Appeasement DA 1 - Michigan7 2013

Michigan Debate Classic Sophomores
Deming/Whitmore 2013
Appeasement DADW Lab
Neg
1NC Shell (Cuba)

US is taking a firm stance against Cuba and will not lift the embargo Kovalik and Lamrani, 6/28 - Senior Associate General Counsel of the United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO (USW), Dr. Lamrani, lecturer at Paris Sorbonne Paris IV University and Paris-Est Marne-la-Valle University and French journalist, specialist on relations between Cuba and the US, (Daniel and Salmi, Trying to Destroy The Danger of a Good Example The Unrelenting Economic War on Cuba 6/28, http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/06/28/the-unrelenting-economic-war-on-cuba/ )//RG Imagine then, what Cuba could do if the U.S. blockade were lifted. It is clear that the rulers of the U.S. have imagined this, and with terror in their hearts. Indeed, Lamrani quotes former Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, Felipe Perez Roque, as quite rightly asserting[asserts]: Why does the U.S. government not lift the blockade against Cuba? I will answer: because it is afraid. It fears our example. It knows that if the blockade were lifted, Cubas economic and social development would be dizzying. It knows that we would demonstrate even more so than now, the possibilities of Cuban socialism, all the potential not yet fully deployed of a country without discrimination of any kind, with social justice and human rights for all citizens, and not just for the few. It is the government of a great and powerful empire, but it fears the example of this small insurgent island. The next critical question is how can those of good will help and support the good example of Cuba in the face of the U.S. blockade. Obviously, the first answer is to organize and agitate for an end the blockade. As a young Senator, Barack Obama said that the blockade was obsolete and should end, and yet, while loosening the screws just a bit, President Obama has continued to aggressively enforce the blockade . He must be called to task on this. In addition, Congress must be lobbied to end the legal regime which keeps the embargo in place. In addition, we must support Venezuela and its new President, Nicolas Maduro, as Venezuela has been quite critical in supporting Cuba in its international medical mission. And indeed, one of the first things President Maduro did once elected in April was to travel to Cuba to reaffirm his support for these efforts. It should be noted that Maduros electoral rival, Henrique Capriles who led an attack against the Cuban Embassy in Caracas during the 2002 coup vowed to end support for, and joint work, with Cuba. Engagement with Cuba is appeasement and solves nothing Rubin, 2011 - Labor Law Attorney and Washington Post Journalist (Jennifer, Obamas Cuba appeasement, Washington Post, 8/18, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/rightturn/post/obamas-cuba-appeasement/2011/03/29/gIQAjuL2tL_blog.html )//RG The chairwoman of the foreign affairs committee, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen was equally irate: According to news reports, the Administration attempted to barter for the freedom of wrongly imprisoned U.S. citizen Alan Gross by offering to return Rene Gonzalez, a convicted Cuban spy who was involved in the murder of innocent American citizens. If true, such a swap would demonstrate the outrageous willingness of the Administration to engage with the regime in Havana, which is designated by the U.S. as a state-sponsor of terrorism. Regrettably, this comes as no surprise as this Administration has never met a dictatorship with which it didnt
try to engage. It seems that a rogue regime cannot undertake a deed so dastardly that the Obama Administration would abandon engagement, even while talking tough with reporters. Cuba is a state-sponsor of terrorism. We should not be trying to barter with them. We must demand the unconditional release of Gross, not engage in a quid-pro-quo with tyrants. As bad as a prisoner exchange would have been, the administration actions didnt stop there. The Associated Press reported, The Gross-Gonzalez swap was raised by former New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson, as well as by senior U.S. officials in a series of meetings with Cuban officials. Richardson traveled to Cuba last month seeking Gross release. He also told Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez that the U.S. would be willing to consider other areas of interest to Cuba. Among them was removing Cuba from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; reducing spending on Cuban democracy promotion programs like the one that led to the hiring of Gross; authorizing U.S. companies to help Cuba clean up oil spills from planned offshore drilling; improving postal exchanges; ending a program that makes it easier for Cuban medical personnel to move to the United States; and licensing the French company Pernod Ricard to sell Havana Club rum in the United States. Former deputy national security adviser Elliott Abrams explained, It is especially offensive that we were willing to negotiate over support for democracy in Cuba, for that would mean that the unjust imprisonment of Gross had given the Castro dictatorship a significant victory. The implications for those engaged in similar democracy promotion activities elsewhere are clear: local regimes would think that imprisoning an American might be a terrific way to get into a negotiation about ending such activities. Every American administration faces tough choices in these situations, but the Obama administration has made a great mistake here. Our support for democracy should not be a subject of negotiation with the Castro regime. The administrations conduct is all the more galling given the behavior of the Castro regime. Our willingness to relax sanctions was not greeted with goodwill gestures, let alone systemic reforms. To the contrary, this was the setting for Grosss imprisonment. So naturally the administration orders up more of the same. Throughout his tenure, President Obama has failed to comprehend the cost-benefit analysis that despotic regimes undertake. He has offered armfuls of goodies and promised quietude on human rights; the despots behavior has worsened. There is simply no downside for rogue regimes to take their shots at the United States. Whether it is Cuba or Iran, the administration reverts to engagement mode when its engagement efforts are met with aggression and/or domestic oppression. Try to murder a diplomat on U.S. soil? Well sit down and chat. Grab an American contractor and try him in a kangaroo court? Well trade prisoners and talk about relaxing more sanctions. Invade Georgia, imprison political opponents and interfere with attempts to restart the peace process? Well put the screws on our democratic ally to get you into World Trade Organization. The response of these thuggish regimes is entirely predictable and, from their perspective, completely logical. What is inexplicable is the Obama administrations willingness to throw gifts to tyrants in the expectation they will reciprocate in kind. Appeasement ruins American credibilityencourages resistance to US policy Rock 2kprofessor of political science @ Vassar College, Ph.D., Government, Cornell University, 1985; M.A., Government, Cornell University, 1982; A.B., Political Science, Miami University, 1979 (Stephen R, Appeasement in International Politics, p. 4)//BJ It does so in either (or both) or two ways. First, by ceding strategically valuable territory or abandoning certain of its defenses, the appeaser allows the military balance to shift in favor of
the potential aggressor, eroding the formers deterrent capacity. This might be called the material effect of appeasement. Thus, for example, the abandonment of formidable Czech defenses in 1938 at Munich and the loss of the Czech Army in March of 1939 shifted the military balance toward Germany and rendered her attack on Poland more likely to succeed. Second, and much more critical, is what one can term the psychological effect of appeasement. Specifically, it is argued that appeasement gravely weakens the credibility of deterrent threats. Once it has received inducements, the adversary refuses to accept the possibility that the government of the conciliatory state will later stand firm. It thus advances new and more far-reaching demands. When the government of the appeasing state responds to these demands by issuing a deterrent threat, it is not believe. Ultimately, deterrence fails, and the appeasing state must go to war if it wishes to defend its interests. The real tragedy of Munich, from this perspective, was not that Anglo-French concessions failed to satisfy Hitler in September of 1938although that was bad enoughbut that they encouraged him to attack Poland a year later, in blatant disregard of warnings from London and Paris that they would intervene. Decline in U.S. Credibility Undermines U.S. Hegemony APSA 09 (American Political Science Association, U.S. Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future, Task Force Report, September 2009) As at the regional level, U.S. standing on the global stage appears susceptible to both vicious and virtuous cycles resulting in valleys and peaks, declines and advances. As credibility and esteem decline, the United States may be less able to lead and accomplish its policy goals. Others will be less willing to follow a U.S. lead or defer to U.S. opinions because they no longer believe the United States will get the job done, honor promises, or offer a desirable model to emulate. This, in turn, may further diminish U.S. standing. We see some evidence of this in the most recent period of diminished U.S. standing in global institutions. Logically, however, the converse ought to be true as well. As the United States is perceived to honor promises and show interest in multilateral leadership, its standing may be expected to increase, which may make expanded leadership, increased authority and cooperation possible. We suspect, however, that is harder to recover standing than to lose it. Heg solves nuclear war empirics prove Lewis 09Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009,(James, The blessings of Pax Americana, http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/09/the_blessings_of_pax_americana.html)//BJ The American Non-Empire --- what kind of "empire" is this, anyway? --- is far and away the best cop in world history, bringing the longest period of world peace (since 1948), the widest spread of freedom and democracy, the freest economies ever known, and as a direct result, the greatest world-wide prosperity from China to Brazil. Yes, we've seen horrific tyrannies and wars since 1948 --- but they have been local. No repeat of the Thirty Year War, of the Napoleonic mass wars, 1848, 1878, 1914, 1932, and in spite of decades of Cold War, no imperial expansion by Stalin and Mao Zedong. The Cold War stayed cold, a damned good thing. The Europeans have turned their armies into welfare programs. We were invited to rescue them when the Balkans blew up during the Clinton years. The Middle East is always on a low boil, but it never blows up. (So far.) The same goes for Asia. Koreans still hate Japan because of the horrific actions of the Japanese armies in World War Two. So do the Chinese. But they haven't come to
blows. They understand that they are benefiting from the Good Cop of Pax Americana. Just let the US Navy withdraw from Asia and watch the Japanese getting a nuclear bomb, the Chinese invading Taiwan, and a new age of armed alliances emerging. Democratic governance only spread in Asia after the US victory over Japan. Before that it was tried by Sun Yat Sen and failed. Who would you like to be guarding the world instead of the United States? The UN? China or Russia? Europe? Well, let them call the UN Human Rights Commission the next time they have a problem. (That would be Iran, the Sudan, and Libya.) For sixty years the troubles have been kept local and regional. That is an unprecedented achievement for the United States. Those facts are all around us. Everybody knows it -- our allies, fake allies, enemies and friends. It's hard to tell who's who, but every time they get a choice between American leadership and anything else, they choose us. Then they go home and bitch about it. It's either Pax Americana, nuclear war, or tyranny.
1NC Shell (Venezuela)

Obama taking hardline policy against Venezuela now AP 11 (Without ambassadors, US-Venezuela tensions grow, Associated Press/Fox News, 1/1, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/01/01/ambassadors-venezuela-tensions-grow/)//BJ The United States and Venezuela are starting the year without ambassadors in Caracas and Washington due to an intensifying diplomatic dispute that is likely to persist and boost President Hugo Chavez's long-standing antagonism. Both sides have shown firmly entrenched stances and no willingness to compromise in the past week as the U.S. government revoked the Venezuelan ambassador's visa in response to Chavez's refusal to accept the chosen U.S. envoy. "They thought we were going to back down. Anything negative that happens will be the responsibility of the United States," veteran Venezuelan diplomat Roy Chaderton told the Caracas-based television channel Telesur on Thursday. Chaderton, a close Chavez ally and former foreign minister, said the Venezuelan government is "studying the case with sensitivity ... and will make the respective decisions." Chavez skipped an opportunity to respond during a three-hour speech Thursday night, saying nothing about the U.S. government's decision to revoke the visa of his ambassador, Bernardo Alvarez. President Barack Obama's administration took that step in response to Chavez's rejection of Larry Palmer, the White House nominee for ambassador who has been awaiting Senate confirmation. It is unclear what concrete effects those actions could have on U.S.-Venezuela relations. Diplomats from the two countries have already long had reduced contacts due to tensions fed both by Chavez's condemnations of the U.S. and also by the State Department's criticisms of deteriorating democracy in Venezuela. "Much of the cooperation between the United States and Venezuela in recent years has involved lower-level and lower-profile individuals and agencies than the ambassadors, so the immediate fallout will be limited," said Shannon O'Neil, a fellow for Latin American studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. "But this latest round of escalating tensions ends any hope for calmer relations or more expansive cooperation. Demonizing the United States remains too important a political foil for Chavez," O'Neil said. Palmer angered Chavez by suggesting earlier this year in written responses to questions from Republican Sen. Richard Lugar of Indiana that morale is low in Venezuela's military and that he is concerned Colombian rebels are finding refuge in Venezuela. Chavez has accused Palmer of dishonoring the Venezuelan government by expressing concerns on several sensitive subjects including 2008 accusations by the U.S. Treasury Department that three members of Chavez's inner circle helped Colombian rebels by supplying arms and aiding drug-trafficking operations. "This outcome was predictable from the moment Palmer's comments were made public by Senator Lugar in July," said Miguel Tinker Salas, a Latin American studies professor at Pomona College in Claremont, California. "For the State Department to allow this predictable outcome to develop shows that they had no interest in improving relations with Venezuela." Chavez had vowed not to back down in his opposition to Palmer and dared the U.S. government to expel Alvarez before diplomats confirmed on Wednesday that his visa was revoked. Alvarez was outside the United States when the action was taken, preventing his return. U.S. State Department spokesman Mark Toner said earlier this week that the United States hopes to improve strained relations with Venezuela. "We believe it is precisely because there are tensions in the relationship that it is important to maintain diplomatic communications at the highest level," Toner said. The U.S. Embassy has been without an
ambassador since Patrick Duddy finished his assignment and left in July. A previous dispute prompted similar expulsions of ambassadors at the end of President George W. Bush's administration. In September 2008, Chavez expelled Duddy and withdrew his own envoy, saying it was in solidarity with Bolivia after President Evo Morales ordered out the U.S. ambassador and accused him of helping the opposition incite violence. The Bush administration denied it and reacted by expelling the envoys of Venezuela and Bolivia. After more than nine months, in June 2009, the Obama administration and Chavez's government announced they were restoring their ambassadors. Since then, the relationship has again grown more hostile. In the past month, the U.S. State Department has strongly criticized decree powers granted to Chavez in the waning days of an outgoing congress firmly controlled by his allies. A new National Assembly takes office Jan. 5 with a bigger opposition contingent, and the decree powers will allow Chavez to bypass congress and enact laws in a range of areas for the next year and a half. Despite such friction, the two countries are linked by deep trade ties. Chavez's economy relies heavily on oil sales to the U.S., and also imports large quantities of consumer goods from the United States. Oil sales to the U.S. have declined in recent years as Chavez has sought to diversify his oil market, selling more to allied countries such as China. Chavez, whose anti-U.S. position has been a defining feature of his 12-year presidency, is likely to use the latest dispute to step up his criticism and rally supporters. Larry Birns, director of the Washington-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs, said the stances of both sides make for a volatile situation, and that if their "rhetoric becomes more shrill, the situation can deteriorate faster than either side originally intended." Some in the U.S. Congress, meanwhile, are calling for the U.S. to take a hard line against Chavez. Republican Rep. Connie Mack of Florida said this week that the United States "has looked the other way for far too long as Hugo Chavez destroyed democratic institutions." Mack accused the Obama administration of taking a passive approach toward Venezuela. "Chavez is harming the future of his country and breeding insecurity in the region and he will have to face direct consequences for his decisions," Mack said. "One day the United States and Venezuela will once again have a strong, mutually beneficial diplomatic relationship, but unfortunately, it does not appear that this will be possible under the leadership of Hugo Chavez." Engaging with Venezuela is appeasement Harper, 10 a journalist for Americas Quarterly (Liz, Venezuelas Formal Rejection of Ambassador-Designate Larry Palmer, Americas Quarterly, 12/21, http://americasquarterly.org/taxonomy/term/2741)//RG On one side, you have those espousing "strategic engagement," keeping in line with the Obama administration's stated foreign policy and national security objectives. In short and broadly speaking, these proponents might argue, with an irrational state, you shouldn't turn your back. Look where that got us with North Korea, Iran and Syria. Instead you want a seat at the table to start a dialogue based on mutual respect and to build on areas of mutual interest. You raise concerns discretely and express disapproval quietly or through third parties. As one person said, engagement should be subversive," because you seek to assert positive influence by being present and through cooperation on areas such as business development, financial opportunities, or culture and sports. Indeed, Palmer was the right guy to carry out this mission. But, the engagement policy, as it is practiced with Venezuela, is more like "appeasement ," say people clamoring for a tougher approach. After all, for years now, we have witnessed a democracy's death by a thousand cuts. This past week, Hugo Chvez got one of his Christmas
wishes with the approval of new decree powers, thereby further eroding the country's once well-established institutional checks and balances. Chvez threatens more than human rights and democratic norms; the U.S. has legitimate national security concerns, such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism and narcotrafficking. Yet, as Chvez runs roughshod over international norms, is the U.S. working to halt the downward spiral? Appeasement ruins American credibilityencourages resistance to US policy Rock 2kprofessor of political science @ Vassar College, Ph.D., Government, Cornell University, 1985; M.A., Government, Cornell University, 1982; A.B., Political Science, Miami University, 1979 (Stephen R, Appeasement in International Politics, p. 4)//BJ It does so in either (or both) or two ways. First, by ceding strategically valuable territory or abandoning certain of its defenses, the appeaser allows the military balance to shift in favor of the potential aggressor, eroding the formers deterrent capacity. This might be called the material effect of appeasement. Thus, for example, the abandonment of formidable Czech defenses in 1938 at Munich and the loss of the Czech Army in March of 1939 shifted the military balance toward Germany and rendered her attack on Poland more likely to succeed. Second, and much more critical, is what one can term the psychological effect of appeasement. Specifically, it is argued that appeasement gravely weakens the credibility of deterrent threats. Once it has received inducements, the adversary refuses to accept the possibility that the government of the conciliatory state will later stand firm. It thus advances new and more far-reaching demands. When the government of the appeasing state responds to these demands by issuing a deterrent threat, it is not believe. Ultimately, deterrence fails, and the appeasing state must go to war if it wishes to defend its interests. The real tragedy of Munich, from this perspective, was not that Anglo-French concessions failed to satisfy Hitler in September of 1938although that was bad enoughbut that they encouraged him to attack Poland a year later, in blatant disregard of warnings from London and Paris that they would intervene. Decline in U.S. Credibility Undermines U.S. Hegemony APSA 09 (American Political Science Association, U.S. Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future, Task Force Report, September 2009)
As at the regional level, U.S. standing on the global stage appears susceptible to both vicious and virtuous cycles resulting in valleys and peaks, declines and advances. As
credibility and esteem decline, the United States may be less able to lead and accomplish its policy goals. Others will be less willing to follow a U.S. lead or defer to U.S. opinions because they no longer believe the United States will get the job done, honor promises, or offer a desirable model to emulate. This, in turn, may further diminish U.S. standing. We see some evidence of this in the most recent period of diminished U.S. standing in global institutions. Logically, however, the converse ought to be true as well. As the United States is perceived to honor promises and show interest in multilateral leadership, its standing may be expected to increase, which may make expanded leadership, increased authority and cooperation possible. We suspect, however, that is harder to recover standing than to lose it. Heg solves nuclear war empirics prove Lewis 09Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009,(James, The blessings of Pax Americana, http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/09/the_blessings_of_pax_americana.html)//BJ
The American Non-Empire --- what kind of "empire" is this, anyway? --- is far and away the best cop in world history, bringing the longest period of world peace (since 1948), the widest spread of freedom and democracy, the freest economies ever known, and as a direct result, the greatest world-wide prosperity from China to Brazil. Yes, we've seen horrific tyrannies and wars since 1948 --- but they have been local. No repeat of the Thirty Year War, of the Napoleonic mass wars, 1848, 1878, 1914, 1932, and in spite of decades of Cold War, no imperial expansion by Stalin and Mao Zedong. The Cold War stayed cold, a damned good thing. The Europeans have turned their armies into welfare programs. We were invited to rescue them when the Balkans blew up during the Clinton years. The Middle East is always on a low boil, but it never blows up. (So far.) The same goes for Asia. Koreans still hate Japan because of the horrific actions of the Japanese armies in World War Two. So do the Chinese. But they haven't come to blows. They understand that they are benefiting from the Good Cop of Pax Americana. Just let the US Navy withdraw from Asia and watch the Japanese getting a nuclear bomb, the Chinese invading Taiwan, and a new age of armed alliances emerging. Democratic governance only spread in Asia after the US victory over Japan. Before that it was tried by Sun Yat Sen and failed. Who would you like to be guarding the world instead of the United States? The UN? China or Russia? Europe? Well, let them call the UN Human Rights Commission the next time they have a problem. (That would be Iran, the Sudan, and Libya.) For sixty years the troubles have been kept local and regional. That is an unprecedented achievement for the United States. Those facts are all around us. Everybody knows it -- our allies, fake allies, enemies and friends. It's hard to tell who's who, but every time they get a choice between American leadership and anything else, they choose us. Then they go home and bitch about it. It's either Pax Americana, nuclear war, or tyranny.
1NC Shell (Generic)

