nullity of marriage but CA reversed the decision on the basis that petitioner has not sufficiently established the grounds for psychological incapacity: gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability

ISSUE: Whether Zosimo Pesca s actions constitute psychological incapacity HELD: DENIED. Petitioner failed to establish proof that respondent showed signs of mental incapacity that would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant provided in Art. 68 of the Family Code. The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit." The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos. At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. CHOA V CHOA 392 SCRA 641 NOVEMBER 26, 2002 FACTS: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 16, 2000 Decision and the May 22, 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53100 March 15, 1981 Petitioner Leni Choa married respondent Alfonso Choa and had 2 children respondent filed before RTC complaint for annulment based on October 27, 1993 psychological incapacity of petitioner February 20, 1998 respondent filed a formal offer of exhibit; petitioner did not object but instead, filed a motion to dismiss (demurrer to evidence) on May 11, 1998 RTC denied petitioner s demurrer of evidence; filed motion for December 2, 1998 reconsideration but was denied. Elevated to CA through a petition for certiorari

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CA held that demurrer was not the correct procedure; proper remedy was for the defense to present evidence and appeal there from. Petitioner also failed to show that the issues in the court had been resolved arbitrarily without basis

ISSUES: Is certiorari available to correct an order denying a demurrer to evidence? In its denial, did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion by violating or ignoring the applicable law and jurisprudence? HELD: In general, interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to certiorari proceedings. 21 However, this rule is not absolute. In Tadeo v. People, this Court declared that appeal -- not certiorari -- in due time was indeed the proper remedy, provided there was no grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction or oppressive exercise of judicial authority. In fact, Rules 41 and 65 of the Rules of Court expressly recognize this exception and allow certiorari when the lower court acts with grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of an interlocutory order. The evidence against respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties marriage. The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed cases against him. Sorely lacking in respondent s evidence is proof that the psychological incapacity was grave enough to bring about the disability of a party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In Molina, we affirmed that "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes of psychological incapacity. Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Specifically, his testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true, was medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Neither did he testify that it was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. BARCELONA V CA 412 SCRA 41 SEPTEMBER 24, 2003 FACTS: Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997 Decision as well as the 7 August 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order dated 21 January 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, in Civil Case No. Q-9524471. The Regional Trial Court refused to dismiss private respondent s Petition for Annulment of Marriage for failure to state a cause of action and for violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The assailed Resolution denied petitioner s motion for reconsideration. March 29, 1995 Tadeo Bengzon filed a petition for annulment against Diana Barcelona (petitioner). On May 9, 1995, Tadeo filed a motion to withdraw petition which the RTC granted on June 7, 1995 July 21, 1995 Tadeo filed annulment again but petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds: no cause of action and violates SC administrative circular 04-94 on forum shopping Ground for dismissal of the petition for reconsideration filed by petitioner (against deferring resolution) was the complainant s failure to state a cause of action but according to Judge Pison, petitioner was shown to have violated the complainant s right so there is cause of action. RTC issued its December 2, 1998 Order denying petitioner s Demurrer to Evidence. It held that "[respondent] established a quantum of evidence that the [petitioner] must 11 controvert." After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the March 22, 1999 13 Order, petitioner elevated the case to the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as CA-GR No. 53100.

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ISSUE: Whether evidences presented are sufficient to invoke psychological incapacity in annulling said marriage HELD: A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue." The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff s evidence to sustain a verdict. In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. The evidence against respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties marriage. In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital union. Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. Specifically, his testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true, was medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Neither did he testify that it was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Medical examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, so long as the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity adequately. Here, however, the totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity -- more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination. PETITION GRANTED. ANNULMENT CASE WAS DISMISSED DEDEL V CA G.R. NO. 151867 JANUARY 29, 2004 FACTS: Petitioner David Dedel married Sharon Corpuz on September 28, 1966 (civil rites) and church wedding on May 20, 1967. they had four children Petitioner claims that during the marriage Sharon turned out to be irresponsible and immature wife and mother; had several affairs with other men. Sharon was treated by clinical psychiatrist Dr. Lourdes Lapuz but affairs continued. She even married the Jordanian national and had 2 children and left with him. April 1, 1997 petitioner filed a petition for annulment on the grounds of psychological incapacity. Summons were severed but no response from respondent. Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan who conducted a psychological evaluation of petitioner who found him to be conscientious, hardworking, perfectionist Dayan noted that Sharon was suffering from anti-social personality disorder evidenced by her promiscuity and lack of remorse; these are indications amounting to psychological incapacity RTC rendered said marriage null and void ISSUE: Whether anti-social personality disorder constitutes as psychological incapacity HELD: Respondent s sexual infidelity and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which makes the respondent completely unable to perform her essential marital obligations.

