Adm. Case No.

1474

January 28, 2000

CRISTINO G. CALUB, complainant, vs. ATTY. ABRAHAM A. SULLER, respondent. What is before the Court is a complaint for disbarment against respondent premised on grossly immoral conduct for having raped his neighbor's wife. In the morning of January 20, 1975, while complainant was away, respondent Atty. Abraham A. Suller went to the complainant's abode in Aringay, La Union ostensibly to borrow a blade. As the respondent was a friend of the family and a neighbor, the complainant's wife let him in. Thereafter, respondent began touching her in different parts of her body. When she protested, respondent threatened her and forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. At that moment, complainant returned home to get money to pay for real estate taxes. When he entered the house, he saw his wife and respondent having sexual intercourse on the bed.1 She was kicking respondent with one foot while the latter pressed on her arms and other leg, preventing her from defending herself. On January 23, 1975, complainant filed with the Municipal Court, Aringay, La Union a criminal complaint2 for rape against respondent. The case was later remanded to the Court of First Instance, Agoo, La Union. On June 3, 1975, Cristino G. Calub filed with the Supreme Court the instant complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Abraham A. Suller.3 On June 16, 1975, the Court required respondent to file an answer within ten (10) days from notice. 4 On July 14, 1975, respondent filed his answer. He denied the accusation as a fabrication.5 On July 21, 1975, the Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and recommendation.6 From 1975 until 1978, the Office of the Solicitor General conducted hearings where both parties appeared with their respective counsel. In a petition filed on November 6, 1978, respondent prayed for the suspension of proceedings pending final termination of Criminal Case No. A-420 pending with the Court of First Instance, La Union, Branch 3, Agoo.7 On December 11, 1978, the Court referred the petition to the Solicitor General, the case having been referred to him previously.8 In 1991, the investigation of the case was transferred to the Committee on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines. On August 28, 1991 the latter sent notice of hearings to both parties. 9 On January 23, 1992, the Committee issued an order terminating the proceedings and considering the case submitted for resolution as notice to complainant remained unserved while respondent failed to appear despite due notice.10 On March 3, 1993, the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a resolution recommending that the disciplinary penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year be meted on respondent.11 The record discloses that the Court of First Instance acquitted respondent Suller for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Such acquittal, however, is not determinative of this administrative case. The testimonies of witnesses in the criminal complaint, particularly that of the complainant suffice to show that respondent acted in a grossly reprehensible manner in having carnal knowledge of his neighbor's wife without her consent in her very home.

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.12 In this case, we find that suspension for one year recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is not sufficient punishment for the immoral act of respondent. The rape of his neighbor's wife constituted serious moral depravity even if his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal prosecution for rape. He is not worthy to remain a member of the bar. The privilege to practice law is bestowed upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally.13 "Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must also be possessed at all times in order to maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity."14 WHEREFORE, respondent Abraham A. Suller is DISBARRED from the practise of law. Let his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 2614 May 21, 1991 MAXIMO DUMADAG, petitioner, vs. ERNESTO L. LUMAYA, respondent. Respondent Atty. Ernesto L. Lumaya of Banganga, Davao Oriental is administratively charged with unethical practices, conflict of interest and disloyalty to client by Maximo Dumadag in a sworn lettercomplaint dated 22 December 1983. Respondent was complainant's counsel in Civil Case No. 148 before the RTC of Banganga, Davao Oriental, filed against spouses Jose and Jesusa Avellanosa, involving the sale of a parcel of land. Civil Case No. 148 was terminated via a compromise agreement which provided, inter alia, that not later than 1 October 1979, the Avellanosas would pay Dumadag the amount of P4,644.00 and in turn Dumadag would execute in favor of the Avellanosas a deed of reconveyance of the land. However, in case of failure of the Avellanosas to make full payment of the P4,644.00 within the stipulated period, Dumadag would be entitled to obtain possession of the land. The compromise agreement, prepared by respondent, was approved by the trial court. The Avellanosas failed to comply with their undertaking under the compromise agreement to pay complainant the amount of P4,644.00 not later than 1 October 1979, which necessitated the filing by Dumadag of a motion for execution. According to complainant, he asked his then counsel, herein respondent, to prepare and file the appropriate motion for execution; however, the latter failed to do so. It was through the assistance of the court stenographer, Mr. Eleuterio Catubig, that complainant himself signed and filed the motion and later obtained the writ of execution. When the writ of execution was issued, Deputy Sheriff Rogelio Dongiapon, according to the complainant, instead of serving the same on the Avellanosas, connived with respondent attorney by selling a one (1) hectare portion of the land subject of Civil Case No. 148 to one Eleonora Astudillo to satisfy complainant's claim out of the proceeds of the sale, without however Dumadag's knowledge and consent. The Deed of Sale between the Avellanosas and Astudillo, dated 14 September 1981, was notarized by respondent attorney and stated that the "parcel of land, together with all the improvements found and existing thereon, (is) free from liens and encumbrances, whatsoever. "It expressly stated on its face "That this Deed of Sale is executed also to satisfy finally the claim of Maximo Dumadag in Civil Case No. 148 of the CFI of Banganga, Davao Oriental." After the sale to Astudillo, or on 16 June 1983, Deputy Sheriff Rogelio Dongiapon made a Sheriff's Return of Service which stated: Respectfully returned to MR. JAIME B. TOROBA, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Clerk of Court, this Court, the original copy of the Writ of Execution in Civil Case No. 148, with the information that said Writ of execution was partially satisfied the defendants Jose R. Avellanosa and Jesusa N. Avellanosa having paid the amount of FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY FOUR (P4,344. 00) Philippine Currency to Atty. Ernesto L. Lumaya, plaintiff's counsel in the above entitled case in November, 1981, with the balance of P300.00 which the defendants Jose R. Avellanosa and Jesusa N. Avellanosa have not paid up to this moment. (Emphasis ours) The said amount of P4,344.00, according to complainant, was not delivered to him by respondent attorney, even after the former made a demand on the latter. After respondent's comment and complainant's reply had been filed, the case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. Actual investigation and hearings were conducted by Provincial Fiscal Arnulfo M. Agleron of Mati, Davao Oriental, who submitted a report to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Based on said report, the OSG prepared and submitted its own report, including therewith a complaint for disbarment against respondent attorney, pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court. While respondent later filed an answer to the OSG prepared complaint against him, he however, did not appear at the earlier investigation despite due notice. We will nonetheless consider his answer as well as comment prior to the referral of the case to the OSG.