The United States is taking a firm stance against appeasement in Latin America Benner, 09 - Assistant Director of the Managing Global Insecurity Project at the Brookings Institution, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the Department of State, and the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation at USAID, and U.S. Embassy Kathmandu. (Holly, President Obamas first 100 days, Brookings Institution Managing Global Insecurity, 5/1, http://www.brookings.edu/media/Research/Files/Reports/2009/5/01%20obama%20mgi/obam a_mgi.PDF)//RG Management and Mitigation at USAID, and U.S. Embassy Kathmandu. Obama faces an unenviable set of foreign policy challenges, including a global financial crisis and two ongoing wars, as well as obstacles in building domestic constituencies for a globalist agenda in a dismal budgetary environment. It is also premature to evaluate success on issues and policies that will take months and years to achieve. However, high-level appointments, speeches, diplomatic visits, and early policies provide an indication of the new administrations priorities and strategies. Despite these challenges, the new administration has changed the tone of U.S. engagement with the international community and arguably made progress towards re-establishing U.S. leadership in certain areas specifically in Latin America. The administration has taken a firm stance in regard to these countries, contrary to what right-wing activists are saying. The Obama administration has demonstrated progress in articulating a new vision for global engagement. However, the test will come in implementing this visiondeveloping polices on complex and interrelated issues and ensuring domestic politics are aligned to support the global agenda. Appeasement ruins American credibilityencourages resistance to US policy Rock 2kprofessor of political science @ Vassar College, Ph.D., Government, Cornell University, 1985; M.A., Government, Cornell University, 1982; A.B., Political Science, Miami University, 1979 (Stephen R, Appeasement in International Politics, p. 4)//BJ It does so in either (or both) or two ways. First, by ceding strategically valuable territory or abandoning certain of its defenses, the appeaser allows the military balance to shift in favor of the potential aggressor, eroding the formers deterrent capacity. This might be called the material effect of appeasement. Thus, for example, the abandonment of formidable Czech defenses in 1938 at Munich and the loss of the Czech Army in March of 1939 shifted the military balance toward Germany and rendered her attack on Poland more likely to succeed. Second, and much more critical, is what one can term the psychological effect of appeasement. Specifically, it is argued that appeasement gravely weakens the credibility of deterrent threats. Once it has received inducements, the adversary refuses to accept the possibility that the government of the conciliatory state will later stand firm. It thus advances new and more far-reaching demands. When the government of the appeasing state responds to these demands by issuing a deterrent threat, it is not believe. Ultimately, deterrence fails, and the appeasing state must go to war if it wishes to defend its interests. The real tragedy of
Munich, from this perspective, was not that Anglo-French concessions failed to satisfy Hitler in September of 1938although that was bad enoughbut that they encouraged him to attack Poland a year later, in blatant disregard of warnings from London and Paris that they would intervene. Decline in U.S. Credibility Undermines U.S. Hegemony APSA 09 (American Political Science Association, U.S. Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future, Task Force Report, September 2009)
As at the regional level, U.S. standing on the global stage appears susceptible to both vicious and virtuous cycles resulting in valleys and peaks, declines and advances. As
credibility and esteem decline, the United States may be less able to lead and accomplish its policy goals. Others will be less willing to follow a U.S. lead or defer to U.S. opinions because they no longer believe the United States will get the job done, honor promises, or offer a desirable model to emulate. This, in turn, may further diminish U.S. standing. We see some evidence of this in the most recent period of diminished U.S. standing in global institutions. Logically, however, the converse ought to be true as well. As the United States is perceived to honor promises and show interest in multilateral leadership, its standing may be expected to increase, which may make expanded leadership, increased authority and cooperation possible. We suspect, however, that is harder to recover standing than to lose it. Heg solves nuclear war empirics prove Lewis 09Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009,(James, The blessings of Pax Americana, http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/09/the_blessings_of_pax_americana.html)//BJ The American Non-Empire --- what kind of "empire" is this, anyway? --- is far and away the best cop in world history, bringing the longest period of world peace (since 1948), the widest spread of freedom and democracy, the freest economies ever known, and as a direct result, the greatest world-wide prosperity from China to Brazil. Yes, we've seen horrific tyrannies and wars since 1948 --- but they have been local. No repeat of the Thirty Year War, of the Napoleonic mass wars, 1848, 1878, 1914, 1932, and in spite of decades of Cold War, no imperial expansion by Stalin and Mao Zedong. The Cold War stayed cold, a damned good thing. The Europeans have turned their armies into welfare programs. We were invited to rescue them when the Balkans blew up during the Clinton years. The Middle East is always on a low boil, but it never blows up. (So far.) The same goes for Asia. Koreans still hate Japan because of the horrific actions of the Japanese armies in World War Two. So do the Chinese. But they haven't come to blows. They understand that they are benefiting from the Good Cop of Pax Americana. Just let the US Navy withdraw from Asia and watch the Japanese getting a nuclear bomb, the Chinese invading Taiwan, and a new age of armed alliances emerging. Democratic governance only spread in Asia after the US victory over Japan. Before that it was tried by Sun Yat Sen and failed. Who would you like to be guarding the world instead of the United States? The UN? China or Russia? Europe? Well, let them call the UN Human Rights Commission the next time they have a problem. (That would be Iran, the Sudan, and Libya.) For sixty years the troubles have been kept local and regional. That is an unprecedented achievement for the United States. Those facts are all around us. Everybody knows it -- our allies, fake allies, enemies and friends. It's hard to tell who's who, but every time they get a choice between American
leadership and anything else, they choose us. Then they go home and bitch about it. It's either Pax Americana, nuclear war, or tyranny.
Uniqueness
General
Obama is currently is taking an offensive stance against rogue states Boyle, 13 - professor of international law at the University of Illinois College of Law (Francis, Obama Prepares to Wage Offensive, First-strike Strategic Nuclear Warfare against Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and Syria, Global Research, 6/24, http://www.globalresearch.ca/obama-prepares-to-wage-offensive-first-strike-strategic-nuclearwarfare-against-russia-china-iran-north-korea-and-syria/5340299) Since nuclear deterrence is not now and has never been the Obama administrations nuclear weapons policy from the get-go, then by default this means that offensive first-strike strategic nuclear war fighting is now and has always been the Obama administrations nuclear weapons policy. This policy will also be pursued and augmented by means of integrated non-nuclear strike options. (Ibid). Therefore the entire 2013 NPR and Obamas recent nuclear arms reduction proposals must be understood within this context of the United States pursuing an offensive, strategic firststrike nuclear war-fighting capability as augmented by non-nuclear strike forces: After a comprehensive review of our nuclear forces, the President has determined that we can ensure the security of the United States and our Allies and partners and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing a one-third reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the level established in the New START Treaty. Id. at 6. And we know now for sure that all the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems that Obama is currently in the process of deploying in Europe, Asia, and the United States, on land, at sea and perhaps in Outer Space are designed to provide the United States with a strategic, offensive, first strike nuclear war fighting capability against Russia and China and Iran and North Korea and Syria for starters. The latter three because the United States has taken the position that they are not in compliance with their obligations under the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty: the United States has relied increasingly on non-nuclear elements to strengthen regional security architectures, including a forward U.S. conventional presence and effective theater ballistic missile defenses Id. at 9. So the United States government is currently preparing to launch, wage and win an offensive, first-strike strategic nuclear war against Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and Syria. All the rest is just palaver. Including by our Dissembler-in-Chief. An honors graduate of Harvard Law School.
Latin America
The United States is taking a firm stance in establishing US leadership in Latin America Benner, 09 - Assistant Director of the Managing Global Insecurity Project at the Brookings Institution, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the Department of State, and the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation at USAID, and U.S. Embassy Kathmandu. (Holly, President Obamas first 100 days, Brookings Institution Managing Global Insecurity, 5/1, http://www.brookings.edu/media/Research/Files/Reports/2009/5/01%20obama%20mgi/obam a_mgi.PDF)//RG Management and Mitigation at USAID, and U.S. Embassy Kathmandu. Obama faces an unenviable set of foreign policy challenges, including a global financial crisis and two ongoing wars, as well as obstacles in building domestic constituencies for a globalist agenda in a dismal budgetary environment. It is also premature to evaluate success on issues and policies that will take months and years to achieve. However, high-level appointments, speeches, diplomatic visits, and early policies provide an indication of the new administrations priorities and strategies. Despite these challenges, the new administration has changed the tone of U.S. engagement with the international community and arguably made progress towards re-establishing U.S. leadership in certain areas specifically in Latin America. The administration has taken a firm stance in regard to these countries, contrary to what right-wing activists are saying. The Obama administration has demonstrated progress in articulating a new vision for global engagement. However, the test will come in implementing this visiondeveloping polices on complex and interrelated issues and ensuring domestic politics are aligned to support the global agenda.
Cuba
US is taking a firm stance against Cuba and will not lift the embargo Kovalik and Lamrani, 6/28 - Senior Associate General Counsel of the United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO (USW), Dr. Lamrani, lecturer at Paris Sorbonne Paris IV University and Paris-Est Marne-la-Valle University and French journalist, specialist on relations between Cuba and the US, (Daniel and Salmi, Trying to Destroy The Danger of a Good Example The Unrelenting Economic War on Cuba 6/28, http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/06/28/the-unrelenting-economic-war-on-cuba/ )//RG Imagine then, what Cuba could do if the U.S. blockade were lifted. It is clear that the rulers of the U.S. have imagined this, and with terror in their hearts. Indeed, Lamrani quotes former Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, Felipe Perez Roque, as quite rightly asserting[asserts]: Why does the U.S. government not lift the blockade against Cuba? I will answer: because it is afraid. It fears our example. It knows that if the blockade were lifted, Cubas economic and social development would be dizzying. It knows that we would demonstrate even more so than now, the possibilities of Cuban socialism, all the potential not yet fully deployed of a country without discrimination of any kind, with social justice and human rights for all citizens, and not just for the few. It is the government of a great and powerful empire, but it fears the example of this small insurgent island. The next critical question is how can those of good will help and support the good example of Cuba in the face of the U.S. blockade. Obviously, the first answer is to organize and agitate for an end the blockade. As a young Senator, Barack Obama said that the blockade was obsolete and should end, and yet, while loosening the screws just a bit, President Obama has continued to aggressively enforce the blockade . He must be called to task on this. In addition, Congress must be lobbied to end the legal regime which keeps the embargo in place. In addition, we must support Venezuela and its new President, Nicolas Maduro, as Venezuela has been quite critical in supporting Cuba in its international medical mission. And indeed, one of the first things President Maduro did once elected in April was to travel to Cuba to reaffirm his support for these efforts. It should be noted that Maduros electoral rival, Henrique Capriles who led an attack against the Cuban Embassy in Caracas during the 2002 coup vowed to end support for, and joint work, with Cuba.
Venezuela
Obama taking hardline policy against Venezuela now AP 11 (Without ambassadors, US-Venezuela tensions grow, Associated Press/Fox News, 1/1, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/01/01/ambassadors-venezuela-tensions-grow/)//BJ The United States and Venezuela are starting the year without ambassadors in Caracas and Washington due to an intensifying diplomatic dispute that is likely to persist and boost President Hugo Chavez's long-standing antagonism. Both sides have shown firmly entrenched stances and no willingness to compromise in the past week as the U.S. government revoked the Venezuelan ambassador's visa in response to Chavez's refusal to accept the chosen U.S. envoy. "They thought we were going to back down. Anything negative that happens will be the responsibility of the United States," veteran Venezuelan diplomat Roy Chaderton told the Caracas-based television channel Telesur on Thursday. Chaderton, a close Chavez ally and former foreign minister, said the Venezuelan government is "studying the case with sensitivity ... and will make the respective decisions." Chavez skipped an opportunity to respond during a three-hour speech Thursday night, saying nothing about the U.S. government's decision to revoke the visa of his ambassador, Bernardo Alvarez. President Barack Obama's administration took that step in response to Chavez's rejection of Larry Palmer, the White House nominee for ambassador who has been awaiting Senate confirmation. It is unclear what concrete effects those actions could have on U.S.-Venezuela relations. Diplomats from the two countries have already long had reduced contacts due to tensions fed both by Chavez's condemnations of the U.S. and also by the State Department's criticisms of deteriorating democracy in Venezuela. "Much of the cooperation between the United States and Venezuela in recent years has involved lower-level and lower-profile individuals and agencies than the ambassadors, so the immediate fallout will be limited," said Shannon O'Neil, a fellow for Latin American studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. "But this latest round of escalating tensions ends any hope for calmer relations or more expansive cooperation. Demonizing the United States remains too important a political foil for Chavez, " O'Neil said. Palmer angered Chavez by suggesting earlier this year in written responses to questions from Republican Sen. Richard Lugar of Indiana that morale is low in Venezuela's military and that he is concerned Colombian rebels are finding refuge in Venezuela. Chavez has accused Palmer of dishonoring the Venezuelan government by expressing concerns on several sensitive subjects including 2008 accusations by the U.S. Treasury Department that three members of Chavez's inner circle helped Colombian rebels by supplying arms and aiding drug-trafficking operations. "This outcome was predictable from the moment Palmer's comments were made public by Senator Lugar in July," said Miguel Tinker Salas, a Latin American studies professor at Pomona College in Claremont, California. "For the State Department to allow this predictable outcome to develop shows that they had no interest in improving relations with Venezuela." Chavez had vowed not to back down in his opposition to Palmer and dared the U.S. government to expel Alvarez before diplomats confirmed on Wednesday that his visa was revoked. Alvarez was outside the United States when the action was taken, preventing his return. U.S. State Department spokesman Mark Toner said earlier this week that the United States hopes to improve strained relations with Venezuela. "We believe it is precisely because there are tensions in the relationship that it is important to maintain diplomatic communications at the highest level," Toner said. The U.S. Embassy has been without an ambassador since Patrick Duddy finished his assignment and left in July. A previous dispute
prompted similar expulsions of ambassadors at the end of President George W. Bush's administration. In September 2008, Chavez expelled Duddy and withdrew his own envoy, saying it was in solidarity with Bolivia after President Evo Morales ordered out the U.S. ambassador and accused him of helping the opposition incite violence. The Bush administration denied it and reacted by expelling the envoys of Venezuela and Bolivia. After more than nine months, in June 2009, the Obama administration and Chavez's government announced they were restoring their ambassadors. Since then, the relationship has again grown more hostile. In the past month, the U.S. State Department has strongly criticized decree powers granted to Chavez in the waning days of an outgoing congress firmly controlled by his allies. A new National Assembly takes office Jan. 5 with a bigger opposition contingent, and the decree powers will allow Chavez to bypass congress and enact laws in a range of areas for the next year and a half. Despite such friction, the two countries are linked by deep trade ties. Chavez's economy relies heavily on oil sales to the U.S., and also imports large quantities of consumer goods from the United States. Oil sales to the U.S. have declined in recent years as Chavez has sought to diversify his oil market, selling more to allied countries such as China. Chavez, whose anti-U.S. position has been a defining feature of his 12-year presidency, is likely to use the latest dispute to step up his criticism and rally supporters. Larry Birns, director of the Washington-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs, said the stances of both sides make for a volatile situation, and that if their "rhetoric becomes more shrill, the situation can deteriorate faster than either side originally intended." Some in the U.S. Congress, meanwhile, are calling for the U.S. to take a hard line against Chavez. Republican Rep. Connie Mack of Florida said this week that the United States "has looked the other way for far too long as Hugo Chavez destroyed democratic institutions." Mack accused the Obama administration of taking a passive approach toward Venezuela. "Chavez is harming the future of his country and breeding insecurity in the region and he will have to face direct consequences for his decisions," Mack said. "One day the United States and Venezuela will once again have a strong, mutually beneficial diplomatic relationship, but unfortunately, it does not appear that this will be possible under the leadership of Hugo Chavez."
North Korea (Impact)