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At best, the circumstances described are grounds for legal separation under Art 55 of Family Code. Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void. PETITION DENIED REPUBLIC V QUINTERO-HAMANO G.R. NO 149498 MAY 20, 2004 FACTS: Petition for review of the decision dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the marriage contracted between herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano. January 14, 1988 Lolita Quintero and Japanese national Toshio Hamano were married in Bacoor Cavite. Respondent did not know that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated. After the marriage, Toshio left for Japan but never returned. No financial support received from him Summons were served by publication but the respondent failed to answer November 20, 1996 prosecutor reported that no collusion exists. During trial petitioner testified how Toshio abandoned his family and offered documentary evidence to support her claims August 28, 1997 RTC declared marriage null and void on the grounds that Toshio failed to perform his essential marital obligations ISSUE: Whether Toshio s abandonment constitutes as psychological incapacity (mixed marriage) HELD: The totality of evidence presented are insufficient to prove that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated following Santos and Mo.ina guidelines Mere abandonment is not tantamount to psychological incapacity. No other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although as a general rule, there is no need for medical exam, it would have helped the petitioner to prove her case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. In proving psychological incapacity, there is no distinction between a Filipino spouse and a foreign spouse. Guidelines set cannot be bended on the account of nationality. The norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality. PETITION GRANTED, RTC DECISION REVERSED. SIAYNGCO V SIAYNGCO 441 SCRA 422 OCTOBER 27, 2004 FACTS: A petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City, dated 31 January 2001, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent herein Judge Manuel Siayngco August 11, 1973 Juanita Carating (petitioner) married Manuel Siayngco (respondent) civil rites and church on June 27, 1973. Adopted baby boy September 25, 1997 respondent filed for declaration of nullity based on Art 36; petitioner was over domineering, selfish, volatile, nagger and trivial. No respect for his position as judge. This is rooted in her deep-seated resentment from lack of love and appreciation from her parents According to petitioner, respondent is lying because he wants to be with his paramour Respondent presented Dr Valentina Garcia (psychiatrist); from her psychiatric evaluation, both had narcissistic psychological repertoire (along with their other maladaptive traits),

13

failed to adequately empathize (or to be responsive and sensitive) to each other s needs and feelings Based on the psychiatric report of Dr Eduardo Maaba, petitioner is psychologically capacitated to comply with essential marital obligations January 31, 2001 RTC denied petition for nullity based on insufficient evidence July 1, 2003 CA reversed RTC decision based on psychiatric report of Dr Garcia that both are psychologically incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v CA

ISSUE: Whether root cause of psychological incapacity was identified based on Molina guideline #2 HELD: Based on the report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity. Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that respondent Manuel s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. Respondent failed to prove that his wife s behavior and actions are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage. Dr. Garcia s report does not even mention that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated. PETITION GRANTED. CA DECISION WAS REVERSED ANTONIO V REYES G.R. NO. 155800 MARCH 10, 2005 FACTS: Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed thejudgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void Decembher 6, 1990 petitioner and respondent were married in Pasig and had a child who died 5 months after birth March 8, 1993 petitioner filed for declaration of nullity based on Art. 36, alleging that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with essential marital obligations, incapacity existed at the time of the marriage and exists up to the present Petitioner alleged that respondent is a pathological liar who lied about everything Petitioner presented Dr Dante Abcede (psychiatrist) and Dr Arnulfo Lopez (clinical psychologist); based on their tests, respondent s constant lying was pathological or abnormal. This undermined the basic relationship of the marriage. Respondent denied all allegations; presented Dr Antonio Efren Reyes (psychiatrist) who tested respondent and found her to be psychologically capacitated to perform marital duties Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondent s psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test Church annulled marriage due to lack of discretion on both parties but CA reversed decision on the insufficiency of evidence provided ISSUE: Whether evidences presented by petitioner are sufficient to prove psychological incapacity of respondent

