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Rendering Safe Improvised CBR Devices

Though less common than their conventional IED counterparts, chemical and radiological explosive devices are still a threat to both urban environments and the battleeld. Andy Oppenheimer, AIExpE, an expert on these weapons, outlines their dangers and describes how best to neutralise them

he use by insurgents and terrorists of chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) materials in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) is a growing threat in both military and civilian arenas. Improvised chemical devices (ICDs) have been used in several massresponse incidents most notably, the sarin nerve agent attacks in Tokyo in March 1995. A series of attacks by Al Qaeda in Iraq at the height of the insurgency from October 2006 to June 2007, which killed 115 and injured 854 Iraqi civilians, involved the hijacking and explosion of tankers carrying tons of one of the most common toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) in worldwide use chlorine. Reports from Afghanistan in April

2010 and in July 2012 describe Taliban attacks on girls schools with bottle bombs containing easily acquired malathion organophosphate (a nerve agent precursor that causes similar injuries), resulting in dozens of students being hospitalised. Much of a chemical (CWA) or biological warfare agent (BWA) is dissipated by the explosion, but may still affect victims away from the detonation point, and other methods of release (such as light aircraft) would produce symptoms hours or days after dispersal. Radioactive fallout does not vanish, however buildings and whole districts may be cordoned off indenitely or properties demolished, and long-term health effects beyond

An explosives ordnance disposal expert at work on a suspect gas canister

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acute radiation syndrome (ARS) are possible. In theatre operations, CBR use by insurgents work as area denial weapons, as they delay troop movements and contaminate sensitive and personal equipment. Toxic challenges As CBR devices are, to date, rare, they pose multiple challenges to rst responders and explosives ordnance disposal (EOD) teams who have to train using varied scenarios. Render-safe procedures (RSPs) involve defusing the device separating the explosive charge from the detonator and disposing of it, although RSPs will vary considerably depending on the hazard in the device or delivery system. These variables include the type, toxicity and amount of agent within the device, the incident size, type of explosive, the initiation and detonator system, the physical size of the package, the estimated response duration, and the surrounding area whether inside a building, vehicle or transit train, for example, or in the open air. Of prime importance for CBR (and the least likely, N Nuclear) is temperature and wind direction, which will determine dispersal and deposition of material if the device explodes. Therefore, an increased cordon is necessary for containment and decontamination. Moving a device, which would never be done by responders, could release the contents, and there is always a high risk that it is booby-trapped or has unreliable or unstable initiation components. Timer-operated and multiple devices complicate response, particularly to an initial come-on

The Monica Remote Case Entry System is attached to a device in readiness for sampling the contents

There is always a high risk that a device is booby-trapped, or has unreliable or unstable initiation components
device, which seeks to divert and target the EOD operatives who would respond to it and move civilians away into another area believed to be safe, but where a secondary planted device, often bigger than the rst, detonates. A victim-operated IED situation (either by suicide bomber or boobytrap) makes the task even more of a challenge. Having to wear increased personal protective equipment (PPE) increases the difculty of the task. Robot sensors A prime aim is to survey and identify the CBRN agent enclosed in the device, which may be sealed, or it may be leaking hazardous material if not well-sealed. A radiation alarm at, for example, an airport or port may involve an EOD squad who must determine if a package is a radiological dispersal device (RDD), that may be heavily shielded. If unshielded, the device will be emitting radiation, or an IED may be wired up to a container of radioisotope or toxins. A full-threat assessment based on intelligence is vital to ascertain the nature of the device, but this may not be available to EOD squads and rst responders. Remotely controlled vehicles (RCVs) are invaluable tools for the job and may be equipped with sensors to identify the device contents. While RCVs are not used in all aspects of RSPs, they are highly valued as they allow responders to be located safely away from the hazard and provide data about it to the team in real time, and more speedily than it can be