US bargaining power is preventing North Korean conflict Carpenter 06-- senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute; served as Catos director of foreign policy studies from 1986 to 1995 and as vice president for defense and foreign policy studies from 1995 to 2011 (Ted Galen, A Nuisance, Not a Threat, CATO Institute, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/nuisance-not-threat)//BJ Even if North Korea conducts additional tests of the Taepodong-2 and other missiles, it is a manageable problem, not a mortal threat to U.S. or regional security. Granted, no sensible person wants the weird hermit kingdom to have nuclear weapons or missile systems. But the United States has thousands of nuclear warheads and the means to deliver them with pinpoint accuracy. We have deterred other strange and ruthless regimes in the past, most notably the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin and China under Mao Tse-tung. Both countries had far more nuclear weapons and missiles than North Korea ever can hope to build. We should be able to deter the likes of Kim Jong Il. The North Korean regime, while bizarre and brutally repressive, has never shown signs of suicidal behavior. And attacking the United States would definitely be suicidal. Even attacking a U.S. treaty ally, such as Japan or South Korea, would be extraordinarily risky. No North Korea war now Talmadge 13-- Tokyo News Editor for The Associated Press, with a special focus on Asian security/defense issues (Eric, A Look At North Korea's Artillery Shows Why No One Wants War, Business Insider, 4/7, http://www.businessinsider.com/why-no-one-in-korea-wants-war-20134)//BJ TOKYO (AP) As tensions rise on the Korean Peninsula, one thing remains certain: All sides have good reason to avoid an all-out war. The last one, six decades ago, killed an estimated 4 million people. North Korea's leaders know that war would be suicidal. In the long run, they cannot expect to defeat the United States and successfully overrun South Korea. War would be horrific for the other side as well. South Korea could suffer staggering casualties. The U.S. would face a destabilized major ally, possible but unlikely nuclear or chemical weapons attacks on its forward-positioned bases, and dramatically increased tensions with North Korea's neighbor and Korean War ally, China. Here's a look at the precarious balance of power that has kept the Korean Peninsula so close to conflict since the three-year war ended in 1953, and some of the strategic calculus behind why, despite the shrill rhetoric and seemingly reckless saber-rattling, leaders on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone have carefully avoided going back over the brink.
Links (General)
Generic
Appeasement ruins American credibilityencourages resistance to US policy Rock 2kprofessor of political science @ Vassar College, Ph.D., Government, Cornell University, 1985; M.A., Government, Cornell University, 1982; A.B., Political Science, Miami University, 1979 (Stephen R, Appeasement in International Politics, p. 4)//BJ It does so in either (or both) or two ways. First, by ceding strategically valuable territory or abandoning certain of its defenses, the appeaser allows the military balance to shift in favor of the potential aggressor, eroding the formers deterrent capacity. This might be called the material effect of appeasement. Thus, for example, the abandonment of formidable Czech defenses in 1938 at Munich and the loss of the Czech Army in March of 1939 shifted the military balance toward Germany and rendered her attack on Poland more likely to succeed. Second, and much more critical, is what one can term the psychological effect of appeasement. Specifically, it is argued that appeasement gravely weakens the credibility of deterrent threats. Once it has received inducements, the adversary refuses to accept the possibility that the government of the conciliatory state will later stand firm. It thus advances new and more far-reaching demands. When the government of the appeasing state responds to these demands by issuing a deterrent threat, it is not believe. Ultimately, deterrence fails, and the appeasing state must go to war if it wishes to defend its interests. The real tragedy of Munich, from this perspective, was not that Anglo-French concessions failed to satisfy Hitler in September of 1938although that was bad enoughbut that they encouraged him to attack Poland a year later, in blatant disregard of warnings from London and Paris that they would intervene.
Cuba
Engagement with Cuba could have serious consequences to the United States history proves Rubin, 2011 - Labor Law Attorney and Washington Post Journalist (Jennifer, Obamas Cuba appeasement, Washington Post, 8/18, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/rightturn/post/obamas-cuba-appeasement/2011/03/29/gIQAjuL2tL_blog.html )//RG The chairwoman of the foreign affairs committee, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen was equally irate: According to news reports, the Administration attempted to barter for the freedom of wrongly imprisoned U.S. citizen Alan Gross by offering to return Rene Gonzalez, a convicted Cuban spy who was involved in the murder of innocent American citizens. If true, such a swap would demonstrate the outrageous willingness of the Administration to engage with the regime in Havana, which is designated by the U.S. as a state-sponsor of terrorism. Regrettably, this comes as no surprise as this Administration has never met a dictatorship with which it didnt try to engage. It seems that a rogue regime cannot undertake a deed so dastardly that the Obama Administration would abandon engagement, even while talking tough with reporters. Cuba is a state-sponsor of terrorism. We should not be trying to barter with them. We must demand the unconditional release of Gross, not engage in a quid-pro-quo with tyrants. As bad as a prisoner exchange would have been, the administration actions didnt stop there. The Associated Press reported, The Gross-Gonzalez swap was raised by former New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson, as well as by senior U.S. officials in a series of meetings with Cuban officials. Richardson traveled to Cuba last month seeking Gross release. He also told Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez that the U.S. would be willing to consider other areas of interest to Cuba. Among them was removing Cuba from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; reducing spending on Cuban democracy promotion programs like the one that led to the hiring of Gross; authorizing U.S. companies to help Cuba clean up oil spills from planned offshore drilling; improving postal exchanges; ending a program that makes it easier for Cuban medical personnel to move to the United States; and licensing the French company Pernod Ricard to sell Havana Club rum in the United States. Former deputy national security adviser Elliott Abrams explained, It is especially offensive that we were willing to negotiate over support for democracy in Cuba, for that would mean that the unjust imprisonment of Gross had given the Castro dictatorship a significant victory. The implications for those engaged in similar democracy promotion activities elsewhere are clear: local regimes would think that imprisoning an American might be a terrific way to get into a negotiation about ending such activities. Every American administration faces tough choices in these situations, but the Obama administration has made a great mistake here. Our support for democracy should not be a subject of negotiation with the Castro regime. The administrations conduct is all the more galling given the behavior of the Castro regime. Our willingness to relax sanctions was not greeted with goodwill gestures, let alone systemic reforms. To the contrary, this was the setting for Grosss imprisonment. So naturally the administration orders up more of the same. Throughout his tenure, President Obama has failed to comprehend the cost-benefit analysis that despotic regimes undertake. He has offered armfuls of goodies and promised quietude on human rights; the despots behavior has worsened. There is simply no downside for rogue regimes to take their shots at the United States.
Whether it is Cuba or Iran, the administration reverts to engagement mode when its engagement efforts are met with aggression and/or domestic oppression. Try to murder a diplomat on U.S. soil? Well sit down and chat. Grab an American contractor and try him in a kangaroo court? Well trade prisoners and talk about relaxing more sanctions. Invade Georgia, imprison political opponents and interfere with attempts to restart the peace process? Well put the screws on our democratic ally to get you into World Trade Organization. The response of these thuggish regimes is entirely predictable and, from their perspective, completely logical. What is inexplicable is the Obama administrations willingness to throw gifts to tyrants in the expectation they will reciprocate in kind. Unilateral concessions to Cuba promotes socialism and anti-Americanism in Latin America Brookes 9-- a Heritage Foundation senior fellow and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense (Peter, Keep the Embargo, O, New York Post, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/item_Oul9gWKYCFsACA0D6IVpvL, 4/15)//BJ IN another outreach to rogu ish regimes, the Obama ad ministration on Monday announced the easing of some restrictions on Cuba. Team Bam hopes that a new face in the White House will heal old wounds. Fat chance. Sure, it's fine to allow separated families to see each other more than once every three years -- even though Cubanos aren't allowed to visit America. And permitting gifts to Cuban relatives could ease unnecessary poverty -- even though the regime will siphon off an estimated 20 percent of the money sent there. In the end, though, it's still Fidel Castro and his brother Raul who'll decide whether there'll be a thaw in ties with the United States -- or not. And in usual Castro-style, Fidel himself stood defiant in response to the White House proclamation, barely recognizing the US policy shift. Instead, and predictably, Fidel demanded an end to el bloqueo (the blockade) -- without any promises of change for the people who labor under the regime's hard-line policies. So much for the theory that if we're nice to them, they'll be nice to us. Many are concerned that the lack of love from Havana will lead Washington to make even more unilateral concessions to create an opening with Fidel and the gang. Of course, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with -- without any concessions on Cuba's part, of course. Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to -- Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left. Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad. The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already. The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association. Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in. We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.) With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western
Hemisphere. The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time. Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers. The US embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to Cuba's brutal repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it. Haven't we learned that yet? Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should hold firm onto the leverage the embargo provides. Appeasement policies embolden the Castro regimeleads to acts of aggression Claver-Carone, 13 -- the Executive Director of Cuba Democracy Advocates in Washington, D.C., on the Board of Directors of the U.S.-Cuba
Democracy PAC, host of "From Washington al Mundo" on Sirius-XM's Cristina Radio (Mauricio, Why Obama's 'extended hand' is counter -productive, The Hill, 1/22, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/278543-why-obamas-extended-hand-is-counter-productive)//BJ
In the 19th century, U.S. abolitionist leader William Lloyd Garrison astutely observed, With reasonable men, I will reason; with humane men I will plead; but to tyrants I will give no quarter, nor waste arguments where they will certainly be lost. Garrison recognized something in the psyche of tyrants that withstands the test of time. In the last century, Western leaders failed to heed Garrisons advice and, as a result, opened the flood-gates of two of the greatest tragedies in modern history -- fascism and communism -- at tremendous human cost and suffering: In 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain conceded the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia to Germany in hopes of appeasing Adolf Hitlers aggression. Then in 1945, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Chamberlains successor, Winston Churchill, conceded to a Soviet Union sphere of political influence in Eastern and Central Europe believing Joseph Stalin could be reasoned with. At the time Churchill even remarked, "Poor Neville Chamberlain believed he could trust Hitler. He was wrong, but I don't think I'm wrong about Stalin." He lived to regret his serious miscalculation. Unfortunately, U.S. President Barack Obama began his 21st Century presidency, also failing to heed Garrisons advice, offering an extended hand to the rogue regimes of our time. During his inaugural speech in 2009, Obama famously stated, "To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist." The results have been counter-productive; the more so because the president prematurely extends his hand before tyrants give the slightest indication of unclenching their fists. In Iran, Obama ignored the calls for freedom by the Green Movement in 2009, when thousands risked (and many lost) their lives to protest that countrys brutal regime, and sent a letter to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei seeking to improve relations. The result has been a more belligerent Iran one intent on fomenting terrorism and building nuclear weapons. In Syria, the president bet that tyrant Bashar al-Assad was something of a reformer. In 2011, as Syrians in their quest for freedom took to street demonstrations, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton doubled down on Obamas bet apparently thinking we could reason with Assad. The result has been 50,000 civilian deaths and a threat to unleash chemical weapons on his own people and, perhaps, even his neighbors. In Cuba, Obama eased travel and remittance sanctions almost immediately upon taking office as a good-faith gesture. The response has been the taking of an American hostage, Alan P. Gross, who recently began his fourth year in one of Castros prisons, and the sharpest spike in repression since the 1960s. Last year alone there were over 6,250 documented political arrests by the Castro regime against peaceful democracy activists. Finally, in North Korea, Obama continued the path of his predecessor,
George W. Bush, in seeking fruitless aid-for-moratorium deals, with the boyish new dictator Kim Jong Un. These were answered with two dangerous rocket launches in 2012 -- a failed one in April and a successful one in December. Obama is now trying to correct his positions issuing stronger sanctions toward Iran, granting diplomatic recognition of Assads opposition and warning North Korea of serious "consequences" if it fires another missile. Not as regards Cuba. Obamas Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication, Ben Rhodes, reiterated again this month that Obama is still willing to extend a hand to Castros brutal regime. Thats not very strategic. Why is Obamas extended hand so counter-productive in dealing with these tyrants? Advocates for normalizing relations with these regimes can't deny these policies fail, instead they say brutal regimes need an enemy abroad to blame for their failures. It is a pompous rationale, which assumes residents of these countries are ignorant or impervious to who is beating, torturing, imprisoning and executing them. Hint: It is not the United States. The reason why the extended hand policy is so counter-productive is -- as Garrison warned long ago -- tyrants are not reasonable and view an extended hand as a sign of weakness and, seeing no risk of consequences, ratchet up their criminal behavior. Obama understands this in dealing with Al Qaeda, which happens to be his greatest foreign policy success. The President should apply a similar rationale to dealing with the Ahmadinejads, Assads, Castros and Kims of the world. Appeasement policies strengthen the Castro regime and weakens US influence Rubin 11-- an American neoconservative columnist and a blogger for the Was hington Post. (Jennifer, " Obamas Cuba appeasement, The
Washington Post, 10/18, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/post/obamas-cuba-appeasement/2011/03/29/gIQAjuL2tL_blog.html)//BJ
As bad as a prisoner exchange would have been, the administration actions didnt stop there. The Associated Press reported, The Gross-Gonzalez swap was raised by former New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson, as well as by senior U.S. officials in a series of meetings with Cuban officials. Richardson traveled to Cuba last month seeking Gross release. He also told Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez that the U.S. would be willing to consider other areas of interest to Cuba. Among them was removing Cuba from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; reducing spending on Cuban democracy promotion programs like the one that led to the hiring of Gross; authorizing U.S. companies to help Cuba clean up oil spills from planned offshore drilling; improving postal exchanges; ending a program that makes it easier for Cuban medical personnel to move to the United States; and licensing the French company Pernod Ricard to sell Havana Club rum in the United States. Former deputy national security adviser Elliott Abrams explained, It is especially offensive that we were willing to negotiate over support for democracy in Cuba, for that would mean that the unjust imprisonment of Gross had given the Castro dictatorship a significant victory. The implications for those engaged in similar democracy promotion activities elsewhere are clear: local regimes would think that imprisoning an American might be a terrific way to get into a negotiation about ending such activities. Every American administration faces tough choices in these situations, but the Obama administration has made a great mistake here. Our support for democracy should not be a subject of negotiation with the Castro regime. The administrations conduct is all the more galling given the behavior of the Castro regime. Our willingness to relax sanctions was not greeted with goodwill gestures, let alone systemic reforms. To the contrary, this was the setting for Grosss imprisonment. So naturally the administration orders up more of the same. Throughout his tenure, President Obama has failed to comprehend the cost-benefit analysis that despotic regimes undertake. He has offered armfuls of goodies and promised quietude on human rights;
the despots behavior has worsened. There is simply no downside for rogue regimes to take their shots at the United States. Whether it is Cuba or Iran, the administration reverts to engagement mode when its engagement efforts are met with aggression and/or domestic oppression. Try to murder a diplomat on U.S. soil? Well sit down and chat. Grab an American contractor and try him in a kangaroo court? Well trade prisoners and talk about relaxing more sanctions. Invade Georgia, imprison political opponents and interfere with attempts to restart the peace process? Well put the screws on our democratic ally to get you into World Trade Organization. The response of these thuggish regimes is entirely predictable and, from their perspective, completely logical. What is inexplicable is the Obama administrations willingness to throw gifts to tyrants in the expectation they will reciprocate in kind.
Venezuela
Appeasement worsens relations with Venezuela Christy 13 - Patrick served as Senior Policy Analyst for the Republican National Committee (RNC), focusing on energy, foreign affairs, and national security issues. (Patrick, Obama Must Stand Up for Democracy in Post-Chavez Venezuela. http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/15/after-chavez-us-mustencourage-democratic-venezuela. March 15, 2013)cy Washington must realize that a strategy of engagement alone will not ensure a renewed and improved partnership with Caracas. Failure to realize this will not only undermine whatever influence America has in the months ahead, but also send a troubling signal to Venezuela's increasingly united political opposition. The Obama administration should instead pursue a more principled policy towards a post-Chavez Venezuela. In particular, it should: Pressure Caracas to implement key election reforms. Venezuela's opposition faces formidable obstacles. Interim President Maduro will use the government's near-monopoly control of public airwaves, its established networks of political patronage and last-minute public spending programs to bolster his populist agenda. Washington should stress publicly and privately that any attempts to suppress or intimidate the opposition runs contrary to Venezuela's constitution and the principles defined in the InterAmerican Democratic Charter, which was adopted by Venezuela in 2001. To this point, Jos Crdenas, a former USAID acting assistant administrator for Latin America, writes, The Venezuelan opposition continues to insist that the constitution (which is of Chavez's own writing) be followed and have drawn up a list of simple electoral reforms that would level the playing field and better allow the Venezuelan people to chart their own future free of chavista and foreign interference. Demand free, fair and verifiable elections. Although Venezuela announced that a special election to replace Chavez will be held next month, it is important to remember that elections alone do not make a democracy. Indeed, Chavez long embraced the rhetoric of democracy as he, in reality, consolidated executive power, undermined Venezuela's previously democratic political system and altered the outcomes of election through corruption, fraud and intimidation. The Obama administration should make clear that free and fair elections, properly monitored by respected international election observers, are essential to Venezuela's future standing in the hemisphere and the world. Likewise, Secretary of State John Kerry should work with regional partnersincluding (but not limited to) Brazil, Canada, Colombia and Mexicoto firmly encourage Maduro's interim government. A unified regional voice would send a powerful signal to Chavez's cronies in Caracas and longtime enablers in China, Iran and Russia. Condition future diplomatic and economic relations. Corruption and criminality were widespread under the Chavez regime, as high-level government and military officials benefited from close ties to corrupt businesses and international drug traffickers. Yet to date, the Obama administration has done little to hold Venezuela's leaders accountable. Washington should make clear that full diplomatic relations with the United States will be contingent upon Venezuela ending ties to international terrorist groups and rogue regimes like Iran. If Venezuela takes meaningful steps to end these ties and ensure future elections, the United States should work with Caracas and the private sector to reform Venezuela's energy industry and identify key development projects and reforms to improve the country's economic future. The United States can play an important role in shaping Venezuela's post-Chavez future. But to do so, the Obama administration will need to stand with the people of Venezuela by publicly defending democratic principles and the impartial rule of law in Latin America.
Engaging with Venezuela is appeasement Harper, 10 a journalist for Americas Quarterly (Liz, Venezuelas Formal Rejection of Ambassador-Designate Larry Palmer, Americas Quarterly, 12/21, http://americasquarterly.org/taxonomy/term/2741)//RG On one side, you have those espousing "strategic engagement," keeping in line with the Obama administration's stated foreign policy and national security objectives. In short and broadly speaking, these proponents might argue, with an irrational state, you shouldn't turn your back. Look where that got us with North Korea, Iran and Syria. Instead you want a seat at the table to start a dialogue based on mutual respect and to build on areas of mutual interest. You raise concerns discretely and express disapproval quietly or through third parties. As one person said, engagement should be subversive," because you seek to assert positive influence by being present and through cooperation on areas such as business development, financial opportunities, or culture and sports. Indeed, Palmer was the right guy to carry out this mission. But, the engagement policy, as it is practiced with Venezuela, is more like "appeasement ," say people clamoring for a tougher approach. After all, for years now, we have witnessed a democracy's death by a thousand cuts. This past week, Hugo Chvez got one of his Christmas wishes with the approval of new decree powers, thereby further eroding the country's once well-established institutional checks and balances. Chvez threatens more than human rights and democratic norms; the U.S. has legitimate national security concerns, such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism and narcotrafficking. Yet, as Chvez runs roughshod over international norms, is the U.S. working to halt the downward spiral? Venezuelan appeasement strengthens rogue states and terror groups Diaz-Balart 12, --House representative for the 25th District of Florida, Republican (Lincoln, Obama's Policies Toward Cuba and Venezuela: Ignorance is NOT Bliss, Congressional Documents and Publications, July 11, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1024545504/13F53479E415C249851/ 6?accountid=14667)//BJ "As to Venezuela, President Obama said that Chavez 'has not had a serious national security impact' on the United States. His willful ignorance on this matter is shocking from a U.S. president. The President must have forgotten that his own State Department expelled the Venezuelan consul general in Miami for plotting against U.S. security interests, and that Chavez fiercely supports the State Sponsors of Terrorism Iran, Syria, and Cuba, and the terrorist organizations, the FARC and Hezbollah, with his vast petroleum resources, safe harbor, and access to credit. "It is dangerous that President Obama is utterly blind to the brutal nature of the Castro dictatorship, and to the grave threats posed by Hugo Chavez's committed support for terrorist states and organizations. The Castro dictatorship and Chavez actively work against U.S. interests and in coordination with other U.S. foes. In our dangerous world, it is appalling that the United States has a President who completely fails to appreciate serious threats within our own hemisphere."
Weak US foreign policy towards Venezuelan allows Chavez to assist Iran in developing nuclear weapons and support terrorist groups. Bolton 10-- American lawyer and diplomat who has served in several Republican administrations, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (John R, The Chavez Threat, Los Angeles Times, 9/16, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/751110281/13F536D93DA49CD2483/ 17?accountid=14667)//BJ Beyond enhancing his own swaggering reputation, Chavez's growing closeness with Russia and Iran on nuclear matters should be our greatest concern. For decades, after military governments fell in Brazil and Argentina, Latin America prided itself on avoiding the dangers of nuclear proliferation. The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco symbolized this perceived immunity, but the region's nuclear-free status is today gravely threatened. Now, Venezuela is openly helping Iran evade international sanctions imposed because of Tehran's nuclear weapons program. Along with the refined petroleum products it supplies Tehran, Chavez allows Iranian banks and other sanctioned enterprises to use Caracas as a base for conducting business internationally and, reportedly, to facilitate Hezbollah's activity in the hemisphere. Even more alarming, Venezuela claims Iran is helping develop its uranium reserves, reportedly among the largest in the world. Indeed, the formal agreement between them signed two years ago for cooperation in the nuclear field could easily result in a uranium-for-nuclear-knowhow trade. In addition, Chavez has a deal with Russia to build a reactor in Venezuela. All of which may signal a dangerous clandestine nuclear weapons effort, perhaps as a surrogate for Iran, as has been true elsewhere, such as in Syria. President Obama and other freely elected Western Hemisphere leaders at a minimum need to tell Chavez clearly that his disassembling of Venezuela's democracy is unacceptable. This is very nearly the exact opposite of current White House policy, which attempts to appease Chavez, Castro and other leftists, as it did by joining them against the democratic forces in Honduras. Appeasement policies towards Venezuela leads to North Korean aggressionconflict spills over and leads to regional war Grey 10-- CFO and co-founder of CapLinked, founded Crestridge Investments and Third Wave Partners, and was managing director of Emigrant Bank (Christopher, BLAME APPEASEMENT FOR NORTH KOREA'S ANTICS, WND Commentary, 11/29, http://www.wnd.com/2010/11/234213/)//BJ The appeasement policy of the Obama administration, including his endless apologies for America and his coddling of dictators such as Hugo Chavez and Ahmedinejad are the diplomatic equivalent of throwing red meat in front of North Koreas wild, carnivorous beast of a regime and daring them to eat it. They have not disappointed. Conventional wisdom is that this attack was caused by the inevitable turmoil resulting from the ongoing transfer of power from longstanding dictator Kim Jong-il to his young son, Kim Jong-un. Some have suggested the attack was intended to give the appearance inside heavily controlled North Korea that Kim Jong-un was responsible for a great military victory against the South. This may be true, but why do something so extreme and risk creating a real war, as well as angering their benefactors in China, just for internal public relations reasons? People say the North Koreans are crazy and their behavior cant be explained with reason, but I think their behavior shows a rational mind at work. They have calculated that the current American administration is so
