0 оценок0% нашли этот документ полезным (0 голосов)
15 просмотров5 страниц
In 1997, Brgy. San Roque filed for an expropriation suit before the MTC of Talisay. The MTC denied the suit because apparently under BP 129, MTCs do not have jurisdiction over expropriation cases as it is the RTCs that are lodged with the power to try such cases. So Brgy. San Roque filed it before RTC Talisay but then Judge Pastor denied the suit arguing that the action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20,000.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should take cognizance of the expropriation case.
HELD: Yes. Under Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over “all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; . . . . .” The present action involves the exercise of the right to eminent domain, and that such right is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
What are the two phases of expropriation cases?
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, “of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.” An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, “no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.”
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of “the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.” This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. . . .
It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government’s exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
In 1997, Brgy. San Roque filed for an expropriation suit before the MTC of Talisay. The MTC denied the suit because apparently under BP 129, MTCs do not have jurisdiction over expropriation cases as it is the RTCs that are lodged with the power to try such cases. So Brgy. San Roque filed it before RTC Talisay but then Judge Pastor denied the suit arguing that the action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20,000.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should take cognizance of the expropriation case.
HELD: Yes. Under Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over “all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; . . . . .” The present action involves the exercise of the right to eminent domain, and that such right is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
What are the two phases of expropriation cases?
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, “of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.” An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, “no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.”
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of “the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.” This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. . . .
It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government’s exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Авторское право:
Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
Доступные форматы
Скачайте в формате PDF, TXT или читайте онлайн в Scribd
In 1997, Brgy. San Roque filed for an expropriation suit before the MTC of Talisay. The MTC denied the suit because apparently under BP 129, MTCs do not have jurisdiction over expropriation cases as it is the RTCs that are lodged with the power to try such cases. So Brgy. San Roque filed it before RTC Talisay but then Judge Pastor denied the suit arguing that the action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20,000.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should take cognizance of the expropriation case.
HELD: Yes. Under Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over “all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; . . . . .” The present action involves the exercise of the right to eminent domain, and that such right is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
What are the two phases of expropriation cases?
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, “of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.” An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, “no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.”
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of “the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.” This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. . . .
