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Essay Topic: "Describe h~alisation is impacting on China's resource

acquisitions in Sudan."

Subject: Global Business Context

Author: Andrew J. Hook


Student Number: S3253096

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of globalisation on Su~ along with the effects of
heavy Chinese investment in Sudan's resources sector. The changing extent of Chinese
involvement in Sudan, and more widely Africa, are discussed, along with the reasons for
this: future resource supply for China; diplomatic imperatives (such as Taiwan and
supporters wit~ the UN); and, providing a long-term export market for Chinese goods
and service,( Some further geopolitical implications Oftl+ role that China is playing in
Sudan and Africa are discussed, and Hofstede's cul~l dimensions are used to analyse
China's approach to Sudanese resource investment. Risk-avoidance and long-term
orientation were identified as key dimensions in this analysis. /'

BUSM4041 Page 1 of 16 A J Hook, s3253096


Introduction

To the global community, Sudan is commonly linked with the current humanitarian crisis
in Darfur, a region in the west of Sudan, which started in 2003, and continues to this day.
Organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have been vocal
regarding the human rights abuses in DarfuLd the involve~ the Sudanese
government (Amnesty International, 2009). The Unites Stat~ declared Sudan a
"nation that supports terrorism", and ~ banned US companies from operating in areas
in Sudan (US Department of State, 2008). /'

As part of this crisis, China is often singled out for criticism for maintaining good
relations, ongoin~de and arms supply to th~udanese government (Sudan Divestment
Taskforce, 2007; Amnesty International, 2009). Indeed, film director Steven Spielberg
raised Darfur as the reason for a high-profile rejection for assisting the Beijing 2008
Olympics (Washington Post, 20080nd actress Mia Farrow has been notable in
-: /'
publicising the Chinese involvement in Darfur (Guler, 2009; Straits Times, 2007).

The economic, political, social and cultural implications of the situation in Sudan provide
an excellent case~y into how the process of globalisation is affecting developing
nations in Africa. It also incorporates other themes, such as the global role of developing
./

superpowers and shifts in the geopolitical landscape from the 20th century to the 21 st.

The discussion will examine the extent of Chinese current and future involvement in
Sudan and why this is occurring, implications on the geopolitical landscape globally and
also on how cultmal differences may impact-on decisio~proaclresiJetwe-en'------------
Sudan, China and the West. ,,/

Globalisation

Globalisation has been defined as "the shift towards a more ~grated and interdependent
world economy" (Hill, Cronk, and Wickramasekera, 2008). Alternatively, Nayyar (2006)

BUSM4041 Page 2 of16 A J Hook, s3253096


discusses globalisation as being either a process of integration with the world economy,
or a strategic attempt to integrate with the world economy. /"

In this discussion of globalisation, it is helpful to assess the Sudan-Chinese relationship in


the terms of elements of globalisation, such as m~s and production, and in terms of
- -
the drivers of globalisation - trade and investment barriers, technological change and
demo graphics iHill et al, 2008). ~he consequences of globalisation in terms of the
impact on Sudanese jobs, incomes and quality of life are very pertinent in the context of
the civil war between the north and south of Sudan, the ceasefire in 2005 and coexisting
/' /'
governments until 2011, and for the crisis in Darfur (CIA World Factbook, 2004, 2008).

One other background issue that complicates the discussion around China and
globalisation is that China does not operate as a Western-style dem~acy where business
operates in quasi-independence of the government (Woetzel, 2008). China's history and
politics means that most large businesses are currently, or have recently been, 'state-
owned enterprises' (SOEs) (Woetzel, 2008~he implication is that business is often
inseparable from state-driven imperatives, and hence investment by business along
globalisation lines is also governmental investment.~he economic neo-liberalist
overtones of free markets and globalisation apply in limited and non-standard ways when
discussing Chinese involvement in globalisation (Mohan and Power, 2008)./

In a similar vein, the lack of a free market and emergi~pportunities for private
investment, such as an infant sharemark~IMF, 2009), observer status with the World
Trade Organisation (WTO) (WTO, 2009), and the beginning concepts of widely held
plivate oWllelship oflalld (MOOle;-ze~O make-Sudan's expelielIc·p-e~w<nitt1tlh--l----------
globalisation different from the Western economies. /

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To What Extent has Sudan Embraced Globalisation?