weak, so willing to surrender and appease an aggressor, that they really dont have any significant risk of paying the price for this attack. The North Koreans may have miscalculated though. South Korea was shaken to its core by what happened. Up until this attack, the South Koreans have been moving away from a close alliance with Americas military. They have been pushing for U.S. troops to leave. They have been objecting to the economic and political costs of a perceived military and diplomatic dependency on America. They generally have been conciliatory with North Korea and have bent over backwards to avoid confrontation and hostility. They have supported the Chinese approach to engaging North Korea, which basically involves treating them as equals. Even after the incident earlier this year in which North Korea sank a South Korean ship, killing 46 sailors, the South exercised restraint. This time is different. South Koreas people and government are enraged by this attack. The rhetoric coming from South Korea towards the North is now the most hostile that it has been since the two countries were at war nearly 60 years ago. For South Korea, this attack seems to feel like Pearl Harbor. Their national identity has been violated. Any kinship they have felt with the North seems to be gone. High level government officials in the South are calling for military retaliation and not ruling out the possibility of war with the North. Suddenly, South Korea is begging to get closer to Americas military. They requested one of our carrier groups be sent immediately to conduct war games with them. Of course, we have accommodated them. We have no choice but to help them not only by treaty but also because we cannot afford to turn our back on an ally. If we dont support our allies, especially those allies of over 60 years, we wont have any allies in the world. China is in a similar mess. They cannot back down from their support of North Korea even as this situation is exactly what they dont want for both diplomatic and economic reasons. There is no upside for the Chinese to get dragged into a war on the Korean Peninsula. They want to keep North Korea, which is basically their violent stepchild, in a controlled box. Unfortunately, North Korea is making it clear that they want more. They want to flex their muscles. Thats what this attack was really trying to demonstrate. North Korea wanted to show that they could blatantly attack the South at will, kill civilians, and get away with it because both the South Koreans and the Americans dont have the guts to do anything about it. North Korea further has threatened to use nuclear weapons both on South Korea and even on the United States, Japan or any country supporting South Korea if war does occur. They have moved surface to surface missiles into position. This provocation cannot be taken lightly. We know that North Korea has nuclear warheads as well as the necessary long range surface to surface missiles on which to send them. They probably dont have the technology to reach the mainland of the United States, but they could possibly reach Hawaii. Defense analysts have feared something like this for years. Of course, any such attack logically would be suicide. The United States easily could annihilate the entire country of North Korea. In all likelihood, these are empty threats. However, the risk of a severe and disastrous miscalculation by the North Koreans grows with every sign of weakness by the United States. During the Cuban missile crisis decades ago, the only way we prevailed was by convincing the Soviets that we would annihilate them if they attacked us. We and our allies need similar resolve, rather than half measures and conciliation, right now. North Korea is a bully. They view any attempts to help them as weak. They view negotiation and diplomacy as weak. They view civilized behavior as weak. The only thing they understand is strength. They need to believe that we will destroy them if they do not stop their aggression. The Chinese can help deliver this message to the North Koreans, but first the Chinese have to believe it themselves. The Chinese have been pushing us around economically for years. They violate trade and currency agreements at will. Every time we raise an objection to their human rights abuses or aggressive behavior towards Taiwan, Tibet, or Japan, they tell us shut up and stay out of their affairs. We
have a credibility problem with them as well. To be fair to the Obama administration, this appeasement of North Korea has been going on for decades. No administration has been willing to step up and get rid of this rogue state that is a danger to the entire world. The difference now is that we have circumstances inside North Korea that are more volatile than they have been in decades combined and an American administration that is perceived as the weakest on national security since Jimmy Carter. This is an extremely dangerous mixture. Hopefully Obama and his team can, like John Kennedy and his team did during the Cuban crisis, rise to the occasion and get the North Koreans to back down. War can be prevented, but the possibility of war is real. This situation could spin out of control and lead to a catastrophe if it is not handled properly. Lets hope that this administration is up to daunting job at hand. Potentially millions of lives depend on it.
Cuban Embargo
Lifting the Cuban Embargo is unconditional engagement Rubin, 09 Journalist for the Weekly Standard, National Review, American Spectator, and the New York Observer (Contentions Flotsam and Jetsam, The Commentary, 9/17, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2009/09/17/flotsam-and-jetsam-426/)//RG Obama gets the back of the hand from Cuba: Cuba will not make any political or policy concessions to improve relations with the U.S. no matter how small, Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez said Wednesday, snubbing Washingtons suggestions that some reforms could lead to better ties. He told a news conference that the United States must lift its 47-year-old trade embargo without waiting for anything in return. Easing embargo undermines U.S. credibility reinforces Cubas tyrannical regime Walser 11 (Ray, a veteran Foreign Service officer, is a Senior Policy Analyst specializing in Latin America at The Heritage Foundation, 1/18/2011, The Foundry, Obamas Ill-Timed, Confusing Concessions Leave Cuba Unimpressed, http://blog.heritage.org/2011/01/18/obamas-ill-timedconfusing-concessions-leave-cuba-unimpressed/) jy On January 14, the White House unveiled further liberalization of its Cuba policy. New changes alter rules to allow easier American citizen visits, permit non-family remittances (up to $500 per quarter), and broaden the number of U.S. airports able to send charter flights to Cuba. The measures, the White House trumpeted, will increase people-to-people contact; support civil society in Cuba; enhance the free flow of information to, from, and among the Cuban people; and help promote their independence from Cuban authorities. Liberals proponents of enhanced Cuba ties have applauded the measure. The decision, however, is ill-timed and confusing and fails to impress the hard-line Castro regime. It is ill-timed because it comes just as a Cuban Communist Party congress prepares to ratify an economic game plan that throws more than a million Cubans into the private sector while preserving the fundamentals of a command or planned economy. Cubas un-free economic model, Jose Azel of the University of Miami notes, reflects the desire for control by the military and the Communist Party of every aspect of Cuban life and an economic program that is antithetical to the individual liberty and empowerment necessary to bring about an economic renaissance. Non-family remittances will provide a modest lifeline that supports the objectives of the regime: a voiceless, powerless private sector that will not rock the Communist boat. The decision is confusing because it undercuts recent attempts to pressure the Cuban regime to release U.S. citizen Alan Gross. Speaking in Santiago, Chile on January 13, Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere Arturo Valenzuela said, the United States finds it very difficult to advance on matters of common interest with Cuba while President Raul Castros government continues to hold Gross, a U.S. government contractor. Gross was arrested in December 2009 and has spent a year in Cuban prison without charges. Havana claims that Gross is a spy but has made no attempt to prove the case. Before Valenzuela could return home, the White House announced the latest unilateral easing of travel restrictions, a blow to those ready to keep the Gross case at the center of the current debate on U.S.Cuban relations. Ileana Ros-Leithen (RFL), chair of the House Foreign Affairs committee, correctly summarized the Obama Administrations errors: Loosening these regulations will not help foster a pro-democracy environment in
Cuba. They certainly will not help the Cuban people free themselves from the tyranny that engulfs them. [They] undermine U.S. foreign policy and security objectives and will bring economic benefits to the Cuban regime. The Castro regime continued to take the Obama Administration to task for its failure to lift full travel restrictions and charged it with seeking domination and destabilization of Cuba. The Cuban Foreign Ministry went into rage mode when a visiting U.S. delegation present for immigration talks met with Cuban dissidents. It charged the U.S. with advancing a policy of subversion and intervention and supporting internal counterrevolution. So much for an improved climate in relations! After two years, the valiant promises of candidate Obama regarding Cuba with his call for libertad [liberty] and a road to freedom for all Cubans that begins with justice for Cubas political prisoners, the rights of free speech, a free press and freedom of assembly leading to elections that are free and fair are largely overshadowed by more unilateral concessions to the Castro regime.
Impact Scenarios
Heg
US credibility key to US heg Kydd 96(Andrew, received his Ph. D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago in 1996 and taught at the University of California, Riverside and Harvard, In America(used to) Trust the Hegemony, the Yale Press, 7/2/1996) (http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20202601?uid=3739728&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256& sid=21102552206777) Benign hegemony explains why the hegemon cooperates, but why do any of the other states cooperate? The theory of coercive hegemony provides an answer. Although the smaller states in the system may prefer to free ride, the hegemon coerces them into cooperating by offering additional incentives or threatening additional costs for noncompliance. This perspective is a favorite of Marxists and realists alike. Revisionist historians of the Cold War portrayed U.S. foreign policy as driven by its economic interests. In this view, domestic elites, eager for export markets and outlets for investment, used American power to force economic openness on an unwilling world and to suppress popular re sistance.8 Realists such as Robert Gilpin have argued that great powers establish international orders to their liking after they prevail in hegemonic wars. These orders serve the security interests of the reigning hegemon at the expense of the lesser powers, until one of them, by dint of economic growth, rises to a position where it can challenge the hegemon in a new great-power war.9 Coercive hegemony is the Mafioso view of hegemony?hegemony as an offer you cannot refuse. Credibility is important, in the sense envisioned by deterrence theory. The hegemon's threats must be credible, in that the followers believe that if the hegemon makes a threat, it will carry it out. Coercive hegemons enforce their will on reluctant followers and would rather be feared than loved. The Bush administration's view of hegemony combines ideas from both benign and coercive hegemony. In this view, most states obey the rules of the international system. Some states, however, pose grave threats to American security and to global stability. These states must be deterred or coerced into abandoning their links to terrorism, weapons of mass destruction programs, or general adversarial stance. The United States may have to provide this public good alone, because most states prefer to free ride, but this is the burden of hegemony. What is important is not what the free riders think, because their behavior is inconsequential, but what the potential threats think. They must fear the wrath of the United States. In the tipping game, the payoffs for cooperating and free riding both increase, but once past the tipping point, states prefer to cooperate rather than free ride. This means if states think that many others will cooperate, they prefer to cooperate as well. Credibility is conceived of differently in the third view of hegemony, the hegemonic assurance perspective.10 This view is based on the tipping game.11 The tipping game is like the public goods game except for one crucial assump tion: in the tipping game, the payoff for cooperation eventually exceeds the payoff for free riding if enough others are expected to cooperate. In Figure 2, this is illustrated by the fact that the payoff lines cross and the payoff for co operation ends up on top. All states think that cooperation is a good idea and would like to cooperate if they could be assured that enough others will as well. Each state fears, however, that not enough other states will cooperate to make their own cooperation worthwhile. In order to cooperate, then, each state needs to be assured that a sufficient number of other states will cooperate to get the group past the "tipping point" where the lines intersect, beyond which everyone prefers to cooperate. 10 Given that everyone wants to cooperate if everyone else is expected to, one might wonder why cooperation is not more or less automatic in the tipping game. Why would states fail to
cooperate if everyone knows that everyone else wants to? One of the most important impediments to cooperation in situations such as the tipping game is mistrust. Mistrust in this context is a fear that other states may secretly prefer to free ride, as in the public goods game, or may be at tempting to hijack the cooperative effort of others to serve their own narrow interests. Hegemony promotes cooperation in the face of this kind of mistrust in two ways. First, by engaging in discussions and providing credible information, the hegemon builds a consensus that the parties have a common goal, have identified a workable strategy for attaining it, and face a tipping problem in executing the strategy.12 Second, by pledging to cooperate, the hegemon helps to get everyone to the tipping point so that they wish to cooperate as well. Given its size, if the United States is willing to cooperate, only a few other states need to cooperate as well to push past the tipping point and get cooperation from the rest of the group. Thus, hegemons are well placed to foster international cooperation by persuading the group that they face a tipping problem and then getting the group past the tipping point so that everyone wants to cooperate. However, this process only works if the hegemon is trusted by the other states. If the hegemon is seen as trustworthy, the information it provides about the nature of the problem and the appropriate response will be viewed as credi ble, so that other states will come to see the issue as a tipping problem. The hegemon's intention to cooperate will also be regarded as credible, so other states will be willing to cooperate as well. The hegemon's power is then a boon. By moving the world closer to the tipping point, the hegemon makes it that much easier for the world to cooperate. If the hegemon is untrustworthy, however, it will not only not promote cooperation, it will make other states less likely to cooperate. If the hegemon is untrustworthy, others will doubt the information it provides and question the wisdom of the proposed solution. They will also doubt whether the hegemon will abide by its side of any cooperative arrange ments. These concerns will prevent the other states from cooperating. For hege mony to promote cooperation via hegemonic assurance, therefore, the hegemon needs to be trustworthy.
Heg solves nuclear war all empirics go neg Lewis 09Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009,(James, The blessings of Pax Americana, http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/09/the_blessings_of_pax_americana.html)//BJ The American Non-Empire --- what kind of "empire" is this, anyway? --- is far and away the best cop in world history, bringing the longest period of world peace (since 1948), the widest spread of freedom and democracy, the freest economies ever known, and as a direct result, the greatest world-wide prosperity from China to Brazil. Yes, we've seen horrific tyrannies and wars since 1948 --- but they have been local. No repeat of the Thirty Year War, of the Napoleonic mass wars, 1848, 1878, 1914, 1932, and in spite of decades of Cold War, no imperial expansion by Stalin and Mao Zedong. The Cold War stayed cold, a damned good thing. The Europeans have turned their armies into welfare programs. We were invited to rescue them when the Balkans blew up during the Clinton years. The Middle East is always on a low boil, but it never blows up. (So far.) The same goes for Asia. Koreans still hate Japan because of the horrific actions of the Japanese armies in World War Two. So do the Chinese. But they haven't come to blows. They understand that they are benefiting from the Good Cop of Pax Americana. Just let the US Navy withdraw from Asia and watch the Japanese getting a nuclear bomb, the Chinese
invading Taiwan, and a new age of armed alliances emerging. Democratic governance only spread in Asia after the US victory over Japan. Before that it was tried by Sun Yat Sen and failed. Who would you like to be guarding the world instead of the United States? The UN? China or Russia? Europe? Well, let them call the UN Human Rights Commission the next time they have a problem. (That would be Iran, the Sudan, and Libya.) For sixty years the troubles have been kept local and regional. That is an unprecedented achievement for the United States. Those facts are all around us. Everybody knows it -- our allies, fake allies, enemies and friends. It's hard to tell who's who, but every time they get a choice between American leadership and anything else, they choose us. Then they go home and bitch about it. It's either Pax Americana, nuclear war, or tyranny.
Latin America
US appeasement in Latin America destabilizes the regionNicaragua proves Wilson 11-- the President of Americans for Limited Government (Bill, Obamas Appeasement to the South, NetRightDaily, 1/4, http://netrightdaily.com/2010/12/obamas-appeasement-to-thesouth/)//BJ As noted by a December 26th, 2010, editorial by the Washington Post, Soft on Nicaragua, the U.S. has failed to respond and has not condemned the Nicaraguan land grab. In fact, the State Department has yet to say anything about the matter. But perhaps this is all a part of Barack Obamas grand strategy to not condemn as a means of achieving concessions. Of course, at some point, appeasement begins to look like approval. The silence has been inexcusable, but the statement by U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua Robert Callahan that the communist state was now a candidate for U.S. foreign aid via the Millennium Challenge Corporation is an insult. And Valenzuelas handshake with Ortega a week after the invasion began is a crime against liberty. Making matters worse, Nicaraguan dictator Daniel Ortega has stacked that countrys Supreme Court simply so it could rule he is eligible to run for reelection even though he is term-limited by the constitution. Clearly, Ortega has taken a page from Manuel Zelaya, who attempted a similar coup in Honduras to stay in power for life. Moreover, the Sandinistas have seen fit to reprint the Nicaraguan constitution to allow term-limited officials, including Supreme Court justices and election magistrates, to stay in power indefinitely, undoubtedly to solidify Ortegas hold on power. This is the same regime responsible for the murder of thousands of Nicaraguans in the 1980s as it waged its revolution. Weakness invites aggression, and it is clear that the ineptitude of the Obama Administration has not gone unheeded in the region. In the last week of the year, Chavez expelled U.S. envoy Palmer for his comments about Venezuelas proxy war against U.S. ally Columbia. Columbia, like Costa Rica, is in danger from these insurgent forces seeking to topple freedom in the region. Venezuela has unsurprisingly refused to condemn the Nicaraguan invasion of Costa Rica in the Organization of American States, and itself has a horrendous record of suppressing opposition in its country. Chavez has made himself dictator-for-life and has eliminated privately-run press organizations. And Barack Obama has done nothing, and his stooge, Valenzuela, since being appointed to his post continues to project a weak U.S. posture in the region. That wont be changing any time soon, and certainly not in time to save nations like Nicaragua from once again falling into the grips of an authoritarian regime. Freedom will not long endure in the Americas without U.S. leadership, and under the Obama Administration, Central and South America are becoming less free. Hopefully, the incoming House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and her counterparts in the U.S. Senate will immediately conduct in-depth hearings so that Assistant Secretary of State Valenzuela can explain in detail the weak appeasement policies of the Obama Administration in Central and South America. He needs to answer for Hillarys handshake and his own. Latin American wars go global Rochin 94 Professor of Political Science (James, Professor of Political Science at Okanagan University College, Discovering the Americas: the evolution of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America, pp. 130-131)//BB
While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more important. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. Perceptions of declining U.S. influence in the region which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, under-development, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic interests, and so on were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in the hemisphere. Hence, the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region. Analysts at the time worried that in a worst-case scenario, instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena a concern expressed by the director of research for Canadas Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war. This is one of the motivations which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
North Korea
US appeasement policies lead to North Korean aggression Grey, 10-- CFO and co-founder of CapLinked, founder of Crestridge Investments and Third Wave Partners, and managing director of Emigrant Bank (Christopher, BLAME APPEASEMENT FOR NORTH KOREA'S ANTICS, WND Commentary, 11/29, http://www.wnd.com/2010/11/234213/)//RG The appeasement policy of the Obama administration, including his endless apologies for America and his coddling of dictators such as Hugo Chavez and Ahmedinejad are the diplomatic equivalent of throwing red meat in front of North Koreas wild, carnivorous beast of a regime and daring them to eat it. They have not disappointed. Conventional wisdom is that this attack was caused by the inevitable turmoil resulting from the ongoing transfer of power from longstanding dictator Kim Jong-il to his young son, Kim Jong-un. Some have suggested the attack was intended to give the appearance inside heavily controlled North Korea that Kim Jong-un was responsible for a great military victory against the South. This may be true, but why do something so extreme and risk creating a real war, as well as angering their benefactors in China, just for internal public relations reasons? People say the North Koreans are crazy and their behavior cant be explained with reason, but I think their behavior shows a rational mind at work. They have calculated that the current American administration is so weak, so willing to surrender and appease an aggressor, that they really dont have any significant risk of paying the price for this attack. The North Koreans may have miscalculated though. South Korea was shaken to its core by what happened. Up until this attack, the South Koreans have been moving away from a close alliance with Americas military. They have been pushing for U.S. troops to leave. They have been objecting to the economic and political costs of a perceived military and diplomatic dependency on America. They generally have been conciliatory with North Korea and have bent over backwards to avoid confrontation and hostility. They have supported the Chinese approach to engaging North Korea, which basically involves treating them as equals. Even after the incident earlier this year in which North Korea sank a South Korean ship, killing 46 sailors, the South exercised restraint. This time is different. South Koreas people and government are enraged by this attack. The rhetoric coming from South Korea towards the North is now the most hostile that it has been since the two countries were at war nearly 60 years ago. For South Korea, this attack seems to feel[s] like Pearl Harbor. Their national identity has been violated. Any kinship they have felt with the North seems to be gone. High level government officials in the South are calling for military retaliation and not ruling out the possibility of war with the North. Suddenly, South Korea is begging to get closer to Americas military. They requested one of our carrier groups be sent immediately to conduct war games with them. Of course, we have accommodated them. We have no choice but to help them not only by treaty but also because we cannot afford to turn our back on an ally. If we dont support our allies, especially those allies of over 60 years, we wont have any allies in the world. China is in a similar mess. They cannot back down from their support of North Korea even as this situation is exactly what they dont want for both diplomatic and economic reasons. There is no upside for the Chinese to get dragged into a war on the Korean Peninsula. They want to keep North Korea, which is basically their violent stepchild, in a controlled box. Unfortunately, North Korea is making it clear that they want more. They want to flex their muscles. Thats what this attack was really trying to demonstrate.
North Korea wanted to show that they could blatantly attack the South at will, kill civilians, and get away with it because both the South Koreans and the Americans dont have the guts to do anything about it. North Korea further has threatened to use nuclear weapons both on South Korea and even on the United States, Japan or any country supporting South Korea if war does occur. They have moved surface to surface missiles into position. This provocation cannot be taken lightly. We know that North Korea has nuclear warheads as well as the necessary long range surface to surface missiles on which to send them. They probably dont have the technology to reach the mainland of the United States, but they could possibly reach Hawaii. Defense analysts have feared something like this for years. Of course, any such attack logically would be suicide. The United States easily could annihilate the entire country of North Korea. In all likelihood, these are empty threats. However, the risk of a severe and disastrous miscalculation by the North Koreans grows with every sign of weakness by the United States. During the Cuban missile crisis decades ago, the only way we prevailed was by convincing the Soviets that we would annihilate them if they attacked us. We and our allies need similar resolve, rather than half measures and conciliation, right now. North Korea is a bully. They view any attempts to help them as weak. They view negotiation and diplomacy as weak. They view civilized behavior as weak. The only thing they understand is strength. They need to believe that we will destroy them if they do not stop their aggression. The Chinese can help deliver this message to the North Koreans, but first the Chinese have to believe it themselves. The Chinese have been pushing us around economically for years. They violate trade and currency agreements at will. Every time we raise an objection to their human rights abuses or aggressive behavior towards Taiwan, Tibet, or Japan, they tell us shut up and stay out of their affairs. We have a credibility problem with them as well. To be fair to the Obama administration, this appeasement of North Korea has been going on for decades. No administration has been willing to step up and get rid of this rogue state that is a danger to the entire world. The difference now is that we have circumstances inside North Korea that are more volatile than they have been in decades combined and an American administration that is perceived as the weakest on national security since Jimmy Carter. This is an extremely dangerous mixture. Hopefully Obama and his team can, like John Kennedy and his team did during the Cuban crisis, rise to the occasion and get the North Koreans to back down. War can be prevented, but the possibility of war is real. This situation could spin out of control and lead to a catastrophe if it is not handled properly. Lets hope that this administration is up to daunting job at hand. Potentially millions of lives depend on it. North Korean aggression could lead to a nuclear miscalculation Harjani, 13 journalist for CNBC with a degree in international relations from the University of Virginia (Ansuya, Heres the Real Problem with North Korea, CNBC, 4/10, http://www.cnbc.com/id/100629299)//RG Repeated threats of aggression from North Korea have created little panic in Asian markets, with many investors interpreting the reclusive state's saber rattling as merely an attention-seeking ploy. But rising tensions on the Korean peninsula should not be taken lightly, say experts, noting that there is a risk of miscalculation by both North and South Korea if the 30-year-old Pyongyang leader, Kim Jong-un, pushes the boundaries too far. South Korea's benchmark Kospi Index rose almost one percent on Wednesday - its third straight day of gains - paring some of the losses seen in the previous week after North Korea declared it has entered "a state of war" with the South. Other equity markets in the
region have not reacted dramatically, with Japan's Nikkei 225 extending gains this week on optimism over the Bank of Japan's aggressive monetary easing and China's Shanghai Composite edging down marginally on domestic factors including worries over a bird flu outbreak. But experts point to the risk of underestimating Kim Jong-un's threat. "There is a risk that North Korea doesn't know where the red line is, and they engage in provocations which turn into a full scale conflict," said Patrick Chovanec, chief strategist at Silvercrest Asset Management, adding that the new leader's inexperience is a concern. Tensions between the North and South escalated further on Wednesday following local media reports that Pyongyang has moved one or more long-range missiles in readiness for a possible launch. This followed a warning by Pyongyang a day earlier, telling foreigners to leave South Korea to avoid being dragged into a "thermonuclear war." Adding to this, North Korean workers failed to turn up at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, jointly operated with the South, bringing operations to a halt on Tuesday. "We need to take it very seriously. We're always on a knife edge of a crisis on the peninsula. Of course many threats are never really carried out, but we do seem to be entering new territory here, new threats, more specific threats, a lot more threats in a truncated period of time than is the norm," said Bruce Klinger, senior research fellow for the Heritage Foundation.
