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Griffin Paparatto Research Question: The most general sort of question I'm interested in answering is how one's most

basic ontological commitments can influence more specific philosophical positions which may have initially seemed to have no relation !hat is the relationship between natural and social "inds#are they parasitic and how might the se$%gender distinction map onto them& 'ow useful is it to uphold a strict distinction between the two and can it be (ustified& 'ow do the different strands of essentialist thin"ing relate to each other and what conflicts are there betwween them and the particular anti)essentialist interpretation of *eleu+e I'm e$amining& 'ow might this philosophical position toward se$%gender relate to any sort of biological%psychological discussion of the sub(ect and can the philosophical proceed independently& !hat is the relation between the somewhat abstracted philosophical discussion of se$%gender and people's lived e$periences& Tentative 'ypothesis: I thin" that approaching the se$%gender distinction and the general ontological underpinnings of each from a *eleu+ian perspective allows us to understand them in a way which can grant them some ontological status without holding them as some sort of static or essential property of people ,e$es and genders can be real -and I will e$plore what that would mean%entail. while still being constructed /ost importantly0 *e 1anda's discussion of population thin"ing challenges the idea that any particular set of se$es%genders is default I'll be approaching this position first through a critique of natural%social "inds and then through an e$amination of how adopting the position I endore leads one to ta"e the previously stated position toward se$%gender In the thesis I'm interested in e$ploring the relation between what might be considered a particular interpretation%application of *eleu+e's metaphysics and recent discussion surrounding natural and social "inds within 2analytic philosophy 2 /ore specifically0 I'm interested in applying this critique of natural%social "inds to the se$%gender distinction in an approach which resembles Another Look at the Reality of Race, by Which I Mean Racef. In wor"s by /anuel *e1anda and 1evi 3ryant0 there is an e$amination of the metaphysical system which underlies *eleu+e's philosophy In Intensive Science & Virtual Philosophy0 specifically0 *e1anda sees himself as providing another method by which we can approach *eleu+e's metaphysics and strengthen its positions 4mong its claims -which are critiqued and further e$panded upon by 3ryant. is a position of anti) essentialism which he sees *eleu+e endorsing *e1anda further elaborates that position and applies it to discussion of natural "inds but focuses mostly on species as proposed natural "inds 3ryant critiques *e1anda in a chapter of he !e"ocracy of #b$ects0 but is in agreement on his position toward essences !hile 3ryant gives slightly more attention to social "inds0 he still focuses mostly on the natural "inds found in physics or -non) human. biology 5hapter 6: *eleu+e's 7ntology 8irst0 I'll e$amine *eleu+e's own ontology as it is interpreted%applied by *e1anda and 3ryant0 among others I'll trace the development of what *e1anda call's *eleu+e's

anti)essentialism through morphogenesis 'ere I will argue that we should accept something similar to *e1anda's anti)essentialism and that this is what *eleu+e actually claims 5hapter 9: :atural ; ,ocial <inds I'll then move on to provide a basis for the discussion on natural "inds as they are discussed in 2analytic philosophy 2 3ryant here will be particularly useful as he sort of provides a bridge between the sets of vocabulary of *eleu+e and that of 2natural "ind tal" 2 This will allow me to situate *eleu+e's position among other's positions on natural "inds as well as e$plore the relation between natural -biological. and social "inds 5hapter =: 4nti)essentialism as it applies to se$%gender This will be sort of a synthesis of the first two chapters to the e$tent that I will be critiquing a position toward se$%gender as a natural "ind -as well as the position on the distinction of se$ and gender. from the direction of *eleu+e's ontology This is where my approach will mirror that of >oshua Glasgow in two ways In his essay0 he begins to argue for racial anti)realism by using what he calls the /ismatch 4rgument: -6. 8or the race debate0 the relevant metaphysical question is whether the commonsense concept of race pic"s out something real -9. The breeding populations identified by science are not pic"ed out by the commonsense concept of race Thus0 -=. Those breeding populations are not races in the sense relevant for the race debate I will attempt to ma"e a mismatch)li"e argument for both natural "inds and se$%gender as a natural%social0 i e Given anti)essentialist arguments0 there cannot be something li"e the natural "inds tal"ed about0 and given the arguments against natural%social "inds there cannot be something li"e se$%gender as we generally use the terms Bibliography: !ifference an% Repetition -*eleu+e. A housan% Plateaus -*eleu+e. &illes !eleu'e -5olebroo". Intensive Science an% Virtual Philosophy -*e1anda. A housan% (ears of )onlinear *istory -*e1anda. !ifference an% &ivenness -3ryant. he !e"ocracy of #b$ects -3ryant. !eleu'e an% &en%er & !eleu'e an% +ueer heory ,ocial 5onstruction and the Philosophy of ,cience -<u"la. he Metaphysics of &en%er -5harlotte !itt. Delusions of Gender (Cordelia Fine) &en%er Is a )atural ,in% -ith a *istorical .ssence -3ach. Another Look at the Reality of Race, by Which I Mean Race f ->oshua Glasgow. Philosophical Analysis an% Social ,in%s -'aslanger ; ,aul. What is &en%er .ssentialis"/ -!itt. #b$ectivist an% .ssentialist #ntolo0ies of &en%er & Love -'arrison. he Metaphysics of Se1 an% &en%er -,veinsd?ttir. .ssence, I%entity, an% the 2oncept of Wo"an -,tol(ar.