In terms of the elements of globalisation, Sudan has been slowly opening its markets
-:
since its independence in 1956. The older (prior to 1980) bilateral trade agreements have
been with predominantly Eu an countries, such as Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland
7
and France (UNCTAD, 2006). Later bilateral treaties have focused on the Arab world
and other Islamic countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, along with other major
economies such as India and China, with the majority of these signed in the last decade
/'
(UNCT AD, 2006). However, the US has not signed any agreements with Sudan, and
has designated Sudan as a "state sponsor for terrorism", along with legislation to divest
assets frojP--Companiesoperating in certain areas of Sudan (D.S. Department of State,
2008).

Sudan is currently classed as a World Trade Organisation (WTO) observer, which


comp~e observer country to commence accession proceedings after five years (WTO;
2009). Sudan commenced the proceedings in 1994, and has been working through the
-:
process since (WTO, 2009). Sudan is also a member of various agreements and forums,
such as a partnership agreement between;he European Union and Africa, Caribbean and
Pacific Group States (UNCTAD, 2006), Arab and Islamic agreements regarding
,/'
investment and capital (UNCTAD, 2006), and the China-Africa Cooperation Forum
/'

(CACF) (Shinn, 200-r;Bahgat, 2007). Bahgat (2007) also notes that 'Sudan has also been
invited to OPEC meetings as an observer since 2001 illustrating its emergent status as an
oil exporter'<Tn 2006 and 2007, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) f0:Judan has increased
by around 11% and a similar level is projected for 2008 (IMF, 2007).
,/'

In terms of Adam Smith's "invisible hand" concepts (Hill et al, 2008), Sudan's strengths
with respect to production are around oil, and some minerals (CIA World Factbook,
2008r,;ithough_~~~ific~~t investment has been_~nd \V~~_b_e
require~ t~~ccess !hese
assets .../'The current stated oil reserves are 6.6 billion barrels of oil as of 2006 (Bahgat,
/ ./
2007; CIA World Factbook, 2008). Bahgat (2007) also notes that the quality of the oil,
»:
and access, is generally good, with oil reserves being land-based. Transportation and

BUSM4041 Page 4 of 16 A J Hook, 83253096


access to international markets from a logistical basis is also attractive'LFrom a military
point of view, Sudan's government has imported significant levels of arms, using about

80% of its oil revenues in the early 2000's for purchasing arms, and China has been a
. ,/ /'
major supplier (Sudan Divestment Taskforce, 2007; Washington Post, 2004). Sudan has

also invested in weapons manufacture, and has claimed self-sufficiency in small to large
/
weapons manufacture (Sudan Divestment Taskforce, 2007).

Implementation of technological improvements has been slow in Sudan, with 80% of the

labour force still focused in agriculture, and low labour force participation in
/
manufacturing (CIA World Factbook, 2008). Indicators of modern communications,

such as mobile phone penetration and internet use are comparatively high, at 7.5 million
telephones for 41 million inhabitants, and internet access is estimated at 1.5 million users
/'

respectively (CIA World Factbook, 2008). Older technological devices such as fixed-line

telephony and television are at much lower levels - at 345,000/in lines and 3 television
stations (although 1997 figures) (CIA World Factbook, 2008). This suggests that Sudan

has jumped the traditional infrastructure directly to a sophisticated communications grid,

although cellular networks are concentrated on the major cities (CIA World Factbook,
2008)./There is also concern that the technological skills-transfer between Chinese FDI

or Chinese nationals to the Sudanese is not being pursued to any large degree (Sudan
-:
Divestment Taskforce, 2007), despite overall African commitments made by China
(Shinn, 2007). /'

Although globalisation processes within Sudan are at a comparatively lower level than

de~elo.pe~ countries, it is wo.rth noting ~~::e is similar sentime~t to o~her anti- .