Respondent claims that it was the presiding judge in Civil Case No. 148 who played an active role in the settlement proceedings between Dumadag and the Avellanosas, and that it is unfortunate, according to respondent, that there are no written records to prove this fact, but that it was agreed that Jose Avellanosa would pay Dumadag the amount of P4,644.00 in installments, which he did, and that complainant Dumadag claimed and received the money each time payment was made by Jose Avellanosa; thru herein respondent. His (respondent's) mistake according to him, was that he merely noted at the back of his own copy of the judgment by compromise the sums paid, all in the total amount of P3,000.00, and all taken by complainant Dumadag, without any receipts. All his (respondent's) records of the case, according to respondent, were also taken by Dumadag from his office when he became a provincial board member. Respondent also denies having been asked by Dumadag to file a motion for execution in Civil Case No. 148 or having received from him a cow or P700.00; however he was promised one cow since he paid the expenses in Civil Case No. 148. Anent the sale by the Avellanosas to Eleonora Astudillo, the same, according to respondent, was a private sale, Dumadag was not a party thereto. Respondent also claims that he was not aware that a motion for execution had been filed in Civil Case No. 148 by Dumadag when the Deed of Sale between the Avellanosas and Astudillo was presented to him for notarization, and that he did not see any cash change hands as he was informed that it was just a ratification of an earlier verbal sale. He notarized the deed of sale without intention to cause any damage. Respondent however admits that in a later case, Civil Case No. 283 (where the validity of the sale from the Avellanosas to Astudillo was assailed by Dumadag), it was disclosed that from the P7,000.00 actually realized from the sale of the land to Astudillo, the sheriff deducted P1,605.00 for his expenses, with the balance being given to the vendors (Avellanosas), because Dumadag had already been paid by the Avellanosas thru their lawyer, herein respondent. In the Court's resolution of 16 April 1990, respondent was required to answer the OSG complaint. Respondent's answer merely reiterates his earlier explanation and further states: The truth of the matter was that the DEED OF SALE WAS ALREADY Prepared when SHERIFF Dongiapon, the spouses Avellanosa and Maxima Astudillo came to my Office for the Notarization of that DEED OF SALE. What respondent did was only to ask whether the signatures are their and that the consideration was paid but did not go over the contents. All of the parties affirmed their signature and informed respondent that the consideration was paid in installments. At that time respondent never was informed that the proceeds was for the final satisfaction of Mr. Dumadag's claim. Respondent knew it only when Mr. Dumadag came to claim the money of course I have to tell the truth and I told him, Maximo Dumadag, that I have never received any money from Sheriff ROGELIO DONGIAPON and I did not even know that there was a petition for the issuance of a writ of execution that he filed because I was never asked by him. Mr. Maximo Dumadag told me that he will file a case against me if I will not give the money . .. For the reasons that respondent's acts constitute lack of fidelity, loyalty and devotion to his client's cause, unethical practice and a violation of his lawyer's oath, the OSG recommends respondent's suspension from the practice of law for not less than five (5) years. In the case of Licuanan vs. Melo (Adm. Case No. 2361 February 9, 1989) a lawyer was disbarred for retaining for his personal benefit for over a one (1) year period, the amount of P5,220.00 received by him in behalf of his client, thereby compelling the latter to file a groundless collection suit which exposed said client to a damage countersuit. While not exactly identical with the Licuanan case, herein complainant Dumadag had to file a separate civil case (No. 283 for annulment of sale, damages and attorney's fees) to recover the amount of P4,344.00 from his previous counsel, herein respondent, Atty. Lumaya. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 16 Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court. Both parties failed to apprise this Court of the final disposition of Civil Case No. 283, even as the Court took note of the RTC decision in said case where a finding was made that the land earlier sold by the Avellanosas to Dumadag is separate and distinct from the one (1) hectare portion sold by the Avellanosas to Astudillo. However, the RTC in its decision also ordered co-defendant (herein respondent) Atty. Lumaya to pay the plaintiff (herein complainant) the sum of P4,344.00 he (Atty. Lumaya) had received from Deputy Sheriff Rogelio Dongiapon for herein complainant. Therefore, even a respondent consistently denied liability to Dumadag, his former client, the records abundantly point to his receipt of and failure to deliver the amount of P4,344.00 to his client, the herein complainant, a clear breach of the canons of professional responsibility. ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby SUSPENDS Atty. Ernesto Lumaya INDEFINITELY from the practice of law effective from date of his receipt of this resolution. Let this resolution be served personally on the respondent at his given address of record and entered in his record as attorney. Let the IBP and the Court Administrator be furnished also a copy of this resolution for their information and guidance as well as for circularization to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 4748. August 4, 2000 VICTORIA V. RADJAIE, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE O. ALOVERA, Respondent. Atty. Jose O. Alovera, former Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 17, faces disbarment for having penned a Decision[1 dated January 30, 1995 long after his retirement from the Judiciary on January 31, 1995 which ultimately divested complainant Victoria V. Radjaie of her property in Panay, Capiz. In an Affidavit-Complaint[2 filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant on April 21, 1997,[3 complainant sought the disbarment of respondent enumerating the following particulars to support her contention that the questioned January 30, 1995 decision was prepared after the retirement of respondent: a) Almost all orders issued by then Judge Alovera prior to his retirement bear the stamp "RECEIVED" by Branch 17 of RTC-Roxas City, with the initial of the one who received it for filing with the courtrecord except the Order of January 25, 1995 (p. 87 records) admitting, and the Decision dated January 30, 1995 (pp. 88-93, ibid.). b) It can also be seen that all the orders issued prior to the retirement were all type-written in the same type-[writer] except the January 25, 1995 Order (p. 87) and the Decision (pp. 88-93) and these two (2) documents appear to have been type-written on the same type-[writer]. c) It is also a source of wonder why plaintiffs formally offered their evidence one year after the last witness was presented last December 10, 1993. xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library Plaintiffs had until January 20, 1994 to formally offer their evidence but it took them one (1) year and five (5) days to file such a simple pleading. It goes against the normal human experience when plaintiffs who are allowed to present evidence ex-parte are usually very quick in having things done because there is no opposition but in this case it took plaintiffs a while to formally rest which was only fifteen (15) days prior to the retirement of Mr. Alovera. This timing is highly suspect. d) Even plaintiffs' formal offer of evidence showed badges of fraud. It was not received by the trial court. Page 67 shows this clearly. It would not be surprising if the same was also inserted into the records on a much later date and Atty. Alberto Villaruz must be made to explain this too. It was dated January 20, 1995 but the date of the Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) of Atty. Alberto A. Villaruz, counsel for the plaintiffs, was issued only on January 31, 1995. This is shown on Page 71 of the records. e) There is no showing that the January 25, 1995 Order (p. 87) admitting the formal offer was even received by a Court staff for filing with the records. f) The same can be said of the January 30, 1995 Decision (pp. 88-93) which was allegedly decided five (5) days after the Order admitting the evidence (p. 87) was allegedly issued. What a swift action from a retiring judge. g) A copy of the Decision was not even sent to the counsel for the plaintiffs but is shown to have been received by one of the plaintiffs only on August 1, 1995 (p. 93). h) Again, it is beyond the normal experience for a lawyer such as Atty. Villaruz who is a practitioner in the locality and who is in Court almost everyday that he will not follow up if there is already a decision rendered in a case where he was allowed to present evidence ex-parte or even be told about it. i) The records show that all orders after the retirement of Mr. Alovera bear the stamp "RECEIVED" by the Court staff who received them for filing in the court records. Traversing the allegations of the Affidavit-Complaint as purely speculative and not based on personal knowledge, the respondent, in his Comment[4 dated August 20, 1997, further assailed as simply selfserving complainant's Affidavit-Complaint alleging that a careful scrutiny of the expediente of Civil

Case No. V-6186 would reveal that respondent observed due process when he resolved the said case against complainant.5It was only when Judge Julius Abela, who succeeded him in RTC, Br. 17, Roxas City, annulled, through a resolution, the questioned January 30, 1995 decision, which ostensibly having become final was also executed, did the matter get out of hand.[6 His said decision, respondent argued, may only be impeached, annulled or otherwise set aside under three (3) modes,7 all of which were either not availed of by complainant for lapse of time, or like an action to annul the judgment, though still available, should not have been filed in the same court, which rendered the questioned decision, but should have been filed, instead, in the Court of Appeals.[8 As to the absence of stamp "RECEIVED" on the questioned decision, respondent shifted the blame to the then OIC Clerk of Court of the said court, Mrs. Nenita Aluad, contending that after the decision was rendered on January 30, 1995, he lost control of it and he surmised that Mrs. Aluad, who had the duty to receive and record the decision, might have lost it "momentarily." In a Resolution[10 dated October 22, 1997, this Court referred the instant case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and recommendation. While in the process of investigation, three (3) incidents occurred, namely: 1. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Capiz Chapter, approved Resolution No. 9, Series of 1997 on December 17, 1997, questioning the order, dated November 28, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 17, Roxas City, which ordered the suspension from the practice of law of herein respondent and Atty. Alberto Villaruz; 2. The Court En Banc, in its Resolution of December 22, 1997, resolved to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) in G.R. No. 131505, entitled "Atty. Alberto A. Villaruz vs. Honorable Julius L. Abela," ordering the respondent judge therein to cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing his questioned order dated November 28, 1997 in Civil Case No. V-6186, which ordered the suspension of Atty. Villaruz; and, 3. Respondent Alovera filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, entitled "Jose Alovera vs. Victoria Villariez-Radjaie and Judge Julius L. Abela," under G.R. No. 131768, which, at the time was still pending, questioning the Order of November 28, 1997 which ordered respondent's suspension from the practice of law. Thus, necessitated the filing of the Manifestation[11 by the Office of the Bar Confidant on January 27, 1998, inquiring from the Court whether to proceed with the investigation of the case in view of the aforementioned incidents. chanrobles virtual law library On February 18, 1998, the Court directed the Office of the Bar Confidant to proceed with the investigation of the instant case. Judge Julius Abela, Nenita M. Aluad, legal researcher, Teresita V. Bauzon, court stenographer, Concepcion Alcazar, clerk-in-charge of civil cases and special proceedings, all of Regional Trial Court, Br. 17, Roxas City, Rosa Dapat, court stenographer of Regional Trial Court, Br. 15, Roxas City and the complainant herself testified as witnesses for the complainant. The respondent presented as his lone witness, Mrs. Rosa Dapat, who merely testified on the January 10, 1993 proceedings inside his chambers. Respondent himself did not testify and neither did any other witness testify for him, despite the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum on Ireneo Borres and Ludovico Buhat, who both failed to appear at the investigation. In lieu of their oral testimonies, respondent offered and presented their respective affidavits.[13 Complainant chose not to object thereto and even waived her right, through her counsel, to cross-examine them. The established facts, as quoted from the Report dated November 17, 1999 of the Office of the Bar Confidant, are as follows: On July 2, 1992, the heirs of the late Faustina Borres, Segundina Borres, Felisa Borres, Micaela Borres, Maria Bores, and Sixto Borres (hereinafter "Borres heirs") through their counsel, Atty. Alberto A. Villaruz, filed an action for Partition and Accounting, docketed as Civil Case No. V-6186, with the Regional Trial Court, Br. 15, Roxas City, against herein complainant, Victoria V. Radjaie, who was presumably an heir of the late Faustina Borres. The action sought, among others, the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-24150 in the name of herein complainant covering a parcel of land