A North Korean nuclear strike could lead to a world-wide nuclear winter and nuclear proliferation of the entire Asian region Hayes and Hamel-Green, 09 Professor of International Relations, RMIT University, Melbourne, and Director, Nautilus Institute, San Francisco and Dean of and Professor in the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development at Victoria University, Melbourne (respectively)(Peter and Michael, The Path Not Taken, The Way Still Open: Denuclearizing The Korean Peninsula And Northeast Asia The Asia, Pacific Journal, 12/14, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Michael-Hamel_Green/3267)//RG The international community is increasingly aware that cooperative diplomacy is the most productive way to tackle the multiple, interconnected global challenges facing humanity, not least of which is the increasing proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Korea and Northeast Asia are instances where risks of nuclear proliferation and actual nuclear use arguably have increased in recent years. This negative trend is a product of continued US nuclear threat projection against the DPRK as part of a general program of coercive diplomacy in this region, North Koreas nuclear weapons programme, the breakdown in the Chinesehosted Six Party Talks towards the end of the Bush Administration, regional concerns over Chinas increasing military power, and concerns within some quarters in regional states (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) about whether US extended deterrence (nuclear umbrella) afforded under bilateral security treaties can be relied upon for protection. The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the
North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westbergs view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also followThe period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hungerTo make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earths protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community. North Korea is currently believed to have sufficient plutonium stocks to produce up to 12 nuclear weapons.6 If and when it is successful in implementing a uranium enrichment program - having announced publicly that it is experimenting with enrichment technology on September 4, 20097 in a communication with the UN Security Council - it would likely acquire the capacity to produce over 100 such weapons. Although some may dismiss Korean Peninsula proliferation risks on the assumption that the North Korean regime will implode as a result of its own economic problems, food problems, and treatment of its own populace, there is little to suggest that this is imminent. If this were to happen, there would be the risk of nuclear weapons falling into hands of non-state actors in the disorder and chaos that would ensue. Even without the outbreak of nuclear hostilities on the Korean Peninsula in either the near or longer term, North Korea has every financial incentive under current economic sanctions and the needs of its military command economy to export its nuclear and missile technologies to other states. Indeed, it has already been
doing this for some time. The Proliferation Security Initiative may conceivably prove effective in intercepting ship-borne nuclear exports, but it is by no means clear how airtransported materials could similarly be intercepted. Given the high stakes involved, North Korean proliferation, if unaddressed and unreversed, has the potential to destabilize the whole East Asian region and beyond. Even if a nuclear exchange does not occur in the short term, the acute sense of nuclear threat that has been experienced for over five decades by North Koreans as a result of US strategic deterrence is now likely to be keenly felt by fellow Koreans south of the 38th Parallel and Japanese across the waters of the Sea of Japan. China, too, must surely feel itself to be at risk from North Korean nuclear weapons, or from escalation that might ensue from next-use in the Korean Peninsula resulting not only in the environmental consequences noted above, but in regime collapse and massive refugee flows. South Korea and Japan appear willing to rely on their respective bilateral security pacts with the United States to deter North Korean nuclear attack for the time being. However, should South Korea and/or Japan acquire nuclear weapons, the outcome would be destabilizing, especially if this resulted from rupture of their alliance relationships with the United States. Extinction resultsthe conflict will spillover CHOL 2002 (Kim Myong, Director Center for Korean American Peace, 10-24, http://nautilus.org/fora/security/0212A_Chol.html) Any military strike initiated against North Korea will promptly explode into a thermonuclear exchange between a tiny nuclear-armed North Korea and the world's superpower, America. The most densely populated Metropolitan U.S.A., Japan and South Korea will certainly evaporate in The Day After scenario-type nightmare. The New York Times warned in its August 27, 2002 comment: "North Korea runs a more advanced biological, chemical and nuclear weapons program, targets American military bases and is developing missiles that could reach the lower 48 states. Yet there's good reason President Bush is not talking about taking out Dear Leader Kim Jong Il. If we tried, the Dear Leader would bombard South Korea and Japan with never gas or even nuclear warheads, and (according to one Pentagon study) kill up to a million people." U.S. Perception Counts Most What counts most is not so much North nuclear and missile capability as the American perception that North Korea may have such capability. No matter how true North Korean nuclear capability may, such capability does not serve the political purposes of Kim Jong Il and his policy planners in dealing with the U.S., unless Washington policy planners perceive North Korean nuclear threat as real. Their view is of the Americans being hoaxed into suspecting that the North Koreans have already nuclear capability. The Americans are the most skeptical people in the world. Due to the historic al background of their nation building, they are least ready to trust what others say. What they trust most is guns and money. This is the reason why the Americans show a strong preference for lie detectors, which are ubiquitous in the U.S. If the North Koreans say that they have nuclear capability, the immediate American response is to doubt the statement. If the North Koreans deny, the Americans have a typical propensity to suspect that they have. Most interestingly, Americans readily accept as true acknowledgement after repeated denial. It is easy to imagine how stunned James Kelly and American officials were at the reported post-denial acknowledgement by First Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju that the North Koreans have a uranium enrichment centrifuge. As expected, American officials have been ordered into globe-hopping tours, rallying international support for their campaign to apply pressure to bear upon the North Koreans to dissuade them from their alleged nuclear weapons program. Bush, Rice, Rumsfeld and other tough guys took
special care to paint North Korea as different from Iraq, offering the North Koreans the stripedpants treatment. It is too obvious that indirect diplomacy is not effective now matter how hard the Americans may consult their allies and the allies of North Korea. The past consultation with Russia and China failed to produce any positive results, because they have little leverage with North Korea. The four-way talks are a case in point, where the Americans ended up talking with the North Koreans. Three Options Available Then the question arises of how to interpret the reported North Korean admission of the possession of a uranium enrichment device. One most likely explanation is that it is more of an invitation to diplomatic negotiations than refusal to talk. There are a few months to go before the target year of 2003 strikes. In other words, the Kang Sok Ju statement means that the North Koreans still keep the nuclear trump card, namely, that the Bush Administration has no choice but to pick up where the Clinton Administration left off. The Bush Administration is left with three choices: The first is just to ignore North Korea and let the regime of Kim Jong Il emerge a nuclear power with atomic and thermonuclear weapons in their arsenal with a fleet of ICBMs locked on to American targets. This option is most likely to set into motion the domino phenomenon, inducing Japan and South Korea to acquire nuclear arms, making unnecessary the American military presence on their soil with anti-Americanism rising to new heights. The second choice is for the Americans to initiate military action to knock out the nuclear facilities in North Korea. Without precise knowledge of the location of those target facilities, the American policy planners face the real risk of North Korea launching a fullscale war against South Korea, Japan and the U.S. The North Korean retaliation will most likely leave South Korea and Japan totally devastated with the Metropolitan U.S. being consumed in nuclear conflagration. Looking down on the demolished American homeland, American policy planners aboard a special Boeing jets will have good cause to claim, "We are winners, although our homeland is in ashes. We are safely alive on this jet." The third and last option is to agree to a shotgun wedding with the North Koreans. It means entering into package solution negotiations with the North Koreans, offering to sign a peace treaty to terminate the relations of hostility, establish full diplomatic relations between the two enemy states, withdraw the American forces from South Korea, remove North Korea from the list of axis of evil states and terrorist-sponsoring states, and give North Korea most favored nation treatment. The first two options should be sobering nightmare scenarios for a wise Bush and his policy planners. If they should opt for either of the scenarios, that would be their decision, which the North Koreans are in no position to take issue with. The Americans would realize too late that the North Korean mean what they say. The North Koreans will use all their resources in their arsenal to fight a fullscale nuclear exchange with the Americans in the last war of [hu]mankind. A nuclear-armed North Korea would be most destabilizing in the region and the rest of the world in the eyes of the Americans. They would end up finding themselves reduced to a second-class nuclear power.
Drug War
Weak foreign policy towards Venezuela worsens the drug warhardline stance is needed Walser 11-- Ph.D., a Senior Policy Analyst at The Heritage Foundation (Ray, Weakness on Chavez, Drugs and Terror Plague Obamas Latin America Policy, The Heritage Foundation, 5/10, http://blog.heritage.org/2011/05/10/weakness-on-chavez-drugs-and-terror-plague-obamaslatin-america-policy/)//BJ The record will show that the May 9 extradition by Colombia of Walid Makled Garcia to Venezuela constitutes a major lost opportunity for the Obama Administration to interrogate and prosecute a Venezuelan drug kingpin with close ties to high-level Venezuelan officials and to expose the depth of narco-corruption within the Hugo Chavez regime in Venezuela. Makleds extradition follows the decision by Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and the Colombian courts to honor the Venezuelan request for extradition over a similar request made by the U.S. In exchange for Makled, the Colombians are banking on closer commercial and security ties, including reduced support for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), with the imperious and unpredictable Chavez. The relationship between Chavez and the narco-terrorists of the FARC is again the subject of careful international scrutiny following release of a detailed examination and analysis of links between the FARC and Venezuela by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The study includes the most complete set of documents recovered from the laptop of Raul Reyes, the FARCs chief of staff, who was killed during a daring military strike by Colombian forces in March 2008 in his safe haven on Ecuadors soil. The study reviews the long record of collaboration by Chvez and his top confidants with the FARC, which they viewed as an ally that would keep U.S. and Colombian military strength in the region tied down in counterinsurgency, helping to reduce perceived threats against Venezuela. The return of Makled to Venezuela and the release of the IISS study are important reminders of the serious regional security threat posed by the Chavez regime, a threat the Obama Administration has routinely downplayed. The persistent Chavez threat prompted the introduction for debate and passage on May 4 of H.R. 247, which reviews Chavezs record of support for terrorism and (1) condemns the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for its state-sponsored support of international terrorist groups; (2) calls on the Secretary of State to designate Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism; and (3) urges increased and sustained cooperation on counter-terrorism initiatives between the Government of the United States and allies in the region. Placing Chavez on the list of state sponsors of terrorism is a measure that is long overdue. Overall, the highly contentious nature of the U.S. Chavez relationship is also being increasingly documented in further releases of cables from the U.S. embassy in Caracas. Following President Obamas trip to Latin America, the Administration has moved into reorganize mode as the State Departments Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Arturo Valenzuela recently announced that he is returning to academia later this summer. During Valenzuelas nearly two-year tenure at State, improvements in regional policy for the Western Hemisphere have been difficult to identify, as Chavez appeared to run roughshod over the region with little reaction from the Administration. Former Foreign Policy editor Moises Naim described U.S. policy for Latin America as well-sounding, well-meaning, but clich-ridden and, ultimately, irrelevant. Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (RFL), chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, did not mince words. She argued that Valenzuelas time at State has been marked by abject
failure by the U.S. to stand up to the attacks against democracy and fundamental freedoms. U.S. interests have suffered as a result. Results in WMD terrorism on the U.S. Anderson, 08 (10/8/2008, Curt, AP, US officials fear terrorist links with drug lords, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-10-08-805146709_x.htm) MIAMI There is real danger that Islamic extremist groups such as al-Qaida and Hezbollah could form alliances with wealthy and powerful Latin American drug lords to launch new terrorist attacks, U.S. officials said Wednesday. Extremist group operatives have already been identified in several Latin American countries, mostly involved in fundraising and finding logistical support. But Charles Allen, chief of intelligence analysis at the Homeland Security Department, said they could use well-established smuggling routes and drug profits to bring people or even weapons of mass destruction to the U.S. "The presence of these people in the region leaves open the possibility that they will attempt to attack the U nited S tates," said Allen, a veteran CIA analyst. "The threats in this hemisphere are real. We cannot ignore them." Added U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration operations chief Michael Braun: "It is not in our interest to let that potpourri of scum to come together."
Iran/Terrorism
US weakness speeds up Iranian nuclear development
Kahwaji 12CEO of INEGMA (Riad, Eroded US Deterrence Posture Emboldens Iran, Worries Allies Analysis, Eurasia Review, 1/11, http://www.eurasiareview.com/11012012-eroded-usdeterrence-posture-emboldens-iran-worries-allies-analysis/)//BJ The failed U.S. policy in dealing with Iran in general, and its nuclear policy in particular, has eroded Washingtons deterrence posture to a level that not only Tehran does not seem to care about threats by American officials, it is now daring the worlds main super power to a fight. The policy of setting red lines to Tehran has been a huge failure. Ever since the political showdown started between the two sides in 2004 over Irans nuclear program, the United States has set several red lines that were all crossed by Iran, and Washingtons response has been limited to pushing four United Nations Security Council Resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran. The international sanctions have thus far failed to curb Irans nuclear program.We have crossed all the red lines and the U.S. did not do anything, and we do not think they can do anything at this stage, said one Iranian official at a recent closed door conference in a European city. They (U.S. and West) said enrichment of uranium was a red line and we crossed it, and they said enriching to 20 percent was a red line and we crossed, he added. Now U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has warned that Irans closure of the Strait of Hormuz was another red line for us and that we will respond to them. He also added: Our red line to Iran is do not develop a nuclear weapon. The question here is how serious does Tehran take U.S. threats after it successfully crossed several red lines without any retribution from Washington? If one adds to this the heightened Iranian rhetoric and bolstering of military capabilities, it can only be concluded that the U.S. deterrence posture vis--vis Iran has been seriously eroded. Iranian officials and analysts view in their writings and speeches the U.S. pullout of Iraq as a defeat and the inability to control the situation in Afghanistan as a failure. Iranians and their Hizbullah allies in Lebanon believe the summer 2006 Israeli war was a big defeat to Israel. Subsequently, Hizbullah officials strongly believe that Israel, like its American patron and ally, has lost its deterrence posture. Hizbullah leaders openly talk about their military buildup and readiness to take on Israel anytime. They believe their growing capabilities have deterred Israel from attacking them or Lebanese territories. Actions by Washington over the past couple of years have reinforced the belief within many Hizbullah and Iranian leaders that the U.S. Administration is weak and unwilling to enter any military confrontations, and could be on the retreat. Such actions and signals by the U.S. are: Hizbullah succeeded to break up Israeli spy cells and to uncover CIA agents in Lebanon, which presumably forced the agency to close down its Lebanon operations. Hizbullah boasted about this as yet another sign of fading American power. The U.S. loss of the high-tech Sentinel unmanned drone, and the alleged decision by the White House to veto a military operation to retrieve it was perceived by Iranian and Hizbullah officials as a proof for the growing capabilities of Tehran and American weakness. Irans success in pursuing its nuclear program unabated by diplomatic and economic measures by the West is seen by many Iranians as a testimony for the success of their policies and Americas failure. Despite the fact U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan uncovered and reported Iranian-supplied arms with insurgents nevertheless Washington did not take any action. This, according to many observers, eventually emboldened the Iranian government. American and Western sailors and naval officers operating in the Arabian Gulf talk in private about several provocations
by Iranian gunboats that are ignored and not reported by the U.S. Administration. This reached a level that prompted some American officials to indirectly suggest through the media establishing a hot-line with the Iranian Navy to avoid any major incidents escalating into a war. This idea did not pick up any traction, but surely was seen by many observers as another sign of U.S. stepping away from a confrontation with Iran yet another sign of weakness. It would not take any analyst who attends a conference with Iranians and even Arab experts and officials to realize that the current U.S. administration is seen as weak and indecisive . Naturally, such an administration cannot be expected to be taken seriously by Iran when it makes concealed threats of resorting to military option to stop Iranian nuclear program. The global financial problem is seen by Iranians as an additional factor that makes U.S. talk of war as useless and futile. For many Arab Gulf officials, who are Americas allies in the region, todays America is much different than it was less than 20 years ago, when Iran never dared to threaten the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and stood on the side without any action watching the U.S. invade Afghanistan (on its eastern borders) and later Iraq (on its western borders). Washingtons quick and complete switch in its foreign policy from an offensive mode to a passive mode seems to have severely undermined U.S. deterrence posture. It is hard for third world countries to see or understand how a global super power could be pushed around and be helpless against a third world regional power. The more important matter is to understand the rational and behavior of Iranians. How do they see and interpret U.S. inaction and back-tracking on issues and red lines? Independent objective observers do see the large difference in balance of power in U.S. favor, but do influential Iranian leaders see it the same? Many Hizbullah and Iranian official speak about the effectiveness of asymmetrical war against Israel or the United States. But do they believe they can win a war against either one (or both) through exploitation of asymmetrical capabilities? Bluffs and empty threats do not seem to work well with Iranians and have only degraded U.S. deterrence posture. Knowing the adversarys intentions is always the toughest job of intelligence analysts and decision makers. While the ambiguous nature of the Iranian regime has made it hard for Westerners to figure out its intentions, the transparent nature of Western democracies has made it easy for Iranians to figure out the intentions of Washington and its allies. This factor has enhanced Iranian deterrence posture and weakened Americas. This situation has raised concern amongst many of Americas regional allies who count on it for protection against foreign (Iranian) aggression. One Arab Gulf official said in private: If Iran is behaving in such a bold manner and it is not yet a nuclear power, just imagine how it will behave when it actually possesses nuclear weapons.
Iran conflict goes nuclearjumpstarts massive proliferation worldwide Kemp and Gay 13--*director of the regional security program at the Center for the National Interest; served on the National Security Council during the Reagan administration AND ** an assistant editor at The National Interest (Geoffrey and John Allen, The High Cost of War with Iran, The National Interest, 3/25, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-high-cost-wariran-8265?page=1)//BJ As counterintuitive as it may seem, Iran could also start the war. Certain hardline cliques within Iran are willing to engage in provocative actions. If a terror plot like that against the Saudi
ambassador to the United States were to succeed, it would likely be seen as a casus belli. Further, Irans economic isolation is a source of tension that it could seek to alleviate by provoking instability. Needless to say, inaction has its own costs. There is not yet any indication that Iran has chosen to build a bomb, but as its nuclear program steadily advances, detecting and stopping a rush to weaponize will become more difficult. An Iran with a nuclear weapon will be better-equipped to resist the efforts of the United States and its allies in the Middle East. There will be fewer options if relations sour. Still, Iran isnt likely to give atomic weapons to terrorists or launch sudden nuclear attackshistory suggests that even the most radical regimes that get the bomb, like Maos China, become very wary of using it. Irans leaders may sponsor terror, but they are not out to commit national suicide by provoking nuclear retaliation against their country. Perhaps the biggest concern with an Iranian bomb is that it will end the nuclear nonproliferation regime and provoke a cascade of proliferation, not only in the Middle East but in South and East Asia, including South Korea and Japan. This would be a significant setback for the United States, which has long made nonproliferation a center of its foreign policy. The risk of a nuclear conflict would increase. Peace negotiations in the Middle East can only take place with a nuclear-free Iran Haas 10-- a senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the American Foreign Policy Council (Lawrence J., A nuclear Iran dooms peace talks, McClatchy-Tribune News Service, 9/2, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/749261452/13F5394F4CB734F2D4B/ 62?accountid=14667)//BJ WASHINGTON -- On the very day Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the United States would lead a renewed Israeli-Palestinian peace effort, Iran boasted that it had test-fired a surface-to-air missile. A day later, Iran began loading fuel rods into its Bushehr nuclear reactor, marking further progress on its quest for nuclear weapons. A day after that, Iran's leaders unveiled the nation's first home-built unmanned, or "drone," bomber, with a range of more than 600 miles and which President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said could serve as a "messenger of death" to hostile outside forces. These [nuclear] developments illustrate a big problem with the U.S. peace effort -- it will divert U.S. time and attention from the far more pressing challenge of containing Iran's regional hegemonic ambitions, which threaten our allies, our role in the region, and our ongoing efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan and other hotspots. The issues of Israeli-Palestinian peace and Iran's rise are closely intertwined, but not in the way the Obama administration thinks. From the administration's standpoint, Israeli-Palestinian peace will set the stage for progress on larger regional issues -- such as Iran -- by eliminating a sore point that inflames the region and hampers U.S. prestige. Quite the contrary, the road to IsraeliPalestinian peace runs through Tehran. That is, the more that the United States can weaken Iran, the greater will be Washington's chances to secure peace in the region. That's because, at the moment, Iran can essentially guarantee that peace will neither come nor, if it came, stick. Tehran equips its terrorist clients -- Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon -- with thousands of rockets to fire at Israel and, thus, disrupt any negotiations that seem to be getting serious. The stronger that Iran grows, the more it can disrupt such peace efforts. An Iran with nuclear weapons, which is perhaps six months to two years away, will be better placed to protect its terrorist clients and de-stabilize Iraq, Afghanistan, and other states where its military and intelligence agents now operate. But let's assume, as the White House would argue, that it can both contain Iran and promote Israeli-Palestinian peace, with one not detracting from the other. Its decision to push for peace, and set a one-year goal, was wrong-
headed anyway because the prerequisites for peace do not exist. Hamas, which remains committed to Israel's destruction, denounced the peace talks as "a new attempt to deceive the Palestinian people." That Hamas, which rules Gaza, remains at war with the Palestinian Authority, which rules the West Bank, makes it hard to see how any deal could apply to the Palestinian community writ large. Hopes that the Palestinian people or Arab states will convince, or successfully pressure, Hamas to fall in line in the aftermath of a deal are fanciful. Nor are conditions ripe in the Jewish state. A nation that withdrew from Gaza only to see it become a base for Hamas and its rockets largely opposes a similar move from most of the much larger West Bank. Were he inclined, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu might be just the hawkish leader to sell Israeli-Palestinian peace to a wary public -- in the very unlikely event that he and PA President Mahmoud Abbas could resolve the issues of a Palestinian "right of return" to Israel and the final status of Jerusalem. But Netanyahu's governing coalition, which includes skeptics of the peace effort, would collapse over any deal that Abbas could accept -- and that would leave both the government and the Israeli people opposing a deal. Thus, the United States has put its prestige on the line with little chance of success and huge potential to hamper its already-inadequate efforts to face down its far more serious regional challenge. That's a fool's errand -- at best.
A2s
A2 Non-Unique
In recent years Obama has not taken an appeasement approach Chapman, 12 - Editor for the Chicago Tribune (Steve, Appease this, GOP! A Republican attack departs from reality, The Chicago Tribune, 2/9,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-02-09/news/ct-oped-0209-chapman20120209_1_appeasement-barack-obama-gop-convention)//RG
In Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. policy under Obama is not much, if any, different from what we would have expected had Bush stayed for a third term. Even when Obama has diverged from previous policy on other issues, the change cannot be detected without a microscope. Romney and Co. accuse Obama of allowing Iran to proceed toward getting nuclear weapons without noting that much of Iran's progress came under Bush, or that his sanctions are tighter than those of his predecessor. Nor do Republicans mention that under Bush, North Korea carried out its first nuclear detonation. Santorum says Obama is even "refusing to do anything covertly" to stop Iran from getting nukes. Really? How would he know? Has he not heard about the untimely deaths of Iranian nuclear scientists or the mysterious computer virus (reportedly a U.S.-Israeli project) that destroyed hundreds of its nuclear centrifuges? The Romney campaign faults the administration for "bowing to Chinese pressure and refusing to sell F-16s to Taiwan." But Obama did increase U.S. arms shipments to the Taiwanese, including Patriot missiles and Black Hawk helicopters. And guess who else declined to sell them F-16s?George W. Bush. You know the guy who apologized to Beijing. The next time Republicans feel the urge to use the word "appeasement," they might first take a close look at the record. Or buy a dictionary.
A2 Appeasement Good (Appeasement Bad)