It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government’s exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Авторское право:
Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
Доступные форматы
Скачайте в формате PDF, TXT или читайте онлайн в Scribd
(1hls ls a "#$ %&''&()$ proceedlng lnsLlLuLed by a prewar [usLlce of Lhe peace whose poslLlon was fllled by Lhe appolnLmenL and conflrmaLlon of Lhe respondenL afLer llberaLlon.) 1he facLs brlng Lhls case wlLhln Lhe auLhorlLy of *#+, -.$'/,0& 1,2 345&'$ 6#/)#.+$7 and 8$4+(9$ :&;;#4<& 1,2 =$4&( >?&/)&. eLlLloner's accepLance of oLher publlc offlces lncompaLlble wlLh [udlclal funcLlon operaLe as an abandonmenL of Lhe poslLlon Lo whlch he seeks relnsLaLemenL. lL remalns Lhe peLlLloner was appolnLed [usLlce of Lhe peace for Lhe munlclpallLy of llar, rovlnce of Cebu, ln november, 1933. Pe had held LhaL offlce unLll Aprll 23, 1944, when he ceased Lo acL for reasons noL dlsclosed ln Lhe record. Cn AugusL 19, 1943, Lhe [urlsdlcLlon of Lhe [usLlce of Lhe peace of San lranclsco, oro and 1udela, vlcenLe de 8oda, was exLended Lo comprlse Lhe munlclpallLy of llar. vlcenLe de 8oda was laLer succeeded by lellxberLo 8. Sosmena, who was [usLlce of Lhe peace unLll Aprll 14, 1946. lrom Lhe laLLer daLe SepLember 1, 1946, Lhe offlce of [usLlce of Lhe peace of llar was vacanL. lL was on Lhe lasL menLloned daLe LhaL Lhe respondenL enLered upon Lhe performance of hls duLles ln LhaL offlce. eLlLloner [olned Lhe pollce force of Lhe ClLy of Cebu as lleuLenanL from !une 11, 1947, Lo !anuary 13, 1948 lrom !anuary 16, 1948, Lo Aprll 24 of Lhe same year, he was AsslsLanL rovlnclal Warden. 1haL peLlLloner was forced Lo seek or accepL [obs ln order Lo llve would noL alLer Lhe case even lf we assume, for Lhe sake of argumenL, LhaL economlc necesslLy was a valld plea. 1he governmenL was noL Lhe only source of galnful employmenLs LhaL could have Llde hlm over whlle walLlng, as he says, for reappolnLmenL Lo hls old poslLlon. 1he LruLh ls LhaL for almosL Lwo years afLer llberaLlon, before he accepLed oLher governmenL poslLlons, he goL poslLlon was wlLhouL any permanenL lncumbenL, he dld noL enLer publlc servlce, and he dld noL ralse a flnger Lo clalm hls [udlclal posL. lL would seem LhaL he losL all lnLeresL ln Lhe same unLll he changed hls mlnd or found he had ls dlsmlssed wlLh cosLs. * lf Lhls ls hard Lo undersLand, lL's Lhe faulL of Lhe Supreme CourL. 1he case ls so shorL Lhls ls acLually Lhe orlglnal. ," )()-) '" ).'/)0
lAC1S: ln 1920, peLlLloner A8A?A was lnlLlally appolnLed Lo Lhe posL of [usLlce of Lhe peace (!) of 4 Lowns ln llocos Sur buL hls [urlsdlcLlon was LhereafLer llmlLed Lo only 2 munlclpallLles Lhen CnL? CnL munlclpallLy (CervanLes) durlng Lhe !apanese occupaLlon. Abaya evldenLly accepLed Lhese appolnLmenLs made durlng Lhe !apanese occupaLlon and served as ! unLll 1944 when, because of Lhe LhreaL of mlllLary clashes beLween !apanese forces on one slde and Lhe llllplno guerrlllas on Lhe oLher, he lefL hls posL and fled Lo Lhe mounLalns for safeLy. AfLer llberaLlon, Abaya was agaln appolnLed as ! of 1WC munclpallLles, afLer whlch a ulLC delegaLe deslgnaLed Abaya as Lemporary !", Lhe appolnLmenL Lo "LermlnaLe as soon as hls successor was appolnLed by Lhe cenLral offlce." upon Lhe resLoraLlon of peace and order and upon normal funcLlonlng of Lhe CommonwealLh governmenL, resldenL Csmena gave Abaya an &; +()/'+4 appolnLmenL as !. When Lhls appolnLmenL was submlLLed Lo Lhe ConA, lL was Lurned down. Abaya was agaln appolnLed as ! by resldenL 8oxas, buL Lhe ConA dld noL acL upon Lhe appolnLmenL. uue Lo Lhe lnacLlon of Lhe ConA, res. 8oxas exLended an &; +()/'+4 appolnLmenL Lo Alvear, whose appolnLmenL was laLer conflrmed by Lhe ConA.
Abaya clalms Lo have senL several proLesL leLLers Lo Lhe Cfflce of Lhe resldenL and conferred wlLh Lhe v and anoLher SenaLor. lalllng Lo recelve lmmedlaLe rellef, Abaya commenced "#$ %&''&()$ proceedlngs for Lhe purpose of havlng hlm declared Lhe legal and lawful ! and Lo have Alvear removed. Alvear clalms LhaL Abaya had losL hls rlghL, LlLle or valld clalm Lo Lhe poslLlon of ! of CervanLes and Angakl by reason of abandonmenL, conslsLlng ln hls accepLance of Lhe poslLlon of ! of CL8vAn1LS CnL?, durlng Lhe !apanese occupaLlon, sald poslLlon belng dlfferenL and dlsLlncL from Lhe clrculL of CervanLes and Angakl held by hlm before Lhe war. lSSuL: WheLher Abaya abandoned hls offlce of ! of Lhe 2 munlclpallLles (CervanLes and Angakl), rovlnce of llocos Sur? 8uLlnC: 8ecause of Lhe abnormal condlLlons obLalnlng ln llocos Sur, parLlcularly Lhe Lowns of CervanLes and Angakl durlng Lhe war, Lhere was reason Lo belleve LhaL Lhe changlng of Lhe orlglnal clrculL occupled by Abaya ellmlnaLlng Lherefrom Lhe Lown of Angakl, was Lemporary measure Lo meeL Lhe exlgencles of Lhe admlnlsLraLlon of [usLlce ln LhaL area, under abnormal condlLlons, and LhaL hls accepLance of Lhe new posL dld noL lnvolve or enLall abandonmenL of hls old poslLlon. ln proof of Lhe Lemporary naLure of Lhe change ln Lhe clrculL ls Lhe facL LhaL when condlLlons reLurned Lo normal, Lhe old clrculL comprlslng Lhe Lowns of CervanLes and Angakl was resLored. And lL ls slgnlflcanL Lo noLe LhaL when sald old clrculL was resLored, Lhe peLlLloner was llkewlse resLored Lo hls old posL by appolnLmenLs exLended by Lwo admlnlsLraLlons (Csmena & 8oxas). ln Lhose days Abaya could noL very well dlcLaLe hls Lerms of accepLance of Lhe poslLlons exLended Lo hlm. Pe had Lo Lake Lhem as Lhey came, accepLlng Lhe poslLlon of ! of 1 munlclpallLy alone durlng Lhe occupaLlon and accepLlng a new appolnLmenL Lo hls old clrculL (2 munlclpallLles) durlng Lhe days followlng Lhe llberaLlon. Pe had no freedom of cholce. 1he lmporLanL Lhlng ls LhaL he never lnLended Lo abandon hls old posL and all along durlng Lhe !apanese occupaLlon and even afLer llberaLlon he conLlnued ln Lhe [udlclal servlce and exerclsed and dlscharged Lhe funcLlons of Lhe ! ln Lhe same place and area whlch he dld before Lhe war. 1he appolnLmenLs by resldenLs Csmena and 8oxas, Lhough noL conflrmed by Lhe ConA, were unnecessary, LhaL lL dld noL and could noL add anyLhlng Lo or dlmlnlsh hls rlghL Lo Lhe offlce conferred by hls orlglnal appolnLmenL, buL LhaL sald appolnLmenLs may be regarded as a mere resLlLuLlon of Lhe offlce whlch belonged Lo hlm buL whlch he falled Lo hold because of, and durlng Lhe war. 1" %/'/2 '" 23+43$+* 5)6%27 Cn 19 uec 1914, ablo 1eves was appolnLed [usLlce of Lhe peace of Luzurlaga, negros CrlenLal. Pe had slnce dlscharged Lhe duLles of sald offlce up Lo Lhe war ln uec 1941. negros CrlenLal, or parL Lhereof, was subsequenLly occupled by Lhe !apanese army. 1he plalnLlff followed and sLayed wlLh Lhe guerrlllas ln Lhe free area and conLlnued Lo dlscharge hls duLles as [usLlce of Lhe peace of LhaL parL of Luzurrlaga noL occupled by Lhe lnvaders. Powever, ln CcL 1943, Lhe plalnLlff was arresLed by Lhe !apanese and was kepL as prlsoner. 8ecause of plalnLlff's absence, Lhe uepuLy Covernor appolnLed ALLy. Mauro Ldrlal as [usLlce of Lhe peace of sald munlclpallLy of Luzurrlaga. ln CcL 1944, ablo 1eves managed Lo escape asked Lhe uepuLy Covernor under Lhe guerrllla CovL Lo resLore hlm Lo [usLlce of Lhe peace of Luzurrlaga. lalnLlff secured Lhe necessary clearance, and, on 4 !an 1943, he was appolnLed [usLlce of Lhe peace of Lhe munlclpallLles of Luzurrlaga and 8acong , by uepuLy Covernor MargarlLo 1eves, whlch appolnLmenL was approved by Alfredo MonLellbano, Covernor of Lhe lslands of negros and Slqul[or. lalnLlff 1eves resumed, or raLher quallfled for sald offlce and dlscharged Lhe duLles Lhereof. Cn May 1, 1943, 1eves was agaln appolnLed acLlng [usLlce of Lhe peace of Luzurrlaga, 8acong and uauln, sald appolnLmenL bearlng Lhe approval of Lhe Commandlng Cfflcer of CAu 24. Cn Lhe same day, Lhe plalnLlff quallfled for and assumed sald offlce. 1hen, on uecember 26, 1943, 1eves was agaln appolnLed by resldenL Serglo Csmena, as ad lnLerlm [usLlce of Lhe peace of Luzurrlaga, negros CrlenLal. 1eves agaln quallfled for and assumed sald offlce. Pls appolnLmenLs were noL conflrmed. uesplLe Lhls non-conflrmaLlon, plalnLlff 1eves conLlnued ln offlce. 8ecause of Lhls non-conformaLlon of 1eves' appolnLmenL , Lhe resldenL nomlnaLed Lhe defendanL erpeLuo A. Slondlong [usLlce of Lhe peace of Luzurrlaga and sald nomlnaLlon was conflrmed by Lhe ConA on 3 SepL 1946. Slndlong Look Lhe correspondlng oaLh on 14 SepL 1946, and Lhen advlsed Lhe plalnLlff of hls appolnLmenL and demanded of hlm Lhe surrender of Lhe offlce. lalnLlff refused Lo comply wlLh Lhls demand. A summary order was lssued, dlrecLlng plalnLlff ablo 1eves Lo make dellvery wlLhln 10 days of Lhe offlce of [usLlce of Lhe peace of Luzurrlaga, LogeLher wlLh Lhe documenLs and records perLalnlng LhereLo Lo Lhe defendanL erpeLuo A. Slndlong, under penalLy of conLempL.