with an area of 215,777 square meters situated in Panay, Capiz, and the declaration of the said parcel of land as property commonly owned by the Borres heirs. On July 16, 1993, Br. 17, to which Civil Case No. V-6186 was re-raffled, declared herein complainant in default and ordered the Borres heirs to present their evidence on July 30, 1993. It was only after three (3) postponements that the Borres heirs were able to start presenting their evidence ex-parte on October 8, 1993. For lack of material time, however, the presentation of evidence was again reset to November 22, 1993, which again was postponed and reset to December 10, 1993. On December 10, 1993, there were several criminal and civil actions scheduled for trial, which commenced at about 10:00 in the morning, before Br. 17, including Civil Case No. V-6186, which was listed number four in the court calendar. Judge Alovera presided over the hearing and Teresita V. Bauzon, court stenographer of Br. 17, took down notes of the Proceedings. Atty. Villaruz appeared for the accused in a criminal case before Br. 17 at the time. The court had a recess at 11:10 and resumed at 11:35 in the morning. After the hearing of criminal cases was through, Civil Case No. V6186 was called at about 11:55 in the morning, but the plaintiffs as well as their counsel, Atty. Villaruz, were no longer inside the courtroom. The session thus adjourned at 11:57 in the morning without Civil Case No. V-6186 being heard. At about 11:30 in the morning of the same date, Atty. Villaruz approached Rosa Dapat, who was the court stenographer at the time of RTC, Br. 15, Roxas City, while she was in her office. Atty. Villaruz told her that Judge Alovera was requesting her to assist in the proceedings of Civil Case No. V-6186. At first she was hesitant to accede to the request as Br. 17 had also its own court stenographer. She relented though when told that Br. 17 as well as the other branches had no available court stenographer. She then went to Br. 17 and saw Atty. Villaruz standing by the door of the chambers of Judge Alovera. Atty. Villaruz motioned her to enter the chambers, which is separate from the courtroom. While inside the chambers, she saw Judge Alovera behind his desk and other people whom she did not know. Upon being told that Mrs. Dapat would be the stenographer, Judge Alovera told Atty. Villaruz to start the proceedings. Following the manifestation made by Atty. Villaruz, a witness, whom she later recognized to be Atty. Arturo Agudo, was called. At that instant Judge Alovera stood up and said, "All right, you just continue," and then went out of the chambers.18 Judge Alovera would occasionally return to the chambers in the course of the proceedings, but he would just sit down and listen while Atty. Villaruz was conducting his direct examination of the witness and presenting documentary evidence. The proceedings lasted up to 12:10 in the afternoon, with Judge Alovera making only two rulings in the course thereof, including the one he made at the end when he ordered the plaintiffs to file their written offer of evidence on January 20, 1994. From this point on, complainant would establish how the January 30, 1995 decision of Judge Alovera in Civil Case No. V-6186 came about. Prior to his retirement from the judiciary on January 31, 1995, or on January 5, 1995, Judge Alovera designated his legal researcher, Mrs. Nenita Aluad, to be the OIC Branch Clerk of Court. As part of her functions as such OIC, all decisions, orders and resolutions of Br. 17 would first be received by her from the judge, and would stamp them "RECEIVED" and put thereon the date of receipt as well as her initial or signature. This is in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court. Sometime in February of 1995, Mrs. Teresita V. Bauzon, court stenographer of Br. 17 since 1993, was asked to type the draft decision in Civil Case No. V-6186 in Judge Alovera's house. When she inquired if he can still do it, Judge Alovera told her that he had one (1) year more to decide cases. With this assurance, she typed the draft decision on a single bond paper without a duplicate as Judge Alovera was dictating it. On August 1, 1995 at about 9:30 in the morning, retired Judge Alovera came to Br. 17, with a man and a woman, later identified as the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. V-6186, behind him. While he was approaching Nenita Aluad, he uttered to the latter, "Receive this, receive this, " referring to the questioned January 30, 1995 decision, which he was holding. As he spread the decision on her table, he continued, "Because I will defend you even up to the Plaza Miranda. And give copies to these two, pointing to the plaintiffs who were at his back.[25 Almost instantaneously, Mrs. Aluad replied, " I would not receive it because it is already August 1, 1995," and she did not argue with him anymore so as not to embarrass him for being her former superior.26 She then went out of the office while