-------cgrhlOrrlD~a:tthl'::s~a·trorrmovelllents (HIll et aI, 20 . -ats-are-concemed wlth-ehines=e'--f1f7o""~.m--......--------

nationals taking the high-paying r~s and taking small business roles (Large, 2008;

Sudan Divestment Taskforce, 2007). Dumping of Chinese goods into a nascent

cO~I?!rcial secto~_in Sud~n is gener~ing caJls ~o~J~rotectio~ for lo~~!_~u~~nese in~EstrL


(Large, 2008( Operating in unstable and developing countries also presents risk, and
there have been recent attacks, kidnappings and murders committed on Chinese nationals
• t"'I 1 ""~1 T"'" • t ""'AAO/
m sucan ~1ne cconorms , LUU~7.

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Extent of Trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Sudan

Total foreign direct investment (FDI) in Sudan has increased substantially in the years
1995-2009. In the years 1985-1995, the FDI inward flows were an average ofUS$8
million, with FDI stock increasing at around the US$l 00 million mark (UNCTAD, World
,/' /'
Investment Report, 2004 and 2008). As of2007, FDI inward flows had increased to
US$2.4 billion (with 2006 even higher, at US$3.5 billion), and FDI stock at US$13.8
billion (UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2004 and 2008)~

Chinese investment in Sudan has grown significantly in the last decade, from less than
1% of African FDI investment to over 22% of Chinese FDI in Africa (UNCTAD, 2001).
China and Sudan established diplomatic ties in 1959 (Chinese Government Official
->
Portal, 2009), and China established a bilateral trade agreement in 1997 with Sudan
.>
(UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2004).