3889:7 W/n 1eves has a rlghL Lo hls offlce as [usLlce of Lhe peace
;:<=: -/2" under Lhe docLrlne lald down ln @&1$'& 1,2 A&1+(&7 a [usLlce of Lhe peace appolnLed and quallfled before Lhe war, buL who ceased Lo dlscharge hls duLles as such aL Lhe ouLbreak Lhereof, may, afLer llberaLlon or afLer Lhe war, resume and conLlnue ln hls offlce unLll he elLher reached Lhe age llmlL, becomes lncapaclLaLed, reslgns from offlce, ls properly removed Lherefrom, or abandons Lhe same. 1he appellanL hereln ls sLlll below Lhe age of sevenLy, and none of Lhe oLher facLors or elemenLs [usLlfylng loss of, or separaLlon from, hls offlce as [usLlce of Lhe peace of Luzurrlaga, exlsLs wlLh Lhe posslble excepLlon of LhaL of abandonmenL.
lf Lhe acLs of accepLance ln Lhls case, parLlcularly plalnLlff's accepLance of Lhe Lwo new appolnLmenLs Lo Lhe poslLlon flrsL as [usLlce of Lhe peace of Luzurrlaga and 8acong and Lhen of Luzurrlaga, 8acong and uauln, had Laken place durlng normal condlLlons, Lhere mlghL be force and reason ln Lhe poslLlon malnLalned by Lhe lower courL regardlng abandonmenL. Powever, Lhe condlLlons obLalnlng aL Lhe Llme were far from normal.
1he law and Lhe docLrlnes governlng abandonmenL of an offlce may noL and should noL be Loo sLrlcLly applled Lo cases occurrlng durlng war, especlally ln Lhose areas occupled parLly or enLlrely by Lhe enemy. ln accepLlng Lhe posL of [usLlce of Lhe peace of Luzurrlaga and 8acong and uauln, 1eves dld noL abandon hls posL of [usLlce of Lhe peace of Luzurrlaga. Pe has Lhe rlghL Lo hold Lhe same, noL under Lhe new &; +()/'+4 appolnLmenL ln uecember 1943, buL by vlrLue of hls orlglnal appolnLmenL ln 1914. Cne cannoL properly be appolnLed Lo Lhe same posL LhaL he ls already holdlng under a valld appolnLmenL. lncldenLally, lL may even posslbly be malnLalned, and noL wlLhouL reason, LhaL Lhe lasL appolnLmenL for Lhe posL of [usLlce of Lhe peace of Luzurrlaga ln uecember 1943, was lnvalld for Lhe addlLlonal reason LhaL Lhe resldenL could noL exLend an appolnLmenL Lo one who, under a new appolnLmenL, ls noL duly quallfled.
An appolnLmenL Lo Lhe posL of [usLlce of Lhe peace exLended Lo one who had a rlghL Lo lL because of a prevlous pre-war appolnLmenL under whlch he had quallfled and dlscharged hls duLles, may be regarded as a mere resLlLuLlon or resLoraLlon of Lhe poslLlon whlch belonged Lo hlm, and LhaL new appolnLmenL can add Lo or dlmlnlsh hls rlghL Lo Lhe offlce conferred by hls orlglnal appolnLmenL. 1he appolnLmenL exLend Lo Lhe plalnLlff ln uec 1943 was a mere resLlLuLlon of Lhe offlce whlch belonged Lo hlm buL whlch he falled Lo hold because of Lhe war.
>" 2/0)53+ '" 60?@ 5ABC87 urpose of Lhe presenL appeal ln Lhe case aL hand ls Lo have respondenL !usLo Cruz expelled from Lhe offlce of chlef of pollce of Lhe munlclpallLy of Cunlgua and LhaL peLlLloner Slmpllclo Serafln be relnsLaLed. lL all began ln !an. 12, 1931, when lr. Lopez flled wlLh Lhe provlnclal board of 8ulacan, admlnlsLraLlve charges agalnsL Serafln who was chlef of pollce of Cunlgua, 8ulacan, for negllgence ln Lhe performance of hls duLles. 1he board exoneraLed peLlLloner hereln. lr. Lopez LhereafLer appealed wlLh Lhe provlnclal board composed of new members whlch ruled for Lhe dlsmlssal of Serafln. 1he munlclpal presldenL lssued execuLlve order no.1 dlsmlsslng Serafln and appolnLed hereln respondenL Cruz as permanenL chlef of pollce of Culngua. Serfaln flled wlLh Lhe new provlnclal board an M8 whlch was subsequenLly granLed exoneraLlng Serafln of Lhe charge of negllgence ln Lhe performance of hls duLles". 3889:7 W/n a duly appolnLed and quallfled chlef of munlclpal pollce may be dlsmlssed ln order Lo relnsLaLe anoLher who had been dlsmlssed from such offlce pursuanL Lo a valld declslon? W/n Cuo WarranLo ls proper? 