retired Judge Alovera, as well as the two plaintiffs were still inside. At about the same time, Mrs. Concepcion Alcazar, another employee of Br. 17 and the clerk-in-charge of civil cases and special proceedings therein, saw Judge Alovera inside the office of Br. 17 while trying to have her coemployees receive the questioned decision. Nobody, however, received the same because it was already seven (7) months after his retirement. A little later, she found the questioned decision, together with the formal offer of exhibits of January 20, 1995 and the order of January 25, 1995, on the top of her table. Although she noticed that these records were not stamped "RECEIVED" as a matter of procedure, she went on to attach the said records to the expediente of Civil Case No. V6186. She even gave a copy of the questioned decision to one of the plaintiffs, Ireneo Borres, and to Atty. Villaruz, which was received for him by Ireneo Borres. After keeping the expediente, she then entered the questioned decision in her logbook. The Borres heirs succeeded in having the questioned decision executed when, on January 31, 1996, the lessee of the property, which is the subject matter of Civil Case No. V-6186, surrendered possession of the said property in favor of the Borres heirs,[32 Said transfer of possession was made pursuant to the writ of execution issued on January 19, 1996 by the Acting Presiding Judge of Br. 17, Hon. Delano F. Villaruz, through Clerk of Court Susan Mendoza Arce.[33 chanrobles virtual law library Meanwhile, complainant, who had been working in Japan together with his husband who is employed at the Turkish Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, learned of what happened to her property in Panay, Capiz. She was thus prompted to come back to the Philippines, which resulted in losing herb in Japan. Back home, complainant, on March 5, 1996, filed a Petition for Relief from Order, questioning the January 30, 1995 decision and the January 19, 1996 Writ of Execution. She also prayed "that disciplinary and contempt proceedings be taken against those involved in the perfidious anomaly to tamper with the administration of justice." Judge Julius L. Abela took cognizance of Civil Case No. V-6186 as he was the acting presiding judge of Br. 17 at the time of the filing of said petition for relief from order. In the course of the proceedings thereof, he noticed that the Formal Offer of Exhibits purportedly filed by the plaintiffs, i.e., Borres heirs, was dated January 20, 1995, while the PTR of their counsel, Atty. Alberto Villaruz, was issued on January 31, 1995. He concluded then that the said offer could not have been filed on January 20, 1995. When he asked Atty. Villaruz about it, the latter refused to answer and just kept quiet. He likewise observed that there was no order in Civil Case No. V-6186 submitting the same for decision, except for the order made by Judge Alovera on December 10, 1993 during the "simulated proceedings" inside his chambers, where he directed the counsel for the plaintiffs to file his offer of exhibits.[ Mrs. Rosa Dapat, who took down notes during the said proceedings and who was not a member of the staff of Br. 17, was not even acknowledged on the records as the official stenographer in the course thereof. Thus, in his resolution of September 25, 1997, Judge Abela granted the petition for relief filed by complainant and the latter was ordered reinstated to the possession of the property in question. In the same resolution, Judge Abela declared the January 30, 1995 decision null and void, the same not being filed with the clerk of court and not properly rendered in accordance with Section 1, Rule 36, Rules of Court. Prompted by what he considered to be anomalous proceedings, coupled with the prayer of complainant in her petition for relief "that disciplinary and contempt proceedings be taken against those involved in the perfidious anomaly to tamper with the administration of justice," Judge Abela conducted an investigation into the said anomaly. After considering the testimonies of Misses Aluad, Dapat, Bauzon and Alcazar during the investigation, together with the documentary evidence presented, he concluded, thus: From the foregoing facts and circumstances the following facts are established that: chanrobles virtual law library 1) Civil Case No. V-6186 was not tried on December 10, 1993. What transpired was a mock or simulated trial inside the chamber of Judge Alovera where only Atty. Alberto Villaruz, the plaintiffs and Mrs. Rosa Dapat, a court stenographer from another court, were present. No Judge or RTC Branch 17 court personnel were present as there was actual court session in open court going on at that time.

2) The records of Civil Case No. V-6186 were with Judge Jose O. Alovera and remained with him even after his retirement on January 31, 1995. He did not return the record to Mrs. Concepcion Alcazar, Court Clerk III in Charge of Civil Cases. 3) The record of Civil Case No. V-6186 turned up on the table of Mrs. Alcazar together with the "Offer of Exhibits" of Atty. Villaruz dated January 20, 1995 and the "Order" dated January 25, 1995, after the retirement of Judge Alovera. Both the Offer and the Order admitting the exhibits were not properly filed and do not bear markings of having been received by the court. 4) The "decision" of Judge Jose O. Alovera, though dated January 30, 1995, was filed with the court on August 1, 1995 by former Judge Alovera himself and because he was no longer a judge his submission was refused. - CONCLUSIONS The "Offer of Exhibits" of Atty. Alberto Villaruz though dated January 20, 1995 bears signature and PTR No. issued on January 31, 1995. This simply means that the pleadings (were) ante dated. It is impossible for Atty. Villaruz to affix his PTR No. dated January 31, 1995 or any date prior to its issuance. The Offer of Exhibits could have been made only on January 31, 1995 or later. Because this is so, the Order of Judge Alovera dated January 25, 1995 is also ante dated and could have been made only on a date beyond the filing of the Offer of Exhibits. So also with the decision of former Judge Alovera dated January 30, 1995. xxx xxx xxx The Order admitting the exhibits and the decision were made after the retirement of Judge Alovera. He was no longer a judge. The acts of Attys. Alberto Villaruz and Jose O. Alovera constitute deceit, malpractice, serious and grave misconduct as lawyer justifying their suspension from the practice of law and ultimately their disbarment. Based on the foregoing findings, the Bar Confidant recommended the disbarment of respondent, declaring that it found more than sufficient evidence to sustain complainant's charge against respondent that, indeed, the January 30, 1995 decision in Civil Case No. V-6186, which divested complainant of her property in Panay, Capiz, was penned by respondent after his retirement from the judiciary on January 31, 1995. This Court finds the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant to be well-taken. Respondent has thus sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession. In his long years as a lawyer, respondent has forgotten his sworn pledge as a lawyer. It is time once again that the Court inculcate in the hearts of all lawyers that pledge; thus LAWYER'S OATH chanrobles virtual law library " I, x x x, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support and defend its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor consent to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will not delay any man's cause for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntary, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. SO HELP ME GOD. This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice, is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that every lawyer must uphold and keep inviolable

at all times. This oath is firmly echoed and reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility, the particular provisions of which are applicable to the case at bar, provide, to wit: CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. xxx xxx xxx CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. xxx xxx xxx CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. When respondent took the oath as a member of the legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by his pledge. In this covenant, respondent miserably failed. The testimonies of Nenita M. Aluad, Teresita V. Bauzon and Concepcion Alcazar were all quite telling on how respondent acted in a grossly reprehensible manner in having the questioned decision dated January 30, 1995 come to fore, leading ultimately to its execution divesting the complainant of her property. Respondent gravely abused his relationship with his former staff, pompously flaunting his erstwhile standing as a judge. Respondent disregarded his primary duty as an officer of the court, who is sworn to assist the courts and not to impede or pervert the administration of justice to all and sundry. In so doing, he made a mockery of the judiciary and eroded public confidence in courts and lawyers. This Court has been nothing short of exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character from members of the Bar. By swearing the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice a vital function of democracy a failure of which is disastrous to society. Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority for there is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law. Despite the opportunities accorded to respondent to present substantial defense to refute the charges against him, he failed neither to do so nor to offer a valid explanation. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. Given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, the Court finds as appropriate the recommended penalty of the Office of the Bar Confidant in its Report. Such gross misconduct of the respondent brings intolerable dishonor to the legal profession and calls for the severance of respondents privilege to practice law for life. WHEREFORE, respondent JOSE O. ALOVERA is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys and to inform all courts of this Decision.

[A.M. No. RTJ-95-1308. April 12, 2000] EVELYN AGPALASIN, complainant, vs. JUDGE EMERITO M. AGCAOILI, respondent. This treats of the administrative case against Judge Emerito Agcaoili of Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan. The antecedents of this case are summarized by the Investigating Justice as follows: Respondent filed a complaint-affidavit dated September 4, 1992 for estafa at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Aparri against complainant for allegedly shortchanging him of 200 nipa shingles from [the] 5,500 he had purchased from her on May 8, 1991 which he fully paid on May 21, 1991. Answering the estafa charge against her, complainant filed her Counter-affidavit wherein she not only denied the same but also charged respondent with the following offenses: (a) falsification under Article 172, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code for allegedly making an untruthful statement in the affidavit-complaint which became the basis for the charge of estafa in the aforestated criminal case; (b) incriminating an innocent person under Article 363 of the same code for allegedly maliciously accusing complainant of estafa; and (c) violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) for ordering or allowing a man with a pending criminal case before him ([whom] he eventually acquitted) to receive, transport and pay for the fare of the 5,500 shingles of nipa ordered by him from complainant and for allegedly constructing illegally a poultry within the compound of Cagayan State University which is a government property. A copy of complainant's said counter-affidavit to the estafa charge was sent by her to the Cagayan Provincial Prosecutor's Office with the request that a preliminary investigation of her charges against respondent be conducted. A three-man panel of deputized Ombudsman Prosecutors was designated to conduct an investigation of complainant's charges. After initially investigating the charges, the three members of the panel inhibited themselves from further proceeding with the investigation, giving as reason therefor the fact that one of their colleagues at the Cagayan Provincial Prosecutor's Office, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Apolinario Carrao, had filed administrative charges against respondent at the Supreme Court. The Cagayan Provincial Prosecutor's Office thus referred the complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman for the conduct of the preliminary investigation. After investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman found that a determination of whether or not the affidavit-complaint of herein respondent in the estafa case is falsified was still premature and thus held in abeyance any action on the criminal aspect of the case against him until after the termination of the estafa case. It, however, referred the record of the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for appropriate administrative action.[1] In a Resolution, dated June 26, 1996,[2] the Court referred the case to Justice Conchita CarpioMorales of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. Respondent Judge is charged with: (a) ordering or allowing the accused in Criminal Case No. 09-594 to receive, transport and pay the fare for 5,500 nipa shingles for respondent Judge's benefit and subsequently acquitting the accused therein; and (b) illegally constructing a poultry within the compound of the Cagayan State University, a government property located at Carig, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. [3]

