A Basis for the Declaration of Morality

September 20, 2009 in Meditations Found in the philosophy of morality of Immanuel Kant and introduced in his work Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals are the concepts of categorical and hypothetical imperatives. n imperati!e is defined by Kant to be the proposition of an action which is deemed necessary. In askin" why a moral command is considered a cate"orical imperati!e, many other #uestions and distinctions must first be made. $ne of these in#uiries would be how the #uestion of morality is related to metaphysics, and one would e!entually be confronted by the theory of deontology. Deontology is based on the idea of the e%istence of a set of uni!ersal laws which are unchan"in", and are not deri!ed from e%perience or empirical means. &hese pre'e%istin" moral obli"ations can be disco!ered by followin" the three formulations of the cate"orical imperati!e. (efore this, one must understand the distinction between a hypothetical imperati!e and a cate"orical imperati!e. A hypothetical imperative is a conditional command whose force depends on the desire or "oals of the person recei!in" the command. It is mostly found in the form of an )if*then+ clause. For example, )If a person wants to play a "ame of chess, he must first obtain a partner and a chess set+. Ima"ine a person who absolutely dislikes the "ame of chess. Since this person has no desire to play a "ame of chess, then the command carries no force, and the person most likely will not seek out a chess partner or set. If a person did want to play chess, they would do as the command says, leadin" to the conclusion that the sub,ecti!e hypothetical imperati!e is not ,ustified in itself, but only a means to an end. -omparable is the categorical imperative, which is ,ustified as an end in itself. cate"orical imperati!e is e#ui!alent to the uni!ersal laws of deontolo"y. It is not circumstantial, therefore bein" reco"ni.ed as an absolute, as opposed to a hypothetical imperati!e which is sub,ecti!e. ccordin" to Kant, it is the only basis for a declaration of morality. n action and the conse#uence of an action are morally empty, and carry no wei"ht in the determination of morality. &he only ob,ect which is rele!ant to the deliberation of morality is related to the intention of the doer. If this intention is in ali"nment with the duty of the doer, then the intention can be considered morally "ood. /uty is considered to be )the necessity to act out of re!erence for the law+ set by the cate"orical imperati!e. &he intention must follow the underlyin" ma%im, or principle that is the source of moral worth, in which the act is performed, which is the cate"orical imperati!e. Kant proposed three formulations to the cate"orical imperati!e0 ct only accordin" to that ma%im by which you can at the same time will that it would become a uni!ersal law, act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, ne!er simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end, and act as thou"h you were throu"h your ma%ims a law'makin" member of a kin"dom of ends. It is understood by Kant that an action must be performed in accordance with these three formulations to be morally "ood.

It may now be understood why a moral command is considered a cate"orical imperati!e. moral command would ne!er lead one to perform an action which is a means to an end. Such an action is sub,ecti!e, and could not be willed uni!ersally due to its sub,ecti!e nature. &he deliberation of morality lies in the source of its moral worth, which is the ma%im by which the action is performed. &his action is performed out of duty and will always be an end in itself, not simply a means to an end. It is not a conditional )if*then+ clause, but more of an )ou"ht+ statement. 1hen the aforementioned re#uirements are met, then and only then may we prescribe a moral responsibility.