In 2008, bilateral trade was standing at US$8.2 billion (Chinese Government Official
Portal, 2009), although many sources point out that published figures are difficult to
verify and may include other forms of inter-country fmancial instruments (UNCTAD,
200~um et al 20090upporting this, Lum et al. (2009)~ficallY note that: 'many
PRC (People's Republic of China) economic investments abroad can be counted as aid
rather than foreign direct investment because they are secured by official bilateral
agreements, do not impose real financial risks upon the PRC companies involved, or do
/ »>:
not result in Chinese ownership of foreign assets". Kaplinsky and Morris (2009) describe
a typical process whereby the Chinese EXIM bank provides a low-cost line of credit to
~~~~~~-A-frican-states, Chinese films terrderfot the business, with-successfn-I--ten:derers~ha~vt1linn·go--~~~~~~
funds transferred within Chin>and the payment for the loans being a drawdown on /
commodity exports to China. Hence external transparency of this process is very low.

Sudanese tariff barriers and duties are being reported under WTO guidelines (WTO,
2008), with highest levels of tariffs being on agricultural goods, and lower levels of
manufactured goods (WTO, 2009(iocal production of agricultural goods uses around

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80% of the labour force, and manufactured goods around 7% of the labour force (CIA
-:

World Factbook, 2008), suggesting that the existing tariff approach is designed to protect
local agricultural enterprise and encourage importing of manufactured goods.

Why is China investing in Sudan?

Original Chinese investments in Africa can be viewed as "third-world solidarity" in terms


of political ties with the decolonisation of Africa and the Cold War, demonstrated by the
Bandung Conference of Non-aligned nations in 1955 (Kaplinsky and Morris, 200~

More recent reasons for investment in Africa were around state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) investing in resources and infrastructure, which is now being followed by more
private-sector ent~ses, often building on the services needed for the SOEs (Kaplinsky
and Morris, 2009). The main areas of foreign direct investment from China in Sudan are
in oil, minerals and some sm~usiness supporting Chinese investments in Sudan
(Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009). Shinn (2007)~0 suggests while the current imperatives
are resources-driven and diplomatic, the Chinese leadership has also identified Africa as
a long-term prospect for exports and investment outside of resources. US Congressional
hearings regarding current Chinese investment strategies in Africa suggest that
investment is driven mainly by resource39'Pply and diplomatic imperatives (Lum,
Fischer, Gomez-Granger, Leland, 2009).

-:
As an oil consumer, China became a net importer of oil in 1993 (Bahgat, 2007). As of
2006, China b7e the third-largest global importer of oil, behind the US and Japan
-------A(BR-ahgat;-2007). China's demandis-projected to inclease fr~.6 million barrets-perday
in 2003 to 15 million barrels per day in 2030 (Bahgat, 2007). A~2007, around)9%-
60% of Sudan's oil is supplied directly to China (Hanson, 2008; Bah~ 2007), with
____ ~ _~ ~_udan_m~king~p_Cl~ound1.~~ ofChina'.s ~jJimport~.f!lCl!?-~at~29Q}).__ ._ _ __ _.

With the increased stability in the south of Sud/, China is actively looking for further
investment opportunities (The Monitor, 2008). China has suppiied the Government of

BUSM4041 Page 7 of 16 A J Hook, s3253096


South Sudan with a $300 million loan, and in response, the South Sudanese have toured
China and made reassurances that China's oil investments were secure according to the
provisions of the peace agreement between north and south (Large, 2008).' Proven oil
reserves have been increasing over the last decade,.>
suggesting that further oil reserves are
available with increased exploration (Bahgat, 2007).

Geopolitical Landscape

Although Western firms, such as Chevron, Total, and Arakis, were first into Sudan in the
1980s, stability and political differences have meant that China was the only major
/
country to invest in Sudan from the 1990s onward (Guler, 2009; UNCTAD Country
->
Profile, 2006). During the 1990s China has adhered to a foreign policy around Deng's
/
"24-character strategy" (Klein-Ahlbrandt and Small, 2008), being:

"Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities /d I
{,
bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership. "

-:
Lum et al (2009) also note "only four of 48 sub-Saharan African countries ... still maintain
official relations with Taiwan". In a similar fashion, Sudan reciprocates: "Sudan fully
supports the Chinese government's measures to deal with the [Uygur Autonomous
Region] incident" (Chinese Government Official Portal, 2009)(

While China has historically pursued an attitude of political non-interference with nation
-:

states (Large, 2008), the US has had a mo~ctive foreign policy, through sanctions, by
direct missile attack in 1998 (Large, 2008), by freezing overseas assets of certain high-
--------rI anking-Sud-anese go'VeInment-figuIes, and Iegards the cUIIentPresident-onft'-SSnurldalaIn-l,--iO"lnn't':'IaITI-----