Appeasement undermines US credibility Henriksen 99 - Thomas H. Henriksen is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, where he focuses on American foreign policy, international political affairs, and insurgencies. (Thomas. Using Power and Diplomacy To Deal With Rogue States. Hoover Institution. February 1, 1999. http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159)//cy Terrorist rogue states, in contrast, must be confronted with robust measures, or the world will go down the same path as it did in the 1930s, when Europe and the United States allowed Nazi Germany to propagate its ideology across half a dozen states, to rearm for a war of conquest, and to intimidate the democracies into appeasement. Rogue states push the world toward anarchy and away from stability. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former national security adviser to President Carter, cited preventing global anarchy as one of the two goals of "America's global engagement, namely, that of forging an enduring framework of global geopolitical cooperation." The other key goal is "impeding the emergence of a power rival."4 Appeasement no use, Cuba will continue to resist CNN 09 (Castro wants more from Obama on Cuba. CNN. April 13, 2009. http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/14/cuba.travel.obama.castro/)cy Earlier Obama lifted all restrictions on the ability of individuals to visit relatives in Cuba, as well as to send them remittances. The move represents a significant shift in a U.S. policy that had remained largely unchanged for nearly half a century. But several key components of America's embargo on the island nation will be preserved. Travel restrictions for Americans of non-Cuban descent will also remain in place. Castro, in his message, said Obama can use his "talents" in creating a constructive policy that would end the embargo that "has failed for almost half a century." "On the other hand, our country, which has resisted and is willing to resist whatever it takes, neither blames Obama for the atrocities of other U.S. administrations nor doubts his sincerity and his wishes to change the United States policy and image," Castro said. "We understand that he waged a very difficult battle to be elected, despite centuries-old prejudices." Obama thinks the change in U.S. policy will ultimately help bring about a more tolerant, democratic Cuban government but, said White House Latin American policy adviser Dan Restrepo. The president thinks creating independence, creating space for the Cuban people to operate freely from the regime is the kind of space they need to start the process toward a more democratic Cuba," Restrepo said. But critics of the change blasted the administration for unilaterally changing what had been a long-settled U.S. policy. The Castro "dictatorship is one of the most brutal in the world. The U.S. economic embargo must remain in place until tyranny gives way to freedom and democracy," Rep. Connie Mack, R-Florida, said in a written statement. Obama "should not make any unilateral change in America's policy toward Cuba. Instead, Congress should vigorously debate these and other ideas before any substantive policy changes are implemented." The president's gesture precedes a trip this week to Trinidad and Tobago for a key meeting of hemispheric powers -- the Summit of the Americas. Castro said Cuba had "resisted and it will continue to resist." "It will never beg for alms. It will go on forward holding its head up high and cooperating with the fraternal peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean; with or without Summits of the Americas; whether or not the president of the United States is Obama, a man or a woman, a black or a white citizen."
Weak foreign policy jeopardizes American peaceCarter administration proves. Hardline policies are key to world peace. Carafano 10Ph.D., Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, E. W. Richardson Fellow, and Director (James Jay, Lesson from Jimmy Carter: Weakness invites aggression, The Heritage Foundation, 9/12, http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2010/09/lessonfrom-jimmy-carter-weakness-invites-aggression)//BJ "Detente," Ronald Reagan once quipped, "isn't that what a farmer has with his turkey -- until Thanksgiving Day?' When Reagan took over the White House he planned to make his foreign policy everything that Jimmy Carter's was not. Carter had tried accommodating America's enemies. He cut back on defense. He made humility the hallmark of American diplomacy. Our foes responded with aggression: Iranian revolutionaries danced in the rubble of the U.S. Embassy; the Soviets sponsored armed insurgencies and invaded Afghanistan. Later in his presidency, Carter tried to look tough. He proposed a modest increase in defense spending; pulled the United States out of the Moscow Olympics; and slapped an embargo on wheat exports to the Soviet Union. These actions hurt high jumpers and American farmers, but didn't faze our enemies. It was too little, too late. As Reagan entered his presidency, the U.S. economy and the American spirit were low. Still, he committed to a policy of "peace through strength." And, even before he put his plan into action, our enemies began to worry. Yuri Andropov, the chief of the KGB -- the Soviet's spy network -- feared that Reagan planned to attack. "Andropov," wrote Steven Hayward, in his "Age of Reagan"ordered the KGB to organize a special surveillance program in the United States -- code-named Operation RYAN -- to look for signs of preparations for an attack." Reagan's assertive approach to foreign policy did not spark war. It produced peace. The Kremlin discovered Reagan was not the cowboy they feared. But they respected the more muscular United States. Russia agreed to the most effective arms control treaty in history. The benefits spread. According to the Canadian-based Human Security project, deaths from political violence worldwide (even accounting for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq) have declined continually since the end of the Cold War ... until recently. Reagan's opponents never understood the importance of peace through strength. When the Gipper went to negotiate economic strategy with House Speaker Tip O'Neil, he was told Congress would cut $35 billion in domestic spending only if Reagan pared the same amount from the Pentagon budget. Reagan refused. Defense was not the problem, he told O'Neil. Defense was less than 30 percent of spending, down from nearly half the budget when John F. Kennedy had been president. (Today, Pentagon spending is less than one-fifth of the budget.) Keeping America safe, free, and prosperous, he concluded, doesn't start with making the nation unsafe. Small wonder that people are saying the world looks like a rerun of the Carter years. The Obama Doctrine possesses many Carteresque attributes: a heavy reliance on treaties and international institutions; a more humble (and, often, apologetic) U.S. presence around the globe, and a diminishment of U.S. hard power. And the Obama Doctrine has reaped pretty much the same results. When asked if he feared a U.S. military strike against his country's nuclear program, the Iranian president scoffed at the notion. Meanwhile, after yielding to Russian complaints and canceling plans to build missile defenses against an Iranian attack, Obama signed an arms control treaty which, the Kremlin boasts, will further limit our missile defense. Yet Moscow still complains that the more limited system the Obama administration wants to field is too much. Once again, American concessions have only encouraged Moscow to be more aggressive. Even in Iraq and Afghanistan, the White House's commitments are laced with qualifiers that encourage our nation's friends and enemies to doubt U.S. resolve. Put simply, if
President Obama continues to pursue a Carteresque foreign policy -- talking softly while whittling away at the stick -- he will only put American lives and the prospects of peace at greater jeopardy.
Aff
Non-unique
General
The United States have been using a policy of appeasement for 30 years Iran Proves Holleran, 2012 journalist for the LA times and the San Francisco Inquirer (Scott, 30 years of Appeasing Iran, CNN News, 10/1, http://cnsnews.com/blog/scottholleran/30-years-appeasing-iran)//RG Every [Iranian] leader since Khomeini has threatened America with jihad including by nuclear meansand every U.S. administration has responded with coddling and cooperation. Appeasement began within months of Khomeinis takeover and the embassy attack and despite the act of war, the U.S. did not launch a military counterstrike to the assaultever. 1979 was the beginning of a repeat cycle; Iran would attackthe U.S. would appeaseand Iran would attack harder and deeper. For example, President Carter
redefined Iran's initial act of war as a crisis and, after he negotiated a hostage release, Iran attacked our Marinescausing Reagan to withdraw troopswhich encouraged Iran to attack Americans everywhere. This included ordering the assassination of writer Salman Rushdie, and threatening to bomb his U.S. publisher and bookstores, prompting the first President Bush to abandon defense of Americans at homein turn causing Iran to attack more Americans. By the time a Clinton administration official declared in 1997 that America has nothing against an Islamic government in Iran, Iran was on its way to bombing the U.S. Navy and co -sponsoring 9/11. After 9/11, the second President Bushs secretary of state sought to negotiate with Iran for help in the war against the Talibanhelp from an Islamicist dictatorship in a war against an Islamicist dictatorshiprevealing America as a paper tiger. In each instance of U.S.
appeasement, Iran escalated both the scale and severity of its attacks. Under President Obama, who campaigned pledging cooperation, Iran has continued its advance toward nuclear weapons. History shows that appeasement leads to mass murder and that, from 1979 to 9/11, Iranian-sponsored attacks are often launched with secrecy and surprise. With the looming reality of an atomic Iran, we need an urgent end to appeasement.
Venezuela/ Cuba
The Obama Administration has been using a policy of appeasement towards Cuba and Venezuela since his election Boothroyd, 12 journalist and political activist for Venezuelan Analysis (Rachel, Republicans vow to halt Policy of Appeasment in Venezuela, Venezuelan Analysis, 9/23, http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/7283)//RG Republican nominee for Vice-President of the U.S., Paul Ryan, has vowed that a Romney administration would get tough on Castro, tough on Chavez and to end what he described as a policy of appeasement applied by the Obama administration towards both Cuba and Venezuela. Ryan made the comments from the Versailles Restaurant in Miami, Florida last Saturday, where he was accompanied by staunch members of the anti-Castro lobby, including Republican Representative, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. Ros-Lehtinen is a member of the Cuban-American Lobby and the Congressional Cuban Democracy Caucus; organizations which claim to be aimed at speeding up Cubas transition to democracy. "In a Mitt Romney administration, we will not keep practicing this policy of appeasement; we will be tough on this brutal dictator (Castro). All it has done is reward more despotism... We will help those pro-democracy groups. We will be tough on Castro, tough on Chavez. And it's because we know that's the right policy for our country, said Ryan. The nominee had reportedly travelled to Florida in a bid to win over the majority Latino vote two months ahead of the US elections. Florida is currently thought to be a swing state and could prove a determining vote for the overall election results. Results of a recent voter intention poll in the state carried out by NBC news show that Obama currently has a 5% lead over Romney, with a voting intention of 49% to 44%. I learned from these friends, from Mario (Diaz-Balart), from Lincoln (Diaz-Balart), from Ileana (Ros-Lehtinen), just how brutal the Castro regime is, just how this president's policy of appeasement is not working. They've given me a great education, lots of us in Congress, about how we need to clamp down on the Castro regime, said Ryan. According to Ros-Lehtinen, Ryan is now a loyal friend to those who campaign on Cuba-related political issues.
Cuba
Non-uniqueObama appeasing Cuba now Diaz-Balart 12 (Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart represents the 21st congressional district in South Florida; August 21, 2012; Mario
Diaz-Balart: Obama has Pursued Policy Appeasement; Fox News Latino; http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/08/21/mario-diaz-balart-obama-has-pursued-policy-appeasement-toward-castroregime/)
These compliments and the fact that they were not disavowed by the White House come as no surprise, given President Obamas appeasing stance regarding anti-American totalitarian regimes. Since he took office in January 2009, President
Obama has pursued a policy of appeasement toward the totalitarian Cuban dictatorship. Despite the Castro brothers harboring of international terrorists and their increasingly relentless oppression of the Cuban people, President Obama weakened U.S. sanctions and has increased the flow of dollars to the dictatorship. In response, the Castro brothers amped up their repression of the Cuban people and imprisoned American humanitarian aid worker Alan Gross for the crime of taking humanitarian aide to Cubas small Jewish community. Clearly, President Obama is not concerned about the threat posed by the Cuban dictatorship, nor has he manifested genuine solidarity with the prodemocracy aspirations of the Cuban people. - U.S. Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart, R-Fla. The Cuban people are protesting in the streets and demanding freedom. But rather than supporting the growing, courageous pro-democracy movement, President Obama
instead has chosen to appease their oppressors. While President Obama claims that his policies aim to assist the oppressed Cuban people, his actions betray that he is not on their side. You
cannot credibly claim to care about the oppressed while working out side deals with their oppressors and welcoming the oppressors elite into the United States with open arms. And you cannot claim to support political prisoners while increasing the flow of dollars to their jailers. The failures of the Obama administration in Cuba are not an isolated foreign policy failure.
Around the world, President Obama has taken an approach of appeasement when it comes to some of our most virulent enemies. In addition to Cuba, from Iran to Syria to Venezuela, President Obama has shown an unwillingness to stand firm when anti-American forces threaten our interests, and his weakness has emboldened Americas enemies. If we are goin g to reassert our position in the world, we need a change at the top.
Engagement/Appeasement Good
General
Only engagement solves for creating pro-West stateshistory proves Dorn 06-- a China specialist and co-editor of Chinas Future: Constructive Partner or Emerging Threat? (James A., Economic Engagement Makes Sense, CATO Institute, 10/11, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/economic-engagement-makes-sense)//BJ It is curious why the senators have persisted in their effort when they clearly know protectionist measures would impose a heavy tax on U.S. consumers (in the form of higher prices for Chinese-made goods), harm U.S. companies doing business in China, alienate reformers in Beijing, embolden hardliners, and invite retaliation. Rather than listen to Senators Schumer and Graham, the new Congress would be wise to follow a policy of long-term strategic economic engagement, as advocated by Secretary Paulson. Unlike the two senators, who have visited China only once, in March of this year, Mr. Paulson, former CEO of Goldman Sachs, has visited China many times and has a deep understanding of its financial markets. In a major policy speech in Washington, just prior to his trip to Beijing last month, the secretary argued, Protectionist policies do not work and the collateral damage from these policies is high. He also believes that increasing economic freedom in China will eventually lead to political reform, as it has in other countries. However, we should not expect this to happen overnight; patience is a virtue. The important thing is to keep China moving in the direction of economic liberalism. The reason is simple, said Paulson: Economic liberalizationwith the interdependence and the growth that it bringscan play an important role in advancing the cause of peace and stability. Although it is proper to criticize China for its human rights violations, its lack of a transparent legal system, and its violations of intellectual property rights, we should not ignore the substantial progress China has made since it embarked on economic liberalization in 1978. U.S. economic security, as well as Chinas, will depend on promoting economic liberalism, rather than fostering protectionism. Any missteps that weaken the liberal global economic order and fuel economic nationalism will undermine a constructive U.S.-China policy of engagement. We must not repeat the mistakes of the 1930s, when the Smoot-Hawley tariff and monetary policy errors effectively ended the liberal international order. Free trade and financial integration are essential for prosperity and peace. As Cordell Hull, U.S. secretary of state from 1933 to 1944, wrote, Unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic competition with war. Beijing can help resolve global imbalances by moving toward a more flexible exchange rate regime and liberalizing capital outflows so that there will be less pressure on the Peoples Bank of China to accumulate foreign reserves. Delaying adjustment means faster accumulation of reserves, greater risk of capital losses by holding dollar assets, and a stronger incentive to diversify. Delay also means an increasing threat of inflation as Chinas central bank creates new yuan to buy dollars. It is thus in Chinas interest, as well as in the interest of the United States, to move forward on this issue. Meanwhile, Congress needs to get its house in order by limiting the growth of government spending and reducing taxes on capital. Most important, the U.S. needs to practice what it preaches about free trade. Appeasement good empirically solves conflicts, the WWII comparison is moot Record 8 (Jeffrey, defense policy critic and teaches strategy at the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama, Summer 2008, Retiring Hitler and Appeasement from the National Security
Debate, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/08summer/record. pdf) jy Appeasement, which became a politically charged term only after World War II, actually means to pacify, quiet, or satisfy, especially by giving in to the demands of, according to Websters New World Dictionary and Thesaurus, which goes on to list synonyms including amends, settlement, reparation, conciliation, and compromise.13 These terms are consistent with what most historians and international relations theorists understand to be the phe nomenon of appeasement: states seeking to adjust or settle their differences by measures short of war. Theorist Stephen Rock defines appeasement as simply the policy of reducing tensions with ones adversary by removing the causes of conflict and disagreement,14 a definition echoed by political scientists Gordon Craig and Alexander George: the reduction of tension between *two states] by the methodical removal of the principal causes of conflict and disagreement between them.15 Thus Richard Nixon was guilty of appeasing Communist China in 1972 by embracing Beijings one-China policy, and Ronald Reagan was guilty of appeasing the Soviet Union in 1987 by resolving tensions with Moscow over actual and planned deployments of intermediaterange nuclear forces in Europe. Unfortunately, Anglo-French behavior toward Nazi Germany gave appeasement such a bad name that the term is no longer usable except as a political pejorative. Before Munich, however, observes historian Paul Kennedy, the policy of settling international . . . quarrels by admitting and satisfyinggrievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to an armed conflict which would be expensive, bloody, and possibly very dangerous was generally viewed as constructive, positive, and honorable.16 Five years after World War II, Winston Churchill, the great anti-appeaser of Hitler, declared, Appeasement in itself may be good or bad according to the circumstances. Appeasement from weakness and fear is alike futile and fatal. He added, Appeasement from strength is magnanimous and noble, and might be the surest and only path to world peace.17 An oft-cited case of successful appeasement from a position of strength is Great Britains resolution of disputes with the United States from 1896 to1903.18 By the 1890s the number and power of Britains enemies were growing. Britain had no great-power allies and faced rising challenges from Germany and Russia coupled with continuing tensions with France and the United States. Tensions with industrially expanding and increasingly bellicose Germany became especially acute when in 1898 Berlin gratuitously moved to challenge British naval supremacy in European waters. Accordingly, Britain decided to reduce the potential demands on its military power by resolving outstanding disputes with the United States and France. With respect to the United States, it agreed to American demands that Britain explicitly accept the Monroe Doctrine; submit British Guianas border dispute with Venezuela to international arbitration; agree to US construction, operation, and fortification of an interoceanic canal through Central America; and settle an Alaskan-Canadian border dispute in Americas favor. None of these concessions involved vital British security interests, which in fact were advanced by transforming the worlds greatest industrial power from a potential enemy into a friend (and later indispensable ally). Accepting US dominance within the Western Hemisphere not only laid the foundation of American entry on Britains side in World War I; it also permitted a British naval evacuation of the hemisphere for operations in European waters.Meaning of the Word Use of the Munich analogy not only twists the meaning of appeasement; it also ignores the extraordinary nature of the Nazi German threat. Though the analogys power to persuade is undeniable, Nazi Germany remains without equal as a state threat. Genuinely Hitlerian security threats to the United States have not been replicated since 1945. The scope of
Hitlers nihilism, recklessness, military power, and territorial-racial ambitions posed a mortal threat to western civilization, and there was nothing inevitable about his ultimate defeat. No other authoritarian or totalitarian regime ever employed such a powerful military instrument in such an aggressive manner on behalf of such a monstrous agenda. Hitler was simultaneously unappeasable and undeterrablea rare combination that made war the only means of bringing him down.He understood that he could not achieve his international ambitions without war, and no territorial or political concessions the democracies might offer him would ever be enough. Empirics disproveappeasement is the most effective strategy when dealing with rogue states Scoblic 8-- executive editor of the New Republic, is the author of "U.S. vs. Them: How a Half Century of Conservatism Has Undermined America's Security" (J. Peter, It's 2008, not 1938, Los Angeles Times, May 17, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/may/17/opinion/oescoblic17)//BJ But if there is anything that has been discredited by history, it is the argument that every enemy is Hitler, that negotiations constitute appeasement, and that talking will automatically lead to a slaughter of Holocaust-like proportions. It is an argument that conservatives made throughout the Cold War, and, if the charge seemed overblown at the time, it seems positively ludicrous with the clarity of hindsight. The modern conservative movement was founded in no small part on the idea that presidents Truman and Eisenhower were "appeasing" the Soviets. The logic went something like this: Because communism was evil, the United States should seek to destroy it, not coexist with it; the bipartisan policy of containment, which sought to prevent the further spread of communism, was a moral and strategic folly because it implied long-term coexistence with Moscow. Conservative foreign policy guru James Burnham wrote entire books claiming that containment -- which, after the Cold War, would be credited with defeating the Soviet Union -- constituted "appeasement." Instead, conservatives agitated for the rollback of communism, and they opposed all negotiations with the Soviets. When Eisenhower welcomed Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev to the United States in 1959, William F. Buckley Jr., the right's leader, complained that the act of "diplomatic sentimentality" signaled the "death rattle of the West." Conservatives even applied this critique to one of the most dangerous moments in human history: the Cuban missile crisis, during which the United States and the Soviet Union nearly came to nuclear blows over Moscow's deployment of missiles 90 miles off the American coast. When President Kennedy successfully negotiated a peaceful conclusion to the crisis, conservative icon Barry Goldwater protested that he had appeased the Soviets by promising not to invade Cuba if they backed down. The Soviets withdrew their missiles in what was widely seen as a humiliation to Khrushchev, but Goldwater believed that Kennedy's diplomacy gave "the communists one of their greatest victories in their race for world power that they have enjoyed to date." To Goldwater, it was far preferable to risk nuclear war with the Soviets than to give up our right to roll back Fidel Castro. Indeed, conservatives considered virtually any attempt to bring the arms race under control as a surrender to communism. When the SALT I agreement capping nuclear arsenals came to Capitol Hill, conservative Rep. John Ashbrook (whose presidential candidacy Buckley supported in 1972) said that "the total history of man indicates we can place very little reliance on treaties or written documents. This is especially true when the agreements are with nations or powers which have aggressive plans. Hitler had plans. Chamberlain's Munich served only to deaden the free world to reality. The communists
have plans. SALT will merely cause us to lower our guard, possibly fatally." A few years later, Sen. Henry "Scoop" Jackson, the elected face of the burgeoning neoconservative movement, charged President Carter with "appeasement in its purest form" for negotiating SALT II, which set equal limits on the number of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles and bombers. Ronald Reagan, whose election in 1980 was seen as the culmination of the conservative movement, dubbed SALT II "appeasement" as well, but the trope would come back to bite him. Although Reagan pleased the right enormously during his first three years in office with his military expansion, his call for rollback and his advocacy of missile defenses, conservatives reacted with horror once he began serious negotiations with the Soviets. When he and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987, which for the first time eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons, Buckley's National Review dubbed it "suicide." The Conservative Caucus took out a full-page newspaper ad saying "Appeasement is as unwise in 1988 as in 1938." It paired photos of Reagan and Gorbachev with photos of Neville Chamberlain and Hitler. Containment, negotiation, nuclear stability -- each of these things helped protect the United States and end the Cold War. And yet, at the time, conservatives thought each was synonymous with appeasement. The Bush administration has been little different, refusing for years to talk to North Korea or Iran about their nuclear programs because it wanted to defeat evil, not talk to it. The result was that Pyongyang tested a nuclear weapon and Iran's uranium program continued unfettered. (By contrast, when the administration negotiated with Libya -an act that its chief arms controller, John Bolton, had previously derided as, yes, "appeasement" -- it succeeded in eliminating Tripoli's nuclear program.) Alas, John McCain accused President Clinton of "appeasement" for engaging North Korea, instead calling for "rogue state rollback," and now he dismisses the idea of negotiations with Iran. Given conservatism's historical record, Obama's inclination to negotiate seems only sensible. When will conservatives learn that it is 2008, not 1938?