The Court received Justice Carpio-Morales' Report on May 21, 1998. Justice Carpio-Morales summarized the evidence for both the complainant and respondent Judge, thus: EVIDENCE FOR COMPLAINANT xxx In early May 1991, while complainant was tending her business selling nipa shingles at a landing site near Branch 9 of RTC Aparri, Cagayan, a male employee of respondent approached her informing her that respondent wanted to purchase nipa shingles from her to be used in the construction of respondent's poultry house inside the Cagayan State University (CSU) in Carig, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. She thereupon went to the CSU to estimate the number of shingles needed for the poultry house. She then conveyed to respondent that 5,500 shingles were needed and respondent approved it and agreed to buy them at a discounted price of P70.00 per hundred [shingles] payable upon segregation, freight on board Aparri, Cagayan. Complainant and her salesman/helper Vicente Umengan (Umengan) thus segregated 5,500 nipa shingles in the presence of respondent's male representative. On May 10, 1991, respondent, through RTC Branch 9 stenographer Violeta Bigayan (Violeta), gave two P500.00 bills or a total of P1,000.00 as advance payment to complainant's employee Umengan, complainant not being then around. On May 11, 1991, a Saturday, complainant together with Umengan went to respondent's chambers to collect the balance of the purchase price and [to] advise him to pick up the nipa shingles as the owner of the compound where they were temporarily stacked-up was already complaining. [Inside] respondent's chambers, complainant was introduced by respondent to Sixto Bumatay (Bumatay) who was then facing trial for robbery along with five others before respondent's court, and to Bumatay's counsel Atty. Juan Antonio (Atty. Antonio). Complainant was then instructed to deliver the nipa shingles to either of the two men with the advice that Bumatay would take charge of the payment of the balance of the purchase price. In the morning of May 13, 1991, upon her return from Pangasinan, complainant called for an FC, Liner minibus and loaded the nipa shingles in the presence of Bumatay. While the loading was in progress, Atty. Antonio and Umengan arrived. Atty. Antonio, however, let before the loading was finished as Bumatay assured him that he would take care of everything. After the loading was finished, Bumatay handed to complainant P385.00 representing the freight charges of the nipa shingles which she in turn gave to the driver of the bus. Complainant then asked about the balance of the purchase price, and Bumatay replied that respondent himself would pay it upon delivery of the nipa shingles at the CSU compound in Tuguegarao. In view of that development, complainant instructed her secretary Arsenia Casilian. (Arsenia) to personally deliver the nipa shingles at the CSU compound at Tuguegarao and collect the balance of the purchase price amounting to P2,850.00 from respondent. Upon arriving at the CSU compound, the nipa shingles were unloaded in the presence of respondent and a man who assisted in the unloading. Respondent then issued a Metrobank (Tuguegarao Branch) check for P2,850.00 to Arsenia who gave it to complainant upon returning to Aparri. The check, however, when presented forpayment, was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds, and on redeposit, it was just the same dishonored for the same reason. On May 21, 1991, complainant went to respondent's office to inform him of the dishonor of the check (Respondent admitted that this check was dishonored). x x x. Respondent immediately issued another check, Land Bank (Tuguegarao Branch) Check No. 1743842, for the same amount. On the same occasion, respondent ordered additional 2,300 nipa shingles x x x at P90.00 per hundred from complainant partial advance payment for which he issued another Metrobank (Aparri Branch) check in the amount of P1,600.00.

In the morning of May 25, 1991, complainant shipped from Aparri, Cagayan 8,500 nipa shingles to Tuguegarao, Cagayan via a Malamug Trans bus with instruction to its driver, Benedict Cosme Malamug (Malamug), to unload 2,300 thereof at the poultry house of respondent inside the CSU compound and to collect from respondent the corresponding fare and the balance of the purchase price of the nipa shingles. After several days, an employee of respondent went to complainant and asked her why she had not yet delivered the second order of 2,300 nipa shingles. This drew complainant to confront Malamug who told her that the nipa shingles were not unloaded at the CSU compound as nobody there wanted to receive the same and pay for the corresponding fare, hence, the entire batch of 8,500 nipa shingles was unloaded at the yard of one Freddie Llanto. Complainant thus caused the immediate delivery of the 2,300 nipa shingles to respondent. More than one month after the delivery, of the 5,500 shingles or on June 25, 1991, complainant was summoned by respondent to his chambers where he berated her for shortchanging him, so he alleged, of 200 nipa shingles out of the said order of 5,500. Jolted, complainant tried to explain her side but respondent did not [give] her a chance and bragged that he could easily put her in jail. Certain that she did not defraud respondent, complainant challenged him to sue her in court. It occurred to complainant to inquire about the second shipment for 2,300 shingles from Malamug who explained that the caretaker of the poultry house of respondent could not pay for the freight charges and the balance of the purchase price therefor, hence, he unloaded only 1,600 shingles and retained the rest. In the meantime, respondent rendered a decision in Criminal Case No. 09-594 dated August 9, 1991 acquitting Bumatay and his co-accused upon a finding that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Almost four (4) months from the date of delivery of the 5,500 shingles ordered by respondent or on September 10, 1991, respondent filed a case for estafa against complainant before the MTC of Aparri, Cagayan arising from the alleged shortchanging of 200 shingles. In a decision dated June 16, 1993, the MTC of Aparri acquitted complainant of estafa. EVIDENCE FOR RESPONDENT: RESPONDENT'S testimony goes: Anent the first charge, the same is not true for it is his policy as a judge not to ask any favor from anybody as he knows that it would have to be repaid with another favor. Anent the alleged meeting at his chambers on May 11, 1991 during which he introduced Bumatay and Atty. Antonio to complainant and told her that Bumatay or Atty. Antonio would pay for the fare of the 5,500 nipa shingles, the same is not also true as it has been his policy since his appointment in 1990 not to allow the entry of, summon or talk with any litigant or his lawyer inside his chambers without the presence of the other party. Besides, May 11, 1991 fell on a Saturday and was Aparri's town fiesta and he could not have been in his office on that day as he goes to his residence which is "not far from Aparri" every weekend. Moreover, he never had any conversation with complainant except during that only instance when he demanded from her the delivery of the 200 nipa shingles which occurred only sometime "after May 11, 1991, or May 13 or May 15". He did not know about the participation of Bumatay and/or Atty. Antonio in the shipping of the nipa shingles to Tuguegarao although he later came to know about Atty. Antonio's participation when he asked stenographer Violeta several days after May 13, 1991 what happened to the nipa shingles to which she informed that it was Atty. Antonio who paid in advance for the freight charges therefor. Thus informed, he immediately issued a Pay to Cash Metrobank (Aparri Branch) check in the amount of P530.00 and handed it to