09<DEF7 no Lo boLh. 8espondenL Cruz was permanenLly appolnLed chlef of pollce by Lhe munlclpal presldenL Lo flll Lhe vacancy as ordered by Lhe provlnclal board afLer Lhe necessary proceedlngs provlded by law. 1he appolnLmenL ln quesLlon was conflrmed by Lhe munlclpal councll afLer Cruz has been quallfled and enLered upon hls duLles as chlef of pollce. 1herefore, he has acqulred a vesLed rlghL and cannoL be removed nor dlsmlssed Lherefrom excepL for any causes deslgnaLed and ln accordance wlLh Lhe proceedlng esLabllshed by law speclflcally Sec. 2272 of Lhe AdmlnlsLraLlve Code. Cuo warranLo proceedlng dlsmlssed. G" .)62$+ H" 0$I/0$
5)6%27 Cn 1946, AnLonlo Lacson was appolnLed provlnclal flscal of negros CrlenLal by Lhe resldenL (Manuel 8oxas). 8uL on 1949, resldenL (Llpldlo Culrlno) nomlnaLed Ponorlo 8omero ln Lacson's sLead, nomlnaLlng Lhe laLLer as provlnclal flscal of 1arlac. 1he nomlnaLlons of boLh Lacson and 8omero were conflrmed by Lhe Commlsslon on AppolnLmenLs (CCA). Whlle 8omero assumed offlce, Lacson refused Lo accepL hls new appolnLmenL and opposed Lhe Lwo courL appearances of 8omero as Lhe new prosecuLor of negros CrloenLal. Pe asked Lhe [udges (narvasa and Ccampo) Lo sLrlke from Lhe records 8omero's appearances ln Lhelr courLs. 8uL Lhe Lwo [udges overruled Lacson's ob[ecLlon, maklng Lhem fellow respondenLs ln Lhls quo warranLo proceedlng.
I)3+ 322?/7 WheLher Lacson has Lhe rlghL Lo Lhe posL of provlnclal flscal of negros CrlenLal and Lo ousL 8omero Lherefrom? ?LS. 1he CourL upheld Lacson's rlghL Lo Lhe offlce by answerlng sub-lssues (as provlded below).
0)%3$7 1.uld Lhe CCA's conflrmaLlon, wlLhouL Lacson's accepLance of hls nomlnaLlon, creaLe a vacancy ln Lhe posL where 8omero could be lawfully appolnLed? nC. 1here are Lhree sLeps Lo appolnLmenL: nomlnaLlon by Lhe resldenL, conflmaLlon by Lhe CCA, and accepLance of Lhe nomlnee. 1he flrsL Lwo sLeps consLlLuLe a mere offer for Lhe posL and are respecLlvely, Lhe acLs of Lhe LxecuLlve and LeglslaLlve deparLmenL. 8uL Lhe lasL ls necessary Lo make Lhe appolnLmenL compleLe and effecLlve. Slnce Lacson decllned Lo accepL Lhe new appolnLmenL, he conLlnues as flscal ln hls old posL. no vacancy creaLed.
2.uoes Lhe nomlnaLlon of Lacson Lo 1arlac and lLs conflrmaLlon by Lhe CCA equlvalenL Lo a removal from offlce? ?LS. 1o appolnL and Lransfer from one provlnce Lo anoLher would mean removal and separaLlon from offlce. 1he naLure of Lhe offlce of Lhe provlnclal flscal falls under clvll servlce laws Lo be appolnLed by Lhe resldenL wlLh Lhe consenL of CCA.
3. WheLher Lhe resldenL can, even wlLh Lhe conflrmaLlon of CCA, remove a provlnclal flscal wlLhouL cause? nC. 1he (1933) ConsLlLuLlon denles such rlghL, as lL provldes LhaL no offlcer or employee ln Lhe clvll servlce shall be removed or suspended excepL for cause provlded by law." 1he prohlblLlon agalnsL removal excepL for cause ln our ConsLlLuLlon has no counLerparL ln Lhe lederal ConsLlLuLlon of Lhe unlLed SLaLes, Lhus, Lhe Amerlcan cases clLed by respondenL are lnappllcable. lurLher, Lhe AdmlnlsLraLlve Code provldes LhaL a provlnclal flscal over 63 shall vacaLe hls offlce, Lhe loglcal lnference ls LhaL unLll he reaches 63 he has Lhe rlghL Lo conLlnue ln offlce. lurLhermore, Lhe 8evlsed AdmlnlsLraLlve Code provldes LhaL before a clvll servanL ls removed, Lhere musL flrsL be an lnvesLlgaLlon where he wlll be glven a falr hearlng and opporLunlLy Lo defend hlmself. ln Lhe case of peLlLloner Lacson, Lhe record falls Lo show LhaL he has been charged wlLh any vlolaLlon of law or regulaLlon or found gullLy LhereLo as Lo warranL hls removal from offlce.
lnasmuch as Lacson nelLher lefL, abandoned, nor reslgned from hls posL, Lhere has no vacancy, and consequenLly, Lhe appolnLmenL of respondenL ls lnvalld.