El-Bashir, as a war criminal (US Department of State, 2008). /'

~
Klein-Ahlbrandt and Small (2008) discuss the changing approach over the last two or
three years of the Chinese government to international relations. China's pressure on the
Sudanese government to accept a joint African Union - United Nations peacekeeping

BUSM4041 Page 8 of 16 A J Hook, s3253096


force in Darfur was an example of how China appears to be taking a more lead role in
global challenges (People's Daily Online, 2007)~owever, they point out that:

"China's shifting diplomacy reflects not afundamental change in its values, but a new
perception of national interests ...Beijing is not subordinating its economic aims to other
goals; it is simply devising more sophisticated means to secure them. "

Sudan can also be considered along with Angola, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of
Congo and Chad as formi~ corridor of oil-supplying and mineral-bearing countries,
with contiguous borders. Angola also supplies 20% of China's oil imports, and has
recently been admitted as a member of OPEC (Bahgat, 2007fchina is in a process of
setting up "Strategic Economic Zones" (SEZ's) in Africa to allow mineral resources to be
moved from point of extraction to China vi~r-es Salaam in Tanzania, rather than via
sea-routes from West Africa (Davies, 2008). Similarly, Chinese companies are building a
US$1.15 billion railway connection from Khartoum to Port Sudan (Sudan Tribune,
2007~

The China-Africa Cooperation Forum (CACF), where Chinese and African leaders meet
every three years to discuss improving economic relations, has provided a counterpoint to
US and European interests and influence (Shinn, 2007). China has also initiated other
related cultural and develoP/t aid, and paralleling the US Peace Corps with "youth
volunteers" (Lum et al, 2009).

\
From an African point of view, Sudan is one of a large number of countries that are
starting down the road to mOle--mudenrpol~at-systems and-capitalist economies /'
(Moore, 2001; Bigsten and Durevall, 2003). The issues of foreign debt (IMF, 2007) and
continued involvement by former colonial powers, along with underdeveloped resou~,
have been argued by many authors to be a state of arrested development (Moore, 2001;
----
------ -- --Z-------~ -------'>:':---- - - --
Bigsten and Durevall, 2003; Sandbrook and Romano, 2004).

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Moore (2001) concludes that the" ... the imposition of neoliberalism, in the absence of
geostrategically grounded alternatives means that the hurdles on the road to modernity
are nearly insurmountable."~gsten and Durevall (2003) are more optimistic, but agree
that because the idea of a "country" or a "state" has been imposed by others, rather than _ ~
developed; the loyalty of citizens is to other groups rather than the stat6urther, the
method by which elites retain power in African countries is to support their supporters,
,.----
and the fragility of power thus limits the policy options available to them (Bigsten and
Durevall, 2003; M~e, 2001)./

Cultural Implications

An analysis of cultural differences might provide some insight into the relationship
between China and Sudan, and also the way in which China and the West are dealing
with the issues of Darfur and more broadly, the strains of developing economies in
Africa. /

Notwithstanding th/ments around the validity of Hofstede's work on cultural norms


(McSweeney, ~), the examination of differences and similarities in Hofstede's indices
(Hofstede, 2009; Hill et al, 2008) between East African/Arab World, China and the
Western Nations - US and Australia as examples - may provide a way to view this
.. ~
situation.

/'
Hofstede (2009) does not provide information regarding Sudan, however the composition
of Sudan could reasonably be seen as a composite of the "Arab World" and of "East
/
Africa". The composition of Sudan's ethnic group-s-rs-preumnirnrntlybtacXi5-2%)and
Arab (39%), and religious groupings are split between Sunni Muslim 70% (in north),
Christian 5% (mostly in south and Khartoum), and indigenous beliefs 25% (CIA World

-~~
Factbook,
~ .
2008):rhe ~official languages are Arabic and English, with a program of -~~---~--_.
--------.-~----~------~---~--~.

"Arabization" in process (CIA World Factbook, 2008). Based on this information, it is


reasonable to assume that the cultural factors are similar to "The Arab World", and
especially when the ruling groups are Islamic Arabs. /

BUSM4041 Page 10 of 16 A J Hook, 83253096


Hofstede's Dimensions

140

120

100

I!lArabWorld ••
80
IIAustralia
Cl East Africa ••
CChina •.
iO
• United States

40

20

PDI IDV MAS UAI LTO


Category

Legend: PDI:Power Distance Index - IDV:Individualism - MAS:Masculinity - UAI:


Uncertainty Avoidance Index - LTO: Long-term Orientation

-:
Figure 1: Hofstede's Dimensions for Selected Countries (Hofstede, 2009)

Referring to Figure 1, it can be seen that there are parallels between China and "Sudan"
(as an East Africa/Arab World combination), and also some significant differences:-The
power distance index is high in both Sudan and China, but low in the Western countries, /