Violeta for delivery to Atty. Antonio representing reimbursement of the freight charges, which amount was arrived at by him by estimating the freight charges to be at ten (P.10) centavos per shingles (TSN July 16, 1996, p. 24). His acquittal of Bumatay in the robbery case was due to the prosecution's failure to prove the guilt of Bumatay beyond reasonable doubt and not as insinuated in the complaint. Anent the second charge, there is nothing wrong in the construction of the poultry house inside the compound of the CSU as the same is covered by a Memorandum of Agreement (Exhibit "4") executed by and between his wife, Mrs. Norma Agcaoili, and CSU's President, Dr. Armando B. Cortes, which agreement was duly ratified by the University's Board of Regents. To corroborate part of his testimony, respondent presented stenogrpaher Violeta, Atty. Juan Antonio, retired Judge Felipe Tumakder, and Dominador Tamayao whose respective testimonies follow after their names. VIOLETA BIGAYAN-TORIDA, Court Stenographer III of Branch 9, RTC Aparri, Cagayan: On May 13, 1991, while she was at the nipa shingles landing site following the directive of respondent for her to look for a vehicle to ship the nipa shingles bought by Mrs. Agcaoili at Aparri to their poultry house in Tuguegarao, she saw Atty. Antonio whose help for the purpose she sought. Atty. Antonio at once told her that he knew of a booking agent who could provide her with the transportation and assured her that he would take charge of the shipment. With that assurance, she left the matter to Atty. Antonio. She was not able to tell respondent, however, about the help extended her by Atty. Antonio as respondent had not yet arrived that day. After several days, Atty. Antonio advised her that the nipa shingles were already shipped to Tuguegarao and that he had already paid for the freight charges amounting to P530.00. She later told respondent about the shipping of the nipa shingles by Atty. Antonio and respondent issued her a Pay to Cash Metrobank check bearing the aforesaid amount which she gave to Atty. Antonio. She never saw Bumatay, Atty. Antonio or the complainant in the company of respondent on May 8, 11 and 13, 1991. Complainant could not have met respondent, Bumatay and Atty. Antonio at respondent's chambers on May 11, 1991 as there was no one who held office that day, it being a Saturday and Aparri's town fiesta. On cross examination, she admitted that Atty. Antonio told her that it was his client, Sixto Bumata y, who shipped the nipa shingles to Tuguegarao but that she was unable to tell thesame to respondent up to the time she was testifying (Bumatay in an affidavit dated September 24, 1992 x x x admitted having supervised the loading of the 5,500 nipa shingles, in his capacity as booking Agent of the FC Liner, and of paying for the freight thereof at P7.00 per 100 pieces or a total of P385.00). ATTY. JUAN ANTONIO, a private practitioner and Sixto Bumatays counsel in the robbery case: He was not present when the 5,500 nipa shingles were being loaded on board the FC Liner bus on May 13, 1991. On that particular day, he attended the morning session held at Branch 9 of the RTC Aparri presided by respondent which started at 8:30 o'clock [sic]. He left Branch 9 at about 10:30 o'clock [sic] that same morning and proceeded to Branch 7 which is about 150 to 200 meters away. On his way to Branch 7, he saw Violeta, whom he knew to be Branch 9's stenographer, by the road fronting the nipa landing site. Surprised to see her there as the session in Branch 9 was still going on, he asked her why she was there to which she replied that she was waiting for a bus to load nipa shingles bound for Tuguegarao.

Motivated by his desire to help her, he advised Violeta that she could not expect a bus to pass by that spot where she was as buses were prohibited from entering commercial streets unless specifically called for by prospective customers. He thereupon told her that if she wished, he would instruct his client, Sixto Bumatay, who is a booking agent of FC Liner, to instruct a bus driver to pick-up the nipa shingles from the place and also to advance the freight charges therefor which she could reimburse later. Violeta heeded his suggestion. He then dropped by Bumatay's place and instructed him to have an FC Liner bus pickup Violeta's cargo and to advance the corresponding freight therefor which she would later reimburse. After about six or eight days later (TSN June 28, 1996, p. 179) when he was in Branch 9 of the Aparri RTC, he saw Violeta who handed to him a check representing the reimbursement of the freight charges which Bumatay advanced, the amount written on the face of which he could no longer remember. And he did not inspect the check to see against which bank it was drawn or who drew it for he presumed that it was Violeta's whom he likewise presumed owned the nipa shingles. It was only when he went to court on or before May 20, 1991 that he was told that a certain lady (complainant) was complaining to the judge about the payment of the subject nipa shingles that he learned that respondent owned the same. JUDGE FELIPE TUMAKDER (RET.), former judge of the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan. He notarized the Memorandum of Agreement executed by and between respondent's wife, Mrs. Norma Agcaoili, and CSU represented by its president, Dr. Armando Cortes, which document was already prepared when presented to him by the parties thereto on a certain date which he could no longer remember. Admitting that he certified to the fact that a photocopy of the memorandum (Exhibit "4", p. 154, Rollo) was a reproduction of the original, he could not, however, declare that such photocopy was indeed a faithful reproduction of the original as he could not locate his notarial records and the original copy of respondent was never shown to him when he signed the certification in issuing which he merely relied in good faith on his clerk who prepared it. DOMINADOR O. TAMAYAO, Director of Extension of CSU, who testified in lieu of Dr. Armando Cortes-signatory to the memorandum of agreement who was unavailable at the time he was called to testify on June 27 and 28, 1996: He has personal knowledge about the lease agreemen between the university as represented by Dr. Cortes and Mrs. Agcaoili, he being a member of the technical committee which studied the technical aspect of the project subject thereof. He admitted, however, that he had no participation in the execution of the documents relating thereto which were subject of the subpoena duces tecum as he was not the custodian thereof. REBUTTAL EVIDENCE ARSENIA CASILIAN, complainant's secretary: On May 13, 1991, she was sent by complainant to Tuguegarao via an FC Liner bus to deliver the 5,500 nipa shingles at CSU compound in Tuguegarao and to collect the balance of the purchase price in the amount of P2,850.00 from respondent. After delivering all the 5,500 x x x nipa shingles in the presence of respondent at the CSU compound, respondent handed to her a Metrobank check in the amount of P2,850.00 which she in turn gave to complainant upon her return to Aparri.

During the loading of the nipa shingles, she was with Atty. Antonio, Sixto Bumatay, Vicente Umengan and complainant at the nipa landing site and she saw Bumatay pay for the freight charges of the nipa shingles.[4] The Court has pored over the records of this case and finds the foregoing summary of the evidence to be consistent therewith. The Court also agrees with the following assessment of the Investigating Justice: I. On the first charge: There is no evidence on record that respondent acquitted Sixto Bumatay in the robbery case by reason of the favor he extended towards the respondent. The undersigned is convinced, however, that respondent directed or allowed Sixto Bumatay and Atty. Antonio to take charge of the shipping of the nipa shingles he purchased from complainant and to let Bumatay pay for the freight thereof. Respondent and his witnesses' version do not inspire credence. Respondent's witness Violeta Bigayan is a trusted employee. She was, by the defense['s] account, the one sent by respondent to arrange for the shipping of the 5,500 nipa shingles to Tuguegarao, to pay to complainant, thru Vicente Umengan, the advance payment of P1,000.00 therefor, and to deliver the alleged reimbursement check to Atty. Antonio. At the time Violeta took the witness stand on July 16, 1996, she was still a court stenographer at respondent's sala, hence, still under the latter's moral ascendancy. For these reasons, her likelihood of telling the truth becomes seriously suspect. Atty. Antonio's objectivity, on the other hand, is betrayed by his close association with respondent. At the time complainant was instructed by respondent at the latter's office to deliver the nipa shingles to either Atty. Antonio or Bumatay on May 11, 1991, the two were present. Atty. Antonio at one point during the pendency of this case at the Office of the Ombudsman even served as respondent's counsel (vide: Exhibit "14", Rollo, pp. 211-212) which likely accounts for his bias towards respondent. Atty. Antonio's testimony that he presumed that the shingles belonged to Violeta contradicted the latter's claim that she told him to ask at the nipa landing site about the nips shingles "bought by Mrs. Agcaoili". Besides, Atty. Antonio's claim that he did not bother to ask Violeta regarding the ownership of the nipa shingles and that he never bothered to check or peruse the Metrobank check given by her is not in accordance with the ordinary course of things and human experience. Violeta's claim that she was sent by respondent to look for a bus to ship the nipa shingles without him giving her money to pay for the freight thereof, that she without respondent's knowledge asked Atty. Antonio to facilitate the transportation of the said nipa shingles without her bothering to tell Atty. Antonio from whom he would secure the nipa shingles and to whom and to which area in Tuguegarao they would be delivered, and that she only learned after several days that the nipa shingles were already transported are incredible. How could Atty. Antonio have known from whom, among the vendors operating in the nipa landing site, to secure/claim the 5,500 nipa shingle's and to whom he would deliver them in Tuguegarao if Violeta did not advise him about it [?] And if it were really true that Violeta was asked by respondent to look for a vehicle to ship the shingles, it is incredible that she would not immediately verify whether or not they were actually shipped by Atty. Antonio or Bumatay. For if respondent had asked her whether or not she complied with his order, what concrete answer would she give? In fine, the testimonies of the above-named witnesses for respondent are not credible. Violeta and Atty. Antonio's testimonies thus discredited, respondent is left with his own testimony to rely on to rebut complainant's accusations.