Venezuela
Venezuelan appeasement will lead to disaster for USMaduro actions prove Cardenas 13 (Jose R., former Chief of Staff, Senior Advisor, and Speechwriter for the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs in the US Department of State, former Acting Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean of USAID, former Senior Advisor to the Secretary General of the OAS (Organization of American States), former Senior Professional Staff Member of U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 06/14/13, Shadow Government, How Not to Treat the Neighborhood Bully.) Instead, this is what we have seen from the Maduro government in the last few months: Accused the United States of giving Chvez his cancer Repeatedly accused the United States of fomenting instability in Venezuela, including alleging that former U.S. officials had entered the country to poison him Expelled two U.S. military attachs from the U.S. Embassy, accusing them of destabilizing the country Insulted Obama as "the big boss of the devils" Arrested a U.S. filmmaker (subsequently released) on spurious charges of espionage Accused the United States of trying to assassinate Capriles and make it look like it was the government Accused former Colombian President lvaro Uribe of trying to assassinate Maduro Accused the opposition of purchasing 18 U.S. warplanes to be based in Colombia Accused Salvadoran mercenaries of trying to kill Maduro Denounced the Peruvian foreign minister for suggesting that Latin American countries could help mediate political tensions in Venezuela (the minister was forced to resign) Accused CNN of fomenting a coup against his government More closely aligned Venezuela with the Castros' Cuba than anything ever seen under Chvez Not exactly what you would call a charm offensive. Indeed, the only thing we have seen from the Maduro government since its tainted victory is an accelerated offensive to replace the Castro regime as the bully in the Latin American neighborhood, using threats both explicit and implicit to intimidate anyone daring to criticize its anti-democratic actions. Rewarding bad behavior is no way to treat a bully. Moreover, one does not have to be Bismarck to recognize that indulgence of belligerent actions among states only encourages more aberrant behavior. Most frustrating is that, unlike Chvez, Maduro's vitriol and bombast are a reflection of his weakness, not his strength. Clearly, he is in over his head, commands no respect at home, has disputed legitimacy, and is manifestly incapable of managing the socioeconomic disaster bequeathed by Chvez. In such a scenario, he desperately needs U.S. recognition of his regime, and it is now being handed to him on a silver platter, with no apparent concessions being demanded of him. That isn't statesmanship; it's an abdication of it. Maduro and his Cuban minders are avowed enemies of the United States. Throwing them a "lifeline" -- as the Washington Post put it in a blistering editorial -- with some wooly hope that they will see the error of their ways will only succeed in inviting an even worse situation for U.S. interests than the one we are confronting now.
Link TurnEngagement Increases Credibility
General
Engagement is a PREREQUISITE to successful sanctionsincreases American credibility and forges international cooperation Baker et al 2Kpresident for the Fund for Peace, adjunct professor in the Graduate School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University (Pauline H., Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, p. 162)//BJ Engagement strategies, if tried and found unsuccessful, can build support for sanctions or military force among other countries, particularly given the international reputation of the United States as biased in favor of punitive action. Given that multilateral action is almost always preferable to unilateral action, a failed engagement strategy can still be a success. This paradox is demonstrated most clearly in the case of Iraq. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 revealed that previous US attempts to engage Saddam Hussein had abjectly failed. The diversity and breadth of the international coalition that America forged, and the successful military campaign that followed from it, are well known. As Kenneth Juster points out, American efforts to mobilize this coalition were greatly facilitated by the fact that the United States had pursued a policy that sough cooperation with Iraq for the years preceding the invasion. This earlier policy prevented Iraqs Arab neighbors, who had urged the United States to engage Saddam Hussein in the late 1980s, from justifying the invasion of Kuwait on the grounds that it was an Iraqi response to American pressure. Instead, previous engagement efforts have the Bush administration credibility, which allowed it to garner support beyond its traditional allies for both sanctions and military force. US hardline policies worsen anti-US sentiment across Latin America engagement is key to increased US credibilityturns the DA Griffin 13-- a Crimson editorial writer (John A., Engage with Venezuela, The Harvard Crimson, 4/3, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/4/3/Harvard-Venezuela-Chavez-death/)//BJ When Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez died in early February, his country was thrown into a period of national mourning as the political equilibrium in Latin America hung in the balance. As Venezuela chooses its next president, Washington should seek to reverse the current trend of acrid relations between the two nations and engage with the Venezuelan government in Caracas toward stability and prosperity in the Western hemisphere. While it might seem likely that relations between the United States and Venezuela would naturally improve after the death of the combative Chvez, the opposite now seems more likely. Before passing away, Chvez had handpicked a successor in Nicholas Maduro, who has assumed power in the interim before the presidential election in April. As Chvezs handpicked successor, Maduro has already continued with his mentors trend of using anti-American rhetoric to bring popularity to his government, even declaring that American agents may have infected Chvez with the cancer that killed him. While Washington has officially declared that it is committed to a more functional relationship with Venezuela, its actions have not been consistent with this idea: The United States offered no official condolences for Chvezs death, and both nations have started expelling diplomats from the other. Neither nation, it seems, is steering toward more congenial relations with the other. Admittedly, the United States has good reason to be less than enthused about more Chvez-style governance in Venezuela. Calling himself a 21st-century socialist, Chvez nationalized the lucrative oil industry, developed strong trade and diplomatic relationships with Iran and Cuba, repeatedly decried the United States as an imperialist force,
and cooperated with the Iranians in developing nuclear technology. Engaging in petty diplomatexpulsion spats, however, is no way to deal with any of these problems, and it in fact only strengthens the Chavistas hold on their country. The diplomatic and economic opportunities that would stem from greater engagement would far outweigh the meager benefits reaped from our current policies . Diplomatically, positive engagement with Venezuela would be a major step toward building American credibility in the world at large , especially in Latin America. Chvez (along with his friends the Castros in Cuba) was able to bolster regional support for his regime by pointing out the United States attempts to forcibly intervene in Venezuelan politics. Soon, a number of populist governments in Latin America had rallied around Chvez and his anti-American policies. In 2004, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and three Caribbean nations joined with Venezuela and Cuba to form the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America, an organization in direct opposition to the Free Trade Area in the Americas proposed (but never realized) by the Bush administration. Chvez galvanized these nationsmany of whom have experienced American interventionist tacticsby vilifying America as a common, imperial enemy. Unfortunately for the United States, its general strategy regarding Venezuela has often strengthened Chvezs position. Every time Washington chastises Venezuela for opposing American interests or attempts to bring sanctions against the Latin American country, the leader in Caracas (whether it be Chvez or Maduro) simply gains more evidence toward his claim that Washington is a neo-colonialist meddler. This weakens the United States diplomatic position, while simultaneously strengthening Venezuelas. If Washington wants Latin America to stop its current trend of electing leftist, Chavista governments, its first step should be to adopt a less astringent tone in dealing with Venezuela. Caracas will be unable to paint Washington as an aggressor, and Washington will in turn gain a better image in Latin America. Beyond leading to more amicable, cooperative relationships with Latin American nations, engagement with Venezuela would also be economically advisable. With the worlds largest oil reserves, countless other valuable resources, and stunning natural beauty to attract scores of tourists, Venezuela has quite a bit to offer economically. Even now, America can see the possible benefits of economic engagement with Caracas by looking at one of the few extant cases of such cooperation: Each year, thousands of needy Americans are able to keep their homes heated because of the cooperation between Venezuela and a Boston-area oil company. Engagement with Venezuela would also lead to stronger economic cooperation with the entirety of Latin America. It was mostly through Venezuelas efforts that the United States was unable to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas, an endeavor that would have eliminated most trade barriers among participant nations, thereby leading to more lucrative trade. In a world where the United States and Venezuela were to enjoy normalized relations, all nations involved would benefit from such agreements. For both diplomatic and economic reasons, then, positive engagement is the best course of action for the United States. As it stands, the negative relationship between the countries has created an atmosphere of animosity in the hemisphere, hindering dialogue and making economic cooperation nearly impossible. While there is much for which the Venezuelan government can rightly be criticizedauthoritarian rule, abuse of human rights, lack of market-friendly policiesnothing that the United States is doing to counter those drawbacks is having any effect. The United States should stop playing tough guy with Venezuela, bite the bullet, and work toward stability and prosperity for the entire hemisphere. We arent catching any flies with our vinegarits high time we started trying to catch them with honey.
Turn: Hardline policies decrease American credibility--increase nuclear proliferation Conway 03-- the Vice Chairman of Cargill; its Director since 2008; Corporate Vice President of Cargill, Inc. and N.V. Cargill; Director of US-China Business Council and U.S.-India Business Council (Paul Daniel, Sanctions of Engagement? Designing U.S. Diplomatic Policy Tools to Confront Nuclear Proliferation in Iran, North Korea, India, and Pakistan, p. 17)//BJ Indeed, sanctions have, in fact, been the U.S. foreign policy tool of choice in promoting nonproliferation. To date, however, these existing policies have had limited success. Gary Hufbauer et al.. examined 116 instances of cases of economic sanctions employed between 1914-1990, and concluded that over 60% did not achieve their stated objectives, and those that did were only partially successful. Where sanctions have been imposed to prevent nuclear proliferation their efficacy has been very low. This, proponents of the sanctions approach argue, is because the conditions in which economic sanctions have been imposed regarding nuclear proliferation have not met the criteria usually required for a successful sanctions outcome. That is, the sanctioning state (e.g. the United States) has not had a close relationship with the weaker sanctioned partner, has not dominated its import-export trade and has required more than a small change in policy. Thus, in 1992 when the United States imposed sanctions against North Korea, the sanctions had no effect at all, since U.S. trade with North Korea was already proscribed. Nor have sanctions prevented nuclear proliferation in Iran (which has been treated as a pariah by the United States since its 1979 Islamic Revolution). The reasons for the ineffectiveness of sanctions against India and Pakistan must be sought elsewhere than in the absence of thick economic intercourse. It is clear, however, that they have had counterproductive results. They have alienated significant sectors of the Indian strategic affairs community while increasing Indias self-reliance on critical military technologies. In Pakistan, sanctions have resulted in feelings of abandonment and an erosion of American influence, which has opened the door to more fanatical and hostile factions. Margaret Doxey, one of the most influential experts on sanctions, concludes that sanctions will not succeed in drastically altering the foreign and military policy of the target. Moreover, a sanctions policy can be counterproductive when it relies too heavily on negative pressures with little or no prospect for positive incentives. Turn: Protectionist policies towards Cuba undermines US credibility in Europe Haass and OSullivan 2K-- *Formerly a senior aide to President George Bush; Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, Washington DC; author of The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War AND **Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (Richard N., Meghan L, Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies Brookings Institution, Surivival, volume 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pg. 15, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000surv ival.pdf)//BJ Although the peaceful transition of Cuba to a democratic, market-oriented country remains the ultimate goal of the US, the context in which this aim can be pursued has altered significantly. When stringent US sanctions were placed on Cuba in 1962, Cuba posed a threat to the US as
an outpost of communism in the Western hemisphere and an ardent exporter of revolution to its neighbours. However, almost 40 years later and in the wake of the Cold War, Cubas importance has dwindled and its ability to promote radical politics among its democratising neighbours has evaporated almost entirely. Not only has much of the rationale for isolating Cuba collapsed, but US policy towards the country in particular the imposition of secondary sanctions has created tensions with Americas European allies that outweigh Cubas importance. Finally, Americas sanctions-dominated policy towards Cuba demands reevaluation because it is warping the message that the United States sends to potentially moderating rogue regimes elsewhere. Cuba remains on the terrorism list (a grouping of countries designated by the US as state sponsors of terrorism), even in the absence of a Cuban-sponsored terrorist act for many years. This discrepancy signals to others on the terrorism list that their renouncement of terrorism will not necessarily free them from the designation or from the many sanctions associated with it. Despite the many good reasons to reassess US policy towards Cuba today, formidable obstacles have thus far prevented the sort of policy overhaul needed. Most importantly, sections of the Cuban-American community have vehemently opposed any policy changes which would confer legitimacy on Castro or possibly prolong his rule. Nevertheless, recent generational changes have opened possibilities for moderates to gain prominence in this community. In addition, the growing number of American farmers and businessmen expressing interest in doing business in Cuba indicates the existence of at least one influential domestic US constituency favouring engagement. Rather than maintaining the status quo, the US should simultaneously pursue two forms of engagement with Cuba. First, it should actively seek out Castros willingness to engage in a conditional relationship and to chart a course towards more satisfactory relations. It should attempt to strike a dialogue with Castro in which reasonable benefits are offered to him in return for reasonable changes. Rather than accentuating the desire for a regime change or immediate democratic elections, US policy-makers should make lesser goals the focus of their policy, as the more ambitious the demands, the less likely Castro is to enter into a process of engagement. For instance, the release of political prisoners and the legitimisation of political parties might be offered in exchange Diplomatic isolations undermine US credibility in the regionengagement is key Oxford Analytical 11 (VENEZUELA/US: Diplomatic vacuum erodes influence, Oxford Analytical Daily Brief Service, 1/4, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/abicomplete/docview/822221411/13F67DF9A 954BB59BC4/7?accountid=14667)//BJ EVENT:The United States expelled Venezuelan Ambassador Bernardo Alvarez on December 29 following Venezuelan rejection of the US ambassador-designate to Caracas. SIGNIFICANCE:While the move will not impact already strained bilateral ties, the diplomatic vacuum will further erode US leverage at a significant juncture in Venezuelan politics. ANALYSIS: After the serious deterioration in Venezuelan-US relations during the presidency of George W Bush, there was much optimism that President Barack Obama's government would improve bilateral ties. When Obama acceded to office, Washington had no ambassadorial representation in Venezuela following the expulsion of the US ambassador to Venezuela, Patrick Duddy, and his Venezuelan counterpart, Bernardo Alvarez, in September 2008 ( see VENEZUELA/US: Expulsion marks new low in relations - September 12, 2008). Venezuela's 2008 move to revoke US ambassadorial representation was taken in solidarity with the Bolivian government, which expelled the US ambassador for alleged links to violent anti-government
protests (see BOLIVIA: Opposition offensive generates uncertainty - September 11, 2008). Alvarez was subsequently expelled by the US State Department in a tit-for-tat retaliation. Cordiality to crisis. In what was seen as an important first step in diplomatic rapprochement, Washington and Caracas announced the restoration of ambassadors in June 2009. However, the United States has had no ambassadorial representation in Venezuela since outgoing Duddy left his post in July 2010, and rather than improving, bilateral relations have remained frozen. Points of sustained contention for Venezuela in its relations with the United States include: continuing US federal funding of Venezuelan opposition groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) -- an estimated 40 million dollars per year is channelled through US agencies, including the National Endowment for Democracy; claims of persistent US violation of Venezuelan sovereignty in relation to the conduct of its foreign affairs and defence acquisitions; and unsubstantiated US allegations of corruption, drug trafficking, sponsorship of terrorism and human rights violations by the Venezuelan government. President Hugo Chavez and senior Venezuelan officials maintain that there is strong continuity in ideological perspective between the Bush and Obama governments. Chavez frequently claims US endorsement of the removal of President Manuel Zelaya in Honduras as evidence that Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton share the 'imperialist' vision of the preceding Republican administration, while continuity in State Department personnel has fuelled continuing Venezuelan suspicion that US efforts to destabilise the Chavez administration continues. The release by WikiLeaks of the 2007 document, 'A Southern Cone perspective on countering Chavez and reasserting US leadership', detailing State Department strategies to isolate Chavez, has confirmed this deep unease, specifically as the document's author, Craig Kelly, is currently principal deputy assistant secretary of state. Renewed ambassadorial friction. The Venezuelan government had made clear from the outset its opposition to the nomination of Larry Palmer as Duddy's replacement (see VENEZUELA/US: Bilateral relations to remain tense - July 14, 2010). Palmer's background as a promoter of free markets (he was a strong advocate of the North American Free Trade Agreement) and his role as ambassador to the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Paraguay and Honduras catalysed an antagonistic response, but particularly problematic was his background as president of the InterAmerican Foundation. This federally funded organisation sponsors NGOs in Central and Latin America, engaging in the kind of activities that the Chavez government considers a Trojan horse for the destabilisation of foreign governments. Making the current diplomatic crisis all the more predictable was the publication in July 2010 of a written response from Palmer to questions from Republican Senator Richard Lugar. This detailed Palmer's view that morale in the Venezuelan armed forces was low and the Venezuelan government was supporting rebel groups in Colombia through the provision of trafficking corridors, weapons and safe havens. This reconfirmed the Venezuelan government's position that Palmer had no mandate for diplomacy and was a threat to Venezuela's national security. Amid a flurry of domestic legislative initiatives during the Christmas period, the Venezuelan government withdrew agreement for Palmer as ambassador-designate, prompting the State Department to rescind the diplomatic visa of Alvarez, who has served in the United States for the last seven years. Diplomatic vacuum. Although the State Department has emphasised its commitment to restoring dialogue and diplomatic relations, it is unlikely that the Chavez government will prioritise this: On a foreign policy level, the Venezuelan administration has advanced its vision of a multipolar world order (see VENEZUELA: Multipolar diplomacy will not boost Chavez - November 2, 2010). Relations with Russia, China, Iran and hemispheric neighbours (including vastly improved links with Colombia) have diluted dependence on US commercial ties while impeding the possibility of US recourse to a strategy of isolating
Venezuela. Anti-Americanism is a valuable tool by which the Venezuelan government can legitimise contentious initiatives such as the new law on Political Sovereignty and National SelfDetermination, which prohibits foreign funding of political parties and NGOs. Perceived US threats to Venezuelan sovereignty can also provoke a nationalist backlash in Venezuela that will strengthen Chavez in the run-up to the 2012 presidential election. There is a strong view in Venezuelan government circles that the window of opportunity to work with Obama has now closed and that the US president is now a significantly weakened political figure. In this context, the absence of a US diplomatic presence on Venezuelan territory is read as a strengthening of state sovereignty that limits the potential for US meddling in domestic affairs. US loss?. There is a strong argument that the State Department overplayed its hand in this current spat. Palmer was a deeply contentious figure, whose nomination was easily read -- not only by Venezuela but also other regional governments -- as an incitement to further friction. Without ambassadorial representation in Venezuela, Washington finds itself on the margins as the country moves into a decisive phase for the future of the Chavez government, and as hemispheric efforts to mediate between Chavez and his opponents look likely to be stepped up amid deepening polarisation and the threat of renewed political instability ( see PROSPECTS 2011: Venezuela - November 25, 2010). As the impact of highly contentious manoeuvres in Venezuela's National Assembly take effect (including the granting of decree powers to Chavez for 18 months), the United States will be limited to ineffective megaphone diplomacy that will embolden Chavez rather than force concessions from his administration. This new impasse in US-Venezuela ties comes as the Obama administration struggles to determine a viable foreign policy course in the hemisphere and faces mounting pressure from right-wing Republicans in Congress to adopt a more aggressive stand against 'authoritarianism' in the Americas. The goal of progressive Latin American governments was to build bridges to Obama as a means of insulating his administration from US right-wingers. This has now been jettisoned, with Chavez in particular keen to expose Obama as a lame-duck president. CONCLUSION: Conflictive forces from the Venezuelan left and US right may insert themselves into the diplomatic vacuum caused by the withdrawal of ambassadorial representation. This will deepen mutual suspicion and misunderstanding.
Cuba
Appeasing Cuba would re-establish US Credibility St. Louis Post-Dispatch 13 (U.S. trade embargo with Cuba needs to change. Distributed by Creators Syndicate, Inc. Reprinted from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. 2013, http://www.creators.com/opinion/daily-editorials/u-s-trade-embargo-with-cubaneeds-to-change.html) About 35 percent of the Cubans in South Florida broke ranks with the Republican party to vote for Obama, a Democrat. His support was especially strong among younger Cuban-American voters, many of whom don't share the animosities of their fathers and mothers. Lifting the embargo would be in the best interests of the United States in several ways: Economic. Although Cuba is just a blip on the global economic radar, it is a mere 90 miles from Florida and offers new markets to U.S. farmers and businesses. Strategic. Lifting the embargo would re-establish U.S. credibility throughout the Caribbean, Central and South America. It would deflect Cuba's public flirtations with Russia, China and Venezuela. Brainpower. Cubans are poor but well-educated and literate at levels above other developing Latin American countries. It offers a trove of doctors and teachers, as well as a population hungry for access to the democratizing effects of the Internet, cell phones and personal technology. Humanitarian. Two generations of families in both countries have been tormented and divided. Families should be reunited, and Americans should be allowed to enjoy the ecological and cultural splendor of the island.
US Credibility not Key