and likewise individualism is 10 ·n Sudan nd China, but high in the Western countries.
Interestingly, China is very diffe! ent ~ the other comparison countries when it
deals with uncertainty and risk, an the very noticeable tendency for long-term I ./
onentation,

/ /
Guler (2009) and Klein-Ahlbrandt and Small (2008) suggest that the US Government's
__ ~____ .. ,n212rQach_C.'lb~_dire~ta12pI.PJ!gh".1...dJl..riugJh~BJJ£.hJl.dministration
tp...J2arfuJ,.Ill1d_en...gllgiug_
»:
with China over the region, was not particularly successful. The direct approach to
~
influencing China relies on convincing China to use its influence to force the Sudanese
government to prevent the spread of conflict in the south and also in Darfur (Lum et al,

BUSM4041 Page 11 of 16 A J Hook, s3253096


~. .> ~
2009;!gein-Ahlb~t and Small, 2008; Richardson, 2007; Sudan Divestment Taskforce,
2007; Guler, 2009): The current ceasefire agreement with the rebels in the south is
holding, but a separate conflict on the western border in Darfur is continuing (CIA World
»:
Factbook, 2008). However, as m~ned previously, Klein-Ahlbrandt and Small (2008)------
and Christensen and Swan (2008), amongst many other commentators have noted a
recent change in China's stance over the last few year~

Considering Hofstede's indices on risk aversion and long-term orientation, the previous
Chinese approach to Sudan, and the recent change, appear to be wholly consistent:
/~

China's aims of long-term supply of oil and resources (Bahgat, 2007),


... ..
and maintaining
pressure on governments to, ~instance, maintain diplomatic embargoes on Taiwan
(Christens en and Swan, 2008) have probably achieved the majority of its aims with the
North Sudanese government:The application of the US's ban on companies investing in
~
Sudan presents a market opportunity for China (Shinn, 2007), and this approach could be
argued to be encouraging China's investment in Sudan (Chinese Governmental Website
Portal, 2009r.-However, the change from China being a minor regional power, where
previously risk was managed by providing economic ~ngthening of an undemocratic
military regime (Sudan Divestment Taskforce, 2007; Amnesty International, 200~ to a
superpower moving to protecting growing assets and infrastructure in Sudan, and Africa
in general, require a modification to the previous Chinese foreign policy approach
/ ./
(Mohan and Power, 2008; Klein-Ahlbrandt and Small, 2008).

-:

Davies (2008) points out that significant strategic Chinese investment in Africa, including
Sudan, is being used to provide resource transportation and supply chain infrastructure on
~
a "grand scale". This is an exceHent example-oftrow China's Iisk-averse-cuhure-~
long-term orientation is influencing how China operates, and deals with other cultures.
Even ~ long-standing principle of strong support of existing states (Mohan and Power,
________
. .__30~8)~!?;!in~t th~ pre~<li.!ing_(liplo~~!ic..~I"!~~~~xy
~£~~ks ~o!h~C~~~~~e~~!tural
dimension of uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation. »>

BUSM4041 Page 12 of 16 A J Hook, s3253096


Conclusion

In a submission to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on


African Affairs in 2008, Thomas J. Christensen commented:

"In general, we see China's growing activity on the continent as a potentially positive /
force for economic development there, which is a goal we share ...policy differences
should come as no surprise given the two countries very different demographic and
economic conditions, histories and political systems. "

The nascent state of many African states, including Sudan, suggests that globalisation, as
championed by the WTO and developed nations, has a different meaning in Africa:"The
involvement of China as a source of economic stability and continuing demand, and also
its respect for existing geopolitical states, suggests that there is an opportunity to develop
a new model for developing African nations. ,/

Underlying the concept of globalisation however, Moore (200sr:eflects that:

"Globalisation literature ... is devoted largely to the advanced capitalist portion of the
global political economy, where all the indices of product integration, shrinking distance,
and the advance of the "informationalisation mode of production" are on the
increase ... Globalisation is different in Africa. There the birth of capitalism and
modernity is starting all over again. "

China is using its bilateI al tlade agl eements amt-i:ntematiol1atlyunpuputarapprmrch~o


achieve its own resource supply and diplomatic ends:' The poor humanitarian outcomes
in many African states, and China's potential influence on these same states, suggests
____!~at an e_nga~ementvvith Chi~a,~d~ressin~!~e ~nder!yin!treason~ior China's resource
acquisitions and investments, may provide a constructive and perhaps more long-term
I-r-..>
approach for the West to achieve.Jheir own diplomatic goals, and provide better outcomes
for the Sudanese people.

BUSM4041 Page 13 of 16 A J Hook, s3253096


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/
BUSM4041 Page 14 of 16 A J Hook, s3253096
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th
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