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HELD: In understanding Art 36, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law." Each case must be judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. Petitioner was able to sufficiently prove the psychological incapacity of his spouse (witnesses, experts, etc). The root cause of respondent s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, etc. Respondent s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child s real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage. Also, The gravity of respondent s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. However, although Dr Abcede did not comment on the incurability of respondent s illness, the SC ruled that each case is to be tried based on the merits of the facts presented and not just juridical precedence. PETITION GRANTED, ARRIAGED ULL A D VOID M N N REPUBLIC V IYOY 470 SCRA SEPTEMBER 21, 2005 FACTS: In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines December 16, 1961 Crasus and Fely married in Cebu City; both had 5 children. After the marriage, Fely was hot-tempered, nagger and extravagant 1984 Fely went to the US; after a year, Crasus received divorce papers from Fely and eventually found out that Fely married an American. Respondent filed complaint after 13 years of marriage Fely denied claims that it was respondent who was a drunkard, lazy etc. No deposition submitted from Philippine Consul in US to RTC; RTC declared marriage void ab initio on October 30, 1998 State intervened but CA affirmed RTC decision ISSUE: Whether abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity

15

HELD: Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband s surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus s Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage. Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen . Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus. DECISION REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. MARRIAGE IS VALID AND SUBSISTING YU V YU 484 SCRA 485 MARCH 10, 2006 FACTS: Petitioner Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for habeas corpus before CA on January 11, 2002 alleging that his estranged wife Caroline Tanchay-Yu (respondent) unlawfully withheld from him the custody of their minor child respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and March 3, 2002 dissolution of ACP before Pasig RTC March 21, 2002 while habeas corpus was pending, CA awarded petitioner of full custody over their child with full visitation rights to respondent

Petitioner and respondent later filed on April 5, 2002 before the appellate court a Joint Motion to Approve Interim Visitation Agreement which was, by Resolution of April 24, 2002, approved. On April 18, 2002, respondent filed before the appellate court a Motion for the Modification of her visiting rights under the Interim Visitation Agreement. To the Motion, petitioner filed an Opposition with Motion to Cite Respondent for Contempt of Court in light of her filing of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC which, so he contended, constituted forum shopping. By Resolution of July 5, 2002, the appellate court ordered respondent and her counsel to make the necessary amendment in her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig City RTC in so far as the custody aspect is concerned, under pain of contempt. In compliance with the appellate court s Resolution of July 5, 2002, respondent filed a Motion to Admit Amended Petition before the Pasig RTC. She, however, later filed in December 2002 a Motion

16

to Dismiss her petition, without prejudice, on the ground that since she started residing and conducting business at her new address at Pasay City, constraints on resources and her very busy schedule rendered her unable to devote the necessary time and attention to the petition. The Pasig RTC granted respondent s motion and accordingly dismissed the petition without prejudice, by Order of March 28, 2003. On June 12, 2003, petitioner filed his own petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and dissolution of the absolute community of property before the Pasig RTC, docketed as JDRC Case No. 6190, with prayer for the award to him of the sole custody of Bianca, subject to the final resolution by the appellate court of his petition for habeas corpus. The appellate court eventually dismissed the habeas corpus petition, by Resolution of July 3, 2003, for having become moot and academic, "the restraint on the liberty of the person alleged to be in restraint [having been] lifted."

FERRARIS V FERRARIS G.R. NO. 162368 JULY 17, 2006 FACTS: This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error. February 20, 2001 Pasig RTC denied the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by the petitioner on the grounds that epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity and evidence on record was insufficient to prove infidelity. Motion for reconsideration was denied on April 20, 2001 CA affirmed in toto the judgment of RTC; it held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or that 4 his "defects" were incurable and already present at the inception of the marriage. The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to establish the substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the essential marital obligations. ISSUE: Whether CA erred affirming RTC decision in denying petition for annulment on the account of insufficient evidence HELD: It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts, which are unavailing in the instant case. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment

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and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes manifest themselves. Neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. PETITION DENIED WITH FINALITY MALLION V ALACANTARA G.R. NO. 141528 OCTOBER 31, 2006 FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising a question of law: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license? October 24, 1995 Oscar Mallion filed a petition before RTC seeking declaration of nullity of his marriage with Editha Alcantara under Art. 36 of Family Code November 11, 1997 RTC denied petition on the ground that the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to warrant the relief he is seeking. June 11, 1998 Appeal filed with CA was dismissed for failure to pay docket and other lawful fees with reglamentary period July 12, 1999 petitioner filed another petition seeking nullity of marriage, alleging that marriage was void ab initio due to absence of marriage license. Respondent filed a motion to dimiss on August 13, 1999, on the grounds of res judicata and forum shopping October 8, 1999 RTC granted respondent s motion to dismiss According to Mallion, relief prayed for is the same but the cause of action is different; res 1 judicata does not apply ISSUE: should the matter of the invalidity of a marriage due to the absence of an essential requisite prescribed by article 4 of the family code be raised in the same proceeding where the marriage is being impugned on the ground of a party s psychological incapacity under article 36 of the family code HELD: The SC held that in civil case no. Sp 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in that case Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and the second actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. All three requisites are present in the instant case. If same facts or evidence would sustain both petitions, the two actions are considered the same and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action. Petitioner has the same cause of action nullity of said marriage the grounds or basis are just different. Petition denied due to lack of merit
1