US credibility not keyIsrael deters Iran from lashing out Gordon 12-- a journalist and commentator in Israel, a reporter for the Jerusalem Post, works for the English edition of Haaretz; a contributing editor of the Israeli quarterly Azure, a JINSA Visiting Fellow (Evelyn, Iranian Report Shows U.S. Needs Credible Military Threat, Commentary Magazine, 11/14, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2012/11/14/iranianreport-shows-u-s-needs-credible-military-threat/)//BJ If Washington is serious about stopping Irans nuclear program, the report it really ought to pay attention to isnt the International Atomic Energy Agencys latest, important though its information on Irans progress is. Rather, its the one issued last week by Irans own Intelligence Ministry, which advocates diplomatic negotiations to avert the threat of a Zionist attack. As Haaretz Arab affairs analyst Zvi Barel wrote, this report is noteworthy for several reasons. One is that Intelligence Minister Heydar Moslehi is close to Irans supreme leader and decision-maker, Ali Khamenei, who even forced President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to retain Moslehi when the president wanted to fire him last year. Another is that Khamenei posted the report on his own website and has shown it to Western leaders. In other words, theres good reason to think this report reflects Khameneis own thinking. That makes it worth paying attention to what it sayswhich is equally noteworthy. First, as Barel pointed out, the report advocates negotiations, not in response to economic sanctions, but due to the threat of military action. Second, this threat doesnt come from America: The report doesnt even mention the prospect of American military action, and in fact concludes that Washington doesnt consider Irans nuclear program a threat. What concerns the ministry is the threat of Israeli military action. Several conclusions follow from these points. First, just as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has claimed all along, the only way it might be possible to get Iran to give up its nuclear program is via a credible military threat. Second, despite President Barack Obamas lip service about keeping the military option on the table and his cheerleaders insistence that he isnt bluffing and really will take military action against Iran if necessary, the Iranians themselves dont believe itand theyre the ones who matter. Third, despite the enormous effort the administration has invested in trying to deter Israeli military action against Iran, the Iranians still think Israel might defy Washington and attack, and they also believe Israel is capable of inflicting enough damage that theyve decided adopting a political-diplomatic policy and exploiting the potential of international organizations is a necessary course of action to avoid it. Thats an enormous achievement for Netanyahu: He has kept the Israeli military option credible in Iranian eyes despite the administrations best efforts to undermine it. Finally, however, theres no indication that Iran is willing to actually make concessions on its nuclear program, as opposed to merely engaging in empty negotiations for the sake of forestalling a military attack. And that fact (which should be a warning to anyone who embarks on negotiations with it) may well be related to the fact that the regime considers an Israeli attack damaging but survivable. Thus, while Im all in favor of tougher sanctions, like those Congress is now considering, what the Iranian report shows is that if Washington really wants to
end Irans nuclear program, the thing it needs most is a credible military option. For only if Tehran felt threatened by Americas far superior military might it actually consider abandoning this program.
No Link
There is minimal evidence to support appeasement failurestheir authors are speculating Rock 2Kprofessor of political science @ Vassar College, Ph.D., Government, Cornell University, 1985; M.A., Government, Cornell University, 1982; A.B., Political Science, Miami University, 1979 (Stephen R, Appeasement in International Politics, p. 5)//BJ Although this critique of appeasement is deeply ingrained in the American consciousness, there is surprisingly little evidence to support it [the failure of appeasement]. No systematic analysis of cases of attempted appeasement exist, and there is no reason to believe, a priori, that concessions never work, that it is impossible to satisfy a dissatisfied state or leader. Indeed, simple logic suggests otherwise. Not every statesman is a Hitler or even a Stalin. Not every state that makes demands has unlimited ambitions. As Robert Jervis notes, Our memories of Hitler have tended to obscure the fact that most statesmen are unwilling to pay an exorbitant price for a chance at expansion. More moderate leaders are apt to become defenders of the status quo when they receive significant concessions. Of course the value of these concessions to the status quo power may be high enough to justify resistance and even war, but the demands are not always the tip of an iceberg. To use the more common metaphor, the appetite does not always grow with the eating. As I shall argue later, cases of successful appeasement can be found. But even if they could not, this would not in itself prove the futility of the strategy. Defenders of deterrence have recently argued that, contrary to claims made by critics, most deterrence failures can be attributed mainly to improper implementation of deterrent policy, rather than to flaws in the underlying model of state behavior on which the policy is based. While this dispute remains unresolved, it offers an important lesson to those who would reject appeasement because of its failures, without investigating their causes. Failed attempts at appeasement must be scrutinized in order to determine whether the outcome was primarily the result of policy mistakeswhich could presumably be remedied by policymakersor the consequences of erroneous assumptions made by appeasement about the nature of states and of their interactions. There is also only minimal evidence to support the second major criticism of appeasement: that by undermining a states credibility, it renders later attempts at deterrence futile. Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, in their study of crisis bargaining, found that states did not generally base expectations regarding others behavior on their past actions. Paul Huth and Bruce Russett similarly concluded that, in terms of what makes deterrence work, the defenders past behavior in crises seems to make no systematic difference. Engagement is NOT appeasement Larison, 12 Senior editor for The American Conservative (Daniel, Engagement is not Appeasement, The American Conservative, 12/17, http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/engagement-is-notappeasement/)//RG The former Republican Senator from Nebraska could have been speaking to his former colleagues when he insisted, Engagement wont fix all problems, but
engagement isnt appeasement or surrender or even negotiation its a bridge-building process, an opportunity to better understand others on the basis of mutual self-respect. Cutting off contacts with other regimes doesnt hasten their downfall or weaken their hold on power. On the contrary, such regimes can take advantage of attempts at isolation to suppress dissent, consolidate power, and rally their nations behind them. It is not the purpose of engagement to undermine other regimes. The purpose is and should be to advance the interests of the United States. It is more likely that authoritarian regimes will gradually lose their grip on power if the people in their countries are exposed more regularly to contacts with other nations than if they are shut off from them. Repressive regimes will engage in brutal crackdowns and will violently suppress challenges to their control. That isnt going to change, and it will happen no matter who occupies different Cabinet posts or the White House. That isnt something that the U.S. can normally prevent, nor does the U.S. have the resources to police how all these regimes act in their own countries, but it is something that the U.S. might be able to limit to some degree if it were in a position to influence these regimes. Refusing to engage with these regimes deprives the U.S. of influence. It deprives these regimes of nothing.
No I/L
No US credibility nowinaction in Syria undermined US legitimacy Singh 13-- managing director of The Washington Institute (Michael, U.S. Credibility on Iran at Stake in Syria, The Washington Institute, 6/12, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policyanalysis/view/u.s.-credibility-on-iran-at-stake-in-syria)//BJ Likewise, many analysts were surprised by Hezbollah's open admission of its deep involvement in Syria, because they viewed the group as primarily a Lebanese political party or as engaged in fighting Israel. While both of these are true, they neglect that Hezbollah is more fundamentally a group created to project Iranian power into the Levant, a mission with which its Syrian venture -- as well as its activities in Iraq during the last decade -- is perfectly compatible. Western officials' inattention to this broader picture has real strategic consequences for U.S. interests. No matter how much American policymakers stress that the "military option" is on the table with respect to Iran's nuclear program, Washington's failure to push back on Iranian aggression in Syria, and the European Union's reluctance to penalize Hezbollah for its actions, undercut the credibility of Western warnings . Whatever the view of the West, for Tehran these issues, as well as the West's responses to them, are inextricably connected. And not just for Tehran -- America's allies in the region also see U.S. actions in different theaters as linked, and they view with alarm Washington's passivity in the region. Consequently, American influence is everywhere diminished as friends and foes alike increasingly factor Washington out of policy decisions, and the force of America's allies collectively is reduced as each pursues policies independently not just of the United States but, to a great extent, of one another. Once lost, influence is costly to regain, which gives rise to a vicious cycle. Re-establishing U.S. influence and credibility requires actions that, as crises deepen and multiply, become costlier as time passes, which reinforces the argument against taking them. Nowhere is this more evident than in Syria. Costly interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have soured U.S. officials on further entanglement in the Middle East. But disengaging from the region will only add to the costs of those wars, not compensate for them. One lesson we must learn from those conflicts, however, is to have clear objectives and to pursue them economically. When it comes to Iran, the objective has never been and should not become merely limiting Iranian nuclear activities, but disrupting the strategy of which both the nuclear program and Syria, as well as Iran's asymmetric actions, are parts. A non-nuclear Iran emboldened by victory in Syria remains dangerous. The economical way to begin countering Iran's strategy is not to wait for a last-resort strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, or worse yet to continue offering Iran nuclear concessions in hopes it will bite; rather, it is to press Iran in a place like Syria, where it is far from home and perhaps overextended. Defeating Iranian designs in Syria will not halt Tehran's nuclear ambitions, but it may restore in the eyes of Iranian and allied officials alike the credibility of American power, and force Tehran to reconsider the costs of its strategy. For Iran, Major General Safavi reminds us, has a strategy in the Middle East; the United States must as well.
Impact/Link Turns
Cuba
Constructive engagement is essential to evolve Cubas government Pascual et al. 09 - Vice president and Director of Foreign policy (Carlos, CUBA: A New policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement Institute of Forign Policy at Brookings, 4/9, http://www2.fiu.edu/~ipor/cuba-t/BrookingsCubaReport-English.pdf)//RG This paper proposes a new goal for U.S. policy toward Cuba: to support the emergence of a Cuban state where the Cuban people determine the political and economic future of their country through democratic means. A great lesson of democracy is that it cannot be imposed; it must come from within; the type of government at the helm of the islands future will depend on Cubans. Our policy should therefore encompass the political, economic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of their country. This policy will advance the interests of the United States in seeking stable relationships based on common hemispheric values that promote the well-being of each individual and the growth of civil society. To engage the Cuban government and Cuban people effectively, the United States will need to engage with other governments, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In so doing, U.S. policy toward Cuba would reflect the hemispheres and our own desire to encourage the Cuban government to adopt international standards of democracy, human rights, and transparency. Engagement does not mean approval of the Cuban governments policies, nor should it indicate a wish to control internal developments in Cuba; legitimate changes in Cuba will only come from the actions of Cubans. if the United States is to play a positive role in Cubas future, it must not indulge in hostile rhetoric nor obstruct a dialogue on issues that would advance democracy, justice, and human rights as well as our broader national interests. Perversely, the policy of seeking to isolate Cuba, rather than achieving its objective, has contributed to undermining the well-being of the Cuban people and to eroding U.S. influence in Cuba and latin America. it has reinforced the Cuban governments power over its citizens by increasing their dependence on it for every aspect of their livelihood.. By slowing the flow of ideas and information, we have unwittingly helped Cuban state security delay Cubas political and economic evolution toward a more open and representative government. And, by too tightly embracing Cubas brave dissidents, we have provided the Cuban authorities with an excuse to denounce their legitimate efforts to build a more open society
Venezuela
Positive Engagement with Venezuela is critical for both diplomatic and economic benefit Griffin, 13 Editorial Writer for Harvard University (Jonathan, Engage with Venezuela, The Harvard Crimson, 4/3, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/4/3/Harvard-Venezuela-Chavezdeath/#)//RG When Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez died in early February, his country was thrown into a period of national mourning as the political equilibrium in Latin America hung in the balance. As Venezuela chooses its next president, Washington should seek to reverse the current trend of acrid relations between the two nations and engage with the Venezuelan government in Caracas toward stability and prosperity in the Western hemisphere. While it might seem likely that relations between the United States and Venezuela would naturally improve after the death of the combative Chvez, the opposite now seems more likely. Before passing away, Chvez had handpicked a successor in Nicholas Maduro, who has assumed power in the interim before the presidential election in April. As Chvezs handpicked successor, Maduro has already continued with his mentors trend of using anti-American rhetoric to bring popularity to his government, even declaring that American agents may have infected Chvez with the cancer that killed him. While Washington has officially declared that it is committed to a more functional relationship with Venezuela, its actions have not been consistent with this idea: The United States offered no official condolences for Chvezs death, and both nations have started expelling diplomats from the other. Neither nation, it seems, is steering toward more congenial relations with the other. Admittedly, the United States has good reason to be less than enthused about more Chvez-style governance in Venezuela. Calling himself a 21st-century socialist, Chvez nationalized the lucrative oil industry, developed strong trade and diplomatic relationships with Iran and Cuba, repeatedly decried the United States as an imperialist force, and cooperated with the Iranians in developing nuclear technology. Engaging in petty diplomat-expulsion spats, however, is no way to deal with any of these problems, and it in fact only strengthens the Chavistas hold on their country. The diplomatic and economic opportunities that would stem from greater engagement would far outweigh the meager benefits reaped from our current policies. Diplomatically, positive engagement with Venezuela would be a major step toward building American credibility in the world at large, especially in Latin America. Chvez (along with his friends the Castros in Cuba) was able to bolster regional support for his regime by pointing out the United States attempts to forcibly intervene in Venezuelan politics. Soon, a number of populist governments in Latin America had rallied around Chvez and his anti-American policies. In 2004, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and three Caribbean nations joined with Venezuela and Cuba to form the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America, an organization in direct opposition to the Free Trade Area in the Americas proposed (but never realized) by the Bush administration. Chvez galvanized these nationsmany of whom have experienced American interventionist tacticsby vilifying America as a common, imperial enemy. Unfortunately for the United States, its general strategy regarding Venezuela has often strengthened Chvezs position. Every time Washington chastises Venezuela for opposing American interests or attempts to bring sanctions against the
Latin American country, the leader in Caracas (whether it be Chvez or Maduro) simply gains more evidence toward his claim that Washington is a neocolonialist meddler. This weakens the United States diplomatic position, while simultaneously strengthening Venezuelas. If Washington wants Latin America to stop its current trend of electing leftist, Chavista governments, its first step should be to adopt a less astringent tone in dealing with Venezuela. Caracas will be unable to paint Washington as an aggressor, and Washington will in turn gain a better image in Latin America. Beyond leading to more amicable, cooperative relationships with Latin American nations, engagement with Venezuela would also be economically advisable. With the worlds largest oil reserves, countless other valuable resources, and stunning natural beauty to attract scores of tourists, Venezuela has quite a bit to offer economically. Even now, America can see the possible benefits of economic engagement with Caracas by looking at one of the few extant cases of such cooperation: Each year, thousands of needy Americans are able to keep their homes heated because of the cooperation between Venezuela and a Bostonarea oil company. Engagement with Venezuela would also lead to stronger economic cooperation with the entirety of Latin America. It was mostly through Venezuelas efforts that the United States was unable to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas, an endeavor that would have eliminated most trade barriers among participant nations, thereby leading to more lucrative trade. In a world where the United States and Venezuela were to enjoy normalized relations, all nations involved would benefit from such agreements. For both diplomatic and economic reasons, then, positive engagement is the best course of action for the United States. As it stands, the negative relationship between the countries has created an atmosphere of animosity in the hemisphere, hindering dialogue and making economic cooperation nearly impossible. While there is much for which the Venezuelan government can rightly be criticizedauthoritarian rule, abuse of human rights, lack of market-friendly policiesnothing that the United States is doing to counter those drawbacks is having any effect. The United States should stop playing tough guy with Venezuela, bite the bullet, and work toward stability and prosperity for the entire hemisphere. We arent catching any flies with our vinegarits high time we started trying to catch them with honey.
General
Turn: Nuclear prolif is stabilizing prevents conventional conflict and miscalculation Madison 06 - US Navy Lieutenant, (Peter N ,THE SKY IS NOT FALLING: REGIONAL REACTION TO A NUCLEAR-ARMED IRAN, 3/1 Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA445779)//BJ Owing to the vast destruction nuclear weapons can generate, they have ironically guaranteed security for the nations that possess them. Any attack against a nuclear state carries the risk of provoking a devastating response. Consequently, the benefits and dangers of nuclear weapon proliferation have been debated for decades. Perhaps the most debatable point is whether more nuclear states advance or weaken world security. Naturally, this issue remains moot. Yet, one must concede that the world has judiciously avoided the use of nuclear weapons for sixty years , suggesting the avoidance is attributable to more than luck . Professor Jan Breemer of the Navy War College asserts that at some point , luck loses its random nature and reflects skill .10 / 1. Nuclear Optimists: More May Be Better11 / Nuclear Optimists advocate a gradual increase in the number of nuclear states. They argue that a cautious increase does not correspond to an increased likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used. They further contend that this gradual spread is far better than if it were rapid or nonexistent.12 Supporters point to over sixty years in which deterrence helped prevent nuclear conflict. According to Professor Kenneth Waltz of the University of California at Berkeley, The world has enjoyed more years of peace since 1945 than had been known in modern history.13 Indeed, there has been no general war in this period, in spite of a variety of confrontations that could lead to rapid escalation and conflict.14 Instead nuclear weapons made nuclear war an unlikely possibility.15 / Professor Waltz argues that if deterrence produces the ideal, then the opposite must be correct: not having a clear balance of terror preventing a misstep leads to uncertainty of action by a state. He states that defeated countries like Germany following World War II, which fought conventionally, will at the very worst survive with limited suffering. Nuclear deterrence assures a totality of defeat; therefore, no rational actor will risk destruction.16 Instead of instability and uncertainty, nuclear weapons increase stability and certainty, making miscalculation difficult and politically pertinent predictions easy.17
Impact Defense
Iran
Iran war inevitable Jett 12a retired U.S. ambassador (in Peru and Mozambique), teaches at the School of International Affairs at Penn State University (Dennis, The inevitable war with Iran, PostGazette, 8/26, http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/opinion/perspectives/the-inevitable-warwith-iran-650549/)//BJ Five years ago there was considerable media speculation that the United States was about to bomb Iran to stop its nuclear program. Despite the hype, it was clear that was not going to happen. Times have changed. Now a war with Iran is not imminent, but it is inevitable. And if you liked Iraq, you will love Iran. A war with Iran will be far worse. For starters, Iran has four times the land area and three times the population of Iraq, so it is not a small challenge. While Iraq had no nuclear program, Iran has a well-developed one, which it claims is for peaceful purposes, with 14 different industrial sites supporting it. Some of them are hardened to withstand an attack and are well defended. So an air war to destroy them won't be easy and a ground war is unthinkable, even for the most hawkish chest-thumpers. Another problem is the reaction to an American attack. The Bush administration justified invading Iraq by citing its violations of a number of U.N. resolutions. When the United Nations would not authorize the use of force, the United States then ignored it, robbing the operation of its legitimacy. The United States went ahead anyhow, but 48 countries went along. It was a coalition of the coerced and co-opted, but it gave a fig leaf of international acceptability. If we attack Iran, no country, except perhaps Israel, will be joining us. There will be several Sunni autocrats quietly urging that we hit the Persian Shiites hard, but they will contribute nothing else. No other nation will be willing to kill Iranians and have its forces be killed by them. While the attack will be condemned around the world, its effect in Iran will be even worse. Invading Iraq brought down Saddam Hussein, but an attack on Iran will consolidate the power of the regime in power. The advocates of war say the Iranians will topple their government once it begins. But an attack will only strengthen the grip of the Iranian leadership just as 9/11 did for President George W. Bush. At that point the Iranians will have no reason to hide any intention to build a bomb and every reason for doing so. An air campaign would set back their program by two years at best. So it would not be a few air strikes and then victory parades. It would mean a semi-permanent state of war. And the Iranians will react to being bombed. At a minimum, the unrest and their geographic position on the waterways that carry much of the world's oil will make four dollars for a gallon of gas seem like the good old days. Then there are the unintended consequences. What if the day after the bombing starts an intelligence report comes in saying factions of the Pakistani military were so angered by an American attack on a fourth Muslim country that some of their nuclear weapons have gone missing and may be on their way to being used? Is that an impossible scenario from the hosts of Bin Laden and the planners of the Mumbai terrorist attacks? A recent New York Times article talked about the real possibility of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal falling into the hands of Islamic extremists. But why if a war is such a bad idea, is it inevitable? The answer is domestic politics. If Mitt Romney wins in November, he has already made clear, during the Republican debate in Iowa, that Israel will dictate his policy in the Middle East. And he will need a war, just like Mr. Bush, to distract people from the failure of his economic policies, which are just like Mr. Bush's. If President Barack Obama wins, one might hope for a different outcome. A recent opinion piece in The New York Times was titled "How America Can Slow Israel's March to War." It was written by Dennis Ross. He worked in every administration since Jimmy Carter was president, with the exception of George W. Bush's, and is
thought by many to have never been more than a front man for the Israeli right. His program for postponing war consists of providing political cover for an Israeli attack, providing political support once it happens and providing weapons and more weapons to make it possible. With bunker-busting bombs and midair refueling capabilities donated by the United States, Israel will be able to start a war, but it won't be able to finish one. Invariably the United States will be drawn into the conflict to protect its interests and Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu knows there is a good chance his old friend Mitt won't be moving into the White House. And he knows that once re-elected, his leverage on President Obama will be drastically reduced. So the list has no doubt already been presented to American officials and, in order to avoid a crisis in the midst of an election campaign, promises to fill it have already been made. The article by Mr. Ross is just preparing public opinion for the day the payoff is made. It would be nice to think war could be avoided, but the steps necessary to do that are unlikely to be taken. On the American side, we could offer to open an embassy in Tehran to conduct some real diplomacy rather than shouting at each other through the media. The United States could also recognize that regime change in Iran will come from within and not through saber rattling from abroad. As for Israel, Iran would have no excuse for threatening it if peace were made with the Palestinians. The outline of what a settlement would look like has been on the table since the Clinton administration. Mr. Netanyahu is not Menachem Begin, however, who negotiated an agreement with Egypt with the help of Jimmy Carter. Mr. Netanyahu would rather hold on to power than take a chance on peace -- even if that means a war he can't win and the United States can't avoid.
Heg
History proves American hegemony is unsustainable. Layne, 7 (Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2007 American Empire: A Debate p 63 States are ever-vigilant when it comes to maintaining their security because they want to survive as independent players in international politics. Up to a point, therefore, it is a good thing for a state to be powerful. But when a state becomes too powerful, it frightens others; in self-defense, they seek to offset and contain those great powers that aspire to primacy. And the ironclad lesson of history is clear: states that bid for hegemony (primacy) invariably fail.As Henry A. Kissinger has said, "hegemonic empires almost automatically elicit universal resistance, which is why all such claimants have sooner or later exhausted themselves."34Indeed, the history of modern international politics is strewn with the geopolitical wreckage of states that bid unsuccesfully for primacy: The Hapsburg Empire under Charles V, France under Louis XI V and Napoleon, Victorian Britain, Germany under Hitler. By pursuing a strategy of primacy, the United States today risks the same fate that has befallen other great powers that have striven to dominate the international political system.

Appeasement DA 1 - Michigan7 2013

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Appeasement DADW Lab

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1NC Shell (Cuba)

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1NC Shell (Venezuela)

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1NC Shell (Generic)

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North Korea (Impact)

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A2 Appeasement Good (Appeasement Bad)

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