Respondent's testimony, however, like the testimonies of his said two witnesses, does n ot persuade. His feigned ignorance of Bumatay's and Atty. Antonio's participation in the loading of the nips shingles and in the payment of the freight charges therefor cannot prevail over the positive assertion of complainant that he himself told her on May 11, 1991 to deliver the nipa shingles to either Bumatay or Atty. Antonio. Complainant's testimony about her having [been] instructed by respondent on May 11, 1991 to deliver the shingles to either Bumatay or Atty. Antonio is being questioned by respondent as being in contradiction with what she stated in her counter-affidavitcomplaint-affidavit (Exhibit "A"). The contradiction between complainant's assertion during her testimony at the witness stand and her statement in her counter-affidavit is more apparent than real. The instruction forUmengan to deliver the nipa shingles to either Bumatay or Atty. Antonio was given by an employee of the court (Violeta) on May 10, 1991 following Violeta's delivery to Umengan of the advance payment of P1,000.00. The instruction of respondent to complainant for her to deliver the nipa shingles to either of the duo was given a day after, i.e., on May 11, 1991.There was thus no contradiction. What is thus apparent is that the instruction given by respondent to complainant on May 11, 1991 was just a reiteration or confirmation of the instruction given on May 10, 1991 by respondent's stenographer Violeta to complainant's employee Umengan. That May 11, 1991 was a Saturday and Aparri's town fiesta does not render complainant's testimony worthless and unreliable. On the contrary, it would even strengthen her claim, for were we to believe respondent's claim that he never receives litigants or their lawyers inside his chambers, it is very likely, that the meeting took place on that non-working day to avoid people around, who might be knowledgeable about the pendency of Bumatay's case in his sala, seeing respondent in the company of Bumatay and Atty. Antonio. Impropriety is known to be usually done in secret. Besides it is not unlikely that respondent was in Aparri to attend the town fiesta. What renders respondent's claim of ignorance about Atty. Antonio's participation even more incredible is his claim that he came to know of the alleged participation of Atty. Antonio in the shipping of his nipa shingles only "several days" after the May 13, 1991 when he asked Violeta what happened to them. Such claim defies logic and reason. Under normal circumstances, an ordinary person prudent enough to take ordinary care of his business or any concerns or interests would not allow a day [to] pass without wanting to know what happened to an undertaking - like shipping of 5,500 nipa shingles - he entrusts to a subordinate. As a judge, respondent is presumed to know that it is unlawful and improper to receive any kind of favor from litigants or their counsel in whatever form it may be given. Yet, on being allegedly informed of the shipping by Atty. Antonio of the shingles and of his advancing of the freight charges, he did not ask Violeta why x x x. He just readily issued an alleged reimbursement check. A careful scrutiny of the alleged reimbursement check (Exhibit "10") dated June 4, 1991 and purportedly deposited for payment on June 11, 1991, however, convinces the undersigned that the issuance of the same was an afterthought intended to exculpate respondent. Why was the check made payable to "cash" and not to the order of Atty. Antonio who, per information of Violeta, paid for the freight[?] Why was P530.00 written on the face of the check if, by respondent's own estimate, the freight charge is P.10 per shingle and, therefore, the total amount should be P550.00? Since Bumatay claims to have paid only P385.00, why the acceptance and presentation of the check for payment? And why should Atty. Antonio's signature appear on the Pay to Cash check when Bumatay could encash it himself and needed no guarantor for the purpose[?] Such is only reflective of the panic attendant to the exposure of respondent's receipt of favor from a litigant. Finally, if as Atty. Antonio claimed he was handed the reimbursement check "six or [eight] days" after May 13, 1991 when the shingles were

shippped to Tuguegarao or at the latest on May 21, 1991, was respondent so financially strapped that he had to postdate to June 4, 1991 the P530.00 check? II. On the second charge: Respondent's defense is that the use of the lot located inside the CSU compound in Tuguegarao where he constructed his poultry house is covered by a memorandum of agreement-contract of lease executed by his wife and Dr. Cortes duly approved by the Board of Regents of CSU. The persons presented by respondent supposedly to identify and authenticate the documents bearing on the lease turned out to be unreliable. Notary public Judge Tumakder who issued a certification that the memorandum of agreement was a true copy (Exhibit "4", p. 154, Rollo) admitted never seeing the original or copy thereof when he made the certification as his own file copy was missing and the file copy of either the CSU or Mrs. Agcaoili was never presented to him when he issued the certification. On the other hand, Mr. Tamayao of CSU admitted that he had no hand in the execution of the photocopied documents he brought with him as he is not the official custodian thereof. Respondent of course later produced an alleged carbon original of the memorandum of agreement (Exhibit "12-j") leasing a portion of the CSU property for a period of ten (10) years commencing on April 1, 1991, which document appears to have been notarized on July 1, 1991 and, per certification of therein signatory CSU President Dr. Cortes, ratified by the Board of Regents on October 14, 1991. As reflected in the undersigned's comment during the investigation, however, (TSN July 16, 1996, p. 12), and in complainant's counsel's cross-examination of respondent, the said document-Exhibit "12-j" contains handwritten entries in different ink - colored ballpens, original and over carbon paper typewritten entries, and corrections/super-impositions over snow-fake [sic] portions. But even assuming that the document covering the alleged lease is genuine, it would appear that at the time the construction of the poultry house started in May 1991 when the nipa shingles were delivered, the use of the lot on which it was being constructed was not yet covered by a valid and binding contract. For the Memorandum of Agreement between CSU and his wife was executed only on July 11, 1991 and was allegedly ratified by the CSU Board of Regents only on October 14, 1991. [5] On the basis of the foregoing, the Investigating Justice recommends that, as regards the first charge, respondent Judge be dismissed for gross misconduct. Prescinding from the above disquisitions, the undersigned finds that respondent's proven act of having ordered or allowed Sixto Bumatay, an accused in a robbery case pending in his sala, to transport and pay for freight charges of 5,500 nipa shingles, constitutes gross misconduct. Respondent thus failed to live up to the norm that a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Rule 2.01, Canon 2, Code of Judicial [C]onduct). He openly transgressed the rule that a judge (or any immediate member of the family) shall not accept a gift, bequest, favor or loan from anyone except as may be allowed by law (Rule 5.04, Canon 5, Code of Judicial Conduct). A magistrate must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official and otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. (In re: Judge Benjamin H. Virrey, 202 SCRA 628, 634 [1991]). He, as it has often be[en] said, is like Ceasar's Wife, and like her, he must be above suspicion and beyond reproach (In re: Judge Benjamin H. Virrey, Ibid.).[6] The recommendation is well taken.