A matter [already] judged", and may refer to two things: in both civil law and common law legal systems, a case in which there has been a final judgment and is no longer subject to appeal

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CATALAN V CA 514 SCRA 607 514 SCRA 607 FEBRUARY 6, 2007 FACTS: This petition for review assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69875 dated August 6, 2004, which reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-10636, declaring the marriage between respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on the ground of bigamy, as well as the Resolution dated January 27, 2005, which denied the motion for reconsideration. petitioner Felicitas Amor married Orlando Catalan in Pangasinan and June 4, 1950 migrated to the US soon after (became US citizens). April 1988, both divorced Orlando married Merope but since the latter had a prior subsisting June 16, 1988 marriage, petitioner filed for declaration of nullity of marriage against Orlando and Merope with damages Respondents (Orlando and Merope) filed motion to dismiss due to lack of action as petitioner was not a real party-in-interest but was denied October 10, 2000 marriage between Orlando and Merope was declared void ab initio by RTC CA reversed RTC decision and declared marriage was still subsisting ISSUE: Whether petitioner has the required standing in court to question the nullity of the marriage between Orlando and Merope HELD: Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner and respondent Orlando were naturalized American citizens and that they obtained a divorce decree in April 1988. However, after a careful review of the records, we note that other than the allegations in the complaint and the testimony during the trial, the records are bereft of competent evidence to prove their naturalization and divorce. It was not sufficiently established that Felicitas and Orlando were already US citizens at the time they secured divorce decree in April 1988. Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree 23 becomes absolute. In such case, the RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the respondents void for being bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated 24 December 21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope, and the other, in Calasiao, Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents. Under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended 27 28 in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action Thus, in Nial v. . 29 Bayadog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights. REPUBLIC V TANYAG-SAN JOSE 517 SCRA 123 FEBRUARY 6, 2007 FACTS: Respondents Laila Tanyag-San Jose (19 yrs 4 mos) and Manolito San Jose (20 yrs 10 mos) were married on June 12, 988 and had 3 children 9 years couple stayed with Manolito s parents. Manolito was jobless, gambler and addict. August 20, 1998 Laila left Manilito and moved back to her parents house March 9, 1999 Laila filed for petition for declaration of nullity of marriage citing Art 36 Laila presented Dr Nedy Tayag (clinical psychologist) and declared that from the psych tests and interviews on Laila that Manolito (whom she did not personally examine) was

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psychologically incapacitated. His anti-social personality disorder appears to be grave and is deeply [immersed] within the system. It continues to influence the individual until the later stage of life. ISSUE: Whether Manolito s behavior characterized as anti-social personality disorder constitutes psychological incapacity HELD: Petitioner s portrayal of respondent as jobless and irresponsible is not enough.As the Supreme Court said in the Molina case (supra), "(I)t is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness." There is no showing that [Dr.] Tayag was able to interview the respondent or any of his relatives in order to arrive at the above conclusion. Obviously, the data upon which the finding or conclusion was based is inadequate. If being jobless (since the commencement of the marriage up to the filing of the present petition) and worse, a gambler, can hardly qualify as being mentally or physically ill what then can We describe such acts? Are these normal manners of a married man? Dr. Tayag had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had merely been relayed to him by respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable. Dr. Tayag s Psychological Report does not even show that the alleged anti-social personality disorder of Manolito was already present at the inception of the marriage or that it is incurable. Neither does it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder nor identify its root cause. The root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained (Santos case)

ZAMORA V CA G.R. 141917 FEBRUARY 7, 2007 FACTS: This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to annul and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 5, 1999 and January 24, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53525, entitled "Bernardino S. Zamora v. Norma Mercado Zamora," which affirmed the dismissal of a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage. June 4, 1070 Petitioner Bernardino Zamora married Norma Mercado in City; did not have any child. In 1972, Norma went to the US to work as a nurse; left in 1974 again. In 1989, she was already a US citizen Petitioner filed for declaration of nullity of marriage, alleging that Norma was horrified at the mere idea of having children and also abandoned him when she left for the US Norma denied that she refused to have a child, alleging that petitioner was unfaithful and had two affairs with different women and had children with them. RTC denied Bernardino s petition citing that there is no evidence of June 22, 1995 psychological incapacity on Norma (no gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability) August 5, 1999 CA affirmed RTC decision citing Molina and Santos guidelines ISSUE: Whether or not refusal to have children and abandonment constitutes psychological incapacity; Whether or not the presentation of psychologists and/or psychiatrists is still desirable, if evidence in this case already shows the psychological incapacity of private respondent