The IDEAL 357 Magnum disruptor is designed to disrupt an IED without dispersing the contents

done manually. The team must be able to rely on the robot to complete the task. RCVs for CBRN incidents may have to be decontaminated, but this means building radiation-hardening into the robot. Other limitations include the limited mobility of larger RCVs in tough terrain. An example of a compact detection package mounted on a RCV for ICD identication is the Environics ChemPro Detector Module. This has a multi-sensor CWA and TIC detection array with 10 sensing channels and an open-loop Ion Mobility Spectroscopy (IMS) sensor to provide CWA sensitivity below military-grade levels, and is likely to be used in ICDs. The robot can integrate the digital output of the ChemProDM into the vehicles displays. An optional Remote Alarm Unit (RAU) can be mounted away from the module and can replicate the display of a hand-held chemical detector. Many sensors are designed to be used in a Hot Zone and for transmitting data back to the incident point (IP). Non-intrusive analytical X-ray equipment can see liquid or powder ll, which may indicate an ICD or liquid explosive, which is used increasingly by terrorists. A compact CWA and TIC detector is pre-positioned close to the entry spy point made by a small cordless rotary tool. For RDDs, a ruggedised microprocessor-controlled

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One reliable way to analyse the contents of a chemical weapon is to take a sample, which would be invaluable for forensics

radiation detector would be needed, with integrated sensors for all types of radiation alpha (short-range, non-penetrative), beta and gamma (longerrange, penetrative). X-raying the contents can also be done by the RCV by a system such as the Pixium and Logos Imaging system, which can take high-resolution X-rays of the IED and produce a 16-bit picture in 10 seconds. For suspected RDDs, a portable High Purity Germanium (HPGe) detector can quickly and accurately identify the radioactive contents. Battery-operated, mechanical coolers have been introduced to make heavy HPGe detectors which have to be cooled less cumbersome. Shooting the bomb Where disruption of the device is viewed possible and suitable, disrupter weapons on the RCVs are used to shoot the device with ultra-high-speed projectile or water. Some squads use the IDEAL .357 Magnum Disrupter, a precise-aim EOD weapon for disrupting an IED without causing dispersal of its toxic contents. The Proparms 12.5mm Recoilless (RC) Disrupter is a recoilless, waterjet disrupter used as a surgical tool for an accurate hit on the initiator device contained within the package. The MONICA Remote Case Entry System from MMIC EOD features a gas-tight, self-sealing probe that can be inserted through the casing of the device, whatever its shape or surface condition. It can provide fully sealed access for sampling, extraction and neutralisation of the contents in situ within two minutes, and can be carried by two operatives in full PPE. Extraction of gas, liquid or powder agent is done with drip-free seals, which prevent toxic release. The insertion and sampling can be completed

from up to 500m away, and the system can provide feedback to the operator. Remote disruption may also be achieved using electronic countermeasures (ECM), which prevent a mobile phone signal from setting off the receiver in the device. Containing the device When a device cannot be dismantled or rendered safe which would include, at the extreme end of CBRN, improvised nuclear devices methods of containment would be applied, or if a device threatens downwind contamination or is located where damage is unacceptable. Bomb suppressant foams and blast containment tents help to suppress the explosive force and may neutralise CBAs and contain radiological particles. A ballistic blanket over the tent provides an extra barrier against the blast. An RDD could be placed in a mobile explosion containment vessel to limit the spread of radioactive contamination to within the vessel. Despite lack of precedent, and the preponderance of conventional IEDs, guns and rockets as the terrorists preferred weapons, training and equipment development for improvised CBRN devices may become an inescapable part of how EOD teams and other responders carry out their dangerous jobs in present and future conicts. n Andy Oppenheimer, AIExpE, is Editor of Chemical, Biological & Nuclear Warfare (CBNW) and author of IRA: the Bombs and the Bullets: a History of Deadly Ingenuity (Irish Academic Press, 2008). He is an Associate Member of the Institute of Explosives Engineers and a Member of International Association of Bomb Technicians & Investigators (IABTI)

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