The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.[7] He should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,[8] and avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.[9] His personal behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond reproach, for he is, as he so aptly is perceived to be, the visible personification of law and of justice.[10] Regrettably, respondent Judge has failed to live up to these standards. His act of allowing a litigant in his sala to pay for the freight of his personal acquisitions constitutes a blatant violation of Rule 5.04, Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting judges from accepting a gift, bequest, favor or loan from anyone except as may be allowed by law. Judge Agcaoili thereby degraded the administration of justice, mocked the dignity of his office, and cast doubt on the independence and integrity of the entire judiciary. That the accused who indulged respondent Judge's corrupt tendencies was subsequently acquitted further gives rise to suspicions that the judge was influenced by the favors the accused extended to him. It gives the impression that the judge was swayed by factors other than the evidence on record, that he arrived at the decision of acquittal other than by his own independent judgment. A judge should, in pending or prospective litigation before him, be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in determining his judicial course. [11] He must not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity.[12] A decision which correctly applies the law and jurisprudence will nevertheless be subject to questions of impropriety when rendered by a magistrate or tribunal believed to be less than impartial and honest.[13] As regards the allegedly illegal construction of a poultry house in the premises of the Cagayan State University, the Court, however, like the Investigating Justice, is inclined to give respondent Judge the benefit of the doubt in view of the lease agreement subsequently executed between the University and respondent's wife. In any event, the second charge has been rendered moot by the penalty of dismissal this Court is about to impose upon respondent for the first charge. Indeed, this is not the only instance that respondent Judge has committed a transgression of judicial ethics. In Chan vs. Agcaoili,[14] this Court found respondent guilty of simple negligence resulting in non-compliance with Canon 2, Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. In said case, Judge Agcaoili failed to issue a warrant of arrest against an accused who had jumped bail. His omission merited from this Court a reprimand and a warning that a repetition of similar acts or omissions in the future will be dealt with more severely. In Cortes vs. Agcaoili,[15] this Court found respondent guilty of three infractions. First, respondent Judge was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he ordered the release of confiscated forest products to a person who had derived his title from another who had no license, permit or authority to possess the same, in utter disregard of the provisions of Section 78 of the Revised Forestry Code. Second, respondent Judge was found guilty of improper grant of bail. He issued an order granting bail without a recital of any evidence presented by the prosecution, making such order defective in form and substance. Moreover, the grant of bail was unjustified since no document was submitted to support the submission that the accused was ill and suffered brain injuries. Third, the Court ruled that respondent Judge was guilty of fraternizing with litigants in violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. For these infractions, the Court imposed upon respondent Judge a fine of P20,000.00 for ignorance of the law and another P20,000.00 for the improper grant of bail. Respondent was also suspended for ten days, since it was his second infraction of the rules on bail, the first being in Chan v. Agcaoili.[16] The Judge was, likewise, reprimanded for fraternizing with litigants. Finally, the Court warned respondent that a repetition of the foregoing or similar transgressions shall be penalized much more severely.

Thus, respondent Judge has habitually flouted judicial ethics and betrayed judicial standards. By his own actions and omissions, he has shown he does not deserve the honor of his office. On this occasion, therefore, the Court metes upon respondent the severest of administrative penalties. He is, hereby, stripped of his robes. WHEREFORE, Judge Emerito M. Agcaoili is hereby DISMISSED from the service for gross misconduct. The Court hereby orders the FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits to which he may be entitled with prejudice to REEMPLOYMENT in the government service, including government-owned or controlled agencies or corporations. This is WITHOUT PREJUDICE to any other action that may be properly taken against him for possible violation of, among other laws, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended). SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. MTJ-95-1062. July 31, 2000] MS. ALICE DAVILA, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSELITO S.D. GENEROSO, respondent. [A.M. No. MTJ-00-1260. July 31, 2000] DR. LETICIA S. SANTOS, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSELITO S.D. GENEROSO, respondent. The office of a judge requires him to obey all the lawful orders of his superiors. A judge is required to decide cases before him with dispatch, mindful that delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith of the people in the judicial system. A judge who cannot comply with such a sworn duty should not serve the judiciary any longer. Administrative Matter No. MTJ-95-1062 was commenced by a letter-complaint[1] sent to the Court Administrator by Ms. Alice Davila (complainant Davila), complaining of undue delay in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 12293 before respondent Presiding Judge of Branch 34 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. Complainant Davila alleged that subject criminal case was deemed submitted for decision way back on February 16, 1993 but has remained undecided. In a 1st Indorsement[2] dated May 30, 1994, Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis (DCA Abesamis) required the respondent judge to comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from notice. In view of the failure of respondent judge to comply with the said 1st Indorsement, Reynaldo L. Suarez (DCA Suarez), successor of DCA Abesamis, sent a First Tracer[3] warning the respondent judge that should he fail to comment he (DCA Suarez) will recommend resolution of the Complaint without respondents comment. On October 11, 1995, the Court Administrator received a letter[4] from complainant Davila, dated September 7, 1995, requesting information as to the status of her subject complaint against the respondent judge. Thereafter, DCA Suarez recommended to the Court that respondent judge be made to explain his failure to decide subject Criminal Case No. 12293 and to comply with the directives of the Court Administrator in connection therewith. Acting thereupon, the Court issued the following Resolutions, to wit: 1.....Resolution,[5] dated December 11, 1995, requiring respondent judge to "(a) EXPLAIN his failure to decide Crim. Case No. 12293; and (b) SHOW CAUSE why he should not be administratively dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the directive of the Office of the Court Administrator requiring him to inform said Office of his comment/action on the complaint of Alice Davila, both within ten (10) days from notice hereof." 2.....Resolution,[6] dated October 7, 1996, requiring the respondent judge, anew, to comment on the subject complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice; 3.....Resolution,[7] dated August 13, 1997, requiring, for the last time, the respondent judge to comply within ten (10) days from notice with the aforesaid Resolution of December 11, 1995; otherwise, the same complaint will be decided on the basis of the pleadings and records on hand; 4.....Resolution,[8] dated January 21, 1998, requiring the respondent judge to show cause why he should not be dealt with disciplinary or held in contempt for failure to comment on subject complaint of complainant Davila and to comply with the resolution of August 13, 1997, within ten (10) days from notice; 5.....Resolution,[9] dated October 5, 1998, requiring respondent judge to comply with the resolution of January 21, 1998, within ten (10) days from notice, under pain of appropriate disciplinary action; and

6.....Resolution,[10] dated March 17, 1999, requiring respondent judge to show cause why he should not be dealt with more severely for failure to comply with the Resolution, dated December 11, 1995, and to file the required comment within ten (10) days from notice. Administrative Matter No. OCA IPI 97-251-MTJ was commenced by the letter-complaint[11] of Dr. Leticia S. Santos complaining of the delay in the resolution of her case pending before the respondent judge. She stressed that Civil Case No. 11072, a simple case of ejectment, was submitted for decision on June 28, 1995 but as of June 17, 1996, the case had not been decided. In a 1st Indorsement[12] dated June 20, 1996, DCA Suarez required respondent judge to comment on the said complaint within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. Absent any Comment filed, DCA Suarez sent a 1st Tracer,[13] with the follow-up letter[14] of Dr. Santos thereto attached, requiring the respondent judge to comply with the 1st Indorsement of June 20, 1996 within five (5) days; otherwise, the case would be submitted for the consideration of the Court. On March 17, 1997, the Court resolved to consolidate Administrative Matter No. OCA IPI 97251-MTJ with Administrative Matter No. MTJ-95-1062.[15] It bears stressing that, in the above-cited Resolutions dated August 13, 1997, January 21, 1998, October 5, 1998, and March 17, 1999, respectively, respondent judge was required to comment on the Complainant and to explain his failure to comply with the directives of the Court. But as in the former case, the respondent judge utterly failed to heed the orders of the Court. The Court Administrator recommended the dismissal from the service of respondent judge, with forfeiture of all benefits and leave credits and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporation. After a careful study, and considering the failure of respondent judge to explain the undue delay in the disposition of subject cases before his court and his repeated failure to comply with the orders issued in connection therewith, the Court finds merit in the recommendation of the Court Administrator. The failure of respondent judge to comply with the show-cause resolutions aforecited constitutes "grave and serious misconduct affecting his fitness and worthiness of the honor and integrity attached to his office."[16] It is noteworthy that respondent judge was afforded several opportunities to explain his failure to decide the subject cases long pending before his court and to comply with the directives of the Court, but he has failed, and continues to fail, to heed the orders of the Court; a glaring proof that he has become disinterested in his position in the judicial system to which he belongs.[17] It is beyond cavil that the inability of respondent judge to decide the cases in question within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days from their date of submission, constitutes gross inefficiency[18] and is violative of Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that "[a] judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods." The separation of the respondent judge from the service is indeed warranted, if only to see to it that the peoples trust in the judiciary be maintained and speedy administration of justice be assured. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Joselito S.D. Generoso is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits and leave credits, and with disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any office in the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. SO ORDERED.