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HELD: Molina and Santos cases did not mention the necessity of the presentation of expert opinion. What is important, as in Marcos v Marcos, is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the condition of psychological incapacity. Likewise, Section 2(d) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, states: (d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration. The rule is that the facts alleged in the petition and the evidence presented, considered intotality, should be sufficient to convince the court of the psychological incapacity of the party concerned. Petitioner, however, failed to substantiate his allegation that private respondent is psychologically incapacitated. His allegations relating to her refusal to cohabit with him and to bear a child was strongly disputed. DENIED. REPUBLIC V CABANTUG-BAGUIO G.R. NO. 171042 JUNE 30, 2008 FACTS: Petition for review on the declaration of the nullity of marriage between Lynette CabantugBaguio and Martini Dico Baguio August 12, 1997 Lynette and Martini were married after being pen pals since 1995 Initially, the couple stayed with Lynette s parents. Martini only stayed with his wife during weekends, and on weekdays he was at his parent s house. Lynette soon discovered that Martini was a mama s boy Upon the insistence of Martini s mother, his allotment was divided equally between her and Lynette January 1999 No information about Martini. Lynette also stopped receiving her share of the allotment and upon inquiry with Martini s employer, she found out that he was in Alabang, Muntinlupa October 12, 2000 Lynette filed a complaint for the declaration of the nullity of marriage on the basis of Martini s psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital duties and obligations as stated in Art. 68-70 of the Family Code Summons were served upon Martini to which he did not file any response. No collusion was also established. October 14, 1999 Lynette learned that Martini declared in his employment records that he was SINGLE and named his mother as principal allotee Respondent presented the letter of clinical psychologist who evaluated the behavior of Martini. Based on the report, Martini shows immature personality disorder, dependency patterns and self-centered motives. The situation is serious, grave, existing already during the adolescent period and incurable. As such, Martini is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations in marriage and family January 2, 2002 Cebu City RTC declared that marriage void since Martini was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential martial obligations of marriage and that same incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage ISSUE: Whether or not Martini s being a mama s boy constitutes as a psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code HELD: Art. 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the material bond at the time the causes manifest themselves, nor with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in

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psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. [T]he root cause must be identified as a psychological illness, and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained. For psychological incapacity to render a marriage void ab initio it must be characterized by: 1. Gravity must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage 2. Juridical antecedence it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage 3. Incurability must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proving the nullity of marriage lies on the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage, and against the dissolution and nullity (semper praesumitur pro matrimonio) As seen in this case, Lynette failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove Martini s psychological incapacity. While the court sympathizes with her predication, its first and foremost duty is to apply the law. LIGERALDE V PATALINGHUG G.R. NO. 168796 APRIL 15, 2010 FACTS: Petition to review RTC decision on November 30, 2004 concerning the declaration of nullity of marriage between Silvino Ligeralde (petitioner) and May Ascension A. Patlinghug (respondent) October 3, 1984 Silvino and May got married and had four children. Respondent displayed signs of immaturity, negligence, infidelity and irresponsibility soon after Silvino was reluctant to leave his wife because of his love for her. He gave her another chance after finding out she was sleeping with another man but after a few months, May was back to her old ways and it seemed impossible for her to change Prior to filing the complaint against Patalinghug, Ligeralde consulted Dr Tina Nicdao-Basilio (psychologist). Based on the psychological evaluation, May was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential martial obligations; that the incapacity started when she was young and became manifest after marriage; and that the same was serious and incurable October 22, 1999 RTC decalared the marriage of Ligeralde and Patalinghug based on the psychological evaluation report of Dr. Basilio CA reversed the RTC decision on the grounds that respondent s alleged sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility do not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code and that the psychologist failed to identify and prove the root cause thereof or that the incapacity was medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

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ISSUE: Whether Patalinhug s behavior constitutes psychological incapacity pursuant to Art 36 of the Family Code HELD: Art. 36 of the Family Code states: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage; shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the 7 means of the party involved. The Court likewise laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of 8 Appeals. Relevant to this petition are the following: 1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff 2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision 3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage 4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable 5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage Petitioner s testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of Patalinghug s condition. Even Dr. Nicdao-Basilio failed to show the root cause of her psychological incapacity. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully established by the evidences presented