18lvlA, ln case asked: 1he SC says: 8uL ln [usLlce Lo Lhe resldenL and Lhe Commlsslon on AppolnLmenLs, leL lL be sLaLed once agaln LhaL lL would seem LhaL Lhe Lransfer of Lhe peLlLloner Lo 1arlac was noL meanL and lnLended as a punlshmenL, a dlsclpllnary measure or demoLlon. lL was really a promoLlon, aL leasL aL Lhe Llme Lhe appolnLmenL was made, when Lhe salary grade of a provlnclal flscal ln 1arlac (flrsL class provlnce) ls hlgher Lhan LhaL of negros CrlenLal (second class provlnce). Cnly, LhaL laLer, due Lo a change ln Lhe caLegory of CrlenLal negros as a flrsL class provlnce Loo, Lhe Lransfer was no longer a promoLlon ln salary.
J" )6$2%) H" 5.$0 5ABC87 lL ls alleged ln Lhe complalnL LhaL aL Lhe munlclpal elecLlons held on Lhe 1sL day of uecember, 1903, ln Lhe Lown of Laoag, rovlnce of llocos norLe, Lhe plalnLlff and Lhe defendanL were candldaLes for Lhe offlce of munlclpal presldenL of Lhe sald Lown, LhaL as a resulL of Lhe sald elecLlon Lhe plalnLlff was elecLed Lo Lhe sald offlce by a ma[orlLy of 100 voLes, and LhaL noLwlLhsLandlng Lhls facL Lhe defendanL has usurped sald offlce and unlawfully held Lhe same slnce Lhe plalnLlff was Lhe person enLlLled Lo Lhe exerclse of sald offlce. 1he prayer of Lhe complalnL ls Lo Lhe effecL LhaL [udgmenL be enLered agalnsL Lhe defendanL, excludlng hlm from Lhe exerclse of such offlce and LhaL Lhe plalnLlff be declared Lo be enLlLled Lo Lhe same and LhaL he be glven possesslon Lhereof, and for such oLher and furLher rellef as Lhe facLs ln Lhe case would warranL ln favor of Lhe plalnLlff. ln vlew of Lhe evldence lnLroduced aL Lhe Lrlal by Lhe plalnLlff, and before Lhe defendanL had presenLed hls, Lhe courL, on Lhe laLLer's moLlon, acqulLLed Lhe defendanL, lmposlng Lhe cosLs upon Lhe plalnLlff. 1he courL based lLs acLlon upon Lhe followlng grounds: (1) 1haL Lhe plalnLlff could noL malnLaln Lhe acLlon broughL by hlm because he had falled Lo esLabllsh hls alleged rlghL Lo Lhe exerclse of Lhe offlce ln quesLlon, and (2) LhaL Lhere was no necesslLy Lo lnqulre lnLo Lhe rlghL of Lhe defendanL Lo hold Lhe sald offlce for Lhe reason LhaL Lhls quesLlon had already been deLermlned by Lhe provlnclal board afLer a conslderaLlon of Lhe varlous proLesLs presenLed Lo lL ln regard Lo lrregularlLles commlLLed durlng Lhe lasL elecLlon held aL Laoag for Lhe offlce of munlclpal presldenL and oLher munlclpal offlclals, and for Lhe furLher reason LhaL Lhe presumpLlon ls LhaL a person holdlng a publlc offlce was duly appolnLed or elecLed LhereLo. 3889:K ;:<=: WheLher, Lhe facL LhaL Lhe plalnLlff has falled Lo show LhaL he had any rlghL Lo Lhe offlce, he can malnLaln an acLlon such as Lhls for Lhe purpose of excludlng Lhe defendanL from Lhe exerclse of sald offlce on accounL of lllegallLles alleged Lo have been commlLLed ln Lhe elecLlons. +$"
0ACDL7 B/0)+$( CDD provldes LhaL "Lhe ALLorney-Ceneral of Lhe lslands, or Lhe flscal of any provlnce, when dlrecLed by Lhe Chlef LxecuLlve of Lhe lslands, musL commence any such acLlon, and when upon Lhe complalnL or oLherwlse he has good reason Lo belleve LhaL any case speclfled ln Lhe Lwo precedlng secLlons can be esLabllshed by proof, he musL commence such acLlon." B/0)+$( EFF provldes LhaL "Lhe ALLorney-Ceneral of Lhe lslands or Lhe flscal for a provlnce, may, aL hls own lnsLance, brlng such an acLlon, or he may, on leave of Lhe courL ln whlch Lhe acLlon ls Lo be commenced, or a [udge Lhereof ln vacaLlon, brlng Lhe acLlon upon Lhe relaLlon of and aL Lhe requesL of anoLher person, buL, lf Lhe acLlon ls broughL aL Lhe requesL of and upon Lhe relaLlon of anoLher person, Lhe offlcer brlnglng lL may requlre an lndemnlLy for expenses and cosLs of Lhe acLlon, Lo be glven Lo hlm by Lhe parLy aL whose requesL and upon whose relaLlon Lhe same ls broughL, before commenclng lL." llnally, ,/0)+$( EFC, under Lhe headlng "An lndlvldual may commence such acLlon," provldes as follows: "A person clalmlng Lo be enLlLled Lo a publlc offlce, unlawfully held and exerclsed by anoLher, may brlng an acLlon Lherefor." lf Lhe leglslaLor had lnLended Lo glve Lo all clLlzens allke Lhe rlghL Lo malnLaln an acLlon for usurpaLlon of publlc offlce, he would have plalnly sald so ln order Lo avold doubL on a sub[ecL of such far-reachlng lmporLance. A slmple provlslon would have sufflced for Lhls purpose. lar from lL, Lhe leglslaLor has on Lhe conLrary especlally and speclflcally provlded ln secLlons 199, 200, and 201 who musL and who may brlng such acLlons, and lL ls very clear LhaL lL was hls lnLenLlon Lo glve such rlghL Lo Lhose expressly menLloned ln Lhe above-clLed secLlons and Lo no oLher, followlng Lhe well-known rule of law G+(0.#,+$ #(+#, /,) /H0.#,+$ &.)/'+#,2G lL has been noLlced LhaL Lhe above referred Lo Lhree secLlons only menLlon Lhe ALLorney-Ceneral, Lhe provlnclal flscal, and Lhe lndlvldual 0.&+4+(9 )$ </ /()+)./; )$ )I/ $JJ+0/ unlawfully held and exerclsed by anoLher. lL ls Lo be lnferred from Lhls lasL provlslon LhaL Lhe lndlvldual who does noL clalm Lo have such a rlghL can noL brlng an acLlon for usurpaLlon of publlc offlce. M" *)063) '" #/0/@ 5)6%27 eLloner urlflcaclon Carcla was a Senlor Clerk ln Lhe CourL of Appeals wlLh a salary of hp 3400 per annum. ln SepLember of 1962, Lhe poslLlon of Senlor Clerk ln Lhe llscal ManagemenL ulvlslon of Lhe CourL of Appeals wlLh a salary of hp 4800 became vacanL. (noLe: 1he poslLlons of senlor clerk and senlor clerk ln flscal managemenL dlvlslon are dlfferenL). eLlLloner flled a wrlLLen appllcaLlon for Lhe sald poslLlon. Powever, lL was Angelo erez who was appolnLed Lo Lhe vacanL poslLlon on 12 SepLember 1962. Pe was aL LhaL Llme a Cash and ayroll Clerk ln Lhe same dlvlslon wlLh a salary of hp 3960 per annum. lor Lhls reason, peLlLloner flled a proLesL before Lhe Clvll Servlce Commlsslon argulng LhaL she was nexL ln rank, beLLer quallfled and enLlLled Lo a preferenLlal appolnLmenL Lo Lhe poslLlon. 1he CSC denled Lhe proLesL baslng lLs declslon on Lhe uepuLy Clerk of CourL of and AdmlnlsLraLlve Cfflcer of CA's lnformaLlon LhaL ln Lhe hlerarchlcal organlzaLlon, Lhe Cash and ayroll Clerk ls nexL ln rank. Also, Lhe naLure of work of Lhe vacanL poslLlon ls almosL same wlLh Lhe poslLlon prevlously held by erez (Cash and ayroll Clerk) hence erez ls more quallfled. 1hus, on CcLober 1966 Lhe appolnLmenL of erez was conflrmed by CSC. eLlLloner Lhen commenced Lhe acLlon of quo warranLo ln CA whlch was denled. Pence Lhls peLlLlon. 322?/7 WheLher or noL Lhe eLlLloner Carcla has Lhe rlghL Lo brlng & "#$ warranLo proceedlng quesLlonlng Lhe legallLy of Lhe appolnLmenL of Lhe 8espondenL erez. ;/.47 no. ln a quo warranLo proceedlng, peLlLloner musL show LhaL he ls enLlLled Lo offlce. AbsenL such elemenL Lhe proceedlng wlll noL prosper. lL was held ln AcosLa vs. llor LhaL "no lndlvldual can brlng a clvll acLlon relaLlng Lo usurpaLlon of a publlc offlce wlLhouL averrlng LhaL he has a rlghL Lo Lhe same, and aL any sLage of Lhe proceedlngs, lf lL be shown LhaL such lndlvldual has no rlghL, Lhe acLlon may be dlsmlssed because Lhere ls no legal ground upon whlch lL may proceed when Lhe fundamenLal basls of such acLlon ls desLroyed. ln oLher words, one whose clalm ls predlcaLed solely upon a more or less remoLed posslblllLy, LhaL he may be Lhe reclplenL of Lhe appolnLmenL, has no cause of acLlon agalnsL Lhe offlce holder. 1hls ls preclsely Lhe slLuaLlon ln Lhe case aL hand, and Lhere ls no cogenL reason Lo change Lhe rule. She was noL even nexL ln rank. Mere expecLancy of appolnLmenL ls noL Lhe same wlLh LlLle over Lhe poslLlon. ln Lhls ground alone Lhe peLlLloner musL fall. Moreover, Lhe peLlLlon was flled more Lhan a year hence barred. 1he rlghL Lo lnsLlLuLe Lhe proceedlng should be counLed from 14 SepLember 1964 when erez assumed Lhe poslLlon. Powever, Lhe peLlLlon was flled only on 1966 or more Lhan a year whlch ls now Loo laLe. N" 60?@ '" 0)I$2 5ABC8: eLlLloners were members of Lhe Manlla munlclpal board and were elecLed ln Lhe 1947 general elecLlons. 1hey flled a peLlLlon for Cuo WarranLo clalmlng LhaL 8A 409 ls unconsLlLuLlonal slnce lL lncreased Lhe congresslonal dlsLrlcLs of Manlla from 2 Lo 4 and lncreased Lhe members from 10 Lo 12, Lhus Lhe 2 respondenLs are lllegally usurplng & exerclslng rlghLs excluslvely perLalnlng Lo Lhe peLlLloners and Lhus lncreaslng Lhe number of a ma[orlLy Lo consLlLuLe a quorum Lo do buslness. 3889:: W/n quo warranLo ls proper. - nC.
0ACDL: eLlLloners have no cause of acLlon. eLlLlon dlsmlssed. ;:<=: SecLlon 6 of 8ule 68 provldes LhaL a person clalmlng Lo be enLlLled Lo a publlc offlce usurped or unlawfully held or exerclsed by anoLher may brlng an acLlon Lherefor ln hls own name. 1he presenL peLlLlon ls noL auLhorlzed because: 1) 1he peLlLloners do noL clalm Lo be enLlLled Lo Lhe publlc offlce alleged Lo be unlawfully held or exerclsed by Lhe respondenLs. 1he peLlLloners allege LhaL Lhey are elecLed members of Lhe munlclpal board and LhaL Lhelr Lerm of offlce wlll noL explre unLll 1931. 1hey do noL and cannoL clalm LhaL Lhe respondenLs have supplanLed Lhem. 2) lf Lhe elecLed councllors had Lhe absoluLe & excluslve rlghL Lo Lhe membershlp, Lhen no oLher person could become a member even lf vacancles should be creaLed by law, deaLh or reslgnaLlon. 3) 1he councllors are elecLed lndlvldually, each Lo flll one seaL ln Lhe board, and noL collecLlvely as a body Lo consLlLuLe Lhe board. vacancles may be fllled by oLher persons, because an elecLed councllor cannoL flll more Lhan one seaL ln Lhe board, Lhus, Lhe peLlLloners' rlghL Lo membershlp Lhereln ls noL excluslve. 4) 1he mere facL LhaL Lhe membershlp of Lhe board was lncreased from 10 Lo 12 does noL ln any way dlmlnlsh Lhe rlghLs and prerogaLlves of Lhe lndlvldual peLlLloners as members of Lhe board. lL does noL resulL ln Lhe dlmlnuLlon of Lhe emolumenL or ln Lhe curLallmenL of Lhe parLlclpaLlon ln Lhe dellberaLlons and of Lhe voLe of each of Lhe peLlLloners as a member of Lhe board. **lf 8A 409 ls unconsLlLuLlonal, Lhe remedy ls SecLlon 4 of 8ule 68-relaLe Lhe maLLer Lo Lhe SollclLor Ceneral and requesL hlm Lo brlng Lhe acLlon ln Lhe name of Lhe 8epubllc of Lhe hlllpplnes. 8eason: a publlc offlce or franchlse ls creaLed or granLed by law, and lLs usurpaLlon or unlawful exerclse ls Lhe concern prlmarlly of Lhe CovernmenL. 1hus, Lhe laLLer ls Lhe proper parLy Lo brlng such acLlon.
Complaint For Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Kokua Coalition v. Dep't of Planning and Permitting, City and County of Honolulu, No. 19-cv-00414 (D. Haw. Aug. 1, 2019)
U.S. District Court civil lawsuit by CSMN INVESTMENTS, LLC alleging discrimination under Americans Disabilities Act, Federal Housing Authority by Cordillera Property Owners Association, Cordillera Metropolitan District in plan to develop drug treatment center at Lodge and Spa at Cordillera